DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Headquarters, 3d Battalion (Airmobile) 187th Infantry
101st Airborne Division (Airmobile)
APO San Francisco 96383

AVDG-CD-C

7 MARCH 1970

SUBJECT: Combat After Action Report: Operation RANDOLPH GLEN (U)

Commanding Officer
3rd Brigade, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile)
ATTN: AVDG-CA-E
APO San Francisco 96383

1. (U) NAME OF OPERATION: RANDOLPH GLEN

2. (U) DATE OF OPERATION: 070001 DEC 69 - Continuing (This report as of:
142400 FEB 70).

3. (C) LOCATION: Phong Dien District, Thua Thien Province. Map reference:
Vietnam: Hai Lang, 1:50,000, Sheet 6442 II, Series L7014a;

4. (C) CONTROL HEADQUARTERS: 3d Battalion (Airmobile), 187th Infantry.

5. (C) REPORTING OFFICER: LTC Herbert Y. Schandler.

6. (C) TASK ORGANIZATION:

a. Task organization at the start of the operation:

A/3/187th
FO 2/319th Arty
3 - Kit Carson Scouts
1 - Interpreter

B/3/187th
FO 2/319th Arty
3 - Kit Carson Scouts

C/3/187th
FO 2/319th Arty
2 - Kit Carson Scouts

D/3/187th
FO 2/319th Arty
1 - 81mm Mort Sqd (DS)
3 - Kit Carson Scouts

E/3/187th (-)
Mort plt (-)
Rcn plt (-)
Gnd Surv (-)
2 - Interpreters

GROUP 4

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD DIR 5200.10
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Bn Control
Mort plt
Rcn plt
Cnd Surv
2 - Interpreters
2 - Brigade Action Teams
3 - Mobile Training Teams (eff 19 LEC 69)

b. Attachments and Detachments: 58th Infantry Platoon, Scout Dog and 577th Combat Tracker Teams, as required.

7. (C) SUPPORTING FORCES:

a. Army Aviation: The support provided by Army Aviation in fulfilling US/GVN support requirements proved invaluable and outstanding during the reporting period. Requirements for Army Aviation included aircraft for command and control, Eagle Flights, visual reconnaissance, combat assaults, relocation of refugees, flame drops, medevac, resupply, and rocket fire support. A total of 372.9 hours of command and control aircraft enabled commanders and district officials to make frequent visits to field locations. Eagle Flights permitted an immediate reaction response to intelligence or visual sightings. Additionally, the integration of GVN elements with Eagle Flights permitted a quick-check method of interrogating civilians moving during daylight hours. Visual reconnaissance aircraft were used to recon proposed locations for units, radar raids, cordons, LZ and PZ's for unit moves and liaison visits to US/GVN locations. Combined US/GVN combat assaults were conducted as well as US insertions and extractions. Civilian refugees were relocated using Army Aviation to avoid boobytrapped areas. To expedite boobytrap clearing operations, 106 CH-47 sorties were flown dropping 1,001 fougasse barrels to burn vegetation away in order that ground troops could more easily find and destroy these anti-personnel mines. A side effect was the detonation of mines and boobytraps by the flames alone. Medevac was used to evacuate US and GVN casualties. The aeromedical evacuation of GVN personnel was a well respected asset by GVN civilian and military forces, and undoubtedly served to foster pro US/GVN attitudes among the population. Dispersal of US/GVN forces in an AO which encompassed approximately 350 square kilometers, dictated extensive use of aerial resupply. Normally 47 separate locations were resupplied using an average of 12 UH-1 sorties daily. Gun ships were used to prepare LZ's for the insertion of recon teams and radar teams. Close liaison between US and GVN counterparts and supporting aviation units coupled with efficient LZ and PZ operations resulted in optimum Army Aviation support during the reporting period.

b. US Air Force: 3/187th Inf contacts with the enemy during the reporting period were limited to small unit actions in or near populated areas, thus negating a requirement for the employment of TAC Air support. Moreover, a major portion of the AO was located outside the specified strike zone. TAC Air was used on two occasions in conjunction with mine and DDT clearing operations. TAC Air napalm drops did not provide desired accuracy or results as compared to the efficiency of CH-47 flame drops. Therefore, TAC Air was discontinued in favor of the CH-47 flame drops for mine and DDT clearing operations.
c. Artillery: Light artillery batteries and a battery of Aerial Rocket Artillery supported the 3d during the reporting period. Both 105mm, 155mm and 8" artillery were employed to neutralize enemy positions and interdict his movement, support units in contact, prep LZ's, and to provide illumination. During the period, H&I missions were fired in an effort to channelize the enemy into friendly ambush locations. H&I fires accounted for the interdiction of one enemy element on 31 JAN 70. This interdiction was verified during interrogation of a PW captured on 7 FEB 70, who stated that five members of his cell had been wounded by artillery on 31 JAN 70. Coordination of artillery fires and infantry mortars provided planned and on call fires for key US/GVN installations and strategic bridge locations along QL-l. During TET, officer-led FO parties were maintained on all major bridges in the AO. In addition to supporting tube artillery fires, Aerial Rocket Artillery was employed in conjunction with "flame drops" and TAC Air napalm strikes to destroy and uncover boobytraps in support of the battalion's mission to assist the district refugee resettlement program. The flexibility and effectiveness of ARA to support ambush contacts added immeasurably to the efficiency of the artillery fires supporting the battalion.

d. Engineer: Numerous enemy anti-personnel and anti-vehicular mines employed in the battalion AO presented a constant hazard to civilian movement and friendly military operations. Engineer mine sweeps were used extensively prior to vehicular movement off of QL-l. Engineer mine detection teams augmented mine and boobytrap clearing operations in the northern portion of the AO preparatory to resettlement of district refugees scheduled during the next reporting period. Upgrading of Routes 555 and 599 leading from QL-l to the resettlement area were 50% complete at the end of the reporting period. Boston Whaler boats with crews supported battalion conducted river patrols and check points.

e. Communications: The primary source of command and control communications within the battalion was provided by FM radio, (PRC-25, PRC-77, and VRC-46). A shortage of long antennas for the PRC-25, somewhat restricted CP locations to areas where communications could be maintained. The battalion TOC, co-located with Phong Dien District Headquarters, communicated with brigade and battalion rear (Camp Evans), using FM and VHF (two common user circuits, one point to point (Bn/BDE-operations/intelligence) and one MARS channel). PRC-88 squad radios, were employed successfully.

8. (U) INTELLIGENCE: (See Inclosure 1, Intelligence).

9. (C) MISSION: Conduct offensive operations emphasizing reconnaissance and ambush in order to deny the enemy access to the populated areas and support the GVN accelerated pacification program while upgrading local GVN forces through training and combined operations.

10. (C) Concept of the Operation: 3/187th Infantry continues offensive operations to assist GVN agencies with pacification efforts in AO; continues advisory, training and liaison mission with GVN forces; denies the enemy
access to the people and resources of AO; coordinate the entire effort of all forces in the area through OPCON, integration of forces and close coordination of independent unit operations in AO.

11. (C) EXECUTION:

a. The 3/187th Inf initiated Operation RANDOLPH GLEN without interruption of tactical and training operations in progress at the termination of Operation REPUBLIC SQUARE. Execution of the battalion's dedicated mission during the period covered by this report comprised two general phases. During the first phase (070001 DEC 69 - 232400 JAN 70) the battalion conducted unilateral and combined training and tactical operations. Combined training and operations involved co-locating a US Company with an RF Company for approximately a three week period to conduct an 84 hour program of formal instruction. Daily combined operations were employed extensively in order that US soldiers could demonstrate, by example, those teaching points stressed during training. Brigade Action Teams, formed from the battalion resources during REPUBLIC SQUARE, trained with RF platoons and provided civic action assistance to local hamlets usually for periods of one month at each location. During the second phase (240001 JAN - 142400 FEB 70) execution of the battalion's training mission was modified by the deployment of both US and RF Companies to provide increased protection for the population and key GVN installations during TET. Combined operations continued without interruption during the entire reporting period.

b. On 5 JAN 70, B Co moved into the north western portion of the district to begin clearing operations. The single most important innovation of the clearing operation was the flame drop (See para 7a above). Over 1,000 barrels of jellied gasoline were dropped by CH-47 helicopter in the resettlement area to detonate and expose mines and boobytraps. Seven secondary explosions occurred. During the reporting period 67 boobytraps were found in the resettlement area. Of these 67, 15 were detonated causing the following casualties: 3/187: 17 WIA, and 1 KIA; VN RF/PF: 9 WIA, and 3 KIA; Vietnamese civilians: 12 WIA, and 1 KIA; B Co 326 Engr Bn and M. C. personell: 5 WIA, and 2 KIA.

7 December (General Situation):

Bn Control: The battalion TOC was co-located with district staff at Phong Dien District Headquarters (YD529345). Bn rear and trains operated from Camp Evans (YD5431). Brigade Action Teams (BAT), conducted combined training and tactical operations and participated in civic action projects in Uu Thuong with the 016 PF Plt (YD5036) and Hien Luong with the 021 PF Plt (YD6331).

A Co: Provided security for the Bn TOC and conducted patrolling and ambushes in AO.

B Co: Conducted combined training and tactical operations with the 224 RF Co in AO and provided security for an MGB 11 worksite at the Pho Trach Bridge (YD519348).

C Co: Conducted combined training and tactical operations with the 360 RF Co in AO.
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D Co: Conducted combined training and operations with the 154 RF Co in AO and provided security for the Song Bo Railroad Bridge (YD612278).

E Co: Provided GS in the Bn AO employing organic Recon, Radar, and 81mm mortar support.

7 DEC 69: A 2½ ton truck, moving the 1st plt of D Co to relieve the 2nd plt, detonated a boobytrapped 155mm Arty round at YD12292. The truck was heavily damaged but there were no casualties. Recon plt (-), in coordination with eight members of the District FF Special Squad, combat assaulted vic YD591440 and joined four inland waterway naval patrol boats for insertion into ambush locations at YD532166, YD521469, and YD515463. A patrol from the 237 RF Co ambushed seven VC at 2150 hours (YD95444) with negative results.

8 DEC 69: Recon plt (-) and the FF Special Squad discovered several bunkers while patrolling from the previous night's ambush locations. Demolitions were requested and delivered by helicopter at 1555 hours. While departing the LZ the helicopter was fired on from three locations (YD512165, YD513470, and YD514471), receiving one hit. ARA and Navy patrol boats engaged all three enemy locations with negative results. C Co terminated combined training and operations with the 360 RF Co, and subsequently discovered a 155mm arty round at YD560300. It was evident that the round was to be boobytrapped but the triggering device had not been installed.

10 DEC 69: The 3rd plt, B Co discovered and destroyed a boobytrapped 82mm round at YD479349.

11 DEC 69: The combined TOC coordinated air moves of three RF Co's i.e., the 222 RF Co was moved to Xom Chua (YD493145); the 237 RF Co to Huong Dien District (YD590455); and the 129 RF Co to Phong Dien District Headquarters. This reflected a change in RF group organization. Combined operations being conducted on 10 and 11 DEC 69 by D Co and the 154 RF Co, forced seven VC attempting to attend a meeting with the C-114 LF Co in Quang Dien District on 10 DEC 69, to remain in Dong Lam hamlet (YD5630). Having failed to accomplish their mission, the VC departed Dong Lam enroute back to the mountainous area to the south. Combined ambush patrols (D Co and 154 RF) engaged two members of the VC group at 1910 hours (YD656303) killing one and capturing one AK-47. The remaining five VC were ambushed by another combined patrol at 2118 hours (YD654307) killing one VC and capturing two AK-47's. At 2331 Companies A, C, and D (-) and the 154 RF Co (-) completed a cordon of Ap Pho Ninh (YD6021). The 153 RF Co and DEOCC representatives were positioned by 120800 DEC 69 when the sweep began. Significant totals included: 995 persons screened, 990 received refreshments, 1,009 viewed movies (mostly children too young to screen), and 516 received MEDCAP. Thirteen suspects were detained (11 released - 2 VCI). The cordon terminated at 121445 DEC 69.

12 DEC 69: A Bn recon team detonated a boobytrap (YI426125) at 0750 hours resulting in two WIA. The same team discovered and destroyed two additional boobytraps (YI527426) at 0840 hours. B Co terminated combined training and operations with the 224 RF Co.

14 DEC 69: B Co discovered and destroyed a boobytrapped grenade at YI483346.
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16 DEC 69: At 2035 hours Companies A and B and the 156 and 185 RF Companies completed a cordon of My Xuyon (YL4740). The S2 and DIOCC representatives were positioned by 171030 DEC 69 when the sweep began. Significant totals included: 501 persons screened, 510 received refreshments, 475 viewed movies, and 326 received MEDCAP. The cordon terminated at 1337 hours. Seven persons were detained; one VCI and six later released. At 2320 hours, one VC was engaged by a member of the 150 PF platoon while attempting to cross QL-1 vicinity YD539338 to reach the Con Son refugee hamlet (1½ km SE of Phong Dien District Headquarters). As the lone VC withdrew back across QL-1 he was engaged by the PF platoon. Four VC returned fire (two B-40 rockets and AK-47 fire) into the hamlet resulting in five civilians KIA, one civilian, two PF WIA, and two houses damaged. A first light sweep recovered one AK-47 magazine and a B-40 rocket.

18 DEC 69: The 1st plt, C Co discovered four boobytraps inside a radius of 30 meters at YD638318. Two were 60mm mortars, one was a 105mm arty round, and one an M-16. All were sighted visually, had trip wire firing devices and were blown in place.

20-21 DEC 69: The third platoon of C Co ambushed a group of enemy in the vicinity of Dong Lam (see 11 DEC 69 entry) on 20 DEC 69. The sequence of the contact is outlined below:

202225 - 3/C/3-187 ambush reports lights and movement at YD555307.

202349 - 3/C/3-187 reports engaging 50 VC moving southwest at YD554305. (The enemy returned a heavy volume of small arms fire and ran toward and through friendly ambush locations. A small but undetermined number of the enemy fled northeast back toward Dong Lam).

202350 - TOC requests ARA.

210004 - ARA on station.

210022 - Flareship on station.

210045 - Air Force flareship on station.

210102 - ARA departs.

210245 - VC captured by C Co ambush.

210833 - Cordon of Dong Lam positioned.

Results of Cordon

Screened - 747; MEDCAP - 510; Received refreshments - 369;
Detained - 8 (3 males, 5 females, and 4 children).
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2114:15 - Cordon terminated.

Final Results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VC KIA</th>
<th>VC WIA</th>
<th>VC PW</th>
<th>Detainees</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(seven released and one held as VCI).

The PW reported that the unit in Dong Lam had consisted of 23 NVA and 7 VC. They had departed Dong Lam en route to the mountains south of QL-1. B Co reported movement vic YD5033 at 1953 hours. Small arms were employed with the enemy returning fire. ARA and illumination were employed. The enemy fired 30 RPG rounds at the 224 RF Co positions. ARA received green tracer fire. ARA was on station for five hours providing direct fire support. B Co moved into blocking positions and artillery provided blocking fires. Sweeps by the 1st plt, B Co and the 224 RF Co resulted in finding one blood trail. There were negative friendly casualties.

24 DEC 69: A Christmas truce was observed 241800-251800 DEC 69. No violations occurred.

26 DEC 69: B Co and C Co commenced combined training and operations with the 185, and 156 RF Co's respectively. At 2025 hours Companies C, D, and the 156, 185, and 222 RF Co's completed a cordon of Thuong An (YD6029). A sweep of the hamlet began 270837 DEC 69 with members of the DIOCC screening 591 persons. The cordon terminated at 271336 DEC 69. Significant totals included: 965 received refreshments; 246 received MEDCAP and eight were detained and later released. D Co terminated combined training and operations with the 154 RF Co and commenced combined training with the 222 RF Co.

28 DEC 69: At 0627 hours Companies A, B, and the 185 and 154 RF Co's completed a soft cordon of Dong Lam. Thirty civilians were screened, 21 of which received MEDCAP, and three being detained and later released.

31 DEC 69: A New Year's truce was observed 311800 DEC 69-011800 JAN 70. No violations occurred.

4 JAN 70: A recon team detonated a boobytrapped grenade at YD543452 resulting in two WIA. Fifteen VC were reported to have entered Trach Hau hamlet (YD518355) to propagandize and collect rice.

5 JAN 70: On this date B Co and the 185 RF Co conducted a combined operation in the area destined to be resettled by some 10,000 refugees during 1970 (YD5043). It was also the beginning of possibly one of the most extensive mine clearing operations of its type in the Division's history. Phong Dien District S2 received a Chieu Hoi.

6 JAN 70: Chieu Hoi received on 5 JAN 70 accompanied a PF platoon on a cordon of Duc Tich (YD5337) at 0600 hours. The cordon terminated at 1100 hours resulting in six VCI being evacuated to Hue.
7 JAN 70: A recon team detonated a booby trap (YL534437) resulting in two WIA.

8 JAN 70: At 10h5 hours A Co detained an individual vicinity YD534384 who did not have an ID card. The detainee was recognized at District S2 as being a VC. At 1630 hours the first of 106 CH-47 flame drops which would deliver 1,001 barrels of fougasse during the next 16 days, was dropped at YD51L36 in the vicinity of the resettlement area. Lt Col Herbert Y. Schandler assumed command of the battalion.

10 JAN 70: B Co and the 185 RF Co cordoned Uu Diem hamlet at 02h9 hours and began a sweep at 0735 hours. The DIOCC screened 293 civilians and detained six; one later confirmed as VC.

15 JAN 70: B Co discovered a cache at YD581284 containing 1 AK-47, 1 grenade, 20 lbs of rice, 29 AK rounds, 7 blasting caps in a rucksack.

16 JAN 70: B, C, and D Co's terminated combined training and operations with the 185, 131, and 222 RF Co's, respectively. CH-47's were used to reposition these RF Companies as well as those listed in the next entry.

17 JAN 70: D Co discovered a cache at YD6028 containing one M-1 carbine, one SKS, and one Russian anti-tank mine. B, C, and D Co's commenced combined training and operations with the 206, 153, and 129 RF Co's, respectively.

19 JAN 70: A recon team discovered a cache containing 50 pounds of rice at YD534414. At dusk the same recon team observed and engaged VC at YD516419 with negative results.

21 JAN 70: C and D Co's and the 153 RF Co cordoned Dong Lam at 0640 hours. DIOCC screened 274 civilians. Significant results included: 210 received MEDCAP, 253 received refreshments, and seven suspects were detained and later released. C Co commenced combined training and operations with 131 RF Co.

24 JAN 70: A major shift occurred in the disposition of RF Co's in preparation for TET. RF Group 3, 131, 224, and the 360 RF Co's departed the district to provide increased security for Hue. Representatives of the DIOCC and the PF Special Squad discovered an underground bunker at 1210 hours at YD518364. When the bunker was uncovered one VC was KIA, one captured along with two AK-47's, one pistol, and 100 small arms rounds. When PF attempted to remove the KIA from inside the bunker a grenade exploded wounding four PF's. At 1530 hours a group of civilians moving to a resettlement area detonated a booby trap at YD518411 resulting in 12 WIA, one of whom later died.

26 JAN 70: In reaction to movement of VC at dusk, the Rn initiated Eagle Flights. The first flight was conducted on 26 JAN 70. At 1830 hours five D Co personnel moving to an ambush site in a Boston Whaler, detonated a mine when the boat beached resulting in three KIA and two WIA. B Co detonated a boobytrap vic YD51442 at 1850 hours, resulting in 2 VN and 1 US WIA. A recon team detonated a boobytrap upon insertion at YL536154 at 1824 hours, resulting in 2 US WIA. The 153 and 129 RF Co's moved to new locations to...
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replace those units deployed on 24 JAN 70. This terminated combined training and operations with C and D Co's. The 206 RF Co remained with B Co and at the request of the district chief, BaT's and MTT's were moved to YD519413 and YL517470 to train and operate with the 153 and 129 RF Companies.

27 JAN 70: On the second night of employing Eagle Flights in the AO, movement was detected at YL519413. While inserting ground troops from two UH-1 in the Eagle Flight, the C&C aircraft received AK-47 fire resulting in one US KIA and one WIA. The ground element assaulted the enemy position killing four VC, and capturing one PW, three AK-47's, one 60mm mortar and other miscellaneous items. FSB Knight was established at YL528422. The FSB was established to extend 105mm coverage to Huong Dien District and the resettlement area during TET.

28 JAN 70: A small hamlet vic YL507421, which was suspected of harboring the VC engaged on 27 JAN 70, was cordoned at 0712 hours by B Co and the 206 RF Co. DIOCC screened 55 civilians. The hamlet population were then moved by CH-47 to Pho Trach for resettlement.

4 FEB 70: C Co discovered a cache consisting of one 4.2 inch HE round, one 90mm HE round, one 105mm HE round; and ten non-electric blasting caps at YD5530.

5 FEB 70: A TET truce was observed 051800-061800 FEB 70. No violations occurred.

7 FEB 70: An Eagle Flight detected movement and a fire vic YD5345. Two recon teams were inserted and made contact with an estimated six VC. Three VC were KIA and one PW captured along with three AK-47's and miscellaneous gear. The following day a search of the contact area revealed an additional VC KIA. One UH-1 KIA during the action.

8 FEB 70: C Co discovered a cache consisting of three ammo cans of rice, one M-1 carbine, canteen, cooking pot and stove at YD5430.

13 FEB 70: C and D Co's and the 156 RF Co conducted a cordon of Pho Ninh hamlet. DIOCC screened 503 civilians; 213 received MEDCAP; 548 received refreshments and 11 were detained (7 released, 3 classified as draft dodgers and one as VC).  

14 FEB 70: FSB Knight was closed and D Co terminated combined operations and training with the 206 RF Co.

12. (C) RESULTS:

a. During the reporting period the 3/187th Inf was successful in denying the enemy freedom of movement throughout Phong Dien District. Emphasis was placed on eliminating the local infrastructure within the district and, as a result of this, the enemy can no longer move at will through the area and his support by the local population appears to be rapidly diminishing.
b. 3/187th Inf Results:

(1) Enemy Personnel Eliminated
   (a) KIA: 10
   (b) FW: ?

(2) Enemy Explosives Eliminated (*Includes dud rds found)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Qty</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AK rds</td>
<td>517</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-16 rds</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-79 rds</td>
<td>11</td>
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<tr>
<td>7.62 rds</td>
<td>11</td>
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<tr>
<td>82mm rds</td>
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<tr>
<td>*105mm rds</td>
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<td>Mines</td>
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<td>Fuzes</td>
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<tr>
<td>Blasting Caps</td>
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(3) Enemy Weapons Eliminated
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(4) Enemy Food Stores Eliminated
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(5) Enemy BDT's Eliminated
<table>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Found</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Detonated</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

c. District Forces Results:

(1) Enemy Personnel Eliminated
   (a) KIA: 3
   (b) FW: 12
   (c) HC: 4

(2) Enemy Explosives Eliminated
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Qty</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AK rds</td>
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<td>60mm rds</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>82mm rds</td>
<td>2</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
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(3) Enemy Weapons Eliminated

(a) AK 4
(b) M-1 1
(c) SKS 5
(d) Carbine 1
(e) M-16 2
(f) Machine Guns 1
(g) RPG 1

(4) Enemy Equipment Eliminated

(a) Radio 1

(5) Enemy BDT's Eliminated

(a) Found 14
(b) Detonated 10

d. Results - Other US Forces:

(1) Enemy Personnel Eliminated

(a) KIA 9
(b) PW 2

13. (C) ADMINISTRATION:

a. Maintenance of Unit Strengths:

(1) At the beginning of the reporting period unit strength breakdown was as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>OFFICERS</th>
<th>WO</th>
<th>EM</th>
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<td>E</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>834</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) At the end of the reporting period unit strength breakdown was as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>OFFICERS</th>
<th>WO</th>
<th>EM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HHC</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>889</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
AVDC-CD-C

7 MARCH 1970

SUBJECT: Combat After Action Report: Operation RANDOLPH GLEN (U)

(3) Unit strengths were maintained with replacements from the Screaming Eagle Replacement Training School (SERTS). During this period of time the average strength of the battalion increased by 53 personnel.

b. Personnel Management:

(1) Orders assigning and reassigning personnel were received in sufficient time to allow for efficient processing in and out of the battalion.

(2) The S2 was responsible for the handling of all Prisoners of War.

c. Development and Maintenance of Morale:

(1) One area of responsibility was greatly improved during the reporting period. Recommendations for decoration for valorous acts were processed promptly and effectively. Awards ceremonies were conducted to insure that, when possible, personnel received their awards before departing the battalion.

(2) The battalion participated in the Rest and Recuperation (R&R) Program. Monthly R&R Allocations for the battalion were seldom turned back unfilled.

(3) Incentive awards were established to promote the battalion's reenlistment program. Some of the awards included a three day in-country R&R, an engraved plaque, and a $25.00 savings bond.

d. Maintenance of Law and Order: Violations of the UCMJ were handled at the lowest level possible. This of course depended on the severity of the offense committed. During the reporting period two men were tried by general court-martial.

e. Summary: The battalion had no major problems in administration during the reporting period.

11. (U) LOGISTICS:

a. Concept of Support:

(1) Logistical support was furnished by the Division Support Command through the 3rd Brigade FSSE.

(2) Resupply was accomplished by use of UH-1 helicopters and 2½ ton vehicles operating from the battalion trains area directly to the units in field locations.

b. Material and Services:

(1) Class I supplies were available in sufficient quantities. One hot meal, (A Ration), was prepared in the battalion trains area and delivered daily to field locations in mermite cans by UH-1 helicopter. "C" Rations were consumed by the units for two meals each day. Three hot meals (A Ration) were served daily to the battalion TOC at District Headquarters.
Subject: Combat After Action Report: Operation RANLOPH GLEN (U)

One hundred and forty two tons of Class I supplies were used during the reporting period.

(2) Class II and IV items were drawn from Division Support Command. One hundred and eighty tons of Class II and IV supplies were used by the battalion during this period with the largest bulk attributed to barrier and bunker material for the battalion TOC and the rear battalion trains area. Class II and IV supplies were used in the construction of FSB Knight.

(3) Class III supplies were used extensively throughout the battalion rear trains area and the battalion TOC due to the number of vehicles the battalion was required to operate. Eighty four tons of Class III was supplied during the reporting period.

(4) A total of 462.5 tons of supplies were used by the battalion during the reporting period. This did not include water obtained from the engineer water point located in the battalion trains areas.

(5) Maintenance: All equipment for repair was evacuated to "D" Co 801st Maintenance for direct support maintenance. A critical shortage of the following items hindered the organizational maintenance capabilities:

(a) Inner tubes for 1/2 ton mule.
(b) Brake shoes for 3/4 ton utility truck M-151.
(c) Inner tube for 3/4 ton utility truck M-151.
(d) Universal joints for 3/4 ton utility truck M-151.

(6) Transportation:

(a) Ground: 2 1/2 ton and 3/4 ton vehicles were used extensively to carry supplies to the battalion forward TOC and to smaller company sized units.


18. (C) Commander's Analysis:

a. During the initial phase of Operation RANLOPH GLEN, the 3/187th Inf successfully accomplished its mission of denying the enemy access to populated areas in the district by conducting offensive operations. Additionally, combined operations and training were conducted to upgrade the proficiency of local GVN forces, thereby enabling these forces to better perform their respective missions. Close coordination with the district headquarters greatly facilitated US assistance to the district in support of the pacification objectives.

b. Tangible evidence of the battalion's success in accomplishing its mission was demonstrated by an absence of VC attacks on VV/UVN installations and the systematic reduction of enemy movement in the district. GVN forces, by
their actions, shown a desire to assume increased responsibility for all facets of their own security and logistical operations.

o. Coordination with all Vietnamese forces in the area was essential to tactical success. This coordination was effected by co-locating the battalion TOC and the district headquarters and by placing RF companies under the operational control of US companies. Another technique was to give RF companies and PF platoons their own small area of operations within the battalion area of operations. These techniques fostered a close working relationship between the Vietnamese on the district staff and the US battalion staff. Each element was immediately notified when the other element was in contact. Fire coordination was achieved in the quickest possible manner. All intelligence was immediately shared. Joint operations were planned and executed rapidly and efficiently. Prisoners were interrogated jointly. Air assets were shared. No action in the district by one side escaped the notice of the other. Joint briefings were held daily and joint situation maps were maintained. This close working relationship was essential to insure that the many actions of US forces, RF, PF, PSDLF, PRU, and RD Cadre were effectively coordinated and did not impinge upon or threaten other forces. The success of this coordination was instrumental in the successful accomplishment of this battalion's mission.

d. In summary, efforts of the battalion to assist the district in furthering its pacification program have been well received, while simultaneously promoting pro-GVN attitudes among the population in areas where US forces conduct offensive operations. Plans are underway to assure continued improvement and successful accomplishment of the battalion's mission during the next reporting period.

HERBERT Y. SCHANDLER
LTC, INF
Commanding

4 Incl
1. Intelligence
2. Combined Training and Operations
3. Psychological Operations
4. Civil Affairs

   a. Coastal Terrain: This is the principle rice producing area and is characterized by open sand flats with sparse vegetation, thickets along many streams, and numerous rice paddies. Trafficability for ground troops was generally good throughout the operation.

   b. Rolling Hills: The terrain in this area consisted of low rolling hills covered with light brush type vegetation, many areas of heavy vegetation in the low areas and along streams, and untended rice paddies. Trafficability in this area was dependent upon the level of precipitation. During periods of heavy rainfall the many small streams and the rice paddies became swollen and became barriers to foot and vehicular movement.

2. (U) Weather: Rainfall during the first days of the operation reduced visibility and slowed ground movement, but as the operation progressed weather improved considerably. The total rainfall during the reporting period was 19.35 inches.

3. (U) Enemy Activities: During the reporting period the following enemy units were believed operating in 3/187 Area of Operation.

   a. The 11 Local Force Company

   b. The 114 Local Force Company

   c. The Viet Cong Infrastructure (VCI) of Phong Dien District (See Appendix 1).

4. (C) Intelligence Operations: Numerous visual reconnaissance missions were flown daily over the AO. Fifteen photo missions were also flown in support of combat operations. These missions were requested primarily to support planning for cordon operations.

   a. Small reconnaissance patrols were employed throughout the AO to monitor enemy movement.

   b. The employment of radar (PPS-4 and PPS-5) proved to be an asset to the battalion throughout the operation. Three to five radars were employed simultaneously in the AO to detect enemy movement. Additional ground surveillance equipment was employed by brigade in support of 3/187.
APPENDIX 1 (VC Infrastructure) to Inclosure 1 (Intelligence) to Combat 
After Action Report: Operation RANLOPH GLEN (U)

1. (C) The VCI of Phong Dien District along with the local force units 
maintain bases in the mountainous jungle areas to the south and southwest 
of the district. The VC and VCI use four routes to enter Phong Dien. Their 
primary route is the river area extending from YD450340 to YD400360. They 
also use the river area extending from YD565287 to YD520323, the low areas 
south and southwest of Camp Evans, and the Song Do river area. The VC and 
VCI often move quite near the Camp Evans perimeter when entering Dong Lam 
hamlet or when using this route to cross Highway 1.

   a. The VCI have three main objectives when infiltrating into the 
district:

   (1) To meet with the people in the population centers to propagandize 
       and proselytize.

   (2) To collect taxes, rice, and other supplies.

   (3) To conduct reconnaissance of allied operations in the district.

b. During the reporting period a total of 44 VCI were eliminated by 
   all allied forces:

   (1) Six from district level positions, 26 from village level positions, 
       and 9 from hamlet level positions.

   (2) Of these, 20 were KIA, 17 were PW's, and 4 were Hoi Chanh's.

2. (C) Included below is a listing of the VCI eliminated during the reporting 
   period. The list is categorized first by district level VCI eliminated and 
   then, by each village in order, to include hamlet level personnel from that 
village.

   a. District level VCI eliminated during the reporting period:

   (1) DANG DAO a member of the Transportation Committee rallied to 
       1h DEC 69 to the District S2 at the Pho Trach Market YD510427. He is current­
       ly at the Hue Hoi Chanh Center.

   (2) TRAN DUC a Finance and Economy Section Chief was killed on 
       7 JAN 70 by the 3rd Brigade Minicav, at YD450337.

   (3) VO DAT a member of the Transportation Committee was captured by 
       the 3rd Brigade Minicav on 25 DEC 69 at YD514251.

   (4) NGUYEN PHU an Organization Committee member was captured by A C:
       3/187 on 8 JAN 70 at YD513364.

   (5) NGUYEN VAN OAI a Military Proselyting Chief was killed by the Pi
       Special Squad on 2h JAN 70 at YD548384. He also held the position of Commo
       Liaison Chief, Phong Loc village.

   (6) LE TRAU a Civil Health Committee member was killed by a combined 
       Eagle Flight Operation on 27 JAN 70 at YD519405. He also held a position as 
       a medic for the CII3 LF Company.
APPENDIX 1 (VC Infrastructure) to Inclosure 1 (Intelligence) to Combat After Action Report: Operation RANDOLPH GLEN (U) (cont)

b. VCI eliminated from the Phong An and Phong Son Villages:

(1) NGUYEN THI LUU a village supply member was detained during a cordon of Thong An hamlet on 13 DEC 69. She was brought to Phong Dien Compound for further interrogation by the Vietnamese and found to be VCI.

(2) NGUYEN THI MQU a village supply member was detained during a cordon of Thong An hamlet on 13 DEC 69. She was brought to Phong Dien District Compound for further interrogation by the Vietnamese and found to be VCI.

(3) TUAN TUYEN was killed on 5 JAN 70 by 1/506 at YD590237. He was a village level security member.

(4) HOANG NGOC LE rallied on 25 JAN 70 to the Group 4 RF Headquarters at YL615276. He was a village level medic and later returned to Phong Dien and led the Vietnamese to two bunkers containing five weapons.

(5) NGUYEN TIEU was killed on 31 JAN 70 by the PRU near the hamlet of Dong Lam vic YD560318. He had just been promoted to District Party Committee and was on his way to Dong Lam for a promotion celebration.

(6) PHAN NGHI rallied on 1 FEB 70. He was a village security member, and rallied by catching a bus to Hue and surrendering there.

(7) NGUYEN THI MAI was detained during a cordon of Dong Lam hamlet YD563317 on 21 DEC 69. She was brought to Phong Dien Compound for further interrogation and found to be a supply member from Dong Lam hamlet.

c. VCI eliminated from the Phong Loc Village:

(1) TRAN LIEN a People's Revolutionary Party Vice Chief (village level) was captured by the FF Special Squad at YD510304 on 24 JAN 70.

(2) VO CAI a village level Current Affairs Committee member was killed on 7 FEB 70 by a Recon Team of 3/187, at YD535450.

(3) VO HANG a village level Finance and Economy Committee member was killed on 7 FEB 70 by a Recon Team of 3/187 at YD535450.

(4) NGUYEN LY a village level Security Committee Leader was killed on 7 FEB 70 by a Recon Team of 3/187 at YD535450.

(5) NGUYEN TIEM a village level Finance and Economy Cadre was killed on 7 FEB 70 by a Recon Team of 3/187 at YD535450.

(6) LE TRUNG a village level Current Affairs Committee member was captured on 7 FEB 70 by a Recon Team of 3/187 at YL535450.

(7) NGUYEN VAN DU a hamlet supply member was arrested on 10 FEB 70 by the Police Special Branch at YD535432.

(8) NGUYEN VAN VANG a Finance and Economy Committee member, hamlet level, was arrested on 10 FEB 70 by the Police Special Branch, at YD535432.
APPENDIX 1 (VC Infrastructure) to Inclosure 1 (Intelligence) to Combat After Action Report: Operation RANDOLPH GLEN (U) (cont)

(9) NGUYEN VAN LE a Finance and Economy Committee member, hamlet level, was arrested on 10 FEB 70 by the Police Special Branch at YD535432.

(10) NGUYEN VAN LAI a Finance and Economy Committee member, hamlet level, was arrested on 10 FEB 70 by the Police Special Branch at YD535432.

(11) NGUYEN THI THAU a Finance and Economy Committee member, hamlet level, was arrested on 10 FEB 70 by the Police Special Branch at YD535432.

(12) NGUYEN THI XOA a Finance and Economy Committee member, hamlet level, was arrested by the Police Special Branch on 10 FEB 70 at YD535432.

d. VCI eliminated from the Phong Hoa Village:

(1) TRAN VAN MIEN a village level Peoples Revolutionary Party Chief was captured by the 3rd Brigade Minicav on 7 JAN 70 at YD450337.

(2) LE THIEM a village level Peoples Revolutionary Party Secretary was killed by the 3rd Brigade Minicav on 7 JAN 70 at YD450337.

(3) LE KHAC TUONG a village level Security Section member was killed by the 3rd Brigade Minicav on 7 JAN 70 at YD450337.

(4) HO HY a village level Security Section member was killed by the 3rd Brigade Minicav on 7 JAN 70 at YD450337.

(5) NGUYEN KHOA CHANH a village level Security Section member was killed by the 3rd Brigade Minicav on 7 JAN 70 at YD450337.

(6) TRAN CHONG a village level Security Section member was killed by the 3rd Brigade Minicav on 7 JAN 70 at YD450337.

(7) LE TAN a village level Farmers Association member was killed by the 3rd Brigade Minicav on 7 JAN 70 at YD450337.

(8) TRAN THI CHANH a Woman's Association Assistant Leader, hamlet level, was detained at a cordon of Uu Diem on 10 JAN 70. She was brought to Phong Dien Compound for further interrogation and found to be VCI.

(9) THAN VAN HOANG a village level Transportation Committee member was captured by a combined Eagle Flight Operation on 27 JAN 70 at YD519405.

(10) LE KHAC LINH a village level Peoples Revolutionary Party and Current Affairs Committee Chief was killed by a combined Eagle Flight Operation on 27 JAN 70 at YD519405.

e. VCI eliminated from Phong Binh Village:

(1) TUAN VAN CAN rallied 5 JAN 70 to the district S2 at YD520360. He was a Transportation Committee member, village level VCI.

(2) NGUYEN HUU MAI killed 7 JAN 70 by the 3rd Brigade Minicav at YD520360. He was a Farmers Association member from the village VCI.
APPENDIX 1 (VC Infrastructure) to Inclosure 1 (Intelligence) to Combat
After Action Report: Operation RANDOLPH GLENN (U) (cont)

(3) NGUYEN THI NGAN was arrested on 21 FEB 70 by the National
Police at Trach Phu Hamlet vic XD486436. She was the assistant secretary
of the hamlet Woman's Association.

f. VCI eliminated from Phong Hien Village:

(1) NGUYEN LAM was killed on 20 DEC 69 by C/3-187 at vic XD55309.
He was an Economy Cadre from the village VCI.

(2) TRAN NGOC TRAN was killed on 20 DEC 69 by C/3-187 at vic
XD55309. He was a security member from the village VCI.

(3) HONG VO was a hamlet level Economy Section member from Phong
Hien village. He was killed on 27 DEC 69 by the PF Special Squad at XD564347.

g. VCI eliminated from the CIU3 Local Force Company

(1) TRAN QUANG NINH was killed on 27 JAN 70 by a combined Eagle
Flight Operation. He was a platoon leader.

(2) LE TRAU was killed on 27 JAN 70 by a combined Eagle Flight
Operation. He was a medic.
1. (C) GENERAL

a. One of the primary missions of the battalion is to upgrade the Regional Forces, Popular Forces, and Peoples Self Defense Forces through combined operations and programmed periods of instruction.

b. To accomplish this mission, several programs were initiated:

(1) Regional Force Companies were co-located with the battalion's line companies on a three week rotational basis. During this period the RF companies received formal instruction and participated in tactical operations conducted by the US rifle company.

(2) Training committees were formed by the battalion and these teams, located at Phong Dien District Headquarters and Camp Evans, were given the mission of training the Popular Force Platoons in selected subjects (i.e.: Artillery, stream crossing, and weapons firing). The PF platoons rotated through these training sites on a daily basis and the training committees were disbanded after all the PF platoons had completed the training.

(3) In December three mobile training teams were formed (one each from the 1/506, 2/506, and 3/157) and given the mission of training the PF platoons. The District Chief did not desire that PF platoons receive additional training and as a result, the mobile training teams were given the mission of training the PSDF in the district. The three mobile training teams were then deployed to the populated areas in the district and began to rotate through the hamlets training PSDF.

(4) Two brigade action teams with the primary mission of conducting civic action within the hamlets were formed from battalion resources. In coordination with the district chief these teams were given a secondary mission of training the PF platoons they were co-located with.

2. (C) PROGRAMS OF INSTRUCTION: In coordination with the district staff, programs of instruction were developed by the battalion for the Regional Forces, Popular Forces, and Peoples Self Defense Forces. The POI's represented the minimum to be focused on the forces being trained and were to be strongly supported by practical application and combined operations.

a. The Regional Force Training Program was as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SUBJECT</th>
<th>HOURS</th>
<th>SCOPE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>M-16 Rifle</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Maintenance &amp; care, zeroing, quick kill, technique of fire.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-60 Machine Gun</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Maintenance &amp; care, zeroing, field firing, technique of fire.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-79 Grenade Launcher</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Maintenance &amp; care, technique of fire.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Claymore</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Employment techniques.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### TABLE 2 (Combined Training and Operations) to Combat After Action Report:
**RANDOLPH GLEN** Continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SUBJECT</th>
<th>HOURS</th>
<th>SCOPE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mines &amp; BBT</strong></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Detection &amp; destruction of BBT, use of grappling hooks, VC mines, marking methods, BBT lane.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Use of Demolitions</strong></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Use of TNT &amp; C4, priming charges, destruction of BBT.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Hand Grenades</strong></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Types and use of hand grenades, throwing techniques.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ambush Techniques</strong></td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Types of ambush, preparation for and movement to ambush, actions at ambush site, wpns, employment, post ambush activities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Patrolling</strong></td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Types of patrols, movement tech. orders and reports, security enroute, execution.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Battle Drill</strong></td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Combat formation, fire &amp; movement, fire and maneuver.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Artillery Adjustment ARA, TAC Air</strong></td>
<td>24</td>
<td>Fire support available, call for fire, Observers adjustment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Airmobile Operation</strong></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Planning for CA, helicopter familiarization, use of helicopter, PZ and LZ action.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### The Popular Force training program was as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SUBJECT</th>
<th>HOURS</th>
<th>SCOPE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>M-16 Rifle</strong></td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Maintenance &amp; care, zeroing, quick kill, techniques of fire.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>M-60 Machine Gun</strong></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Maintenance &amp; care, zeroing, field firing, techniques of fire.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>M-79 Grenade Launcher</strong></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Maintenance &amp; care, tech. of fire.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Claymore</strong></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Employment techniques.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>BBT</strong></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Detection &amp; destruction of BBT, use of grappling hooks, VC mines, marking methods, BBT lane.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ambush Techniques</strong></td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Types of ambush, preparation for and movement to ambush, actions at ambush site, wpns employment, post ambush activities.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
SUBJECT | HOURS | SCOPE
--- | --- | ---
Patrolling | 8 | Types of patrols, movement technique, orders and reports, security enroute, execution.
Artillery Adjustment | 24 | Fire support available, call for fire, observers adjustment.
Airmobile Operations | 4 | Planning for CA, helicopter familiarization, use of helicopter, PZ & LZ

Incl 2 (Combined Training and Operations) to Combat After Action Report: RANDOLPH GLEN Continued

The Peoples Self Defense Force training program was as follows:

SUBJECT | HOURS | SCOPE
--- | --- | ---
Care, cleaning, & tech of fire M-1, M-2, & Thompson submachine gun | 6 | Maintenance, assembly, disassembly, and range firing.
Ambush Techniques | 3 | Preparation for and conduct of ambush.
First Aid & Hygiene | 3 | Four lifesaving steps and personal health habits.
Hamlet Defense | 3 | Internal security structure and defensive techniques.

3. (C) RESULTS:

a. Ten Regional Force Companies were trained.
b. Ten Popular Force Platoons were trained initially and two of these received additional training with brigade action teams.
c. The Peoples Self Defense Force in twenty of the twenty-one populated hamlets of Phong Dien District received training.

4. (C) COMBINED OPERATIONS:

a. The most important training technique employed during the reporting period was the combined operation.
b. During the periods that RF Companies were co-located with the battalion's line companies, combined operations were conducted on a daily basis. These operations included patrol and surveillance, ambush patrols, and, in some cases, cordon and search operations and Airmobile assaults.
c. The brigade action teams conducted combined operations with two PF Platoons on a limited basis.
d. The approximate number of combined operations conducted during the reporting period is as shown below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DISTRICT FORCE</th>
<th>COMBINED OPERATIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RF Co</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RF Platoons</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RF Squad</td>
<td>1,580</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PF Platoons</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PF Squad</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Inclosure 3 (Psychological Operations) to Combat After Action Report: Operation RANDOLPH GLEN (U)

1. (C) GENERAL: Psychological operations were conducted by the battalion to exploit known or suspected enemy weaknesses in order to lower his morale and induce him to Chieu Hoi and to promote pro-GVN attitudes among the local population. The resources available to the battalion for conducting its PSYOPS missions are, for the most part, consolidated at brigade. Brigade resources include audio-visual, airborne speaker, ground speaker, leaflet drop, and artillery leaflet dissemination capabilities. District Vietnamese resources are scant and consist primarily of the use of armed propaganda teams and cultural drama teams requested from province headquarters.

2. (0) PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS:

a. Airborne speaker/leaflet, audio-visual, and ground speaker missions constituted the majority of individual missions requested and coordinated by the battalion. Only one mission involving artillery leaflet dissemination capabilities was conducted. Leaflet rounds are scarce and, in many cases, unserviceable as a result of age. This is unfortunate, for leaflet rounds are highly accurate and represent the best means of exploiting allied firepower themes.

b. Quick reaction leaflet and speaker missions in exploitation of friendly victories and Chieu Hoi's are conducted. These missions represent the best possible use of airborne speaker/leaflet capabilities. The lack of a polaroid camera, film, cassette tape recorder and tapes organic to the battalion necessitates the borrowing of these items to perform quick reaction missions. Reaction time is materially affected.

c. An armed propaganda team from the 101st Polwar Company in Hue operated in the district almost continually from 3 DEC 69 until 11 FEB 70. The team conducted an extensive ground speaker and audio-visual campaign in the hamlets. The person-to-person contact between this 7 man team and hamlet residents represents the best means of persuasion possible. During the TET holidays this team distributed TET magazines in the district. The 3/187th Inf donated 75 stencils in support of the publication.

d. The volunteer information program (VIP) is heavily stressed by 3/187th Inf to help counter the incidence of mines and boobytraps in the district. Increased emphasis on the program began on 19 JAN 70. Battalion S5 distributed VIP handbills to people in Phong Hoa, Phong Hien, and Phong An villages and to refugees moving into the northwestern section of the district. Airborne speaker/leaflet missions began advertising the program at this time. On 27 JAN 70 a civilian found and reported an 81mm mortar round boobytrap. On 29 JAN 70 several civilians found 4 Chinese Communist carbines and turned them into the district senior advisor for their reward. 90C $VN was paid through the brigade for the DJ3T. MACV paid 2500 $VN for the 4 rusted weapons.

e. During the reporting period 4 VC from Phong Dien District rallied with the GVN under the Chieu Hoi program.
1. (c) GENERAL: The civic action program of the battalion continued during the reporting period. The program was geared towards improving the health, education, and welfare of the civilian population in Phong Lien District. Emphasis was placed on utilization of GVN resources and agencies in order to foster use of Vietnamese supply channels and to avoid dependency on US assistance. All projects reflected the needs and desires of the local population. Civil affairs projects include construction and repair of buildings, medcaps, medical classes, activities during cordon operations, assistance in the district chief's resettlement of refugees, and commodity distribution.

2. (c) CIVIL ACTION PROJECTS: During the period 7 DEC 69 - 14 FEB 70, 274 bags of cement, 2736 board feet of lumber, 323 sheets of tin, 35 desks, and 70 benches were delivered in support of 5 schools, 2 dispensaries, and 1 market. One school was completed during the period; 3 schools reached the 95% complete mark (lacking a plastered and painted exterior only). One problem encountered was the continued placement of GVN funded projects on the division project lists. Two school furniture projects placed on the list involved schools which had bought furniture in the last year. Other problems encountered were the lack of initiative on the part of certain hamlet chiefs, misappropriation of materials, and incorrect construction procedures. The material transportation problem has been resolved through continuous use of district truck support.

3. (c) HEALTH PROGRAMS:

a. Medcaps were conducted by the battalion surgeon, company medics, mobile training teams, and brigade action teams. Between 7 DEC 69 and 14 FEB 70, 1,025 people were treated by the battalion surgeon and his staff; 5,627 patients received treatment from other battalion units. Vietnamese health workers and students participate in battalion medcaps. They receive valuable practical experience and aid the battalion surgeon in screening and treating patients. The effect of Vietnamese helping Vietnamese enhances the image of the GVN as a concerned and responsive agent of the people. The 2/506th Inf, 2/319th Arty, and 2/94th Arty conducted medcaps in the district during the reporting period. Emergency medical evacuation of severely injured civilians was also effected. People continue to flock to medcap sites with "coughs and headaches". Vietnamese medical personnel have held opportunists to a minimum, candy and other commodities (except soap) are not distributed at medcaps in order to avoid the association of medcaps with commodity distribution.

b. A medical instruction program designated to train people from individual hamlets in the basics of health, sanitation, diagnosis and treatment of common maladies, and preventive medicine was started by the battalion surgeon in JAN 70. Each of the 21 hamlets in Phong Lien Districts was invited to send two people to the course to be held in the district dispensary. The course was programmed to contain approximately 150 hours of instruction, review, and tests. Additional classes were programmed dependent upon the achievement of the students. Lessons plans were drawn up in English and Vietnamese; a blackboard was fashioned from a ping pong table. Attendance averaged 35 during the reporting period.
Inclosure 4 (Civil Affairs) to Combat After Action Report: Operation RANLOPH GLEN (U) (cont)

4. (C) POPULATION CONTROL:

a. Between 7 DEC 69 and 14 FEB 70, 8 cordon operations were conducted by 3/187th Inf and Vietnamese personnel. To lessen the disruptive impact of the condons a great effort was made to insure the comfort of the civilians involved. Tents were erected, coffee and milk distributed, movies shown, and medcaps conducted. On four occasions a cultural drama team performed. Interrogation was solely Vietnamese. Maximum effort was made to complete the interrogation in four to six hours.

b. The refugee resettlement program in Phong Dien District is implemented by the district chief with guidance from province headquarters. The 3/187th Inf assisted the resettlement program by helping to clear the hamlet areas of mines and boobytraps, requesting trucks for transportation of personnel, and providing some area security.

c. On 19 JAN 70 approximately 350 refugees were transported by US and VN trucks to a location near the resettlement area. They moved by foot to the hamlet sites of Luong Mai (YD524140), Pho Trach (YL509133), Sieu Quan (YD512150), Van Trinh (YD515169), and Vinh Hoa (YD495152). The purpose of this move by heads of households was to survey damaged homesites, clear ground, and visit the graves of their ancestors. On 24 JAN 70 the initial party was returned to Con Son refugee hamlet (YD557337). On 26 JAN 70 another group of approximately 350 heads of households was transported to the resettlement area. At the close of the reporting period most of these people had returned to Con Son for the TET holidays. The target date for complete resettlement of the five hamlets is 30 JUN 70. 1,496 families totaling 6,997 people are to be resettled. Four additional hamlets will be resettled after 30 JUN 70. When all 9 hamlets are resettled it is estimated that newly cultivated rice fields will double existing production tonnage.

5. (C) SPECIAL PROJECTS:

a. During the reporting period SP4 Paul Dawson of A Co conducted English classes three days a week in the district high school (YD530345). He got along very well with the students and VN teachers. His actions on a person to person basis enhanced the image of the 101st Airborne soldier.

b. Between 7 DEC 69 and 14 FEB 70 the battalion had two brigade action teams (BAT's) operating in Phong Dien District. Their mission was to monitor 3/187 construction projects and give technical assistance as required, perform limited medcaps, train PSDF, and conduct limited construction/repair projects. One BAT was located at Uu Thuong (YD506365) and then moved to Vinh Nguyen (YD515337). The other BAT was initially located at Bien Luong (YD635313) and then moved to Uu Diem (YD405434).
Commanding Officer
3rd Brigade, 101st Airborne Division
ATTN: AVDG-CA-E
APO San Francisco 96383

1. (U) Name of Operation: RANDOLPH GLEN Feeder Report
2. (U) Dates of Operation: 150001 FEB 70 to 312400 MAR 70
3. (C) Location: Phong Dien District, Thua Thien Province. Map: Vietnam:
   Hai Lang, 1:50,000, Sheet 6442 I, Series I7014; Ap Lai
   Bang, 1:50,000, Sheet 6441 I, Series I7014
4. (C) Control Headquarters: 3rd Battalion (Airmobile) 187th Infantry
5. (C) Reporting Officer: LTC Herbert Y. Schandler
6. (C) Task Organization:
   Hq/3-187 Inf
   Artillery Liaison Section
   C/3-187 Inf
   Artillery FO Team

   A/3-187 Inf
   Artillery FO Team
   D/3-187 Inf
   Artillery FO Team

   B/3-187 Inf
   Artillery FO Team
   E/3-187 Inf

7. (C) Supporting Forces:
   158th Aviation Battalion
   58th Inf Plt Scout Dog
   577th Combat Tracker Team
   B/326th Engineers
   C/2-319 Artillery - DS
   A/1-39 Artillery - GSR 2-319
   A/2-11 Artillery - GSR 2-319
   C/2-94 Artillery - GSR 2-319
6 April 1970

SUBJECT: Combat After Action Report: Operation RANDOLPH GLEN (U)

8. (U) Intelligence:

Enemy activity during the period was generally limited to small rice carrying parties, commo-liaison and reconnaissance elements in the AO, (Intelligence, Inclosure 1).

9. (C) Mission:

The 3d Bn, 187th Inf conducts offensive operations emphasizing reconnaissance and ambush in order to deny the enemy access to the populated areas and support the GVN accelerated pacification program while upgrading local GVN forces through training and combined operations.

10. (C) Concept of Operation:

3d Bn, 187th Inf continues offensive operations to assist GVN agencies with pacification efforts in AO; continues advisory, training and liaison mission with GVN forces; conducts combined operations to deny the enemy access to population and resources in AO with emphasis on resettlement area; coordinates the entire effort of all US and GVN forces in the AO through OPCON, integration of forces and close coordination of independent unit operations in AO.

11. (C) Execution:

Operational Narrative: 150001 FEB to 312400 MAR 70

15 Feb: Recon Team #3 discovered a boobytrapped 105mm Arty round vic YD573416. The boobytrap was blown in place. D Co discovered and destroyed two bunkers vic YD593502 at 1145 hrs. Cooking utensil and an ammo can full of rice found near the bunkers had been used during the previous two days according to C Kit Carson Scout. Brigade Action Teams were inserted vic YD493443 and YD484426 to begin combined training and operations with PSDF and to participate in civic action projects.

16 Feb: A and C Companies closed into Camp Evans to begin battalion refresher training. Recon Team #4 discovered an 8 inch cimy round at YD534452 which was blown in place.

17 Feb: The 206 RF Co completed combined training and operations with B Co. Mobile Training Team (MTT) #1 detained a PSDF suspected of being VCI. The detainee was later released.

18 Feb: B Company discovered and blew in place a M-16 anti-personnel mine vic YD5023296. A Company discovered and blew in place a boobytrap consisting of C4 and dot cord with a trip wire firing device at YD547305.

19 Feb: B Company detonated a boobytrapped 105mm cimy round vic YD510454 at 1659 hrs, resulting in one US KIA.
SUBJECT: Combat After Action Report: Operation RANDOLPH GLEN (U)

20 Feb: The Honorable Thaddeus R. Beal, Undersecretary of the Army, visited the Battalion CP at Phong Dien. The Undersecretary was accompanied by LTG Zais, XXIV Corp Commander, MG James L. Bowen USA, Director of Force Planning and Analysis, Office of the Vice Chief of Staff, and MG John M. Wright Jr., CG, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile).

24 Feb: B and D Companies closed Camp Evans to begin battalion refresher training. A and C Companies completed battalion refresher training and returned to field locations. A Company prepared to commence combined training and operations with the 225 RF Co. The 153 RF Co detonated a boobytrap at 1106 hrs vic YD503415 resulting in three RF WIA. Medevac was furnished.

25 Feb: At 0930 hrs the initial permanent move of approximately 1,000 refugees to the five hamlets of the Phase I resettlement area was begun (Civil Affairs, paragraph 16).

27 Feb: A Company found a 250 pound bomb vic YD545451; adjacent to a civilian home. The bomb was relocated to an open field and destroyed. One platoon of A Company commenced training with the 153 RF Company. At 1500 hrs FSDF from Pho Trach hamlet vic YD514437 discovered a cache containing 45 82mm mortar rounds and an anti-personnel mine.

28 Feb: B Company received a Hoi Chanh with an AK-47 at 1120 hrs vic YD549301 while participating in battalion refresher training (Intelligence, Inclosure 1, Appendix 1, paragraph 3a). The Hoi Chanh led an element of the Brigade Security Platoon to a bunker vic YD549300. A VC in the bunker refused to surrender. An exchange of grenades resulted in one VC KIA. A Company discovered an M-16 anti-personnel mine at 1420 hrs vic YD529437 which was blown in place.

1 Mar: A Company discovered a cache vic YD508427 at 0837 hrs. The cache contained an 82mm mortar sight, six 82mm mortar fuses, twenty five 82mm mortar charges, and miscellaneous cleaning materials. A Company discovered a boobytrapped 82mm mortar round vic YD504437 at 1420 hrs. The boobytrap was blown in place.

4 Mar: B and D Companies completed battalion refresher training. B Company conducted ambushes vic Camp Evans prior to being placed OPCON to 2-506 Inf effective 070830 MAR 70. D Company departed for Eagle Beach at 1250 hrs.

6 Mar: D Company returned from Eagle Beach at 0845 hrs and was placed OPCON to 1-506 Inf at 1445 hrs. D Company’s planned combat assault into the 1-506 Inf area of heavy contact the previous night was postponed due to weather.

7 Mar: B Company was placed OPCON to 2-506 Inf at 0830 hrs and conducted a dismounted move into the 2-506 Inf AO from Camp Evans. D Company was released OPCON to 1-506 Inf at 0900 hrs, and moved by vehicle into 3d Bn, 147th Inf AO.
AVDG-CD-C 6 April 1970
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10 Mar: The 2nd plt, A Company and 3rd plt, C Company departed for Eagle Beach. Recon Team #4 engaged two VC at 2123 hrs vic YD525372. Night Hawk, artillery, and mortar illumination supported the contact. The team swept the contact area and discovered one VC KIA, and a blood trail that led to YD525374. The VC KIA who had been wounded during the initial contact crawled in a zig-zag pattern for approximately 20 meters where he attempted to engage the recon team with a grenade. The grenade fell short, killing the VC instantly. The following morning, documents were discovered buried along the path the VC had used to crawl away from the kill zone. (Intelligence, Appendix I to Inclosure 1, paragraph 2a (2)).

11 Mar: The 1st platoon of C Company engaged three VC vic YD590265 at 1803 hrs. The enemy was observed and engaged at a distance of 300 meters. One squad blocked while the remaining two squads of the platoon swept the area. Blocking fires were also employed. Results: One VC KIA, one AK-47, and ruck sack containing 50 pounds of rice, captured. (Intelligence, Appendix I, to Inclosure 1, paragraph 3a (1)).

12 Mar: The 2nd platoon, A Company and 3rd platoon C Company returned from Eagle Beach.

13 Mar: Colonel B.J. Coombe, Defense Attache, United Kingdom, Saigon, and Lt Colonel A.G. Jukes, Commanding Officer, Royal Marine Commandos, Singapore, visited the Battalion CP at 0825 hrs. D Company 2-506 Inf, securing FSB Jack, was placed OPCON to 3d Bn, 187th Inf effective 1200 hrs.

15 Mar: Mobile Training Teams #2 and #3 began operations and training with the 225 RF Company. One squad of A Company remained with one platoon of the 225 RF Company under the operational control of the Mobile Training Teams. One platoon of A Company continued training and operations with the 153 RF Company. The 1st platoon of D Company was engaged by enemy RPG and a heavy volume of small arms fire vic YD455311 at 1947 hrs. Artillery fire was employed. Three US were slightly wounded.

16 Mar: C Company(-) participated in a Vietnamese initiated sweep 0700-1100 hrs. C Company blocked from YD581231 to YD592273 in coordination with the 222 and 247 RF Companies. The 014 and 015 RF platoons swept with negative results. At 1525 hrs 1-327(-) combat assaulted vic FSB Jack. At 1540 hrs D/2-506 Ind was released OPCON 3d Bn, 187th Inf and placed OPCON to 1-327(-). The 1-327(-) then assumed responsibility for FSB Jack and the southwestern corner of the 3d Bn, 187th Inf AO.

19 Mar: A Company completed combined training and operations with the 153 RF Company when it was replaced by the 247 RF Company. The 153 RF Company moved to District Headquarters.

20 Mar: C Company(-) participated in a Vietnamese initiated combined cordon operation of Ap Pho Ninh (YD6028) commencing at 0620 hrs. C Company(-) and the 222 RF Company established the line of encirclement while one platoon of
the 153 RF Company, DIOCC, District S2, National Police Field Force, and PF Special Squad swept the cordon area and screened the civilians. Four hundred and four civilians were processed, four were detained. C Company(-) left one squad in Ap Pho Ninh following completion of the cordon at 1037 hrs to commence training and operations with the 016 PF platoon. The 206 and 225 RF Companies exchanged AO's. Mobile Training Team #1, #2, and #3 terminated training with the 225 RF Company and prepared to commence training with the 206 RF Company.

24 Mar: A Company discovered and destroyed in place a boobytrapped 105mm round at YD540460, a homemade boobytrap at YD540436, a dud 155mm round at YD508415, a homemade boobytrap consisting of a metal plate, 20 M-79 rounds and a M-26 fragmentation grenade at YD515427, and a Chi Com mine at YD515427. D Company detonated a boobytrapped 105mm round vic YD49327 at 0946 hrs, resulting in one US WIA. A Hoi Chanh rallied to RF Group 4 (Intelligence, Inclosure 1, Appendix I, paragraph 3a (2)).

25 Mar: B Company was released OPCON 1-506 Inf at 1015 hrs, and returned to Camp Evans. A Company discovered and destroyed in place a boobytrapped 82mm mortar round at YD507437.

26 Mar: A Hoi Chanh rallied to the 127 RF Company (Intelligence, Inclosure 1, Appendix I, paragraph 3a (3)).

27 Mar: C and D Companies passed OPCON to 1-506 Inf when they were inserted vic YD433165 at 1835 hrs and YD453172 at 1752 hrs, respectively. A Company discovered and destroyed a boobytrapped 60mm mortar round vic YD536434 at 1150 hrs. C Company(+), 1-327 Inf passed OPCON to 3d En, 187th Inf at 2240 hrs. C/1-327 Inf continued security of FSB Jack and local patrolling.

28 Mar: RF Group 2 (Light), with 214 and 922 RF Companies attached, entered the District. A resultant shift of RF Group 5 companies, caused termination of A Company's combined operations and training with the 247 RF Company and initiation of combined operations and training with the 225 RF Company.

29 Mar: 1-327 Inf En CP closed FSB Jack from its field location at 1425 hrs. C Company(+), 1-327 Inf passed from OPCON 3d En, 187th Inf back to its parent organization, at that time.

30 Mar: C and D Companies were released OPCON 1-506 Inf at 1550 hrs and 1422 hrs, respectively and were combat assaulted from field locations vic FSB Granite to YD5243 and YD4312. B Co 2nd PIt moved to Eagle Beach by air.

31 Mar: C Company made a dismounted move to participate in a combined operation with the 247 RF Company, NPF, DIOCC, District S2, and PF Special Squad vic YD6233. At 0945 hrs PF Special Squad discovered a bunker containing 100 pounds of rice. Approximately 20 meters from the cache an alert was observed the muzzle of an AK-47 in a small spider hole in the fork of a trail. Small arms fire was exchanged and two grenades were thrown int-
the spider hole. Three VC KIA were discovered in the ground level concealed bunker. One AK-47, one 840 rocket launcher, and four 60mm mortar rounds were also found.

12. (C) Results:

a. The mission during this reporting period was successfully accomplished in that enemy movement to and from villages for the procurement of rice was interdicted.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>US RESULTS</th>
<th>GVN RESULTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Enemy KIA</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KBAA &amp; KBA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hoa Chanh</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Captured</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IWC</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GSWC</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

BBT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FOUND</th>
<th>DET</th>
<th>WIA</th>
<th>KIA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SA Munitions 1161 rds 36
HE Munitions 12 2200 lbs
Rice 1165 lbs
Sensitive Documents 3 bundles 1 bundle
Detainees 45 4

Friendly Losses:

| KIA | 0 |
| WIA | 11 |
| Body to Weapon Ratio 4:9 3:12 |
| Enemy to Friendly 4:3 3:0 |

13. (C) Administration:

a. Maintenance of Unit Strengths:

(1) At the beginning of the reporting period unit strength breakdown was as follows:
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(2) At the end of the reporting period unit strength breakdown was as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>OFFICERS</th>
<th>WO</th>
<th>EM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HHC</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>892</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(3) During this period of time the average strength of the Battalion decreased by 13 personnel. The decrease was due to the accelerated DEROS.

b. Personnel Management:

(1) Orders concerning personnel leaving and joining the battalion are received in sufficient time. However there has been some delay in officer's promotion orders, all involving promotions from 2LT to 1LT.

(2) The S-2 was responsible for the handling of all prisoners of war.

c. Development and Maintenance of Morale:

(1) Recognition of valorous actions while in combat was again a major goal for the Battalion. The battalion conducted two (2) awards ceremonies in which a total of 28 personnel received valorous awards. On 16 Feb 70 Major General John M. Wright, Commanding General of the 101st Airborne Division presented 18 medals to 3/187 personnel and on 24 Feb 70 Col William Bradley presented 10 awards to personnel.

(2) The Battalion participated in the Rest and Recuperation Program. The allocations sent to the battalion were used to the fullest.

(3) A total of 220 personnel enjoyed three (3) days at Eagle Base for rest and relaxation.
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d. Maintenance of Law and Order: Infractions of UCMJ were handled at the lowest level possible. The handling of these infractions at this level has proven very effective. No General Courts-Martial were held.

e. Summary: The Battalion had no major problems in administration during this period of time.

14 (C) Logistics

a. Concept of Support

(1) Logistical support was furnished by the Division Support Command through the 3rd Brigade FSSE.

(2) Resupply was accomplished by use of UH-1 helicopter and 2 1/2 ton vehicles operating from the Bn Rear Trains area directly to the companies.

(3) 1st Bn 506th Inf assumed logistical support of B Co 3d Bn, 187th Inf on 7 Mar 70. 3rd Bn 187th Inf assumed logistical support of D Co, 2nd Bn, 506th Inf on 12 Mar 70. B Co 3/187th came back under the battalion logistical control on 25 Mar 70. D Co 2/506th Inf went back to their battalion logistical control on 19 Mar 70. C and D Companies went OPCON 1/506 on 27 Mar 70 and returned on 30 Mar 70.

b. Material and services:

(1) Class I supplies were available in sufficient quantities. One hot meal, Class "A" was prepared in the Bn Trains area and delivered daily to the companies in mermit containers by the use of UH-1 helicopters. One hot meal, Class "A", was delivered by vehicle to FSB Jack daily. Three hot meals, Class "A", were served daily to the Bn forward TOC and delivered by vehicle. "C" rations were consumed by the field units for two meals each day. Fifty tons of Class I supplies were consumed during the reporting period.

(2) Class II and IV items were drawn from Division Support Command. Five tons of Class II and IV supplies were used by the Bn with the majority used in the Bn Trains area.

(3) Class III supplies were used extensively throughout the Bn Rear Trains area and the Bn forward TOC. 3,000 gal of gasoline and 3,500 gal diesel were used at the Bn forward TOC; 500 gal gasoline and 2,500 gals diesel were delivered to C Company's location at YD548232. 500 gal gasoline and 500 gal diesel were delivered to FSB Jack. 36 tons of Class II supplies were used during the operation.

(4) Class V supplies were issued in sufficient quantities with 18 tons being expended during the reporting period.

(5) 181 tons of supplies were used by the battalion during this period of the operation. This figure includes 6,250 gals water to the field lines, 6,000 gals water to FSB Jack, and 18,000 gals to the Bn forward TOC.
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(6) Maintenance:

Equipment requiring repair was evacuated to D Co, 801st Maintenance for direct support maintenance. A critical shortage of the following items hindered the organizational maintenance capabilities:

(a) Inner tubes for ¾ ton mule
(b) Brake shoes for ¾ ton utility truck M-151
(c) Inner tube for ¾ ton utility truck M-151
(d) Universal joints for ¾ ton utility truck M-151

(7) Transportation:

(a) GROUND: 2 ½ ton and ¾ ton vehicles were used extensively to bring supplies to the BN trains area and to the BN forward TOC.

(b) AIR: The majority of all resupply was accomplished through the use of UH-1 helicopters.

(c) SEA: There was no movement conducted by water during the phase of the operation.

15. (U) Chemical: N/A

16. (C) Civil Affairs:

a. General: The Civic Action Program of the battalion continued during the reporting period. The program was geared towards improving the health, education, and welfare of the civilian population in Phong Dien District. Emphasis was placed on utilization of GVN resources and agencies in order to foster use of Vietnamese supply channels and to avoid dependency on US assistance. All activities reflected the needs and desires of the local population. Civic Action Activities include construction and repair of buildings, medicals, medical classes, activities during cordon operations, assistance in the resettlement of refugees, and commodity distribution.

b. Civic Action Projects: Support during the period of 7 Dec 69-31 Mar 70, consisted of, 326 bags of cement, 2736 board feet of lumber, 343 sheets of tin, 98 desks, and 124 benches were delivered in support of five schools, two dispensaries, and one market. Four schools were completed during the period. One problem encountered was the continued placement of GVN funded projects on the Division projects list. Two school furniture projects placed on the list involved schools which had purchased furniture in 1969. Other problems encountered were the lack of initiative on the part of certain Hamlet Chiefs, misappropriation of materials, and incorrect construction procedures. The material transportation problem has been resolved through continuous use of district truck support.

c. Health Program:

(1) A medical instruction program designed to train people from individual hamlets in the basics of health, sanitation, diagnosis and treatment of common maladies, and preventive medicine was started by the Battalion Surgeon in Jan 70. Each of the 21 hamlets in Phong Dien District was invited...
to send two people to the course to be held in the district dispensary. The 36 hour course was completed on 31 March. Students practiced what they had learned during medcaps. Lesson plans were drawn up in English and Vietnamese; a blackboard was fashioned from a ping pong table. Attendance averaged 32 per class-session during the reporting period.

(2) Medcaps were conducted by the Battalion Surgeon, company medics, Mobile Training Teams, and Brigade Action Teams. Between 7 Dec 69 and 31 Mar 70; 3,409 people were treated by the Battalion Surgeon and his staff; 5,466 patients received treatment from other Battalion units. Vietnamese health workers and students participated in medcaps; thus receiving valuable practical experience while aiding the Battalion Surgeon in screening and treating patients. The effect of Vietnamese helping Vietnamese enhances the image of the GVN as a concerned and responsive agent of the people. The 2-94 Artillery, 2/506 Inf, 2/319 Artillery and Screaming Eagle Replacement School conducted medcaps in the district during the reporting period. Emergency medical evacuation of severely injured civilians was also effected. People continue to flock the medcap sites with "coughs and headaches." Vietnamese medical personnel have held opportunists to a minimum. Candy and other commodities (except soap) were not distributed at medcaps in order to avoid the association of medcaps with commodity distribution.

d. Population Control:

(1) The refugee resettlement program in Phong Dien District is implemented by the District Chief with guidance from Province Headquarters. The 3d Bn, 187th assisted the resettlement program by helping to clear the hamlet areas of mines and boobytraps, requesting trucks for transportation of personnel, providing some area security, requesting CH-47 helicopter support for movement of tin and barbed wire, and by distributing wood, foodstuffs, and soap among the new hamlets.

(2) On 19 Jan 70 approximately 350 refugees were transported by US and VN trucks to a location near the resettlement area. They moved by foot to the hamlet sites of Long Mai (YD524440), Phat Trach (YD509433), Sieu Quan (YD512450), Van Trinh (YD515469), and Vinh Hoa (YD495452). The purpose of this move by heads of households was to survey damaged homesites and clear ground. On 24 Jan 70 the initial party was returned to Con Son Refugee Hamlet (YD-537337). On 26 Jan 70, another group of approximately 350 heads of households were transported to the resettlement area. On 25 Feb 70 approximately 1000 people were transported from Con Son Refugee Hamlet to the resettlement area to begin rebuilding homes and cultivating rice fields. On the 4th and 16th of March a total of 7,360 sheets of tin were airlifted from Thua Thien Provincial warehouse to four of the new hamlets. On 9 Mar 70, 180 rolls of barbed wire and 1,800 engineer stakes were also airlifted to the resettlement area. 5,000 pounds of salvaged plywood and cross beams and 240 ammo boxes were given to the District Chief between 23 Mar and 31 Mar 70 for distribution to the resettlers. Foodstuffs and soap were given to the hamlet chiefs for distribution.
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(3) Between 7 Dec 69 and 31 Mar 70, 10 cordon operations were conducted by 3-187 Inf and Vietnamese personnel. To lesson the disruptive impact of the cordon a great effort was made to insure the comfort of the civilians involved. Tents were erected, coffee and milk distributed, movies shown, and medcaps conducted. On four occasions a cultural drama team performed. Interrogation was conducted solely by Vietnamese. Maximum effort was made to complete the interrogation of all civilians within a total of four to six hours.

e. Special Projects

(1) During the majority of Operation Randolph Glen, SP/4 Paul Dawson of A Company taught English classes in the District High School. He was well accepted by the Vietnamese and did much to further the image of the 101st Airborne Division (AMBL).

(2) During the operation 2 Brigade Action Teams (BAT'S) were formed from the Battalion's resources. These teams were dedicated to specific hamlets and given the following missions: train PSDF and PF forces in the hamlet, conduct limited facility medcaps and short term civic action projects, monitor the Battalion's major civic action projects, and promote understanding and goodwill between the 3/187 and the civilian population. In February the teams were given the additional mission of advertising the Volunteer Information Program and accepting munition turn-ins. In early March the BAT's training mission was deleted as requested by the District Chief. In early March one BAT was disbanded as part of the Battalion's disengagement plan. The remaining BAT is presently located in the hamlet of Uu Diem (YD485434).

17. (C) PSYOPS

A. GENERAL: Psychological operations were conducted by the Battalion to exploit known or suspected enemy weaknesses in order to lower his morale and induce him to Chieu Hoi and to promote pro-GVN attitudes among the local population. The resources available to the Battalion for conducting its PSYOPS missions are, for the most part, consolidated at Brigade Hq. Brigade resources include audio-visual, airborne speaker, ground speaker, leaflet drop, and limited artillery leaflet dissemination capabilities. District Vietnamese resources were scant and consisted primarily of armed propaganda teams and cultural drama teams requested from Province Headquarters.

b. Psychological Operations:

(1) Airborne speaker/leaflet, audio-visual, and ground speaker missions constituted the majority of individual missions requested and coordinated by the Battalion. Only one mission involving artillery leaflet dissemination capabilities was conducted. Leaflet rounds are scarce and, in many cases, unserviceable as a result of age. This was unfortunate because leaflet rounds are highly accurate and represent the best means of exploiting allied forces themes.
(2) Quick reaction leaflet and speaker missions to exploit successful friendly operations were conducted. These missions represented the best possible use of airborne speaker/leaflet capabilities. The lack of a polaroid camera, film, cassette tape recorder and recording tape organic to the Battalion necessitated borrowing these items to perform quick reaction missions. Resultant reaction time was materially affected.

(3) An Armed Propaganda Team from the 101st Polwar Company in Hue operated in the district almost continually from 3 Dec 69 until 15 Mar 70. The team conducted an extensive ground speaker and audio-visual campaign in the hamlets. The person-to-person contact between this seven man team and hamlet residents represented the best means of persuasion possible. During the TET festivities this team distributed TET magazines in the district. The 3-187th Inf donated 75 stencils in support of the publication.

(4) The Volunteer Information Program (VIP) was heavily stressed by the 31 Bn, 187th to help counter the incitement of mines and boobytraps in the district. Increased emphasis on the program began on 19 Jan 70. The Battalion S-5 distributed VIP handbills to the people in Phong Hoa, Phong Hien, and Phong An villages and to refugees moving into the northwestern section of the district. Simultaneously, airborne speaker/leaflet missions began advertising the program. During Operation RANDOLPH GLEN, 66,000§ VN was paid for 32 munition turn-ins by civilians in Phong Dien District. An additional 20 turn-ins were pending payment as of 31 Mar 70. A standing agreement between 3/187 and the MACV District Advisory Team provided MACV funds primarily for weapons payments and 101st Airborne Division funds for mines, boobytraps, and ammunition payments.

(5) During Operation RANDOLPH GLEN, 7 VC from Phong Dien District rallied to the GVN under the Chieu Hoi program.

18. (C) COMMUNICATIONS: The primary source of command and control communications within the Battalion was provided by FM radio, (PRC-25, PRC-77, and VRC-46). A shortage of long antennas for the PRC-25 somewhat restricted CF locations to areas where communications could be maintained. The Battalion TOC, co-located with Phong Dien District Headquarters, communicated with Brigade and Battalion rear (Camp Evans) using FM and VHF, (two common user circuits, one point to point PRC-88 squad radios were employed successfully.

19. (C) ENGINEERS: The 326th Engineer Bn was of great assistance during the reporting period. They enlarged the Helipad at Phong Dien District Headquarters, and helped with the painting of the four landing pads. Work is now being completed on the Jeanne Road northwest of Phong Dien. The estimated time of completion of Jeanne Road is 30 April. The 326th Engineers have conducted numerous mine sweeps in support of the Psyops team, and have been instrumental in speeding-up the resettlement program.
The 14th Engineer Battalion also contributed in large measure to pacification in the district during this reporting period. Work was continued on Route 555 along the northern boundary of the district. Two bridges were completed and two more, including a 400 foot trestle bridge connecting Phong Dien and Huong Dien district, were begun. Work was also begun on a spur road off of Route 555 leading to the refugee resettlement hamlets of Pho Trach (YD492440) and Luong Mai (YD529439).

20. (C) ARTILLERY:

a. Mission: To provide indirect and direct fire support for the 3d Bn, 187th Inf.

b. Concept of the Operation: During the reporting period the 3d Bn, 187th Inf received artillery fire support from C Btry, 2/319th Arty, the direct support 105 battery and reinforcing support from six other artillery batteries, varying in size from 105 to 8". The battalion also received support from C Btry 4/77 Aerial Rocket Artillery Battalion. Artillery support included a thorough interdiction program which proved effective in channelizing enemy movement within the AO, illumination missions for recon elements in contact or pursuit, defensive targets, and LZ preps using ARA in conjunction with tube artillery which proved very effective in providing fire support and cover while insertions were being made. Several Time On Targets were fired based on highly rated intelligence reports. On 18 Mar 70 an artillery TOT was credited with the destruction of an enemy bunker complex vicinity YD4833. Artillery support continued to be very effective during the reporting period.

21. (C) ARMY AVIATION: During the reporting period Army Aviation proved invaluable. Aircraft was used for command and control, eagle flights, visual reconnaissance, combat assaults, medevac, resupply, and rocket fire support. Eagle flights permitted an immediate reaction response to intelligence or visual sightings. Medevac was used to evacuate US and GVN casualties. The aeromedical evacuation of GVN personnel was a well respected asset by GVN civilian and military forces, and served to foster pro-US/GVN attitudes among the population. Gunships were used to prepare LZ's for the insertion of recon teams and radar teams.

22. (C) SPECIAL EQUIPMENT & TECHNIQUES: During the reporting period the 3d Bn, 187th Inf utilized radar raid teams (consisting of a PFS-4 or PFS-5, and 81mm mortar crew and tube, a crew-served starlight scope, a 9CRM recoilless rifle, and an infantry squad for security), eagle flights (last light flights carrying only American troops and daylight flights carrying US and Vietnamese intelligence personnel to check Vietnamese moving or working in the area), Scout Dugs, and multiple squad size ambushes.
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23. (C) COMMANDER'S ANALYSIS:

   a. During the initial phase of Operation RANDOLPH GLEN, the 3d Bn, 187th Inf, successfully accomplished its mission of denying the enemy access to populated areas in the district by conducting offensive operations. Additional combined operations and training were conducted to upgrade the proficiency of local GVN forces, thereby enabling these forces to better perform their respective missions. The Battalion's efforts greatly facilitated the attainment of pacification objectives. The successful beginning of the district's refugee resettlement program was a great step toward these objectives.

   b. Tangible evidence of the Battalion's success in accomplishing its mission was demonstrated by an absence of VC attacks on US/GVN installations and the systematic reduction of enemy movement in the district. GVN forces, by their initiative and actions, have shown the desire and the ability to assume increased responsibility for all facets of their own security and logistical operations.

   c. Coordination with all Vietnamese forces in the AO was essential to tactical success. This coordination was effected by colocating the Battalion TOC and the district headquarters and by placing RF Companies under the operational control of US Companies. Another technique was to give RF Companies and FF Platoons their own small area of operations within the Battalion area of operations. These techniques fostered a close working relationship between the Vietnamese district staff and the US Battalion staff. Each element was immediately notified when the other element was in contact. Fire coordination was achieved in the quickest possible manner. All intelligence was immediately shared. Joint operations were planned and executed rapidly and efficiently. Prisoners were interrogated jointly. Air assets were shared. No action in the district by one side escaped the notice of the other. Joint briefings were held daily and joint situation maps were maintained. This close working relationship was essential to insure that the many actions of US forces, RF, FF, PSDF, and RF cadre were effectively coordinated and did not impinge upon or threaten other forces. The success of this coordination was instrumental in the successful accomplishment of this Battalion's mission.

   d. In summary, efforts of the Battalion to assist the district in furthering its pacification program have been well received, while simultaneously promoting pro-GVN attitudes among the population in areas where US forces conduct training and offensive operations.

   [Signature]

   HERBERT Y. SCHANDLER
   LTC INFANTRY
   Commanding
1. (U) TERRAIN: The terrain in the area of Operations of 3d Bn 187th Infantry varied from coastal lowlands north of Highway 1 to rolling hills south of the highway.

   a. Coastal Terrain: This is the principle rice producing area and is characterized by open sand flats with sparse vegetation, thickets along the many streams, and numerous rice paddies. Trafficability for ground troops was generally good throughout the area.

   b. Rolling Hills: The terrain in this area consisted of low rolling hills covered with light brush type vegetation, many areas of heavy vegetation in the low areas and along streams, and untended rice paddies. Trafficability in this area was generally good for both ground troops and vehicles, except during periods of precipitation when the rice paddies and streams in the area became temporarily swollen.

2. (U) WEATHER: Weather during the reporting period was generally fair and warm with intermittent periods of rain fall and morning ground fog. The total rain fall for this period was two inches.

3. (C) ENEMY ACTIVITIES: During the reporting period the following enemy units were believed operating in the 3/187 Area of Operation:

   a. The C1l3 Local Force Company

   b. The C1l4 Local Force Company

   c. The Viet Cong Infrastructure (VCI) of Phong Dien District (See Appendix 1).

4. (C) INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS: Visual reconnaissance mission were flown daily over the AO.

   a. Small reconnaissance patrols were employed throughout the AO to inhibit enemy movement.

   b. The employment of radar (PES-4 and PPS-5) proved to be an asset to the battalion throughout the operation. Three to five radars were employed simultaneously in the AO to detect enemy movement. Additional ground surveillance equipment was employed by Brigade in support of 3/187.
1. (C) The VCI of Phong Dien District along with the local force units maintain bases in the mountainous jungle areas to the south and southwest of the district. The VC and VCI use four routes to enter Phong 'Dich District. Their primary route is the river area extending from YD450348 to YD480368. They also use the river area extending from YD465287 to YD520323, the low areas south and southwest of Camp Evans, and the Song Bo river area. The VC and VCI often move quite near the Camp Evans perimeter when entering Dong Lam hamlet or when using this route to cross Highway 1.

   a. The VCI have three main objectives when infiltrating into the district:
   
      (1) To meet with the people in the populated centers to propagandize and proselytize.
   
      (2) To collect taxes, rice and other supplies.
   
      (3) To conduct reconnaissance of allied operations in the district.

   b. During the reporting period a total of 20 VCI were eliminated by all allied forces:

      (1) Two from district level positions, 5 from village level positions, and 13 from hamlet level positions.
   
      (2) Of these, 2 were KIA and 18 were PW.

2. (C) Indicated below is a listing of the VCI eliminated during the reporting period. The list is categorized first by district level VCI eliminated and then, by each village in order, to include hamlet level personnel eliminated from that village.

   a. District level VCI eliminated during the reporting period:

      (1) Hoang Ngoc Cu an engineer squad leader for the District Party Committee was KIA on 3 Mar by C Company, 3/187 at YD604283.

      (2) Nguyen Tuang Vy Commo/Liaison Cadre for the District Party committee was KIA on 11 Mar by Recon, 3/187 at YD 525372.

   b. VCI eliminated from Phong An and Phong Son Villages:

      (1) Phan Son, a sapper for the Village Party Committee, was captured by the O14 FF just after detonating a mine at Pho Ninh hamlet on 5 Mar, YD607294.

      (2) Tran Den same as above.
c. VCI eliminated from Phong Loc Village:

(1) Tran Thi Chuy, a Supply Section member from My Phu hamlet was arrested on 20 Mar by the Police Special Branch at YD607294.

(2) Vo Thi Dinh, a Commo/Licison and Economy member from Luong Mai hamlet was arrested on 20 Mar by the National Police at YD535340.

(3) Pham Thi Lao, a Commo/Licison and Intelligence Cadre from My Phu hamlet was arrested on 20 Mar by the Police Special Branch at YD535430.

d. VCI eliminated from Phong Hoa Village:

(1) Nguyen Thi Hoi was arrested by the National Police on 21 Feb at YD500421. She was a hamlet level Intelligence Cadre.

(2) Nguyen Thi Xe was arrested by the National Police on 21 Feb at YD500421. She was a hamlet level Political Cadre.

(3) Nguyen Thi Hoc was arrested by the National Police on 26 Feb at YD487436. She was a hamlet level recruit with no position yet.

(4) Nguyen Khoc Loc was arrested by the National Police on 26 Feb at YD487436. She was a hamlet level Intelligence Cadre.

(5) Nguyen Van Cu was arrested by the National Police during a Vietnamese cordon of Uu Dien at Yd 500421 on 11 Mar. He was a member of the hamlet Farmer's Association.

e. VCI eliminated from Phong Binh Village:

(1) Nguyen Thi Ngan was arrested by the National Police on 21 Feb at YD486436. She was a member of the Hamlet Women's Association.

(2) Nguyen Quach was captured on 16 Mar by the PRU at YD508437. He was a Village Supply Section Member.

f. VCI eliminated from Phong Nguyen Village:

(1) Le Thanh Giac was captured by 2/306 at YD485327 on 26 Feb. He was a Village Security Committee Member.

(2) Do Nan was arrested by the Vietnamese Military Security Service on 5 Mar. He was a member of the Military Proselyting Section, hamlet level.
(3) Truan Dang Dong was arrested by the Vietnamese Military Security Service on 5 Mar. He was a member of the Military Proselyting Section, Hamlet level.

3. (C) There were also four Local Force VC eliminated, one KIA and three Hoi Chanh's.

a. VC eliminated from the C-113 Local Force Company and the Phong Son Armed Unit (a platoon of the C-113).

(1) Le Dien was KIA on 11 Mar by C Company 3/187 at YD590265. He was a guerilla member of the Phong Son Armed Unit.

(2) Thai Cuoc rallied on 24 Mar to GP 4 RF Headquarters at YD614279. He was a guerilla member of the Phong Son Armed Unit.

(3) Nguyen Nghia rallied on 26 Mar to the 129 RF Company at YD615297. He was a guerilla member of the C-113, which he told us had been just renamed the Phong Dien Ranger Unit.

b. VC eliminated from the C-114 Local Force Company: Van Phiet rallied on 28 Feb to B Company 3/187 at YD544313. He was a squad leader in the C-114 Local Force Company.

4. (C) There were also three unidentified VC/VCI KIA on 31 Mar 70 by the Phong Dien PF Special Squad at YD628339.