QUESTION 16

What are the reasons for expecting more change in the countryside in the next two years than in past intervals? What are the reasons for not expecting more? What changes in RVNAF, GVN, U.S. and VC practices and adaptiveness would be needed to increase favorable change in security and control? How likely are such changes, individually and together; what are the obstacles?

Cautionary Note

Much of the below analysis is predicated upon various statistics which are reported from Vietnam, with particular emphasis upon the Hamlet Evaluation System (HES). Several weaknesses of the HES combine to make the overall picture it presents of the status of pacification in Vietnam tend to be overly optimistic: (1) It does not measure political development in any sophisticated or sensitive way; (2) It is reliant upon the subjective judgement of a foreigner; (3) It requires the adjudgee to be the adjudger -- thus requiring a somewhat inhuman capacity for honesty and objectivity; (4) It asks an impossible task of its reporters: In a countryside average, each district adviser would have to visit 37 hamlets each month (not counting "P" and "VC" hamlets); or more than one a day in order to make his assessment of their ratings -- given the magnitude of his other tasks, he cannot visit all the hamlets he rates; (5) Many of the ratings can only be supplied by the Vietnamese, thus the District Advisor is, in some cases, at the mercy of the District Chief who may have totally different perceptions of what is being asked and what the answer is or should be. Despite these shortcomings, the HES and our other statistical systems represent the best data that is available to us and therefore must be used in the decision making and evaluating process; however, it is important to keep in mind that these statistics can only show gross relative trends and are constantly in need of caveats which can only be supplied by the subjective judgements and analysis of informed knowledgeable individuals.

Reasons for Expecting More Change

The favorable balance in opposing forces achieved by the GVN provides new possibilities for increased security of the countryside. Tables 1 and 2, below, show the change in friendly and enemy forces from 1967 to 1968:

| TABLE 1 |
| FRIENDLY FORCES STRENGTH FIGURES |
| 31 Dec 67 | 31 Dec 68 | Percent Change |
| South Vietnamese Army (ARVN) | 303,000 | 387,200 | +28 |

16-1
### Regional Force/
#### Popular Force (RF/PF)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>31 Dec 67</th>
<th>31 Dec 68</th>
<th>Percent Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>300,000</td>
<td>393,000</td>
<td>+ 31</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TABLE 2**

**ENEMY FORCES STRENGTH FIGURES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>31 Dec 67</th>
<th>31 Dec 68</th>
<th>Percent Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>North Vietnamese Army (NVA) (excludes 23,000 North Vietnamese Army fill in Viet Cong units)</td>
<td>65,000</td>
<td>83,000</td>
<td>+ 27.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VC main force/local force (includes 23,000 North Vietnamese fill)</td>
<td>63,000</td>
<td>60,000</td>
<td>- 4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guerrillas</td>
<td>73,000</td>
<td>59,000</td>
<td>- 19.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTALS</td>
<td>201,000</td>
<td>202,000</td>
<td>+ 0.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

GVN territorial forces are starting 1969 with about a six to one advantage over VC main force/local force and guerrillas, compared with a five to one advantage at the start of 1968. Table 3 shows the ratio of friendly forces to enemy forces.

**TABLE 3**

**STRENGTH RATIO: FRIENDLY TO ENEMY**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>31 Dec 67</th>
<th>31 Dec 68</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RF/PF</td>
<td>4.8:1</td>
<td>6.6:1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARVN to NVA</td>
<td>4.7:1</td>
<td>4.6:1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The increase in proportion of NVA indicates that the enemy is attempting to make good his VC losses with northern replacements. The significant drop in VC main force/local force and guerrillas in 1968, taken with the increase in NVA, indicates a substantial recruiting problem which should become still more serious as pacification progresses.

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Table 4

TOTAL US/FREE WORLD STRENGTHS AND FORCE RATIOS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>31 Dec 67</th>
<th>30 Nov 68</th>
<th>Percent Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>US/Free World Strength</td>
<td>556,605</td>
<td>616,929</td>
<td>+ 9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Force ratios for combined ARVN, RF/PF, US and Free World versus the enemy:

- 31 Dec 67: 5.4:1
- 30 Nov 68: 6.9:1

The GVN is stronger and more stable than in the past several years. It has a freely elected, constitutional government which is slowly becoming more responsive to the aspirations of the people. President Thieu is the most knowledgeable GVN official concerning pacification and he is highly effective in that role. The President and Prime Minister are exerting strong personal leadership, holding provincial and district officials to high standards and encouraging dialogues with administrators and political groups.

Rapid completion of the current RVNAF improvement program and continued implementation of the Phase I and Phase II RVNAF expansion programs should appreciably improve territorial security with a concomitant improvement in pacification.

The integration and consolidation of US civilian and military pacification support activities under the Commander, US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (COMUSMACV) provides maximum assistance for the GVN. Additionally, COMUSMACV has implemented and plans to make operational early in 1969 improved techniques for reporting, measuring, and analyzing the status of pacification, including a major revision of the Hamlet Evaluation System (HES). These measures will permit better allocation of pacification effort and resources, and thus facilitate management.

The Vietnamese are considering their situation far more seriously than in the past. They are increasingly motivated to commit themselves more fully to winning their war. Significant events in 1968, particularly the Tet offensive, President Johnson's 31 March 1968 speech, and the Paris talks, have shocked the Vietnamese into a greater sense of urgency than in past periods. Removal of 21 province and 92 district chiefs for corruption or inefficiency in 1968 demonstrates the GVN willingness to exert pressure on its officials.

The 1969 pacification program focuses substantially more attention and resources on providing security to the rural population and strengthening the country's political foundations than in previous years. The GVN aims to control 90 percent of the population by December 1969 by concentrating on the destruction of VC local forces and the elimination of VC infrastructure.
a. Recent improvements in the GVN organization should result in more effective execution of pacification in 1969. The Central Pacification and Development Council (CPDC) now integrates and coordinates all GVN pacification elements for the first time. All assets have been concentrated on achieving a single set of clearly defined objectives. Ambitious goals have been set and pressure to achieve these goals is increasing steadily.

b. US units have assumed a larger role in pacification. Combined operations involving US units with all types of Vietnamese Forces are highly effective because they link American initiative, drive and leadership to Vietnamese knowledge of the local situation, customs, language and prevalent VC modus operandi.

US field commanders estimate that nearly half of their operations are in support of the accelerated pacification campaign. Simultaneously, the Allies are destroying significant amounts of prepositioned supplies and equipment which are so vital to the enemy's main forces. These continuous and highly effective allied military spoiling operations are perhaps the single most important new factor to be considered when assessing the complex pacification picture, especially future prospects. Under this allied umbrella the GVN's own security forces are operating with increased effectiveness. Similarly, other GVN pacification efforts benefit immeasurably from the allied military shield.

The December HES shows that 76.3% of the population (or 13,338,700 people) are now in the relatively secure category. This represents the highest percentage in this category since 1963. At the same time the percentage of the population in the contested category had dropped to 11.4% (or 1,963,100); while the VC category is estimated at 12.3 percent (or 2,155,100). These latter figures represent the lowest percentages ever in these categories.

The total resources available for pacification activity are greater than at any previous time. RVNAF stands at an actual strength of 826,500 as of end of December 1968 -- an increase of 179,000 since January 1968. Revolutionary Development (RD) cadre increased from 49,380 to 59,653 during the same period of time; while Provincial Reconnaissance Units (PRU) and National Police (NP) increased from 3,433 to 5,032 and from 70,291 to 78,431 respectively during the same period.

Total estimated VC/NVA personnel losses during 1968 were 290,000 which represents 92.1 percent of the average estimated VC/NVA strength.

It is estimated that 70% of the personnel in VC/NVA combat forces are NVA; thus diminishing their capability to relate to the South Vietnamese peasant.

Total number of operations, contacts, weapons captured and enemy killed in action (KIA) by RF and PF have increased significantly during...
1968. (RF operations went from 38,487 in May to 66,958 in November; contacts increased from 1,378 to 3,061 during the same period. The PF show a similar increase in effort: operations; Apr 1968 - 62,661; November 1968 - 119,801; contacts; Apr 1968 - 1,449; November 1968 - 3,506.)

Another measure of reality concerning the RF/PF is found in the opinions of senior US military commanders in the combat theater. The current assessment of these individuals is that with few exceptions, RF/PF, and particularly RF, combat effectiveness has improved significantly in the past 10 to 12 months. This notable improvement is attributed to the current intensive weapons and equipment improvement programs, and, perhaps even more important, the outstanding performance of the Mobile Advisory Teams who work around the clock with the RF and PF.

The Accelerated Pacification Campaign (APC), designed to increase the security level in more than 1000 contested hamlets, has thus far met with little opposition and with apparent success. As of 11 January 1969, 1,320 of the 1,332 hamlets targeted for the APC have been entered by GVN forces--of these, 842 are now considered to be in the "relatively secure" category. Further, functioning local governments were located in 84% of the targeted hamlets.

Although the overall Chieu Hoi figure for 1968 was considerably lower than that for 1967 (18,140 compared to 27,178), the monthly intake during the last quarter of 1968 (2,115, 2,408 and 3,117) was among the highest since the initiation of the program, and January rates, reported to date, indicated a continuation of this trend.

During 1968, the People's Self Defense Forces (PSDF) program was initiated. By the end of December 1968 approximately 1,000,000 PSDF had been organized, 517,000 had been trained and 107,000 weapons had been distributed.

If categories A&B and the non-hamlet secure population are considered by themselves, the percentage of population under primary GVN influence has increased during 1968 from 37.3% in January to 46.7 in December.

Reasons for not Expecting More Change

The main reason for not anticipating still further gains in 1969-1970 is the nature of the pacification itself. Pacification is inherently a slow process. Gains in any area can only be consolidated by continuous effort over a long period of time. It would be unrealistic to predict that much more than 90 percent of the population will come under the GVN control before the end of 1969.

As long as NVA units constitute a serious threat to the RVN security, significant change in enemy posture can effect pacification
gains in either direction. Commitment of the NVA main force units will not only draw away present US and South Vietnamese support but could, if considered with increased guerrilla activity, result in an unfavorable reorientation of territorial security forces.

-- While total number of resources which could be devoted to pacification efforts in the countryside have increased significantly during 1968, the actual number of resources committed in support of pacification in the countryside have stayed approximately the same or decreased slightly. Less than one-third of all RF companies were committed to village/hamlet security during 1968 (31.9% in January; 31.1% in December). Slightly less than two-thirds of all PF platoons were committed to village/hamlet security during 1968 (64.1% in January; 65.8% in December). The percentage of ARVN maneuver battalions committed to direct support of pacification fell from 35 in 1967 to 16 in January 1969.

-- Further, while total RVNAF resources have increased 179,000 during 1968 the PF have only increased about 22,000 (from 151,000 to 173,000) and their planned increase by the end of Phase II RVNAF modernization program is only 6,000 more (to a force level of 179,000). A recent study shows a positive correlation between PF in a hamlet and the hamlet's ratings while, at the same time, showing a negative correlation between RF in a hamlet and the hamlet's HES rating. Further, PF are on the leading edge of pacification and bear the brunt of the program at the hamlet level. The minimal increase being made in the size of the PF tends to support the conjecture that "real" progress in pacification will not be significantly faster during 1969.

-- Since January 1967 the percentage of the South Vietnamese people subject to active influence by the VC/NLF has gone from 58 to 61 by the end of November 1968. Thus, VC/NLF political influence in South Vietnam, especially in the countryside, has probably not declined and may have increased.1/

-- At village and hamlet level, the GVN has about 38,000 members of its political infrastructure while the VC have approximately 70,000 or more of their political infrastructure. (The GVN figure does not include Revolutionary Development (RD) Cadre. The Joint Chiefs of Staff would include that portion of the RD Cadre engaged in political and development work in rural areas - approximately 25,000 of the RD Cadre. The VC figure does not include other VC irregular forces such as Secret Self-Defense, Armed Assault Youth which have some political roles to carry out.)

1/ Using end-November 1968 HES data, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that 44.4 percent of the rural population was subject to significant VC presence and influence (20.6 percent VC control, 23.8 with active VCI). Obviously, the criteria selected by JCS explains the significant differences in the conclusions derived from identical data used by OSD.
Despite significant increases in total number operations by RF and PF during 1968, the results per unit, per operation and per contact remained nearly constant or showed only marginal improvement, and, in some cases, such as enemy KIA and enemy weapons captured per contact, showed a decrease. (However, it is important to remember that our data for measuring combat effectiveness is not very sophisticated nor sensitive; thus analysis using this data can only show gross trends at best and may not be an accurate measurement of reality.) With regard to Regional Forces, the percentage of operations which made contact compared to total operations was 3.6\% in April 1968 (the first month Territorial Forces Evaluation System (TFES) reports are available,) varied from 1.1\% to 4.6\% during the year, and was 3.4\% in December. The number of enemy KIA by RF per contact during 1968 varied considerably from (1.63 to .58) but number in April was .95 and in December it was .68. At the same time the number of enemy weapons captured by RF per contact was .47 in April and .25 in December. These figures tend to indicate that RF efficiency and effectiveness has improved little if any during 1968. Another possible conclusion is that combat effectiveness of the RF is largely dependent upon VC initiative -- in other words, that enemy KIA, weapons captured and contacts are basically controlled by the enemy. One other indication available tends to contradict the above conclusions as the average number of operations with contact per RF company per month rose during 1968 from 1.3 in April to 2.2 in December with the last six months of 1968 showing an upward trend. As with the statistics concerning RF operations, those concerning Popular Force operations showed mixed results. The percentage that PF platoons operations made contact compared to total operations remained below 3\% during the entire year, it was 2.3\% in April and 2.2\% in December. The enemy KIA per contact by PF dropped from .84 in April to .39 in December. Over the same time period, the enemy weapons captured per contact by AF dropped from .33 to .14. Again, these figures seem to indicate that PF efficiency and effectiveness have not measurably improved during 1968. However, as with the RF statistics, the average number per month per unit of PF platoon operations rose during 1968 from .34 in April to .61 in December. Apparently, the "best" assessment that can be reached, given the inadequacies of the data available and the contradictions the present indications offer, is that RF/PF have increased their efforts in the gross sense but have not yet significantly increased their combat effectiveness or efficiency. (It should be noted that the main source for this data, TFES, is currently undergoing major revisions so that it will be more sophisticated, sensitive and accurate.)

As of November 1968, it is estimated that about 1800 VC "Liberation Committee's had been formed. Close to 80\% of these were at the village level, thus about one-half of the villages in South Vietnam could have these "committees" or a de facto sub rosa VC/NFL "government."

It is estimated that at least 1300 GVN employees and officials were assassinated during 1968 and another 330 abducted. It is likely
that a large majority of these employees and officials were in the countryside, thus further diluting GVN capability to project itself in the rural areas.

-- Analysis of PF efforts during 1968 reveals that PF platoons received ground reinforcements in support of contacts only at 11% of the time. Additionally, 36 percent of the PF were considered by their advisors to have less firepower than the enemy they were confronting in December 1968. The seriousness of these figures is amplified by the fact that over the past five years approximately half of all VC activities have been against the PF. However, PF firepower, according to advisors' reports, has improved 65% in the period from May through December 1968.

-- As of 11 January 1969, less than one quarter of the RF and PF units which were scheduled to be deployed into the hamlets targeted for the APC had actually been deployed. This tends to support the view that progress in the APC is due more to lack of any enemy reaction than any other single cause.

-- Almost 67% of 1785 hamlets which were programmed for pacification during 1968 were hamlets which had been either "new life" or Revolutionary Development hamlets during 1967 or earlier. This would seem to corroborate some observer's statements that we have been pacifying the same hamlets year after year. 1/

-- In 1968, pacification represented only 5% of total US expenditures in South Vietnam, indicating despite its relative high priority, the effort expended in support of pacification was relatively small in comparison with the total resources expended. (JCS notes that while the amount is small by US standards, the GVN is strained to the breaking point with its present pacification program. Pacification is, and must be, a 99% GVN effort, and most knowledgeable pacification authorities believe that it is practically impossible for the GVN to absorb any appreciable increases in expenditures for its pacification program.)

1/ JCS Notes: Revolutionary Development hamlets planned but not worked in 1967 and those that did not achieve all of the pacification goals during 1967 were rescheduled in the 1968 RD program. This represents continuity of effort in the face of insufficient RD team resources and territorial security forces to meet the goals of the 1967 program. The expansion of the enemy main force effort in 1967 greatly hampered but did not stop pacification progress. Sixty percent of the hamlets that became relatively secure in 1967 were RD hamlets.
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-- Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE) Number 14-69; 16 January 1969, The Pacification Effort in Vietnam states, in part:

a. During 1968, however, new uncertainties have arisen which are bound to have impact on Revolutionary Development. With the beginning of negotiations and the end of the bombing of North Vietnam, there is a growing belief -- at least among informed Vietnamese -- that the war is coming to an end, sooner rather than later. Among these people, there is growing apprehension over the shape of a final settlement and the firmness of the American commitment. To the extent that this uncertainty may be reflected in the countryside, it would tend to undermine the gains of Revolutionary Development. Moreover, any weakening of the central government, whether real or imagined, would magnify the uncertainties of officials involved in Revolutionary Development programs and thus pose a growing threat to this aspect of pacification.

b. Even leaving aside such general uncertainties, progress in the field of "nation building" or Revolutionary Development is likely to be painfully slow for several basic reasons. As noted, security is an indispensable prerequisite. In areas where there is a decline in security conditions, even temporarily, the resulting damage to confidence and respect for the government more than offsets gains from developmental projects. Even if security conditions remain good, the administrative capability of Vietnamese officials is weak; Revolutionary Development is heavily dependent on American advice, assistance, and inspiration. Pervasive corruption is a constant threat to the entire system.

c. Pacification is far too complex, covers too many individual programs, and is geographically too diverse to permit clear prognoses. All things considered, the program as a whole has made a significant contribution to the prosecution of the war and to the political struggle. It has been most successful in expanding the presence of the GVN in the countryside; it has been less successful in establishing permanent security or stimulating genuine loyalty and commitment to the Saigon government. And it has been laggard in coping with the political threat posed by a well-organized and disciplined Communist infrastructure. This has been a significant weakness, threatening and undermining other gains.

d. Much will depend on the attitude of the GVN. It cannot be said that the various Saigon governments have shared the American enthusiasm or dedication to pacification. Results obtained during 1966 and 1967 were largely because of constant American pressures. The skills, funds, and motivation have been overwhelmingly American; the GVN has provided manpower and occasional high level endorsements but has been far from committed to the programs. Too often GVN officials have participated or cooperated simply to please their American counterparts, or to share in the spoils of the inevitable corruption.

e. The GVN still does not have the skills and resources to assume a significantly greater role in the management and execution of an effective pacification effort in 1969. US assistance is still vital to success, but gaining popular acceptance will depend finally on a growing effectiveness of the GVN’s performance in the program.

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A major uncertainty is how much time is left to make up past deficiencies and consolidate current gains. Pacification has already strengthened the GVN position vis-à-vis the Communists. Over the next several months, further progress in pacification will almost certainly not make the GVN much more able to cope with the VC in peacetime than it would be today. A significant advance in this respect would probably require at least a year. And the terms of a settlement could undo virtually all that has been accomplished, especially since progress has been minimal in reducing the political threat.

**Plans for 1969**

The OSD analysis of the GVN Pacification Plan for 1969 follows:

The GVN Pacification Guidelines for 1969 have set the following objectives:

1. 90% of the population will come under the "relatively secure" (A + B + C) category.

2. 33,000 VC Infrastructure personnel will be eliminated.

3. Local government will be established in all villages; Village Administrative Committees and Hamlet Managing Boards will be elected in all secure hamlets and villages; village and hamlet officials will be trained in a large scale program.

4. 2,000,000 People's Self Defense forces to be recruited and 400,000 armed.

5. 20,000 Hoi Chanh (returnees).

6. The total number of refugees will be decreased to less than 1,000,000 and 300,000 will be resettled.

7. The information and propaganda effort will be increased.

8. Rural economy will be stimulated and rice production increased from five to six million tons.

In more specific terms, the 1969 pacification guidelines will require the following:

Total "relatively secure" population will number about 16,122,420 or an increase of 2,783,720 during 1969. This would mean an increase of over 231,977 per month into the A + B + C category. During the last quarter of 1968, the monthly increase in these categories was about 480,000 per month; thus, the 1969 goal seems attainable if: (1) Hamlets and their populations are made relatively secure at the same rate as during the last six months of 1968; (2) The VC activities and opposition to pacification remain near the same level as during the last six months of 1968. (Total incidents during the last six months of 1968 were at approximately the same level as during 1964.)
The monthly rate that rural population moved into A + B + C category during all of 1968 was 146,000; thus the 1969 campaign would have to achieve nearly two times the monthly rate for the total 1968 program.

33,000 VCI to eliminated in 1969 would represent 30% of the total estimated VCI in South Vietnam (CIA estimate). It would require monthly eliminations at triple the monthly rate for 1968 (3,000 vs 1,314) and a good bit higher than the rate achieved during the last two months of 1968 (2,355). Since the low level easier targets are the first to be eliminated, it can be expected that there will be difficulty in maintaining momentum in the anti-VCI campaign even if efficiency and effectiveness are considerably improved. The 1969 goal does not seem possible to attain.

Of the approximately 2,600 villages in SVN, about 1,290 had some form of fairly regular GVN presence by the end of 1968; this represented an increase of about 220 villages during the year or about 18 villages were provided some form of GVN aligned administration each month. Considering the last quarter of 1968, during the months of the Accelerated Pacification Campaign and the scale-down of VC activity, about 85 villages per month were provided some form of GVN administration. To attain the 1969 goal will require a total of 1280 villages to be provided a GVN aligned administration or about 107 villages per month. Considering the rate at which village administrations were provided and considering that approximately 1100 villages may have VC/NLF "liberation committees" duly "elected", it seems unlikely that this goal can be obtained.

The present guidelines call for the training of nearly 42,000 village and hamlet officials during 1969. At present, it is planned to train these officials at Vung Tau where the RD Cadre are already being trained at the rate of approximately 5,000 a month. Shortage of facilities as well as instructors and lack of preparation makes it very unlikely that this ambitious program can be accomplished.

Latest reports indicate that 1,000,000 PSDF have been organized, 517,000 trained and 107,000 weapons distributed. Attainment of 1969 goals will require the signing up of 1,000,000 individuals and the issuing of about 300,000 weapons and it should be relatively easy to accomplish despite some misgivings as to the effectiveness and actual accomplishments of this program by US officials in Vietnam.

The weekly Chieu Hoi rates for 1967 and 1968 were 522 and 348 respectively; however, the weekly rate for the past 16 weeks (as of 25 January 1969) has been 644. To attain the 1969 goal would require a weekly intake of 385 which seems easily attainable unless an offensive equal in magnitude to the Tet offensive is mounted by the VC/NVA.

During 1968 approximately 1,000,000 Tet and May offensives' evacuees were aided and returned to their homes or provided new homes. Total regular
refugees in South Vietnam by the end of November 1968 were about 1,250,000. It is estimated that over 250,000 regular refugees were resettled during the year; Barring unforeseen circumstances, the refugee goals for 1969 should be met. However, this will mean that over 900,000 refugees remain to be resettled indicating that the refugee problem will be with us for a considerable period of time.

-- The 1968 rice crop is estimated at 4.8 million metric tons. Given the increase from 40,000 hectares planted in IR-8 rice during 1968 to the planned 150,000 to 200,000 hectares to be planted during 1969 (IR-8 yields approximately 5 metric tons per hectare); the greater use of fertilizer (250,000 tons used in 1968; 400,000 tons planned for 1969); and the present improved security situation, the rice goal for 1969 should be met.

Summary of the 1969 Plan

Of the eight goals of the 1969 Pacification Campaign, three seem unlikely of attainment, or at least overly ambitious:

-- 90% of the population relatively secure
-- 33,000 VCI eliminated
-- Local government established in all villages; village hamlet officials trained

Three seem relatively sure of attainment:

-- 2,000,000 PSDF recruited and 400,000 armed
-- 300,000 refugees resettled and less than 1,000,000 refugees remaining
-- Rural economy stimulated and 6,000,000 metric tons of rice produced

One seems to be understated and could be increased:

-- 20,000 Hoi Chanh

And one is not measurable in a meaningful way under the present indicators:

-- Increase information and propaganda effort

From analysis of the above facts, several assessments can be made:

(1) Many, to include JCS, CINCPAC and MACV, consider that the VC/VVA are considerably weakened as indicated by the rapid increase in relatively secure population during the last quarter of 1968; thus, pacification progress should accelerate in 1969.
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(2) Others, including OSD, think that pacification progress was made during 1968, but it is difficult to determine how much is due to the real weaknesses of the VC/NVA and the real strength of the GVN/RVNAF and how much is due to a deliberate plan by the VC/NVA not to oppose the pacification program but to concentrate on a political solution; thus, future pacification progress in the countryside is subject to too many variables beyond US/GVN control and is almost impossible to predict. In any case, progress probably will be made during 1969 but not at the rates of the last quarter of 1968 and it is unlikely that the 1969 goals will be met unless there is some sort of unpredictable dramatic breakthrough.

(3) Some, generally in the minority, assess that pacification has not made "real" progress during 1968; any "progress" indicated is because of faulty assessments, inadequacies of present indicators, lack of VC opposition because of VC/NLF concentration on organizing for the forthcoming political struggle and the withdrawal of NVA units (which is adjudged a tactical maneuver tied to negotiations). All of this "progress" could fade away without a trace if the VC choose to challenge, just as the 1967 "progress" faded away in the face of the Tet offensive. This view would hold that the VC influence over the countryside has not diminished but has increased during 1968 and that "great" progress or "real" progress is unlikely in 1969 unless the VC influence and presence is overcome and a GVN presence and influence installed, and the program as presently conceived is unlikely to accomplish such a task.

--- Depending upon which of the above assessments is accepted, the comments on what changes in RVNAF, GVN, US and VC practices and adaptiveness would be needed to increase favorable change in security and control vary considerably.

If the JCS, CINCPAC, MACV view is accepted, then the changes which would be needed are:

--- Several changes in practices could increase favorable developments or at least the rate of development. A change of tactics by the South Vietnamese toward small company-size operations would provide an increase in territorial security and would permit extension or acceleration of pacification.

--- An extension of US unit involvement in pacification will have an increasing effect on the rate of progress. This involvement is contingent on the enemy's use of his main force units, and may have to cut back if the enemy attempts to use his main forces more aggressively than at present. The South Vietnamese adoption of US unit techniques for pacification would assist in accelerating the program. However, many South Vietnamese commanders are still reluctant to divide their commands or to conduct small unit operations.
Success in 1969 is largely dependent upon aggressive execution of the program at all levels of the GVN. This, in turn, is largely contingent upon US pressure on the GVN to put forth the maximum possible effort at all times. If US pressure is relaxed, the probability of successful pacification effort in 1969 will be reduced.

Continuing qualitative improvement in the GVN pacification personnel and administration, successful implementation of the APC, and realization of the goals established in the Guidelines for the 1969 Pacification Campaign would increase favorable trends.

Other requirements include: (a) continued development of national political unity and organization; (b) stimulation of active participation of the population; (c) continued development of a base of law and legal procedures; (d) adjustment of the inequitable salary structure of civil servants; (e) increased income for the workers; (f) increased impetus on land reform; (g) increased Government of Vietnam emphasis on supervision and direction of province pacification planning and execution; and (h) concerted US/GVN effort to establish a national psychology of success, while continuing to build Vietnamese self-confidence to assume greater responsibility for their own destiny.

The obstacles to accomplishment of any or all of the above changes are:

The many US/GVN actions designed for positively affecting changes in the countryside are all calculated to reduce relative enemy offensive activity. In the face of these measures, it does not appear that the enemy will be capable of a sustained increase in relative offensive activity; on the contrary, his more probably course will be in the direction of reduced capability.

The growing energy and spirit with which the GVN is accelerating pacification efforts is encouraging. There have been many pacification programs in the past, but none on the scale and with the resources and the leadership being demonstrated today. Despite many continuing and serious problems, pacification has more than regained the momentum lost following the Tet and May offensives, and the outlook is most favorable. In 1969, the GVN should continue to achieve the same high level of progress in pacification as was evidenced during the last quarter of 1968.

However, if the less optimistic view of present and future progress in pacification is accepted, then the magnitude and seriousness of changes required expands considerably. The less drastic approach would call for not only the above changes but also the changes which can be made with minimum disruption of the present system and procedures. Among such changes would be:
a. Increase the quality and quantity of territorial security and pacification operations aimed at expanding GVN influence and diminishing the VC support structure and its guerrilla and local force units.

-- Give priority attention to the territorial security forces by increasing support from regular forces, by providing more and better functioning communications as now planned under current RVNAF modernization and improvement programs, by increasing the force levels of Popular Forces and by detailing more regular force officers and NCO's to fill leadership shortages in territorial security units.

-- Emphasize quality rather than quantity in the Phoenix program by providing greater incentives for the identification and capture of high ranking or key personnel in important positions within the VC infrastructure, as opposed to elimination or larger numbers of lower ranking personnel of lesser importance.

-- Be prepared to establish a national constabulary type territorial security force under the Ministry of the Interior as may become necessary in the event the activities of the RVNAF are severely circumscribed in the post hostilities environment due to a restriction of the use of the RVNAF to maintain security, law and order resulting from a ceasefire agreement or other agreement to terminate hostilities.

-- Augment territorial security forces as required with RVNAF regular force maneuver battalions, and US maneuver battalions if necessary, to improve level of security in selected high-priority districts. Develop more effective pacification tactics.

-- Reward unit and individual performance in providing local security and eliminating the VC infrastructure through promotions, awards and publicity.

-- Initiate motivational and educational actions to change the attitudes of RVNAF personnel towards the populace and toward pacification programs.

-- Revitalize the RF by redistribution of leaders from headquarters elements to combat units, cross assignment and ARVN officers, and improved training and motivation.

-- Bring about attitudinal changes in RVNAF leadership towards the worth of the populace and the necessity for local security.

-- Restructure RVNAF and increase PP to a force level of 250,000 during 1969 while decreasing ARVN and RF correspondingly.

-- Provide specific training to US and ARVN maneuver battalions commanders and their staffs in the tactics and techniques of providing offensive security operations in direct support of pacification.
b. Increase the Vietnamese perceptions that they must take the required actions to improve their own capabilities and effectiveness; that the US does not consider it has an "open-ended" commitment; and that they can "win" their own war if they really try.

-- Continue and accelerate the turn over of funding responsibility for most pacification programs to the GVN. It should be made clear to the Vietnamese that we will continue to provide overall budgetary support but that they must fund and manage their own pacification program and that we will retain the option to withdraw funding if the programs are mis-managed or subverted through inefficiency, disinterest or corruption.

-- Reduce a significant number (perhaps as high as 50%) of both tactical unit and the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) advisors over the next year. Withdrawal of advisors should be as a reward for good performance, not bad, with the growth in Vietnamese capability and efficiency being stressed.

-- Continue to stress the requirement to meet the felt needs of the people in all discussions with GVN leadership. Particularly, programs should be developed and initiated to reward officials, civil and military, for activities which assist the people and advance the GVN toward influencing the population.

-- The above changes could accelerate the pacification process during the forthcoming year. Further, because they would not require a major disruption of the system or present procedures, the obstacles which would prevent their accomplishment are not major and could be overcome.

The advocates of the more radical assessment, who feel that progress in pacification has been chimerical during 1968 and is likely to remain that way in 1969, would call for, in addition to the above changes, other rather dramatic changes. The rationale for such changes results from a basic difference in perception of the nature of the pacification process. These individuals would argue that pacification is a state of mind--not a social condition. Pacification's real objective is attitudinal change, both by the South Vietnamese leadership and by the South Vietnamese people. On the one hand, the leadership needs to perceive the necessity for relating to the people and for providing them with clear evidence that the GVN represents the "JUST CAUSE" and for providing a reasonable degree of local security. On the other hand, the people need to perceive that security and commitment necessarily go together simultaneously and that the GVN represents the "JUST CAUSE" to which they should pledge their allegiance. (The Vietnamese are not nationalistic in the sense that they respect and support their "government". They are, however, extremely proud of their nation and of being Vietnamese. It therefore follows that the people...
who are willing to die in the service of the GVN are not doing so because of their respect for their government nor the image of that government. They are doing this because they think they are fighting for "The JUST CAUSE".

Therefore, the basic and most important changes that could be made would be those that will have a positive effect toward creating the necessary attitudinal changes:

a. The institution of strong and energetic leadership in the top levels of GVN and RVNAF which is concerned with people and will emphasize the need for the GVN and RVNAF to relate to the people.

b. A promotion system based upon merit and not on personal loyalty.

c. Elimination of corrupt and ineffective officials, civil and military, at all levels, including some at the highest.

d. A system of punishment for officials and soldiers who mistreat the general public, individually or collectively.

e. Politicization of the pacification program so that it stimulates genuine loyalty and commitment to the central government. The RD cadre should be indoctrinated and trained to develop local grass roots political organization at the hamlet and village level and should be tied into the present program for development of village administration.

f. Increasing demonstrations of concern by all representatives of the GVN, executive, legislative and judicial of real concern for the average Vietnamese and his welfare.

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These changes would require complete reorienting of the system of values and perceptions that the present Vietnamese leadership possesses. Since this is the most difficult task for any oligarchy to carry out, the US should be prepared to assist the Vietnamese leadership in carrying such changes out. This can, perhaps, be done by making it clear to the Vietnamese leadership at the highest level that: (1) While we will continue our support, we are determined to reduce our direct efforts; (2) We are convinced that they can no longer survive unless they make these rather drastic changes and we will assist them to make them, teaching them the skills necessary to survive in a changing system. In regard to the latter, we would provide the key Vietnamese leaders with mutually agreed upon special advisors who would act more as "special assistants" to the Vietnamese than as US agents assigned to advise them and to monitor their activities.

The obstacle to these types of changes would be enormous. The chances of their being carried out are minimal. Yet, because they do attack the central issue of pacification and because they carry the greatest potential pay off if instituted, they may be well worth attempting.
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QUESTION 17

What proportion of the rural population must be regarded as "subject to significant VC presence and influence?" (How should hamlets rated as "C" in the Hamlet Evaluation System -- the largest category -- be regarded in this respect?) In particular, what proportion in the provinces surrounding Saigon? How much has this changed?

---

Rural population regarded as "subject to significant Viet Cong presence and influence" is the rural population evaluated in the Hamlet Evaluation System as contested, and Viet Cong controlled by security ratings. The following table presents security evaluation data for contested and Viet Cong-controlled rural hamlet population.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percent of Rural South Vietnam Population</th>
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<tr>
<td>Contest</td>
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<tr>
<td>Contested</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Viet Cong Controlled</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contested and Viet Cong Controlled</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total South Vietnam rural population in December 1968 was 10,836,500. The reduction in rural-contested and Viet Cong-controlled population in November and December 1968 coincided with the Accelerated Pacification Campaign, which is targeted on rural hamlets.

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Another approach to measuring rural population, subject to significant Viet Cong presence and influence, is to add the Viet Cong-controlled population to that remaining rural population in any hamlet with active Viet Cong infrastructure.

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An issue which impinges upon all assessments of the situation evolves around the interpretation of who has how much influence over the population of "C" hamlets. The JCS, CINCPAC and MACV view "C" hamlets as follows:

a. Hamlets rated as "C" in the Hamlet Evaluation System may be subject to some Viet Cong political/psychological activity and influence. For example, "C" hamlets may have village and hamlet Viet Cong infrastructure, although the infrastructure probably is unable to live or operate in "C" hamlets except covertly or at night. However, friendly capabilities are considerably more significant than Viet Cong capabilities. The willingness of the Viet Cong to resort to terror tactics permits them to "influence" the population to a far greater degree than their numbers or political power base would otherwise permit. Nevertheless, to rate "C", a hamlet must achieve a Hamlet Evaluation System score of between 2.50 and 3.49 out of a possible 5.00 for a "perfect" hamlet.

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Since "c" is beyond the halfway point on the rating scale, a "c" hamlet is considered relatively secure.

b. Hamlets, which are rated "c" within the Hamlet Evaluation System, normally would not be regarded as being subject to significant Viet Cong presence and influence. However, it is possible that this would not be true, since the hamlet letter rating represents the average of 18 separate ratings. For example, a hamlet's Viet Cong infrastructure could receive a "d" or "e" rating which would indicate "significant" Viet Cong present, while the overall rating could place the hamlet in a "c" category because of other indicators receiving higher ratings. However, proper ratings of guerrilla activity, Viet Cong extortion, and Viet Cong taxation - all controlled by the Viet Cong infrastructure - should give adequate weight and balance of the overall Hamlet Evaluation System rating. Considering solely the hamlet Viet Cong infrastructure, a "c" category indicates that most of the hamlet undercover party apparatus has been identified and accounted for, with the possible exception of deep-cover agents working under the control of higher echelons within the Viet Cong infrastructure. The Viet Cong infrastructure remaining within a given hamlet rated "c" are quite limited as to overt and covert activity, allowing normal Government of Vietnam economic, political, and social activity to function. Thus, population falling within the "c" category is not generally considered to be affected by significant Viet Cong presence and influence.

On the other hand, OSD views "c" hamlets as follows:

- The HES system was designed as a management tool to assist in allocating GVN and US resources in rural South Vietnam. As such, the responses concentrate on those areas over which the GVN/US have the most direct influence, namely the activities of GVN ministries and political activities directed by the GVN. Accordingly, 12 of the 18 "indicators" measure GVN presence and activities with only 6 "indicators" measuring enemy activities. The values assigned to these "indicators" are given equal weight in determining the alphabetical standing of each hamlet and the system is thus biased in favor of ratings favorable to the GVN. Moreover, HES ratings are made by Americans, few of whom speak Vietnamese, who are in the district generally from 6 months to a year, and who are able to visit the hamlets being rated on an average of less than once a month. Accordingly, the raters' appraisal of those elements of GVN activity is more complete than for those of the VC. This weakness regarding rating of the VC/NVA is illustrated by the fact that when the requirement is laid on him to pay particular attention to certain VC activities such as that of the infrastructure (VCI), reported findings, as indicated in the tables below, indicate greater VC presence than was formerly perceived. It is for these reasons that OSD considers that C hamlets should not be considered as being "relatively secure" and that for "grading" purposes only 50% of the C hamlets should be considered as primarily under GVN influences.

- The following tables illustrate the influence of the Viet Cong Infrastructure over the hamlet (rural) population as shown by indicators 2a and 2b of the Hamlet Evaluation System. (In indicator 2a of the HES, a rating of "c" is given when "Intelligence indicates that most of the party apparatus is identified; but some agents under village or district control are still operative." In indicator 2b, a rating of "c" is given when "Most of the key members of village apparatus have been identified, effectiveness curtailed").
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Indicator 2a, Hamlet Infrastructure

<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Dec 67</th>
<th>Jun 68</th>
<th>Nov 68</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A&amp;B</td>
<td>24.1</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>17.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>20.8</td>
<td>23.1</td>
<td>28.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D&amp;E&amp;VC</td>
<td>36.6</td>
<td>40.3</td>
<td>32.7</td>
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</table>

Indicator 2b, Village Infrastructure

<table>
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<tr>
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<th>Dec 67</th>
<th>Jun 68</th>
<th>Nov 68</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A&amp;B</td>
<td>31.4</td>
<td>24.2</td>
<td>26.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>22.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D&amp;E&amp;VC</td>
<td>35.4</td>
<td>39.7</td>
<td>32.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

-- In indicator 4a which "measures" the presence of GVN administration in hamlets, a rating of "C" is given when "managerial groups are resident; mostly locally appointed or elected; and are usually present at night". Following table indicates the percentages under this category for 1968:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Dec 67</th>
<th>Jun 68</th>
<th>Nov 68</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A&amp;B</td>
<td>34.5</td>
<td>29.6</td>
<td>31.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>17.7</td>
<td>20.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D&amp;E&amp;VC</td>
<td>39.3</td>
<td>51.9</td>
<td>46.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

-- If the OSD assessment of "C" hamlets is accepted and the "C" hamlet population is split evenly between primary GVN influence and primary NLF influence, the above tables would show the following:

Hamlet Infrastructure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Dec 67</th>
<th>Jun 68</th>
<th>Nov 68</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GVN Influence</td>
<td>34.5</td>
<td>29.6</td>
<td>31.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NLF Influence</td>
<td>47.2</td>
<td>51.9</td>
<td>46.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Village Infrastructure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Dec 67</th>
<th>Jun 68</th>
<th>Nov 68</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GVN Influence</td>
<td>38.9</td>
<td>33.1</td>
<td>37.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NLF Influence</td>
<td>42.9</td>
<td>48.6</td>
<td>44.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

GVN Administration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Dec 67</th>
<th>Jun 68</th>
<th>Nov 68</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GVN Influence</td>
<td>44.1</td>
<td>41.5</td>
<td>46.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NLF Influence</td>
<td>38.9</td>
<td>40.5</td>
<td>39.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Thus, the range of possible percentages for the rural populace "subject to significant VC presence and influence" would be from 39.6 to 46.7 percent given the above interpretation of the "C" hamlets. Other assessments would tend to show that at least 65% of the rural population is subject to disciplined VC infrastructure activities. Probably as close as it can be estimated, 50% of the total rural population is subject to significant VC presence and influence and, at least 50% and probably more, of the rural population living in "C" hamlets is subject to such presence and influence.

-- The following table contains the proportion of rural population in provinces surrounding Saigon (Gia Dinh, Long An, Bau Nghia, Binh Duong, Bien Hoa) that are "subject to significant Viet Cong presence and influence," i.e., rural-contested and Viet Cong-controlled hamlet population.
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Percent of Rural Hamlet Population
In Five Provinces Surrounding Saigon

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Jan 68</th>
<th>Mar 68</th>
<th>Oct 68</th>
<th>Dec 68</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Contested</td>
<td>27.3</td>
<td>45.5</td>
<td>28.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Viet Cong Controlled</td>
<td>19.8</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>17.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contested and Viet Cong Controlled</td>
<td>47.1</td>
<td>66.9</td>
<td>45.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The marked change between January and March 1968 in the rural security conditions surrounding Saigon is indicative of the enemy's selection of Saigon as a primary target. The significant improvement since Tet is a measure of the improved security situation which is better around Saigon than the countrywide average. The rural hamlet-contested and Viet Cong-controlled population has been reduced by over 15 percent since the beginning of the Accelerated Pacification Campaign, despite continued enemy emphasis on Saigon as his primary target.

-- However, the enemy's political influence exerted through his infrastructure exceeds his overall influence. For example, although 30.1 percent of the rural population in the five provinces surrounding Saigon is either contested or Viet Cong-controlled, the December 1968 Hamlet Evaluation System shows that 43.3 percent is affected by the presence of hamlet-level Viet Cong infrastructure and 45.4 percent is affected by village-level Viet Cong infrastructure.

-- One analysis of the VC infrastructure presence and influence in the five provinces surrounding Saigon indicates that 96% of the hamlet population in those provinces is subject to such presence and influence. At the same time, the latest RES statistics for December 1968 indicate that 90.1% of the population of III Corps was in relatively secure category.

a. Attempts to relate other data to either of these indicators have not been illuminating. For instance, the Chieu Hoi rate for III Corps has been relatively low in comparison to its percentage of population (15.4% of the Chieu Hoi in 1968 are III Corps while III Corps has 31.2% of the population) and, further, has been lower this year than its average over the last four years (III Corps has averaged 22% of the Chieu Hoi over the last four years). Further, III Corps' percentage of total Chieu Hoi dropped during the last six months of 1968 (15.4% for the year and 15.0% for the last six months). Normally, Chieu Hoi rates correlate positively with numbers of military operations; however III Corps during 1968 had the highest number of battalion days of operations of any Corps area yet its percentage of total Chieu Hoi went down.

b. The Phoenix data shows that of the 95,708 Viet Cong infrastructure members in all South Vietnam, 29.5% were in I Corps; 33.3%, II Corps; 12.6%, III Corps; and 24.2%, IV Corps.1 This low percentage for III

1/ Represents a count of specific VCI names and identified positions held in Phoenix files in Saigon and is not the presently accepted MACV figure.
means that the III Corps Phoenix program has been the most successful of all Corps as it eliminated 30% of its VCI during 1968. Given the fact that III Corps is the location (when in country) of COSVN plus has Saigon and contains over 30% of the population of the country, it seems unlikely that only 12.6% of the total VCI is located in III Corps. There is one report which indicates there are 7,500 VCI in Saigon alone (a figure which does not seem unreasonable in a city of 2 to 3 million inhabitants). Therefore it seems prudent to suspect that the VCI influence in the provinces around Saigon, while not all pervasive as the 96% figure above tends to indicate, neither is the GVN influence as widespread as the 90% "relatively secure" population figure tends to indicate.

-- A further factor to be considered is the opinion held by most Americans, past and present, who have knowledge of the situation in III Corps, that the three ARVN divisions in III Corps are the worst divisions in all of ARVN. A recent report by a very competent observer indicates that the RF/FP of III Corps have little confidence in the three ARVN divisions stationed there.

-- Thus, if the OSD assessment of "C" hamlets is accepted, an educated guess about VC influence in the provinces surrounding Saigon would be that the VC have significant influence over more than half of the rural populace in the five provinces immediately surrounding Saigon with particular strength in Long An and Hau Nghia.

-- Because of the VC/NVA threat to the Saigon metropolitan area during first half of 1968, the emphasis during much of this year in III Corps was to eliminate the commo-liaison VCI and not the higher level cadre, it may be adduced that the VCI structure in and around Saigon is still largely intact. Further, it is likely that the VCI in Saigon in particular are targeted against the GVN in what the NLF sees as the forthcoming political struggle to commence upon completion of the Paris Negotiations. Thus, it is unlikely that the higher level cadre will expose themselves prior to that.

-- Therefore, it would seem prudent to assume that "significant VC pressure and influence" will remain largely intact in III Corps during 1969, given present US and GVN and VC/NVA tactics and techniques.
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QUESTION 18

What number or verified numbers of the communist political apparatus (i.e., People's Revolutionary Party members, the hardcore "infrastructure") have been arrested or killed in the past year? How many of these were cadre or higher than village level? What proportion do these represent of total People's Revolutionary Party membership, and how much - and how long - had the apparatus been disrupted?

COMUSMACV reports that during 1968, 15,776 members of the Viet Cong Infrastructure (VCI) were killed, captured or surrendered. Of these, approximately 2,050 were cadre of higher than village level.

- A breakout of the method of neutralization follows:

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Killed</td>
<td>2,255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Captured</td>
<td>11,291</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rallied</td>
<td>2,230</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Of the 15,776 Viet Cong infrastructure neutralization reported during 1968, 12.9 percent (2,050) were serving at district level or higher. The remaining 87.1 percent served at village and hamlet level - most being functionaries that the Viet Cong infrastructure probably can easily replace. However, considering the heavy casualties inflicted on the enemy, there is no doubt that an unknown but significant number of Viet Cong infrastructure of all ranks have been neutralized but not officially accounted for because of inadequate records and inability to identify the dead.

- The number of VCI members neutralized during 1968 was about 16-20% of the total VCI estimated strength. However, our information on the VCI is soft and recognized as such. CIA and DIA estimate the VCI total strength to be between 80,000 and 100,000 now. Estimates have risen in the past several years. OSD analysis of Hamlet Evaluation System (HES) data over the past two years indicates that the more we concentrate on the VCI, the more we recognize the extent of VCI existence. In January 1967, excluding non-hamlet secure population, about 56% of the population was subject to some VCI influence. The figure had risen to 61% by November 1968. Further, we do not know about recruitment nor do we have an accurate accounting of the disposition of captured or rallied VCI members.

Approximately 10% of those neutralized in 1968 were People's Revolutionary Party Membership. COMUSMACV estimates the current personnel strength of the Viet Cong infrastructure at roughly 83,000. Of those, 20 to 40 percent (16,400 to 32,800) are believed to hold membership in the People's Revolutionary Party. The 2,050 cadre or higher than village-level Viet Cong infrastructure neutralized represent approximately 5.2 to 12 percent of the total People's Revolutionary Party membership. Examination of the monthly, provincial, by-name Viet Cong infrastructure neutralization reports for 1968, shows that 10.7 percent (1,967) of the total neutralized were People's Revolutionary Party members. Approximately 19 percent (332) of the People's Revolutionary Party members served

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at higher than village level.

Losses during 1968 have not unduly disrupted the communist political apparatus.

-- In terms of organizational goals, progress against the Viet Cong infrastructure has been satisfactory. However, it cannot be determined whether the number of Viet Cong infrastructure neutralized reflects an accurate picture of permanent or net losses to the Viet Cong infrastructure, especially in view of the lack of data on the final disposition of those who were apprehended. The attack on the Viet Cong infrastructure during 1968 did not significantly reduce the communists' ability to carry out essential activities, although Viet Cong infrastructure attempts to revitalize and strengthen their organizations in the major cities were often disrupted by fairly effective police work. Viet Cong infrastructure operations were disrupted in several geographic areas, and a noticeable attrition resulted from a combination of losses in combat and from anti-infrastructure activities. However, government intelligence on the Viet Cong infrastructure and operations against their activities diminish significantly as one gets further from the secure urban areas. What losses the Viet Cong infrastructure has suffered apparently have not unduly hampered its functioning. Recent Viet Cong moves to streamline the infrastructure by reclassifying cadre according to their effectiveness and by transferring numbers of low-level or inefficient cadre into military units, suggests that Viet Cong infrastructure personnel losses have not yet approached the critical stage. It does not appear likely that they will in the near future.

The anti-infrastructure program suffers from some significant problems. These are:

-- Judicial Processing. This is one of the weakest links in the overall attack on the Viet Cong infrastructure. This is highlighted by the number of persons under detention who have been judicially processed: 16,638 as of 31 December 1968. Numbers of innocent persons, or at least persons who have been forced to perform tasks for the Viet Cong, have been arrested and held, sometimes for extended periods, without a hearing. Justifiably concerned, the Office of the Prime Minister established special screening committees throughout the country to review the cases of a large number of civil detainees, and many have since been released. On the other hand, real Viet Cong infrastructure and Viet Cong supporters are being released prior to judicial processing or receive very light sentences, usually on the ground of lack of sufficient evidence.

-- Detention Facilities. Interrogation and detention facilities are inadequate in many areas. At the end of November 1968, there was a total of 38,700 civilian confinement spaces in Vietnam, and the total
incarcerated population was reported by Government of Vietnam officials to be 37,689. These figures, based on the best data available, are considered to be accurate only for the national prison system which holds 32,689 prisoners and detainees. The remaining 5,000, said to be held in National Police detention facilities throughout the country, is an unverifiable estimate. There are four national prisons, 37 provincial prisons, and 50 existing or planned detention centers. Although these figures indicate that there are sufficient confinement spaces on a nationwide basis, overcrowding still exists in some provinces, and poor prisoner accounting procedures are the rule rather than the exception. OSD estimates that roughly 60% of the prisoners arrested in 1968 were released. Steps are underway to remedy these problems.

-- Government of Vietnam Intelligence Capability. The effectiveness of the attack on the Viet Cong infrastructure is hampered by the limited intelligence capability of the Government of Vietnam. Personnel in those agencies tasked with gathering intelligence on the Viet Cong infrastructure and running operations against it, such as the Police Special Branch and Military Security Service, simply have not had the training and background for sophisticated intelligence work. This is especially true at the district level and down, where the responsible Government of Vietnam personnel may barely be able to read and write. Many have difficulty understanding the requirements sent down to them, let alone fulfilling them. Although the Phung Hoang program is geared primarily to the district level, most of the talent, intelligence information, and reaction capability is presently found at province level. Information available at province level is often not fully disseminated down to the district; moreover, most of the District Intelligence Operations Coordination Centers are still in the process of developing the data base needed to operate effectively against the Viet Cong infrastructure. Further, many of the intelligence agencies are beginning to exhaust their intelligence data bases. For these reasons, to a great extent, operations targeted against specific individuals are not too common. Most Viet Cong infrastructure personnel are picked up in sweeps, cordon and search operations, or in ambushes on communication routes; only 10-20% of those neutralized are specifically targeted through the Phung Hoang program.

In summary, at the current rates of attrition, the VCI can sustain its operations and replace its losses except in a few localities. We are, however, making inroads and should continue to disrupt VCI activities in an increasing number of hamlets. But it should be understood that the VCI is too large and well established to be permanently neutralized or rendered impotent, short of an extended and intensive campaign over the next several years, including much improved Government of Vietnam performance. (A more detailed prognosis for the VCI is contained in the response to Question 19).

1/ OASD(SA) Southeast Asia Analysis Report, December 1968

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QUESTION 19

What are the reasons for believing that current and future efforts at "rooting out" hard-core infrastructure will be--or will not be--more successful than past efforts? For example, for believing that collaboration among the numerous Vietnamese intelligence agencies will be markedly more thorough than in the past? What are the side effects, e.g., on Vietnam opinion, of anti-infrastructure campaigns such as the current "accelerated effort" along with their lasting effect on hard-core apparatus?

-- The Government of Vietnam (GVN) did not fully commit itself to the attack on the Viet Cong infrastructure (VCI) until July 1968. Since that late date, the steady improvement in organizational efficiency has resulted in an increase in neutralizations. Given 12 to 24 more months of continuous US/GVN effort and command emphasis, present progress will pay off with much more significant damage to the VCI. Far more than in the past, the GVN has the will and the organization to achieve this goal.

-- GVN officials are increasingly aware of the need to pinpoint the attack on the VCI. Continued high-level GVN and US command emphasis should assure that this awareness continues to spread.

-- The program has generated coordination and cooperation at all levels, often where little or none previously existed. This includes disparate GVN officials, agencies, and military units, as well as US and allied agencies and military forces.

-- Intelligence and Operations Coordinating Centers, which have been established at province, district, and autonomous city levels, are becoming increasingly capable both of conducting anti-VCI operations and in supporting military and territorial security forces. Many of these centers have just reached the "take-off" point, and can be expected to assist greatly in intensifying operations against the VCI.

a. These centers are building data bases on VCI personalities and modus operandi. As they improve their capability to collate and analyze raw data, perfect source control, and agent handling techniques, operational effectiveness will improve proportionately. Inspection and training programs have been instituted and additional programs are being developed to upgrade capabilities, especially at district level and lower. The civil arms of the GVN, particularly the police, have been strengthened by heretofore unavailable military, Provincial Reconnaissance Unit (PRU), and National Police Field Force support.

b. The centers have also increased the degree of province and district chief control over territory and resources by providing a more efficient staff mechanism through which they can plan and operate.
-- As part of the "Accelerated Pacification Campaign (APC)", a special PHOENIX-PHUNG HOANG (Anti-infrastructure) campaign was launched on 20 October 1968 which concentrated military and paramilitary assets against the VCI. Results show that during the last quarter of 1968, VCI neutralization accounted for just under 40 percent of the total for all of 1968. Of the VCI above village level who were "neutralized", slightly over 38 percent were "neutralized" during the last 3 months.

-- The VCI definitely is beset by problems. Most of these are related to the pressures of the war. However, an encouragingly increasing number of them can be attributed directly to the APC and to the anti-VCI effort. A notebook recently captured in Thua Thien Province in I Corps described the considerable losses among both guerrillas and infrastructure personnel caused by the South Vietnamese Army (ARVN) and allied operations. A captured report from VC Subregion 4 complained about the shortage of personnel; stated that more than one-third of the hamlets in the subregion had no Party members, while the quality of existing Party chapters was below par. The chapters were described as weakened by factionalism and lack of determination. A source in Binh Chanh District in Gia Dinh Province reported in early October that a VC guerrilla platoon had been brought in, broken down, and assigned to four villages to help rebuild the infrastructure.

a. There has also been an increasing number of captured documents which labeled the PHOENIX-PHUNG HOANG operation as a cunning, wicked plot and exhorted all VC/NVA Armed Forces to be wary of and strive to wipe out the "cruel die-hard agents of aggression." A captured document dated 10 December 1969, contained a detailed commentary on the mission, organization, and activities of PHOENIX-PHUNG HOANG from national to district level, and a VC plan to counter PHOENIX-PHUNG HOANG activities, stated that, "the most effective measure to combat this organization is to eliminate its members."

b. Perhaps more telling is the increasing amount of broadcast time Radio Hanoi and Liberation Radio devote to denouncing the APC, particularly PHOENIX-PHUNG HOANG operations. A Liberation Radio commentary on 3 December 1968 called for the implementation of the Peoples Liberation Armed Forces Command's order to "crush the head of the venomous snake PHOENIX." The communists have ordered all members of the Peoples Liberation Armed Forces "to resolutely smash the US-puppet rural pacification scheme, annihilate, and completely disintegrate enemy pacification teams, and to annihilate PHOENIX teams which are composed of spies and intelligence agents."

c. One of the most explicit examples is that given by a VC proselyter in the Saigon/Cholon area. On 13 January 1969, he remarked to a personal friend (who happens to be an allied
intelligence agent) that the PHOENIX-PHUNG HOANG Committee had recently been so active that it was very difficult to carry out any effective political activity; that young peace workers were getting tired; and that he himself was thinking of staying in the background until a more favorable time.

---

The problem the PHOENIX-PHUNG HOANG problem faces is not in the system but in the expectations of instant success. PHOENIX-PHUNG HOANG is succeeding, but not alone, and not immediately. One of its major values is an intelligence gathering program in support of operations. There appears to be a positive correlation between allied military operational activity and Viet Cong political losses. PHOENIX-PHUNG HOANG identifications are required to enable the combat elements and FRU's to succeed. The VC political apparatus must stay in one geographical area and develop populous support. So long as VC cadres are kept jumping defensively, they will be unable to consolidate and covert terrorists into responsible government. The advantage is with the GVN as long as it has the capability to police its territory. The VC political apparatus will continue to struggle and hide, probably for years, but it is being defeated.

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There are indications that higher ranking VCI may be moving into more secure areas where small anti-VCI forces have more difficulty operating.

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Report padding could become a problem under pressures of pacification campaign quotas. Hence, the by-name verification process becomes a more important check. Dissemination in the near future of GVN/US approved job descriptions of VCI executive and key cadre positions should help tighten up both operations and reporting procedures.

---

Based on the PHOENIX-PHUNG HOANG-reported "neutralizations" for 1968, 3.2% of the province level VCI, 8.8% of the district level VCI and 14.4% of the village and hamlet VCI were "neutralized." It is estimated that less than 1% of the VCI above province level were "neutralized." Thus, if the Phoenix program becomes twice as efficient during 1969 as it was during 1968, we would "neutralize" about 2% of the highest level VCI, 6% of the provincial level, 18% of district level and 29% of the village and hamlet level.

---

Better understanding of the program, better organization, improved tactics and techniques, better coordination and cooperation, improved personnel relations should improve the PHOENIX-PHUNG HOANG program execution during 1969. However, increasing difficulty in identifying, locating and "neutralizing" VCI as the easier targets are "neutralized" would tend to decrease the effectiveness of PHOENIX-PHUNG HOANG program execution during 1969.

---

Perhaps more important than organizational problems or increasing difficulties in locating VCI is the effect on the PHOENIX-PHUNG HOANG program of local accommodations between the VCI and the people and the VCI and the
GVN infrastructure. There is no data on local accommodations and accurate information on its existence and the extent of the area where it is practiced is very limited. However, it can be said that as the Vietnamese begin to perceive clearly that some form of negotiated settlement is to be reached with the National Liberation Front (NLF), then the pressure to reach some form of local accommodation will probably be increased, thus increasing the difficulties in carrying out the PHOENIX-PHUNG HOANG program. The Joint Staff feels that the record of the Phoenix program since November when serious negotiations were in progress does not substantiate this view.

Additionally, it is important to remember the realities of the war in Vietnam--families have close relative on both sides of the conflict. There are ways that are accepted to kill your brother and there are other ways such as "breaking his rice bowl" which are not. Further, an attitude of "if I don't bother his home, he won't bother mine" is sometimes prevalent, particularly at the hamlet level. One of the reasons why it took the GVN so long to initiate the PHOENIX-PHUNG HOANG program was just that reason. Until the VC/NLF/NVA "broke the faith" by attacking the cities during Tet 1968, the GVN was reluctant to carry out a systematic program of "neutralizations" in fear of reprisal and apparently because of this sort of unwritten agreement. Again as negotiations progress, or given the appearance of progressing toward a settlement, the pressures within families to reach accommodation will increase and, correspondingly, the effectiveness of the PHOENIX-PHUNG HOANG program could decrease.

The 16 January 1969 National Intelligence Estimate on the Pacification Program, concurred in by DIA, CIA, INR and NSA, states in part:

"Over the next several months, further progress in pacification will almost certainly not make the GVN much more able to cope with the VC in peacetime than it would be today. A significant advance in this respect would probably require at least a year. And the terms of a settlement could undo virtually all that has been accomplished, especially since progress has been minimal in reducing the political threat."

This statement tends to support the conclusion that dramatic improvement in the PHOENIX-PHUNG HOANG program in the near future is unlikely, and that "rooting out" the hard core VCI will continue to be slow and hard to do and that the whole program could be placed in jeopardy by the negotiations in Paris. Moreover, it indicates the judgment by the intelligence community that it will be at least a year before the GVN is in a significantly better position to deal with VC in the political struggle that may follow a cessation of hostilities.

The gathering of the representatives of all or most of the Vietnamese intelligence agencies together under the roofs of the District and Province Intelligence and Operations Coordination Centers represents a giant step forward toward gaining active cooperation and collaboration among these Vietnamese agencies in the program of "neutralizing" the VCI. However, it is important also to remember that in the end cooperation and collaboration between Vietnamese agencies is a function of the relationship between the agency heads and the struggle for personal power within...
the Vietnamese political milieu; thus, the cooperation seemingly beginning with the development of the Intelligence and Operations Coordination Centers could be reversed with the toss of one hand grenade.

In terms of organizational goals, progress against the VCI has been satisfactory. However, it cannot be determined whether the number of VCI neutralized reflects an accurate picture of permanent or net losses to the VCI, especially in view of the lack of data on the final disposition of those who were apprehended. The attack on the VCI during 1968 did not significantly reduce the communists' ability to carry out essential activities, although VCI attempts to revitalize and strengthen their organizations in the major cities were often disrupted by fairly effective police work. VCI operations were disrupted in several geographic areas, and a noticeable attrition resulted from a combination of losses in combat and from anti-infrastructure activities. However, government intelligence on the VCI and operations against their activities diminish significantly as one gets further from the secure urban areas. What losses the VCI has suffered apparently have not unduly hampered its functioning. Recent VC moves to streamline the infrastructure by reclassifying cadre according to their effectiveness and by transferring numbers of low level or inefficient cadre into military units, suggests that VCI personnel losses have not yet approached the critical stage. It does not appear likely that they will in the near future.

The effectiveness of the attack on the VCI is hampered by the limited intelligence capability of the SVN. Personnel in those agencies tasked with gathering intelligence on the VCI and running operations against it, such as the Police Special Branch (PSB) and Military Security (MSS), simply have not had the training and background for sophisticated intelligence work. This is especially true at the district level and down, where the responsible SVN personnel may barely be able to read and write. Many have difficulty understanding the requirements sent down to them, let alone fulfilling them. Although the PHOENIX-PHUNG HOANG program is geared primarily to the district level, most of the talent, intelligence information, and reaction capability is presently found at province level. Information available at province level is often not fully disseminated down to the district; moreover, most of the District Intelligence Operations Coordination Centers (DIOCC) are still in the process of developing the data base needed to operate effectively against the VCI. For this reason, to a great extent, operations targeted against specific individuals are not too common. Most VCI personnel are picked up in sweeps, cordon and search operations, or in ambushes on communication routes.

The above evidence seems to show that, while there has been improvement in our efforts to "root out" the infrastructure and further improvements are expected during 1969, there are inherent difficulties in the target, the organization and the methodology of the PHOENIX-PHUNG HOANG program which make a dramatic improvement in the program unlikely. Further,
the vast effect that seeming progress in reaching a settlement in Paris could have on the program's execution makes predictions of greater success during 1969 highly conjectural. Additionally, results to date and predicted over the next year do not support the contention that the program, within that time frame, can have a lasting effect on the hard-core apparatus.

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The chief danger in a program such as the current anti-VCI drive is that it can cause the arrest of some innocent persons and result in inconvenience and injustice, giving the government a poor image. However, there are side effects on the positive side as well:

a. The increasing number of ralliers is indicative of the effect that various GVN programs, but particularly PHOENIX-PHUNG HOANG, are having on the populace. These ralliers are providing valuable information on enemy activities, locations of enemy forces, arms and rice caches, and significantly, information on VCI. One of the largest anti-VCI operations so far conducted in I Corps - Meade River - was generated as a result of information obtained from a raller and on the basis of PHOENIX-PHUNG HOANG intelligence. In Binh Dinh Province, ralliers were used in a psychological operation which resulted in an entire hamlet rallying en masse on 24 December 1968.

b. Evidence indicates that the general population is cooperating more with GVN officials. For example, enemy activity in outlying portions of cities has often been reported by the people, demonstrating that they are putting more trust and confidence in Government of Vietnam agencies. The stepped-up VC terrorist-type activity in and around provincial capitals, and the VC's repeated attempts to lower the morale of the populace, has generally proven fruitless. These actions, and the GVN response to them, appear to have instilled a measure of confidence in the GVN leadership.

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We have no systematic or continuing evidence on the "side effects" of the Phoenix program. There are those who feel that the PHOENIX-PHUNG HOANG program, in particular the operation of the PRU's, may be counter-productive as it alienates the non-committed population more than it hurts the VCI. There is not much evidence to support this conjecture.

---

Perhaps the most serious criticism of the PRU is that the whole concept and operation are copied after the Communists and that by copying their extra legal methods we lose any claim we have to the "just cause." (The majority of the infrastructure of the GVN are not nationalistic in the sense that they respect and support their "government" (Chinh Phu). They are, however, extremely proud of their nation and of being Vietnamese (Quoc Gia). It therefore follows that the people who are willing to die in the service of the GVN are not doing so because of their respect for their government nor the image of that government. They are doing this because they think they are fighting for "The JUST Cause.")
An additional "side effect" for which we have no accurate measure is the fact that the PHOENIX-PHUNG HOANG program is looked upon by many Vietnamese as having been forced upon the GVN by the Americans. Further, the FRU program is clearly identified as an American program—supervised, controlled and financed by Americans. Thus, the issue of national sovereignty is a "real" issue with regard to Vietnamese attitudes toward the PHOENIX-PHUNG HOANG program and particularly the FRU program. How much anti-Americanism is caused by these perceptions is unknown, but the suspicion is that it is enough so that it should be taken into account when assessing the program.
How adequate is our information on the overall scale and incidence of damage to civilians by air and artillery and looting and misbehavior by RVNAF.

The adequacy of information on the overall scale and incidence of damage to civilians by air and artillery is questionable.

-- On one hand, COMUSMACV considers that information of the overall scale and incidence of damage to civilians by air and artillery is direct and adequate. The JCS and CINCPAC concur. Further, COMUSMACV considers that adequate information is available on such damage caused by Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF). Civilians killed or wounded and damages to property are reported, and the nationality of force and weaponry causing the casualties or damages are identified. Three sources of information are available.

-- On the other hand, there is little information available on damage in most Viet Cong controlled areas, and portions of contested areas. There is little systematic reporting to Washington on the overall level of combat damage.

-- The overall level of combat damage undoubtedly has been high. For example: the damage to Vietnamese cities at Tet was considerable; there have been over two million refugees in SVN since 1964 -- many of these were caused by combat activity; the US Navy alone reports they have destroyed almost 35,000 structures and damaged about 43,000 since 1966. While much of the destruction has been unavoidable due to enemy provocations and tactics, undoubtedly some destruction could have and can be avoided.

Concerning RVNAF looting and misbehavior, there is no complete and comprehensive reporting system on this subject either in MACV or the Government of Vietnam. However, some conclusion can be drawn from available information.

-- COMUSMACV considers that information on this subject is of sufficient adequacy to indicate that the problem is still not fully controlled. MACV's Hamlet Evaluation System (HES) and System for Evaluation the Effectiveness of RVNAF (SEER) provide information from US advisors which permits evaluations of the incidence and seriousness of misconduct on the part of the RVNAF and also reflecting respect for the rights of the populace by Vietnamese Army and Marine units. For example, the HES shows that each month about 900 hamlets, or 7% of the hamlets reporting, are adversely affected by either minor or serious incidents of troop misconduct, ranging from drunkenness and chicken stealing, to murder or rape. Based on quarterly response to the SEER questionnaire during 1968, 93% of US advisors to the South Vietnamese Army and Marine Corps units considered that their units
respected the rights of the populace and property always or most of the time. The Vietnamese do not maintain a comprehensive reporting system for determining the overall scale and incidence of damage to civilians through looting or misbehavior by Government of Vietnam Forces.

-- RES data are available to indicate the adverse incidents committed by the RVNAF against hamlet population. (These data are reported monthly from the field by the Hamlet Evaluation System and are maintained in an automated file with entries back to January 1967).

(1) A sampling of data indicating the incidence of misbehavior of the RVNAF and other allied troops shows that the RVNAF caused minor incidents affecting the population in approximately 43% of all hamlets reported for the months examined (Figure 1). The RVNAF also was reported as causing serious incidents affecting the population in 23% of all hamlets. (Figure 2).

(2) South Vietnamese Army troops caused serious incidents in more hamlets than the Regional and Popular Forces. However for minor incidents, the reverse was true (Figure 3). This fact may be attributable to the Regional and Popular Forces normally being an integral part of the community in which they are assigned. The South Vietnamese Army regulars, on the other hand, are most likely to be exposed to the hamlet population during military operations against the Viet Cong/North Vietnamese Army forces.

(3) The RVNAF was reported to have caused both major and minor incidents in 42% of all hamlets. It is interesting to compare South Vietnamese Army and US troops with respect to the hamlet reports. From the standpoint of behavior toward the population, US and South Vietnamese Army troops are on a par (Figure 4).

(4) It must be recognized that the Hamlet Evaluation System measurement is imprecise, and conclusions drawn from the data presented should be so qualified.
## FIGURE 1

**HAMLETS IN WHICH MINOR INCIDENTS WERE REPORTED AS AFFECTING POPULATION**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Sep 67</th>
<th>Oct 67</th>
<th>Nov 67</th>
<th>Jan 68</th>
<th>Apr 68</th>
<th>Jul 68</th>
<th>Aug 68</th>
<th>Sep 68</th>
<th>Nov 68</th>
<th>Total Reports</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RVNAF</td>
<td>1,455</td>
<td>1,412</td>
<td>1,302</td>
<td>1,226</td>
<td>1,037</td>
<td>971</td>
<td>1,014</td>
<td>1,083</td>
<td>868</td>
<td>10,368</td>
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<tr>
<td>Revolutionary Development Cadre</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>734</td>
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<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>462</td>
<td>467</td>
<td>447</td>
<td>428</td>
<td>396</td>
<td>404</td>
<td>462</td>
<td>500</td>
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<td>172</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>145</td>
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<td>128</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>1,306</td>
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<td>Other Friendly Elements</td>
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<td>868</td>
<td>896</td>
<td>848</td>
<td>773</td>
<td>725</td>
<td>779</td>
<td>845</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>6,715</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL REPORTS</strong></td>
<td><strong>3,091</strong></td>
<td><strong>3,012</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,885</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,730</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,398</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,290</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,433</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,690</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,537</strong></td>
<td><strong>23,066</strong></td>
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</table>

RVNAF Percentage of Total Reports: 47% 47% 45% 45% 43% 42% 42% 40% 39% Av - 43%

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## Hamlets in Which Serious Incidents Were Reported as Affecting Population

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Sep 67</th>
<th>Oct 67</th>
<th>Nov 67</th>
<th>Jan 68</th>
<th>Apr 68</th>
<th>Jul 68</th>
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<th>Sep 68</th>
<th>Nov 68</th>
<th>Total Reports</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>RVNAF</strong></td>
<td>44</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>757</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Revolutionary Development Cadre</strong></td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>82</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>United States</strong></td>
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<td>44</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>575</td>
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<td><strong>Other Free World Military Assistance Forces</strong></td>
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<td>10</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>240</td>
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<td>121</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>317</td>
<td>266</td>
<td>248</td>
<td>212</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>1,548</td>
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<td><strong>Total Reports</strong></td>
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<td>251</td>
<td>241</td>
<td>223</td>
<td>557</td>
<td>506</td>
<td>486</td>
<td>469</td>
<td>243</td>
<td>3,202</td>
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**RVNAF Percentage of Total Reports**

|                   | Sep 67 | Oct 67 | Nov 67 | Jan 68 | Apr 68 | Jul 68 | Aug 68 | Sep 68 | Nov 68 | Av - 23 |
|-------------------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------||
|                   | 20     | 17     | 21     | 19     | 23     | 24     | 25     | 31     | 23     | 23     |
## Figure 3

**Hamlets in which Minor Incidents Were Caused by Army of Vietnam and Regional Forces/POPULAR FORCES**

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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Sep 67</th>
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<th>Nov 67</th>
<th>Jan 68</th>
<th>Apr 68</th>
<th>Jul 68</th>
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<th>Sep 69</th>
<th>Nov 68</th>
<th>Total Reports</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Army of Vietnam</strong></td>
<td>610</td>
<td>603</td>
<td>544</td>
<td>499</td>
<td>394</td>
<td>385</td>
<td>435</td>
<td>444</td>
<td>330</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Regional Forces/Popular Forces</strong></td>
<td>845</td>
<td>809</td>
<td>758</td>
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<td>643</td>
<td>586</td>
<td>579</td>
<td>639</td>
<td>538</td>
<td>6,124</td>
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**Hamlets in which Major Incidents Were Caused by Army of Vietnam and Regional Forces/Popular Forces**

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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Sep 67</th>
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<th>Nov 67</th>
<th>Jan 68</th>
<th>Apr 68</th>
<th>Jul 68</th>
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<th>Sep 68</th>
<th>Nov 68</th>
<th>Total Reports</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Army of Vietnam</strong></td>
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<td>27</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>430</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Regional Forces/Popular Forces</strong></td>
<td>17</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>327</td>
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## HAMLET REPORTS OF INCIDENTS AFFECTING POPULATION

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<th>FORCE</th>
<th>HAMLET REPORTS</th>
<th>PERCENT TOTAL</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RVNAF</td>
<td>11,125</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army of Vietnam</td>
<td>4,674</td>
<td>18%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Regional Forces/Popular Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>Revolutionary Development Cadre</td>
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<td>United States</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other Friendly Elements</td>
<td>8,263</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>26,268</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
QUESTION 21

To what extent do recent changes in command and administration affecting the countryside represent moves to improve competence, as distinct from replacement of one clique by another? What is the basis of judgement? What is the impact of the recent removal of minority group province mid-district officials (Hoa Hao, Cao Dai, Montagnard) in their respective areas?

Changes in Command and Administration

--- Considerations of political and personal allegiance remain and will, no doubt, always remain of paramount importance in the assignment of key personnel throughout the Vietnamese command and administrative structure. Since the national election of September 1967, for example, President Thieu has moved quite successfully from a "coalition" in which key jobs were divided between Thieu and Ky supporters to replacement of Ky men by those loyal to him. Nevertheless, it does appear that newly appointed province and district officials are being selected on the basis of competence from within the politically acceptable candidate group. This is a new and important development.

--- Recent changes in command and administration affecting the countryside represent a substantial effort to improve competence, in addition to President Thieu's moves toward consolidation of his personal political power base. In 1968, 25 province chiefs and 162 district chiefs were changed. The changes were made primarily to remove inefficient or corrupt officials (21 province chiefs, 92 district chiefs). Field reports indicate that the new district and province officials are significantly more honest and competent than their predecessors. In addition, newly assigned officials are required to attend special training courses designed to prepare them for administrative and political duties. The stated intent of the Government of Vietnam is to prosecute those officers removed for corruption. To a greater degree than before, ousted officers have been transferred to positions where they could do less damage, rather than merely shifted to similar positions elsewhere as was the common practice in the past.

--- Collateral evidence of the intent and effort of the Government of Vietnam to give priority to administrative improvement are provided for in the 1969 Pacification Program:

a. The mounting of large-scale training programs for village and hamlet officials.

b. Studies to streamline administrative procedures at the local government level.

c. The rendering of greater autonomy and authority to the village.
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d. The availability of, and control over, more resources, particularly self-help funds to the village.

e. The very strong pressure from the central government and the President to increase the number of elected village and hamlet officials.

--- It may be useful in this context to bear in mind that (1) due to the nature of the political system in South Vietnam, competence and replacement of one clique by another are complementary terms not opposing. Given the state of political development, this is likely to remain true for some time to come. Thus, if the new district and province chiefs and division and regimental commanders were not basically aligned with Thieu as opposed to their predecessors who were aligned with Ky, they could not be effective in the accomplishing their jobs given the political and military milieu that prevails in South Vietnam; and (2) our in depth knowledge of individual loyalties, family ties, clandestine networks, etc., in South Vietnam is sufficiently marginal to cast doubt on any answer provided to questions of this nature. In many cases we are dealing in supposition, assumption and intuition and not with facts or evidence.

Removal of Minority Officers

--- On balance, the impact of the recent removals of minority group province and district officials does not appear to have generated any serious antigovernment feeling. In general, the Government has been discerning in handling this matter. In relation to the Hoa Hao, which has serious internal pressures toward dissenion, non-Hoa Hao have been placed in important positions at province level.

--- In relation to the Montagnards, a more politically cohesive group (if only because of a relative lack of political sophistication) Montagnard officials have been replaced with other and more competent Montagnards. It is significant that the Government has agreed in negotiations to nominate more Montagnard officials to senior province and district positions. The benefits of such a policy are clear in areas like Pleiku where an excellent Montagnard province chief has been able to make significant gains in the Pacification Program.

--- Recent changes of the province chief in Tay Ninh and An Giang resulted in assignment of non-affiliated officials. The changes were made ostensibly to improve performance, but the change in Tay Ninh was probably to remove a controversial figure. In An Giang replacement of an inept Hoa Hao province chief by a non-affiliated officer has resulted in improved administration without serious disturbance among the people.

--- Other removals have had mixed results. In Chau Doc, for instance, the Province Senior Advisor has reported that the replacement of the old Hoa Hao politician by a non-Hoa Hao as Province Chief has been very successful with much of the factional rivalry and sissonance that went on before now diminished and better cooperation and job effectiveness by the Provincial
staff and the district Chiefs and staffs. On the other hand, the removal of a Cao Dai politician as Province Chief in Tay Nhinh and his replacement by a Catholic had serious repercussions which forced the GVN to back down from trying the ex Chief for corruption and further to reappoint him to assist the new Province Chief. With regard to the Montagnards, the Vietnamese have by and large left Montagnards in those positions of authority which they have allowed them to have.

-- It should be brought out, however, that the GVN cannot "control" these minority groups by replacing Province or District officials in Hoa Hao Cao Dai, or Montagnard territory. These groups effectively control their area through unofficial and sub rosa channels and organizations which have a unity and capability for action which exceeds that of the official GVN structure. Thus, generally speaking, the GVN, by meddling with these minority organizations seldom can accomplish much in the way of "controlling" over them, but almost always runs the risk of alienating them. Therefore, the GVN's most fruitful course of action with regard to these minority groups generally lies in reaching some mutually advantageous accommodation with them.