AVDO-CS

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

Commanding General
XXIV Corps
ATTN: AVII-GCT
APO 96349

(U) The enclosed Operation Report - Lessons Learned is forwarded in compliance with USARV Supplement 1 to AR 525-15 and XXIV Corps Regulation 525-2.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

DONALD A. SEIBERT
Colonel, GS
Chief of Staff

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CO, 2nd Bde, 101st Abn Div (Ambl) w incl

Regraded Unclassified when
Separated from Classified
Inclusions
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R: GRADED UNCLASSIFIED
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  CSSIC INFO 2
AVD-66

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airborne), Period Ending 31 October 1970, RDG 0609LG (u)

1. (G) Operations: Significant Activities

a. Operations. The reporting period was marked by continuing close coordination and cooperation with the 1st Infantry Division (ARVN) and the Thu Thien Province and District Officials. This close coordination and cooperation was exploited in the conduct of operations designed to assist GVN forces in assuming full responsibility for all aspects of combat, pacification and development (Vietnamisation).

   (1) Operation TEXAS STAR, a division wide operation that commenced on 1 April 1970, continued through the reporting until termination on 5 September 1970.

   (a) The division continued to conduct extensive airborne operations in the cao bang mountains of the division AO, employing the 1st and 3d Bdes, in coordination with the 1st, 3d and 54th Regts (ARVN), and division reconnaissance assets to maintain a protective shield around the periphery of the populated lowlands, locate and destroy enemy units, base camps and cache sites, and interdict enemy movement into the lowlands. These operations provided the necessary secure environment in which the 2d Bde, in coordination with the 3d and 54th Regts (ARVN) was able to assist GVN officials of Thu Thien Province and Districts, in pursuing national objectives related to GVN political stability and socio-economic development.

   (b) In early August, Operation CHICAGO FRAN/IA: SON 353 continued in the FS/08 MAUJAN, GOODMAN and AIRBORNE area. Elements of the 1st Bde, in operational coordination with the 3d Regt (ARVN) had assaulted into the area on 25 July, followed on 30 July by two battalions of the 3d Regt (ARVN). This operation was designed to locate and destroy enemy caches, supply drop and demolish enemy installations, and interdict routes of re-supply and communication in the mountains area northeast of the GIAM VALLEY.

   (c) Also in early August, intelligence information and increased enemy activity evidenced an enemy build-up of forces in the FS/08 O'KEELLY area. Intelligence gained from a Hot Shot, who rallied on 13 August, indicated that the 6th NVA Regt was preparing for major assault designed...
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Operational Report - Lese-n: Learned 1st Airborne Division (Air Mobile), Peso-Ln in 31 October 1970, and GSUC-22 (RE) (U)

to 500 A&M units to conduct O'M'ILLY during the month of August. In
response to this intelligence, the 1st Bnpt (A&M) reinforced elements
station in B/00 O'M'ILLY area deployed three battalions to conduct search
and attack operations in the O'M'ILLY area. The 3d Bnpt, in combination
with the 3d Bnpt (A&M) commenced operations northwest of 3E/00 O'M'ILLY
in the HA0N TE and JUDTE areas. Combined operations continued in the
O'M'ILLY, K'UN' and JUDTE areas throughout the month of August and were
successful in locating and inflicting heavy casualties on enemy units in the
area.

(d) During the period 26 August to 5 September, the division began
reporting in writing and reallocating units in preparation for the implementa-
tion of Operation JEFFERSON (EMH/BOECON 11127). This realignment included
an increase in responsibility for support of pacification, development an-
mobile training teams in the populated Locals of the division. The
3d Bnpt assumed responsibility for maintaining liaison with GVN officials
in the four districts of Qu Cia Chien Area north of the Perfume River:
HUE, DANJ, MIKON DIII, and PHU. This district. The 3d Bnpt
maintained responsibility for maintaining liaison with GVN officials in
the CH, HAI, SUN, and HU/VA G Districts.

(e) Enemy forces inflicted by the division during Operation JEFFERSON
were:

- Killed in action (b-w comm.) 2570
- Present of War 3
- Wounded 12
- Mortal Wounded 422
- silk
- Total division casualties during the operation were:
- Killed in action 347
- Died of Wounds 7
- Wounded in action 1799
- Missing in action 7

2

(4) The division implemented Operation Order 197-70, JEFFERSON 111-7/
Operation - Report - Lessons Learned, 10th Air Div - Division (Air Div), Forte Laban - 1 October 1947, AWG STRIN (V) (B) (0)

In the fall of 1947, the situation indicated the enemy's probable objectives would be to maintain pressure on US, AAF and territorial forces, while continuing to rebuild the Air Force infrastructure. Offensive activity was expected to be characterized by attacks by the "front-line" divisions and support attacks against Allied maneuver units. As a result, the enemy directed his efforts in the coastal areas. In December, it was anticipated that the enemy would attempt to improve the existing position areas and lines of communication, and establish forward staging areas which would continue to run until the 8th Air Force joined the offensive and for the redeployment of US forces from the area. Opportunity to launch a major attack in the Philippines during the wet season was estimated to occur. These probable enemy courses of action and to exploit the lessons learned in the 1946-47 monsoon season.

(a) Unit Organization

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1st Air Div S</th>
<th>24th Div S</th>
<th>3rd Air Div</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st Inf</td>
<td>2nd Inf</td>
<td>3rd Inf</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd Inf</td>
<td>4th Inf</td>
<td>5th Inf</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6th Arm (1s)</td>
<td>3rd Arm (1s)</td>
<td>7th Arm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8th Arm (2s)</td>
<td>9th Arm (2s)</td>
<td>10th Arm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Avn</td>
<td>2nd Avn</td>
<td>3rd Avn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th Avn</td>
<td>5th Avn</td>
<td>6th Avn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Arty (1s)</td>
<td>2nd Arty (1s)</td>
<td>3rd Arty (1s)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th Arty (1s)</td>
<td>5th Arty (1s)</td>
<td>6th Arty (1s)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th Arty (1s)</td>
<td>8th Arty (1s)</td>
<td>9th Arty (1s)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10th Arty (1s)</td>
<td>11th Arty (1s)</td>
<td>12th Arty (1s)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(continued)
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**Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airborne), Period Ending 31 October 1970, S2 G-300-65 (M) (D)**

|----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-------------|------------|--------------|-------------------|--------------|-------------|---------------------|

(b) The primary mission of JEFFERSON (MEN/MOISTON PLAN 70) is to provide a protective shield for the populated lowlands of THIA THIAN Province, to isolate and destroy enemy forces, staging areas and forward cache sites, to protect vital lines of communication and to assist GVN officials in meeting their pacification and development goals for 1970. The operation sustains the concept of a complete integration of effort of all agencies within the division area of operation for the accomplishment of the inseparable tasks of improving territorial security, protecting the people against terrorism, improving the People's Self-Defense Force (NSFP), developing local self-management in administrative, economic, and financial affairs, developing a greater national unity, improving the life for war victims, establishing an information system to educate and motivate the people to participate in local development, and continuing to build towards prosperity for all.

(a) To accomplish this mission during the northeast monsoon season, division units were repositioned in the piedmont and eastern mountain regions. Repositioning facilitated resupply operations by road and greatly decreased the possibility of small units being isolated deep in the upland mountains without the capability of being reinforced, as a result of extended periods of inclement weather. The 1st Bde was positioned southwest of HMB to conduct reconnaissance and security operations in their assigned AS. Elements of the Bde secured 36/09 BASTONG (TD 620009), BILIMOGHIN (TD 706102), and TESSEL (TD 520634), prepared to close TESSEL.

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Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile),
Period Ending 31 October 1970, RO 05808-65 (E2) (U)

on order, the Bde continued to conduct operations in close coordination
with the 3d Regt (ARVN). The 2d Bde was positioned in the lowlands, pied-
mont and eastern mountain regions to support the pacification and develop-
ment progress in close coordination and cooperation with the 5th Regt (ARVN).
Elements of the 3d Bde secured FS/0Bs ARSENAL (ID 81208), BRICK (ID 839995),
TOMAHAWK (2D 713013), and LOS BANDOS (AT 832999). The Bde maintained liaison
with the six districts of THAN THIEN Province as stated above. The 3d Bde
was positioned in the lowlands, piedmont and canyon regions south of CAMP
EUREKA to conduct reconnaissance and security operations in close coordina-
tion with the 1st and 3d Regts (ARVN). Elements of the Bde secured FS/0Bs
BAKERSAN (ID 439497) and JACK (ID 493287) and maintained liaison with the
four northern districts of THAN THIEN Province.

(d) During the month of September, concentrated enemy activity con-
tinued in FS/0B O'BRIEN area. It became apparent that the enemy remained
determined to drive ARVN forces from the area by employing indirect fire
attacks, followed by limited ground probes. These tactics resulted in
light casualties to ARVN forces in the area. Combined search and attack
operations by elements of the 1st and 3d Regts (ARVN), supported by divi-
sion assets, continued to locate and inflict moderate casualties on the
enemy.

(e) On 26 September, elements of the 1st Bde, in coordination with the
3d Regt (ARVN), air assaulted to conduct limited objective operations in
the FS/0B TENNESSEE and WHIP area. This operation was conducted in re-
action to intelligence which indicated the 5th Regt, MESSK base area
were located in the vicinity of TENNESSEE and WHIP. During this same
time period, elements of the 2d Bde conducted operations deep in the
division AO in the vicinity of the RUONG RUONG VALLEY to locate and de-
stroy base areas of the 4th Regt, WHIP. Persisting low clouds, high
winds and heavy rains restricted these operations during the period 1 to
3 October. Both operations were terminated on 4 October with minimal
success. Small amounts of enemy stores had been located and evacuated
or destroyed, but no major base areas had been discovered and no signifi-
cant enemy contact had been established.

(f) Following their operation in the TENNESSEE and WHIP area, the
1st Bde and the 3d Regt (ARVN) launched a combined operation in the area
north of FS/0B BASTOGNE in the vicinity of the traditional boundary of
the 1st Bde and the 3d Regt (ARVN). A build-up of intelligence during
the last two weeks of October indicated the presence of elements of the
810th Rn, 5th NVA Regt in this area. Operations in the BASTOGNE area
continued through the reporting period with sporadic contact, resulting
in 53 NVA/VC KIA and 38 individual weapons captured.

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Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 31 October 1970, REG CSROR-65 (P2) (V)

(g) FS/OS O'REILLY was closed by the 1st Bde (ARVN) on 7 October. Operations in the vicinity of O'REILLY were highly successful, causing moderate to heavy NVA casualties. The massing of forces around the firebase during August and September had presented numerous targets which were vulnerable to allied fire support weapons systems. The decision to close FS/OS O'REILLY was based on expected difficulty in re-supplying or reinforcing elements in the area during the northeast monsoon. The enemy had not forced the 1st Bde (ARVN) to withdraw from the firebase.

(3) (a) Air Activities:

During the reporting period, close air support sorties were flown in the division area of operation as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Aug</th>
<th>Sep</th>
<th>Oct</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PAC directed air strikes</td>
<td>975</td>
<td>757</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>1893</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat Sky Spot</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>495</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAF Gunship (Shadow and Stinger)</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USMC Flareship</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Confound 40ex

HE (Tons)             2822.50  2007.50  1044.75  5874.75

Napalm (Tons)         194.00  116.75  6.50  315.25

20mm cannon (rds) 47,640  99,773  22,420  170,833

(b) The following ARC LIGHT strikes were employed in the division AO:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Aug</th>
<th>Sep</th>
<th>Oct</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>154</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(c) Bombs damage assessments of tactical air strikes and ARC LIGHT strikes during the reporting period revealed the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Aug</th>
<th>Sep</th>
<th>Oct</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Enemy killed by air force</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Category</td>
<td>KIA</td>
<td>MIA</td>
<td>WIA</td>
<td>GSW</td>
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<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug</td>
<td>305</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>.2</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>651</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne-Division (Airborne),
Period Ending 31 October 1970, ROS GENTAC-65 (R2) (U)

(5) Friendly casualties during the reporting period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>KIA</th>
<th>MIA</th>
<th>KIA</th>
<th>KIA</th>
<th>KIA</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HHC/DIV</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HHC/1 BN</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HHC/2 BN</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>HHC/3 BN</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>3/187 INF</td>
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<td>16</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/327 INF</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/327 INF</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/501 INF</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/501 INF</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/502 INF</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/502 INF</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>52</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/506 INF</td>
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<td>4</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/506 INF</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/506 INF</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>DIV ASST</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>101 AVN GP</td>
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<td>14</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPT COMD</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/17 Cav</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L/75 RANGERS</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>326 ENGES</td>
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<td>3</td>
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<td>2</td>
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<td>6</td>
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<tr>
<td>501 SIG</td>
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<td>101 MP</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TOTAL 30 278 0 10 55 273
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Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airborne),
Period Ending 31 October 1970, MACDFSOR-65 (R2) (U)

(6) Operations Narrative for period 1 August - 31 October. See Enclosure 1.

b. Training:

(1) The current battalion refresher training program, initiated 12 May 1970,
has continued with slight changes in rotation of battalions caused by operational
commitments. The number of mandatory subjects and training hours has been re-
duced from 27 hours to 15-1/2 hours to allow battalion commanders more flexibility
for instruction during refresher training.

(2) A sniper course of instruction has been established at the Screaming
Eagle Replacement Training School for the 1st Infantry Division (Airborne). The
intent of the program of instruction is to conduct intensive marksmanship training
for selected personnel of the 1st Infantry Division (Airborne). Students success-
fully completing the course will be highly skilled marksmen, capable of engaging
the enemy at extended small arms ranges. Class 1-70 will commence on 3 November
1970. The training program will be of 12 days duration.

(3) The division began receiving in-theater personnel from other commands for
replacement training at SHORF on 8 September 1970. Initially, the program was
of 19-1/2 hours duration. As the number of arriving personnel increased, it be-
came necessary to reduce the instruction to 13 training hours, permitting a more
rapid turnover at SHORF. The objective of the training is to provide instruction
in those areas that are required to attain maximum degree of combat proficiency
in airborne operations.

(4) The division has reduced its OWN training program in the populated
lowlands. The division discontinued deployment of the indicated battalion on
21 August 1970, and the number of MRTs deployed decreased from 22 to 2 during
the quarter due to the arrival of newly formed Mobile Advisory Teams (MAT). The
remaining 2 teams are located in Phu Tho and Nam Ha Districts. These two teams
train and conduct operations with separate RF companies. Presently there are
no MATs programmed to replace these teams. It is anticipated that these teams
will remain active until they are no longer needed by the respective districts.
During the last quarter, the following combined operations were conducted:

- 91 company-size operations
- 15 platoon-size operations
- 22 RF squad-size operations
- 11 RF platoon-size operations

These combined operations consisted primarily of night ambushes and daylight
patrols. Reconnaissance in force, combat assaults, and Eagle Flight operations

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were also conducted. Formal classes were taught by NTTs when GVN officials or local commanders requested instruction in specific subject areas. Elements of the division will continue to maintain liaison with each of the 10 rural districts in Tu, Thien Province for the purposes of coordinating combined operations.

(5) Preparations for the northeast monsoon were initiated in mid-August, in order to place the division in the best possible posture for the rainy period. The need for wet weather training was emphasized to all battalions. It was recommended that battalions modify refresher training lesson plans in appropriate subject areas to integrate training on operational problems caused by the northeast monsoon. It was further recommended that battalions include in their refresher training river crossing techniques, construction of defensive positions, equipment maintenance, and field hygiene during the northeast monsoon.

(6) On 1 September 1970, the NTT/1203 team arrived at the 101st Airborne Division (AirMobile) to begin training the 501st Maintenance Battalion (AirMobile), and armorers and gunners within the division on the M703 grenade launchers. The weapon was received favorably by the division. On 23 October 1970, the NTT/1203 team returned to follow-up previous instruction. The team noted that in many cases the M703 barrel would not lock in position. This has been attributed to excess plastic on the breech end of the handgun or to the barrel latch being a fraction too long. Capt Charles White, team chief, noted that this fault had been discovered in a few isolated cases during the initial instruction. He recommended, at that time, that the specifications and plans for the barrel handgrips and barrel latches be re-examined to determine where the problem exists.

c. Chemical

(2) General. The division chemical section, with operational control of the 10th Chemical Detachment (CGD) and the 10th Chemical Platoon (CP) continued the program of combat support.

(2) New Techniques. Employment of PHIS Slurry. This Slurry has been used in several areas throughout the division AO. The slurry is an ultraviolet sensitive material of the Personnel Marking and Identification System which is used to mark and identify individuals trespassing in unauthorized areas within the division AO. Target areas are planned by division, brigade, ARVN and District Headquarters. The slurry is employed using the Agramco sprayer mounted in a UH-1 helicopter. The target areas are known or suspected enemy routes of infiltration. These routes are restricted to civilian use and have low vegetation for helicopter spray operations. A line approximately 20 meters wide and 3,000 meters long is created by making several low-level passes perpendicular to the suspected direction of enemy movement. Approximately 700 gallons of PHIS Slurry have been employed to date. Ultraviolet lamps are used to monitor civilians to detect traces of the PHIS slurry. Monitoring is conducted at entrances to base camp areas and during cordon and search operations. Over a 3 week period
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Operational Report - Leavenworth, 101st Airborne Division (Airborne),
Period Ending 31 October 1970, HCS ORAR-65 (R2) (U)

4,950 individuals have been monitored resulting in 39 persons being detained.
In some cases, the detainees were questioned by division IPM teams and Vietnamese National Police. Though
most personnel were released, several admitted trespassing into unauthorized areas and 12 individuals were identified as draft dodgers.

(3) Improvisation. Truck-mounted diesel defoliation rig. The use of
authorized herbicides (K200 and White) is restricted to areas specifically
approved by Provian and KAOV authorities. Requirements often arise to de-
foliate areas where herbicides are not authorized. Therefore, in a con-
tinuing effort to exploit new ways to enhance support to ground unit commanders,
a method was developed to burn vegetation with diesel. This is accomplished
by use of a 75% diesel - 25% oil mixture dispersed from truck-mounted diesel
containers using two hoses and a 100 GPM pump. Any type diesel containers,
hoses, and pump that have compatible fittings will work. Three men are required
to operate the rig - a truck driver, a pump operator, and a hose man. When the die-
sel has been dispersed in sufficient concentration and the truck removed to a
safe area, the vegetation can be ignited by a portable flamethrower, trip flares,
or smoke grenades. If burning cannot be accomplished because of mines, communi-
cation wires, or other equipment in the area, the diesel fuel is allowed to
remain on the ground. The diesel, if left on the grass, will kill the vegetation
in about seven days. In this case, a fire guard should watch the area for
approximately five hours after spraying to prevent accidental ignition. After
this time the diesel will be soaked into the ground and will be very difficult
to ignite. The diesel defoliation operation is supervised by an officer or
responsible noncommissioned officer. Fire extinguishers should be readily avail-
able. Using this method, defoliation was accomplished around five Vietnamese
district headquarters, several fire support bases and base camp perimeters, and a
critical bridge site.

(4) Expedient. Use of Persistent CS on enemy crops.

Due to a rapid increase in reported enemy crop locations within the division
area, an extensive crop destruction program was initiated during August using
organic division assets. Lug-4-Vugs filled with herbicide agent KAOV were employed
on small, widely scattered plots. Three crop locations were reported with
numerous large cultivated fields which would require an extensive effort to destroy
employing Lug-4-Vugs. To reduce the effort required to deny the crops to the
enemy, a plan was devised and executed to drop CS on the three large fields
to restrict enemy harvesting efforts and to contaminate the crops with CS. Two
CH47 Helicopters flew a total of six sorties dropping 165-25-gallon drums of
persistent CS on the fields from an altitude of 4000 ft AGL. Visual reconnais-
sance revealed 100% of the drums landed within the target areas and approximately
75% of the crops were effectively covered with CS.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>MISSION</th>
<th>MISSIONS</th>
<th>QOUNTS</th>
<th>AMOUNT</th>
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<tr>
<td>Airborne Personnel Extract</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>71</td>
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<tr>
<td>Flak Silly</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>700 Gallons</td>
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<tr>
<td>Plane Drop</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>336</td>
<td>3,682 Drums</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bulk CS2 (persistent)</td>
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<td>10</td>
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<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>72 RIL-52a</td>
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<td>Tactical CS (non-persistent)</td>
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<td>54</td>
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<td>Defoliation</td>
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<td>Herbicide, Agent Blue</td>
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<td>49</td>
<td>2,775 Gallons</td>
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<td>Defoliation (con't)</td>
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<td>Aerial Diesel</td>
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<td>20</td>
<td>1,660 Gallons</td>
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<td>33</td>
<td>336 Jugs</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>Protective Masks Inspected</td>
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<td>Repaired/Drac</td>
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<td>Decoy Appx MIL Inspect/Drac</td>
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<td>0/0 Apparatus</td>
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<tr>
<td>Maty Hites Inspect/Drac</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>5/1 Mity Kits</td>
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### Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airborne)

**Period Ending:** 31 October 1970, BES Cmds 65 (UK) (V)

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<td>Cave Seeding/Operations</td>
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<td>N/A</td>
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#### d. Intelligence

1. **Enemy Situation**

   a. At the beginning of the reporting period, enemy units were located as follows:

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<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>LOCATION</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4th Regt HQ</td>
<td>YG9751</td>
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<tr>
<td>4th Inf Bn</td>
<td>221897</td>
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<td>4th Air Bn</td>
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<td>5th Regt HQ</td>
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<td>5th Inf Bn</td>
<td>YG6297</td>
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<td>6th Inf Bn</td>
<td>YG5968</td>
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<tr>
<td>6th Art Bn</td>
<td>TG5715</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K32 25th Arty Bn</td>
<td>TG7259</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chatham 1 Sapper Bn</td>
<td>TG6995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chatham 2 Sapper Bn</td>
<td>TG7294</td>
</tr>
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<td>6th Regt HQ</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>32nd Inf Bn</td>
<td>TD3765</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32nd Inf Bn</td>
<td>TD3018</td>
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<td>TD4224</td>
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<tr>
<td>32nd Inf Bn</td>
<td>TD3626</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32nd Inf Bn</td>
<td>TD3918</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th Front HQ</td>
<td>TD2130</td>
</tr>
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<td>8th Regt HQ</td>
<td>TD2085</td>
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<tr>
<td>8th Inf Bn</td>
<td>TD2824</td>
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<td>8th Inf Bn</td>
<td>TD1929</td>
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<tr>
<td>9th Inf Bn</td>
<td>TD2730</td>
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<td>K9 (All 20th) Sapper Bn/3042 Division</td>
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<td>10th Inf Bn</td>
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<td>11th Inf Bn</td>
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<td>K12 25th Arty Bn</td>
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<td>K12 Sapper Bn</td>
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<td>K12 Sapper Bn</td>
<td>TD1327</td>
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<tr>
<td>324th Div</td>
<td>TA 511</td>
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<td>403rd Regt HQ</td>
<td>TB4415</td>
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<td>1st Inf Bn</td>
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<tr>
<td>3d Inf Bn</td>
<td>XG340</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/2 Trans Bn</td>
<td>XG214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29th Inf Regt</td>
<td>YK306</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th Inf Bn</td>
<td>XG680</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8th Inf Bn</td>
<td>XG205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9th Inf Bn</td>
<td>XG205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>675th Arty Regt</td>
<td>NA 611</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11A Recon Bn</td>
<td>YM9398</td>
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<td><strong>Local Force Units</strong></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phu Loc Special Action Unit</td>
<td>YM0395</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phong Dien Special Action Unit</td>
<td>YM0226</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quang Dien Special Action Unit</td>
<td>YM0172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C115 Local Force Company</td>
<td>YM6851</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C116 Local Force Company</td>
<td>YM6854</td>
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<tr>
<td>Phu Vang Special Action Unit</td>
<td>YM9398</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hue City Recon Bn</td>
<td>YM6851</td>
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**Ha B5 Front**

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<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>12th AT Bn</td>
<td>XD9982</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 Arty Bn</td>
<td>DMZ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14th AA Bn (12.7mm)</td>
<td>DMZ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15th Logistic Bn</td>
<td>Unlocated</td>
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<tr>
<td>16th Signal Bn</td>
<td>DMZ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17th Trans Bn</td>
<td>DMZ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19th Med Bn</td>
<td>XD9939</td>
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<tr>
<td>33rd Sapper Bn</td>
<td>XD9561</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75th AA Bn (12.7mm)</td>
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**304th NVA Div**

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<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9th Inf Regt</td>
<td>XD9922</td>
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<tr>
<td>1st Inf Bn</td>
<td>XD7738</td>
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<tr>
<td>2d Inf Bn</td>
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<tr>
<td>3d Inf Bn</td>
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<tr>
<td>22B Inf Regt</td>
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<tr>
<td>66th Inf Regt</td>
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<tr>
<td>7th Inf Bn</td>
<td>XD8930</td>
</tr>
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<td>8th Inf Bn</td>
<td>XD8530</td>
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<tr>
<td>9th Inf Bn</td>
<td>XD0530</td>
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**320th NVA Div**

<table>
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<th>Location</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>48th Inf Regt</td>
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<td></td>
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</table>
Operational Report - Landing Zones - 101st Airborne Division (Airborne),
Period Ending 30 October 1969

UNIT                           LOCATION
52d Inf Regt                   Unlocated
64th Inf Regt                  Unlocated
325th NVA Div (AXA 308)        Unlocated
36th Inf Regt                  Unlocated
45th Inf Regt                  Unlocated
102d Inf Regt                  Unlocated
27th Inf Regt (Indep)          YD3668
1st Inf Bn                     YD3669
2d Inf Bn                      XD0570
3d Inf Bn                      XD0459
31st Local Force Group         YD1185
27th Inf Bn                    YD1185

136th Inf Regt (Indep)         Unlocated
246th Inf Regt (Indep)         YD9271
1st Inf Bn                     XD9273
2d Inf Bn                      XD7944
3d Inf Bn                      XD9461
270th Inf Regt (Indep)         XD1966
126th Naval Sapper Regt        YD2189
84th Arty Regt                 XD9874
164th Arty Regt                XD9684
204th Arty Regt                Unlocated

(b) August 1970

During August the 4th NVA Regiment continued to avoid significant contact, and for the second consecutive month, its activity remained at a generally low level. Elements of the 5th NVA Regiment continued offensive operations, with attacks by fire against Allied installations along the Nui Son (D) p Tehran and lowland areas. Activity by the 6th Regiment during August was directed against Firebase O'KELLY. They were reinforced by elements of the 29th NVA Regiment, 324th Division. Analysis indicated that the 324th Division possibly was controlling enemy operations in the Firebase O'KELLY area. Activity by units of the 7th Front remained subdued, except for the 808th NVA Battalion. On 13 August, the battalion made its third incursion into the Quang Tri (P) Inlands in as many months.
2. Enemy activity in the 85 Front area of operations (USFC) continued at a high level throughout the month of August. High points of activity during the month were the incursion into the Hai Long (D) lowlands by the 3rd Battalion/7th Regiment, and the overall eastward deployment of the 9th Regiment to the Quang Tri – Thuong Son border areas. This marked the first time that any other element of the 85 Front had operated this far south, except for the brief appearance of elements of the Division in the line area during the 9th Offensive of 1968. In early August, enemy activity increased significantly in the Firebase BARKET area. By the end of the month enemy casualties were 124 NVA kia and two NVA wounded. A FW captured from the 15th Engineer Company/266th Infantry Regiment, revealed that the 246th was responsible for constructing a road from Gia Dinh, south to Ben Bai (vicinity ID562) through Laos, and east through Quang Tri (P) to the Binh Dinh area in preparation for the infiltration of the 1st and 2nd Battalions/246th Regiment. Analysis of captured documents and FW interrogations revealed that the 26th Sapper Battalion/30th Division had been redesignated the 19th Sapper Battalion.

(a) September 1970

1. In Military Region Tri-Thien-Hue, September began with an apparent concentrated effort by the enemy to drive ARVN forces from the mountainous areas. During the month, the enemy employed a total of 2450 rounds of 60mm, 82mm, 120mm mortar, 75mm recoilless rifle and 122mm rocket fire in the Firebase O'BRIEN area. Both the 6th and 29th Regiments remained firmly committed around the firebase. Activity continued to be light in the 9th Front area of operations. The 803rd Regiment remained uncommitted in the northern portion of the A Shau Valley. Although activity in the 4th Regiment area of operations increased during the month of September, the regiment generally continued to avoid significant contact with Allied units. The overall level of enemy initiated activity decreased in the 5th Regiment AO. The month was marked by limited probes and attacks by fire against 63 and ARVN installations.

2. Enemy activity in the 85 Front during September showed a 50 percent decrease when compared with August. Evidence was found confirming operations by the 27th NVA Regiment in the central DMZ area, indicating that the unit was refitted and resupplied, and possibly was assuming a more aggressive role. Activity in the western DMZ and in western Quang Tri (P) pointed to the probability of an enemy build-up in the Binh Dinh area, as sensor activations in this area were sustained at a relatively high rate throughout the month. Activity in the area of operations of the 30th Division decreased substantially during September. The 68th Regiment possibly withdrew southward in order to maintain control of the vital infiltration and logistical routes of western Quang Tri (P). Though there was a lack of identifiable contact with the 9th Regiment, it was believed that elements of the regiment may have deployed to the O'BRIEN-SAN BARBA area. At the end of September, intelligence pointed to a possible NVA assault offensive in the 85 Front area of operations.

(d) October 1970

1. During October, the 4th Regiment concentrated on interdicting the Hue-Dalang Railroad, but otherwise continued to avoid significant contact.
Activity in the 5th Regiment increased steadily throughout the month, culminating on 22 October with attacks by fire on Camp Eagle and Firebases HUNTING-HAW and ARSENAL. Significant contact with the 6th Regiment indicated increased interest in the lowlands as several contacts occurred east of QL-2. Activity in this area dropped significantly with the closing of Firebase D'BUETLY. The 7th Front, after a period of little or no consequential activity, achieved a mine-sweep team on 17 October vicinity YD980376, resulting in two US KIA, seven US WIA, 12 ARVN KIA and 11 NVA KIA. Contact with the 803d Regiment at the beginning of the month was negligible. However, by the end of October, the regiment had completed refitting and was returning to a combat role.

2 Enemy activity in the 85 Front throughout October appeared to be following the basic outline of the Second Phase of the Fall Campaign. This phase consisted of the following steps: collecting information and stockpiling food and equipment, weapon preparation and troop rest, and attacks on selected targets beginning in early November. Firebase W3132 remained a frequent target for attacks by fire. Ground attacks remained at a low level. Significant contacts developed as a result of allied operations rather than because of enemy operations. On 8 October, in response to heavy sensor activations, Trip 0, 3d Sqd, 17th Cav engaged possible replacements for the 304th Division at YD9764387, resulting in 29 NVA KIA. On 14 October 2d Co, 4th Bn, 2d Regt (ARVN) engaged an enemy force at XG964304, resulting in three NVA KIA and miscellaneous supplies and equipment captured.

(a) At the end of the reporting period, enemy units were relocated as follows:

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<tr>
<th>UNITS RELOCATED</th>
<th>NEW LOCATION</th>
<th>OLD LOCATION</th>
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<td>TD520</td>
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<td>322d Div</td>
<td>TD217</td>
<td>BA 611</td>
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<td>YD316</td>
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<td>YD412</td>
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<td>25th Regt HQ</td>
<td>TD131</td>
<td>YD406</td>
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<td>7th Inf Bn/29th Regt</td>
<td>TD823</td>
<td>YG906</td>
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<td>TD308</td>
<td>YD4307</td>
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<td>XG793</td>
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Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Air Mobile), Period Ending 31 October 1970, HHC DIVID-55 (E2) (C)

UNITS RELOCATED

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UNITS NOT PREVIOUSLY LOCATED

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UNITS NOT PREVIOUSLY CARRIED

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<td>XD0160</td>
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<td>XD0765</td>
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NEXT IDENTIFICATION DESIGNATED

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<thead>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>QL16 Local Force Co</td>
<td>QL3218</td>
</tr>
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</table>

(2) Viet Cong Infrastructure (VCI) Generics; in Hua Thien (F)

(a) August 1970

The number of VC/VCI related incidents increased from 38 in July to 46 in August. There was a significant increase in sabotage activity and a slight increase reported for propaganda and assassination incidents. However, the majority of the incidents (80%) were mine/tax collection, and VC/W اللبن incidents: Attacks by fire against US installations increased, while attacks against GVN and ARVN installations decreased. There were two separate incursions into the lowlands by the NVA during August. Both of these incidents occurred in Bui Long (D), Quang Tri (F), indicating a continuing enemy interest in this area. During the month of August, a total of nine VCI were neutralized by GVN and Allied operations within Hua Thien (F). The number, none were considered significant under current MACV standards.

(b) September 1970

The number of VC/VCI related incidents decreased significantly from 46 in August to 29 in September. Terrorist and mine/tax collection, however, remained at approximately the same level as in August. These two categories constituted 75% of the total number of incidents.

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Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101ST Airborne Division (Airmobile),
Period Ending 31 October 1970, PROCEP-65 (R2) (0)

It was reported that the VC/VCU were attempting to infiltrate into the lowlands
by breaking up the Special Action Units into smaller teams to facilitate the
 gaining of rice. This reflects the success of Allied efforts to stop VC/VCU
rice collection during the September harvest. VCU neutralization for the month
of September totaled 19, with six being village level or below, while seven
were district level or higher.

(a) October 1970

The number of VC/VCU related incidents decreased significantly from 29 in
September to 19 in October, the lowest monthly total since July 1969. Rice/tax
collection incidents (right) continued to constitute the largest single category
of incidents. There were two intelligence gathering incidents during the month,
marking the first such attempt recorded since January 1970. During September,
October and November 1969 there was an average of 42 VC/VCU incidents per month.
This year's sharp decrease in incidents could result from a weakened VC/VCU
organization, resulting from the increased effectiveness of recent EE, FE, and
SBDF operations. The following table compares the VC/VEU incidents for August
(Left), September (Center), and October (Right) by district:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DISTRICT</th>
<th>PHN/LOC</th>
<th>PROP</th>
<th>SAP</th>
<th>INTSH</th>
<th>AERO</th>
<th>AREA</th>
<th>TERROR</th>
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<td>1/0/0</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TOTAL | 11/10/9 | 11/1/2 | 11/1/2 | 0/0/2 | 2/0/2 | 1/0/0 | 4/6/5 |

3. G2 Air Operations

(a) During the reporting period, 498 photo targets were scheduled to be
 flown by direct support aircraft. Of this figure, a total of 300 were completed.
 A total of 391 infiltrated targets were scheduled, and 162 were completed. The
 major cause of incomplete missions was bad weather, particularly during October.

(b) Infiltrated missions were concentrated within single brigade areas of
operations to avoid boundary areas and thereby expediting artillery clearances.

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On 8 October, a meeting was held with representatives from the 131st Surveillance Airplane Company to discuss the effectiveness of the infrared surveillance program. A series of tests conducted by the 131st indicated the optimum operational altitude for their infrared system to be between 1500 feet and 2000 feet above ground level. As a result of this meeting, a new series of preplanned infrared targets was prepared with the main consideration being the altitude of terrain features in the target area. Targets were planned to allow the aircraft to fly close to the optimum altitude over the majority of the terrain in each target area.

(a) Photo targets scheduled by G2 Air prior to 24 September were usually strip photos along prominent terrain features (i.e., roads and streams). A few area targets were flown with a requirement for imagery sidelpap. The strip targets were easier for the imagery interpreter to plot because of the identifiable terrain features. However, the amount of activity on the imagery was only a small portion of the total enemy activity believed to be in that target area. On 24 September, a new policy was instituted for developing photo targets. A new format was used to provide coverage of two km x four km areas including a recognizable terrain feature. Keeping within the guidelines set forth by the 131st Surveillance Airplane Company that no more than four passes be made over a Priority III target area, the new format was determined to be acceptable when the requirement for sidelpap was deleted. The intelligence gained from these area targets has shown a significant increase over the old system of strip targets. However, the strip target remains a valuable aid for surveillance of infiltration routes and avenues of approach into the lowlands.

(b) G2 Ground Surveillance Operations

(a) The DART I sensor readout station continued to readout and interpret sensors in the division reconnaissance zone. DART I has successfully replaced manual readout in the Batak aircraft. Batak, an Air Force EC-121, now functions entirely as an airborne antenna relay for DART I. DART I is currently being modified to accommodate Phase III sensor equipment. The addition of Phase III sensor equipment, coupled with the increased analytical capability of DART I over the manual readout system, will enable ground surveillance operations to continue to develop as a major asset in monitoring enemy movement in the division reconnaissance zone. Although reliance upon the DART I system has increased, particularly during the northeast monsoon, the Air Force reduced the on-station time for Batak from 24 hours to 21 hours. However, this three-hour period when Batak is not on-station falls during the daylight hours when sensor activity is generally low.

(b) The number of Patrol Seismic Intrusion Devices increased from 147 to 209, which attains the division goal of two sets per line platoon.
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Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborn Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 31 October 1970, RG 357, R-65 (22) (U)

(c) During the reporting period, the number of ground monitor sites decreased from eleven to ten. The sites at FB ARISOLD (TD717), Long Co Bridge (208935), FB BAGLEY (TD4711), FB YEDDEL (TD5963) and FB BASTORNE (TD6399) were closed. The following sites were opened: OP CHLORATE (TD6399), "USS Screaming Eagle" (TD6999), FB BRICK (TD6999), and FB JACK (TD9292).

(d) In anticipation of the limitations which weather conditions will impose on the majority of available surveillance systems during the northeast monsoon, the division is expanding its electronic ground surveillance system to provide greater coverage throughout the division. Phase III equipment has been requisitioned for ground monitor sites. Upon receipt of this equipment, the division's electronic surveillance capability will allow coverage of areas inaccessible to visual surveillance. Phase III sensors are already being placed in the division reconnaissance zone. This added sensor coverage will be of considerable value in the surveillance, reduce than adverse weather conditions; include aerial reconnaissance for extended periods of time.

(e) There was a significant decrease in sensor activity during the reporting period. During August, the activations dropped to an average of 50 per week, and fell to an average of 40 per week in September. Most activity noted during these months occurred in the division reconnaissance zone, specifically, along Routes 616, 922, 9222, 549 and 77.

(f) Radars operating in the brigade area of operation continued to detect enemy movement. An average of 44 radar sightings per week were recorded during the months of August and September. Increased emphasis has been placed on the maintenance of radar to the 301st Maintenance Battalion, resulting in a greatly reduced radar down-time.

(5) Counterintelligence Section

(c) During the reporting period, the Counterintelligence Section continued to provide the division with intelligence support in the areas of sabotage, espionage, subversion, personnel security and physical security. Seven cases of possible espionage, five cases of security violations, six cases of possible disobedience, and five cases involving hitenson Scouts, daily hire civilians and security clearances were investigated by the section.

(b) The PSI Section continued to validate security clearances within the division. The office performed a total of 7813 PSI actions: 37% crypto accesses were granted; 559 USAFIR checks were made; 9792 local files checks were conducted; 70 SI and S&I requests were processed; 478 SECRET, INTERIM SECRET, etc. requests and all were processed; 507 SECRET clearances were granted; five PSI cases were handled; 1362 new personnel were processed; and 1312 clearances were validated.

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Operational Report - Lesson Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile),
Period Ending 31 October 1970. RGS GEORGE-65 (22) (U)

(a) During the reporting period, a total of 119 operations involving
safe openings, recovery of lost combinations, combination changes and lock and
safe repairs were conducted. The Counterintelligence Section also provided a
DASE (Defence Against Sound Equipment) trained agent who conducted a preliminary
survey of the DASE.

(b) G2 Plans/Order of Battle Section. The G2 Plans/Order of Battle Section
continued to monitor, analyze and report the enemy situation throughout Northern
Military Region I. Continuing emphasis was placed on the timely dissemination
of the collected information to all commanders. Change 2 to the Order of Battle
Handbook was published during the reporting period. An addition was made to the
Division Collection Plan in order to present collection agencies with 101st
Airborne Division (Airmobile) essential elements of information (AEl). The Order
of Battle section assisted G-5 in preparing a handbook on enemy units to be used
in targeting psychological operations.

(c) Interrogation Section. During the reporting period, the IPW Section,
101st Military Intelligence Company (Divisional), processed six prisoners of
war (four NVA/PW, two VC/PW), one VC Ho Chi Minh, and 24 batches of enemy documents
captured by units of the 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile). In addition, 28
prisoners of war (12 NVA/PW, 17 VC/PW), two VC, and 13 riflemen (eight NVA/VC, five
VC/VC), and an unknown number of enemy document batches from ARVN units in
the tactical area were processed.

(d) Weather

(a) August

1. The average rainfall over the coastal plain was 4.3 inches which is
0.4 inches more than expected. Thunderstorm activity was higher than normal
with 10 thunderstorm days recorded over the coastal plain and 13 recorded
over the mountains. No ceilings less than 1000 feet were recorded over the
coastal plain. Fog was recorded on four days, but visibility was restricted
for only a few hours each day. Maximum temperatures were two degrees higher
than normal, with an average maximum temperature of 95 degrees Fahrenheit.
Minimum temperatures remained at their seasonal average of 77 degrees Fahrenheit.

2. Bad weather restricted airmobile operations on three days during August.
Operations by the 2d Sqdn (A-Sq) 17th Cavalry were delayed on 7 and 8 August by
bad weather. On 15 August, rain and limited visibility caused cancellation of
12 FAC Air sorties and one company-sized assault.

(b) September

1. The average rainfall over the coastal plain was 16.3 inches, which was
about an inch more than normal.
Thunderstorm activity was above normal with 10 thunderstorm days recorded over the coastal plain and 20 over the mountains. Ceilings less than 1000 feet were observed on six days. Ceilings less than 300 feet occurred on four days. Fog occurred on three days, but visibility was restricted for only a few hours each day. Maximum temperatures were four degrees higher than normal with an average temperature of 92 degrees Fahrenheit. Minimum temperatures remained near their seasonal average of 75 degrees Fahrenheit.

2 Airmobile operations were restricted for only three days during September. High winds and clouds restricted aerial reconnaissance of the division reconnaissance zone on 2 September. High winds and clouds restricted aerial reconnaissance and movement in the southern and western portions of the AO on 27 September. On 30 September, heavy rain, low ceilings and high winds caused the cancellation of three battalion-size moves.

(c) October

1 The average rainfall over the coastal plain was 47.19 inches which is approximately 25 inches above normal. Thunderstorm activity was lower than normal with two thunderstorm days recorded over the coastal plain and one over the mountains. Ceilings less than 1000 feet were observed on 14 days. Ceilings less than 300 feet were observed on 1 day. Fog occurred on 15 days and occasionally lasted the entire day. Both maximum and minimum temperatures were two degrees lower than normal. Maximum temperature averaged 81 degrees Fahrenheit, and minimum temperature averaged 70 degrees Fahrenheit.

2 During October airmobile operations were restricted for thirteen days and were cancelled on four other days. On 1-3, 19-22, and 26-31 October, persisting low clouds, high winds, and heavy rains restricted use of divisional aircraft assets. Impending typhoon conditions halted operations on 15, 16, 24 and 25 October.

(d) Precipitation Data in Inches (Coastal Lowlands).

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<th>Month</th>
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<th>Mean</th>
<th>Minimum</th>
<th>Actual</th>
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<td>September</td>
<td>37.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>73.1</td>
<td>22.3</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>47.2</td>
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4. Personnel

(1) Chaplains. During this period the religious progress of the division has been carried on without notable problems. All division units have been provided with chaplain coverage.
The availability of air transportation continues to be the key to the success of the program. A total of 2,754 religious services were conducted with attendance of 59,381.

(2) Finance. During the reporting period, the division finance office continued the use of Mobile Finance Days to provide full spectrum finance services to personnel located on fire support bases. The team periodically visits fire support bases, permitting personnel to benefit from services such as partial payments, allotment changes, sale of treasury checks, collection for savings deposit program, and acceptance of pay complaints. Conversion of military payment certificates to series 892 was initiated on 7 October. The 101st Military Police Company assisted division finance in the initial notification process and provided security throughout conversion operations. Conversion was completed with no significant difficulties.

(3) Staff Judge Advocate. Court-martial and Article 15 statistics for the reporting period are as follows:

1. General courts-martial cases tried - 6
2. Special courts-martial cases tried - 137
3. Summary courts-martial cases tried - 3
4. Article 15's - 1,265
5. Bad conduct special courts-martial cases tried - 9

Courts-martial and Article 15's involving command interest offenses:

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<th>SPG</th>
<th>SPH-SCB</th>
<th>ART 15</th>
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<td>Blackmarket activities</td>
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(3) Key personnel roster as of 31 October 1970 and changes in command and staff assignments which occurred during the reporting period:
CONFLICT

Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Air Mobile),
Period Ending 31 October 1970, RS OF-65 (R2) (U)

CO
MG John J. Hamnessay

AOC(G)
MG Sidney B. Barry

AOG
BG Glen E. Smith promoted to Brigadier General Sep 27

Coffs
COL Hugh A. McDonald

CO, 1st Bde
COL Paul Y. Gorman

CO, 2d Bde
COL Walter H. Root

CO, 3d Bde
COL Benjamin L. Harrison

CO, NESCON
COL David F. Grange

CO, Div Artillery
COL Leo S. Surrat

CO, 101st Avn Gp
LTC (P) E. F. Davis

ACoSF G1
LTC C. H. Barlow succeeded LTC C. J. Hoesthen, Jr. 26 Oct

ACoSF G2
MAJ D. J. Johnson succeeded LTC J. S. Cronen 14 Sep

ACoSF G3
LTC R. J. Young

ACoSF G4
LTC C. H. Haskin finally succeeded MAJ P. Yost erm 22 Aug

ACoSF G5
LTC H. Furville succeeded MAJ H. W. Thompson 7 Aug

Chem Off
LTC G. Jackson succeeded LTC J. R. Klug 1 Sep

Div Surg
LTC S. Bay

HI
LTC J. Lobodinski

IG
LTC Hurwitz

SJA
LTC K. S. Hedley succeeded LTC C. W. Welborn 13 Sep

Fin Off
LTC M. J. Falconer

Chap
LTC J. P. Solier succeeded LTC G. E. Keys Jr. 16 Aug

AG
LTC T. K. Ninix

CO, 1st Bn (Amph)
LTC G. R. Nardone succeeded LTC D. L. Yoder 8 Aug

327th Inf
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Operational Report – Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 30 October 1970, ROM C5PD6-65 (22) (U)

CO, 2d Bn (Ambt) 327th Inf

LTC J. J. Garza succeeded LTC E. F. Pickett 1 Sep

CO, 2d Bn (Ambt) 502d Inf

LTC C. J. Shaw

CO, 1st Bn (Ambt) 503rd Inf

LTC A. O. Dister succeeded LTC T. S. Aaron 28 Sep

CO, 2d Bn (Ambt) 503rd Inf

LTC M. A. Boos succeeded LTC O. W. Livingston Jr. 20 Oct

CO, 1st Bn (Ambt) 502d Inf

LTC R. N. Long succeeded LTC A. E. West 16 Sep

CO, 1st Bn (Ambt) 506th Inf

LTC E. B. Porter

CO, 2d Bn (Ambt) 506th Inf

LTC J. O. Bond

CO, 3d Bn (Ambt) 187th Inf

LTC R. J. Sutton succeeded LTC L. C. Hinds 26 Oct

CO, 3d Bn (Ambt) 504th Inf

LTC J. S. Wartling

CO, 2d Bn (Ambt) 11th Arty

LTC R. J. Ouko

CO, 2d Bn (Ambt) 319th Arty

LTC R. S. Kemp succeeded LTC W. A. Walker 18 Oct

CO, 2d Bn (Ambt) 320th Arty

MAJ (F) H. H. Brandt succeeded LTC A. B. Davis 26 Oct

CO, 1st Bn (Ambt) 321st Arty

LTC J. L. Doran succeeded LTC A. A. Ely Jr. 25 Aug

CO, 4th Bn (Aerial Arty) 77th Arty (Ambt)

LTC C. L. Nowalk

CO, 2d Sqdn (Ambt) 17th Cav

LTC R. F. Nolan

CO, 101st Avn Bn (Avn Hs) (Ambt)

LTC W. N. Fechey

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Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile),
Period Ending 31 October 1970, HHC CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

CO, 159th Ave Bn
(Ambt Hq) (Ambt)
LTC R. J. Gerard

CO, 159th Ave Bn
(Ambt Hq) (Ambt)
LTC G. F. Norton

CO, 346th Engt Bn
LTC C. F. Rodolph

CO, 326th Med
Bn (Ambt)
LTC R. E. Day

CO, 5th Team
Bn (Ambt)
LTC H. I. Small

CO, 326th SES
Bn (Ambt)
LTC K. R. Jacobs succeeded LTC R. N. Kosmoe 10 Aug

CO, 31st Maint
Bn (Ambt)
LTC R. L. Radeser succeeded LTC J. F. Dunn 6 Oct

CO, 501st Signal
Bn (Ambt)
LTC R. W. Smart

Logistics

(1) General. Logistic support for all division operations was provided
through DISCOM forward service support elements (FSSE) using the area support
concept. Throughout the period, a conscious effort was made to offset the
reduction of blade time resulting from adverse weather conditions. DISCOM
continued to provide civil action support in District II, Hue City and to
assist PHU (PHU Province in upgrading the capabilities of the Sector
Maintenance and Direct Support Logistics Center (SAMSLOC). At the end of the
reporting period, five projects remain to be completed.

(2) DISCOM continued to provide Super Contact Teams to units returning
from operations for refresher training. The number of battalions or
company-size marshalling operations conducted during the reporting period
are as follows:

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
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<th>Partial</th>
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Operational Report - Lebanon, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile),
Period Ending 31 October 1970, COS GPUR-65 (R2) (B)

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34th BN

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</table>

(3) The 5th Transportation Battalion (Aircraft Maintenance and Supply) (Amb) continued to provide direct support maintenance for repair of the 474 aircraft authorized the division.

(a) During the reporting period, 664 aircraft were received on work orders from divisional aviation units and 633 were released back to the units. On 16 September 1970, the battalion was given overall responsibility for supplying support for the conversion of the CH47 Super G aircraft back to the normal CH47 configuration, requiring the change out of 54 T55-L11 engines, and replacement with 54 T55-L70 engines. Conversion began on 17 Oct 70 and by the end of this reporting period 17 aircraft conversions had been completed. The conversion program has gone smoothly and all aircraft are expected to be completed by 8 Nov 70. The battalion also performed its first 15th PW on a CH47 aircraft, during this period. The FMS was accomplished by contract personnel assigned to B Company, 5th Transportation Battalion, during the period 4-29 Oct 70, requiring 25 days and 2200 manhours.

(b) Documentation, classification, and retrograde of unserviceable equipment and supplies has kept both 5BF's working around the clock. In October, the battalion retrograded 5,322 serviceable lines valued at $425,232.87 and 1,145 lines of unserviceable supplies valued at $5,139,782.92. The present authorized stockage list of the two tech supplies totals approximately 11,700 lines. The battalion processed 40,583 requisitions during this period.
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Operational Report - Leesons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile),
Period Ending 31 October 1970, ROC CRPR-65 (E2) (U)

(4) The 301st Maintenance Battalion (Appl) continued to provide direct
support maintenance to divisional units. A recapitulation of support mainte-
nance activity during the reporting period is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CATEGORY</th>
<th>DROUGHT</th>
<th>H.</th>
<th>AVERAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ammunition</td>
<td>.15%</td>
<td>.12%</td>
<td>.12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signal</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
<td>2.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Automotive</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
<td>3.0%</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* % deadline of total authorised

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITEMS</th>
<th>DROUGHT</th>
<th>H.</th>
<th>AVERAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Signal</td>
<td>6816</td>
<td>6824</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Automotive</td>
<td>828</td>
<td>811</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineers</td>
<td>899</td>
<td>800</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ammunition</td>
<td>1806</td>
<td>1873</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service</td>
<td>945</td>
<td>963</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Instrument</td>
<td>954</td>
<td>939</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(a) Technical Supply Activities. The 301st Maintenance Battalion
technical supply continued to process an average of approximately 22,153
requests per month. Demand satisfaction has fluctuated somewhat on a weekly
basis with an average for the period of 32%, while demand accommodation remained
almost constant, averaging 80%. Demand satisfaction reached a high of 60%
while demand accommodation has been maintained at 79.7%. Receipt of major
assemblies has increased greatly, resulting in a low deadline rate in each
major commodity area.

(b) MilSurp exchange program. During the quarter the battalion
up-graded 31,641 items. Over 18,500 barrels have been inspected and over
4,000 old barrels have been replaced.

(5) The 426th Supply and Service Battalion (Appl) continued to provide
basic supply support to the division by air and ground means. The battalion
rigged external sling loads of Class I, II, III, IV and V requiring 5,660
Operational Report – Lances Earned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile),
Period Ending 31 October 1970, AEF 05/FOR 65 (M2) (B)

air-sorries during the reporting period. Battalion trucks drove 55,009 miles
during the quarter, delivering 2,995 passengers, 1644 short tons of freight,
1,196,794 gallons of water and 277,868 gallons of fuel.

g. Civil Affairs

(1) Pacification and development activities in Thua Thien Province
continued at a high rate during the reporting period. In these three months,
77 projects were completed, and at the end of the period 62 were in pro-
gress. The overall effort of the division is directed toward the achieve-
ment of the national objectives outlined in the Thua Thien Province Pacifi-
cation and Development Plan, 1970. All efforts are closely coordinated
with SVN officials, and all operations are undertaken at the request of the
province chief. The province Civic Action Priority List, developed at the
hamlet, village and district level and consolidated and approved at the
province level, serves as the guideline in the selection of projects to
be undertaken.

(a) During the period, phase I of the "Vietnamization" program has
concluded with considerable success. Between 15 August and 8 October,
complete responsibility for control of cement issues for military civic
action projects was passed by 101st Air Div (Amph) 05 to Thua Thien Pro-
vince Property Book Officer. Additionally, combined district inspection
of all military civic action projects in the province was undertaken.
This resulted in identifying weaknesses, improving reporting, increasing
impetus for completing projects, and establishing closer time between
province, district, village and hamlet officials.

(b) Phase II of the civic action "Vietnamization" program will involve
the passage of responsibility for the control and allocation of all civic
action supplies now stored at the 05 warehouse to the Thua Thien Province
Property Book Officer.

The decision to move into phase II was based on the successful assume-
tion of responsibility by province for receiving, controlling and issuing the
2,000 bags of cement moved from Camp Eagle during phase I above. Excel-

tent cooperation and understanding which exists between Thua Thien Province
officials and their USAID advisors has made this progress possible.

(2) The Phu Loc Hospital was dedicated and opened for outpatient
and inpatient care of expectant mothers during the reporting period. Work on this facil-
ity, which will have an inpatient capacity of 200, is in response to a
request from the Thua Thien Province Chief and the Province Senior Advisor.
Materials issued from the 05 warehouse in support of the hospital include:
75 bags of cement, 24 rolls of barbed wire, 60 sheets of roofing tin, 160
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Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile),
Period Ending 31 October 1970, AER 0566-65 (KZ) (U)

engineer stakes, 500 feet of rebar, two rolls of reinforcing wire, 12 pieces
of 42" acraver, 24 pieces of 24" acraver, 126 board feet of 4"x10" lumber,
26 board feet of 4"x6" lumber, and eight board feet of 4"x4" lumber. Addi-
tionally, from the 101st Air Div (Airl) FROG/Civic Action IX Fund, seven
Vietnamese carpenters were hired to construct furniture in the 65 warehouse
for the hospital. So far 20 beds, six desks and six benches have been deliv-
ered. Six more desks, six benches and 60 night stands are presently under
construction. These items will be delivered to Thu Luong Hospital upon
completion. The estimated labor cost for the complete project is $49,930

(3) Significant progress was made in the resettlement of 200 Montagnard
families (627 people) who had immigrated to Thuan Thien Province from
Quang Tri Province. A decision was made by provincial officials to relocate 200
Montagnard families from Gia Chinh IV Hamlet (FD 747666) in Nam Boi District
to Lien Bang (FD 746135) also in Nam Boi. Coordination for the operation
was affected by the CORV War Victims Advisor, the Nam Boi District Senior
Advisor, the division, and the 5th and 7th Platoons of the 29th Civil Affairs
Company. Land was cleared by the 277th Engineer BN and framing lumber for
house construction was procured from XVIII Corps and delivered by the 7th
Platoon. Five 10 medium tents were delivered by the 7th Platoon for use
as temporary shelter. The 7th Platoon has continued to deliver framing
lumber and scrap plywood from the 65 warehouse, and also delivered 500
same boxes which were assembled by the 35 of the 1/302 Inf BN. To date 266
pieces of framing lumber (2-xx-xx-12'x14' and 4-xx-xx-14'), 500 same boxes and
2,500 board feet of scrap plywood have been delivered. Province has pro-
vided the roofing for the houses. A total of 100 two-family dwellings
are planned, and to date 21 houses have been completely finished.

(4) Thuan Thien Province has continued to make steady progress in its
Return to Village (RTV) program. Phase II of the 1970 RTV program started
on 1 July 1970 and ended 31 October 1970. During the period 1 August -
31 October 1970, a total of 445 families (2,726 people) were returned to
their ancestral homes. Of these, 307 families (1,327 people) have already
received their RTV payment (10 sheets of tin and 7,500 VND). The great
majority of the returnees have, since 1 August, been resettled in Phu Tho
District. A few have returned to hamlets in Quang Diox District. The Phu
Tho RTV was directed by the 7th Platoon of the 29th Civil Affairs Company,
which secured trucks from province and the 2d Brigade of the 101st Airborne
Division (Airmobile) for the move. To date, Thuan Thien has resettled 64,225
of the 85,144 refugees during and after Tet of 1968.

(5) The 501st Signal BN completed a poultry house in Bu Nghi, chickens
imported from Singapore, Taiwan, Japan, and hatching of chickens in the Bu Nghi area
will soon be supplementing the diet of the inhabitants of the An Phu Old
Folks Home. Present OWH programs provide only 15 cents a day for food for these people, and a dietary protein deficiency exists. During the reporting period a poultry house was completed on the grounds of the home. Some 200 chicks per cycle will be purchased when one day old at a cost of between 35 and 50 VND. After 10 weeks, some will be sold at a profit of about 70-75% per chick, and the rest will be kept for consumption. These will keep the project self-sustaining while the meat from these consumed will alleviate the protein shortage.

(6) During the period of this report a total of 394 LANDCAPs were held and 19,644 medical and dental patients were examined.

(7) Major projects completed during the reporting period:

(a) Loc Son Village bridge repair (ID 930008), Phu Loc.
(b) Co Han Hamlet school repair (ID 705277), Huong Tra.
(c) Thong Bang Hamlet bridge (ID 768143), Han Hoa.
(d) Ka Trung Hai Hamlet village office (ID 965775), Phu Tho.
(e) Van Trinh Hamlet school (ID 514791), Phong Dien.
(f) Dong Van Hamlet school furniture (ID 035012), Phu Loc.
(g) An Lao Dong Hamlet school furniture (ID 987057), Phu Loc.
(h) Phu Caong Hamlet market repair (ID 149001), Phu Loc.
(i) Khe Non Village school repair (ID 568464), Huong Dien.
(j) District HQ - Hau III conference room (ID 769237), Hau II.
(k) Phaco Lao Hamlet road repair (ID 135015), Phu Loc.
(l) Liem Quan Hamlet school construction (ID 515452), Phong Dien.
(m) Pho Trach Hamlet school construction (ID 506477), Phong Dien.
(n) Luong Mai Hamlet school construction (ID 525480), Phong Dien.
(o) An Le Hamlet aid station (ID 625308), Phong Dien.
(p) Con Son Hamlet pipeline (ID 520040), Phong Dien.
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period ending 31 October 1970, RES CEB03-65 (2) (2)

(q) An Hoa Hamlet poultry house (YD 742223), Hue X.
(r) Thuy Dong Hamlet footbridge (YD 191004), Phu Loc.
(s) Loc Hai Village school construction (AT 890365), Phu Loc.
(t) Van La Hamlet school repair (YD 899169), Hung Tra.
(u) Trach Van Hamlet school construction (YD 519396), Phong Dien.
(v) Loc Ben Village market repair (YD 927094), Phu Loc.
(w) Tran Nguyen Hamlet school repair (YD 527346), Phong Dien.

(g) During the reporting period 77 projects were completed. This number includes 13 schools, one dispensary, two administrative buildings, 22 wells, three bridges, and six others.

(g) The division currently has 62 civic action projects underway. These include four schools, eight dispensaries, two administrative buildings, one library, 21 wells, one footbridge, seven markets, eight washstands, four road repairs, one pier, and five others.

(10) Commodities issued during the reporting period:

- Cement: 766 bags
- Tin: 277 sheets
- Lumber: 49,221 board feet
- Scrap lumber: 6,240 board feet
- Nails: 146 kilos
- Masonite: 8 sheets
- Paint: 18 gals
- PSP: 198 sheets
- Ammo boxes: 4,259 boxes
- Culvert: 214 sections
Operational Report – Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airborne),
Period Ending 31 October 1970, RUS GPGR-65 (Z2) (1)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reinforcing wire</td>
<td>3 rolls</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P nesprine</td>
<td>18 gals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dirt fill</td>
<td>4,200 cubic yards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barbed wire</td>
<td>36 rolls</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ngr stakes</td>
<td>306 stakes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sand bags</td>
<td>2,500 bags</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tint</td>
<td>7 kilos</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lime</td>
<td>25 bags</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sand</td>
<td>7 tons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Screen</td>
<td>9 rolls</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Damaged pallets</td>
<td>75 pallets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food</td>
<td>18,474 pounds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clothing</td>
<td>1,735 pounds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soap</td>
<td>206 pounds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical supplies</td>
<td>262 pounds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Desks</td>
<td>120 desks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benches</td>
<td>120 benches</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blackboards</td>
<td>46 each</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beds</td>
<td>40 each</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School kits</td>
<td>50 kits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>English books</td>
<td>40 books</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swing</td>
<td>1 swing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seesaw</td>
<td>1 each</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Firewood</td>
<td>1 trailer</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 301st Airborne Division (Airmobile),
Period Ending 31 October 1970, S/S GENFOR-63 (22) (U)

b. Psychological Operations.

(1) Four separate atrocities were perpetrated by the enemy against the local populace of Thua Thien Province prior to daybreak on 2 August 70. A detachment of the 7th PSKOP bn, GIDDK to 2d Brigade, 301st Abn Div (AmbH), reacted to these incidents by immediately coordinating with the districts involved and deploying their ground teams to the sites. Upon arriving, they were met by representatives of the Vietnamese Information Service and together collected the anti-GVN and anti-FUSAF leaflets that had been distributed by the enemy. Immediately upon arrival, the ground loudspeaker teams began broadcasting pro-GVN messages and the effect of the VC propaganda was effectively negated. Photographs and tape-recorded interviews were made for possible future use.

(2) Two quick reaction aerial broadcast missions were conducted in support of the 1st Inf Div (AMPH) on 12 and 14 Aug 70. The broadcasts were directed at elements of the 2d Bn, 9th NVA Regiment which had maintained 199 Ki, 17 FMs, and five rifles within a three day period.

(3) A 21T caller was received by a reconnaissance element of the 1st Inf Div (AMPH) on 12 Aug 70 in the vicinity of FS/GB O'REilly. For the following six days, the Ho Chi Minh was exploited solely as a source of current intelligence on enemy activities in the area. On 15 Aug 70, the Ho Chi Minh made a Chien Ho tape directed at his former unit, 6th Company, E-10 Bn, 6th NVA Regiment, where the Ho Chi Minh had been a political commissar since the unit's arrival in South Vietnam. The tape was used against the 6th Bn of the period of 19 - 20 and 23 - 24 August 1970. No positive results from the missions were noted except for an increased amount of hostile fire directed at PSKOP aircraft. A translation of the Ho Chi Minh's tape follows:

"Dear comrades of Xi/6 Co. Can you identify me? I am LT Le Ba Que, political commissar of Xi/6 Co. Do you remember that the BN CO (Doang) and the Political Commissar (Ch Van Sau) told us many times about plans to contain the enemy? After several days of fighting, do you see any of our comrades who fought with us in the front? What has happened? I hope my survivors still on the 652 mountain (FS/GB O'REilly) become clearheaded enough to understand the hollow promises of our cadre. I advise you to allow yourself the opportunity to rally to the GVN like me or go back home, leaving the battlefield. Do you know that my one buried Minh, Phu, Linh, Chien or Song of Gi/11 who died on top of 652 mountain?"

(4) On 16 Aug 70, the 101st Abn Div (AmbH) captured an NVA FPC from the 5th Co, 2d Bn, 9th NVA Regt. After interrogation of the FPC and review of captured documents pertaining to the same battalion, the division PSKOP section initiated a three day campaign against the 2d Bn, 9th NVA Regt

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Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile),
Period Ending 31 October 1970, RRS CPD-65 (R1) (0)

during the period 23–25 August 1970. The themes used during this campaign were as follows:

(a) Your Leaders Idea.
(b) Sick and Wounded.
(c) Food and Medical Treatment.
(d) Allied Air and Ground Fire Power.
(e) Helicopters and B-52's.
(f) Malaria.

(5) During the period 7–15 Aug, the 4th Detachment ground teams provided 43 broadcast hours in support of the village and hamlet elections held on 16 Aug 70. A detailed breakdown of the districts covered follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Broadcast Hours</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hauong Tra</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phong Dien</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hauong Thuy</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phu Thu</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nam Hao</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>43</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(5) Urging voters to get out and vote during the national elections held on 30 August 1970 was the theme of a joint NS/VIS ROKP campaign conducted during the period 19–29 Aug. Again support was provided by the 4th Det, 7th ROKP Rn. The program was designed to instill a feeling of democracy in the people and to get them to the polls with a reassurance of their personal safety. A detailed breakdown of hours by district was as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Broadcast Hours</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hauong Thuy</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phu Loc</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Air Mobile), Period Ending 31 October 1970, COMPSFOR-65 (RE) (C)

By and disseminated by the 9th SOS over the target within sixteen hours. The 9th SOS led government forces to numerous bunkers in northern Thin Thin Province, accounting for six enemy X1A, five FN, and capture of individual weapons, and medical supplies.

(12) A combined operation including the 1st Bde and 3d Btg (ARVN) was supported by division PSYOP and 1st Bde PSYOP. Four priority leaflets requested by 901st Bde were developed by 7th PSYOP for dissemination by the 3rd Bde during the operation. The leaflets were rally appeals and instructions to rally within the specific area of operations. Information obtained from documents captured during this operation was used to target known X1A units by name and location. The 1st Bde provided a sketch of the area related to a NVA map, and erected red beacons to instruct potential ralliers to rally safely.

(13) At request of the 1st Bde, division PSYOP developed a quick reaction (35) leaflet, focusing on the “ultra-modern" treatment given to all FN. The leaflet was targeted against the 4th Bn, 510th Bn, 5th NVA Regt. This leaflet was the first of a series of leaflets targeted against the 5th Bn by the 1st Bde. A great majority of these were priority leaflets that were printed by 7th PSYOP Bn and dropped in conjunction with aerial broadcasts with the same general themes. The campaign is continuing at the end of this reporting period.

(14) At the request of the Assistant Province Advisor for PSYOP, the division PSYOP section on 14 Oct 70 dropped 1,000,000 leaflets publicizing the Voluntary Informant Program and Phoenix Program to the people of the lowland areas of Thin Thin Province. A follow-up drop was accomplished on 22 Oct by 2d Bde PSYOP, with another 1,000,000 leaflets with the same themes in the same areas.

(15) In order to publicize President Nixon's new peace proposal, division PSYOP requested a leaflet summarizing his five points. The leaflet was printed by the 7th PSYOP Bn and was dropped exclusively in the canopy to point east to the 7th the unwillingness of NVA to make peace.

(16) In order to inform the people of Phu Loc District of a new curfew going into effect on 15 Oct, the 2d Bde PSYOP section requested a 13 leaflet to be developed and printed by division PSYOP. Twenty thousand handbills were turned over to 2d Bde and were distributed the following week by 4th Bn, 7th PSYOP Bn ground teams.

1. Medical

(1) During this reporting period the tactical deployment remained the same as in the previous quarter with Company A in direct support of 1st Bde, Company B in direct support of 2d Bde, Company C in support of the 3d Bde and NVA and 9th PSYOP Company in support of division rear units located at Camp Eagle.
Operation 1 Report - Laos: Earnest Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile),
Period Ending 31 October 1970, RG 355P-62 (32) (U)

(2) Medical statistical recapitulation:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Co A</th>
<th>Co B</th>
<th>Co C</th>
<th>Set Co</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Patients seen at clearing station</td>
<td>2,007</td>
<td>2,070</td>
<td>1,860</td>
<td>2,689</td>
<td>8,536</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dental patients</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>930</td>
<td>1,152</td>
<td>233</td>
<td>2,365</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Admissions</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>237</td>
<td>235</td>
<td>722</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transferred</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>422</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Reappraisal:

<p>| | | | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LCD</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>367</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NBO</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>551</td>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(3) Medical Diseases:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Co A</th>
<th>Co B</th>
<th>Co C</th>
<th>Set Co</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Malaria</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZI0s</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>248</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diarrhea</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>207</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skin diseases</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>335</td>
<td>309</td>
<td>331</td>
<td>1,255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R/F</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>929</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>957</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heart problems</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>297</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gastroenteritis</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heat injuries</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VD</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>548</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Med-evac missions       | 1,050 |

(3) The air ambulance platoon continued its mission to provide aeromedical evacuation support to the 101st Airborne Division. The majority of support was from Camp Eagle base camp; however, for most of the period, two WHF air ambulances have been stationed at Camp Rhino to provide quicker response to the northern regions of the area. During this reporting period, the one aircraft which had been placed with Division Flight Standards, was
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Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (AirMobile),
Period Ending 31 October 1970, RG 5973F-R5 (R5) (U)

(5) Accident/incident experience in the 101st Aviation Group for this
reporting period is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
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<td>Accidents</td>
<td>10</td>
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<td>Incidents</td>
<td>22</td>
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<td>Forced landings</td>
<td>3</td>
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<td>Precautionary landings</td>
<td>31</td>
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<tr>
<td>Combat damaged A/C</td>
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1. Engineer.

(1) On 6 August, Company A assumed the rehabilitation project at FS/03
BASTOGNE, clearing the old 105mm artillery area and cutting slots for pre-
fabricated bunkers. As FS/03 HABERGEN was closed, Company A removed the bunkers
intact from that firebase by air and emplaced them at BASTOGNE. Based upon
an estimate of the engineer and security effort required to keep route 547
open from FS/03 BASTOGNE to FS/08 WEISCHEL during the northeast monsoon, it was
decided that WEISCHEL would be closed before the wet season set in, but would
be kept operational for as long as weather permitted. Accordingly, a program
was developed to retrograde bunkers from WEISCHEL to BASTOGNE by road and by
air. Company A executed the program at both ends, dismantling and preparing
bunkers for lift out at WEISCHEL, and reconstrucion and emplacing bunkers at
BASTOGNE. The program began at a slow pace in mid-August and accelerated
rapidly toward the end of the month as the rainy season approached. A total
of 85 bunkers were back-hauled by air and ground operations. On 9 August,
Company C, having completed the mess hall at FS/08 BIMLENGHAN, began con-
struction of a mess bunker at BASTOGNE. The structure, 20' x 104', with a
concrete floor and built-in drains, was brought near completion by Company
C on 1 September and turned over to Company A for finishing touches. On 12
August, Company C began reconstruction of FS/08 JACK, unoccupied since early
May. JACK was constructed as a two-battery FS/08, incorporating all the
lessons learned in firebase construction during the spring and early summer
and incorporating a feature not often used in the division area of operations:
a perimeter berm. The project was planned and executed by Company C. In
early August, enemy mining activity increased, particularly along Route 547
between FS/08 BASTOGNE and WEISCHEL. As a result, daily mine-sweeps were resumed
on the more secure roads and sweeping procedures in all companies were reviewed
and adjusted to meet the challenge. Company A, conducting the sweep east from
WEISCHEL toward BASTOGNE, and non-divisional engineers sweeping west from BASTOGNE,
frequently found mines of varying types.
Throughout August, Company C worked at FS/08 LOS BANG and TOKamines clearing mine fields, expanding wire, building bunkers, and improving the access roads at these locations. On 28 August, one platoon from Company B joined Company C in the construction of FS/08 JACK. Also on 28 August, FS/08 CLAYMORE was closed, and the 64 bunkers replaced by Company B and all defenses developed through its six-week occupation were left intact. Similarly,パターン was closed and left intact on 21 August as the division redeployed its armament posture. On 29 August, Company C opened and began reconstruction of FS/08 BUNK. Company C, on 1 September, began construction of a raft for use in Lang 08 Bay: a sensor-readout station, a radar, and a quid fifty-caliber machine gun platform. A flat bed of steel sections, "Easy cubes," was procured, and Company C placed a deck on the float which measured 22' x 77' and constructed a 10' x 30' bunker on the float for living and working space for the personnel manning the facility. Throughout August, all lettered companies performed numerous landing zone construction missions in support of the brigades and the cavalry squadron. On 4 September, Headquarters Company began construction of the Truyen Thuy Road, a civic action project, to improve the existing trail between Route 41 and the bridge built by Company C in the same area several months before. During July and August, base development and other support projects were accomplished in large numbers. Typical of these were construction of a boat exchange storage facility at Camp Evans, billets, and office for the 1st Platoon, Company C at Camp Eagle, 34 pole officers mess at Camp Evans, rears of the G-17S rapprochement tower at Camp Evans, improvement of Company C and 2d Platoon 3-4 in Phu Bai, helped and road maintenance at Camp Eagle, and many other earthwork and minor vertical construction projects.

As Operation JEFFERSON GLEN began, work continued on all active FS/08s with bunker construction and preparation of the bases for the coming monsoon rains. Monsoon preparations included placing rocks on interior and access roads to maintain trafficability, filling ditches to create proper drainage; clearing and lining of drainage ditches to promote effective runoff of water; clearing, replanting, and addition of culverts and construction of proper headwalls; improvement of drainage around bunkers and other structures; and the use of various other techniques. All bunkers scheduled for retrograde from FS/08 CMC/24, had been removed by mid-September to BASTIOLA and BIRCHMANS. Company 2 began bunker construction and culvert replacement at BIRCHMANS on 2 September, and moved into monsoon preparations there as the month progressed. Company 3 completed initial construction of the trail for Lang 08 Bay on 9 September. On 23 September further work was begun to widen the roof of the raft-bunker for evacuation. The roof expansion was not completed by the end of the month due to material shortages. The raft, dubbed the "SS Screaming Eagle," was operational in the Lang 08 Bay from 9 September, but was plagued by leakage problems, requiring continual attention from battalion personnel. Company C began bunker construction at FS/08 KIRKLAND on 12 September and at FS/08 JASMIN on 13 September; both projects included a 40' x 22' mass bunker.
At KAKASAK in late August and early September, Company B added eleven 10' x 12', and three 8' x 12' bunkers and other miscellaneous structures to the base and through September expanded much effort in monsoon preparations at that location. On 19 September, Company B constructed one bunker at the 4th Line Bridge. Company A supported the reopening of OP Checkmate on 16 September, and expanded the position into a 2-vehicle forward command post complex, clearing fields of fire and cutting slits for bunkers. Eight 8' x 12' bunkers were flown into location, and completion of the bunkers on 2 October marked the end of the project. Several artillery raids and short-term infantry operations were supported by Companies A and C in September; by Company A at FSB MOROCCO, FSB TAHITI, and FSB SHIP; and Company C at FSB SLIDE. In mid-September, Headquarters Company completed all work at the Sector Maintenance and Direct Support Logistic Center facility. This project took over six months. Work at Haung Nhu Road was severely hampered by rain, and the project was eventually suspended in late September. Earlier in the month, Headquarters Company replaced poles supporting radio power lines above the level of a raised dump truck bed. Company A continued the mine sweep of Route 547 between BACAO and VSONHE. Work continued at JAO and BRICK. Companies B and C completed construction of the 90 bunkers at JAO on 26 September, and Company D began constructing a monsoon preparation there. Company G, at FSOC BRICK, completed construction of the 49 bunkers at that location on 28 September and began to concentrate on monsoon preparations. Development of FSOC RAYONG progressed well, with 50 bunkers completed at the end of the month and monsoon preparations proceeding concurrently with bunker construction. During September, both Company B at CAMB WANN and also Company A at COF EAGLE conducted the relocation of numerous SMA huts in support of tenant units at those camps. Company B performed landing zone construction in support of the second and third Brigades and the 2d Sgn 17th Cav (AHC) during the month. Throughout September, Headquarters Company concentrated their efforts to prepare roads on fire support bases for the approaching rains. Headquarters Company, grading and shaping roads and drainage areas, spreading rock, applying asphalt, repaving and replacing culverts, and filling potholes, worked day and night into October with the monsoon preparations. The move of Headquarters and Headquarters Company, and Company A into the area was supported by Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 10 in mid-September was made quickly and efficiently without any decrease in engineer support to the Division.

(3) Company C, on 1 October, began construction of a 40-foot steel stringer bridge on New Providence Road near the 5th Transportation Battalion area at CAMF EAGLE. The single-lane, class 60 bridge was constructed beside an existing single-lane concrete and steel bridge to relieve a traffic bottleneck and safety hazard at that location. The bridge was completed on 26 October. Headquarters Company completed rehabilitation of the road to 02-56 on 6 October. In early October, a period of heavy rainfall caused deterioration of roads at CAMF EAGLE and at some fire bases.
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airborne),
Period Ending 31 October 1970, RER 05F0R-65 (22) (U)

Headquarters Company redoubled the effort already being put into Eagle roads, and the lettered companies, supported by headquarters equipment, worked at the fire bases to repair damage and to upgrade the roads so that additional rain would not cause further deterioration. Road work included grading, compacting, pan spraying, filling with rock where necessary, installing and repairing culverts, and other assorted tasks. On 10 October, Company B began construction of latrines which were built at CAMP EVANS and lifted to FS/03 RAXASAI by US-1 aircraft. Six latrines were completed by 27 October.

Company A returned to OP CHECHNAF on 15 October for additional work on clearing fields of fire, installing defensive wire, and performing minor work on bunkers. Work at OP CHECHNAF was completed on 25 October. From 27 to 22 October, Company B replaced a large section of 56-inch culvert in the 211st Maintenance area at CAMP EVANS. Company A completed bunker construction at FS/03 EUSTOUGE on 18 October, with a total of one hundred-seventy 8' x 12' bunkers, seven 10' x 24' bunkers, and a 26' x 104' mass bunker constructed since early August. Also on 18 October, Company A began construction of four aviation warning-markers for aircraft control points outside CAMP EVANS. The 15-foot-high structures were built in the shape of truncated pyramids with checkered-penned sides. On 18 October, Company C completed widening the bunker roof of the Long Co raft. The raft continued to have leakage problems throughout October, and much work was done in an effort to solve that problem. Headquarters Company began rehabilitation of the perimeter road in Fox trot sector of CAMP EAGLE on 19 October, and on 22 October, began resurfacing the auto-rotation strip at FS/03 STRATHMAN.

Company C, from 21 to 21 October, cleared 150 meters of an old antipersonnel mine field at FS/03 LOS BANGES, utilizing thirty-four cases of bungalow torpedoes. On 22 October, Company A began rehabilitation of the Division Headquarters Company mess hall. Headquarters Company completed rebuilding the Hotel sector perimeter road on 22 October, and on 23 and 24 October, did additional work on the Hung Tuy road, on which work had been suspended in late September because of rain. After two days of heavy rain, work opened work to cease on that civic action project. Company B, on 23 and 24 October, constructed a 10' x 24' bunker for MACV advisory personnel at the Hung Tuy BP/FP compound. Throughout October, Company A continued the development of EUPINGHAM, constructing bunkers and working on drainage problems. At the end of the month, Company A had completed 27 bunkers on that fire base. Company B continued support of FS/03s RAXASAI and JAG, concentrating on drainage improvement and minor construction on bunkers and facilities. At JAG, Company B installed numerous culverts and placed over 500 cubic yards of rock on interior roads to improve the trafficability and drainage there. Company C continued bunker construction and fire base development at BRICK, ARSENAL, and TOMAHAWK, completing the mass bunker at TOMAHAWK. Mine sweeping missions were continued on CAMP EAGLE access roads and on Route 547 between EUPINGHAM and EUSTOUGE.
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Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 1st Airborne Division (Airmobile)
Period Ending 31 October 1970, RBS GR-525 (R2) (U)

Company B assumed responsibility for the mine sweep of the road to BAKTHAN
on 23 October and on 25 October, sustained casualties of one killed and two
wounded in the performance of that mission. As the wet season set in, boat
platoons supported daily operations over the entire area of operations.
Base camp construction and maintenance was performed by all lettered com-
panies throughout October. Headquarters Company performed numerous small
earth-moving tasks.

(4) The reporting period closed with the battalion continuing to provide
general and direct support to the division and extensive emergency rescue
and resupply for the Vietcong during a severe flood. On 29 October,
Headquarters and B Company commenced an around-the-clock debris-removal
operation that saved the six-foot Ford bridge on Route 527. More than
5,000 pounds of explosive were used. Four boat rescue teams were dispatched
during the flood. The first team, on 30 October, was airlifted to Phong
Dinh district and rescued 732 civilians and resupplied 3,000 more with
critically needed food. The second team, on 30 October, moved overland
to the Song Be river and resupplied 3,200 civilians and two RF companies with
rice and fish. The third team, on 31 October, rescued three persons and
transported 300 pounds of rice to isolated civilians in Phong Dinh district.
The last boat team was airlifted to Phu Tho district to provide resupply of
stranded individuals.

m. Air Cavalry Operations

(1) During the reporting period, 23 Squadron (Airmobile), 17th Cavalry
continued its role of providing reconnaissance and security and was targeted
in areas of known or suspected enemy activity.

(2) The squadron, in support of the 1st Infantry Division (Airborne) during
August, detected enemy movement and concentrations near PH/0S O'HEILLY. This
early warning of enemy activity and constant support for the ARVN during
August and September around O'HEILLY resulted in the eventual halt of the
enemy’s advance. During September, the squadron moved a forward command post
to Dan Song and conducted extensive operations in the KLEHEAN VALLEY,
searching for rear bases areas of the 4th and 5th Independent Regiments/ARVN.
Poor weather during the last half of October restricted the squadron’s recon-
naissance efforts.

(3) Results of reconnaissance during the reporting period:

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<tr>
<th>August</th>
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<tr>
<td>Spot Reports</td>
<td>1,207</td>
<td>1,402</td>
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<td>GSRC</td>
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(4) During the quarter, Squadron medical assets have continued to be used to augment existing medical aid in Thai Than Province. Nearly a thousand Vietnamese were treated in Squadron MEDCAPs. Three patients were taken to Hue Hospital for specialized treatment. The Squadron has set a goal of two MEDCAPs per week, thereby providing greater medical assistance to Vietnamese in District III. Currently, these MEDCAPs are established in the two villages which, according to the District chief, have the greatest need for assistance. The MEDCAPs provide not only medical assistance to the people but also medical training to the Vietnamese health workers. Each MEDCAP includes one Vietnamese health worker and a minimum of one nurse.

(5) The Squadron has a quota of 300,000 leaflets to be dropped each week to augment the leaflets dropped by the 9th SOS Support Company. Targets for the drops have been: trails, suspected base sites, areas of enemy contact, and airstrike targets.

(6) Ranger activities.

(a) Company L (Ranger) 75th Infantry, under operational control of the 2d Squadron (Airmobile), 17th Cav provides division with the capability of conducting long range reconnaissance patrols, surveillance of enemy infiltration routes and prisoners of war snatch missions when tactically feasible.

(b) During the month of August, Company L (Ranger) 75th Infantry employed Ranger teams in the vicinity of KHE THERIEN, XD 9331 and south of CPT EML in the KHE THERIEN Valley, at XD 8905, and in the KHE THERIEN area, near YC 7095. A total of 38 teams were deployed by the company during the month. Fourteen enemy sightings were made and contact was initiated on ten occasions. As a result of these contacts, two NVA/VN were killed. Two company sustained three KIA and nine WIA.

(c) During September, Co L employed Ranger teams in the A Shau Valley in the vicinity of XD 8905, and the KHE THERIEN Valley area, near YC 7095. A total of 24 teams were deployed by the company during the month. Twelve enemy sightings were made and contact was initiated.
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Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 31 October 1970, HCS GRUB-65 (22) (1)

by Ranger personnel on six occasions. As a result of these contacts, five NVA/VC were killed. The company sustained one KIA.

(c) Co L deployed a total of 24 teams during the month of October. Ten teams were inserted in the vicinity of each NVA; four teams were inserted along Route 6471 and the remainder were inserted in or near the Khe Sanh, Nho Tung and Song Be river valleys. Ranger teams established contact with the enemy on five occasions and had visual sightings on eight occasions.

2. Artillery.

(1) The 101st Airborne Division Artillery (Airmobile) provided close and continuous fire support to maneuver units throughout the reporting period. Light howitzer battalions continued to provide direct support to the infantry brigades with the 2d Bn (Amb), 320th Arty (105) in direct support of the 1st Bn; the 1st Bn (Amb), 321st Arty (105) in direct support of the 2d Bn; and the 2d Bn (Amb), 319th Arty (105) in direct support of the 3d Bn. The 2d Bn (Amb), 11th Arty (155) and the 4th Bn (Air Mobile Arty), 77th Arty (Amb) continued to provide general support artillery fires to the division. Additionally, Strt A, 4th Bn (Air Mobile Arty), 77th Arty (Amb) was general support reinforcing 1st Bn (Amb), 321st Arty; Strt B, 5th Bn (Air Mobile Arty), 77th Arty (Amb) was general support reinforcing 2d Bn (Amb), 320th Arty; and Strt C, 4th Bn (Air Mobile Arty), 77th Arty (Amb) was general support reinforcing 3d Bn (Amb), 319th Arty.

(2) The following 106th Artillery Group units provided heavy artillery support to allied forces in Northern Military Region I. The 1st Bn (8/175mm SP), 39th Arty, general support reinforcing 1st Inf Div Arty (AWV); 2d Bn (8/175mm SP), 39th Arty, general support reinforcing 101st Air Div Arty (Amb); 3d Bn (8/175mm SP), 39th Arty, general support reinforcing 101st Air Div Arty (Amb); 4th Bn (8/175mm SP), 94th Arty, general support reinforcing 5th Bn (155 SP), 4th Arty.

(3) Strt D, 1st Bn (AWV, SP), 44th Arty, Strt E (AWV), 65th Arty, and Strt F (CIV), 44th Arty, whose parent units are general support to IX Corps, were deployed in Northern Military Region I to provide support for base and bridge security.

(4) Artillery fires were employed throughout the division area of operation in response to sensor activations, radar detections, aerial surveillance, and intelligence. Artillery support for AWV/GVN forces was provided through direct coordination between located AWV and US artillery fire direction centers or through liaison officers or US advisors with AWV/GVN forces. US and AWV artillery units continued to employ coordinated fires in support of combined operations.
Operations Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile),
Period Ending 31 October 1970, RG5 DDE6-65 (R2) (U)

(5) During the reporting period, the 4th Bn (Artillery), 77th Artillery (Airborne) played an increasingly important role in the support of the 1st Inf Div (ANFH). The number of contact fire missions flown in support of ANFH units greatly outnumbered the number flown in support of US forces. A close and effective liaison effort between the battalion and the 1st Inf Div (ANFH) produced commendable results. Through classes and experiences, Artillery Rocket Artillery sections have maintained a ratio of one enemy killed per 16 rockets expended, in support of ANFH units.

(6) During the northeast monsoon season, emphasis is placed on taking advantage of all division aircraft assets to maintain visual reconnaissance in the division AO. In expectation of receiving an increase of visual reconnaissance missions, Battery A (Aviation), 377th Artillery (Airborne) commenced an extensive training program in early August. Pilots are trained by experienced aviators who are fully qualified in low level flight with the OH-6A aircraft. Individuals must volunteer for these missions prior to starting the training program. This training is thorough and has proven successful in that Battery A has not experienced any accidents during low level visual reconnaissance missions.

o. Information

(1) Public Information

(a) Number of hometown news releases: 3,004

(b) Number of news/feature stories released to public and military media: 193

(c) Number of photographs released: 235

(d) Number of correspondents provided support by the information office: 68

(a) Coverage was also provided for 26 distinguished visitors to the division, including Mr. Robert Johnson, assistant secretary of the Army, and Pan American, Miss America, 1970.

(2) Command Information

(a) During the reporting period, seven issues of the division newspaper, 'The Screaming Eagle', and the summer issue of the division magazine, 'Adventures with Destiny', were published.

(b) A special issue of the 'Airborne Bateline' was published on 8 October on President Nixon's address to the nation on Southeast Asia.

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Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 151st Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 31 October 1979, RCF SPER-65 (RC) (U)

(a) Two command information fact sheets entitled "You and WD" and "Drug Abuse" were printed and distributed to division personnel.

(b) Two taped reports were released for use of AFVN by the division's radio broadcast section.

2. (c) Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations and Recommendations.

   a. Personnel. None

   b. Intelligence.

   (1) Use of sensors during periods of bad weather.

      (a) Observation: Unattended ground sensors are of greatly increased importance as intelligence sources during periods of bad weather.

      (b) Evaluation: During periods of poor visibility or severe storm conditions, available methods of surveillance become limited. Unattended ground sensors are only slightly affected by adverse weather conditions. An increase in false activations caused by a higher ambient noise level. This slight increase in false activations can be offset by jamming.

      (c) Recommendation: Commanders consider the value of unattended ground sensors during periods of bad weather.

   (2) Use of aerial photographs for briefing Ranger teams.

      (a) Observation: Aerial photographs greatly enhance the planning and orientation of individual team members prior to operations.

      (b) Evaluation: During the planning phase of ranger team operations, the team leader and his assistant normally are afforded the opportunity to make an aerial reconnaissance. The remaining team members must rely solely on the memory of the team leader and/or his assistant for terrain orientation. The use of aerial photographs of the operational area during the mission briefing to familiarize each team member with terrain, vegetation, landing zones and pick-up zones, has proven to be a valuable assistance to Ranger teams.

      (c) Recommendation: Ranger units consider using aerial photographs for planning and orienting team members.

(3) Traditional AO boundaries provide the enemy sanctuaries.
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(a) Observation: The enemy sets up base camps along traditional boundary lines.

(b) Evaluation: For well over a year, the 13 grid line has been the traditional northern boundary line between the 1st Bde and the 3d ARVN Regt. When any reconnaissance or offensive operations were initiated into this area, the enemy would simply move across the boundary line, thus occupying what amounted to a sanctuary. A coordinated offensive by the 1st Bde and the 3d ARVN Regt into this area resulted in 53 NVA KIA and 38 WIA. All indications show that elements of the 310th Bn have operated in the sanctuary for at least two years.

(c) Recommendation: Units should exercise a more coordinated and annual surveillance of their AO boundaries.

(d) Observation: The enemy reuses his old base camps.

(e) Recommendation: Set up a systematic plan for the detection and reconnaissance of known enemy base camps.

(f) Observation: Woodcutters can be excellent sources of intelligence.

(g) Recommendation: Maintain and expand facilities which increase contacts with woodcutters.

(h) Observation: Woodcutters can be excellent sources of intelligence.

(5) Observation: This group of woodcutters had established themselves in an area considered a sanctuary by the 310th Bn. They were excellent sources of intelligence and provided useful information regarding enemy activities.

(6) Observation: Woodcutters can be excellent sources of intelligence.

(7) Recommendation: Maintain and expand facilities which increase contacts with woodcutters.

(8) Observation: Woodcutters can be excellent sources of intelligence.

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(100) Observation: Woodcutters can be excellent sources of intelligence.
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Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile),
Period Ending 31 October 1970, NAV SNEU-68 (N2) (U)

(a) Observation: Valuable blade time may be lost due to a lack of specific weather information around individual FS/UBs. During periods of marginal weather, attempts to resupply FS/UBs have been aborted after arrival of the aircraft over the FS/UB. Conversely, resupply strikes have been cancelled prior to take off during periods of marginal weather when conditions at a particular FS/UB were acceptable.

(b) Evaluation: Focusing on weather information can readily assist the planning and conduct of airmobile resupply operations. Pathfinders are located on FS/UBs to provide aircraft traffic control and are trained to provide area weather information. Requiring Pathfinders to provide hourly weather information during periods of marginal weather has improved the utilization of blade time.

(c) Recommendation: Commanders consider adopting this program during periods of marginal weather.

(c) Operations

1. Expedient calibration for Radar Course Directing Control, AN/TPQ 104.

(a) Observation: The VSF, Air Support Radar Team (ASRT) located at FS/UB (exact location not provided) is required to calibrate the Radar Course Directing Control, AN/TPQ 104 monthly and as required due to specific maintenance or repair operations. The specified calibration procedure requires that an air or ground observer spot the strike of the bomb against a predeter
dined prominent terrain feature. Inclement weather conditions severely restrict observed calibration and has resulted in the AN/TPQ 104 RADAR being considered nonoperational even though the equipment is correct mechanically.

(b) Evaluation: In order to conduct calibration while maintaining an adequate troop safety margin, the G3 Air arranged for calibration of the AN/TPQ RADAR using a Radar Set, AN/RFQ 4 to determine bomb strike locations and a second air tracking radar (USAF AN/RSQ 77 or VSF AN/TPQ 104) to verify the attack aircraft in-flight characteristics. When a flight of two attack aircraft is available, the use of a second air tracking radar is not necessary. Calibration using the above controls in an adverse weather environment resulted in Circular Error Probable (CEP) accuracies of 20 meters and 35 meters on successive calibration runs. These CEPs were within the required 30 meters CEP and were accepted by Marine Air Support Squadron 3 as being adequate. Use of this alternate calibration procedure resulted in having the ASRT operational a minimum of two days earlier than could have been obtained by waiting for suitable weather conditions.
Additionally, an ARVN adverse weather calibration procedure has been established and is expected to prove highly beneficial during the northeast monsoon.

(c) Recommendation: That units supported by USARV Air Support Radar Team adopt this alternate calibration system when inclement weather conditions restrict observed calibration.

(2) Use of pepsprime "road mix" as an expedient surfacing technique.

(a) Observation: Secondary roads in zone 1 utilize laterite soil for subgrade, base courses, and surfacing. An expedient means of dust control in the summer, and waterproofing in the winter is the application of a surface coating of pepsprime. This surface coating of pepsprime is satisfactory during the dry season but erodes quickly during the frequent torrential rains in the wet season.

(b) Evaluation: Once the pepsprime surfacing erodes, the action of water and heavy truck tires quickly breaks through to the base courses, and in time, to the subgrade. Roads to firebases were impassable for several months (November, December, and January) last year because of this. In an attempt to rectify this situation, employing available equipment and materials, a superior field expedient surfacing technique was developed. The road surface is first scarified to a depth of four to six inches. The first application of pepsprime is a 30/30 pepsprime/TPA mixture. After this is thoroughly windrowed, a second mixture is then applied 70/30, and windrowed. This is followed by two more 70/30 applications. This mixture is then graded and compacted. The final step is the application of a conventional surface coating of pepsprime. Depending on the temperature and humidity, the road is travelable in 1-3 days. This method provides both the dust-inhibiting characteristic of the conventional pepsprime surface plus an impermeable wearing course.

(c) Recommendation: That units consider adopting the expedient surfacing technique stated above.

(3) Use of Soil-cement Sandbags in Drainage Systems.

(a) Observation: A substitute for culvert was found to be necessary because of the high price of the culvert and the difficulty in its procurement.

(b) Evaluation: In lining open drainage ditches, soil-cement sandbags were found to be an adequate substitute for culvert sections.
When the sandbags are properly mixed and shaped, they form a solidified lining that satisfactorily prevents excessive accumulation of mud in the ditches.

(a) Recommendation: That soil-cement sandbags be used in lining ditches when standard culvert is not available. This saves time in conservation of man-hours and avoids the delay encountered in requesting materials through supply channels. Another appropriate use for the soil-cement sandbags would be in the construction of culvert headwalls where ordinary sandbags require greater stability.

(b) Recommendation: That the procedures discussed above be used for engagement of radar acquired targets.

(c) Observation: Enemy targets acquired by the TRS-25 radar must be engaged rapidly by artillery for fires to be effective.

(b) Evaluation: Several measures can be taken to expedite processing calls for artillery fires to engage these targets. Radar spotter observed over a period of several months have revealed patterns of enemy activity. Many spotterings have centered in a relatively small number of grid squares. These grid squares are pre-located daily. Permanent air warning data to the center of mass of the pro-located grid have been posted with the AMCU station. When a radar spotting is received the AMCU station is requested to post the target and the target is fired.

(c) Observation: In August 1970, Ranger team Japan II executed a roll-out exchange with team Japan I. Three hours after the insertion, team Japan II makes contact. A roll-out is accomplished when a helicopter enters a landing zone and one team exits the aircraft from one door while the ground team boards the aircraft through the other door. If this is accomplished in a touch down in less than 15 seconds, the method is acceptable. When using ladders for roll-out, one team climbs down one ladder while the other team climbs the other ladder. To execute the ladder roll-out of Ranger team Japan II, the aircraft hovered in the LZ for seven minutes.

(b) Evaluation: Seven minutes in the LZ is too long for any operation. The theory of using a roll-out is sound when executed properly. Ladder extractions necessitate that the aircraft hover in one position.
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for a prolonged period of time allowing the enemy to determine the location of the ground elements.

(c) Recommendations: Roll-outs should only be conducted when a ground element has a confirmed touch down LI. This minimizes the time the aircraft is actually in the landing zone and enables a faster exchange of ranger teams.

(d) Counter mortar target engagement using direct fire.

(e) Observation: Possible enemy mortar positions must be plotted and fired prior to darkness on the first day of occupation on a new firebase.

(b) Evaluation: When a howitzer battery occupied FSB ELITE, several possible enemy mortar locations were plotted and fired using direct fire on the high ground to the rear of the firebase. This was accomplished prior to nightfall on the first day of occupation. When the firebase came under indirect fire attack three nights later, the battery immediately engaged the preplanned targets with direct fire, silencing the mortar and causing a secondary explosion.

(c) Recommendation: Employ direct fire on possible enemy mortar locations prior to darkness and give specific assignments to each gun section on action to be taken if the firebase comes under attack. When rounds begin to fall on firebase all sections engage assigned targets with 10-15 rounds and then await further instructions to expend on known enemy locations.

(f) Carrying 77-pound rockets on inboard wing of A-1H aircraft.

(a) Observation: A modification in the manner in which 77-pound, HE warhead, 2.75 inch, Folding Fin Aerial Rockets are carried on A-1H aircraft equipped with four 155G rocket pods has increased the possibilities of reducing major damage to aircraft during emergency conditions.

(b) Evaluation: The 77-pound warhead rockets are loaded in the inboard wings only, while lighter munitions are carried in the outboard stores. The heavier inboard wing stores can be jettisoned during engine failures or other emergency conditions and the lighter outboard stores can be retained for stability and assistance in maintaining an upright attitude, once ground contact is made.

(c) Recommendation: Aerial artillery units consider the use of the
above stated method of carrying rocket munitions.

d. Organization. None.
e. Training. None.
f. Logistics. Care of equipment during the rainy season.

(a) Observation: The northeast monsoon creates special problems in the care of equipment. In the past, existing drying facilities have not been adequate to handle the necessary large quantity of wet and soiled equipment.

(b) Evaluation: Preparation for erection and establishment of drying facilities for items of equipment being retrograded during the rainy season poses a major problem. The utilization of drying tents or other suitable facilities have not been considered adequate to supplement the existing laundry facilities during the influx of wet equipment from field locations.

(c) Recommendation: Units consider the amount of tentage or building space required to satisfy their particular needs. Periodically, as units return from the field for a short stand down, their equipment is placed in the drying facility to prevent mildew and other damage from moisture. These facilities should be available in forward and rear positions. The construction of field expedient heating devices from 55-gallon drums cut in half and properly ventilated will provide a suitable heat source. Diesel fuel is used in conjunction with discarded paper products which are not otherwise usable for construction material. Despite the distasteful odor, the equipment can be dried. Fire burning material should be kept outside the tent; a stove pipe should be run through the structure to provide radiant heat. If available, a fan should be used for circulation.

g. Communications. None

h. Material.

(i) Engine Failure.

(a) Observation: Five of the 10 accidents experienced during the reporting period were direct result of engine failure over unsuitable forced landing areas.

(b) Evaluation: Preliminary analysis of the engine failures indicate 4th stage compressor failures and foreign object damage are the primary causes.
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(c) Recommendation: In view of the unsuitable terrain in NB I, it is
essential that positive steps be taken to eliminate in-flight engine
failures. A combination of proper fuel handling procedures, "iron-
spectrometric oil analysis, turbine engine analysis, daily "go-to-
job" analysis and go-to-go checks will prevent any "small- fuel at-
vention failures if properly employed and monitored.

(2) Excessive non-available time on engineer equipment due to flat
tires.

(a) Observation: Graders, cranes, loaders, tractors, and backpacks
have continued to be disabled from two to twenty-four hours because of flat
 tires at job sites. Normally, when one of these critical pieces of equipment
becomes inoperable, other equipment also ceases to work.

(b) Evaluation: It has been found that when an item of engineer
equipment has a flat tire, it requires between six to twenty-four hours
to dismount, retread, repair, return, and remount. Normally, engineer
equipment will perform only one operation (i.e., loading, dozing), and
is dependent on other equipment to complete a mission. Hence, when one
piece is disabled, other equipment must cease work. Normally, wheeled
engineer equipment does not carry the factory with spare wheels and
tires as does ordnance equipment. Consequently, each time a flat occurs,
that tire must be repaired and returned. Spare wheels can be ordered
through normal supply channels. It is feasible to maintain spare tires
for the equipment in the rear area or to stock the spares on the
equipment. Either method saves time.

(i) Recommendation: Sufficient spare wheels and tires for the
engineer equipment should be stocked at supply channels. These
spares can then be utilized in the same manner as spare tires on ordnance
vehicles.

1. Other.

(1) Portable Flame Throwers used to fight fires.

(a) Observation: During the summer months, several large fires created
by enemy activity destroyed property on forward fire bases which
were inaccessible to effective fire fighting equipment.

(i) Recommendation: Search for ordnance equipment results in use of
the portable flame thrower filled with "Lite Water" (NA 1216-735-1216.
Lite Water is a concentrate foam forming agent which produces small
water, steam, or fine mist when mixed with water and sprayed under pressure.
Normally, one presurized tank will employ two loads of Lite Water.)
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Once this employment technique was developed, a message was dispatched
directing observers to establish a fire point on each occupied firebase
which included two portable flamethrowers, M2A1 or M3A7, and a pressurized 55-gallon drum of
water, are now required to be maintained for fighting fires. It was found that the pressure regulator
on the M2A1 should be adjusted to an operating pressure of 125 psi. The M3A7
pressure regulator cannot be adjusted. This fire fighting expedient has
already been credited with saving a mess hall and an ammunition dump.

(a) Recommendation: This fire fighting expedient be adopted by other
units.

(b) Medicines for MEDEPWS.

(a) Observation: Despite the generally good quality of supplies and
the performance of interpreters, there has been a lack of understanding
by the Vietnamese patients as to the use of medicines, and therefore a
failure of US Medec Assist to meet its full potential.

(b) Evaluation: The best medicine does no good if the patient does
not know how to use it. In fact, it could prove extremely harmful.

(c) Recommendation: To help bridge the gap of understanding, medicine
labels should be translated into Vietnamese. This will greatly assist
Vietnamese health workers, and help prevent the misuse of drugs by the
villagers.

(c) MEDEPWS Utilization.

(a) Observation: Improper utilization of MEDEPWS, Phase II, is detrimental
to the psychological effect of the program.

(b) Evaluation: MEDEPWS, Phase II, is for the purpose of training
Vietnamese medical personnel. After 6-8 MEDEPWS, the Vietnamese health
workers with proper training become sufficiently proficient to conduct these
activities. However, when only a small number of Vietnamese can be trained
because training is being conducted, an unfavorable impression is conveyed
to those not trained.

(c) Recommendation: The surgeon with the MEDEPWS team should choose
10 to 15 personnel with more serious medical problems for treatment.
Meanwhile, the Vietnamese village health workers already trained should
assist the minor ailments under the guidance of the team medic. Thus, max-
imum treatment and training benefit is derived from the mission.

(e) Aerial Broadcast System in Loukhia:

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(a) Observation: The most effective altitude for broadcasting in the loyalties is 500-700 feet.

(b) Evaluation: Currently, the minimum altitude for aerial broadcast is 1000-1500 feet. During test flights at various altitudes, it was observed that the best responses were obtained at an altitude of 900-1000 feet. These responses consisted of people stopping their work to look up and listen. Prior to these tests, their reactions would not be noted.

(c) Recommendation: The existing altitude restriction should be lowered. Aircraft operating over the loyalties should be allowed to 500-700 feet when the tactical situation permits.
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1. (C) On 25 July, the 1st Brigade, in operational coordination with the 3d Regt, 1st Inf Div (ARVN), initiated Operation VOX/GREAT PEARL/LMM SEC 363. This operation continued into the reporting period.

2. (C) 1-12 August 1970

a. On 3 August, the 1st Bn assumed responsibility for FSB/TB BASTOGNE from the 2d Bn, and the 3d Bn (-) (Amm), 187th Inf moved from BASTOGNE to CAMP EVANS to increase patrol, surveillance and ambush operations south of the camp. On 3 Aug, the 1st Bn (Amm), 502d Inf and the Reconnaissance Platoon moved by air to secure FSB/TB BASTOGNE and begin local patrol and surveillance operations. The 2d Bn (Amm), 502d Inf air assaulted from FSB/TB BAKHSAAN and the SWORD area into three landing zones southwest of FSB/TB GLADIATOR. This assault was conducted in response to intelligence indications of a possible enemy attack against the firebase.

On 5 August, the 2d Bn (Amm), 501st Inf extracted from the GLADIATOR area and moved by air to CAMP EVANS to prepare for an assault into the vicinity of MEXICO on 6 August.

The 1st Bn (Amm), 506th Inf, having completed battalion refresher training, moved by vehicle, on 6 August, to FSB/GB BIRMINGHAM and ARSENAL to secure those firebases and conduct local patrol operations. The battalion passed from the operational control of the 3d Bde to operational control of the 2d Bde. The 1st Bn (Amm), 502d Inf terminated operations, vicinity BIRMINGHAM and ARSENAL, and moved to ABU BAI Combat Base to begin battalion refresher training and assume the mission of the division ready force.

The 1st Bn (Amm), 101st Inf, having completed battalion refresher training, moved by vehicle, on 6 August, to FSB/GB BIRMINGHAM and ARSENAL to secure those firebases and conduct local patrol operations. The battalion passed from the operational control of the 3d Bde to operational control of the 2d Bde. The 1st Bn (Amm), 502d Inf terminated operations, vicinity BIRMINGHAM and ARSENAL, and moved to ABU BAI Combat Base to begin battalion refresher training and assume the mission of the division ready force.

The 1st Bn (Amm), 101st Inf, having completed battalion refresher training, moved by vehicle, on 6 August, to FSB/GB BIRMINGHAM and ARSENAL to secure those firebases and conduct local patrol operations. The battalion passed from the operational control of the 3d Bde to operational control of the 2d Bde. The 1st Bn (Amm), 502d Inf terminated operations, vicinity BIRMINGHAM and ARSENAL, and moved to ABU BAI Combat Base to begin battalion refresher training and assume the mission of the division ready force.

On 8 August, in response to intelligence indications of an enemy build-up in the FSB/GB O'REILLY area, the 1st Regt (ARVN) moved its Reconnaissance Company to augment the security of the firebase. The 3d Battalion moved to landing zones northeast, northwest and west of the firebase and conducted search and attack operations in an attempt to gain contact with the enemy.

On 9 August, while conducting armored reconaissance in the vicinity of FSB/GB O'REILLY in support of the 1st Regt (ARVN),
elements of Trp B, 2d Sqdn (Ambl), 17th Cav reported sighting 800 NVA on a ridge line in the vicinity of XQ 292569-12302200. In response to this sighting, 26 tactical air strikes, for 52 sorties, were flown in the area. In addition, 36 sorties of aerial rocket artillery were expended in the target area. Sky Spot missions continued throughout the night.

On 10 August, the 4th Bn, 1st Regt (ARVN) air assaulted from the FS/OB Barnett area to a landing zone two kilometers northwest of O'Reilly to begin reconnaissance in force operations, moving south. Throughout the day, 14 forward air control missions were employed against known enemy locations in the O'Reilly area.

On 12 August, Operation CHICAGO PIAK/LAM SON 363 was terminated and all units engaged in the operation began preparations for redeployment. The 2d Bn, 3d Regt (ARVN) moved to CAMP SALLY and the 2d Bn (Ambl), 522d Inf, minus Co C, moved from FS/OB MAHNEK and vicinity to CAMP ZAGLE and prepared for movement to FS/OB BARNETT.

Cumulative results of the operation were 97 enemy killed (15 by US/2 by ARVN), 18 individual weapons captured (ARVN), and 14 crew served weapons captured (eight by US, six by ARVN). Three ARVN soldiers were killed in action and 43 were wounded in action. US casualties were two soldiers with minor wounds.

b. Significant Activities. On 1 August, elements of the 2d Sqdn (Ambl), 17th Cav and the 4th Bn (Aerial Art), 77th Art (Ambl) killed 10 enemy in two engagements near BREKING and GRANITE. At 1600 hours, the 1st and 2d Companies, 2d Bn, 3d Regt (ARVN) engaged an estimated enemy platoon with small arms fire three kilometers north of GOODMAN, killing 12 enemy and recovering two RPG Launchers, one AK-47, five CHICOM demolition mines, 27 RPG rounds, 110 82mm mortar rounds and miscellaneous documents. One ARVN soldier was killed and 15 were wounded.

At 0241 on 15 August, the 2d Co, 2d Bn, 1st Regt (ARVN) engaged an enemy force with small arms fire 300 meters from their position at XQ 363233 (MAWIL). A search of the contact area revealed 15 NVA KIA, one 60mm mortar (complete) and 150 60mm mortar rounds. Five ARVN soldiers were wounded in the action.

PHU BAI Combat Base was attacked by fire twice on 2 August. Four 122mm rockets were received at 2006 hours and two rockets at 2303 hours. No casualties or damage were caused. Artillery was
CAMP EVANS received seven 122mm rockets at 031256 August, resulting in two US WIA; there were no other damages. Also on 3 August, the 1st BN, 3d Regt (ARVN) killed seven enemy and recovered four individual weapons, near AIRBORNE.

On 5 August, elements of the 3d Sqdn (Ambl), 17th Cav, in scattered contact, killed 11 enemy and destroyed five 12.7mm machine guns. On 6 August, air cavalry elements destroyed four and captured two additional 12.7mm machine guns.

On 6 August, two platoons of Trp D, 2d Sqdn (Ambl), 17th Cav and the 3d Bn, 2d Regt Company were inserted in the vicinity of T0981997, seven and one half kilometers west of RANGER, to conduct a ground DDA of an ARVN LIGHT unit. The 3d Bn, 2d Regt Company discovered 67 bunkers, 300 RPG rounds, 600 pounds of C4, 500 NVA uniforms, 50 boxes of medical supplies, 36 cases of AK-47 rounds, 100 82mm mortar rounds, 15 ruck-sacks and 25 pounds of miscellaneous documents.

Elements of the 1st BN, 1st Regt (ARVN) killed seven enemy 1500 meters north of FS/08 O'REILLY on 6 August. The firebase received 82mm mortars at 1715 hours, resulting in one ARVN soldier KIA and one WIA.

Also on 6 August, at 1919 hours, HUE CITY received four 122mm rockets, which impacted in the ARVN detention center. One billet was destroyed, 14 detainees were killed and 89 were wounded.

At 0645 hours on 9 August, the 2d Co, 1st BN, 1st Regt (ARVN) received eighty 82mm mortar rounds impacting on and around their position, two kilometers west of FS/08 O'REILLY. There were no casualties. At 1715 hours, the 2d, 1st BN, 1st Regt (ARVN), on FS/08 O'REILLY, received 82mm mortar fire resulting in one ARVN soldier KIA and 13 WIA. During the night, the 2d Co, 1st BN, 1st Regt (ARVN) killed 12 enemy two and one half kilometers west of the firebase, and suffered two KIAs.

In the area of CHIMAO PEAK/LAM SON 363 operations, the 1st and 2d BNs, 3d Regt (ARVN) killed 11 enemy near AIRBORNE.

On 10 August, a total of 36 enemy were killed in the vicinity of FS/08 O'REILLY by elements of the 1st Regt (ARVN), supported by the 2d Sqdn (Ambl), 17th Cav. Eight ARVN soldiers were wounded in action during the day, as the enemy made extensive use of 82mm mortars.

The firebase received two 75mm recoilless rifle rounds and six 82mm mortar rounds, which caused no casualties or damage.

On 11 and 12 August, a total of 112 enemy were killed in the vicinity of FS/CE O'REILLY. Elements of the 1st and 4th BN, 1st Regt (ARVN) accounted for 19 enemy killed. The 28 Sqdn (Amb), 17th Cav killed 23, and tactical air strikes and AAA killed 70. One ARVN soldier was killed and 11 wounded during the two days of contact.

3. (G) 13-25 August 1970.

a. On 13 August, the 21 BN (Amb), 502d Inf passed from the operational control of the 1st BN to the 2d BN and moved from CAMP EAGLE to FS/CE BARNETT and vicinity. The mission of the battalion was to secure the firebase and conduct search and attack patrols in the area. This move released the 2d BN, 1st Regt (ARVN) to assault from BARNETT to an 12 five kilometers west of FS/CE O'REILLY, and begin reconnaissance in force operations, moving to the west.

FS/CE MAUREEN was closed at 141525 August.

On 15 August, the 1st BN, 1st Regt (ARVN) extracted from the O'REILLY area and moved to LA VANG to prepare for future operations.

On 16 August, while conducting EDA, the Ban Bac Company discovered a large medical cache at YD166216, four kilometers northeast of RANGER. To assist in exploiting this discovery, three Platoons of Trp B, 2d Sqdn (Amb), 17th Cav were inserted. All elements were extracted on 17 August.

On 18 August, the 1st BN (Amb), 327th Inf moved by air and vehicle from FS/CE VEGHEL and BASTOGNE to CAMP EAGLE to prepare for refresher training and assume the DRF mission. The 1st BN assumed OPCON of the 1st BN (Amb), 506th Inf from the 2d BN and the battalion moved by air to VEGHEL and BASTOGNE. The 1st BN (Amb), 167th Inf completed refresher training and began patrol and ambush operations to the south and southwest of CAMP EVANS.

On 21 August, the 1st BN (Amb), 327th Inf completed battalion refresher training and, on 21 August, returned to FS/CE VEGHEL and BASTOGNE. The 1st BN (Amb), 506th Inf returned to operational control of the 2d BN and moved to PHU LOU District to secure PHU LOS HANGS and TOMAHAWK. The 21 BN (Amb), 327th Inf moved from PHU LOU District to CAMP EAGLE to begin battalion refresher training and assume the DRF mission.
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Also on 24 August, the 3d Bn. 506th Inf., which had been detached from the division since early 1968, began arriving at Phu Bai Combat Base. The battalion, with attached artillery and engineer support, most recently had been employed in the A Shau area.

b. Significant Activities. Shortly after insertion into the FS/OS BARNETT area on 13 August, the 3d Plt., Co A and the Recon Plt., 2d Bn. (Ambl); 502d Inf. made contact with enemy forces resulting in six NVA Kia, one US soldier killed and three wounded.

At 15/145 August, two kilometers southeast of FS/OS O'REILLY, the light CP, and 2d and 3d Co., 3d Bn., 1st Bgt. (ARVN) received 62mm mortars, RPG and small arms fire from a company size enemy force. The elements returned organic weapons fire and were supported by aircraft from the 2d Sqdn. (Ambl); 17th Cav and the 4th Bn. (Aerial Art.) 71st Arty (Ambl). A search of the contact area revealed 15 NVA Kia and three CSVC. ARVN casualties were two soldiers KIA and 16 WIA.

On the night of 15-16 August, at TD 171319, three kilometers west-southwest of FS/OS BARNETT, the 2d and 3d Platoons of Co B and the 3d Platoon, Co D, 2d Bn. (Ambl), 503d Inf., while in their HDP, engaged in a night long battle with an estimated company size enemy force. A first light search of the area, on 16 August, revealed 34 additional enemy killed in the contact area, a large number of bunkers and significant amounts of enemy equipment and supplies.

Also on 16 August, a ground BDA by elements of the 2d Sqdn. (Ambl), 17th Cav and the Recon Company, four kilometers northeast of RAKER, resulted in the discovery of 12 bunkers, eight huts, 60 NVA uniforms, 14 medical kits, seven sets of medical instruments, 2400 pounds of rice, 100 122mm rockets, and miscellaneous documents. Additionally, elements of the 1st Bvt. Div. (ARVN) killed 27 enemy in the vicinity of FS/OS O'REILLY. Four ARVN were killed and seven were wounded.

On 18/0425 August, at TD 193273, vicinity JEROME, the 1st Bn. 3d Bgt. (ARVN) received RPG and small arms fire from an estimated enemy battalion surrounding their position. The ARVN elements returned organic weapons fire, resulting in 38 NVA KIA and one NW captured. Thirteen ARVN soldiers were wounded in the action.

An estimated company size enemy force reoccupied a bunker complex at TD 171319, a location which had been used as an HDP by elements of the 2d Bn. (Ambl). 502d Inf., supported by helicopter gunships, ADA, artillery and air strikes, assaulted the position at 0200 hours and secured the hill mass by 1300 hours. Twenty-five
enemy were killed in the assault. The company suffered one killed and eight wounded.

On 22 August, three kilometers northwest of RIPCORD, the 3d Co, 3d Bn, 1st Spt (ARVN) discovered 20 enemy killed the previous day by tactical air strikes.

On 23 August, elements of the 2d and 4th Bns, 1st Spt (ARVN) killed 34 enemy in the O’REILLY area. Enemy losses included 250 one-half pound satchel charges, 100 8mm mortar rounds, and five crew served weapons. ARVN casualties were two KIA and nine WIA.

During the period 13-25 August, 290 enemy were killed in combined operations by elements of the 1st Inf Div (ARVN) and the 3d Bde in the O’REILLY/BAKHURT/JEROME areas. Six US and 21 ARVN soldiers were killed in action during the period.

4. (c) 26 August – 5 September 1970.

a. During this period, in anticipation of the northeast monsoon, the division began to reposition and realign units in preparation for Operation JEFFERSON GLEN/MUNSOON PLAN 70.

On 26 August, the 3d Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf completed movement from AN KHE, RVN and the 2d Bde assumed operational control of the battalion.

Also on 26 August, the 3d Bde CP at CAMP EVANS assumed operational control of the 3d Bn (Ambl), 187th Inf and responsibility for maintaining liaison with GVN officials in districts in the division AD which are north of the Perfume River. With this change, the 3d Bde assumed a share of the responsibilities for pacification, development, and RTES in the populated lowlands from the 2d Bde.

On 28 August, the 2d Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf passed from the operational control of the 1st Bde to the 3d Bde. Co G secured PB/GB MAUREEN during the insertion of Netty C, 2d Bn (Ambl), 319th Arty which conducted an artillery raid. In conjunction with the artillery raid, the 1st Bn (Ambl), 507st Inf closed PB/GB GLADIATOR at 1945 hours. The battalion continued to conduct search and attack patrols in the RAKKASAN/GLADIATOR area.

On 29 August, the 3d Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf combat assaulted to HICK and vicinity to secure the firebases and conduct search and attack operations. Netty D, 2d Bn (Ambl), 320th Arty closed the firebase at 1515 hours.
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On 30 August, the division continued realignment of forces and responsibilities in preparation for the northeast monsoon by readjusting maneuver battalions and passing responsibility for PS/OS BIRMINGHAM from the 2d Bn to the 1st Bn. The 1st Bn (Ambt), 501st Inf and the 2d Bn (Ambt), 502d Inf passed from the operational control of the 3d Bn to the 1st Bn. The 1st Bn (Ambt), 501st Inf moved from the MEXICO/GLADIATOR area to PS/OS BIRMINGHAM to secure the firebase and conduct local patrol operations. The 2d Bn (Ambt), 502d Inf terminated operations in coordination with the 3d Regt (ARVN) at PS/OS BARNES, and moved to CAMP EAGLE to begin battalion refresher training. The 1st Bn (Ambt), 506th Inf assaulted from PHU LOC District into the GLADIATOR/MEXICO/GLADIATOR area, and passed from the operational control of the 3d Bn to the 1st Bn. The 2d Bn (Ambt), 327th Inf completed battalion refresher training and redeployed to PHU LOC District. The battalion CP moved to PS/OS TONARIVIK.

On 31 August, the 3d Bn closed PS/OS KATHERINE and MAUREEN. Btry C, 2d Bn (Ambt), 319th Art terminated the artillery raid at PS/OS MAUREEN and moved to CAMP EVANS. The 2d Bn (Ambt), 506th Inf continued search and attack patrols in the vicinity of the firebase.

On 2 September, the 2d Bn (Ambt), 501st Inf moved by air from the canopy east of RIFGARD to PHU BAI Combat Base and began preparation for an assault into the TENNESSEE area in reaction to intelligence and contacts developed by ranger teams. The battalion passed from the operational control of the 3d Bn to the 1st Bn.

On 3 September, the battalion moved by CH-47 to LZ ANN and began assaulting into the TENNESSEE area by unin. Co D secured the firebase for the insertion of Btry A, 1st Bn (Ambt), 321st Art.

The division terminated Operation TEXAS STAR at 1800 hours on 5 September and initiated OPERATION 15-70, JEFFERSON GLER/MORGANS PLAN 70.

b. Significant Activities. At 0930, 26 August, vicinity TD332359, two kilometers southeast of PS/OS O'KEEY, the CP, and 1st and 3d Companies, 3d Bn, 1st Regt (ARVN) engaged a large enemy force. Artillery, ARA and tactical air strikes supported the ground elements, which were in contact throughout the day. A search of the contact area revealed 42 NVA KIA. Twenty-six of these were killed by ARA from the 4th Bn (Aerial Artillery), 77th Art (Ambt). Three ARVN soldiers were killed and nine were wounded during the day.

Between the hours of 1935 and 2130 on 26 August, CAMP EAGLE received twelve 122mm rockets, which caused light damage and one minor...
casualty. The 17th Cav Combat Base received three attacks by fire between 0100 and 0638 hours the following morning. Five 122mm rockets, twenty-seven 82mm mortar, and thirty-four 60mm mortar rounds resulted in light damage and seven US personnel with minor wounds.

Later on 29 August, a UBHE from Trp C, 2d Sqdn (Aml), 17th Cav, while inserting a ranger team at C7734956, received ground fire and crashed on the landing zone. While the crew and ranger team were securing the aircraft, they received small arms and mortar fire on their position, resulting in four US KIA and four WIA. Trp D and the Aero Rifle Platoon of Trp C, 2d Sqdn (Aml), 17th Cav and Co A, 3d Bn (Aml), 506th Inf were inserted to reinforce. Artillery, ARA and tactical air strikes supported the contact. A search of the area revealed no enemy casualties.

On 31 August, 28 enemy were killed in the O'REILLY/BARFETT area of operation by elements of the 1st and 3d Regts (ARVN) supported by the 2d Sqdn (Aml), 17th Cav, the 4th Bn (Aerial arty), 77th arty (Aml), and tactical air strikes.

On 3 September, elements of the 1st Rgt (ARVN) engaged an enemy force three kilometers south of O'REILLY, killing 24 enemy. ARA and tactical air strikes supported the contact. Six ARVN were KIA and eight were WIA.

During the period 9 August through 5 September, combined operations in the O'REILLY/BARFETT/JERICHE area resulted in 614 enemy killed.

5. (C) 5 September - 15 September 1970.

a. On 5 September the division initiated OPORD 13-70, Operation JEFFERSON GLEN/MONSOON PLAN 70 in operational coordination with the 1st Inf Div (ARVN) and GVN officials within Quang Tri Province to maintain pressure on enemy forces operating in the AO to deny regular and guerrilla forces access to the lowland population, to deny the enemy access to the rice harvest, and to assist GVN officials in meeting their pacification goals.

Operation TEXAS STAR was costly to the enemy in Northern Military Region. The division killed 2053 enemy, captured over 600 individual and crew-served weapons and over 200,000 rounds of ammunition of all types, and destroyed or captured over 59 tons of rice.

On 6 September, in support of Operation JEFFERSON GLEN/MONSOON...
This page is designed for those who would like to copy pages in the Official Documents section of the Currahee site. This section is not intended to carry explanatory information concerning the documents. Links to images beyond the number in the report will return a "not found page" this is not an error but the result of an easy access to over 1,100 pages of documents.
In support of the 1st Bn, 1st Regt (ARVN), killed 20 enemy and destroyed one 12.7mm machine gun in the FS/GB O'KEELLY area, while elements of the 2d Bn (Ambl), 17th Cav began extensive armed aerial reconnaissance of ELEPHANT VALLEY in coordination with the 1st US Marine Division.

On 10 September, in support of the 1st Regt (ARVN), three OV-10 aircraft dropped 2,550 gallons of thickened fuel on suspected enemy locations in the vicinity of FS/GB O'KEELLY. On the following day 2,970 gallons were dropped in the area.

On 12 September, the 1st Bn (Ambl), 501st Inf completed refresher training. Company A moved by air to provide security for FS/GB MONSARAY, as Company C moved by vehicle to provide security for FS/GB BIRMINGHAM. The battalion (-) conducted operations in the vicinity of FS/GB MONSARAY/BIRMINGHAM. The 2d Bn (Ambl), 501st Inf moved to PHU BRI Combat Base for refresher training and passed to operational control of the 2d Bde.

During this period the enemy concentrated its activities in the vicinity of FS/GB O'KEELLY/BARNETT/JEROME. Elements of the 1st Regt (ARVN) continued conducting operations in the FS/GB O'KEELLY area while elements of the 3d Regt (ARVN) continued operation in the BARNETT/JEROME area.

b. Significant Activities. At 064209 September, Btry B, 4th Bn (Aerial Artillery), 77th Artillery (Ambl) supporting the 2d Co, 3d Bn, 3d Regt (ARNV) engaged and killed two NVA in the vicinity of FS/GB BARNETT.

At 070715 September, the 2d Co, 4th Bn, 3d Regt (ARVN) received 10 rounds of 60mm mortar fire on FS/GB BARNETT. Artillery was employed on a suspected enemy location. At 1340 hours, seven rounds of 60mm mortar impacted near the firebase. At 1615 hours, the element received nine rounds of 60mm mortar fire. A suspected enemy location was not determined.

At 070745 September, two kilometers south of FS/GB BARNETT, elements of the 2d Bn, 3d Regt (ARVN) discovered three NVA KIA and one AK-47 resulting from a claymore trap detonation. At 0831 hours, the element received five rounds of 60mm mortar fire on their position, wounding one ARVN soldier. At 1610 hours, the element discovered an bunker containing four NVA KIA, one AK-47 and six field telephones.

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At 1630 hours, two kilometers southwest of BARNETT, elements of the 3d Bn, 3d Regt (ARVN) discovered 21 NVA killed by air strikes one day earlier.

On 8 September, elements of the 3d Bn (ARVN) engaged 15 enemy with organic weapons five kilometers northeast of JERONE at 0915 hours. A search revealed three NVA KIA and two AK-47s. At 1050 hours, one kilometer northeast of JERONE, five enemy were engaged with organic weapons fires. A search revealed two NVA KIA and one AK-47. At 1200 hours, two kilometers northeast of JERONE, elements of the 3d Bn, 3d Regt (ARVN) discovered 30 huts containing one GNG radio, 20 82mm mortar rounds, three 72mm rocket fuses, 800 AK-47 rounds, one 50 caliber anti-aircraft machine gun and one 82mm mortar cleaning rod. There was evidence of recent enemy activity.

On 8 September, elements of the 2d Bn, 1st Regt (ARVN) received RHC and small arms fire at 1345 hours, two kilometers southwest of FS/OB O'REILLY. At 1500 hours, the elements received an unknown number of 82mm mortar rounds followed by a ground attack. ARA was employed. A search of the area revealed 20 NVA killed by ARA, five AK-47s and one RHC launcher. There were two ARVN soldiers KIA and eight WIA.

On 9 September, Co B, 2d Bn (Amm), 237th Inf assaulted FS/OB BLITZ, secured the area, and passed to operational control of the 1st Bn (Amm), 502d Inf at 0840 hours. Following this assault, 1st Bn (Amm), 327th Inf moved by air to BLITZ to provide support for operations in the area by the 1st Bn (Amm), 502d Inf.

On 10 September, in support of the 1st Regt (ARVN), three CH-47 aircraft dropped 2,130 gallons of thickened fuel on suspected enemy locations in vicinity of FS/OB O'REILLY. At 0500 hours, three kilometers southeast of O'REILLY, elements of the 1st Regt (ARVN) received 200 32mm mortar rounds which were followed by small arms fire. Organic weapons were employed and the enemy withdrew to the south and east. ARA was employed. A search revealed eight NVA KIA, three AK-47s, 250-pound blocks of TNT and 50 RHC rounds. One ARVN soldier was KIA and 10 were evacuated for wounds. At 1300 hours, three kilometers south of BARNETT, an element of the 3d Bn, 3d Regt (ARVN) employed organic weapons against an estimated enemy platoon. The enemy returned small arms fire and withdrew. A search revealed two NVA KIA and one AK-47. Two ARVN soldiers were KIA and one was WIA. At 1500 hours, the element received two rounds of 82mm mortar fire which wounded 10 more ARVN soldiers. A suspected enemy location was not determined.
At 102115 September, Ranger Team BUFFALO from Co L (Ranger), 75th Inf made contact three and one-half kilometers northwest of FS/GB O'KEELEY. The 23 Sqn (Aust), 17th Cgr provided cover and suppressive fire. Sporadic fire was received until the team was extracted at 1010 hours the following day. An aerial reconnaissance by air was made, but no enemy sightings were reported.

On 11 September, enemy activity continued around FS/OB O'REILLY. At 0208 hours, two kilometers west of O'REILLY, elements of the 3d Bn, 1st Regt (ARVN) received small arms fire. The element returned organic weapons fire and the enemy withdrew in an unknown direction. A search conducted under flareship illumination revealed eight NVA KIA, one AK-47, one RPG launcher, 40 RPG rounds, and 120 one pound blocks of TNT. At 1150 hours, two and one-half kilometers southwest of O'REILLY, elements of the 2d Bn, 1st Regt (ARVN) received small arms fire from an estimated enemy battalion. The element returned organic weapons fire and the enemy withdrew in an unknown direction. Artillery, tactical air strikes and ARA were employed. A search of the area produced no enemy assessments. Friendly casualties were nine ARVN KIA, 15 ARVN WIA and one Australian advisor KIA.

At 131020 September, three and one-half kilometers south of FS/OB O'REILLY, an element of the 1st Bn, 1st Regt (ARVN) received RPG and small arms fire from an estimated enemy company. The element returned organic weapons fire and the enemy withdrew in an unknown direction. ARA, Fink Team (1_AH-1_C aircraft) and tactical air strikes were employed. A search of the area revealed 30 NVA KIA, three AK-47s, one RPG launcher, miscellaneous documents and 100 3'x6'x3' bunkers destroyed.

At 160235 September, two and one-half kilometers west of RANKETT, an element of the 4th Bn, 3d Regt (ARVN) engaged an estimated enemy platoon, resulting in 25 NVA KIA. Ten of these were killed by aircraft from A and C Btrys, 4th Bn (Aerial Art), 77th Arty (Aust).

At 151905 September, FS/OB BLITZ received 16 82mm mortar rounds resulting in six US KIA, including the CO of the 1st Bn (Aust), 923d Inf.

6. (c) 16-30 September 1970.

a. On 16 September, Co G, 2d Bn (Aust), 377th Inf assembled to SLEDGE and secured the area for insertion of Co A, 1st Bn (Aust), 201st Inf which passed to the operational control of the 2d Bn (Aust).
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230th Inf, Co A, 3d Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf assaulted to FISTUL. SLEDGE and FISTUL were secured and prepared for insertion of Phases 3 and 4, 1st Bn (Ambl), 232nd Arty and Btry B, 2d Bn (Ambl), 11th Arty the following day. FISTUL SLEDGE was closed by Co D, 2d Bn (Ambl), 327th Inf which then moved by air to FISTUL SLEDGE and returned to the operational control of its parent battalion.

During the period 16 thru 19 September, the 1st Bde continued operations with three battalions in the BIRMINGHAM, VICKSBURG, HACKETT, and NEGRO/CHAD area with no significant contact.

On 20 September, Co C (-), 2d Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf, under operational control of the 1st Bn (Ambl), 327th Inf, secured and commenced construction of OP CHEERIO MD6304. Also on 20 September, an aircraft from Co C, 158th Avn Bn (Ambl Hel) (Ambl), received ground fire while in support of a ranger team of the 1st Bde, 5th Inf (Mech), worked and crashed and burned in the vicinity of TD 113725. There were nine US KIA and one US WIA. Four US KIA were from the 101st Abn Bn (Ambl).

On 23 September, the 3d Bde repositioned three battalions by air. The 1st Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf completed refresher training and moved by air to the FISTUL SLEDGE area and commenced operations. The battalion CP remained at FISTUL RAKKASAN. The 2d Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf moved by air from the RAKKASAN area to CAMP BUNNY to conduct refresher training and assume the mission of division ready force. The 3d Bn (Ambl), 137th Inf continued to secure FISTUL SLEDGE and conduct operations in the area.

On 25 September, during the air assault of the 5th Bn, 2d Regt (ARVN) in the vicinity of XD62656, 14 aircraft from the 158th and 101st Avn Bns (Ambl Hel) (Ambl) received hits and damage from ground fire. Four aircraft were forced to land in field locations and were later extracted. Three crew members from the 158th were wounded and evacuated.

On 26 September, in the 1st Bde area of operations, Co B, 1st Bn (Ambl), 501st Inf passed to-operational control of 2d Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf and moved by air to open and secure FISTUL TENNESSEE. Division aviation assets repositioned Btry D, 2d Bn (Ambl), 320th Arty from HELIBER to TENNESSEE and a platoon from Btry B, 1st Bn (Ambl), 321st Arty from MHU BAI Combat Base to HELIBER.

On 28 September, the 2d Bn (Ambl) 506th Inf, in operational coordination with the 2d Bn, 3d Regt (ARVN), assaulted to VB WILDP.
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seemed the FE for their Bn CP, Light CP, 3d Regt (ARVN), Btry D, 2d Bn (Aml) 320th Arty, and Btry E, 14th Arty Bn (ARVN) and

On 29 September, the 2d Bn, 327th Inf moved its CP by air from SLEDGE to FS/0B TOMAHAWK, closing FB SLEDGE.

During this period elements of the 1st Regt (ARVN) continued operations in the FS/0B O'REILLY area. The enemy initiated 16 separate indirect fire attacks in the area using 60mm, 82mm, and 120mm mortars and 75mm recoilless rifle fires. Elements of the 1st Regt (ARVN) engaged the enemy 11 times and accounted for 95 NVA KIA.

b. Significant Activities. On 16 September, Trp B, 2d Sqdn (Aml), 17th Cav conducted bomb damage assessments and discovered seven NVA KIA and also observed three enemy in the open in the vicinity of XD327. The enemy were engaged with guns resulting in three NVA KIA. At 0330 hours, three kilometers southwest of FS/0B O'REILLY, elements of the 2d Bn, 1st Regt (ARVN) employed organic weapons against an unknown size enemy force. The enemy returned small arms fire and withdrew. 1RA and air strikes were employed. A search of the area revealed eight NVA KIA by small arms and 38 NVA KIA by tactical air and ARA.

At 170905 September, in the vicinity of XD312223 aircraft from Trp B, 2d Sqdn (Aml), 17th Cav observed 10-15 fighting positions and one enemy soldier. The area was engaged with guns and heavy artillery fires. A visual reconnaissance of the area revealed seven enemy KIA.

On 18 September, four kilometers east of FS/0B JACK XD3124, individuals from Co C, 3d Bn (Aml), 187th Inf detonated four unknown type booby traps with unknown type firing devices resulting in eight US soldiers being evacuated for wounds.

Between 1315 and 1600 hrs on 19 September, 10 CH-47 sorties dropped 9900 gallons of thickened fuel on booby trapped areas at XD3124, resulting in four secondary explosions.

At 190300 September, aircraft from Trp G, 2d Bn (Aml), 17th Cav while conducting night armed aerial reconnaissance, observed and engaged 40-45 enemy and numerous bunkers at XD112049, resulting in 18 NVA KIA.

At 201229 September, 500 meters southeast of VIC, Btry A, 4th Bn (Aerial Arty), 77th Arty (Aml) observed and engaged four
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enemy and one 12.7mm machine gun position, destroying the machine gun and killing the four NVA. At 1310 hrs, three kilometers west of HIFORDER the Light CP, 1st Bn, 1st Regt (ARVN) received an unknown number of 60mm mortar rounds and small arms fire from an unknown size enemy force. Organic weapons, artillery, AAR and tactical air strikes were employed. A search of the area revealed 15 NVA KIA, three AK-47s, 43 RPG rounds and 250 lbs of TNT. ARVN casualties were one KIA and 21 WIA.

At 2204hrs September, three kilometers northwest of FS/GB HIPORDER the Light CP, 1st Regt (ARVN) received RPG and small arms fire from an unknown size enemy force. The element returned organic weapons fire and the enemy withdrew. A search of the area revealed three NVA KIA, one AK-47, 17 rock sacks, 225 1b blocks of TNT, 21 RPG rounds and 16 60mm mortar rounds. There were two ARVN KIA and two ARVN WIA. At 1135 hrs, in the same area the Light CP of the 2d Co, 1st Bn, 1st Regt (ARVN) received three 75mm recoilless rifle rounds impacting around their position. AAR was employed on a suspected enemy location resulting in one 75mm LR destroyed and one 7.62mm RID light machine gun destroyed.

On 21 September, the Eco Bao Co passed to operational control of 2d Sqdn (Ambl), 17th Cav. Cavalry aircraft inserted the company three kilometers east of FS/GB BRADLEY and received 50-100 rounds of small arms fire. One US-FH aircraft sustained two hits resulting in one US KIA. At 1203 hrs, the Eco Bao Co engaged an unknown size enemy force with organic fire. The enemy returned small arms fire and withdrew in an unknown direction. The action resulted in three NVA KIA and one 12.7mm machine gun captured, and one ARVN KIA. At 1215 hrs, the company discovered three NVA KIA approximately four days earlier. In the FS/GB OREILLY area, at 0415 hrs, the 3d Co, 4th Bn, 1st Regt (ARVN) received RPG and small arms fire from an unknown size enemy force three and one-half kilometers south of the firebase. Organic weapons, artillery, tactical air strikes and a flareship were employed. A search of the area revealed 23 NVA KIA, two NVA RV, six AK-47s, three RPG Launchers, 16 RPG rounds and 600 one 1 b blocks of plastic explosive.

At 2152 hrs September, in the vicinity of YP62806 (10 kilometers southwest of AK) the Recon Plt, 34 Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf received an unknown number of RPG rounds and small arms fire from an estimated position 200-400 meters to the north of their position. Organic weapons fire, AAR and tactical air strikes were employed. Two soldiers, US KIA and five were WIA in the contact. At 1338 hrs, in the vicinity of YC76743 (10 kilometers southeast of THUH) Ranger 2d DALLAS from Company L (ENG) 79th Inf received small arms fire from an unknown size enemy force resulting in one US KIA.
Inclusion 1 (Operations Narrative) to Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 31 October 1970, USAF OPR-55 (22) (0)

On 25 September, at 0730 hrs, aircraft from Trp A, 2d Sqdn (Ambl), 17th Cav discovered an active 12.7mm machine gun position and engaged the area XD283130 with gunships and a tactical air strike, killing three NVA and destroying the machine gun. At 1043 hrs, elements of Trp A observed and engaged enemy at XD277736 resulting in one NVA KIA. While conducting bomb damage assessment, elements of Trp A discovered two NVA KIA at XD280734 and one NVA KIA and one 12.7mm machine gun destroyed at XD283136.

On 28 September, while conducting visual reconnaissance in the division reconnaissance zone, aircraft from Hq and Hq Trp and Trp B, 2d Sqdn (Ambl), 17th Cav made seven separate observations of enemy activity in the vicinity of the HOCOM HOCH VALLEY between 0745 and 1135 hrs. The sighted enemy were engaged by gunships, resulting in 17 NVA KIA. Two bomb damage assessments were conducted by elements of the 2d Sqdn (Ambl), 17th Cav in the same area revealing five NVA killed by USAF air strikes. A USAF FAC also reported five NVA killed following two tactical air strikes against troops in bunkers in the HOCH HOCH Area Y0891727.

On 29 September, in operations around FO/CH WHIP, the CP, 2d Bn, (Ambl), 506th Inf and Light CP, 3d Bn (ARVN) received 26 rounds of 60mm mortar on and around the firebase. Artillery was employed on suspected enemy location at YG773869. Results were four US WIA and one ARVN WIA. Also on 29 September, elements of the 2d Sqdn (Ambl), 17th Cav, 4th Avn (Aerial Artillery), 77th Artillery (Ambl), and USAF aircraft killed 14 NVA in the southern portion of the division reconnaissance zone. At 2005Z September, three kilometers west of LANG CUC KHE (22°49'N), a train on the Qui-Dong railroad derailed a mine consisting of 40 lbs of TNT with pressure type fusing device, resulting in four crossties destroyed and three meters of track damaged.

At 301324 September, while conducting a search and attack patrol, vicinity YG953838, Co B, 3d Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf received small arms fire from an unknown size enemy force. The element returned fire and conducted a search of the area. Friendly casualties were one US WIA.

7. (C) 1 October - 13 October 1970

a. On 1 October, the 1st Bn continued operating with two buses in the FO/CH KHAM RONG/MASTOKE and VOKHO/THANGSHE area while one in continued offensive operations in the WHIP area in

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Inlosure 1 (Operations Narrative) to Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 101st Airborne Division (Airborne), Period Ending 31 October 1970, RG 260-25-65 (23) (U)

Operational coordination with the 2d Bn, 3d Regt (Airborne). The 2d Bn continued with two battalions operating in the pinions and fringes of the canopy, securing FS/GB TOMAHAWK, LOS RANGE, ARSENAL, and BRICK, while one battalion continued search and attack operations south and southeast of FS/GB PISTOL. The 2d Bn (Airborne), 501st Inf passed to the operational control of the 2d Bn from the 3d Bn and assumed the mission of the division ready force. The 3d Bn continued operations with two battalions in FS/GB BAKKASAN/GLADIATOR area and one battalion in the FS/GB JAG area. The 2d Sqdn (Airborne), 27th Cav continued operations in the division reconnaissance zone and maintained four teams from Co L (Rgr), 75th Inf in the AO.

On 4 October, operations in the FS/GB WHIP, TENNESSEE and WICKER areas were terminated and all three FS/GBs were closed by the 2d Bn (Airborne), 502d Inf. Btry A and B, 2d Bn (Airborne), 320th Arty moved by air from WHIP and TENNESSEE, respectively, to CAMP EAGLE. The 2d Bn, 3d Regt (Airborne) and Btry A, 14th Arty Bn (Airborne) moved by air from WHIP to CAMP SALLY. The 3d Bn (Airborne), 506th Inf terminated operations in the FS PISTOL area and moved by air to PHU RAI Combat Base for refresher training and assumed the mission of division ready force. The 2d Bn (Airborne), 501st Inf moved by air from PHU RAI Combat Base to FS BRICK and commenced operations south and southeast of the firebase.

On 6 October, the CP, 3d Bn (Airborne), 502d Inf moved by air to CP CHECKMATE. On 7 October, Co's A and B assaulted to DT5611 and DT5711 (northwest of FS/GB BASTOGNE) and Co's C and D assaulted to DT5811 and DT6012. The battalion commenced reconnaissance in force operations in the area in operational coordination with 2d Bn, 3d Regt (Airborne).

Also on 7 October, Btry A, 14th Arty Bn (Airborne) moved by air from FS/GB O'KIRKLY to FS/GB MANCE. The 2d Bn, 1st Regt (Airborne) closed the firebase and moved by air and by vehicle to LT VANG while the 3d and 4th Bns continued patrol operations south and southwest of O'KIRKLY.

On 13 October, the 3d Bn (Airborne), 506th Inf completed refresher training and moved by vehicle to FS/GB BATAAN and commenced operations in the area. The 1st Bn (Airborne), 501st Inf moved by vehicle and air from the firebase to PHU RAI Combat Base, and assumed the mission of division ready force and prepared for refresher training.

b. Significant Activities. At 011250 October, four kilometers north of BASTOGNE, the 3d Plt, Co C, 1st Bn (Airborne), 327th Inf engaged three enemy with organic weapons. The enemy returned small arms fire and withdrew in an unknown direction. A search of the
area revealed one NVA KIA. At 012500 hrs, nine kilometers south of Ax, the 2d Plt, Co B, 3d Bn (ambt), 306th Inf observed their Claymore trap detonate. A search of the area revealed one NVA KIA and one AK-47.

At 030221 October, a UH-1E aircraft from Co A, 326th Med Bn (ambt), in support of Co B, 2d Bn (ambt), 327th Inf, crashed in the vicinity of YG970819 from unknown causes. There were three US killed and one injured in the crash. At 0715 hrs, four kilometers south of FS/CS 9TH, the 3d Co, 4th Bn, 1st Hpt (ARVN) received 50 rounds of 60mm mortar fire followed by a ground attack from an estimated platoon. The element returned organic weapons fire and the enemy withdrew. A search of the area revealed 12 NVA KIA, two AK-47s, one RPG launcher, one RPD light machine gun and 38 half pound blocks of TNT. The contact produced one ARVN KIA and two ARVN WIA.

On 3 October, three ranger teams, assigned the mission of observing enemy traffic in the 4 SHAU VALLEY, were extracted from the AO. Ranger Team HOUSTON was inserted on 28 September, vicinity YC503867 and was extracted at 031130 October in vicinity YG908918. Ranger Team ANAHAW was inserted on 28 September, vicinity YG462523 and was extracted at 031130 October from the same area. Ranger Team BELIN was inserted on 28 September, vicinity YG468899 and was extracted at 031119 October in vicinity YG90898. All three teams reported little or no enemy activity in the area.

On 041947 October, three kilometers southwest of FS/CS TOCHAWK the 3d Plt, Co B, 2d Bn (ambt), 327th Inf employed organic weapons fire against an unknown size enemy force, 50 meters to the east of their position. The enemy did not return fire and withdrew in an unknown direction. A search under flareship illumination revealed three VC KIA, three AK-47s and two rucksacks.

On 5 October, the 2d Sqdn (ambt), 17th Cav observed enemy elements in seven different locations throughout the division reconnaissance zone. Gunships and Artillery were employed, resulting in 12 NVA KIA and two mortar tubes captured. At 0910 hrs, one-half kilometer east of XKMS/IC653884, Co B, 2d Bn (ambt), 501st Inf, while conducting search and attack patrols, discovered an enemy cache in an artillery crater. The cache contained the following: nine AK-47s, one Chinese FG submachine gun – model 43, 16 RPG – 7 rounds, 12 RPG – 2 rounds, 24 RPG booster charges, 1000 rounds of 30 cal ammo, 15 88mm mortar fuses, 36 pull-type fuses for 106mm charges, one leather holster, 17 AK-47 magazines, assorted clothing, two 10 pound bags of rice and miscellaneous documents.
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At 061400 October, two kilometers south of T-BONE, the 3d Co, 1st Bn, 3d Regt (ARVN), employing organic weapons fire and artillery, engaged an estimated enemy platoon. The enemy returned small arms fire and withdrew. A search of the contact area revealed 13 NVA KIA, three AK-47s, one carbine, 100 khaki uniforms (no markings), 900 lbs of rice, 100 lbs of salt, 10 AK-47 magazines and 50 RPG rounds.

On 7 October, the Recce Plt, 2d Bn (Inf), 501st Inf observed five enemy four kilometers northwest of PISTOL at 1000 hrs. The enemy were engaged by tactical air strikes. A bomb damage assessment revealed 11 NVA KIA. At 1200 hrs, the same element engaged five enemy with organic weapons fire and one-half kilometers northwest of PISTOL. The enemy did not return fire but withdrew in an unknown direction. A search revealed three NVA KIA and one AK-47. At 0700 hrs the 2d Co, 3d Bn, 1st Regt (ARVN) discovered seven NVA killed by air strikes 24 hrs earlier, three kilometers north of T-PUNKO.

At 080000 October, a RO# CHANG led the 26th National Police Field Force, RF Co 144, and FF Plt 22 to a bunker vicinity TD1349. The element employed organic weapons fire against two enemy. A search of the area revealed one VC KIA, one VC FN, three detainees, two M16s, five AK-47s, one M79, one pound of C4, and miscellaneous documents. At 1200 hrs, another RO# CHANG led RF Co 921 to a bunker at TD17501 which contained two AK-47s, one RPG launcher and miscellaneous medical supplies and detonators. At 1415 hrs, the RO# CHANG pointed out a second bunker in the same area. RF Co 921 engaged three enemy in the bunker resulting in two VC KIA and one VC FN. At 1540 hrs, the RO# CHANG led the company to a bunker at TD177396 which contained two enemy. The enemy were engaged by small arms fire, resulting in two VC KIA, one AK-47, one 60mm mortar tube, and one .30 cal MG barrel captured. At 1700 hrs, the VC FN attempted to escape and was killed by organic weapons fire from RF Co 921. At 1740 hrs, elements of the 1st Bn, 3d Regt (ARVN) engaged organic weapons against an estimated enemy platoon two kilometers south of FS/GB T-BONE. The enemy returned small arms fire and withdrew. A search of the area revealed 12 NVA KIA, two AK-47s, one RPG rocket launcher and 100 lbs of rice.

At 091700 October, vicinity of TD199130, Trp B, 26 Sqdn (Amph), 17th Cav observed six NVA in green uniforms. The employment of air and ground fire resulted in six NVA KIA and one 12.7mm machine gun destroyed. At 1300 hrs, elements of the 2d Bn, 3d Regt (ARVN) engaged and unknown size enemy force four and one-half kilometers.

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north of FS/DB BASECONE. A search of the area revealed eight NVA KIA and three AK-47s.

At 101230 October, enemy elements engaged the 1st Plt, Co D, 2d Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf with RPD machine gun fire four and one-half kilometers north of FS/DB NAXABAN, resulting in one US KIA. The element was engaged again at 1602 hrs by small arms fire three and one-half kilometers north of the firebase resulting in three US KIA. An AH-1G aircraft from Troop A, 2d Sqdn (Ambl), 17th Cav crashed in vicinity 1027400, not as a result of enemy fire, killing one US soldier and injuring another. The aircraft was extracted. Two and one-half kilometers south of T-BONE, reconnaissance elements of the 1st Sq (ARVN) discovered a cache containing 16 individual weapons and one crew-served weapon.

At 110900 October, four and one-half kilometers north of BASECONE, the 2d Bn, 3d Bg (ARVN) engaged an unknown size enemy force with organic weapons fire resulting in seven NVA KIA and three AK-47s. Also on 11 October, Co A, 2d Bn (Ambl), 505th Inf detonated a booby trap which wounded two US soldiers in the NAXABAN area. Two more were wounded by a booby trap in the same area on 12 October, and one US and one 11th Cusseon Scout were wounded by a third booby trap in the same vicinity on 13 October. CS-47 flame drops were employed in the same area on 17 and 13 October resulting in five and two secondary explosions, respectively.

At 131340 October, four kilometers south of FS/DB DAVIS, ARVN in support of elements from the 4th Bn, 1st Bg (ARVN) engaged an estimated enemy platoon in the open, resulting in six NVA KIA.

B. (C) 14 October - 23 October 1970

1. On 14 October, the 1st Bn CP remained at CAMP EAGLE. The 1st Bn (Ambl), 327th Inf continued operations in the vicinity of FS/DB BASECONE. The 2d Bn (Ambl), 526th Inf with its CP at O.C/507 continued reconnaissance in force operations in operational coordination with the 3d Inf Bg (ARVN). The 3d Bn (Ambl), 506th continued search and attack operations in the FS/DB BIRMINGHAM area while the 1st Bn (Ambl), 501st Inf remained at PHU BAI Combat Base, continued the mission of division ready force, and conducted training. The 2d Bn CP remained at PHU BAI Combat Base. The 2d Bn (Ambl), 327th Inf continued to secure FS/DB TOMAHAWK and LOS BANGS and to conduct patrol and ambush operations in the area. The 1st Bn (Ambl), 526th Inf continued search and attack operations in the FS/DB ARSENAL area while the 2d Bn (Ambl), 501st
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Inf continued operations in the PS/CR BRICK area. The 3d Bn GP remained at and continued to direct operations from CAMP EVANS. The 3d Bn (Ambl), 187th Inf GP retained at PS/CR JACK and conducted operations in the area. The 1st and 2d Bns (Ambl), 506th Inf maintained their CPs at PS/CR RAKKASAN to direct operations in the RAKKASAN/GERMANTOWN area.

The Mac Ben Co, inserted 13 October in response to enemy sightings in the DAVIS area, continued search and attack operations.

On 15 October, the division implemented OPLAD 16-70, Typhoon Tropical Storm Contingency Plan at 1100 hrs, in response to weather reports that Typhoon JOAN would dominate the entire AO causing severe weather conditions for four to five days. The plan called for all US and GVN forces to be resupplied and capable of four day operations without further resupply. Resupply was accomplished by 1730 hrs. All isolated units were repositioned by 1830 hrs, so that reinforcement would be possible should they make contact with a numerically superior force. All aircraft were secured with double tie downs and aircraft flights restricted to combat essential missions. The "US SCREAMING EAGLE" in Lang Co Bay was cleared of all offensive equipment. A disaster relief control center was established in the UTCO by the ACoS, G5. Typhoon readiness conditions were terminated on 17 October as weather conditions improved.

On 18 October, the 1st Bn (Ambl), 501st Inf completed refresher training. The Rs GP and Barton Flt moved by vehicle to PS/CR BASTOGNE. Co A moved by air to PS/CR BASTOGNE and secured the forward. Co B moved by air to PS/CR VIKING, Co's C and D conducted assaults and began search and attack operations in the BASTOGNE/VEGRE area. The 1st Bn (Ambl), 377th Inf moved by air and vehicle from BASTOGNE area to CAMP EAGLE, assumed the mission of division ready force and prepared for refresher training. Elements of the 2d Sqdn (Ambl), 17th Cav inserted Ranger Teams AROWART, FALCONS, VIKINGS and PACKERS in the AO to conduct area reconnaissance and determine the extent of enemy activity. Co L (Rgr), 75th Inf maintained two to four ranger teams in the western AO during the period 18-23 October.

In response to increased friendly casualties caused by booby traps during the period 16-23 October, OH-47 aircraft flew 45 sorties and dropped 22,165 gallons of thickened fuel to clear suspected booby trapped areas. Additionally, two sorties were flown to spray 350 gallons of diesel oil to clear perimeters for Quang Dien District.
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UL-1H aircraft flew two sorties to spray 160 gallons of retroreflective
slurry on enemy infiltration routes.

b. Significant Activities. On 14 October the 3d Plt, Co
A, 1st BN (Ambl), 502d Inf was laying concertina wire around OP COLOMBUS.
While driving engineer stakes, the element hit what appeared to be a
70x70cm munition. The 70x70cm munition detonated, wounding four US soldiers.
At 1715 hrs, three kilometers east of STELLA, a trooper from the
2d Plt, Co B, 1st BN (Ambl), 501st Inf was wounded when he detonated
an unknown type booby trap with a pressure type firing device. Trp
B, 2d Sqdn (Ambl), 17th Cav killed four NVA in three separate engage-
ments in the central division reconnaissance zone while Ranger Team
HUNTINGTON observed, engaged and killed one NVA carrying an AK-47
at 0358/72.

At 150820 October, two and one-half kilometers southeast of
O'KELLY, the 3d Co, 3d Bn, 1st Plt (Arvn) observed an enemy platoon
and employed AFA. A search of the area revealed seven NVA KIA, two
M16s, and one RPG launcher.

At 170850 October, in the vicinity of PB/CE JACK, an OH-6A
aircraft from the 3d Bn Air Plt observed one individual with an
AK-47 waving a Chinese leaflet. The individual was picked up and
taken to Camp LYNK. At 1740 hrs, elements of the 2d Bn, 3d Plt
(ArVN) employed organic weapons fire and artillery to engage an esti-
mated squad three and one-half kilometers south of OP LION. A search of
the area revealed five NVA KIA, two AK-47s and two 60mm rocket
rockets destroyed.

On 18 October, the Ho Chi Minh picked up the preceding day
by the 3d Bn was working with a recon team of Co E, 2d Bn (Ambl),
506th Inf three and one-half kilometers north of HELDEN when he detonated
a booby trap consisting of one RPG fragmentation grenade with pressure
type firing device, resulting in one KIA. A 2nd Class Scout wounded in
action. The Ho Chi Minh stated that he had infiltrated from the north
and had only been in the area for three days. He proved to be of
little assistance. At 0040 hrs, vicinity KD118093, an OH-6A aircraft
from Trp C, 3d Sqdn (Ambl), 17th Cav received 100 rds of ground
small arms fire, resulting in one hit in the canopy and one hit in
the fuel cell. Two US personnel received minor wounds. The aircraft
returned to PBU RAI Combat Base and was declared non-flyable.

At 201640 October, a UL-1H aircraft from Co G, 101st Arv Bn
(Ambl) received machine gun fire while inserting elements

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of the 1st Inf Div (Ambl) in vicinity of XD3073. One US soldier WIA by shrapnel.

At 210030 October, four kilometers southeast of FS/UB ROY, the 3d Co, 1st Bn, 54th Regt (ARVN), employing organic weapons fire, engaged an estimated enemy platoon. The enemy did not return fire but withdrew to the south. A search of the area revealed five VC KIA, three RPG rounds, 100 rounds of 7.62mm ammo, one M60 machine gun and two M26 fragmentation grenades.

On 22 October, enemy activity increased. At 2030 hrs vicinity XD15082, a Trp C, 2d Sqdn (Ambl), 17th Cav aircraft observed eight to 10 NVA in the open. The enemy was engaged with gunships. A visual reconnaissance revealed 15 NVA KIA. In the 1st Bde area at 0835 hrs, a bridge XD60092 on Route 547 between BIRMINGHAM and BACTOCHE was discovered to have been sabotaged by demolitions. At 1835 and 2023 hrs, FS/UB BIRMINGHAM received a total of 25 unknown type mortar rounds which impacted outside the perimeter. At 1935 hrs, at XD670090, Co D, 3d Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf received 30 unknown type mortar rounds. In the 2d Bde area at 1400 and 2030 hrs, FS/UB ARSENAL received two mortar attacks totaling eight 82mm rds which impacted 500 meters outside the perimeter. There were no casualties or damage. In the 3d Bde area at 0630 hrs, CAMP EVANS received 25 rds of 82mm mortar fire, wounding one US soldier. At 1350 hrs, at XD496293, a trooper from the 3d Plt, Co D, 2d Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf detonated an unknown type booby trap killing one US soldier and wounding another. At 1845 hrs, CAMP EAGLE received two 122mm rockets which impacted outside the bunker line.

At 230000 October, one kilometer southwest of HELEN, the 3d Plt, Co A, 23 Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf, employing organic weapons fire, engaged five enemy. The enemy returned small arms fire and withdrew to the south. A search of the area revealed one VC KIA and one AX-47. At 1145 hrs, vicinity XD42082, Trp B, 2d Sqdn (Ambl), 17th Cav aircraft received 50-100 rds of small arms fire. The area was engaged by gunships resulting in three NVA KIA. At 2315 hrs, Trp C aircraft observed seven NVA in the open at XD711098. The area was engaged with gunships resulting in four NVA KIA.

9. (C) 24 October - 31 October 1970

a. On 24 October impending typhoon conditions (Typhoon KATE) caused the division to again implement OPLAN 10-70. Typhoon Tropical Storm Contingency Plan. Based on weather reports, the division moved into

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Typhoon Condition 1 at 1500 hrs. All aircraft were assured and a disaster relief control center was established in the NDC. In the 1st Bde area the 1st Bn (Ambl), 327th Inf completed refresher training on 23 October and moved by air to the FS/GB VESSEL and O' CHECKERATE area. The battalion commenced search and attack operations in the VESSEL/BLAKE/CHECKERATE area. The 2d Bn (Ambl), 502d Inf moved by air and vehicle to CAMP EAGLE on 23 October, assumed the mission of division ready force and commenced battalion refresher training on 24 October.

TYPHOON WATT moved over the coast of Military Region 1 south of BA RANG on the morning of 25 October, causing heavy rains and winds up to 50 knots throughout the division AO. TYPHOON WATT rapidly dissipated on 26 October, but persisting low cloud ceilings and scattered rain showers precluded complete utilization of division aircraft assets.

On 26 October, the 1st Bde CP remained at CAMP EAGLE and maintained liaison with the 3d Regt (ARVN). The 1st Bn (Ambl), 101st Inf continued operations in the FS/GB BASTIONS area. The 1st Bn (Ambl), 327th Inf conducted search and attack operations vicinity of FS/GB VESSEL, while the 2d Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf continued operations in the FS/GB BIRMINGHAM area. The 2d Bn (Ambl), 502d Inf continued the mission of division ready force and conducted refresher training at CAMP EAGLE. The 2d Bde CP remained at SHU BAI Combat Base and maintained liaison with the 54th Regt (ARVN).

The 2d Bn (Ambl), 327th Inf continued operations in the FS/GB TONOHAR/LOS BANGS area. The 2d Bn (Ambl), 301st Inf continued operations south and southeast of FS/GB BRICK while the 1st Bn (Ambl), 502d Inf continued operations in the FS/GB ARSENAL area. The 3d Bde CP remained at CAMP EVANS and maintained liaison with the 1st Regt (ARVN). The 3d Bn (Ambl), 187th Inf continued operations in the FS/GB JACK area, with elements north and northeast of KEDIO. The 1st Bn (Ambl), 306th Inf continued operations in the FS/GB RANAHAN area while the 2d Bn (Ambl), 506th Inf continued search and attack, and patrol and ambush operations in the piedmont, vicinity CAMP EVANS.

On 27 October, a northeastern cold front moved into the division area bringing persisting low cloud ceilings and rain which severely restricted use of division aircraft. This cold front, typical of the transition from the southwest to the northeast monsoon, influenced weather in the division area of operations through 31 October. Heavy rains resulted in floods throughout the populated lowlands of northern Military Region 1.

On 30 October, the division Disaster Relief Control Center became operational in the NDC and commenced coordination with US and GVN officials to provide support for flood victims in the populated lowlands. Division aircraft assets were provided to XXIV Corps to evacuate flood victims in
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101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS
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the Da Nang area. On 31 October, division aircraft evacuated 524 flood
victims and distributed 54 tons of G-lations in support of civil affairs
operations in the Da Nang area. Disaster relief operations continued in
this division area through the end of the reporting period.

b. Significant Activities. On 24 October, aircraft from Trp B, 2d
Sydn (Amb1), 17th Cav killed seven NVA in four separate engagements in the
vicinity of FS/GB BEAVER. At 1300 hrs, one and one-half kilometers north
of FS/GB BASTOGNE, a trooper from Co A, 1st Bn (Amb1), 501st Inf detonated
an unknown type booby trap with an unknown type firing device located on
a trail, resulting in one US soldier KIA. At 1200 hrs, three and one-half
kilometers south of FS/GB JACK, a trooper from Co C, 3d Bn (Amb1), 187th
Inf was wounded when he detonated a Soviet mine with a pressure type firing
device. At 1420 hrs, two and one-half kilometers west of DIRECTLY, elements
of the 2d Bn, 1st Regt (ARNV) employing organic weapons fire, engaged an
unknown size enemy force. The enemy returned small arms fire and withdrew
in an unknown direction. A search of the area revealed two NVA KIA, one
AK-47, one RPG, eight graves containing eight NVA killed by tactical air
strikes approximately two weeks earlier, three huts containing eight AK-47
rifles, one unknown type machine gun and two RPG launchers. At 1600 hrs,
the element received 20 rounds of 82mm mortar fire on and around their
position. One US advisor and three ARVN soldiers received minor wounds.
At 2223 hrs, PIB BATT Combat Base received 14 rds of 82mm mortar fire which
impacted throughout the compound. There were two US personnel KIA.

On 251030 October, elements of Co D, 326th Engr Bn (Amb1) and Co A,
1st Bn (Amb1), 506th Inf were returning to FS/GB NAXNAXAN after conducting
road clearing operations when a three-quarter ton truck detonated an
estimated 15 lbs of TNT at TD90221. The team had cleared the road at
the point of detonation approximately one hour prior to the incident. There
was one US soldier KIA and 3 were WIA.

On 28 October, an ambush in the vicinity of C Sector, CAMP EAGLE
(TD902178), received small arms fire and an unknown number of RPG rds from
an estimated enemy squad. The ambush element returned organic weapons
fire and the enemy withdrew in an unknown direction. Six US soldiers were
wounded.
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Tableau 4 (Area of Operations) in Operational Report-Division Keene, 191st
Airborne Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 31 October 1970, NO. 00018 - 65
(II) (II)

SCHEDULE Division AD at the beginning of
JEFFERSON GLEW/MISSION PLAN TO

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