1. (U) Attached is the Operational Report-Lessons Learned of the 525th Military Intelligence Group for the Period ending 30 April 1972.

2. (U) Copies of this report have been forwarded to Department of the Army through 11 Army Vietnam for evaluation and comment.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

J. S. T. Turner, Jr.
Maj, JCS
Adjutant

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SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 525th Military Intelligence
Group, Period Ending 30 April 1972, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3)(U)

HQ, 525th MI Gp
CMD = 1
MGT = 2
S1 = 1
S2 = 1
S3 = 1
S4 = 1
CO, 571st MI Det = 1
CO, 572nd MI Det = 1
CO, 573rd MI Det = 1
CO, 574th MI Det = 1
CO, 575th MI Det = 1
CO, MI Det (CI) = 1
CO, 519th MI Bn (FA) = 1
CO, 504th Sig Det = 1
CO, 358th Avn Det = 1
500th MI Gp = 3
17th MI Det = 3
Subject: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 525th Military Intelligence Group, Period Ending 30 April 1972, RCS CSPOR-65 (R3)(U)

1. (C-NOFORN) Operations: Significant Activities: The 525th MI Group engaged in direct combat support activities during the entire reporting period, a total of 182 days. During this period, the Group produced 12,020 Intelligence Information Reports (IIRs). Supported units responded with 69 artillery strikes, 44 air strikes, and 233 ground operations. Confirmed evaluations of IIRs established that 247 VC/NVA were killed and 7 were captured during the period as a result of the 525th MI Group's information. As of 30 April 1972, a total of 972 sources were employed by the 525th MI Group for intelligence collection activities throughout Vietnam. The following synopsis of significant activities is representative of the nature and scope of the Group's mission activities.

a. In-Country Support and Combat Responses.

(1) In December 1971, an MSS/525th MI Group Source reported the sighting of 30 sampans in Ca He area of Tuyen Binh (D), Kien Tuong (P). Reaction to the IIR resulted in the following: Two VC killed, five sampans destroyed, one POW captured and one M-2 Carbine captured along with 200 pounds of unhusked rice.

(2) A December IIR reported the location, activities and intentions of NVA/VC City Forces and cadre operating in the vicinity of XS 553 595. This report resulted in an operation launched by the DIACC, Binh Phuoc on 6 December which resulted in the capture of a large bunker, one 50 caliber machine gun, three 50 caliber machine gun barrels, two machine gun tripods and one Thompson sub-machinegun.

(3) Another December IIR identified a VC unit of 100 personnel at XT 202 60H, reportedly intending to attack Thanh Son (XT 238 514). The Sector S2 mounted an operation and engaged the unit, resulting in 1 VC KIA and 1 M-79 captured.
(4) An IIR dated 2 December 1971 concerned a company-sized unit and its intentions of supporting the Ben Cau Force in the collection of rice tax. A second IIR dated 5 December 1971 concerned the C.334 Toa Thanh District Local Company and its intentions of collecting rice tax in the Nui Ba Den area. These IIRs were provided to Phuoc Ninh DIOCC, Phu Khuong DIOCC, 52 Tay Ninh Sector and the G2 Advisor, 18th ARVN Division. Ground response resulted in 17 KIA. These IIRs were significant because they indicated the enemy's need for supplies and one method of obtaining these supplies.

(5) One December report concerned the location, activities, transportation and recreational facilities of a 100 man NVA/VC base camp. Source observed this camp and spent the night at the location on 11 December 1971. The camp was located at the vic of YU 605 050 in Duc Phong District on the border with Quang Duc Province. This report is significant because it is the first report this team has ever had from this area and indicated that the particular source who reported it had good access capabilities to an area of this province where this team had little or no coverage. This report was also important because it was extremely detailed with regard to the transportation facilities and manner of life at the base camp. It indicated that the enemy definitely considers this border area as a safe haven from ARVN harassment.

(6) One IIR accurately predicted a mortar attack on Dien Khan and Cam Ranh Bay that took place on 16 January 1972.

(7) Two IIRs contained sightings of heavily armed units of 300 and 500 men entering SVN from Laos reportedly accompanied by PT-76 tanks. Another January IIR indicated that the 1st NVA Regt had moved into SVN from the tri-border region preparatory to attacks on Kontum.

(8) A report was submitted concerning a 20 man NVA/VC unit in the vicinity of YU 277 023 on 25 January 1972. Source learned from a conversation with one of the members of the enemy unit that it intended to stage an ambush on the road to Duc Phong on either the night of 28, 29 or 30 January. This was confirmed by a subsequent spot report listing 1 VC KIA, 1 VC WIA, 2 PF KIA and 1 PF WIA, during an ambush which occurred on this road on 29 January.

(9) A January report concerning an area blocked off by the enemy resulted in an aerial reconnaissance mission. This flight received ground to air fire which led ultimately to an air strike. Fourteen enemy bunkers were destroyed along with one building and unknown number of enemy KIA's.

(10) Two other January reports covered enemy intentions to shell Tan Uyen (D) headquarters and US troops in the Tan Uyen area. This resulted in a command alert at the district headquarters and at Fire Support Base Fiddlers Green (11th ACR). The next day, at 1600 hours, both the headquarters and the fire support base received 28 rounds of 60mm and 82mm mortar fire.
BRIGHTLIGHT reporting (information concerning PW's) was particularly significant during February in MR II. As a result of increased targeting on this subject, five significant BRIGHTLIGHT reports were submitted. One Source reported a VC PW camp in the To Hap Secret Zone (BF 742 328) that at one time had US PWs. The report indicated that, after about five days, US PWs would be moved to the "5th Inter-Secret Zone" PW camp which was located somewhere northwest of the To Hap Secret Zone camp. Another Source reported a PW camp within the area bounded by coordinates BP 990 629, 520 650, 620 650 and 620 629. This area is northwest of the To Hap Secret Zone and could be the "5th Inter-Secret Zone" mentioned in the above paragraph. Another report indicated that a PW camp within the area bounded by coordinates BP 580 600, 600 600, 580 620 and 600 620. (Overlaps the camp reported in the above paragraph.) Allegedly, three US PWs were in the camp on 23 December 1971. One Source continued to provide coverage on the PW camp in Cambodia which the Group had been monitoring since October 1971. Ten Caucasian and two Negro PWs are allegedly in the camp. An IIR reported two Negro and one Caucasian US PWs sighted west of BN 743 665 moving with 15 VC in an easterly direction. Of interest is that in January 1971, PWs were sighted in this general area as well.

A February IIR concerned the identification of a possible VC Agent in Nha Trang City. This IIR was passed to MSS who stated they also had a similar report. These reports from different agencies were sufficient to have the individual arrested.

An IIR reported the location of a unit which was planning to rocket installations in the Pleiku City area between 25 and 28 February 1972. On 25 February three rockets impacted north of MACV Team 21 compound with negative damage.

A 28 February report stated that the general offensive plan of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam would consist of four rain fronts with the plan to go into effect on 10 March 1972. MARTH would commit three NVA divisions against ARVN bases, Dong Ha City and RF/PF bases along QL-1 in Quang Tri (P) and Thua Thien (P). The Plateau Front had, as its two main objectives, Kontum (P) and Pleiku (P) and would utilize the 5th and 7th NVA Divisions with the support of PT-76 and T-34 tanks. The Van-Ngai Front would have as its primary targets the RF/PF and PSCF units deployed at the newly formed villages and hamlets. This Front was under the command of General Nguyen DON. One of the units taking part in the attack would be the Gold Star Division. The fourth front, the Plain Front, had three NVA regiments under the command of General Dong Van CONG and would attack RF/PF outposts near the urban areas.

One IIR concerned a 75 man VC/NVA unit at vic XY 983 955 on 5 March 1972; a second report concerned a 100 man NVA unit in the vic XT 996 811 on 8 March 1972; and a third report stated that the location and activities of a 100 man NVA unit vic XU 934 283 on 3 March 1972. These three reports were significant in that they indicated a build-up of enemy troops in the border area between Phuoc Long and Binh Long Provinces, and because the units were over twice as large as the usual enemy units infiltrating to Vietnam from Cambodia.
A march report concerned the location of a VC battalion consisting of approximately 200 men, mostly North Vietnamese, in the vicinity of XT 180 877 planning to move to the vicinity of Nui Ba Den Mountain. The date of this information was 13 March 1972. A second report dated 20 March 1972, with a date of information of 15 March 1972, described a battalion unit with similar strength, weapons, food, uniforms and intentions as the unit in the first report. It also described the unit as just having made a long move. A third report on 20 March 1972 described a unit with similarities to those reported in the previous two reports. All three reports were emanated from different sources. These reports, along with those of other agencies, formed a pattern tracing the movements of one unit from Cambodia, across the border, and finally to a point approximately 10 Km north-northeast of Nui Ba Den Mountain in the vicinity of XT 360 655. These reports were evaluated as probable and resulted in a command alert. Nui Ba Den was attacked and occupied by the enemy on 8 April 1972.

A report in MR II indicated that a 100 man unit was located at ZA 038 722 on 20 March 1972. This location was midway between current locations of Hqs 95B Regiment and K37/95B. Reported intentions of the unit were to attack the Plei Krong Ranger Camp. Rangers from Plei Krong had contact with enemy units within 6 Km of the reported location.

A March report revealed that Hqs, Military Region Tri-Thien-Hue (MRTH) recently issued a directive to all military and political cadres on MRTH's policy for the recently launched Spring Campaign. The Spring '72 Campaign was to have been initiated at the end of March 1972 and was to continue to the end of April 1972. The campaign was to be called XUAN LY SON. The objectives as reported were:

(a) Military: NVA military units will move toward increased operations against ARVN base camps and outposts. NVA Artillery units will move guns into the IMZ to provide maximum firepower to units operating in the area. Local armed guerrilla units will try to maintain their presence and increase their effectiveness by attacking and harassing RF and PF outposts in the rural areas.

(b) Political: Parallel with military activities, proselyting units will make an all-out effort to support the peace plan proposed at the Paris Talks.

The 812th and 29th Regts. of the 324th Division were ordered by MRTH to prepare for an attack on Quang Tri City. Each regiment had an estimated strength of 1600 men and was organized into four battalions. The battalions of the 812th Regt carried the code numbers of B-1, B-2, B-3, and B-4. The battalions of the 29th Regt carried the code numbers of K-1, K-2, K-3 and K-4. The 812th Regt had two of its battalions located in the vicinity of YD 280 295, while the 29th Regt had its K-3 and K-4 battalions located at YD 156 398. The attack plans called for the 812th Regt to depart its location and move along the northern side of the My Canh river to Truong Phuoc mountain (YD 37 39). From there the
B-3 and B-4 battalions were to move through Hai Lam (V) and Hai Thuong (V) to Quang Tri City. The B-1 and B-2 were to move to the Hai Lang Lowlands to attack the Hai Lang Sub-Sector and disarm the PSDR forces in the area. The 29th Regt was to depart its location in the Ba Long Valley and move in two elements. The K-1 and K-2 Battalions were to move north of the Thach Han River and occupy the populated areas such as Minh Huong (H) (YD 328 544), Nhan Bieg (H) (YD 335 525) and An Don (H) (YD 327 523). From there they were to attack the RF unit guarding the Quang Tri Bridge and shell the city in support of the B-3 and B-4 battalions of the 812th Regt which was to seize Quang Tri City. The second element of the 29th Regt, composed of the K-3 and K-4 battalions, was to move reinforcements from the mountainous areas of Ha Phu (V) and Hai Le (V). The C-3 Sapper Company was performing recon duties in Quang Tri City at the time and had been doing so since before TET. Some of its personnel had been captured. While the attacks on Quang Tri City were in progress, the Ai Tu Combat Base would be shelled and probed by sappers with the primary target being the ammo dump. No ground attack was planned. This report matched another report by an element of the 812th Regiment.

(20) In March 1972, approximately 600 men of the VC Sap Yang Unit, were located at Tinh Trung, BS 722 818 and BS 476 985. The unit was resting and awaiting orders to move into the Kontum/Pleiku area in support of the Highland Front.

(21) On 13 March 1972, elements of the C-11 VC Company, 78th VC Bn, were deployed in the Ngoc Nha area via BT 268 122. The mission of the unit was to provide support to VC local force units in small harassment attacks against GVN outposts and to become familiar with the terrain in preparation for larger scale attacks planned for May 1972.

(22) On 1 April 1972, a company grade VC officer in Thua Thien (P) reported that the objective of the attacks initiated in Quang Tri (P) was to draw ARVN units into the northern province, weakening the position in Thua Thien (P) for operations to cut off Thua Thien (P) at the Hai Van Pass. The 29th NVA Regt was reported to have been given instructions to secure bases in the A Shau Valley from which attacks using tanks would be introduced into Thua Thien (P).

(23) One IIR reported that VC/NVA general offensive actions normally require detailed planning and coordination to initiate. The Quang Da Special Zone (QDSZ) indicated that a meeting took place on 9 April 1972 at an unknown location. Although the purpose of the meeting was not determined, it was believed to be connected with phase two of the offensive. More recently, VC Cadre of QDSZ were stepping up political and military proselyting activities in preparation for an anticipated offensive targeted against ARVN/GVN activities in Quang Nam (P), Da Nang City and the Da Nang Airbase. Civilians were mobilised into labor groups and transportation units to assist labor and transportation units to assist local and main force units for the projected offensive.
AVCJ-FH

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b. General Intelligence Support: US and Vietnamese operations in the Republic of Vietnam and Vietnamese operations in Cambodia continue to produce new information to be analyzed, evaluated, processed and disseminated by the nearly 350 US personnel assigned to the Combined Intelligence Centers, members of the 525th MI Group's 519th MI Battalion (Field Army). The statistical and historical information contributed by these centers is contained in the MACV annual Command History report.

c. Other Historical Information: Based on the DA approved MTOEs, subordinate field units were redesignated as detachments vice battalions (Provisional). The units are now as shown below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>New Designation</th>
<th>Old Designation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>571st MI Detachment</td>
<td>1st MI Battalion (Prov)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>572nd MI Detachment</td>
<td>2nd MI Battalion (Prov)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>573rd MI Detachment</td>
<td>3rd MI Battalion (Prov)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>574th MI Detachment</td>
<td>4th MI Battalion (Prov)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>575th MI Detachment</td>
<td>5th MI Battalion (Prov)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There was no change in strength of the unit from the provisional organization. Within the 519th MI Bn (FA), A Company and 45th Company were consolidated on 21 February 1972 in order to conserve overhead personnel and due to the shortage of personnel in each of the companies. On 1 April 1972, the Group formed the MI Detachment (CI) from available assets. The detachment has the mission of country-wide counterintelligence support for South Vietnam, with the exception of those units which have an assigned MI Detachment. The new organization will enable the Group to more effectively manage and control the in-country counterintelligence effort. During March 1972 the 355th Aviation Detachment relocated to better facilities at the Vung Tau Airfield. The new location gives the unit all-weather maintenance capabilities and improved living conditions.

d. The following personnel changes occurred in command positions during the reporting period:

(1) Commanding Officer: LTC (P) John A. Smith, Jr. vice Colonel Oliver A. Ray, 20 January 1972. (LTC Smith was promoted to Colonel on 7 February 1972.)


(3) Deputy Commanding Officer: LTC (P) Louis Okyen vice LTC (P) Richard W. Brown, 10 April 1972.

AVGI-HM

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2. (C-NOFORN) Lessons Learned: Commander’s Observations, Evaluations, and Recommendations.

a. Personnel

(1) Increase in percentage of drug abusers.

(a) Observation: There has been a moderate increase in the percentage of drug abusers identified within the Group during the period of this report.

(b) Evaluation: Due to the sensitive nature of the Group’s mission, any increase, no matter how slight, is a cause for concern. It has been clearly ascertained that none of the drug abusers held a military intelligence MOS, and the majority of the newly identified drug abusers (approximately 75%) were in-country transfers from non-intelligence standdown units.

(c) Recommendation: That all new arrivals to the unit be subjected to an urinalysis test. Since all new personnel are tested by USARV at the replacement battalion, 525th MI Group had to test only in-country transfers.

(d) Command Action: Permission was sought and received from General McCaffrey, DCG, USARV to test all in-country transfers to the 525th MI Group. This is being accomplished at the present time. Also, drug education has been encouraged and scheduled for subordinate units and unit drug counselors are trained at rehabilitation centers.

(2) Change to the Personnel Service Company Concept.

(a) Observation: In April 1972, the 525th MI Group turned over the functions of Personnel Management, Personnel Actions, Records, and Administrative Services to the 527th Personnel Service Company.

(b) Evaluation: Since no definitive guidance was provided by the 527th Personnel Service Company on the proposed changeover, the 525th MI Group developed its own plan for a phased turn-over of personnel functions to the PSC. This was accomplished efficiently and with a minimum disruption of services.

(c) Recommendation: That the 527th PSC develop an SOP to provide definitive guidelines for any such future contingency.

(d) Command Action: A command visit by the Group Commander inevitably will fortify working relationships. The Group S1 and Personnel officers further met on numerous occasions with the CO, 527th PSC prior to the consolidation date to establish a good working relationship.
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(3) Assignment of Combat Arms Officers.

(a) Observation: During the reporting period a great number of combat arms officers were reassigned to the 525th MI Group from redeploying or deactivating units.

(b) Evaluation: These officers had a wealth of experience which greatly benefited the Group. They were effectively utilized as XO's, SI's, SL's and assistant operations officers at detachment level, allowing MI officers to be utilized in their school trained specialties.

(c) Recommendation: That this system continue to be used to effectively utilize combat arms officers.

(d) Command Action: Commanders have been urged to seek out qualified combat arms officers to fill these needed positions.

(4) Contingency planning for Personnel and Operational phasedown.

(a) Observation: Because of the continued drawdown of US Forces in Vietnam, the 525th MI Group was forced to plan for its own phase down.

(b) Evaluation: Commanders were required to periodically revise their personnel structures in order to insure the necessary personnel were on hand to conduct the reduced scale of operational requirements, yet also meet the authorized strength level set by USARV.

(c) Recommendation: That Commanders continue to be required to periodically revise their personnel structures to comply with the existing and future force reduction programs.

(d) Command Action: Commanders are required to submit their recommendations prior to each phase of the withdrawal program.

b. Intelligence

(1) EGRESS/RECAP

(a) Observation: Frequently, initial EGRESS/RECAP (returnee) reports from field elements have been received piece-meal, and in an incomplete and inconsistent format.

(b) Evaluation: There is an evident need for a standard format incorporating certain basic information, when available, in such reports.

(c) Recommendation: That a standard format be published for the initial reporting of EGRESS/RECAP information of immediate importance.

(d) Command Action: An EGRESS/RECAP standard initial reporting format was published and disseminated to all field elements with instructions for its use.
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(2) Maps for debriefing.

(a) Observation: During the de-briefing of US Evaders it was observed that aviator/navigator personnel, with years of experience working with maps, were having difficulty accurately locating their positions, or "back-tracking" on available maps.

(b) Evaluation: An analysis of the situation revealed that there was a great disparity between the commonly used 1:50,000 maps of the ground forces, and the 1:250,000/1:500,000 aerial navigation maps familiar to the returnees.

(c) Recommendation: Aerial navigation maps should be obtained and utilized, where helpful, in the debriefing of personnel more familiar with that type of map.

(d) Command Action: Appropriate maps have been ordered and will be utilized where indicated by debriefing teams.

c. Operations

(1) Source Recontact

(a) Observation: Source recontact procedures have not been established in all cases by Case Officers.

(b) Evaluation: The present tactical situation in Vietnam has created the situation whereby contact is periodically lost with sources. If proper recontact procedures are established, this will not be the case.

(c) Recommendation: That emphasis messages be forwarded through US and Vietnamese channels reminding the field elements of this basic operational requirement. That sources be given a mechanism to have them returned into Unit 101 authority from refugee channels.

(d) Command Action: Messages have been dispatched to the field elements through both 525th MI Group and Unit 101 channels instructing them to review all recontact procedures and to insure that they are established and practical.

(2) Processing of Project Plans/CIOPS

(a) Observation: Processing of Project Plans/CIOPS takes an inordinate amount of time from origination to final approval.

(b) Evaluation: A complete review of processing time at all locations revealed that these plans take second place to everyday activities. The lack of proper management tools to insure command emphasis on processing of these plans was found to be the cause.
(c) **Recommendation**: A system be established whereby the status throughout the processing cycle can be determined.

(d) **Command Action**: A chart is maintained by Operations indicating the status and locations of Project Plans/CICPS from their inception. Command emphasis has been given both at the staff and field command level to decrease the processing time of these plans.

d. **Organization**

(1) **Creation of an MI Detachment (Counterintelligence)**

(a) **Observation**: Counterintelligence (CI) personnel assigned to MI units having a dual collection/counterintelligence mission are unavoidably utilized in duties outside of their MOS. In such units effective, centralized control over CI investigations, scoping, case control, review, agent supervision and other CI operational matters, of necessity, becomes secondary to the more immediate demands of the overriding collection mission.

(b) **Evaluation**: An analysis of the situation found the observation to be generally valid. In many areas CI coverage was marginal, with low operational priorities. CI liaison activities lacked essential vigor and had no regular frequency.

(c) **Recommendation**: That the counterintelligence elements of MI units pursuing a dual collection/CI mission be detached from the collection elements and placed under command-centralized, CI operational and administrative control.

(d) **Command Action**: A provisional Military Intelligence Detachment (Counterintelligence) was formed on 1 April 1972, incorporating Group CI assets under a single subordinate commander who is responsible directly to the Group Commander, and under the operational control of the Group S2. Initially, five CI Field Offices (FO's), and two CI Resident Offices (RO's), subordinate to the Detachment, provide CI area coverage throughout the Republic of Vietnam.

(2) **Reorganization of Units**

(a) **Observation**: During this reporting period A and 45th Companies were consolidated into one company, with 45th Company assuming all the duties and responsibilities of A Company.

(b) **Evaluation**: Transfer of personnel and records to 45th Company was accomplished with no disruption of normal operations. Due to a high level of coordination and cooperation between the companies, all personnel were able to continue performance of their normal duties while records, weapons, equipment and vehicles were transferred to 45th Company in an efficient manner.

(c) **Recommendation**: That the guidelines used by 45th and A Companies in their consolidation be utilized in future reorganizations of this type.
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(d) Command Action: A detailed report on the consolidation of A and 45th
Companies has been added to the battalion files to be used as a guide in fu-
ture reorganizations.

(3) Relocation of Units:

(a) Observation: The 358th Aviation Detachment moved all personnel and
equipment to a new living and working area.

(b) Evaluation: As a result of preparation for and conduct of this
movement, several areas have been noted for consideration in future movements.
One of the primary factors to be considered should be complete preparation of
the new area prior to the actual movement. During the movement, guards must
be stationed at both the new and the old locations to prevent theft of property.

(c) Recommendation: That these items be considered in future movements.

(d) Command Action: An after action report on this movement is maintained
as a ready reference for such operations in the future.

(4) Contingency Planning

(a) Observation: Incremental personnel strength reductions in the Group
could adversely impact on its capability to successfully satisfy its many
mission responsibilities.

(b) Evaluation: Accelerated withdrawals of US personnel from RVN and the
attendant DEROS curtailments have been announced with no prior warning. Unless
the Group is prepared to accept losses not only of personnel but personnel with
critical hard-skill MOS’s, it could find itself in a position of being forced
to terminate or turn-over lucrative bilateral collection operations due to non-
availability of personnel assets.

(c) Recommendation: That contingency plans be formulated which would con-
sider the likelihood of incremental personnel reductions on a “worst-case”
basis and that, after so doing, a review made of current operations to deter-
mine where personnel assets could be shifted and operations consolidated so
as to enable the Group to return to the degree possible, its present high level
of intelligence production.

(d) Command Action: Such planning was initiated throughout the command
beginning last fall with the result that the Group has since received two (2)
directed personnel strength reductions which have had absolutely no impact on
its capability to successfully accomplish its assigned mission.

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Operational Report - Lessons Learned; 525th Military Intelligence Group, Period Ending 30 April 1972; ROS CSFOR-65 (R3)(U)

(a) Observation: All pilots are required to fly standardization rides every 90 days with an instructor pilot.

(b) Evaluation: Due to the country-wide mission of the 358th Aviation Detachment, it is difficult to arrange for the required flights every 90 days. However, the requirement is met by conducting a quarterly standdown during which this and other required training is conducted.

(c) Recommendation: That all units whose operational mission permits such a standdown use this method to meet recurring requirements.

(d) Command Action: The Group has implemented this program.

(2) Instrument Flight Rule

(a) Observation: Because the unit flying area encompasses all of South Vietnam, detachment aviators experience IFR flying conditions throughout the year.

(b) Evaluation: The detachment renews each aviator's standard and tactical instrument ratings as they expire. The necessary training is conducted by the detachment, even though the requirement for the ratings has been waived for aviators in RVN. It is felt that this training has been a major factor in making the past year both accident and incident free.

(d) Command Action: The Aviation Detachment will continue to conduct this training.

(f) Logistics

(1) Supply Operations (Maintenance of Property Books Accounts)

(a) Observation: The property books, supporting supply records and other related files of the field detachments of this command were not being maintained in accordance with applicable directives. The requisitioning, receipt, issue and management of supplies and equipment was, at best, marginal.

(b) Evaluation: Command Inspections of the field detachments during FY 72 revealed that property books and related records were not being maintained in accordance with applicable regulations. In several instances, applicable command directives were not on hand and supply personnel were not aware of their contents or existence. Analysis of records deficiencies and questioning of supply personnel on supply operations revealed that in many cases, records were being improperly maintained and supply stoppages created, due to lack of knowledge of applicable directives and supply operations procedures by personnel assigned to supply jobs. Analysis of MTOE authorizations for supply personnel versus supply personnel assigned, revealed that of the personnel assigned supply duties, usually, only one person, the supply sergeant, had the correct MOS or any former experience in the logistics field.
(c) Recommendation: That a study be conducted to determine the feasibility of consolidating the field detachments property books for maintenance at group level or of transferring the property books for centralized maintenance at group level, in order to provide the expertise required.

(d) Command Action: During the period 15 March to 15 April 1972, a study as recommended above was conducted. As a result of that study a decision was made to transfer the property books and related records of the 571st, 572nd, 573rd and 574th Military Intelligence Detachments to this headquarters to be maintained by the Supply Technician assigned to the Group S4. On or about 15 May 1972, the property books and related records of the 574th MI Detachment will be transferred to Group S4. Thereafter, at approximately 15-30 day intervals, the remainder of the detachment property books and related records will be transferred to Group S4.

(2) Material Readiness Reporting

(a) Observation: The Group Commander and his staff were not being informed in an accurate and timely manner of the status of Group equipment, especially that equipment which was non-operational.

(b) Evaluation: Two reports were being submitted by Group elements, showing material readiness status, the Weekly Command Deadline Report (required by USARV DCSLOG) and the Quarterly Material Readiness Report (required by DA (TM 38-750)). Neither of these reports provided the proper management tool. The Weekly Command Deadline Report depicted only the numbers of vehicles and other equipment which were non-essential. It did not show the cause of equipment failure. The Quarterly Material Readiness Report (DA Form 2406), while depicting causes, was submitted too infrequently to be of value in assessing equipment status. Because of these deficiencies in the reporting system, neither the Group Commander nor his staff could take action to solve maintenance problems or improve overall Group material readiness.

(c) Recommendation: That the Material Readiness Report (DA Form 2406) be submitted on a weekly basis, and that this report be prepared in such a manner as to accurately reflect equipment status.

(d) Command Action: In early March 1972, the Weekly Material Readiness Report (DA Form 2406) was initiated; a consolidated Group-wide report was then compiled and briefed to the Commander on a weekly basis.

(3) Direct Support Maintenance

(a) Observation: In the Saigon area, it has been difficult to obtain responsive, timely direct support maintenance.

(b) Evaluation: The direct support maintenance unit which supports the 519th/525th Consolidated Motor Pool was located in Long Binh requiring that all
equipment submitted to support maintenance be evacuated to Long Binh Post. In addition, follow-ups were difficult to make due to the time/distance factor involved. At times it was difficult to get work requests accepted since the direct support unit required that all organizational deficiencies on equipment be corrected prior to acceptance of the job. This required 519th/525th Motor Pool personnel to move the equipment to Long Binh, have it inspected, bring it back to Saigon to correct the deficiencies, and move it back to Long Binh to be repaired. As a result of this difficulty, 519th/525th Motor Pool personnel at times performed field maintenance-type repairs which were not authorized by the maintenance allocation chart, and equipment down time was excessively high.

(c) Recommendation: That a maintenance contact team from the direct support maintenance unit at Long Binh (185th Main Support Company (MSC)) be located in the Saigon area.

(d) Command Action: After close coordination between the commanders and staff of the 91st (now 266th) Composite Services Battalion (parent headquarters of the 185th MSC) and this headquarters, and subsequent to the relocation of the 519th Motor Pool from Camp Du Beau (making that facility available for use by the 185th), a Contract Team with automotive and signal equipment maintenance capability moved to Saigon in early April 1972.

(4) Maintenance Records Management

(a) Observation: The Army Maintenance Management System (TAMMS) and prescribed load list (PLL) records maintained by subordinate elements of this command were not being kept in accordance with applicable Department of the Army and USARV regulations.

(b) Evaluation: Command Inspections of subordinate units during FY 72 revealed that maintenance and repair parts supply records were not being maintained in accordance with applicable regulations, or in some cases, with the unit's Standing Operating Procedure (SOP). This was especially true in the field detachments. Analysis of records deficiencies and questioning of maintenance personnel by Group Sh representatives determined that in many cases, records were being improperly maintained due to lack of knowledge on the part of those responsible for their upkeep. Prior to 1 January 1972, USA Engineer Command, Vietnam, conducted a PLL school at Long Binh; however, due to reduction of US Forces, this school had ceased to operate. There was no facility in Vietnam to train records clerks.

(c) Recommendation: That the Group sponsor a training course for a TAMMS and PLL course, and that the Group Sh contact maintenance assistance agencies to provide on-site training and advice on records management.

(d) Command Action: During the period 3-5 April 1972, a TAMMS/PLL training course was held in Saigon for Group personnel. Instructors and lesson materials were provided by the Maintenance Assistance and Instruction Team
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(MAIT), US Army Support Command, Saigon. Twelve personnel completed the course. In addition, the Organization Maintenance and Supply Instruction (OMSI) Team, 29th General Support Group, on request by this headquarters, provided on-site assistance to 513rd MI Detachment and 519th MI Battalion.

(5) Real Estate Status

(a) Observation: The total number and annual cost of 525th MI Group open fund leaseholds as of 1 October 1971 appeared to be excessively high.

(b) Evaluation: As of 1 October 1971, the 525th MI Group had 27 open fund leaseholds at a dollar value of $320,000. In consonance with a MACV message, subject, Reduction of Leased Facilities, subordinate commands were required to take a hard look at their leased holdings with a view towards terminating as many leases as was operationally feasible. Terminations generally took the form of a relocation of an operation to rent-free real estate made available by land use concurrence (LUC). Significant success has been achieved to date through this program of reevaluation as evidenced by the fact that as of the end of the third quarter of fiscal year 1972, the dollar value of Group leaseholds had been reduced to some $207,000, comprising 20 leases.

(c) Recommendation: That command emphasis continue to be placed upon this particular area of concern, and especially upon the need for constant evaluation of real estate assets versus operational requirements.

(d) Command Action: Initiation of a quarterly real estate status report; compilation and publication of statistics depicting real estate status for review and analysis by command; and, finally, inclusion as a subject of command interest on the periodic visits conducted by the Group Commander to his subordinate elements.

(6) Periodic Inspection of Helicopters

(a) Observation: In an effort to enhance the ability of the 358th Aviation Detachment to maintain a high operational readiness rate, the unit endeavors to maintain sufficient spacing on the UH-1H helicopters so as to prevent more than one of them from coming into a Periodic Inspection (PE) at the same time. Since the detachment is required to support five field sites with five helicopters, it is imperative to complete the PE in the least possible time while performing the best maintenance.

(b) Evaluation: Occasionally a situation arises where two helicopters may require a PE at the same time. In such a case, the Group Command Section is advised and makes a decision on how to re-space the flying time and thus eliminate the problem of having two helicopters in for PE at the same time. Due to the high level of command interest in this area, this method of alleviating the problem has been successful.
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(c) Recommendation: That commanders at all levels be continually advised on the status of their helicopters in relation to the PE requirement.

(d) Command Action: The Group Commander has directed that this program be continued.

(7) Maintenance of Signal Equipment

(a) Observation: Proper maintenance of signal and related equipment insures its readiness for mission accomplishment. The degree of command emphasis placed on this subject is directly related to the amount of maintenance performed on the equipment.

(b) Evaluation: Proper use and maintenance of signal and related equipment is the responsibility of the unit to which the equipment is attached. Personnel from 504th Signal Detachment operate and maintain the equipment in support of the MI Detachment Commander. Command emphasis is required in order to keep this equipment in an operable condition.

(c) Recommendation: That when commanders inspect or visit their subordinate elements they insure that attached and supervisory personnel are aware of their responsibilities in regard to signal and related equipment; that classes be conducted at the sites for attached and supervisory personnel to insure that they are familiar with required maintenance.

(d) Command Action: Such classes have been scheduled to be conducted during May 1972.

Communication

(1) Message Preparation

(a) Observation: DD Form 173 (Joint Message Form) has not been prepared properly. Errors in format cause unnecessary delays in the Communications Center as operators take extra time to correct format errors.

(b) Evaluation: Drafters and releasers are not cognizant of their responsibilities IAW AR 105-31. Drafters and releasers have specific responsibilities that must be adhered to in order to draft and release a message for electrical transmission.

(c) Recommendation: That 504th Signal Detachment conduct classes for all drafters and releasers of messages processed at the 504th Signal Detachment Communications Center.

(d) Command Action: The recommendation has been implemented and classes are conducted on a quarterly basis.
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(2) Dedicated Communications System

(a) Observation: With the onset of the enemy offensive in Quang Tri Province, reporting on the tactical situation was not reaching Saigon in an expeditious manner.

(b) Evaluation: The 525th MI Group Detachments with trained intelligence officers had the capability to gather and prepare INTSUM messages and transmit those messages over the dedicated communications network thereby filling a serious time lag. This service was previously provided by the tactical units and the large advisory teams in each of the major Corps areas, however, with the drawdown that capability no longer exists.

(c) Recommendation: That any intelligence group with a mission similar to the 525th MI Group be provided a dedicated communications system. That any intelligence group with a mission similar to the 525th MI Group be prepared to gather and disseminate tactical information and information received from preliminary POW reports and liaison with other information gathering agencies. That the requirement for the collection of information from all sources to enable the highest level of command to receive this information by the most expeditious means be officially levied on the 525th MI Group.

(d) Command Action: Detachments of the 525th MI Group have been given the task of providing INTSUMs twice a day.

h. Other

(1) Counterpart Relations

(a) Observation: Counterpart Commanders often will not take proper personnel actions.

(b) Evaluation: These commanders for one reason or another are either unwilling or unable to take action concerning weak subordinates. It appears that these commanders are grateful when provided a means by the US commanders whereby they can eliminate those who are less than desirable.

(c) Recommendation: That US Commanders put their recommendations, vis-a-vis weak personnel, in writing to their counterpart commanders, at the same time indicating that they are taking like action concerning their own personnel. A tool of this nature can support the counterpart in accomplishing an action he desires but cannot accomplish himself.

(d) Command Action: In selected cases, letters have been dispatched to date to the Commander, Unit 101, which have made such recommendations.
List of Units Assigned
to the 525th MI Group:

UNIT
HHC, 525th MI Group
571st MI Detachment
572nd MI Detachment
573rd MI Detachment
574th MI Detachment
575th MI Detachment
MI Detachment (CI)
519th MI Bn (FA)
504th Signal Detachment
358th Aviation Detachment

LOCATION
Saigon
Da Nang
Nha Trang
Long Binh
Can Tho
Saigon
Saigon
Saigon
Vung Tau

* List provided in accordance with USARV Supplement 1 to AR 525-11, 8 February 1971.