DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 173D AIRBORNE EXG
APO San Francisco 96250

AWAR-SCAN

15 November 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 173d Airborne Brigade, Period Ending 31 October 1970, BOS CSFOR - 55 (R 2)

Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development
Department of the Army
Washington D.C. 20330

1. (c) Operations: Significant Activities

   c. On 1 September 1970 the Brigade entered Phase V of Operation Washington Green, continuing to support the Vietnamization Program by upgrading Territorial Forces (TF/EF) and directly supporting the GVN Pacification Program. In addition, Washington Green V accelerates the program of destruction of the Viet Cong Infrastructure (VCI) in coordination with anti-VCI operations being conducted throughout Binh Dinh Province by the GVN. Priority has been given to the destruction of the VCI. This is accomplished in coordination with GVN forces by quick reaction to intelligence and information provided by ML Chanh. Commanders employ a 'hard shell' cordon of US and GVN forces around a hamlet complex and then enter and seize known VCI residents. Maximum use of prisoner and prisoner interrogation teams is made.

   The Brigade has also continued to refine and implement contingency plans to deny the enemy his objectives while simultaneously inflicting maximum enemy casualties and exploiting lucrative airstrike targets.

   b. Significant Operations:

(1) During August, 3-503 conducted Reconnaissance operations in the upper An Lao Valley, the periphery of the Tiger Mountains in the vicinity of Lo Chau So, and continued the Lo English - Ban Son Bridge - Max Ca Ridge security mission. The 1-503 also provided security for the elections in conjunction with TF/EF units.

(2) On 12 August, one platoon of D Company 3-503 and one EF platoon, acting on information from the Nui Chanh, conducted a search operation in the Nui Ho Da area. This operation was under the control of the EF platoon leader. As a result, a small area and communication cache was captured at 080641.

(3) Contacts had been normally limited to small units, but on 28 August, reconnaissance by the 3-503 disclosed 180 VC and NVA near the south of the Son Ca Valley in the vicinity of grid 20339717. At the same location, re-

DOWNGRADED AT A VARY INTERVALS
DECLASIFIED IN 10 YEARS
- DOD DIR 100-10
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SUBJECT:  Operational Report—Lessons Learned, 173d Airborne Brigade,
Period Ending 31 October 1970, A03 CSFOA - 65 (52)

The lesson of the 3-503 ambush in a section of VC/NLF casualties from this were 32 VC/NLF killed and 1 VC/NLF hit. It was later determined that the ambush unit was the Huynh 6-4 District Force.

(4) On 29 August, 3-503 captured documents which identified several units of the 2nd NVA Division.

(5) On 6 September, the 2-503 conducted blocking force operations in the vicinity of the Monster Mountains. These operations supported the Land Clearing effort and included the 4-503 and the 46th NVA regiment.

(6) As part of the Brigade's continuing effort to ensure bridges to 06 Forces, the 2-503 Inf terminated its security mission at the Bong Son Bridge on 30 September. Doal Muon District Forces assumed responsibility for the security of this main bridge on QL-1.

(7) During September, the 3-503 Inf continued combined operations with NVA and VC units to deny the VC/NLF vital supplies, rice during the harvest period. Also in order to upgrade Territorial Forces, the 3-503 Inf continued its IP Training Program.

(8) During the first part of October, the 3-503 continued combined operations with NVA and VC units to deny the VC/NLF vital supplies, rice during the harvest period. After the harvest, these were temporarily terminated. Although further combined operations are to be conducted during November, because of the rice harvest, the IP Training Program was halted, but it will be reactivated during November.

(9) On 5 October the 320 and 447 NV Companies engaged in an extensive NVA company in which 20 NVA were killed and a variety of equipment was captured, including 1 pound of documents. The document found revealed that the NVA were from the 62 Company of the 1st Battalion, 2nd NVA regiment.

c. Breaches of Security:

The critical figures for the period of 1 August to 31 October 1970 are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IN UNITS: August</th>
<th>September</th>
<th>October</th>
<th>Totals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NIA 6</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NTA 84</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>257</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NML 0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IN N UNITS: August</th>
<th>September</th>
<th>October</th>
<th>Totals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NIA 90</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIA 6</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENGLISHES 211</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>506</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INF. AIRS 94</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIVIL SERVICE 5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2
15 November 1970


During August, it was noted that the enemy was continuing to operate in small units and avoiding contact as much as possible. However, during September the enemy began to initiate contact when he believed he could. In October, the 3-503 reported that with the advent of the monsoon rains enemy activity had declined sharply. The enemy appears to have limited his movement and operations to the low ground and populated areas. He is quite possibly relocating in his mountain sanctuaries for the monsoon season. There is, however, evidence which indicates that small numbers of VC/NVA continue to enter and sometimes remain in hamlets undetected or unreported by SVN forces. Enemy units operating within the Brigade’s AO during the period of 1 August to 31 October 1970, were located as follows on 31 October 1970:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Strength</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st Bn, 2nd NVA Regt</td>
<td>B8808650</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Bn, 2nd NVA Regt</td>
<td>B8965656</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd Bn, 2nd NVA Regt</td>
<td>B8965610</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th Bn, 2nd NVA Regt</td>
<td>B8965665</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th Bn, 2nd NVA Regt</td>
<td>B8965724</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6th Bn, 2nd NVA Regt</td>
<td>B8965734</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8th Bn, 22nd NVA Regt</td>
<td>B8965744</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>304th Artillery Bn</td>
<td>B8965716</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>206th Support Bn</td>
<td>B8965628</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>200th Support Bn</td>
<td>B8965635</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>200th Support Bn</td>
<td>B8965642</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>200th Support Bn</td>
<td>B8965659</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C1 Co</td>
<td>B8965797</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C2 Co</td>
<td>B8965797</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motorized Local Force Bn</td>
<td>B8965800</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hon, Khor (B) Force</td>
<td>B8965800</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Search and Rescue Force</td>
<td>B8965813</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a. Combat Support:

(1) The 3-503d Field Artillery Headquarters remained at LZ English for the reporting period. Battery A continued to occupy FSB Peggy (BA-970) and is in direct support of 1-503 and 3-503. Battery B disengaged from FSB Kaji (B880060) and joined with the two gun raid at FSB Salem (B899860) on 3 October and is in direct support of 1-503 and 3-503. Battery C continued to occupy FSB Two Bits (B894400) with priority of fires to 3-503. Battery D continued to occupy FSB Shourock (B894412) with priority of fires to 2-503 and 3-503. A two gun raid from Battery B remained at FSB Tape (B874131) with priority of fires to 2-503 Infantry.

(2) Tactical Air Support: (a) Brigade Forward Air Controllers flew a total of 750.1 hours in support of operations during the reporting period.

(b) Air Support Missions:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Mission</th>
<th>Sorties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Preplanned FAC Airstrikes</td>
<td>113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immediate FAC Airstrikes</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
506th Official Records
- MACV
  - After Action
- 101st Airborne Division
  - Operational Reports
- 3rd Brigade
  - Operational Reports
  - After Action
  - Situation Report
  - Civil Affairs Report
- 1/506
  - Daily Staff Journals
- 2/506
  - Daily Staff Journals
- 3/506
  - After Action
  - Operational Reports
- 173rd Airborne Brigade
  - Ending 1-31-70 (11 pages)
  - Ending 10-31-70 (11 pages)
- 4th Infantry Division
- World War II 506th Parachute Infantry Regiment
  - After Action
2. (c) Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations, and Recommendations.


(1) Observation: There exists an inadequate number of experienced small unit leaders due to casualties and the short 12 month INF tour.

(2) Evaluation: Although there is an adequate supply of MSOC trained personnel, the number of experienced small unit leaders is critically low. There still remains a period after arrival in INF when the MSOC gains combat experience. This is a most critical period. In small unit operations (especially team and squad size) the element leader is crucial to successful completion of the unit's mission. Jungle warfare small unit operations are quite often the most practical. In this environment the squad or team leader must have a wide and thorough knowledge of his element's purpose, capabilities, and functions.

(3) Recommendation: Each new arrival must be cross-trained in all the vital functions of his unit element in order to fill the position of leader, if necessary, and gain leadership experience.

b. Intelligence: None.

c. Operations:

(1) Utilization of Small Units.

(a) Observation: After a terrain study of an area which was in close proximity to enemy staging areas, a six man Hunter-Killer (H-K) team from the 1-503d Infantry was inserted by AH-1s to interdict the area. The team was undetected and on the second day, it killed a Viet Cong communication liaison chief. In the third day, it severely wounded another VC and killed an NVA. A platoon of the 1-503d was inserted as a reaction force and the next morning, it wounded and captured a VC courier. The initial reconnaissance team was extracted by air on the same ship that inserted a new team. The platoon was extracted and the recon team continued reconnaissance of the area. The next morning, it killed another VC courier.

(b) Evaluation: There were several reasons for the above mentioned successes: 1. The area had not recently been patrolled by friendly troops; 2. Due to dense foliage, the team was well protected from observations; 3. The first insertion was undetected; 4. The platoon broke into six (6) man teams and interdicted other trails; 5. After the team and platoon were extracted, the insertion of a fresh stay-behind reconnaissance team was undetected.

(c) Recommendation: Team-size operations should become more extensively used in jungle terrain. Large platoon size operations seldom result in kills. In small and hard to detect teams, American forces can hide and disrupt VC teams and capture single VC couriers.
1970-30/45

S ubsct I 5 November 1970

Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 173d Airborne Brigade,
Period Ending 31 October 1970, RG 690FOR-65 (22)

(2) Searching Enemy Base Camps.

(a) Observation: While sweeping a base camp bunker complex, two US
soldiers were wounded when they received fire from a bunker which, supposedly,
had already been cleared.

(b) Evaluation: Cursory checks of enemy base camps are unacceptable.
The enemy continually uses fake walls and floors in bunkers as well as
concealed spider holes adjacent to the bunkers.

(c) Recommendation: Bunkers must be carefully entered and probed in
order to properly clear them. Extreme caution must always be used when
operating in recently occupied enemy base camps.

(3) Utilization of Armored Cavalry.

(a) Observation: A reconnaissance team became heavily engaged with a
numerically superior enemy force after dark. An armored cavalry platoon,
located four (4) kilometers away, was dispatched to relieve them. The route
was across low rolling terrain with small hedgerows and streamlines. After
one hour, less than one-third (1/3) of the distance had been covered and an
airmobile relief force was committed to relieve the reconnaissance team.

(b) Evaluation: Cross-country navigation by tracked vehicles, even
under good conditions of visibility, is a tedious and time-consuming process.
Under poor visibility it is an exercise in futility.

(c) Recommendation: When it is necessary to move tracked vehicles across
the terrain rapidly, the cavalry unit commander should be provided with a
helicopter to conduct route reconnaissance and to assist in directing the
vehicles around major obstacles. Under conditions of poor visibility, other
means of reaction must be considered or extended reaction time must be ac-
teped.

(4) Cave Operations.

(a) Observation: Viet Cong and local force guerrillas use numerous
caves for base camps. Some of these caves are so complex that, once found,
they can never be searched completely.

(b) Evaluation: In order for such caves to be properly cleared, a
cordon of the area should be made. Then, incendiary (thickened fuel) or some
other incendiary should be dropped at the mouth of the cave in order to
clear away the brush. A Mighty Mite could be employed with 63, but recent
operations within the Brigade have shown that the Mighty Mite is not very
effective when the cave complex descends more than twenty (20) feet. If
a cave is quite deep, thickened fuel can be poured into it by hand. After
allowing the fuel to burn, smoke should be thrown into the cave prior to
troops entering, to reduce the enemy's visibility.
AVBKC-SO/NIID
15 November 1970
SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned, 173d Airborne Brigade,
Period Ending 31 October 1970, RO 3040/70 - 65 (R2)

(a) Recommendation: Cave-clearing operations must not be done in
busts. Proper detailed planning, organization and equipment must be uti-
liized for successful results.

(b) Employment of Snipers.

(c) Observation: Units within the Brigade have been employing snipers
in pairs in order to achieve first round hits. The snipers engage the same
target simultaneously then shift to the next target. On two occasions, this
method has resulted in multiple hits.

(d) Evaluation: Snipers employed in pairs greatly increase the chances
of making a first round hit, even at extended ranges. Also, it allows one
sniper to sleep while the other is awake during hours of darkness.

(e) Recommendation: Snipers should be employed in pairs whenever the
situation permits.

(f) Use of Scout Dogs.

(g) Observation: During September, the 2–503d Infantry used nine-
teen Scout Dog Teams. This was generally done in areas which were sus-
pected to contain many booby traps.

(h) Evaluation: As a result of booby trap incidents, three handlers
were wounded while two dogs were killed and a third dog was wounded. No
members of 2–503d Infantry were wounded. The utilization of Scout Dogs
improves both the morale of the man and the probability of detecting booby
traps before they are tripped. When the dogs fail to alert it is better
to lose a dog than a human life, although the loss is still felt.

(i) Recommendation: The training and utilization of Scout Dog Teams
for booby trap detection should be continued and, if at all possible, in-
creased.

(j) Enemy Contact.

(a) Observation: At approximately 1900 hours on 13 September 1970,
a platoon from the 2–503d Infantry came under heavy small arms, grenade
and automatic rifle fire. The V/D/TA initiated the contact when the
platoon’s point man was only about five meters from the enemy. As a
result, two US soldiers were killed and three more were wounded.

(b) Evaluation: Obviously, the point man was neither very observant
nor alert. It was quite possible that he was overconfident since he had
been through the same area just a short time before.
AVB-30/END
15 November 1970
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 173d Airborne Brigade,
Period Ending 31 October 1970, RO CSFOR - 65 (R2)

(a) Recommendation: The point man, as well as everyone else, must be
constantly on the alert for the unexpected. The US/ARVN know that the
American soldier is often prone to return on his original route of depa-
ture because it is usually easier and faster. Units, particularly small
ones, should never return along a previously traveled route.

(b) Contact of Elements,

(b) Observation: In a night combat operation, an element left their
FIRE Support Base. When it was approximately one-half of the way to its
destination, the element leader made a check of his unit. His tail squad
had been separated from the rest of the element.

(b) Evaluation: The element had not properly organized for night
movement. There were no emergency steps planned in case individuals of
the element became separated from the main body. Also, what-to-do in
case of radio equipment failure was not covered.

(c) Recommendations: Alternate plans must be made prior to an actual
emergency to include rally points, ambushes, and dry langs. These plans
should also include distress signals in event of radio failure. It should
also be clearly understood that each person is responsible for contact with
the individual to his rear in night operations. Precise and planned pro-
cedures must be understood by all whenever contact is broken.

(9) Evacuating Base Camps,

(a) Observation: Because of recent rains and subsequent flooding,
many of the EV/FP were forced to leave some of their base camps. In
the people were preparing to be lifted out by helicopter, squad and troop
leaders were directed to check the entire compound to insure that all
ordnance had been recovered. Then the last lift was picked up and was
noticed that much equipment and ammunition (of values to the enemy) had
been left by the 87. In order to remedy this situation, a patrol had to
be sent by boat across very dangerous flood waters to retrieve this equip-
ment.

(b) Evaluation: Due to the urgency of the situation, some very im-
portant equipment was left behind - equipment which could have possibly
been used by the enemy had it not been discovered by friendly forces.

(a) Recommendation: Evacuation of base camps, whether under emergency
or normal conditions, must include a thorough search of the area to insure
that nothing is left behind for use by the enemy.

(10) Security for Land Clearing Operations,

(a) Observation: Providing security for base camps during land
clearing operations requires more than one technique or method, depending
on the enemy situation and activities and the terrain.
(b) Evaluation: During initial land clearing operations by the Brigade, it appeared that the major threat to tracked vehicles and Home Flows was 8-40 rockets. Therefore, security was provided for APCs and Home Flows by a screen of dismounted infantry at a distance sufficient to prevent the vehicles from being engaged with 8-40 rockets. The enemy was evidently thwarted by this tactic, or else he rarely chose not to attack. However, after several days of land clearing, he began to heavily booby trap the area. These booby traps varied in size from a hand grenade to a 152mm artillery projectile. They represented a substantial threat to the dismounted infantry screen and brought about a reevaluation of the employment of the security force. To counter the booby trap menace, a Home plow would cut a swath around the area to be cleared. Following the plow were APC’s carrying infantry. The APC’s would halt at varying intervals in order for the troops to observe the area. The infantry would then dismount, disperse and provide security. Neither the APC’s nor infantry would move out of the cleared area. Since Home Flows are virtually immune to explosives as large as a 152mm high-explosive shell, booby traps were neutralized by the plows. This technique proved highly effective and no further casualties were suffered.

(c) Recommendation: After careful evaluation of the area to be cleared, a detailed examination of all available intelligence should be made to determine the enemy’s most probable course of action to halt or delay the land clearing operation. Once a technique is adopted, it is imperative that a constant reevaluation be made to preclude the possibility of adhering to a security technique which protects the Home Flow only at the cost of unacceptable casualties among the security force. The two principal dangers are rockets and booby traps. A third possibility is an enemy small arms attack, but this is improbable due to the tremendous fire power afforded by an infantry-armor security force. Enemy snipers are also a threat, but they can be easily eliminated unless they are firing from a village or inhabited dwelling. Flexibility oriented on enemy activity and available intelligence is the key to success in such operations.

(1) Length of Ranger Operations.

(a) Observation: During extended Ranger team operations, the teams tend to become extremely fatigued and lax after seven or eight days.

(b) Evaluation: Protracted exposure to danger and the elements dulls a Ranger team’s physical condition and mental alertness. As a result, the team becomes increasingly vulnerable, and its efficiency is impaired.

(c) Recommendation: Ranger team missions should not last longer than seven days.

d. Organization: None.

o. Training: None.
AVSCOM HD
15 November 1970
SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned, 173d Airborne Brigade,
Period Ending 31 October 1970, RGS GSPOR-65 (R2)

1. Logistics: None.
2. Communications: None.
3. Material: None.
4. Other.

1) Scouring Enemy POWs.

(a) Observation: While being transported in a cadavus helicopter,
one of two wounded Army prisoners, unconscious from a head wound, ap-
parently awoken during evaucation, became frightened and jumped to
his death from the aircraft.

(b) Evaluation: This action demonstrates the necessity for more
stringent controls of enemy prisoners transported in aircraft. In
this case it was incorrectly assumed that both wounded POWs were su-
niciently tranquil to realize that it was in their own best interest to
remain seated while being carried to a medical aid station. This
assumption was invalid in this case. There is also the possibility
that an able-bodied POW might escape or interfere with the crew if
not bound or closely guarded.

(c) Recommendation: Whenever possible, an armed escort should
accompany wounded prisoners during helicopter travel. Arapulatory wounded
POWs should have their hands and feet tied.

2) Weather Casualties.

(a) Observation: Emphasis on wet weather casualty prevention is
needed to help minimize such casualties during the rainy season.

(b) Evaluation: Units continuously exposed to inclement weather
conditions can suffer general physical debilitation and attendant in-
juries and casualties.

(c) Recommendation: Tailored plans should be developed at battalion
level whereby subordinate units might rotate into base camps and still
be useful to other units conducting operations during the rainy season.
For example, in this brigade an infantry battalion rotates companies into
the battalion base camp for mandatory training and to serve as the Brigade
and Battalion Ready Reaction Forces. This system the company has a five-
day respite from the monsoon weather every 15 or 20 days while continuing
to support the parent unit's mission.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

WILLIAM F. MURPHY II
Captain, GS
Acting Asst AG

11 Dec
Brigade Organization
ORGANIZATIONAL CHART

173rd
2nd Bde

Sp Trps BN
(Prov)

Abn Inf
Bns

2-503

3-319 Abn
FA Bn

1-503

173 Spt
Bn

50th Inf.
Plt (Gp)

75th Inf.
Det (Gp)

HHD

A Co
Admin

B Co
Medical

C Co
Ent & Sys

D Co
Maint

HHC

E Troop 17th
Armored Cav

U Co
Recon

3rd Bn
Co

51st Chem
Det

173 Engr
Co

173 Inf
Det

50th Inf
Det

86th Inf
Det
1 August. At 1230H in the vicinity of ZU20991 C Co, 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry received an unknown volume of small arms fire resulting in one 127H in the vicinity of AC85122 D Co, 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry found storage bins containing an estimated one ton of rice. Also found in the area were two individuals without ID cards and some documents. At 1127H in the vicinity of AC85235 A Troop, 7th Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry observed 5 VC with weapons and rucksacks. Gunships were employed and ARP inserted. The ARP found 3 VC KIA, 2 AK-47’s and 5 rucksacks containing documents.

2 August. At 1029H at YB92009 a patrol from the Recon Platoon, 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry made contact with an estimated 10-12 NVA resulting in 1 US KIA and 1 US WIA. Artillery and air fire was employed. A later sweep revealed a blood trail leading west. At 0945H in the vicinity of YB-176127 a patrol from A Co, 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry found two civilian jeeps hidden in the bush. Vehicles were evacuated.

3 August. No significant activities or contacts.

4 August. At 1135H in the vicinity of YB92089 a Mohawk aircraft from 225th Aviation crashed and burned as a result of suspected 37mm AA ground fire. Crew ejected with no injuries. At 1528H in vicinity of YB92820 a patrol from A Co, 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry made contact with an estimated 6 individuals resulting in 2 US KIA. Seven NVA CHAMPS rallied in vicinity of B Co, 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry during cordon and search operation. Eight more NVA CHAMPS rallied during another cordon and search conducted by D Co, 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry. At 1745H in the vicinity of YA939265 ERP Team 146 made contact with 1 individual resulting in 2 US WIA. Gunships were employed and team was extracted.

5 August. At 1430H in vicinity of ZB072200, an engineer work party from the 259th Engrs found one WIA mine buried in the roadway. At 0935H at YB92285 a patrol from A Co, 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry found 3 decomposed NPA bodies estimated to be 5-6 months old. At 1730H in vicinity of YB907193, B Co, 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry received an unknown volume of small arms fire from an estimated 5 individuals. Negative results or casualties. At 0935H B Troop, 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry, observed 2 individuals at AC85234 and engaged them with small arms fire. A sweep was conducted with negative findings. At 1142H B Troop found 1 VC WIA and 1 AK-47 at AC85230. Individual believed KIA from contact in that vicinity on 1 Aug. At 1350H at AC85230 B Troop made contact with an estimated 15 individuals. Contact broke at 1535H resulting in 1 VC KIA, 1 VC WIA, CLI, 1 VC CIA, 2 AK-47’s, 1 carbine and miscellaneous documents. At 1620H via AC853225, B Troop found 2 graves containing 2 bodies dressed in khaki uniforms estimated to be 2 weeks old. At OL10H in vicinity of ZU202874, B Co, 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry made contact with an estimated squad size element. Patrol swept contact area and found miscellaneous equipment and documents. At 1045H, C Co, 2d Battalion, 8th

Inclosure A
Infantry received 30-40 rounds of small arms fire in vicinity of ZA1502427 from estimated 4 individuals. A sweep was conducted with negative results. At 1043H in vicinity ZA162126 a patrol from C Co, 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry received small arms fire from one individual. Negative results. Another patrol from C Co, received small arms fire from estimated 6-12 individuals. A sweep was conducted with negative results.

6 August. At 1505H in vicinity of ZA123400, A Troop, 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry received one 81mm rocket round and automatic small arms fire from unknown size enemy force. Results were 1 US WIA. Enemy casualties unknown.

7 August. At 1340H in vicinity ZU259866, IFR Team H2C observed 2 individuals 50 meters west of their location. Gunships were employed with unknown results. At 1755H, IFR H2C reported in contact with an estimated NVA platoon. Contact broke 1801H. Results were 1 NVA KIA and team extracted 1802H. At 1335H in vicinity of ZU052399 A Troop, 7th Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry observed 10 individuals moving north on high speed trail. Individuals took evasive action. Gunships employed resulting in 1 WIA KIA.

8 August. At 1205H vicinity ZP786278, a patrol from B Co, 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry found 3 graves containing 3 NVA bodies estimated to be 5-6 months old. At 1848H in vicinity of AP745860, A Troop, 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry and D Troop, 7th Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry found 3 LDG. At 1200H in vicinity of AP745877, B Troop, 1-10 and D Troop, 7-17 found 400 rounds of small arms ammunition and 100 lbs of rice. At 1210H in vicinity ZW232203 a patrol from the Recon Platoon, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry observed 6 individuals with weapons 500 meters south of their location. Artillery was employed and a sweep conducted with negative findings. At 1335H B Co (-) 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry made contact with 4 individuals resulting in 3 US WIA. IFR Team 4C made contact with unknown size enemy force in vicinity of ZA783329 at 1555H. Team was extracted with negative results.

9 August. At 1100H the Recon Platoon, 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry made contact with an estimated 12 man enemy force in vicinity of ZP73445. Negative friendly casualties, enemy casualties unknown. IFR Team H1 at 0700H in vicinity ZW131134 made contact with 4 NVA resulting in 2 NVA KIA. Team was extracted. A later sweep of the area revealed 1 NVA WIA. In the vicinity of ZA062355 at 1208, the 2d Platoon B Co, 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry made contact with an estimated 3 individuals resulting in 1 US KIA, 2 US WIA. Artillery employed and a sweep conducted with negative findings. C Troop, 2d Squadron, 1st Cavalry found a 105mm shell casing containing 10-12 lbs of explosives at ZR133541. Shell destroyed in place.

10 August. At 1025H an element from B Troop, 2d Squadron, 1st Cavalry destroyed one plastic mine found in road at YP904274. At 1120H the Recon Platoon, 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry made contact with 2 NVA at YP943163. Artillery was employed resulting in 2 NVA KIA. At 1000H in the vicinity of YJ786238 a patrol from C Co, 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry found 30-50 bunkers partially destroyed by air strikes. Also found in area was 1 AK-47 and 1 SKS.
Another patrol from C Co found one grave containing 3 NVA bodies estimated to be 3 months old at YB908272. At 1005H the Recon Platoon of 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry made contact with an estimated 25 man NVA force. Artillery and sweep conducted with negative findings. At 2U120157, A Co, 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry found a grave containing 1 NVA body estimated one day old. A Troop, 7th Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry observed 3 individuals wearing green fatigues in vicinity of APO3724 and engaged them with small arms fire. Results unknown. At 1520H in vicinity AP772805, A Troop observed 3 NVA with packs and weapons. Small arms fire was exchanged resulting in 3 NVA KIA.

12 August. At 0845H in the vicinity of YB908272 an element from B Troop, 2d Squadron, 1st Cavalry destroyed one MLA mine found in roadway. At 0945H in the vicinity of ZB114094 an ambush patrol from A Co, 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry made contact with two individuals. A sweep was conducted and one AK-47 was found. B Co, 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry received automatic weapons fire from unknown source in vicinity of ZA05518. One US KIA. G Co conducted a sweep of the contact area and received sniper fire resulting in one US WIA. At 1130H a Troop, 7th Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry observed 2 individuals with weapons. Individuals were taken under fire with unknown results. A Troop observed 4 more individuals with rocket sacks taking evasive action at 1225H. Omni-sweeps employed with unknown results.

12 August. At 0630H in the vicinity of AP772805 a patrol from A Co, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry observed 12 individuals moving south. Mortar fire employed and sweep conducted with negative findings. At 1030H in vicinity of YB904360 the C&C ship of 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry received automatic weapons fire. The aircraft received 2 hits with negative casualties.

13 August. At 0355H in vicinity of YB832206 a patrol from A Co, 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry received small arms fire from an estimated 4 individuals resulting in one US KIA. Mortar fire employed, and individuals fled to southwest. AFR Team 1P at 1630H observed 2 NVA and engaged them with fire at YB908251. Results one NVA KIA, Team estimated it was a 7 man force. At 1300H, vicinity of X0021993 a convoy from the 30th Engineer received 2 rounds of small arms fire resulting in 1 US VIA. A mine sweep team found one 60mm mortar round with 15 lbs of explosive on side of the road at BR129547.

14 August. At 1015H in vicinity of ZB10825, two APC's from 2d Squadron, 1st Cavalry hit mines buried in the roadway which resulted in 4 US WIA. Vehicles were heavily damaged. A mine sweep team found two plastic mines at ZA259663. At 1230H in vicinity of ZA120963 a 2½ ton vehicle traveling north on L3-24 hit a mine resulting in 3 US KIA and the destruction of the vehicle. At 1305H vicinity ZB152336 a road grader and one APC each hit a mine. No casualties, both vehicles were destroyed. Three other plastic mines were found in the same area. At 1400H vicinity of ZA210483 a 2½ ton vehicle carrying MONTAGUARDS hit a mine resulting in 4 KIA and 5 injured. At 1445H in vicinity of ZB160092 a 2½ ton vehicle hit a mine resulting in 1 US VIA. At 1700H in vicinity ZB132134, a 2½ ton truck from the 299th
Engineers hit a mine. Negative casualties although the vehicle was heavily damaged. At 1000H PSH 515 received 2 rounds of 75mm SR fire. At 1600H, vicinity of A3985655, a re-supply convoy made contact with an unknown mine field. The convoy received small arms/auto fire and 3 140mm rocket rounds. One vehicle received 1 140mm round. A Troop, 2nd Squadron, 1st Cavalry received contact and conducted sweep. Results of the contact were 5 US WIA, 1 NVA KIA, 2 light machine guns, 1 SKS and miscellaneous documents captured in action. At 1615H, vicinity of AR791301, a tank from 2/1 Cav hit a pressure type mine which resulted in moderate damage to the vehicle. At 1200H in vicinity YB815200 3 & 4 A Co, 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry received a heavy weapons attack which included 75mm SR and 82mm mortar fire. FAC aircraft received heavy ground fire and was forced to return to DAK TO with three hits.

5 August. The 299th Engineers found one wooden box type mine buried in the shoulder of the road at ZA212977. Another minesweep team found 3 more wooden mines buried in the road at ZA205987. At 1000H, a patrol from 4 Co, 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry, while attempting to move into contact area of previous night, received heavy volume of automatic/small arms fire. FAC aircraft also received heavy ground fire. Results of contact were 2 US KIA, 5 US WIA, 18 NVA WIA. At 1030H, vicinity AO742025, a mine sweep team found a mine constructed of 3 40mm rounds and 1 105mm round. At 1030H, vicinity of AO761333, the Recon Platoon of the 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry observed 5 individuals. Artillery was employed and a sweep conducted revealing two 25 lbs bags of rice and 4 NVA KIA.

16 August. At 1400H in the vicinity of YB75172, a patrol from 3 Co, 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry found one 60mm tube, 2 60mm mortar rounds and one badly damaged NVA body. 3d Co (-) 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry conducted a combat assault into the contact area of 14 Aug at TB813200 and recovered 13 US KIA. At 1930H in the vicinity of DQ033313 a convoy travelling south on HLA made contact with an estimated 20 man force. A tank received a hit from a 140mm rocket. Results were 1 US WIA. D Co, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry observed two individuals near their location at AO663328. The individuals were engaged with AK-47 fire. The contact was followed by a sweep that revealed 1500 lbs of rice.

27 August. LRP Team 1C found one NVA body at YB913648 estimated 2-3 weeks old. A patrol from 3 Co, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry made contact at 1124H, vicinity of AO813141, with an estimated 6 man force. Sweep of the area following exchange of small arms revealed 3 AK-47 and 1 SSG that was believed to be left from contact in that area on 15 Aug.

13 August. At 1340H a 5 ton truck traveling north on HLA struck a mine at ZB130106 resulting in one US WIA. The truck was destroyed. PSH 531 received 13 rounds indirect fire from 064H to 1400H. Negative casualties. At 1005H in vicinity of YB800444 a patrol from 3 Co made contact with an estimated 6 man force. Small arms were exchanged, resulting in 1 NVA WIA/KIA. At 0745H, PSH 515 received 7 rounds of 75mm ER fire with 5 impacting in the perimiter. Negative casualties were sustained. LRP Team 1C employed gunships against 8 NVA observed at YB815900 with unknown results. At 1335H vicinity
19 August. LR Team 15 found 15 bunkers at ZL07268, recently used. Also found 20 NVA bodies estimated to be 2 months old. NVA were apparently killed by artillery believed to be a result of 3 June contact in that area. At 1320H, vicinity AG24347, A Co, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry made contact with an unknown size force. Small arms fire was exchanged and artillery/air strikes were employed. Friendly casualties were 10 US KIA, enemy unknown. At 1320H, B Co, 1-12 made contact with an estimated 10 NVA at ZV24370. Artillery and gunships employed. Enemy casualties unknown, 3 US WIA.

20 August. A minesweep team found 3 mines on PLN, two metallic mines at ZA800799 and one KL-41 at ZA820265. B Co, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry recovered 4 US KIA vicinity ZV24377. Casualties were a result of the contact on 19 Aug. D Co, 1-12 found an estimated 3 tons of rice at AG E7732. A patrol from B Co, 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry found one flame thrower, vicinity of ZV102519, in contact area of 19 Aug.

21 August. LR Team 1F made contact with two NVA at ZB892517. Small arms fire was exchanged and artillery was adjusted. Results were unknown. D Troop, 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry made contact with an unknown size element in vicinity BC179603. A Troop (-) reinforced D Troop. Results of the contact were 8 US WIA, 22 NVA KIA, 2 AK-47, 1 RPG and 1 B-60 RL LIA.

22 August. At 1717H, FSB #1 (DAK TO) received 21 122mm rockets resulting in 1 US KIA, 1 US WIA and 2 O-1 aircraft damaged. At 0640H in vicinity of 22151080 a mine sweep team received small arms fire, one B-60 rocket round and one mortar round. Negative casualties. Four metallic mines were found at ZB152132 buried in the shoulder of the road. A work party at a gravel pit, ZB072285, received 3 rounds sniper fire which resulted in one US KIA. FSB #6 received 5 rounds of 75mm SR fire. Negative casualties. At 0915H, vicinity TP953261, Hawk Eyes Team 1F made contact with an estimated 2 individuals. Grenades were employed resulting in one NVA KIA. A mine sweep team found nine unidentified type mines at ZW190085 buried in the shoulder of the road. At 1445H, vicinity AG013133 a patrol from A Co, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry observed 30 NVA carrying rucksacks and weapons. Artillery and gunships were employed with unknown results.

23 August. At ZA203349 a 2½ ton truck hit a plastic type mine in the center of the road. Negative casualties sustained and vehicle was only slightly damaged. At 0840H, vicinity of ZE167023, a mine sweep team found 5 metallic type mines. At ZE167023, A Troop, 2d Squadron, 1st Cavalry found 15 82mm
mortal rounds and 1 Bangalore torpedo during a sweep of the perimeter.
At 0130H, vicinity A8770827, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry received 30 rounds of 82mm mortar fire. Negative casualties or damage. IRR Team 2B found two butts recently used at ZL248783, containing VG flag and documents. As team moved toward L2 location contact was made with an unknown size enemy force. Small arms fire was exchanged and artillery was employed. Team was extracted. At 0200H vicinity AR7888293, 2d Troop, 2d Squadron, 1st Cavalry received a weapons and ground attack. Enemy employed 82mm mortars and 122mm rockets. Contact was broken at 0215H. At 0530H, 11 were rounds of 82mm mortar fire and 2 122mm rocket rounds were received by A Troop. Results were one US KIA, and one VG WIA/CIA.

26 August. A patrol from C Co, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry observed 15 individuals at 1500H at A9802334. Artillery was adjusted with unknown results. The Recon Platoon of the 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry made contact with an estimated 5 individuals armed with AK-47s at 1035H in the vicinity of ZL2528030. Small arms fire was exchanged resulting in 1 US WIA and unknown enemy casualties. 3d Platoon, A Troop, 2d Squadron, 1st Cavalry received small arms fire and D-40 rocket fire at 1025H in vicinity ZL2195-77. The fire was returned with unknown results. Negative friendly casualties.

At 1627H in vicinity of ZL068705 an LOH from D Troop, 2-1 Cavalry received small arms fire. Aircraft sustained eight hits and was forced down. The pilot was WIA.

25 August. At 1230H at A9802312 a platoon from C Co, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry observed 15 NVA with weapons and rucksacks moving south. Artillery was adjusted and a sweep conducted revealing 200 rounds of 82mm mortar and 1600 rounds of 12.7mm ammunition. An aircraft from D Troop, 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry received possible 12.7mm at fire vicinity of ZU145708. The gunship received no hits and returned fire with unknown results. At 1902H D Co, 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry received an unknown volley of small arms/automatic weapons fire from northwest of their location at A9773393. Negative casualties were sustained and gunships were employed with unknown results.

26 August. FSB #31 received sporadic heavy weapons fire consisting of 82mm mortar and 75mm howl fire that resulted in 1 CSF WIA. A patrol from C Co, 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry found 1 NVA KIA and 1 AK-47 in contact area of 25 Aug. At 1330H in vicinity of ZU203099 a patrol from B Co, 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry made contact with 7 individuals with weapons resulting in 1 US WIA. Artillery was employed and a sweep conducted revealing 2 NVA KIA, 1 AK-47, 2 rucksacks CIA. At 1720H at ZU188956, IRR Team 2A made contact with an estimated 45 NVA resulting in 5 NVA KIA. Artillery was employed and the team was extracted.

27 August. FSB #31 received 5 rounds of 82mm mortar fire. There were no casualties. At 1055H in vicinity of A9751078 the Recon Platoon of 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry observed 3 elephants with packs and 3 NVA with AK-47s. Artillery was employed and a sweep conducted with negative findings. A work team from the 20th Engineers found 3 82mm mortar rounds buried near the road.
at ZA072300. At 1236H in vicinity of BR135514 a patrol from the 2d Squadron, 1st Cavalry made contact with an estimated NVA squad. The contact resulted in 1 NVA KIA. In the vicinity of AR03348, A Troop, 7th Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry engaged 2 NVA armed with AK-47s that resulted in 1 NVA KIA.

28 August. FS3 #31 received sporadic 62mm mortar fire during the day. Negative casualties. At 0115H in vicinity of ZU232875, D Co, 1st Battalion, 23d Infantry received a mortar and ground attack from an unknown size enemy force. Contact broke at 0300H resulting in 5 US KIA, 17 US WIA, and 2 NVA KIA. At 1630H in vicinity of AK766646, G Co, 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry made contact with unknown size enemy force. Artillery and gunships were employed resulting in 1 NVA KIA/23 and airmarked with miscellaneous documents CIA.

29 August. A minesweep team found 3 antitank mines buried in the road at ZU200955. LRP Team 18 killed 2 NVA at YB265508 then received heavy automatic weapons fire from an estimated 2 NVA companies. Team was extracted. A patrol from B Co, 4th Battalion, 503d Infantry (Airborne) found 20 bunkers at ZU222864. Also found 4 AK-47s. Patrol continued sweep and made contact with 4 NVA resulting in 1 NVA KIA. At 1410H in the vicinity of AP721656, A Co made contact with a NVA and small arms fire was exchanged resulting in 1 US WIA and 1 NVA KIA and 1 AK-47 CIA. A Co continued sweep and found a weapons cache consisting of 4 carbines, 2 M-60 MG, 2 50 cal. MG, 3 BAR, 1 60mm mortar complete, 1 M-16, 1 45 cal. pistol and 1 radio, type unknown. D Co, 1st Battalion, 23d Infantry found 18 bunkers at AK774634. A search was conducted and 6 NVA KIA were found with 1 B-40 RL and 3 97mm rounds.

30 August. At 1350H in vicinity of YB877413 a Medevac aircraft observed an unknown number of NVA in open. The enemy was attempting to set up an AA gun. Artillery and air strikes were employed which resulted in 5 NVA KIA and 1.50 cal LMG destroyed. At 0900H, vicinity AO870273, a patrol from D Co, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry set up a heavy ambush and killed 1 NVA and captured one other. At 1112H in vicinity AP744660 a patrol from A Co, 4th Battalion, 503d Infantry (Airborne) engaged 3 individuals with small arms fire resulting in 3 NVA KIA. LRP Team 28 made contact with an unknown size enemy force at AK766328. The team was extracted with enemy casualties unknown. An APC from A Troop, 2d Squadron, 1st Cavalry hit a command detonated mine at ZA164030. Negative casualties were maintained.

31 August. A minesweep team found 90mm shell casing filled with explosive at ZB153131 and one mine constructed with a 3in1 mortar round at ZB152126. A MONOLINH36 villager disclosed the presence of 10 mines located in vicinity of AK875218. At 1010H, vicinity of AC874374 D Co, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry made contact with unknown size enemy force. A sweep was conducted with negative findings. The results of the contact were 1 US WIA. D Troop, 1st Squadron, 16th Cavalry made contact with an unknown size enemy force at AC875316 resulting in 3 US WIA, 2 NVA KIA, 1 SKS and 1 rocket CIA. At 1748H in vicinity ZA106535 A Co, 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry made contact with unknown size enemy element. Enemy employed automatic weapons and B-40 rocket fire. Contact broke 1905H. The results were 7 US WIA and unknown enemy casualties.
1 September. At 1431 in the vicinity of DB39/39, a patrol from C Co, 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry made contact with 8 NVA. Small arms fire was exchanged resulting in 1 NVA KIA. Mortar and artillery fire was also fired in support of the contact. Hawk/Team 1D observed 2 individuals at 20020650 each armed with an SNS. An additional 10 individuals were observed soon after. A 50mm mortar probe was conducted resulting in the team and air/strike were adjusted. The FAC reported 3 NVA KIA.

2 September. At 1010H, FSB 31 received 10 rounds of 52cm mortar fire. Five rounds impacted in the perimeter with negative casualties. Artillery was established with unknown results. At 0900, in the vicinity of YB39/39, a Troop, 1st Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry located 2 trench lines 200-300 meters in length. The trench lines connected into a bunker complex consisting of 100 bunkers. Air strikes were employed to destroy the bunkers.

3 September. At 1015H in the vicinity of YB39/39, B Co, 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry engaged 1 NVA with small arms fire. A sweep was conducted and 2 NVA bodies estimated to be 5 days old were found in a bunker. At 1100H at YB39/43, C Co, 1-12 made contact with 5 NVA resulting in 2 NVA KIA and 2 AK-47s. One other NVA KIA was found later. An unknown size enemy force conducted 2 probes of the defensive perimeter of C Co, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry at FSB #32. The 1st probe was at 0220H and the 2nd probe was at 0600H. One enemy hand grenade was recovered inside the perimeter resulting in 1 US WIA. Six rounds of 52cm mortar fire was received. Artillery and mortar fire was adjusted resulting in 5 NVA KIA and 4 AK-47s captured. At 0223H in the vicinity of ZA95439 D Co, 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry received 30 rounds of 52cm mortar which resulted in 2 US KIA. The fire was returned with unknown results. At 1230H, at ER00/347, an APC from 3 Troop, 2d Squadron, 1st Cavalry hit a mine causing light damage to the vehicle and no casualties.

4 September. At 0955H, FSB #31 received 6 rounds of 107mm fire. Counter mortar fire was returned with unknown results. At 0015H in the vicinity of YB49/44, B & D Co, 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry received a ground attack from the north and northwest from an unknown size force using small arms, machine guns and grenades. The attack was repulsed by organic weapons and artillery fire. The contact terminated at 0115H. A second attack was launched at 0700H and broke at 0800H. The results were 7 US KIA and 27 WIA. Enemy casualties were unknown. A dustoff aircraft in the same vicinity at 1122H received ground fire resulting in the crash of the aircraft and 1 US KIA and 1 US WIA. At 1200H in the vicinity of YB49/39, a patrol from C Co, 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry engaged artillery at an estimated platoon size force with unknown results. At 1205H at MC04/219, a patrol from the Recon Plt, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry received automatic weapon fire from an unknown size enemy force. The patrol was reinforced by 3C/1-10 Cav and a sweep conducted resulting in the discovery of 2 US KIA.

5 September. At 0926H, in the vicinity of YB57/13, a patrol from D Co, 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry made contact with an estimated 10-15 NVA. Small arms fire was exchanged.
resulting in 2 US KIA and 1 NVA KIA. The patrol adjusted artillery into the area with unknown results. The patrol reported the enemy had been occupying hastily dug trenches and bunkers constructed within the past 24 hours. At 0905H in the vicinity of AO 6559, a patrol on the north side of the perimeter of the 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry exchanged small arms fire with 2 individuals which resulted in 1 US KIA.

6 September. At 1000H, in the vicinity of AO 6316, Co C, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry found 3 packs, 1 bag of documents, 1 AK-47 magazine and 70 rounds of 7.65 cal. ammunition. At 0100H, in the vicinity of AO 5225, C Troop, 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry received 6 rounds of 81mm rocket fire. One bunker was hit resulting in 2 US KIA. Fire was returned with unknown results. At 1800H in the vicinity of AO 6559, LRP - 62 made contact with an unknown size force. The team was extracted with 2 US KIA and 1 US WIA. At 0500H, in the vicinity of ZA455422, the CP of the 2d Battalion, 4th Infantry received 15-20 rounds of mortar fire. Negative casualties were sustained. At 21202112, an APC from 2d Co, 2d Battalion, 4th Infantry hit a mine resulting in 1 US KIA and 7 US WIA.

7 September. At 1035H in the vicinity of YB472403, D Co, 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry made contact with 3 NVA. Small arms fire was exchanged which resulted in 1 NVA KIA. At 1535H, at YB812161, a patrol from the Recon Plt, 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry made contact with 4 NVA resulting in 1 US KIA. Enemy casualties were unknown. At 0120H, TF Lance, in the vicinity of YB477714, received a sapper attack from an estimated 20-30 man force. The enemy utilized small arms, 81mm rockets and numerous satchel charges to breach the perimeter. A member of NVA entered the perimeter and attacked the FDC of A Battery, 4th Battalion, 43rd Artillery and the CP of A Co, 4th Battalion, 503d Airborne Infantry. The enemy employed 81mm rockets and satchel charges. The enemy were dressed in shorts, short sleeve shirts and no shoes or hats. Artillery and spook was employed. The contact broke at 0500H, resulting in 9 US KIA, 30 US WIA and 11 NVA KIA. The FDC was destroyed and both the CO of A/4-503d Abn and A/4-62 were KIA.

8 September. At 1116H, in the vicinity of YB564616, an LCH from C Troop, 7th Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry observed 3 individuals in shallow foxholes 30 meters from the site of the "rustoff" crash on 4 Sept. Artillery and gunships were employed with unknown results. At 1735H, the LCH returned to the same location and received heavy automatic weapons fire with negative hits. Artillery was extracted. 2 NVA were observed afterward dragging another individual. 2 NVA were confirmed KIA by artillery. At 1120H, at AE55234, a platoon from A Co, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry made contact with an estimated platoon size force. Contact broke immediately and a sweep conducted with negative results. A patrol from B Co, 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry observed 15 armed individuals at AO 6559. Artillery and gunships were employed with negative results. At 1250H, B Co, 2-35 while on a sweep in the vicinity of YB477714 found 3 NVA KIA, 1 NVA/WIA and 1 AK-47 as a result of the 07 Sept contact. At 1025H in the vicinity of YB460710, B Co, 4th Battalion, 503d Abn Infantry found the possible staging area for the attack on TF Lance on 07 Sept. 2 NVA/KIA were found with 1 AK-47, 1 flare gun and 2 .plcan grenades.
- 9 September. At 1545H, FSB #22 (YUB392223) received 43 rounds of 82mm mortar fire with negative casualties or damage. One NVA KIA was found at ZU232872. The body was estimated to be 7 days old. D Co, 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry located at AC776123 received 15 rounds of 82mm mortar fire at 0652H. One US KIA, a B-40 rocket launcher with 2 rounds and 1 RPG-7 were found by A Troop, 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry at AC622134. At 0630H, in the vicinity of AYTH468, A Troop, 7th Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry received automatic weapons fire from 2 positions. Artillery was employed and two secondary explosions were observed. The Aerial Rifle Platoon was inserted at 1124H and a sweep revealed 5 bunkers, and bloody bandages.

- 10 September. At 1015H, in the vicinity of YB805326, C Troop, 7th Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry observed 1 elephant with pack. Gunships were employed and the elephant was killed. C Troop also discovered numerous foxholes with overhead cover at YB86644. One NVA body estimated 2 months old was found at YF877170. At 1100H the Recon Platoon, 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry, found 8 NVA bodies estimated to be 2 months old at YB835200. C Co, 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry at 1315H observed 6 individuals in the vicinity ZV197038. The individuals were taken under fire and a sweep conducted revealing 1 AK-47 and a blood trail. At 1230H in the vicinity of YU355783, K Troop, 7th Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry received automatic weapon fire from an estimated 10 weapons. Thirty individuals in covered bunkers were observed. Gunships and airstrike were employed resulting in 12 NVA KIA and 30 bunkers destroyed.

- 11 September. At 1655H, LRP Team 4C reported contact with 20-25 NVA at YB847123. Small arms fire was exchanged and the LRP team withdrew. Gunships were employed with unknown results and the team was extracted. D Co, 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry received 9 rounds of possible 120mm mortar fire at FSB #32, YB28287. Between 1500H and 1630H, 46 more rounds of 120mm mortar fire were received resulting in 1 US KIA, 1 US WIA. At 0640H in the vicinity of AC06024A, a SRP from A Co, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry, adjusted artillery and gunships on an estimated 30 NVA. The results were unknown. At 1630H, C Co, 1-12 found 200 bunkers at YB80230 estimated to be 1-2 months old. Patrols from C & D Co's, 4th Battalion, 503d Airborne Infantry found 11 NVA KIA and 1 AK-47 in the vicinity of YF77-17th Air Cav contact of 10 Sept. A patrol from C Co, 4-503d Abn, found 2 N-VIAs, 1 N-VIA, 1 SRA, 2 AK-47's, 2 B-40 rocket rounds and miscellaneous equipment at YU65782.

- 12 September. At 1500H in the vicinity of AY855250, an APC from C Troop, 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry, hit a mine resulting in 2 US WIA. At 0930H in the vicinity of YUB59852, B Co, 4th Battalion, 503d Airborne Infantry, made contact with an estimated 20 NVA force in fortified positions. Artillery was employed and contact was broken at 1035H resulting in 2 NVA KIA and 2 US WIA. At 1253H at YUB50977, the Recon Platoon, 4-503d Abn, made contact with an unknown NVA force. Small arms fire was exchanged resulting in 2 US WIA, 4 NVA KIA and 2 AK-47's CIA. At 1615H in the vicinity of YU657797, a 6th Aviation Battalion Uh-1 aircraft received an unknown number of 50 cal or 37mm rounds resulting in 1 US WIA. At 1330H in the vicinity of YAM1256, a SRP from C Co, 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry made contact with an estimated 6-8 NVA. Small fire was exchanged and mortar fire was adjusted resulting in 1 NVA KIA.
A "DOBR" vehicle hit a mine at Y909234, resulting in 5 US WIA. 2 Troop, 2d Squadron, 1st Cavalry, found 11 satchel charges in the vicinity of Bridge 30, BR145336.

13 September. At 0930H, in the vicinity of Y8838913, an LC1H from A Troop, 7th Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry received ground fire resulting in the crash of the aircraft and 2 US KIA. At 0940H, B Co, 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry, made contact with an estimated reinforced 2 platoons of enemy located in bunkers. Artillery and airstrike fires were employed with unknown results. At 1200H the contact was broken. Friendly casualties were 3 US KIA, 1 US MIA and 24 US WIA. At 1030H in the vicinity of Y8845015, B Co, 4th Battalion, 503d Airborne Infantry, made contact with an estimated NVA company in bunkers. Artillery and airstrike were employed with unknown results. Friendly casualties were 3 US KIA, 9 US WIA. At 1010H at Y8838913, C Co, 4-503d Abn made contact with an estimated fire team force in bunkers. Artillery and airstripe were employed with unknown results. Friendly casualties were 3 US KIA and 6 US WIA. At 0900H at ZA164479, the command post of the 2d Battalion, 5th Infantry, received 6 hand grenades and 8 80-40 rocket rounds which resulted in 3 US WIA. At 1150H, at ZA170709, a SRF from A Co, 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry, made contact with an unknown size enemy force resulting in 1 US KIA and 2 US WIA. At 1600H another SRF from A Co, 1-35th was surrounded at ZA147726 and as a result received 2 US WIA before extraction.

14 September. At 1330H in the vicinity of Y7945312, A Troop, 7th Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry observed 10-12 foxholes and camp fires burning. Automatic weapons fire was received from 2 positions. Gunships were employed resulting in 1 WIA KIA. A Troop observed 2 NVA KIA at Y79482316 and 5-5 man bunkers and numerous foxholes. At 1715H, A Troop observed 75-100 WIA in the open. Gunships and airstrike were employed with unknown results.

15 September. At 0913H in the vicinity of Y9007695, the FS3 at LZ MACB received 10-12 rounds of possible 120mm mortar or 120mm rocket fire resulting in 3 US WIA. A CH47C heavy trap grenade exploded resulting in 1 US KIA and 1 US WIA from the Recon Platoon of the 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry at Y9065715. At 1330H in the vicinity of Y8950730, a CH-47 aircraft received 1 round of 50 cal fire resulting in 1 US WIA and slight damage to the aircraft. At 0900H in the vicinity of Y8938808, the 2d Platoon of B Co, 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry reported 45 rounds of mortar fire impacting in the vicinity of the KIANG ASP. Small arms fire was also received resulting in 1 US WIA. At 1500H at Z9453114, an LC1H from A Troop, 7th Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry received automatic weapons ground fire resulting in 3 hits and 1 US WIA.

16 September. FS3 401 received 2 rounds of 82mm mortar fire. The artillery ASP received a hit resulting in the destruction of 24 rounds of 107mm HE, 2 rounds 106mm HE and 24 rounds of 25mm HE. 3 US WIA and 1 CSF WIA. At 1525H in the vicinity of Y9020066, an APC from the 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry hit a land mine resulting in 3 US WIA. At 1625H at ZA124479, an APC from C Co, 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry hit a mine resulting in 10 US WIA and the destruction of the APC.
17 September. C Co., 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry, at 2246, found 1 60mm mortar complete, 3 60mm mortar rounds, 3 105mm projectiles, 3 3d and 1 4th NW, KIA.

Also the following US equipment was found: 3 M-15s, 1 H-79, 1 H-60 MG, 2 protective masks, 10 nicknamed and 3 pistol bolts.

18 September. At 1523H in the vicinity of YW836212, 2d Co., 6th Battalion, 503d Airborne Infantry made contact with 6 NW. Small arms fire was exchanged resulting in 1 NW KIA. A search of the area revealed 10 NW KIA in a shallow grave estimated to be 7 days old. At 0615H at ZA661146, and 2d Battalion, 5th Infantry firebase received 5 B-40 rocket rounds resulting in 1 US KIA, 2 US WIA.

19 September. At 1730H at YW999086, a Troop, 7th Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry observed 5 ponies and 1 sleeping roll on the ground. Return by fire resulted in 1 NW KIA.

20 September. Between 1600 and 1935 a SIS from C Co., 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry observed some 600 to 700 NW, heavily laden with personnel equipment and crew-served weapons, pass within 15 meters of their position (YW879722). Artillery fired more than 500 rounds of 12s and 28 rounds of field artillery into the area with unknown results.

21 September. C Co., 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry conducted a sweep in the vicinity of YW8703 and found 3 NW KIA by artillery and 1 NW KIA and 1 LMK. At 0401H, A Co., 2d Battalion (Mechanized), 6th Infantry made contact with an estimated squad size force which employed small arms and B-40 rockets. The result of the contact were 3 US KIA and 1 APC destroyed, at 1140H in the vicinity of ZA021129, a 52d Aviation Co. UH-1D crashed and burned as a result of a possible hit from a B-40 rocket round. Three crewmen were KIA and 1 was WIA. At 1700H in the vicinity of ZA021129, another 52d Aviation Company aircraft was hit by a B-40 rocket resulting in 6 US WIA including the CO, 3-5th Inf.

22 September. At 1300H in the vicinity of ZA317717, B Co., 3d Battalion, 5th Infantry received a small arms fire and 60mm mortar attack. Sporadic fire was received until 1629H. The results were 10 US WIA and 5 NW KIA.

23 September. The Recon Platoon, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry, made contact with 3 individuals at JB21216. Small arms fire was exchanged resulting in 3 US WIA and an unknown number of enemy casualties, at 1058H in the vicinity of YW83695, Co. A, 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry while conducting a combat assault received mortar and small arms fire in the vicinity of the IZ. Three aircraft on the last lift received ground fire and one crashed, while 2 Co., 1-22 was being assaulted into the same area the first lift received ground fire and one aircraft crashed. The contact broke at 1800H with 1 US KIA, 19 US WIA, and 10 NW KIA.

24 September. At 1510H in the vicinity of JG602400, a platoon from G Co., 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry made contact with 2 individuals resulting in 1 US WIA. At 0610H in the vicinity of YW817099, D Co., 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry made contact with an estimated NW company. Gunships and artillery were employed resulting in 5 NW KIA, and 2 B-40 rocket launchers, 1 LMK and 1 AK-47 LMG. One US was WIA. At 0615H in the vicinity of YW906997, a B-40 from G Co., 2-35th reported heavy incoming small arms fire. Radio contact
was lost and a sweep was conducted by the company. The results of the sweep were 2 US KIA, 1 US WIA and 1 NVA KIA/CIA. At 1200H in the vicinity of ZA-126747, A Co and the Scout element of the 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry made contact with an estimated 2 NVA squads in bunker positions. Small arms fire was exchanged resulting in 6 US WIA and unknown enemy casualties. At 1300H, at ZA036711, C Co, 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry received an unknown number of 60mm mortar rounds that resulted in 4 US KIA, 2 US WIA and 1 US WIA.

25 September. At 0900H in the vicinity of TU777707, C Co, 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry received a ground attack from an estimated 20 size force using Small arms, automatic weapons and mortars. Contact broke at 1020H when artillery and gunships were employed. B Co and the Recon Platoon, 2-35th received small arms fire enroute to C Company resulting in 1 US WIA. The results of the contact were 23 NVA KIA, 1 NVA WIA/CIA, 2 AK-47's, 3 US WIA, 6 US WIA and 2 B-40 rocket launchers, 4 RPG's, 2 MG's, 6 AK-47's CIA. At 1643H at ZA097377, A Co, 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry made contact with an unknown size enemy force. The enemy used small arms. Contact broke at 1815H and a sweep of the area revealed 2 NVA KIA and 1 AK-47. Friendly casualties were 22 US WIA, 1 AK-47 WIA.

26 September. At 1520H at B0001372, an APC from 3 Co, 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry was hit by a possible B-40 rocket resulting in 3 US KIA, 7 US WIA and heavy damage to the APC. During the afternoon C and 3 Co, 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry both received sporadic sniper fire resulting in 2 US KIA and 3 US WIA. IRP 3A, at TU777728, heard movement around their position and received several incoming grenades. At 0450H the IRP detonated their claymores and threw hand grenades at an unknown size force which resulted in 4 NVA KIA. The team was extracted with negative casualties.

27 September. At 0800H at TU237086, a SEP from A Co, 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry heard movement near their location. At 0820H the SEP reported that it was in heavy contact with an unknown size enemy force and unable to withdraw. 1A/2-35th Inf conducting operations 400 meters from the SEP location, heard the contact and moved to assist the SEP. The platoon arrived at the SEP location at 0920H and made contact with the enemy force. Artillery was adjusted into the area and the remainder of A Co arrived at 1012H. A Co then received 3 ground assaults from an estimated 2 NVA companies. At 1110H B/2-35 Inf joined A Co and the contact was broken. Results of the contact were 32 NVA KIA, 10 US KIA and 17 US WIA; 5 AK-47's, 1 SKS and 1 LMG were CIA.

28 September. No significant incidents.

29 September. At 1825H in the vicinity of ZA12348L, an APC from C Co, 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry hit a mine resulting in 7 US WIA. At 2035H at ZA065235, D Co, 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry received an estimated 40 rounds of 82mm mortar fire, small arms fire, and some grenades resulting in 1 US KIA and 1 US WIA.
30 September. At 12:15, at YP788705 the 3d platoon of C Co., 2d Battalion, 25th Infantry made contact with an estimated platoon size force. The enemy employed small arms, automatic weapons and B-40 rockets. At 14:50, at YP403711, a 4th Aviation Battalion gunship supporting the contact was shot down. The crew escaped injury. Contact broke at 1300, leaving 11 US KIA, 15 US WIA, 1 NVA KIA, 3 AK-47 CIA and 1 LMG CIA. At 15:00, LRP 2F made contact with 5-8 NVA at ACG88168, resulting in 1 NVA KIA. At 12:09, D Co., 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry received sniper fire at ZA53544, resulting in 1 US KIA. At 09:06, at ZA187750, a SRP from the 1st Battalion, 33rd Infantry observed 50 NVA moving west. Mortar fire was adjusted with unknown results.

1 October. At 16:35, 2d Brigade LRP 2D made contact with an estimated platoon of NVA, vic A692226. Gunships were employed and the team was extracted. Results were 2 NVA KIA. At 17:30, a SRP from D Co., 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry made contact with 4-5 NVA at ZA635413. Exchange of small arms fire resulted in 2 US WIA. Mortar fire supporting the SRP resulted in 1 US KIA. Enemy casualties were unknown. At 17:55, a SRP from D Co., 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry made contact with 6-8 NVA resulting in 1 US WIA and unknown enemy casualties. Gunships and artillery were employed. One or more rockets from a gunship ran impacted on another SRP located at ZA673445, resulting in 1 US KIA and 3 US WIA. At 14:00, a SRP from A Co., 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry made contact with an enemy force of unknown size at ZA162727. The SRP broke contact and the ARP from C Trp., 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry was inserted into the area. Results were 1 US WIA and miscellaneous NVA equipment and documents CIA.

2 October. At 16:56, vic YB895455, a SRP from D Co., 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry heard noise and adjusted mortar fire. The rounds impacted on a SRP from the Reconnaissance Platoon, 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry, resulting in 1 US KIA and 3 US WIA.

3 October. At 17:15, a SRP from B Co., 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry, while moving into position made contact with an estimated 5 NVA at YB807747. An estimated platoon of NVA joined the first 5. At 17:45, an airstrike was employed with unknown results. The SRP returned to its patrol base with negative casualties.

4 October. At 07:45, a SRP from C Co., 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry shot and killed a NVA. In five incidents between 07:30 and 15:05, A Trp., 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry observed or received fire. Total results were 4 NVA KIA and 1 NVA WIA/CIA. Airstrikes destroyed 27 bunkers at A6873418 and killed one NVA. At 16:00, 2d Brigade LRP 2F made contact with 20-25 NVA at ZV249169 and was extracted. Results were 3 NVA KIA. At 15:00, at YA-8995417, an anti-tank mine destroyed a 2½ ton truck from Btry D, 4th Battalion 60th Artillery.

5 October. At 15:50, at ZV130932, an OH6 helicopter from C Trp., 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry received fire from an estimated platoon sustaining 15 hits and 1 US WIA. Gunships and airstrike were employed with unknown results.
6 October. At 1439H, a SRP from D Co, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry observed 30 individuals wearing grey and green uniforms. The SRP adjusted artillery with unknown results. At 1110H, an OH6 helicopter from A Trp, 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry received ground fire from an estimated 20 individuals at 24815319. Gunships and airstrikes were employed. At 1145 the SRP of A/7-27 was inserted and swept the area, finding 100 bunkers and 2 NVA KIA.

7 October. At 0655H, 2 VC moved within close range of a SRP from B Co, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry, located at 23809747. The SRP fired on the VC, killing one. At 1625H, A Trp, 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry received ground fire from an estimated company of enemy. Gunships and airstrikes were employed with unknown results.

8 October. At 1530H, 2d Brigade LRP 2C observed 20 individuals at 40758143 and adjusted artillery on them with unknown results. At 1740H, 2d Brigade LRP 2F made contact with an enemy force of unknown size. Artillery was employed and the LRP was extracted. Results were 1 NVA KIA. At 1630H one unwounded, wounded VC surrendered to the Reconnaissance Platoon, 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry at 13809742. At 1745H, a resupply convoy of B Co, 2d Battalion (Mechanized), 8th Infantry received small arms fire and 3 rounds of 75mm rocket, resulting in 2 APC's damaged and 3 US WIA. At 2340H a radio relay station of B/2-8 received 2 rounds of small arms fire, resulting in 1 US WIA.

9 October. At 1030H, 2d Brigade LRP 2C observed a 20-man enemy force, wounding 1 enemy. Artillery and gunships were employed with unknown results. The LRP was extracted. Between 1340H and 1610H, 4 US personnel at 2481093 stepped on anti-personnel mines of unknown type, resulting in 4 US WIA. At 1744H, at 23053544 a CH-47 helicopter belonging to the 52d Aviation Battalion was hit by small arms fire, crashed and burned. Results were 3 US WIA and 1 US KIA.

10 October. At 1035H, at 1331705, an NVA threw a grenade at a SRP from A Co, 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry. The SRP killed the NVA and then received small arms fire from 3 more NVA armed with M-16's. One US was wounded. The SRP returned the fire, killing the 3 NVA. At 0930H, A Trp, 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry observed 15 NVA and received ground fire from 16866598. One OH6 helicopter received 7 hits. Gunships were employed and the LRP was inserted. Results were 3 NVA KIA, including one female.

11 October. SRP's from A and C Co's, 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry found 23 NVA KIA apparently by artillery fire during the previous 2 weeks. At 2207H, 2d Brigade LRP 2D observed 16 individuals with unidentified weapons at 1005165. The LRP adjusted artillery with unknown results.

12 October. At 0720H, an APC from B Trp, 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry hit a mine at 18841221, resulting in 1 US WIA. At 1633H, a FOL truck belonging to C Trp, 2d Squadron, 1st Cavalry received a burst of fire.
resulting in 1 US KIA. At 1950, 2d Brigade LRP 2C made contact with 10-12 individuals. The enemy employed small arms and a grenade, resulting in 2 US WIA. Gunships were employed and the team was extracted. At 2000H, the 70th Engineer Battalion, located at BQ-152156, received sniper fire from an estimated squad of VC. Results were 1 US KIA, enemy casualties unknown.

13 October. At 1515H, a SRF from C Co, 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry while moving into position, made contact with an estimated 3 NVA at YU81212. Results were 1 US KIA and 3 US WIA. Artillery and mortars were employed with unknown results. At 1005H, D Trp, 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry observed an enemy force of unknown size at AO881256. Gunships and artillery were employed. D Trp, 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry swept the area and found 1 VC KIA and 1 AK-47.

14 October. At 1550H, A Trp, 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry observed 2 VC with weapons and took them under fire. The ARP was inserted and found 1 VC KIA. At 2010H, 2d Brigade LRP 2C made contact with an enemy force of unknown size. Gunships were employed and the ARP was extracted. Results were 1 NVA KIA. At 2150, D Co, 2d Battalion, 15th Infantry observed lights of what appeared to be a 16 vehicle convoy on the road in grid YU8634. Artillery, gunships and Spooky were employed. Spooky received ground fire from YU865870. Aerial reconnaissance on 15 October revealed extensive foot traffic in the area but no signs of vehicular traffic.

16 October. At 1420H an APC from the scout section, 2d Battalion (Mechanized), 6th Infantry was hit by a 81mm rocket at ZA114397. Results were 8 US WIA.

17 October. No significant contacts.

19 October. Division Base Camp units conducted Operation CLEANWASP III in the CMZ. At 1020H, 2d Brigade LRP 2D received AK-47 fire from an estimated enemy platoon. Artillery was employed and the team was extracted. Two US were WIA. Enemy casualties were unknown. At 0945H, a 5 ton truck belonging to the 12th Transportation Battalion hit an unidentified type mine. Results were 1 US WIA and hang damage to the truck.

19 October. No significant contacts.

20 October. A UH-60 crashed at AP240725, killing all 20 on board.

21 October. At 1630H, 3d Brigade LRP 3F, at YA745233, observed 35-40 individuals. Gunships, artillery and airstrikes were employed and the ARP was extracted. Results were 3 NVA KIA. At 2210H, at AO886395, a 90mm rocket hit an APC belonging to B Trp, 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry. Five US were WIA. At 1905H, 2d Brigade LRP 2D made contact with 7 enemy and requested extraction. The team leader was not present when the team was extracted. The team loader fell from the extraction helicopter. Results were 1 US KIA, 1 US WIA. At 2100H, an ambush patrol from C Co, 2d Battalion, (Mechanized), 8th Infantry, using an starlight scope, observed 15 individuals at ZA115385. Artillery and mortars were employed on the enemy. A SRF from C/2-8, enroute to its night location, heard screams from the area of artillery impact. Enemy casualties were unknown.
22 October. No significant contacts.

23 October. At 1315H, a SEP from A Co, 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry, in position at ZA062659, received small arms fire and was rushed by 7-10 individuals. The SEP employed small arms and M-79 to break contact. Results were 2 US WIA. Enemy casualties were unknown.

24 October. At 1500H, an element of the Reconnaissance Platoon, Co D, 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry, became surrounded by an estimated platoon of enemy at YB335193. C Trp, 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry extracted the element and received heavy small arms and automatic weapons fire. Gunships and artillery were employed with unknown results.

25 October. Between 1740H and 1845H, FSB #29, located at YB39223, received 15 rounds of 82mm mortar and 75mm recoilless rifle fire. There were no casualties or damage. Counter-mortar fire produced a secondary explosion in the vicinity of YB32220.

26 October. At 1700H, a SEP from C Co, 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry heard movement and digging at YB33218. Airstrikes produced one secondary explosion. Between 1703H and 1915H, FSB #29, at YB33223, received 70 rounds of 82mm mortar and 75mm recoilless rifle fire, with 10 rounds impacting inside the perimeter. There were no casualties or damage. At 0450H, C Co, 1st Battalion 12th Infantry, while conducting cordon and search of a village at K63228, fired on 3 individuals trying to break through the cordon. Results were 1 VC KIA, 1 wounded VC CIA and 1 SKS CIA. At 0720H, D/1-12 received fire from the village, resulting in 1 US WIA. Search of the village produced 3 additional VC CIA, 2 SKS, 2 M1 carbines and miscellaneous documents CIA.

27 October. At 1550H, a headhunter aircraft observed 40 NVA at YB86210. Artillery, gunships and airstrikes were employed. Results were an estimated 20 NVA KIA. At 1350H, OH6 helicopters of C Trp, 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry received small arms fire from ZA05220. Gunships made runs and killed 11 NVA. The SEP was inserted and made contact with an enemy force of unknown size. Results were 1 US KIA and 3 NVA KIA. At 1646H, an OH6 helicopter received ground fire from ZA05220. It crashed and 3 US were injured. The 2d Platoon of A Co, 2d Battalion (Mechanized), 8th Infantry moved to the vicinity of the downed OH6 and extracted the injured. This same platoon made contact with an enemy force of unknown size. Results were 6 NVA KIA, 2 US KIA, 2 US WIA and 1 AK-47, 1 SKS, 1 RPG M3 and 2 packs CIA. A sweep of the contact area on 28 October revealed 17 additional NVA KIA.

28 October. At 0930H, a tank belonging to A Trp, 2d Squadron, 1st Cavalry hit an antitank mine at ZA17008R. Results were 1 US WIA.

29 October. At 1705H, FSB #29, located at YB39223, received approximately 100 rounds of 82mm mortar, 120mm mortar and possibly 75mm recoilless rifle fire. Artillery and airstrikes produced one secondary explosion at YB80221A. Results were 1 US KIA and 4 US WIA. At 1210H, A Trp, 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry observed numerous bunkers at YA92030. Gunships were employed, producing one secondary explosion.
30 October. At 1430H, a member of A Co, 2d Battalion (Mechanized), 6th Infantry, was injured when he stepped on a punji stake. At 0330 counter-mortar radar at LZ JUAN (YAR03293) detected 3 unidentified aircraft at YAS1201. Between 0350H and 0645H a total of 5 aircraft were detected. Gunships were dispatched but no visual sightings were made.

31 October. At 0810H, at YB02421, a SRF from C Co, 1st Battalion, 6th Infantry killed 1 NVA who had approached to within 10 meters of their location. At 0817H, a SRF from B Co, 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry was ambushed while returning to its patrol base. Four US were KIA. The 2d Platoon of 7/2-35th and the Reconnaissance Platoon, 2-35 moved to reinforce the SRF. 2/3/2-35 received sniper fire at YU81077, resulting in 2 US WIA. The platoon found one survivor of the SRF contact at YD315767. At 1541 the platoon made contact and exchanged fire with an unknown number of NVA at YU815766. 1 NVA KIA and 1 AK-47 CIA. At 1010H, a 105mm self-propelled howitzer belonging to B Btry, 3d Battalion, 6th Artillery hit an antitank mine at ZA173334. Results were 1 US WIA and moderate damage to the vehicle.
CHEMICAL OPERATIONS

1. (C) TREATMENT MISSIONS:

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NOTE: Each sortie (C-123 Aircraft) sprays 1000 gallons of defoliant.

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