4 February 1968

SUBJECT: Enemy Attack on US Installations After Action Report

TO: Commanding Officer
17th Combat Aviation Group
APO San Francisco 96240

INFO: Commanding Officer
1st Aviation Brigade
APO San Francisco 96384

1. General: Camp Holloway, Pleiku, RVN, was attacked by two (2) 82mm mortar tubes of an unknown main force unit at 0140 hours on 30 January 1968. The duration of the attack was approximately thirty (30) minutes, during which 20-30 rounds fell within the confines of Camp Holloway.

2. Sequence of Events:
   a. The enemy mortar crews (estimated 12 men) moved into position, vicinity AR 817477 (1400 meters from target center of mass) using the village of Plei No'mu as their base of operations. At 0140 hours, approximately 10-15 rounds were fired, impacting north to south along a lateral sheath 200 meters wide (maximum deflection spread at that range without re-laying the tubes).

   b. The location of the enemy position was visually confirmed from the H&F control tower and counter-mortar fire was employed to neutralize the position. However, after a three to five minute pause, 10-15 additional rounds were received, impacting from south to north along a lateral sheath. The gunships again engaged the position with aerial rocket and mini-gun fire. Incoming rounds ceased at approximately 0210 hours, immediately after the gunships engaged them for the second time.

   c. Gunships and counter-mortar fire continued to engage the confirmed enemy position and possible infiltration routes (Inclosure 1).

   d. During the attack, this installation was on 100% alert and remained so until approximately 0700 hours. Throughout the night gunships and mortars continued H&I fires with unknown results. There are no indications that the Camp Holloway perimeter was penetrated during the attack.
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The mortar attack again indicates that the enemy has used his detailed knowledge of the Camp Holloway facilities. Intended targets were the aircraft refetments and support facilities. Factors that may have influenced the enemy course of action are:

1. Passive defense measures provide more protection to personnel than aircraft.

2. Destruction of aircraft denies combat elements the prime movers of supplies, equipment and troops into forward areas, seriously affecting combat operations.

3. Armed aircraft located at this installation constitute a major deterrent to ground assaults of installations in the Pleiku area.

3. Significant Intelligence Information:

a. The enemy mortar section used the same general location as the mortar element of the 408th Sapper Bn which attacked this installation on 26 January 1968.

b. The reaction of the gunships probably caused the enemy mortars to cease fire, and may have spoiled a planned ground attack. 250 enemy personnel had earlier been reported in the vicinity of AR815565, preparing for an attack on some installation in the area.

c. The following morning, the same enemy element (identified as the H-15 Bn) was located, taken under fire, and destroyed by 52nd CLB gunships. 130 VC and NVA were killed by aircraft and the Battalion Commander captured.

4. Damage Information:

a. Personnel losses by unit are listed in inclosure 2.

b. Major items of equipment damaged or destroyed are listed in inclosure 3.

5. Planned actions and recommendations:

a. Planned Actions.

(1) When an attack is eminent, aircraft will be evacuated from Camp Holloway to an area less likely to be attacked.

(2) Aircraft will be dispersed to decrease the danger of excessive damage to aircraft.

(3) Additional protection will be provided by placing vehicles around the aircraft to absorb as much of the shrapnel damage as possible.
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b. Recommendations.

1) Increase the manning level of the assigned Security Detachment, that it may secure and interdict the area around Camp Holloway, to preclude the employment of enemy mortars.

2) Replace damaged or destroyed equipment as soon as possible. Priority of replacements should be to aircraft to enable the battalion to continue to meet its support requirements.

3) Present perimeter lighting continues to be inadequate. The emergency request of said lighting, dated 10 December 1966, has yet to be completed. Recommend immediate action.

EDWARD P. LUKERT, JR.
LTC, Inf
Commanding
Inclosure 2: Personnel Losses

1. The following personnel were wounded in action, treated at the Camp Holloway Dispensary, and returned to duty.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>UNIT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>WO MATHews, Stanley E. II</td>
<td>170th AHC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1SG ALFRED, Kelly L.</td>
<td>189th AHC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SP/5 HARDWICK, Lawson Jr.</td>
<td>189th AHC</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. The following named individual was wounded in action, and is recovering in the Camp Holloway Dispensary.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>UNIT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>WO LEE, William L.</td>
<td>119th AHC</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. The following personnel were wounded in action and evacuated to the 71st Medical Evacuation Hospital.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>UNIT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CPT SHAW, Frank G.</td>
<td>119th AHC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SP/4 DURKIN, Terrance L.</td>
<td>119th AHC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SP/4 SCHWARTZ, Fred W.</td>
<td>170th AHC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SP/4 SMITH, Jerald D.</td>
<td>604th Maint Det</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SP/5 STORMMINGER, David</td>
<td>334th AOD</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. No personnel were reported killed in action.