LAO DONG NINTH PLENUM DECISION ON WAR IN SOUTH

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RESOLUTION

Ninth Conference of Central
12/1963

[Ninth Conference of the Central Committee of the
Viet-Nam Workers' Party, December 1963 - Editor]

(This is the text of Resolution by the IX Conference of Central
concerning the South, this replaces the draft sent previously.)

STRIVE TO STRUGGLE, RUSH FORWARD TO WIN NEW
VICTORIES IN THE SOUTH

The war of aggression waged by the U.S. imperialists in
South Viet-Nam is the biggest one in the world at present. It
is a special war which is a part of the new military strategy
of the U.S. The U.S. imperialists consider South Viet-Nam
as a testing place for the special war which is aimed at
countering the people's national liberation movements of many
nations of the world. The U.S. war of aggression against
South Viet-Nam has created a very serious situation. The
whole world places a great interest in the South Viet-Nam issue.

For the past two years, since the U.S. established
her military command in Saigon and sent combat troops to
South Viet-Nam, the heroic people in South Viet-Nam, under
the leadership of the Party, have overcome many difficulties
and hardship promoted the national indomitable tradition,
devised effective forms of struggle and achieved glorious
victories. Since early 1963, the South Vietnamese people
have gained significant successes and changed the situation
in our favor. Our forces are being strongly developed while
the enemy forces are weakening.

During two years of heroic fighting, the people of
South Viet-Nam frustrated the Stanley-Taylor plan which was
aimed at pacifying South Viet-Nam within 18 months. The
enemy failed to carry out this plan. He failed in establishing strategic hamlets in South Viet-Nam. He could not relocate two-thirds of the people in strategic hamlets as he had intended. On the contrary, the strategic hamlets that were established were destroyed and many of them turned into our combat villages.

The exceptional efforts of the Liberation troops and people in the South made the modern tactics and weapons of the enemy ineffective. The enemy forces were destroyed and worn down, and his troops were demoralized. The political struggle movement was widely developed. In major cities, large-scale struggle movements were conducted against the enemy in which people of all walks of life participated, including Buddhist followers, pupils, students, and intellectuals. Of particular significance were the movements in Hue where tens of thousands of people participated, and in Saigon-Cholon where hundreds of thousands of people participated. They conducted protest demonstrations to display their determination. Guerrilla warfare was developed. Our military forces were improved in technical and tactical skills. They gained many glorious victories although fighting in difficult conditions.

Our victories and the enemy's failures caused serious internal dissension among the enemy ranks. The U.S. and Diem were in open disagreement. The U.S. masterminded a military coup d'etat to topple the latter and brought to power more tractable henchmen, gathered more pro-American, anti-Communist elements, put forth demagogic policies in an attempt to win the people's heart. They exercised a close control over the Armed Forces of the Puppet Government to step up their aggressive war. However, they could not solve the problem of dissension which became increasingly acute among the ranks of the new ruling clique. In addition, the new Puppet Government leaders also disputed with one another for personal interests, thus causing the disintegration of the strong anti-Communist organizations set up by the Diem-Nhu Family and a deterioration of the morale of the Puppet soldiers. Disagreement over the policy and strategy adopted against the SVN Revolution developed among the U.S. ruling clique at home. A number of Americans, especially intellectuals, publicly protested the aggressive policy of the U.S. Government in SVN. Contradiction also developed between imperialist countries committing aggression
against Southeast Asia, especially between French and U.S. imperialists. The failure of the Stanley-Taylor plan especially the Ap Bac victory of our people, had smashed the U.S. imperialists' hope of winning the war. The U.S. did not bother to hide this from the public. Our people placed an increasingly greater confidence in our final victory while the people of the world also supported our fighting for a just cause in SVN.

The victory of our people in SVN during the past two years proved that the revolutionary forces in SVN were strong. The revolutionary task of our people will certainly be accomplished.

The Resolution of the 15th Central Conference (Jan. 1959) and the subsequent Resolution of the Third Party National Congress have clearly set forth the policy for the Revolution in the South and the struggle guideline designed to win victory. The Resolutions of the Politburo in 1961 and 1962 have clearly set forth the struggle guideline and practical policies designed to counter effectively the armed aggression of the Americans. The Resolutions of COSVN have put into practice and further developed the general Resolutions of the Party on the Revolution in the South. The successes of our Southern compatriots in recent years proved that the Party's Resolutions mentioned above were fully correct.

At present, through our struggle against imperialism the leader of which is U.S. imperialism, we see more clearly the characteristics which are equivalent to the rules concerning the lines and policies of the enemy, we also see the scientific foundation of our anti-U.S. guidelines and policies and consequently we have more confidence in the Party's leadership.

Based on the resolutions and directives of the Party on the Revolution in SVN and the previous experiences gained by our people during the past years, this Resolution gives further clarification on the prospect of the revolutionary movement in SVN and on the struggle guidelines for the Southern compatriots; at the same time, it sets forth the guidelines and missions in order to attain new, bigger victories in the coming period.
ASSESSMENT OF THE BALANCE OF POWER, THE CAPABILITY FOR DEVELOPMENT AND PROSPECTS OF THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE PEOPLES REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENTS

In order to assess and compare our force with the enemy's force, we have to consider them in the frame of a "special" war being currently waged by the U.S. imperialists in SVN.

After the 2nd World War, the U.S. imperialists became imperialist ringleaders, the main force of the international reactionaries and aggressors. In addition, the U.S. imperialists were also international gendarmes. At first, the Americans relied on their temporary superiority in nuclear weapons and set forth their "on-the-brink-of-the-war" policy together with a military strategy of an offensive nature called "massive retaliation" in the hope of making their dream of world domination come true. However, the balance of force was changed rapidly but not in favor of the imperialists. On the one hand, our side has achieved superiority in nuclear weapons become a decisive factor in the development of mankind. The people's national liberation movement has risen strongly, bringing about not only the establishment of countries which have full national sovereignty, but also the establishment of socialist countries such as China, Viet-Nam, Korea and Cuba. On the other hand, the contradictions among imperialist countries have increased more and more. The more the imperialists, especially the U.S. imperialists, make preparations for another world war, the more preventive measures against that world war are taken by our side. If the imperialists madly launch a new world war, they will be smashed by the world people. In this situation, the U.S. imperialists had to admit their failure in their old military strategy and set forth a new strategy which consists of both offensive and defensive measures. This is a strategy of "flexible response" in three types of war: World war, limited war and special war.

The U.S. imperialists will use the following factors to decide on the type of war they wage in each specific area in order to consolidate or broaden their interests: the general balance of forces in the world and in the area concerned, the nature of U.S. interests and the nature of con-
contradictions which the U.S. has to cope with.

The "special" war is chosen to regain the initiative in areas where they are on the defensive. They also conduct this type of war to face the violent revolutionary movements of the peoples in the countries of Africa, Asia, and Latin America. In these areas, both the national liberation movement and the workers' and peasants' revolutionary movement are making great progress. This situation not only disintegrated the imperialists' colonial system but also shook the newly formed bourgeois regimes and posed a serious danger to the entire capitalist system of the world. This danger forced the imperialists to compromise with the bourgeois reactionaries of countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America to maintain colonialism under new forms and with new methods. In addition, as the revolutionary movement in countries of Africa, Asia, and Latin America was increased, the bourgeois elements in these countries cooperated with the imperialists to counter the revolutionary movement of the workers-peasants. Neocolonialism was born from this situation. The special war is a type of war of aggression conceived to fit neocolonialism. In the economic field in nationalist countries, the imperialists relied on the bourgeois governments to exploit the people of these countries. When they initiated their war of aggression and counter-revolutionary war, they primarily use the troops of the bourgeois reactionary governments while they retain the command, supply weapons and money and only introduce their own troops to directly participate in the war at a definite level.

The U.S. imperialists not only used the special war to repress the national liberation movement and the masses' revolutionary movement. In definite conditions, they may also resort to limited war. However, they cannot conduct this type of war wherever and whenever they like. Though possessing a great military strength, they had to scatter their forces over many areas, and as a result, their reaction capability was limited. For this reason their force commitment is contingent upon the attainable objective and the balance of power in each area.

Southeast Asia is a place where the imperialists have many interests. After being defeated in China, Korea and together with the French, being defeated in Indochina, the
U.S. imperialists cooperated with the British and French imperialists to establish a Southeast Asian aggressive bloc. South Viet-Nam is an important link in the Southeast Asia strategy of the Americans. It is also a place where the revolutionary movement was most seething and where the U.S. troops and lackey troops were increased to a great extent. The U.S. imperialists waged the special war in SVN and established the Southeast Asia aggressive bloc in order to achieve the following three objectives:

- Repress the national liberation movement and carry out the neocolonialist policy.
- Build up military bases and prepare to attack our side.
- Keep socialism from spreading throughout Southeast Asia.

If the U.S. imperialists are after the third objective, it is because all national liberation movements tend unavoidably to develop into socialist revolutions, especially in Southeast Asia in general and in South Viet-Nam in particular. In these areas, the national democratic revolutions are being conducted by the strong Marxist-Leninist parties.

The three above-mentioned objectives indicated the U.S. imperialists' intention to overcome the contradictions that exist in SVN: The contradiction between the Vietnamese people and the U.S. imperialists and their henchmen; the contradiction between the peasants and the feudal landlords; the contradiction between the socialist bloc and the imperialist bloc; and the contradiction between the U.S. imperialists and the other imperialists, especially the French imperialists.

The U.S. imperialists are determined to pursue the three objectives mentioned above. However, the third goal is the most important to them, because it includes preventing the decline and collapse of imperialist capitalism in Southeast Asia and over the world. To attain this goal, the American imperialists do not hesitate to wage a "special war", and if they are not successful, they may wage a limited war.
However, the American imperialists were defeated in the war in China and Korea. Along with the French imperialists they were also defeated in the Indochinese war and forced to withdraw from North Viet-Nam. Recently, they were defeated a further step in Laos and had to recognize a neutral government with the participation of the Neo Lao Hac-Xat. Thus, the U.S. imperialists were forced to step back before the offensive of socialism, a force which is now engaged in a life-and-death struggle with them. Therefore, whether they develop the war in South Viet-Nam into a limited war or not, it is certain that they must take into consideration the realistic balance of forces in Southeast Asia, and carefully weigh the serious consequences they might suffer. On the other hand, the Revolution in South Viet-Nam, while setting forth its mission of fighting against the U.S. aggressors for national independence, democracy, peace and neutrality, was aimed at holding the enemy in his special war and finding every way to mitigate the contradiction between the imperialist and socialist camps over the Viet-Nam problem. It was also aimed at winning over the national bourgeoisie in South Viet-Nam to fight against the U.S. imperialists and their henchmen, securing the backing of nationalist countries and aggravating the contradiction between the U.S. and French imperialists.

We must and have the capability to check and defeat the enemy in his "special war." This capability will increase if we are determined to fight the U.S. imperialists and their henchmen, if we have a clever strategem, and know how to exploit the contradictions in the enemy's internal organizations, contradictions between the U.S. imperialists and the other imperialists, especially the French imperialists, contradictions between the U.S. and their henchmen in South Viet-Nam and the bourgeois ruling clique in Southeast Asia. In this way, we can cause difficulties for the U.S. in using the aggressive force of the Southeast Asia block to escalate the war in South Viet-Nam. Additionally, we must develop the movement against the U.S. aggressors, and gain the support of the people of the world, (especially those of the socialist countries, and countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America) for the South Viet-Nam Revolution. This Revolution is conducted on three fronts: the political, military and diplomatic fronts; the diplomatic front is designed to isolate the enemy in the international arena and gain the backing of the entire world.
However, we must always be vigilant and prepared to cope with the U.S. if she takes the risk of turning the war in South Viet-Nam into a limited war. The possibility that a limited war in South Viet-Nam would turn into a world war is almost nonexistent because the purpose and significance of this war cannot generate conditions leading to a world war.

In the framework of the "special war," there are two possibilities:

- First, the Americans would carry on the war at the present or slightly higher level.

- Second, the Americans would intensify the war by bringing in troops many times larger [than the present number] or both American troops and troops from the Southeast Asian aggressive bloc will intervene in the war.

If the U.S. takes a stronger part in the Viet-Nam war but still uses the troops of the satellite countries to play the main role, this war is still considered a "special war." If they use their own troops as the main force and deploy the armed forces of the Southeast Asia aggressive bloc into Viet-Nam, the Viet-Nam war will no longer be a "special war" but a limited war, although it is going on within South Viet-Nam. This may occur in the following cases:

- First, faced with their numerous difficulties in South Viet-Nam, the U.S. imperialists believe that they will be successful if they fight more violently.

- Second, the U.S. believes that the North will not strongly react.

- Third, if they believe their increased involvement in the war in South Viet-Nam will not raise a strong opposition from the people of the U.S. and the world.

However, the above are only remote possibilities because the U.S. cannot evaluate all the disastrous consequences she might bear if she wages the war on a larger scale. She realizes that if she is bogged down in a large-scale and protracted war, she will be thrown into a very
passive position in the world. However, the above possibilities may become more probable if the revolutionary movement in South Viet-Nam is not strong enough.

Through our subjective efforts, let us strive to deal with the first eventuality, at the same time, let us also positively prepare to defeat the enemy should the second eventuality materialize.

We have sufficient conditions to quickly change the balance of forces in our favor. And whether the U.S. maintains its combat strength at the present level or increases it, she must still use her henchmen's army as a main force. However, this army becomes weaker day by day due to the serious decline of its quality, the demoralization of its troops and the disgust of the latter for the Americans and their lackeys. These are the factors that cause the collapse of Americans' and their lackeys' troops. No U.S. financial assistance or weapons can prevent this collapse.

As for us, we become more confident in the victory of our armed forces. Our technical and tactical skills are improved and our fighting spirit is heightened. The people in South Viet-Nam have stood up against the imperialists for almost 20 years, so they have a high political enlightenment. At the present time, the more they fight, the bigger victories they win, the revolutionary movement has created favorable conditions for building up the armed forces. If we properly guide the political and military struggle and the force building program, our military force will grow up rapidly. To create a basic change in the balance of forces between the enemy and us is within our grasp. In the days ahead, our force will be increasingly developed, whereas the enemy will certainly encounter a great deal of difficulties and he will be demoralized. His weaknesses are obvious and have increased after his defeat at Ap Bac, especially after the overthrow of Diem's regime. A strong development of the Revolution will cause many more troubles for the enemy and bring about a quicker disorganization of his armed forces and government. The Revolution in SVN will inevitably evolve into a General Offensive and Uprising to achieve the complete victory.
If the U.S. imperialists send more troops to Viet-Nam to save the situation after suffering a series of failures, the Revolution in Viet-Nam will meet more difficulties, the struggle will be stronger and harder but it will certainly succeed in attaining the final victory. With 800,000 well-trained troops, the French imperialists could not defeat the 12 million courageous Algerians and finally had to give independence and freedom to them. For the same reason, the U.S. imperialists cannot win over 14 million Vietnamese people in the South who have taken arms to fight the imperialists for almost 20 years, and who, with all the compatriots throughout the country, have defeated the hundreds of thousands troops of the French expeditionary force. Now the South Vietnamese people show themselves capable of beating the enemy in any situation. They certainly have the determination, talents, strength and patience to crush any U.S. imperialists' schemes and plans, and finally to force them to withdraw from Viet-Nam as the French imperialists did.

There is the possibility that the South Viet-Nam Revolution must go through a transitional period which entails complex forms and methods of struggling before it attains the final victory. The reunification of the country must be carried out step by step. In the present national democratic revolutionary phase in South Viet-Nam, we must strive to attain victory step by step and gradually push back the enemy before reaching the General Offensive and Uprising to win complete victory. However, we may pass through a transitional period before we attain complete victory. In any case, we must encourage the entire Party, people, and army to attain the maximum victory, and we should not have a hesitating attitude or to pause at the transitional period. If we are highly determined to win and prepared to face any situation, the final victory will certainly be in the hands of our people.

II

GUIDELINE FOR THE STRATEGY AND STRATEGEMS USED IN THE REVOLUTIONARY STRUGGLE OF SOUTH VIET-NAM

1. The strategy and guideline set forth by Central for the revolutionary struggle in South Viet-Nam have been proved correct by the achievements of the South Vietnamese people during the recent years.
To counter the South Viet-Nam Revolution, the U.S. imperialists wage a "special war" which is consistent with their neocolonial policy. It is characterized by U.S. indirect control, through the lackey government, over the South Viet-Nam people. The U.S. uses economic and military assistance to oppress and exploit the South Vietnamese people.

In the special war, there is a limited participation of U.S. troops, but the main military force is their henchmen's army. The pro-U.S. government represents the landowners and the bourgeois reactionary compradors in South Viet-Nam. In a situation where half of the country is abolishing the social classes and advancing toward socialism, these classes feel a deep hatred of the socialist regime in the North and the workers and peasants in the South. There is a close association between these pro-U.S. elements and the U.S., but on the other hand they oppose one another over problems of personal interests.

The patriotic struggle of our people has both the characteristic of a national and a class struggle. It is a struggle of the South Vietnamese people against the U.S. for national independence. It is also a struggle of the U.S., the feudalist landowners, and the pro-U.S. bourgeois compradors against our side, against North Viet-Nam, and against the SVN workers and peasants.

The present Viet-Nam war is an aggressive and an anti-aggressive war, because the antirevolutionary government in South Viet-Nam is supported by the U.S. to carry out the aggressive colonial policy of the latter. It also has the characteristic of an internal war because it is an aggressive war of the neocolonialists. But the purpose of either war, the aggressive war of internal war, is to serve the U.S.'s political purposes.

2. In the special war waged by the U.S. in South Viet-Nam, in addition to the use of money, weapons, and ammunition brought in from the U.S., the enemy also employs the Vietnamese people to fight Vietnamese people, and uses part of our people's property to finance his war expenses. Therefore, the U.S. imperialists and their henchmen find every way to gain the support of the South Vietnamese people. For this purpose, they have to resort to
deceptive political schemes in order to win over our people.

The pro-U.S. government in the South is a government created by the U.S. after the defeat of the French imperialists, it is not a national bourgeois government born of the successful national liberation movement. Thus it is an unworthy government having no connection with the people's cause fighting for independence and democracy. Upon its coming into being, it had to cope with the powerful people's force. The South Vietnamese people have joined the people of the entire country to successfully complete the August Revolution and have won the Resistance war. The South Vietnamese people is [sic] one half of the heroic people which has achieved the national, democratic, people's revolution and is building socialism in one-half of the country. The South Vietnamese people have a high political enlightenment, an indomitable fighting spirit, and strong confidence in their just cause. They are controlling large rural areas, and being guided by an experienced Marxist-Leninist Party. Consequently, since the start of the conflict they have an absolute political superiority over the U.S. and its henchmen. If the U.S. imperialists and their henchmen use a demagogic political scheme, the South Vietnamese people will take advantage of it to stand up and exercise counter-pressure against their domination. For this reason, in order to survive, the SVN government must use fascist schemes to repress the people and dispute the control of the people with the Revolution.

Friction between the lackey government, the U.S. imperialists, the bourgeois class, and the landowners steadily increases while the revolutionary movement of the South Vietnamese people keeps developing. This makes the pro-U.S. government weaker in the political field and induces it to become more fascist in nature.

For this reason, to counter the SVN Revolution, the enemy takes both political and military measures with emphasis on military measures. Although he concentrates on the military, he cannot do without the political measure. As for our people, we are inferior to the enemy as far as weapons, ammunition, equipment and war facilities are concerned, but we have an absolute political superiority. Therefore, we are capable of motivating the people to take part
in the political struggle against the enemy, and at the same time we must have an armed force to counter his military schemes.

Our people's revolutionary war in SVN is still a war in which our people use a small force to counter a large force. Our people must destroy and wear down the enemy's force while developing our forces. We must fight the enemy in all fields in order to weaken his forces and demoralize his troops. The process of combat activities is a process in which our forces develop while the enemy's forces are weakened. The more fighting we conduct the more victories we achieve while the enemy suffered more defeats. In the end we will either destroy the enemy or smash his aggressive and colonial intentions.

The general guideline for our people's revolutionary war in SVN is to conduct a protracted war, relying mainly on our own forces, and to combine political struggle and armed struggle in accordance with each area and time.

The war waged by the people in South VN is a protracted one because we are a small people having to fight an imperialist ringleader which is the U.S.A. We are using our political and moral strength with our military and material weakness to oppose an enemy who is weak politically and morally but strong militarily and materially.

We need time and efforts to overcome many difficulties and hardships in order to tip the balance of power between the enemy and us in our favor: we become stronger while the enemy becomes weaker, only in this way can we gain the final victory. We should try to contain the enemy in the special war, but at the same time we must be ready to cope with him in case he wages the war on a larger scale or brings in the troops of the Southeast Asia aggressive bloc to fight us. We have worked out the protracted war guideline in the anti-French Resistance. However, the substance of this guideline is different from that of the previous one. In the anti-French Resistance, the successes gained during the first years came only from our bourgeoing capabilities. Only when the Chinese Revolution achieved a decisive victory in 1949, did we have a big and
strong rear and favorable conditions to bring the Resistance to final victory with the glorious victory of Dien Bien Phu and the liberation of the North. At present our people's struggle in SVN is also a long one but we have assured factors for success. Today, beside the subjective conditions, we have other favorable objective conditions for success. Today, behind the SVN people is the entire North which is now building socialism, and our bloc which is increasingly stronger and is becoming the decisive factor in the development of mankind. Our struggle for peace and a just cause is supported by the people over the world including the American people.

However, the revolutionary people in SVN must promote a spirit of self reliance. The imperialist bloc has been greatly weakened. Its leader, the Americans, the aggressor of SVN, are the most defeated among imperialists. They have suffered successive defeats from China to Korea, and from Indochina to Cuba. Contradictions between the imperialists are increasingly acute. They are in a paradoxical situation where, standing separately, they cannot do anything, but when associating with one another, they are marred by mutual conflicts.

There are also conflicts between the U.S. imperialists and the bourgeois ruling factions in Southeast Asia. The revolutionary movement for national liberation is rising like a high tide and the imperialists cannot stop it.

On one hand, we must thoroughly understand the guideline for a protracted struggle but on the other hand we must also seize the opportunities to win victories in a not too long period of time. In a revolutionary war, which is at the same time a war against aggression and a domestic war, as in SVN, we should be ready to take advantage of sudden changes in the situation to turn our struggle into a large revolutionary movement to disintegrate the enemy's troops and government. There is no contradiction in the concept of a protracted war and the concept of taking advantage of opportunities to gain victories in a short time, because the method to gain victory in our people's revolution in SVN is to make efforts to build and develop forces in all aspects.
The more we try to build and develop our forces to gain victories in a short time, the more we will have favorable conditions to fight a protracted war. In the course of the protracted war against the enemy there is the possibility that our Revolution in SVN has to go through a transitional phase which entails complex forms and methods of struggle before a complete victory is achieved. However, regardless of which way the revolution may develop, the most essential and decisive condition is still to develop our forces in all fields, especially our military forces, and to be ready to seize opportunities to achieve final victories.

In the course of our political and military development, we should try to defeat the enemy step by step and gain victory bit by bit. So, we should be resolved to fight a protracted war and be ready to seize all opportunities to bring our Revolution in SVN to final victory. Now we are stronger than the enemy politically, we must continue to strengthen our political forces. However, we are still weaker than the enemy militarily. Therefore the key point at the present time is to make outstanding efforts to rapidly strengthen our military forces in order to create a basic change in the balance of forces between the enemy and us in South Viet-Nam.

We should pay due concern to coordinating political and military struggles.

The political struggle plays a decisive and fundamental role. First, because our basic strength is in the political field, and the basic weakness of the enemy is also in the political field. From the start we have the absolute superiority over the enemy in the political field. Second, the enemy cannot refrain from resorting to such political schemes as using the false labels of "nation, people, democracy" in order to woo the people; therefore we must, and can, take advantage of this to hit back at the enemy. Third, the SVN people have had long political struggle traditions and experiences. They have formed a "political army" composed of millions of people conducting continuous attacks against the enemy throughout the country by the use of complex struggle tactics. They have a valiant determination to fight against the enemy and protect their lives and property.
The masses' political struggle is also closely coordinated with the armed struggle waged by the people's armed forces. Not only does the People's Revolutionary Army participate in the direct fight against the enemy at the front, but the "people's political army" also rushes to the front to fight against the enemy's armed forces.

Armed struggle also plays a very basic and decisive role: First, because only with the support of armed struggle can the masses' prestige and position be brought into full play. It is necessary to develop and maintain political struggle in a situation where the enemy is using military force to oppress the people. Second, because the enemy is using military power as a principal tool to maintain his domination and using the anti-revolutionary war to oppose the people, the latter must use revolutionary war to counter the enemy's anti-revolutionary war in order to protect their lives and property and liberate themselves.

If we do not defeat the enemy's military forces, we cannot overthrow his domination and bring the Revolution to victory. To destroy the enemy's military forces, we should use armed struggle. For this reason, armed struggle plays a direct and decisive role.

The development of the revolutionary movement in SVN during the past nine years proved that the above guidelines pertaining to protracted war, with emphasis on self-reliance and coordination between political struggle and armed struggle were fully correct. Because the SVN people strictly carried out these guidelines, they have achieved many great victories.

The guideline pertaining to the coordination of political and armed struggle must be carried out not only during a short time but also over long periods of time. By carrying out this guideline we are preparing for the General Offensive and Uprising by using military and political forces to disintegrate the pro-U.S. government's troops and provoke uprisings in the rural area and cities still under enemy occupation. A General Offensive and Uprising is the necessary goal of the guideline on the use of combined political and armed struggle. The process of advancing toward the General Offensive and Uprising is
one marked by limited offensives and partial uprisings in a complex see-saw dispute with the enemy aimed at pushing back the enemy step by step, winning victory bit by bit and advancing toward winning total victory.

When saying that the political struggle must be coordinated with the armed struggle we do not mean that the armed struggle need not follow the rules of war.

On the contrary, this armed struggle must follow the rules of war. It must be developed according to these rules. The SVN people's war requires suitable guidelines on military strategy, techniques and tactics.

The problems pertaining to base areas, and the relation between the three types of forces, main forces, local force, guerrilla force, and operating methods in different areas... must be settled in accordance with the practical situation in SVN. The armed activities are used not only to destroy the enemy's forces but also to support the political struggle. The armed struggle must attain its highest mission which is to destroy the enemy's forces. The armed struggle must attain its ultimate goal which is to destroy the enemy's combat ability. Since the enemy force is composed primarily of troops of the lackey government, the practical goal of the armed struggle is to destroy and disintegrate the lackey government's army. Only in this way can the Revolution win a decisive victory. For this reason the people in the South must not only have a big and strong political force but a big and strong military force as well. We have to simultaneously fight to destroy the enemy's forces and develop our forces in order to change the balance of forces between the enemy and us in the military field.

As the armed struggle develops according to its own rules to a decisive level, the political struggle must keep pace with the armed struggle.

Based on the characteristics of the situation, the balance of forces between us and the enemy, and the enemy's activities in each area, we coordinate the political struggle with the armed struggle in the three areas: mountainous, rural, and urban areas.
Mountainous area: South Viet-Nam's mountainous area occupies an important strategic position. It offers many favorable conditions for us to conduct a protracted struggle even in the most difficult situations. This is the area where we can build up a large armed force and annihilate many enemy troops in large-scale attacks. We can also use the mountainous area as a stepping stone to expand our activities to the lowlands and, when the situation allows, to attack the key positions of the enemy. In case the enemy expands the war to a larger scale, the mountainous area together with the lowland will enable us to fight a protracted war against him. We should make every effort to control the mountainous areas and have the determination to build these areas into a solid base. The main guideline for our activities in the mountainous areas is to conduct the armed struggle. At the same time, we should continue to motivate the people and ethnic-minority groups, who are concentrated in these areas, to participate in our political struggle. We must also motivate them to counter the enemy's plan of oppressing the highlanders, deceiving the ethnic-minority people and of herding them into land resettlement centers or strategic hamlets, blockading and destroying the economy in the highland and mountains etc.

The lowland and the rural area: These are rich and heavily populated areas. There, our revolutionary movement is active and our revolutionary base-level organizations are relatively widespread. There are the areas where the enemy is striving to scoop up human and material resources for the purpose of using Vietnamese to fight Vietnamese, using war to feed war; these are also the areas where we are determined to dispute with the enemy for the control of human and material resources with which to fight a protracted war. If we succeed in gaining control over the lowlands and rural areas, we will save the mountainous area from isolation. In doing so, we can also develop our forces in these areas and create an advantageous position for our troops to attack enemy key positions. The guideline for our activities in the lowland and rural area consists of coordinating the political struggle with the armed struggle in order to destroy and wear down enemy forces, dispute with the enemy for the control of human and material resources, control villages and hamlets, and enlarge our liberated areas from the mountainous area down to the lowland. Although
political struggle combined with armed struggle is the general guideline applied for the lowland and rural area, under certain circumstances and in certain lowland area, sometimes political struggle should be the main activity and conversely sometimes armed struggle should play the principal role. We must use the lowland and rural area as a place where to wage protracted warfare against the enemy or to destroy large enemy forces.

**Urban area:** This is the area where leading agencies of the enemy, including organs of his central government, are located, where the enemy is concentrating his strong repressive forces and facilities. But this is also the area where the people live in great number and they have a high political enlightenment; they have risen up several times to struggle against the enemy. When the situation is favorable for us to conduct a General Offensive and Uprising, there is the possibility that the people in urban areas will also rise up and coordinate with the revolutionary troops coming from outside to overthrow the enemy's central government. Our principal guideline for operations in the urban areas consists of conducting political struggle, setting up a reserve force, and waiting for favorable conditions. Military activities should be moderately conducted in urban areas to support the political struggle. We must avoid losses and premature exposure of our forces. However, if the situation develops to a point where the balance of forces between us and the enemy changes to our advantage, we can deal the enemy decisive blows right in the urban area.

We should carry out our activities in the three areas, as mentioned above, but we should not let the enemy implement his plan of dividing the area into zones. He tries to carry out this plan with the purpose of maintaining his rear areas and destroying our liberated areas.

Based on the combination of political and military struggles, we should attack the enemy through the coordination of three prongs: political attack, military attack and troop proselyting (using propaganda to motivate enemy troops). Since the principal force of the enemy is composed of troops of the lackey government, troop proselyting plays an extremely important role. It supports our political struggle as well as our armed struggle; it also contributes to our acti-
vities to win over the people and destroy strategic hamlets. By carrying out the enemy troop proselyting activities, we can disintegrate the enemy army, provoke military revolts, and strengthen our forces. The enemy troop proselyting mission has a tactical and also a strategic importance. It should be successfully implemented in order to advance toward the General Offensive and Uprising. One of the most important conditions which will bring victory to our General Offensive and Uprising is that we should materialize an alliance between workers, peasants and soldiers.

The struggle guideline of coordinating political and armed struggle should be thoroughly understood and incorporated in all missions, in all forms of political and military organizations, and in each struggle and phase of struggles, in each battle and each campaign. Therefore, the South Vietnamese people's war is an all-people, all-sided war. It is the continuation and the development of the previous lessons learned from the resistance against the French. Now, it is conducted under new conditions and to a higher degree.

In brief, to defeat the enemy troops, we should thoroughly understand the following strategic guideline: Conduct protracted struggles with principal reliance on our own forces. We should also coordinate the political struggle with the armed struggle, perform activities in the three areas, and attack the enemy on three fronts: Political, military, and troop proselyting. In addition, we should mobilize all revolutionary forces in order to conduct a protracted war waged by all the people on every front, then move toward the General Offensive and Uprising. Even if the U.S. imperialists bring fifty to a hundred thousand additional troops to SVN, we should always continue to strongly expand the all-people, all-sided war in order to defeat the enemy.

The decisive factor which leads to victory in all circumstances is to motivate the people in the political field and strengthen the revolutionary forces in all fields. Our immediate mission is to rapidly increase the military forces.

While following the general strategic guideline for
conducting protracted struggles with principal reliance on our own forces and the combat guidelines of coordinating the political struggle with armed struggle, we should be fully aware of the techniques of exercising strategic and tactical leadership. The following traits should be displayed: aggressiveness, flexibility, operational initiative, and maintaining close coordination.

All these strategic guidelines are the creation of the people of the entire country and presently of the people in the South who have fought valiantly during the past 20 years under the Party's leadership. They will lead the South Vietnamese Revolution to final victory.

3. During the struggle conducted to gain victory, we should make efforts to bring into full play our advantages but we must at the same time see all the difficulties in order to overcome them. We should avoid subjectivity and onesidedness.

Enemy situation: Though they were continuously defeated and began to have doubt about a victory, the U.S. imperialists did not renounce their scheme to cling to SVN. They will probably increase the strength of the lackey government's forces in SVN after they kicked out Diem and while the contradictions between them and their new lackeys are not yet acute. They may concentrate their forces to launch fiercer attacks against us. They may use more modern weapons and new tactics. They are still able to realize part of their strategic hamlet program and may have more wily schemes to consolidate these strategic hamlets. They may be able to use to a certain extent a number of religious sects to oppose us, this is something Diem had refused to do in the past. Besides, we should be careful about the possibility that the Americans may bring in from fifty to a hundred thousand additional troops to SVN to expand the war and turn it into a limited war.

Friendly situation: Our armed forces are still weak. Though we have the capability to develop them, we still need time to implement this task. Our bases and liberated areas are still small and not sufficiently consolidated. Our bases in jungles and mountainous areas are facing difficulties in economy and manpower. Besides, in a number of rural and lowland areas, our revolutionary move-
ment is still weak while in the cities we do not yet have a strong infrastructure, and our organizations in the enemy ranks are still weak.

However, all the above are only difficulties inherent to any process of development. The Revolution will finally overcome all these difficulties to win a glorious victory.

III

IMMEDIATE TASK

The direction of our efforts is as follows: While patiently fighting for a long time, take advantage of favorable opportunities and concentrate efforts to resolutely win big victories of a decisive nature in the forthcoming years.

To attain this goal, our immediate task is as follows: Motivate the entire Party and people to overcome all difficulties; increase their sense of political awareness; strive to strengthen our political and armed forces (especially the armed forces) in order to change the balance of forces in our favor; positively consolidate and expand our base areas, especially in strategic areas of activity, and improve the mobility of strategic and main forces; destroy and disintegrate one by one elements of the enemy force and a number of his strategic hamlets; gain the initiative in mountainous and lowland areas, create favorable conditions for the people in cities to rise up and drive the U.S. imperialists and their henchmen into more crises and nearer to collapse; provide favorable conditions for the revolutionary movement to gain the initiative in strategy and win decisive victories.

In the above immediate task, there are two essential matters which are the main objectives to be attained. They are the following:

1. Destroy one by one elements of the enemy force and create favorable conditions to completely disintegrate his military force which is the main support of the U.S. and their henchmen in South Viet-Nam.
2. Frustrate the enemy schemes in building strategic hamlets and relocating the people. Destroy the majority of the strategic hamlets, gain human and material resources for the Revolution, and control mountainous areas and a large part of the lowland areas.

The above two missions are related to each other and supporting each other. Only by wearing down the enemy force and disintegrating one by one elements of his force can we rapidly destroy his strategic hamlets. Conversely, if we successfully destroy his strategic hamlets, we can create more conditions to destroy and wear down the enemy strength.

If the above two missions are implemented satisfactorily, we will effectively break the enemy's scheme to relocate the people into strategic hamlets and destroy our armed force with his superior military strength. In short, we will frustrate the enemy's strategy in South Viet-Nam.

In order to fulfill the above task, efforts must be made to carry out the following specific tasks:

1. We must actively participate in combat to wear down and destroy one by one elements of the enemy's force.

The common strategic task of our armed force in this all-people, all-sided war is to destroy the enemy military force, and in coordination with the political force, disintegrate the enemy strength; specifically we must try to disintegrate the lackey Army, which is the main instrument of the enemy's regime, and create favorable conditions for our forces to launch the General Offensive and Uprising to overthrow the reactionary government in South Viet-Nam.

To implement satisfactorily the above strategic mission the South Vietnamese people must adopt the tactic of annihilation attacks. We have three types of forces: The main force, local force, and guerrillas. These three forces must launch annihilation attacks against the enemy at various levels: from killing one soldier, capturing one weapon to destroying entire units of the enemy. Only in this way, can we strengthen our forces and wear down the enemy's forces.
Each type of force must have its own combat method. Close coordination must be made between the three types of forces in the accomplishment of their common task.

Though our armed forces are maturing and our regular forces are developing day after day, the type of war waged by our three forces remains one of guerrilla warfare for a long time to come. The main purpose of our campaigns and combat activities is to destroy the enemy's forces. It is necessary for us to attack where the enemy is most vulnerable. Therefore, at present, we must attack the enemy troops while they are out of their fortifications, or moving on roads, waterways, or in the air. Our major combat tactics to be adopted are to lay ambushes, conduct raids, or gradually advance toward mobile warfare, when conditions permit. We should maneuver our troops from a distance to lay ambushes or conduct raids against the enemy when they are in the field. The size of ambushes and raids depends on the situation of each battlefield, element of time, and the forces which we can muster. At the same time, we should grasp the following principles: attack with a maximum assurance of success, attack quickly and withdraw quickly, attack to secure advantages in both the political and military fields. Closely coordinate the military, political, and troop proselyting activities to destroy the enemy troops. Firmly grasp the principle of waging a protracted war strategically and conducting quick attacks and withdrawals tactically, destroying enemy forces, preserving and strengthening our forces.

We must dominate the situation, attack the enemy everywhere, increase vigilance and maintain secrecy so as to take the initiative in combat.

The enemy is waging a special war against the people of South Viet-Nam. He also developed three types of forces (Regular, Regional and Popular Forces), which coordinate with each other to oppress the people and destroy our armed forces.

His three types of forces rely on one another, but his Regular Force divisions play the key role. As long as these Regular Force divisions are not disintegrated and destroyed, the Regional and Popular Forces will have enough
support to conduct their activities. On the other hand, if the Regional and Popular Forces are destroyed and fail to oppress the people, the Regular Force will be forced to disperse widely to cope with us in a passive position. The target of our attacks is always the enemy military forces, but considering the capacity for development of our army and our common mission, we must set forth specific responsibilities for each area, unit and type of force. We must also establish close coordination among our three types of forces, so that we can successfully perform combat duties, destroy the enemy and attain definite military and political objectives. In the past, our attacks were mainly aimed at the enemy's Popular, Regional and Special Forces. What we did was right, because our forces were too weak to destroy the enemy's Regular Force; at the same time, we have to think about the protection of the people's lives and property. But, when our forces are mature enough, our main force should launch annihilation attacks against the enemy Regular Force units. By doing this, we demoralize the enemy troops and disintegrate his Popular and Regional Force and serve the purpose of destroying strategic hamlets and developing guerrilla units.

In 1963, we successfully launched annihilation attacks against the enemy forces of company size. In one battle, we heavily depleted two Regional Force companies and of particular interest is the cases where we destroyed whole battalions of the enemy's forces. For the achievement of greater victories, we must urgently strengthen our forces, improve our combat tactics and technique, leadership and morale of our troops in order to destroy the enemy forces at company and battalion levels.

In addition our main force should launch more mobile attacks in strategic areas of operation, so that it can play a decisive role in our revolutionary war against the enemy's special war.

In combat activities, the Southern army and people have recently gained great victories and adopted many effective tactics. Therefore, we should quickly recapitulate the experiences in order to improve leadership. It is necessary to combine experiences gained in the present war with the experiences gained in the last resistance war.
as well as with experiences gained from other countries. In considering these experiences, we should avoid mechanical dogmatism but we should not disregard our past experience, nor should we disregard experiences from other countries.

2. Destruction of the enemy’s strategic hamlets:

The SVN people have had experiences in destroying strategic hamlets.

Typical examples in this aspect have been set by various local areas. Efforts should be made to recapitulate and disseminate the experiences gained on the destruction of strategic hamlets. Our requirements for the two or three coming years are to basically destroy the enemy’s strategic hamlets and seize control of the majority of the hamlets and villages.

Destruction of strategic hamlets is included in the people’s revolutionary movement against the aggression and enslavement of the U.S. and their henchmen. This movement is part of the political and military struggles waged by the SVN people and Liberation Army.

In recent months, in the southern lowland areas, especially in the central part of Nam Bo, we have been successful in destroying a series of strategic hamlets.

This fact proved the great capabilities of our people’s military and political forces in the destruction of the enemy’s strategic hamlets. It also proved the bankruptcy of the enemy’s "national strategic hamlet’s policy." After the Diem’s government was overthrown, the enemy stated that he would continue to implement that policy. He may order his troops to build and consolidate the strategic hamlets, strengthen fortifications, and defense units in these hamlets, especially in the sensitive areas.

In order to build the strategic hamlets, the enemy adopted his fiercest oppressive control of the population and used many military, political, and economic schemes.

Recently, because of having suffered heavy failures, he employed a large number of troops to hold the strategic hamlets. This caused his troops to disperse in a large
area. He built the strategic hamlets in order to give him
a strong position, but before the development of our peo­
ple's military and political forces, the strategic hamlets
turned into a weakness of the enemy, and became the pla­
ces where we could attack the enemy easily. Therefore,
along with the development of guerrilla warfare, we should
increase our activities to destroy the strategic hamlets in
order to disintegrate the enemy's Popular Forces and "Com­
batt Youths," to paralyze the Regional Forces, and to reduce
the combat capabilities of the Main Forces. In addition,
efforts should be concentrated to establish coordination be­
tween the military activities with the political struggle move­
ments and troop proselyting missions. The practical reality
has proved that the faster we destroyed the strategic ham­
lets, the sooner the "Combat Youth Groups" and Popular
Forces will be disintegrated, the Regional Forces will be
paralyzed, and the Main Forces will be hampered and dis­
persed in their sweep operations. Conversely, when the
Popular Forces were disintegrated, the Regional Forces were
paralyzed, and the Main Forces were hampered and disper­
sed in sweep operations, our movement to destroy the stra­
tegic hamlets could be developed widely.

Along with motivating the people to participate in the
political struggle, we should destroy the enemy's prestige
and properly punish a number of reactionaries and tyrants
who owe blood debts to the people and oppose the revolu­
tion. At the same time, we should conduct indoctrinations
to re-educate and guide those who erroneously followed the
enemy, to return to the people. We should properly carry
out the policy of "repression combined with clemency, and
punishment with re-education," and avoid the rightist and
leftist tendencies.

After the two recent coup d'états, the confusion among
the puppet army and administration and the disintegration of
Diém's oppressive agencies (such as the Labor and Per­
sonalist Party, the Republican Youth Group, the espionage
networks, the reactionary Catholic factions, etc...), crea­
ted many favorable conditions for us to step up the des­
truction of strategic hamlets. We should timely take the
opportunity to motivate the people to demand that the ene­
my abolish the strategic hamlets, wards, and sub-wards.
At the same time, we should conduct political struggles
alone or combined with armed struggle to break the enemy's
oppressive control of the population and destroy a large number of strategic hamlets.

In order to step up the political struggles, we motivate people ideologically, correct our erroneous concept of overestimating the enemy while underestimating the masses. We should not believe that the people are unable to rise up to break the enemy's oppressive control and seize power in hamlets and villages. Nor should we overestimate the people's political awareness by thinking that they are ready to rise up but have not done so because of the enemy's tight control.

We should build combat villages in places where the strategic hamlets were destroyed. The building of combat villages was one of the great achievements of the revolutionary movement in SVN during the recent period. The combat villages were the results of the development of our people's military and political struggles and were the combination of many means to resist the enemy in the military, political, and economic fields.

We should take advantage of our experience in building up our armed forces, expanding guerrilla warfare, developing the economy, maintaining and protecting [farm] production, motivating and indoctrinating the people to develop the combat villages. We must encourage the people to build more combat villages and turn them into the bastions of guerrilla warfare and into a strong support for a protracted struggle.

3. Development of armed forces:

The development of forces is now one of our most important missions. We should ensure all immediate tasks and at the same time, meet the requirements when opportunities arise. We must cause a basic change of the balance between the enemy and us to our advantage.

The fundamental principles applied for the development of the SVN Revolutionary Armed Forces are the same as those applied for the building up the Vietnamese People's Army. Three types of troops of the SVN Revolutionary Armed Forces (main force, local force and militia guerrilla
force) are placed under the absolute leadership of the Party. They follow the regime in which the Party Committee is the leader and the unit commander is the cadre in charge. This regime also includes Party commissars and political officers. This army is not only a combat army, but also an action and production army.

We should apply democracy and strict discipline in the development of the force and practice solidarity between cadre and soldiers and unity between the Army and people.

We should pay immediate attention to the balance between various forces. For example, the militia guerrilla force should be larger than the local force, and the local force larger than the main force. However, we should be flexible, because the development of forces should be in accordance with the situation and our missions in each phase so as to ensure success to serve our strategic plan.

We should, at present, concentrate our efforts on increasing the main force and the development of the militia-guerrillas and the local force. However, take precautions to avoid weakening the local force and guerrilla units while trying to quickly consolidate our main force.

In the development of our troops, we should not only increase the number of troops, but also their quality. This is the most important task. In addition, improve the cadre and the men, ensure the purity of our internal ranks, organize them into light units to ensure high mobility. We should also improve our soldiers' level of political awareness. In addition we must improve their technical and tactical skills and increase their fire power.

We should reorganize and strengthen the command machinery of various echelons so as to help the staff, political and rear service agencies of all ranks to accomplish their duties.

4. Intensification of the political struggle movement, consolidation of the political force and broadening of the NFLSVN.

In SVN, the political struggle movement and the people's political force are available. However, because the
Revolution is going to engage in decisive struggles and the requirements of the new missions are too numerous, we need to continue intensifying the political struggle movement, developing the political force and broadening the NFLSVN.

We must develop to the highest degree this all-people, all-sided war. We must step up efforts to match the level of armed struggle, to destroy more strategic hamlets, counter sweep operations and terrorism, proselyte the enemy troops, protect the life and property of the people and demand the improvement of living conditions and social welfare, etc. We must take advantage of the present favorable situation when the new lackey government is not yet consolidated, to try to increase the political struggle movement and develop the organization of the Front.

We must mobilize to a high level all potential capabilities of the people in order to build and develop the armed forces and serve the armed struggle. We must make all the people realize that the people in South Viet-Nam are waging a patriotic war and everyone must do all he can to bring this war to victory.

We must strive to consolidate and broaden the Liberation Front of South Viet-Nam based on the workers-peasants alliance and led by the Party, so as to give it the ability to motivate the people on a wider scale, to accomplish its new political missions prescribed by the Party, and to assume part of the responsibilities as a revolutionary administration in the liberated areas. Considering the principal contents of the program of the National Front for the Liberation of SVN which consist of winning independence, democracy, peace and neutrality before proceeding toward the reunification of the country, and taking advantage of the time when we are winning resounding victories, when the enemy's internal organization is confused, and the contradictions between the U.S. and French are increasing, we must unceasingly launch political offensive phases by seething forth new policies and slogans, and activating new political organizations to isolate the enemy, win over progressive individuals or organizations having anti-American tendencies and desiring peace, neutrality, independence and democracy in SVN, including pro-French or pro-American elements who belong to the pacifist factions.
Nevertheless, we should clearly distinguish between the broadening of the NFLSVN and the expansion of the alliance with anti-American elements who do not participate in the Front. On one hand, we should broaden the NFLSVN, that means to develop base-level organizations of the Front among the masses, workers, peasants, petty bourgeois, students, intellectuals, and national bourgeois, especially among workers and peasants. At the same time, we should admit into the Front a number of democratic and patriotic personalities who oppose the Americans and lackeys; we must also activate political factions or patriotic organizations, liberation organizations, etc., and admit them to the Front. On the other hand, we should establish an anti-American alliance between the NFLSVN and the political factions which have anti-American tendencies. The admission of an individual or an organization into the NFLSVN Committee must be properly executed according to the regulations of the organizations which are the components of the Front or the general regulations of the Front. With regards to the activation of the anti-American alliance between the NFLSVN and the anti-American factions, we must use broad forms of alliance in order to achieve a unity of action against the Americans under definite conditions or at least we should gain their neutrality or sympathy.

We should gain control over many hamlets and villages. We must promptly intercept all enemy espionage and sabotage activities in hamlets and villages. We should organize the masses of peasants into political forces.

We should take control over the masses in each hamlet and village. Particularly, we should organize and control the youths. We should intensify our political and indoctrination work among the youths to quickly develop our armed forces. We should proselyte every youth who, when forced to join the enemy's army, will work for us among the enemy's army ranks and create conditions to transform every enemy unit into ours.

In the lowlands of Regions 5 and 6, and other rural areas under the enemy's oppressive control, we should work out appropriate slogans to motivate and organize the masses. We must study the land [reform] problem and
work out a proper policy which will boost our political struggle movement among the people and further develop the NFLSVN. Our political struggle movement in Regions 5 and 6 and part of Region 7 was still weak because we did not take appropriate measures, use proper slogans, properly organize the masses, and work out specific plans for coordination of our political struggle and armed struggle. We should lower the enemy's prestige in hamlets, isolate them from the masses, recruit key agents and maintain for a long time the newly emerging forces of the people. Efforts must be made to enlighten the people on political matters so that the people clearly understand the true face of the U.S. aggressors and their traitorous lackeys. We must show them that the U.S. imperialists are not strong and that they are being defeated and will be defeated. We should strengthen the people's confidence in their solidarity and combat capability and in their ultimate victory for the liberation and reunification of the country. We should promote a sense of sacrifice, the spirit of enduring hardships and the determination to fight and win. To do this, we should patiently provide appropriate ideological guidance for the people, and foster their deep hatred against the U.S. imperialists and their lackeys. We should indoctrinate the masses to understand the sacred and urgent duty of the Vietnamese people, which is to stand up to save the country.

In cities and their surroundings, we should motivate the masses to be ready to rise up against the enemy when there is any opportunity.

Our long range tasks are to maintain our base-level organizations, develop our movement, and strengthen and consolidate our forces. However, our immediate tasks are to take full advantage of the favorable conditions created by the enemy's coup d'états to intensify the people's struggle movement so as to cause the enemy to be unable to keep the situation under control. At the same time, we should take advantage of the enemy's false national and democratic slogans to propagandize against him and to legally conduct struggles. We should develop our movements to indoctrinate the people and strengthen the people's organizations. We should thoroughly understand and strictly implement the principles of secrecy in the organization, strengthening and
development of the Party and the Front. We should know how to conceal and protect key forces of the people, so when there is an opportunity, we can promptly motivate the people to rush forward to gain decisive victories. We should review our successes and failures in order to work out an appropriate policy and organization method to be carried out in cities and their surroundings. In this way we will harmoniously coordinate the movement in the cities with our general movement to advance our Revolution in a favorable way. Efforts must be made to plant agents in the enemy's army and administrative agencies, to recruit people of the upper class, especially those who have great influence among the people and assume a high position in society. We should win over the sympathy of the leftist elements in legal political parties and establish close contact with them.

In regard to ethnic minorities, especially ethnic minorities in the western highlands, we should strive to help the people increase their production and improve their living conditions, reduce the contribution of the people, develop educational activities and preventive medicine activities, and inspire the sense of unity between the lowland and highland people and solidarity between the ethnic minorities. We must provide indoctrination for ethnic minorities to heighten their patriotism and their sense of political vigilance in order to forestall the enemy's schemes of breaking up the unity of our national people's bloc. We must work closely with leaders of ethnic minorities, gain their sympathy and improve them. We must promptly correct our shortcomings in our motivation tasks towards ethnic minorities. Attention should be paid to training our cadre who are members of ethnic minorities.

We should pay great attention to the religious proselyting task. We should take precautions against the enemy's new schemes of using the religious sects to oppose us. We should positively increase the awareness of religious followers and gain the sympathy of leaders of religious sects to prevent them from falling into the traps of the U.S. and its lackeys who intend to use various religious sects to oppose us. We must win the religious sects over to our cause.

5. Intensification of the troop proselyting task:
The troop proselyting tasks are the political tasks of our entire army and people and are also our important strategic tasks. The slogan: "Coalition between workers, peasants and soldiers" in our armed and political missions should be thoroughly understood.

The results of our troop proselyting tasks are also the results of our military and political tasks: On one hand, in the political struggle movement of the people, we should make enemy soldiers realize that their own interests are identical to those of the people's interests in the South Viet-Nam Revolution. On the other hand, we should conduct strong destructive attacks to sap their confidence in the U.S. and its henchmen. We must show them that their defeat is inevitable. By doing this, we can disintegrate the enemy's forces. In addition to daily activities, such as, destroying strategic hamlets, countering enemy's sweep' operations, and opposing conscription etc., our troop proselyting tasks should be coordinated with our combat missions in order to create military revolts by whole enemy units. Attention should be paid to directing our troop proselyting activities not only towards enemy soldiers, non-commissioned officers, junior officers, but also towards middle and high ranking officers and officials working in secret organs of the enemy's army. We should make the best use of their capabilities for the Revolution. Therefore, we should absolutely maintain secrecy of our agents and important personnel.

We should strictly implement the clemency policy towards prisoners of war and those who surrender. Simultaneously, we should work out a policy for employing enemy soldiers and officers in case they sincerely rally to our people and Revolution.

Presently, our troop proselyting tasks do not meet the requirements of the Revolution and we failed to make the best use of our available capabilities and advantages. Therefore, we should make every effort to provide appropriate guidance for our troop proselyting tasks and carry them out in accordance with the situation.
6. Build up base areas and intensify economic and financial tasks:

Securing base areas is one of the vital factors to obtaining victory. When the war is developed to a certain degree, and when the main force units are strong, it is necessary to have large and secure base areas. Only when we expand and consolidate the base areas, can we accelerate the capability of the main force units to launch large scale attacks and cause a basic change in the present situation in our favor.

Presently, our base areas are still weak and small. This is a great weakness of the Revolution in the South that we must strive to overcome. We must urgently construct, and expand our major base areas in strategic and springboard areas. We must improve the political tasks, motivate and organize the people to build the Party, implement the ethnic minority policy, and develop guerrilla warfare. In addition, we should also increase production; make a better life for the people; provide and store enough foodstuffs; mobilize the cadre and the people to carry out security maintenance against enemy spies and Special Forces; and build up our organizations, and work out security measures from the highest to the lowest levels. Among these tasks, the most important are to conduct guerrilla activities, increase production, provide and store enough foodstuffs, and implement security maintenance to defend the base areas. To overcome all difficulties in sparsely populated, but important areas, we should strive to bring in people from other areas. We should consider the building and expansion of base areas an extremely important task. No matter how difficult it may be, we should fulfill it at all costs. We should use the revolutionary spirit to overcome seemingly insurmountable difficulties. In doing so, we can achieve a big strategic surprise vis a vis the enemy.

We should create favorable conditions for launching large scale annihilation attacks against the enemy in the mountainous area when he brings his troops to this area, or we should lure the enemy into this area in order to destroy important units of his main force.

Parallelling the reconstruction and expansion of major base areas, we should continue to expand other bases in the
lowlands and in areas along the boundary [between highland and lowland areas]. We should do this for the purpose of linking base areas in the lowlands with those of the mountainous areas forming a system of base areas which encircle the enemy and make it easy to destroy him.

We should properly administer the liberated areas in order to mobilize the people against the enemy, and win over the sympathy of the people in enemy controlled areas. To meet the rapid development of our forces, we are required to increase production, to ensure supply [of food].

Only when we solve the great contradiction [sic] between the development of force and the requirement of supply for force, can we step up our revolutionary war to attain the decisive victory during the coming years.

Presently the main problem of economic and financial tasks in the South is to increase production, practice thriftiness ensure transportation and supply, expand economic exchanges, and counter the enemy's destruction and economic blockade.

We must increase production, so that our units and agencies can operate on a self-sufficiency basis. We must carry out a reasonable tax policy both to ensure a good contribution and to pay due attention to the living conditions of the people. We should combine our political struggles with armed struggles to protect and bring economic interests to our people, develop our economic strength, win over the people, and seize manpower and material resources from the enemy. We must protect production and the material and cultural life of the people. We must try to heighten the sense of self-reliance, and properly use the aid given to us. We must also gave manpower and material resources and simplify our organization. We must enhance the endurance to overcome hardships to carry out the task of the Party and people.

We must pay attention to policy leadership and ideological leadership, strengthen the organization, and take practical measures in the finance and economic tasks.
7. Continue to intensify efforts for winning international sympathy and support:

First, we must try to win the sympathy and support from socialist nations, national liberation movements, workers and the laboring class throughout the world for the struggle conducted by the people of South [Viet-Nam].

During the past few years, the NFLSVN has attained considerable achievements in this respect but still not enough. We have the capability to obtain more results in the above field. We must make every effort to motivate various peace organizations, labor unions, youths, women, lawyers, other professional organizations of various peoples in the world, and various organizations of the people of Africa, Asia and Latin America to take stronger actions in asking the U.S. imperialists to end their aggressive war, withdraw their troops, military personnel and weapons from South Viet-Nam, and let the South Vietnamese people settle their own problems. We must also win the sympathy and support of the people of the nationalist and imperialist countries (the U.S., France and England).

In our hard and complicated struggle against the U.S. imperialists, international support and solidarity are important factors in our victory. Along with the intensification of our armed and political struggles in South Viet-Nam, we must step up our diplomatic struggles for the purpose of isolating warmongers, gaining the sympathy of antiwar groups in the U.S. and taking full advantage of the dissentions among the imperialists to gain the sympathy and support of various countries which follow a peaceful and neutral policy.

8. Strengthening Party leadership:

The mission awaiting us is colossal but also a glorious one. In order to successfully accomplish this mission, we must overcome many difficulties and our entire Party and people must make extraordinary efforts. Therefore, the strengthening of the Party leadership has a decisive significance. First, we should make our Party members thoroughly understand the fundamental characteristics of the situation, our advantages and difficulties, and the new factors which bring about new developments of the Revolution in South VN.
We must make them thoroughly understand our capabilities to win victory, the enemy's inevitable defeat, and new specific missions which will lead us to a final victory. On that basis, we should make our cadre and Party members have a self-reliant spirit, a willingness to fight a protracted struggle and to endure hardships, a determination to fight and win, and a firm confidence in the final victory. We should simultaneously teach them how to seize opportunities in order to gain victory, heighten their vigilance and their will to fight, oppose the rightist and shirking attitudes, and fear of sacrifice. At the same time, we must eliminate adventurism and subjectivism.

We must improve the organization and leadership of the Party in order to meet the war requirements. Efforts should be focused on the improvement of Party Chapters and the indoctrination of Party members.

We must make efforts in the development of Party members among the armed forces of the people and pay attention to the strengthening of the Party in sensitive areas, in enemy-controlled areas where our movement is still weak, in cities and towns, and in the areas of the ethnic minorities.

While strengthening the Party, attention should also be paid to the protection of the Party. Therefore, we must carefully investigate internal personnel and provide good administration of the Party members to prevent the enemy from planting their agents in the Party, or proselyting our cadre and Party members, especially those in leading agencies. We must pay attention to the selection of the Party members among workers, peasants, laborers and intellectuals, and strive to consolidate the Party Chapters. We must also intensify the improvement of our cadre and Party members, and heighten the leadership ability of our cadre and Party Committees authorities.

Military leadership must also be heightened to match the requirements of the common tasks.

**Strengthening of the People's Revolutionary Youth Group:**
In South Viet-Nam, the Youth Group is considered an arm and also a reserve unit for our Party.
According to principle, we must uphold centralization but at the same time promote democracy appropriately. The new mission requires greater efforts from the whole Party and the people.

The development of war requires the most effective coordination of all theaters of operations. All of South Viet-Nam must carry out a unified plan. Therefore, we must strengthen centralization and overcome narrow-mindedness and particularism. While strengthening centralization, we must also develop democracy in the Party. Our war is a revolutionary, a people’s war. Revolution is a creative achievement of the masses. We must develop democracy in compliance with the aspirations of the people and promote the creativeness of the people, so that each of them can concentrate day and night, on discovering the best way to defeat the enemy. In the Revolution, especially in a revolutionary war, the subjective activism of man is highly developed. To win or to lose the war depends on many factors, but the basic one is man. We must develop democracy to promote the subjective activism millions of people. The more victories we gain, the more attention we must pay to developing democracy, and we must trust the masses, the people, and the combatants. From the people’s and combatants’ experiences, we must find out the most effective way to fight the enemy. We must be very flexible, and never let our leadership thinking be restricted by the old formulas. The enemy was defeated chiefly because he could not cope with the millions of human brains, which were always concentrating on finding all means and all forms to defeat him. We should develop this superiority. We should bring democracy into full play in political and armed struggles, among the people, in the army during combat or attacks on strategic hamlets, in the fight against enemy spies; in sum, in all aspects of revolutionary tasks. We must make efforts to eliminate bureaucraticism, commandism, perfunctoriness, detachment from the masses, at the same time we must also guard ourselves against tendencies towards undisciplined liberty, sectarianism, narrow-mindedness and particularism.

The Mission of North Viet-Nam:

To fulfill the above-mentioned mission, not only the Party and people in the South must make outstanding efforts
but the Party and people in the North must make outstanding efforts as well. The role of the two "mien" [parts: North and South VN] in the revolutionary undertaking of the country, as defined by the Party's third National Congress, is unchanged, however it is time for the North to increase aid to the South, the North must bring into fuller play its role as the revolutionary base for the whole nation.

1. There should be a strong evolution in leadership concerning the support and aid for the Revolution in South Viet-Nam; we should thoroughly understand that under the leadership of the Party, our people are peacefully building North Viet-Nam, and at the same time conducting the anti-American war in South Viet-Nam. It is our nation's responsibility to struggle against the U.S. and their henchmen.

Because of the necessity to contain the enemy in the "special war" and confine this war within South Viet-Nam, the participation in the war by North and South Viet-Nam is different. However, both "mien" must make maximum efforts to defeat the enemy.

2. We should indoctrinate cadre, Party members, and the people in North Viet-Nam about their responsibility toward the Revolution in South Viet-Nam in order to increase their revolutionary spirit, their fighting determination, their patriotism, and to encourage them to work harder, and to be ready to fulfill their obligation toward the southern Revolution under any form and in any circumstance.

3. We should plan to aid the South [Viet-Nam] to meet the requirements of the Revolution, and because of this aid, we must revise properly our plan for building North Viet-Nam.

4. We must understand that the favorable development of the Revolution in the South depends on our unceasing efforts to strengthen North Viet-Nam. Therefore, we must increase our economic and defensive strength in North Viet-Nam. We should increase our vigilance at all times and be ready to face the enemy new schemes. At the same time, we should be prepared to cope with the eventuality of the expansion of the war into North Viet-Nam.
5. We must strengthen the research agencies in order to assist Central [the Central Committee of the Viet-Nam Workers Party] direct the revolution in the South, we must coordinate with concerned branches of service in the North in order to better serve the revolution in the South.

Following the long resistance war waged by the entire nation against the French colonialists, the revolutionary struggle of our Southern compatriots has been going on for almost the last ten years. The armed struggle which has been waged since mid-1959 has become decisive by 1962.

Considering the development during the past two years, we are able to fully evaluate the enemy, understand our capability and see clearer the development of South Viet-Nam's Revolution.

We have firm foundations to believe that we will certainly win the final victory. The most important thing at the present time is that the entire Party, the entire people from North to South must have full determination and make outstanding efforts to bring success to the revolution of our Southern compatriots and achieve peace and unification of the country, to win total victory, to build a peaceful, unified, independent, democratic, prosperous and strong Viet-Nam.

END

Make 10 copies. 1 January 1965
"LET US STRENGTHEN OUR COHESION AND UNITY, HEIGHTEN OUR FIGHTING SPIRIT, AND LEAD OUR REVOLUTIONARY CAUSE TOWARDS NEW VICTORIES"

[Hanoi VNA International Service in English, 21 January 1964, broadcast a Nhan Dan editorial on the communique of the Ninth Session of the Viet-Nam Workers Party Central Committee]

Hanoi, 21 January -- "Let us strengthen our cohesion and unity, heighten our fighting spirit, and lead our revolutionary cause toward new victories" is the title of today's editorial in the Hanoi daily Nhan Dan, dealing with the communique on the recent Ninth Session of the Central Committee of the Viet-Nam Workers Party.

The editorial, frontpaged in all other Hanoi dailies today, together with the full text of the said communique, reads in full:

The Ninth Session of the Central Committee of the Viet-Nam Workers' Party, held in December 1963, discussed the world situation and decided upon the Party's international tasks. Together with the other fraternal Marxist-Leninist parties, the Viet-Nam Workers Party pledges to endeavor to defend the purity of Marxism-Leninism, oppose revisionism and rightwing opportunism, which constitute the main danger, and at the same time oppose dogmatism and sectarianism, contribute to enhancing cohesion and unity within the socialist camp and the international Communist movement, rally all forces to oppose imperialism headed by U.S. imperialism, and win ever greater successes for peace, national independence, democracy, and socialism.

The session decided to promote educational work within the Party, with the aim of further heightening the Marxist-Leninist and ideological standard of all the Party cadres, and members, overcoming wrong ideas, heightening the fighting spirit, and bringing new successes to the revolutionary cause of our people. The session also decided to improve and
strengthen the external work of the Party and the state, with the aim of helping our Party, state, and people fulfill their international tasks better.

The Ninth Session of the Viet-Nam Workers Party Central Committee was an important ideological activity of our Party. The resolution of the Central Committee constitutes a theoretical basis to bring about the unity of ideology and action of our entire Party and people.

Marxism-Leninism is the invincible banner of our Party and the brother parties. Thanks to the guidance of Marxism-Leninism, our Party has brought the revolutionary cause of our people from one success to another. One of the important causes of success of our Party is to have creatively applied Marxism-Leninism to the specific conditions of our country and, in the process of leading the Vietnamese revolution, it has not committed mistakes with regard to the political line. In the face of the truculent and cunning imperialist aggressors and their lackeys of all kinds, namely the feudal landlord class and the comprador capitalist class, our Party has never flinched, shown fear, compromised, nor capitulated. On the contrary, it has unceasingly fostered its forces and fighting will, heightened its determination to fight and to win, and pushed forward the revolutionary struggle to overthrow the enemies.

Experience of our successes show that we must always have absolute confidence in the might of the masses, rally the broad masses of the people, with the worker-peasant alliance as the core, organize broad class and national struggles, guiding the masses toward the revolutionary front, and smash the fetters of the imperialists and their lackeys. To overthrow these forces, it is necessary to use the revolutionary violence of the masses to oppose counter-revolutionary violence, and use revolutionary wars to oppose counter-revolutionary wars.

For more than 30 years, the revolutionary process of our people has been a process of uninterrupted struggle, now underground, now open, under legal and illegal forms, combining political struggle with armed struggle. The revolution of
August 1945 was an earth-shaking uprising of dozens of millions of our people, using revolutionary violence and combining armed struggle with political struggle to seize power from the hands of the imperialist aggressors. The protracted war of resistance of the entire Vietnamese people against the French colonialist aggressors and the American interventionists won great victories.

The present patriotic struggle of our compatriots in South Viet-Nam against the U.S. aggressors and their henchmen will certainly win final victory. In the revolutionary struggle as well as in the national construction, we do not fear the enemy, difficulties and hardships, nor sacrifices. To carry out revolution means to overcome difficulties and hardships in order to win independence, freedom, and happiness. The invaluable tradition of our Party and people is a tradition of persevering and undaunted struggle, a tradition of self-reliance, of overcoming difficulties, and of determination to win.

The successful August Revolution, the victorious long-drawn-out war of resistance, the great achievements of the socialist revolution in North Viet-Nam, the successive victories of the South Vietnamese people against the U.S. imperialists and their flunkeys at present, and so forth... (ellipsis as received) are the successes of Marxism-Leninism in Viet-Nam.

They are also the highest norm to value how much we understand and are imbued with the Marxist-Leninist doctrine. The line of the Vietnamese revolution in the present stage laid down by the Third Congress of the Party (September 1960--VNA) reflects the correct application of Marxism-Leninism and the Marxist-Leninist line of the international Communist movement.

The Ninth Session of the Party's Central Committee discussed the strategic and tactical problems of the international Communist movement in the present time and drew a demarcation line between the Marxist-Leninist line of the international Communist movement and the opportunistic line of modern revisionism. On the basis of the revolutionary principles of the Moscow declaration of 1957 and the Moscow statement of
1960, our Party asserted that the unalterable final goal of the international Communist movement is to throw off imperialism, wipe out oppression and exploitation in human society, and build socialism and communism on a world-wide scale.

To achieve this aim, our Party pointed out: It is necessary to strengthen the cohesion and unity of the socialist camp and the international Communist movement, to strengthen the solidarity of the working class, the laboring people, the oppressed nations, and other forces of peace and democracy throughout the world to build up socialism and communism in the socialist system, to carry out revolution in the capitalist system, and to defend world peace.

It is necessary to combine the revolutionary struggle closely with the struggle for peace, to direct the spearhead of struggle at the bellicose and aggressive imperialists headed by the U.S. imperialists, to fight back against imperialism step by step and to overthrow it part by part, to win victory for peace, national independence, democracy, and socialism, to march forward to the total liquidation of imperialism and other reactionary forces and to bring about a socialist and communist world.

The deeper it is sinking in the present stage of the third general crisis of world capitalism, the more truculent and bellicose imperialism, headed by U.S. imperialism, becomes. It is facing mankind with the danger of a new world war. The struggle in defense of world peace and for disarmament, the banning of nuclear weapons, dissolution of aggressive military blocs, dismantling of the imperialists' military bases in other countries, the settlement by peaceful means of all international disputes, and the carrying out of the five principles of peaceful coexistence must be closely combined with the revolutionary struggle of the working class and laboring people and the oppressed nations in the world against imperialism and colonialism—new and old—and reactionary forces and for national independence, democracy, and socialism. These two struggles are closely connected with each other and exert mutual influence. The error of the revisionist line is to separate these two struggles, oppose
the one to the other, and fear that the revolutionary struggles might render the world situation tense and that revolutionary wars might flare up into a world nuclear war.

In its essence the mistake committed by revisionism is to distort and discard the fundamental principles of Marxism-Leninism and the revolutionary principles of the Moscow declaration of 1957 and statement of 1960, carry out a policy of class conciliation and unprincipled cooperation with imperialism, blot out the demarcation line between ourselves, our friends, and our foes, sabotage the revolutionary cause of the working class, and divide the socialist camp and the international Communist movement. Our Party resolutely struggles for the Marxist-Leninist line of the international Communist movement and against the line of modern revisionism.

The revolution in our country is part of the world revolution. We carry out revolution to liberate our working class and people and at the same time to contribute to the liberation of the working class and people the world over. The unanimity within our Party on the line of the Vietnamese revolution and the international Communist movement is an extremely important condition to strengthen the militant forces of our Party in the struggle for socialism in the North and for the peaceful reunification of our fatherland. Every member of our Party must constantly stand firmly on the revolutionary position of the working class, study the revolutionary theories of Marxism-Leninism, thoroughly imbue himself with the line and policies of the Party, bravely correct his shortcomings and mistakes, and struggle irreconcilably against the erroneous opportunist ideologies. The urgent problem at present is to strive to combat the influence of modern revisionism, to overcome rightist and other erroneous ideologies, to enhance socialist collectivism, to foster proletarian revolutionary ethics, to combat individualism, to promote discipline, to fight liberalism, to enhance patriotism and proletarian internationalism, to strengthen the cohesion and unity of the Party, to create an exalted revolutionary spirit, to step up the patriotic emulation movement, to build socialism in the North, to extend active support to the patriotic struggle of our South Vietnamese compatriots, and to take a practical part in the
world people's struggle for peace, national independence, democracy, and socialism.

The Vietnamese revolution has recorded great victories but still has to win complete victory. The world revolution has also achieved great successes, but not yet triumphed completely. The northern part of our country has been liberated and is building socialism, but the class struggle is going on and we have to overcome countless difficulties and hardships to turn our country from a backward agricultural country into a prosperous socialist one. Our compatriots in the South have recorded victory after victory, but the cruel enemy—U.S. imperialism—has not yet given up its schemes of aggression and enslavement. The patriotic, protracted, and hard struggle of our southern compatriots still continues with the aim of defeating the enemy and completely liberating South Viet-Nam.

Socialism triumphed and is triumphing on one-fourth of the globe comprising over one billion people, but the task of building socialism and communism must be carried on and two-thirds of mankind now living on three-fourths of the globe are having to wage hard and complicated revolutionary struggles. The class struggle on a world-wide scale to settle the question of who will win between socialism and capitalism is proceeding in an extremely acute manner. Modern revisionism is a great obstacle on the path of the development of the world revolution. Everyone of us Communists who wants to be always a worthy vanguard militant of the revolution must struggle resolutely against the bellicose and aggressive imperialists headed by the U.S. imperialists and other reactionary forces, and at the same time resolutely struggle against modern revisionism.

As far as from now on, we always strive to contribute to consolidating and strengthening unity within the socialist camp and the international Communist movement, consolidating and strengthening unity between the Soviet Union and China on the basis of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism. We sincerely thank the Soviet Union, China, and the other brother socialist countries for their priceless support and assistance to the socialist construction in North Viet-Nam and the struggle for peaceful reunification of our country.
The drive to study the resolution of the Party Central Committee's Ninth Session is an opportunity to help all our Party cadres and members raise further their comprehension of the revolutionary line in our country and of the international Communist movement, re-examine their ideology and work, strengthen the cohesion and unity within the Party, heighten their revolutionary vigilance and fighting spirit, and actively fulfill all tasks entrusted by the Party and the state.

The Ninth Session of the Party Central Committee proceeded from the desire to strengthen the cohesion within the socialist camp and within the international Communist movement in order to unite the working class and other people of the world to defeat imperialism and its hirelings, to win success for peace, national independence, democracy, and socialism. The revolutionary ideology of the resolution of the Central Committee's session is a source of tremendous strength of our entire Party and people. United around the Party Central Committee headed by President Ho Chi Minh, we will certainly bring the revolution of our people to new victories and make active contributions to realizing the revolutionary principles of the Moscow declaration and statement of 1957 and 1960.

Revisionism and other opportunist tendencies will certainly be defeated.

Marxism-Leninism will certainly win complete victory.