DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, HEADQUARTERS COMPANY
114TH COMBAT AVIATION BATTALION
APO San Francisco 96374

SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned
Headquarters, Headquarters Company
114th Aviation Battalion (Cbt) APO SF 96374
Period Ending 30 April 1971
RCS CSFOR-65(R3)

Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development
Department of the Army
Washington D.C. 20310

25 April 1971

1. Operations: Significant Activities
The mission of Headquarters Company is to support the Battalion Headquarters and staff with billets and administrative support. Operations from dates 1 Nov 70 to 29 Jan 71 consisted of the normal support functions of the company. There were no significant activities engaged in by the company during this period. On 29 Jan 71 the company was deployed by convoy to Quang Tri in support of the Battalion minus. From 1 Feb 71 to 3 Apr 71, Headquarters Company performed its general support mission for the Battalion in Quang Tri and Khe Sanh. On 3 Apr 71 the company was redeployed by convoy to Chu Lai. Emphasis, aside from the regular support mission of the company, is presently being directed toward preparation for the AGI-CMMI inspections which are impending.

2. Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations, and Recommendations
   a. Personnel
      (1) OBSERVATION: Current foreign tour extension policies and large reductions of troops create unavoidable lapses in critical MOSs.
      (2) EVALUATION: Personnel lapses in critical MOS areas must be filled by cross training.
      (3) RECOMMENDATION: That a thorough cross training program be conscientiously begun.
      (4) COMMAND ACTION: A program of cross training as outlined above will begin in this command.
   b. Intelligence. None
   c. Operations
      (1) Convoy Move to Quang Tri
(a) OBSERVATION: The conduct of the move to Quang Tri was substan-
dard for several reasons. Inconsistency of guidance for movement preparation
was the major factor in this.

(b) EVALUATION: Command guidance for the move north to Quang Tri was
inadequate with regard to operational requirements, operating conditions and
the tenure of the operation. Specific guidelines in these areas will allow
transportation requirements to be fulfilled or operational equipment needs to
be altered accordingly.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: With due respect to security, that definite
guidelines be set in these areas. It is much more satisfactory to wait in be-
ginning preparation than it is to begin early and have requirements changed
several times before a move.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: To be carried out at a higher level.

(2) Operation of Rear Detachment

(a) OBSERVATION: The overall conduct of the rear detachment was un-
satisfactory.

(b) EVALUATION: Guidelines for the operation of the rear detachment
were inconsistent and support given the rear detachment was not commensurate
with requirements placed on it.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That the rear detachment be concerned with pri-
marily its own function. Requirements of guards and detail personnel shall
come from elsewhere. A battalion rear should exist with direct control over
the company rears. Sufficient personnel for maximum security of the rear area
and for effective administration of the area must be provided. Correspondence
should be sent with daily couriers. Normal distribution should be completely
done away with. Maximum attention should be given to the necessity of obtaining
needed locks, chains and lumber for the protection of the area. TOE and
station property left behind should be controlled by responsible individuals
left for that specific purpose. There should be no use of the unit's rear area
by anyone unless specified by the unit commander up through the chain of com-
mand.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: None

d. Organization: None

e. Training

(1) Basic Combat Skills

(a) OBSERVATION: Subjection of rear echelon troops to combat condi-
tions is a common occurence. This is evidenced by participation in reaction
and reserve forces and also in convoy moves such as ours to Quang Tri.

(b) EVALUATION: The basic combat proficiency of our troops is far less
than satisfactory in weapons handling and in conduct under fire.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Periodic range qualification should be conducted.
Prior to large moves or tactical contingencies specifically oriented training
should be conducted, i.e. Convoy ambush counter drill.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: Such training will be conducted according to time
and resources.
f. Logistics
   (1) Co-ordination of support responsibilities.
       (a) OBSERVATION: The move to Quang Tri required responsibility for
           our support to be changed.
       (b) EVALUATION: While in Quang Tri there were not clearly defined
           lines concerning who was to give us our logistical support.
       (c) RECOMMENDATION: That our support when deployed to another area
           be thoroughly co-ordinated beforehand, that it be based on that area, and
           that it avoid any reliance on the 'rean except in exceptional instances.
       (d) COMMAND ACTION: To be initiated at higher level.
   (2) Maintenance of all TOE equipment necessary for field operation.
       (a) OBSERVATION: Many items of TOE mess, billet, and other equip-
           ment required for field operation were not on hand.
       (b) EVALUATION: This can seriously hamper expeditious preparation
           of a unit to accomplish its mission in the field.
       (c) RECOMMENDATION: That all TOE field equipment of a unit be con-
           stantly on hand and maintained. Also, that all individual TA-50 equipment
           be on hand in required amounts.
       (d) COMMAND ACTIONS: All TOE equipment not on hand is on requisition.
           All TA-50 equipment not on hand is on requisition.

g. Communication. None

h. Material. None

I. None

[Signature]

EUSTICE M. SHIVER
CPT, IN
Commanding
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, HEADQUARTERS COMPANY
14TH AVIATION BATTALION (COMBAT)
APO San Francisco 96374

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27 April 1971

SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned
Pathfinder Detachment, Headquarters, Headquarters Company
14th Aviation Bn (Ght), APO San Francisco 96374
Period Ending 30 April 1971
RCS GFOR-66 (R3)

Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development
Department of the Army
Washington, D.C. 20310

1. Operations: Significant Activities
The mission of the Pathfinders is to provide combat support and advisory assistance to the Aviation units of the Twenty-Third Infantry Division. Our significant operations for this reporting period consisted of air traffic control, troop pick-up zone co-ordination, air mobility advising and instruction, aircraft recovery, and limited combat assault and "Eagle Flight." The Pathfinders were primarily engaged in air traffic control and aircraft recovery while at Quang Tri.

2. Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations, and Recommendations.
   a. Personnel.
      1. Authorized Strength of this Detachment
         (a) OBSERVATION: This detachment is authorized ten people. The breakdown is as follows:
            OIC - 1LT - 7-1542
            NCOIC-SSG - 11B4Y
            FFDR -E4 - 11B2Y
            FFDR -E4 - 11B2Y
            FFDR -E4 - 11B2Y
            FFDR -E4 - 11B2Y
            FFDR -E3 - 11B1Y
            FFDR -E3 - 11B1Y
            FFDR -E3 - 11B1Y
(b) **EVALUATION:** This amount of personnel is not enough to meet mission requirements. Minimum daily commitments are as follows:

1. Ground Control Tower  
   - 4 men daily
2. Contingent Pathfinder Requirements  
   - 4 men daily
   a. Sling Inspection
   b. Rigging Classes
   c. Rigging Assistance
3. Pickup zone co-ordination, Eagle
   - Flights, Combat Assaults  
   - 4-8 men daily
4. Stand-by Pathfinder Team  
   - 6 men daily
5. OIC, NOIC, Operations Sergeant  
   - 3 men daily

The above shows our requirements on an average day. If required to support daily combat assaults or to operate with field units, as we should be, our requirements for personnel will double. There are more than enough qualified personnel available in this division to fill all requirements. The problem area lies with improper utilization or near complete lack of utilization of Pathfinder assets.

(c) **RECOMMENDATION:** That the Pathfinder Detachment be authorized the following:

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<td>Team Leader</td>
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<td>Team NOC</td>
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<td>PFDR</td>
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(Example of one of four teams existing in proposed detachment strength authorization)

(d) **COMMAND ACTION:** To be initiated at higher level.

b. **Intelligence.** None
c. **Operations.**

1. **Air Traffic Control**
   (a) **OBSERVATION:** Pilots often fail to contact air traffic control agencies, either due to lack of knowledge of their existence, or to lack of information concerning how to contact them.
   (b) **EVALUATION:** This is an extremely dangerous situation in that it causes inconsistent control of air traffic around busy installations.
   (c) **RECOMMENDATION:** Make a pronounced effort to make all involved aware of frequencies and call signs of controllers and to hold pilots accountable for safety violations.
   (d) **COMMAND ACTION:** To be initiated at higher level.
   (a) OBSERVATION: Pathfinders are not utilized in these type operations as much or in the manner that they should be.
   (b) EVALUATION: Lack of usage of Pathfinder assets is due to a deficient amount of actual knowledge concerning Pathfinder Operations and their potential benefit to air mobile operations.
   (c) RECOMMENDATION: That Pathfinders be employed in their intended role in combat operations. The use of Pathfinders on pickup zones will greatly enhance speed and effectiveness of the operation. Use of Pathfinders on the landing zone in combat assaults has many advantages. The most significant one being that the most thorough visual reconnaissance can not determine some things that physical presence on the ground can.
   (d) COMMAND ACTION: To be initiated at higher level.

d. Organization. (See Personnel)
e. Training. None
f. Logistics. None
g. Communications. None
h. Material. None
i. Other. None

[Signature]
GREGORY E. CLARK
1LT, IF
Pathfinder Detachment Commander