SENATOR THOMAS DODD REPORT ON VIETNAM

June 1965
I see them, of the present situation in Vietnam, in southeast Asia, and throughout the countries of the Far East, and their implications for our foreign aid program in the area.

My report will be a long one, because the area is a big one and because some of the essential facts on which we must base our judgments in voting for foreign aid are unfortunately not known.

I am convinced that the principles set forth in the United Nations Charter—a world of free and independent nations, a world free from aggression and the threat of aggression, a world free of the scourge of hunger and the scourge of fear.

I have stated the moral justification for our foreign aid program more eloquently than President Kennedy in his message to Congress on March 22, 1961. Let me quote what President Kennedy said on that occasion:

"There is no escaping our obligations: Our moral obligations as a wise leader and good neighbor in the interdependent community of nations, the obligations of the wealthiest people in a world of largely poor people, as a nation no longer dependent upon the loans from abroad that once helped us develop our own economy—and our political obligations as the single largest counter to the adversaries of freedom."

In the growing impatience with annual outlays for foreign aid, the accomplishments of our foreign aid program are frequently forgotten.

Through the Marshall aid plan, we were able to revitalize the European economy and to give them the strength and the strength that has made our alliance with them a meaningful deterrent to Communist aggression.

Our foreign aid program has saved Greece and Turkey in the postwar period; it has rehabilitated Japan so that she has today become the most prosperous and most highly industrialized nation in Asia; it has helped the Republic of China to maintain its degree of economic stability, and social progress which has today made her a dispenser of technical assistance rather than a recipient of foreign aid; and it has thus far made it possible for nations like Vietnam and Laos to defend their freedom against Communist aggression.

Today I want to address myself specifically to the question of our foreign aid program in the Far East, because it is here, apparently, that the greatest differences are emerging.

During the month of April it was my privilege to travel to all of the free countries of the Far East, to meet with heads of government, foreign ministers, and community leaders, and to discuss the situation in each country with our Ambassadors and the members of our missions, are, in certain cases, with the diplomatic representatives of other countries and with journalists, and acquaintances.

Having sorted out the many notes and documents that were associated with which I returned, and having had some opportunity to consider their meaning and relationship, I want to report to my colleagues today on the salient aspects, as I see them, of the present situation in Vietnam, in southeast Asia, and throughout the countries of the Far East, and their implications for our foreign aid program in the area.

Because the war in Vietnam is big and bloody and dramatic, there has been a tendency to give most of our attention to it, so that we fail to see the broader picture of the general Communist assault on the whole of free Asia which is now taking shape.

Vietnam is unquestionably the most important front, and it may very well turn out to be the decisive front. But Vietnam is not the only front, nor is it the only one whose future is at stake in the current battle.

Although the big news from Vietnam tends to obscure lesser news from other areas of the Far East, and the Communist threat has been under attack for more than 4 years now by insurgent forces directed and supplied from Hanoi.

In Laos, the North Vietnamese openly providing the leadership for the so-called Pathet Lao forces, but I can inform Senators reliably that, as of this juncture, at least 10 full North Vietnamese battalions, without even troubling to conceal their identity, are operating in Laos.

In Malaysia, Sukarno, having cracked down on the last remaining vestiges of Indonesian opposition to communism, is pursuing his policy of confrontation and aggression, with the complete support of both Peiping and Moscow.

Hardly a week goes by without some new act of terrorism by Sukarno's agents in Malaya, or without some new infiltration or attempted infiltration of Indonesian agents in other countries.

In Burma, the government of General Ne Win, having sought to placate Peiping by socializing the country and driving out Western business and influence. And the critics in both categories have still found the fighting bitter battles against Communist guerrillas who control key areas of the country.

In Thailand, the Chinese Communists have already announced the formation of a Thai Liberation Front, patterned after the liberation front in South Vietnam, and the Thai Government has now been obliged to take energetic steps to deal with the first evidences of Communist insurgency in the remote northern areas of the country.

In the Philippines, the Huk have again become active and are in the fighting, and it is generally believed they control, by _terror, a substantial number of villages and towns.

Instead of talking about the war in Vietnam, therefore, it would convey a clearer picture of the situation in the Far East and of the stakes involved there if we talked about the war in Asia. Because the fact is that it is all one war, and it is the freedom of Asia and not merely the freedom of Vietnam that is today at stake."

That this is so is recognized by virtually every thinking Asian who is not a Communist or fellow traveler—not merely in the countries of the Far East, but in neutralist countries like India and Ceylon.

Thus, in an editorial in early April, the Indian Economic Review, which is a semiofficial publication of the All India Congress Committee said the following:

"Nothing should deter lovers of freedom and democracy to make every effort to thwart the Communist China's overrunning the vulnerable southeast Asia, for if our neighbors of southeast Asia succumb, we have no chance of survival if the United States of America, which obviously realizes the tremendous danger of expansionist Communist China, keeps aloof from this area, man's freedom is at stake."

I would in particular like to call the last sentence of this statement to the attention of the many honest citizens who urge withdrawal and fall to understand the issues. It is not merely the survival of India that is at stake, according to the Indian Economic Review, but "man's freedom" in general.

I do not think that this is in any way an overstatement of the gravity of the situation.

If we fail to hold the line in Vietnam, it would require an effort tenfold greater to hold the line elsewhere in Asia.

And the risk of escalation to all-out war would increase in proportion to the enhanced magnitude of the next enemy.

Those who call for withdrawal from Vietnam as part of a general American withdrawal from Asia, at least have the virtue of consistency.

On the other hand, those who urge withdrawal from Vietnam but say nothing about the rest of Asia, have the moral duty to tell us where and how they propose to draw an effective line against the advance of Asian communism.

And the critics in both categories have the further duty to explain to the American people whether they will also propose withdrawal wherever the Communists confront us with a so-called war of national liberation—in Asia, in Africa, or in Latin America.

We live in the era of "wars of national liberation."

Both Moscow and Peiping have hailed such wars as a prime instrument in the struggle for the destruction of capitalism.

If we demonstrate that we do not know how to cope with such a war in Vietnam, the inevitable consequence of our failure will be the spreading of Vietnam throughout the world.

Will the critics of our Vietnam policy urge withdrawal in every one of these cases?

How much more of the free world are they prepared to surrender before they are willing to make a stand in defense of freedom?

If they say that they are not prepared to say where we should make a stand, or if they believe that we should not fight unless the Communists mount a direct attack on our shores or on Western Europe, then
I believe that their folly makes them unwitting accomplices of the Communist drive to destroy America, which the Communists rightly regard as the sole major world power standing between themselves and world conquest.

THE FRAUDULENT REVOLUTION

There is a canard which the Communist propaganda apparatus has assiduously circulated, according to which the Vietcong and the Pathet Lao insurgency in Laos, and the Huk movement in the Philippines, and the Communist guerrilla movement in Burma, and Communist insurgencies everywhere else in the world, are all inspired by the quest for social justice and economic progress on the part of the masses.

Nothing could be further from the truth. It is as much a fraud that the Vietcong insurgency and the Communist insurrections in other countries are spontaneous and testify to the rise of economic and social injustices, as it is that the Vietcong are fighting for liberation from American imperialism.

Socially inspired Communist revolution has nothing in common with the great revolutions of history.

From an historical standpoint, indeed, the Communist revolution can only be looked upon as a counter-revolution as monstrous and retrogressive as Hitlerism. Instead of expanding the frontiers of freedom and bringing about a greater degree of social justice, the Communist revolution has resulted in the organized impoverishment of the people.

Instead of the cultural and spiritual renaissance that has followed in the wake of true revolutions, Communist totalitarianism has everywhere resulted in the nullification of the intellect and the imprisonment of the spirit.

On the other hand, in the free countries of Asia—which the Communists tell us they wish to liberate from their present misery—there is a truly remarkable story to be told about the social and economic reforms that have been registered since the close of the war, and especially over the past decade.

This, indeed, was one of the strongest arguments I brought back with me from the Far East.

Everywhere I went in the Far East, I was amazed by the changes that had taken place since I last traveled through the area in 1961.

Japan, Taiwan, Thailand, and Malaysia are all enjoying unprecedented prosperity.

The standard of living has been rising constantly. It has been made easier through the progressive introduction of social reforms, foreign trade is expanding, and foreign capital is seeking opportunities for investment.

JAPAN

About Japan, I need not tell you, because the story of the unprecedented economic expansion that has taken place over the past decade has been told over and over again.

This is not just a boom that has benefited the affluent.

The Japanese worker and farmer, too, are beginning to enjoy the good things in life in increasing measure.

The streets and highways are almost as jammed as those of any other nation:

The Japanese farmers, the great majority of whom own their own land, as a result of the MacArthur land reform program, use more fertilizer per acre than the farmers of any other nation; and this fact together with their own hard work, has enabled them to achieve the highest output per acre in the world.

The orderliness and discipline of Japanese society and the industry of the people virtually assure that Japan will for a long time remain the foremost industrial power in Asia.

TAWAN

Taiwan was even more unbelievable than Japan in terms of the gains scored in recent years.

As a result of a land reform program that is generally accepted today as a modern model for all the advanced nations, 80 percent of the Taiwanese peasants now own their own land.

They have achieved the third highest productivity per acre and the highest rate of progress in the world and a measure of their prosperity is the fact that three out of four of them now have electricity.

The growth rate for the entire economy has in recent years averaged 7 percent, and last year it hit an amazing high of 10 percent.

Countless new industries are springing up, financed by both foreign and domestic capital.

In 1963, Taiwan for the first time achieved a favorable trade balance, totaling $30 million. By 1964, its favorable trade balances had risen to $83 million. And it is still on the upgrade.

As a result of this miracle of economic and social progress, Taiwan will this month cease to be a recipient of American foreign aid.

MALAYSIA

Malaysia, too, has to be believed.

Its per capita income, which is now close to $400, is the second highest in Asia. Only Japan ranks higher in this sphere.

Under the national development program, a second 5-year plan is now being completed that will have involved the outlay of $1,875 million from the time of its inception.

The program has developed new farmland for distribution to the landless; it has built hundreds of model villages, and it has carried out countless projects to improve the health, education, and welfare of the people.

The workers housing program in Singapore is by common agreement one of the most remarkable undertakings of its kind anywhere in the world.

Once considered one of the most unhealthy areas in the world, Malaysia now has one of the best public health records in Asia, so that life expectancy has risen to 67 years—an almost incredible figure for this part of the world.

The Government has even instituted a helicopter ambulance service to pick up patients requiring hospitalization from remote villages.

To those who think that communism is capable of planning on a national scale, I say that it is not capable of doing so. I would recommend a visit to Malaysia, and specifically a briefing session such as I had at the planning center which is in charge of the national development program. With its hundreds of charts and graphs and maps and models of villages and ports and highways, it is almost like a NATO headquarters devoted to planning a better life for the people.

THAILAND

Thailand, too, presents a picture of a happy people, hard-working, but well-fed and relatively prosperous by Asian standards, and moving upward on the economic and social ladder.

Thailand is one of the largest rice exporting countries in the world. The farming multitudes own their own land, and the average farm is about 10 acres in size, which is large for this part of the world.

The Government has over the past decade encouraged by Thailand's farmers so that they would not be so completely dependent on the export rice market.

The Government also provides free irrigation services and other services to assist the farmers.

The Government is also waging a massive campaign against disease and filth.

One of the things it plans to double the number of teachers and make education compulsory until age 15.

The Thai people are basically happy, contented, and fiercely patriotic.

One proof of this is the fact that, with rare exceptions, all the Thai students who go abroad to study return to Thailand to take jobs at exceedingly modest salaries.

Another proof is the fact that there are virtually no Communists in Thailand.

KOREA

Even Korea, despite her incredible suffering during World War II and the Korean war, has now lifted herself up off the ground and is seen as the model of a rapidly developing native industry and foreign trade.

Korean exports, which a few years ago were virtually nonexistent, last year totaled $120 million; this year the reach $200 million, and in a few years' time are expected to go as high as $400 or $500 million.

The process of economic resurgence in Korea is bound to be hastened, moreover, by the treaty normalizing relations with Japan, which has recently been negotiated and which is now awaiting ratification.

Not merely is the economic and social curve sharply upward in all of these countries, but they also appear to be blessed with politically stable governments and capable leadership.

If the outcome of the struggle between freedom and communism in Asia could be decided solely on the basis of performance, the problem of communism would cease overnight.

The free countries of the Far East, despite the menace of Communist subversion, have demonstrated conclusively...
that freedom makes for progress and prosperity and popular well-being; whereas, the Communist regimes in China and North Vietnam and North Korea and the near-totalitarian socialist regimes in Burma and Indonesia have produced nothing but progressive impoverishment and suffering for their peoples.

There would be no problem of communism in Asia if the contest could be resolved on the basis of performance or by popular referendum.

Communism is compelled to govern by totalitarian methods for the simple reason that it could not long survive if it permitted the people to express their will freely.

But the Communists have no intention of submitting the issue to popular referendum, nor will they be deterred from their aggression by the demonstratable economic and social superiority of the free countries of the Far East that they have marked for subjugation.

The news of the past week indicates that the long-awaited Vietcong offensive is now underway in Vietnam.

It had been more or less common knowledge that the Vietcong had been planning such an offensive, so coincident with the beginning of the rainy season.

It is clear, too, that the Communists are throwing everything they have into this offensive, in the hope of scoring a knockout before the build-up of American and Vietnamese forces makes this impossible.

The scale of the offensive that is now unfolding was suggested by the almost incredible rate at which the Communists have been smuggling arms and ammunitions into South Vietnam, by jungle trails and by sea.

As my colleagues will recall, a single arms cache discovered by Government forces in mid-February contained almost enough equipment to outfit a division.

The scale of the offensive was also indicated in advance by the massive infiltration of North Vietnamese forces.

The Ho Chi Minh government about a year ago was sending in regular units of the North Vietnamese Army.

First they came in battalion strength. Then they began to appear in regimental strength.

And this past week the veterans correspondent, Joseph Alsop, writing from Saigon, reported that we had identified an entire North Vietnamese division moving in concert with the Vietcong forces, and that another division was concentrated on the frontier, apparently ready to enter South Vietnam.

The coming months will be months of testing for the Vietnamese people, for the American people, and for the entire free world.

There will be many costly battles.

There will be victories—but there will also be defeats.

And, because American forces are now involved on a larger scale in the actual fighting in Vietnam, it is plain that American casualties will run much heavier than they have since large-scale fighting first erupted in Vietnam in 1961.

If the Communists score some initial victories in this offensive this should be no reason for despair.

Vietnamese insurgents in military history have scored some initial victories before it has been contained and reversed. Before they finally decided to throw in the surprise in the Korean War, the Chinese Communists also launched a major offensive and they drove our forces back from point after point.

But when this offensive had spent itself, and the United Nations forces launched their final counteroffensive, the Chinese and North Korean Communist forces, with their reserves of equipment and manpower re-trenched for far more rapidly than they had advanced.

So precipitous was their retreat, indeed, that they failed to make a serious stand at a single point; and when they finally swallowed their pride and asked for a cease-fire, our forces stood substantially to the north of the 38th parallel.

So let us not lose heart If the coming weeks bring some bitter news for the cause of freedom in Vietnam.

The commitment we have made there is irrevocable; the strength we are building there is invincible.

With our continued assistance I am certain that the Vietnamese people will ultimately overcome the Communist aggressors and that the Communists will be obliged to sue for peace as they did in Korea.

THE THREE FRONTS OF THE VIETNAMESE WAR

The war in Vietnam over the coming period will be fought on three fronts:

First, the military front; second, the political front in Saigon; and third, the domestic front in the United States.

Having been in Vietnam just over a month ago, I do not underestimate the gravity of the military situation or of the still delicate political situation in Saigon.

In the field of battle, the Government forces have been fighting heroically.

They have suffered heavy casualties, but they have inflicted much heavier casualties on the enemy.

They have suffered reverses, but they have also achieved remarkable successes in certain areas of the country.

Their performance is all the more remarkable when one considers the tremendous advantage enjoyed by guerrillas and when one recalls that, as a result of the British experience with the Malayan insurrection and of similar experiences in other countries, it has until recently been taken for granted that it was essential to have roughly a 15-to-1 superiority in manpower to deal successfully with a Communist-style insurgency.

I would further remind my colleagues that the British Commonwealth forces who fought against the Communist insurgents in Malaya were in the postwar period were not raw conscripts, but highly trained and battle-hardened veterans—among the toughest fighting men to be found anywhere in the world.

Moreover, they had an important advantage which the Government forces in Vietnam do not enjoy.

They were fighting against an ethnically distinguishable enemy, for the simple reason that virtually all of the Vietnamese people are of Chinese extraction.

The Vietnamese Government forces are fighting against a much tougher, much better trained, much better equipped enemy than the British confronted in Malaya.

They do not have the advantage of ethnic distinguishability; a Vietcong soldier looks exactly like a Government soldier.

And they have been fighting not with a manpower advantage of 15 to 1, but with an advantage of, at the most, 3 to 1, and in some parts of the country with no advantage at all in manpower.

With their limited and thinly spread forces they have had to protect their towns and villages and installations, convoy shipments of foods and supplies, conduct searches and forays in the jungle areas, and seek constantly to be on guard against surprise attacks.

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THE POLITICAL FRONT IN SAIGON

That the Vietnamese forces have done as well as they have done is amazing, too, because the conduct of the war has unquestionably been handicapped by the recurrent Government crises in Saigon since the overthrow of the Diem government.

With a crisis of this we should not blame the Vietnamese people too much, because their experience with self-government has been a relatively brief one.

The government of Prime Minister Quat has seriously been seeking to achieve a greater degree of political stability. And I think it is to its credit that since it came to power there have been no major demonstrations or anti-Government or antiwar riots.

I had a long conversation with Prime Minister Quat in Saigon and I was greatly impressed by his intelligence and flexibility and strength of character.

He has had the courage to take certain measures which he believed had to be taken in order to win the active support of the Buddhists for the war. In doing so, he has, perhaps unavoidably, given offense to certain of the Catholic leaders in Vietnam.

It may even be, although I do not pretend to judge, that the Quat government in certain instances has leaned over more than was necessary to win active Buddhist support for the war by dismissing Catholic officials. But the war was being lost, and the Communists were demonstrating competence, and even some competent Buddhists like the mayor of Saigon.
We who are on the outside can only hope that the present difficulties between the Catholic and Buddhist communities in South Vietnam can be overcome. As Mr. Vien also said, Mr. Dang's statement in an interview with J. R. Wiggins, editorial page editor of the Washington Post, a day before, Mr. Vien is said to have told him that the pressure of American public opinion will drive the United States out of South Vietnam.

Mr. Johnson made his statement in an interview granted to J. R. Wiggins, editor of the Post, Chalmers Roberts, and Stephen R. Rosenfeld, Post correspondents.

Mr. Rosenfeld summarized the meeting in this paragraph:

Frowning a heap of American cartoons, signed advertisements, and speeches critical of American policy in Vietnam, the front's new representative in Moscow made clear his reliance on American public opinion rather than on military victory or negotiations, to compel American withdrawal.

The point made by the Vietcong representative in Moscow has also been made by the leaders of the North Vietnamese government and by their chief proponent, with increasing frequency in recent weeks.

I am convinced that President Johnson has weighed and measured every word when he said that he will live out to our commitment in Vietnam, no matter what the cost, and that there is no power on earth that can force us to withdraw.

I am convinced, too, that when President Johnson said “no power on earth,” he meant not only Hanoi and Peking, but also the clannish domestic minority, so-called “motivated,” most of them misguided, who have been grinding out the statements and petitions and speeches which the Vietcong representative in Moscow brandished so triumphantly in the presence of the Washington Post's representatives.

President Johnson will not be deterred from his course by this minority. But by encouraging the Vietcong to believe that the administration will be compelled to capitulate to their so-called public opinion, those who urge withdrawal are creating more than any other group to frustrate the very objectives in whose name they profess to speak.

They are their own worst enemies, as well as the enemies of the freedom, humanity and decency they invoke.

They want the Vietnamese war ended. But their actions can only result in a prolongation of the war. They want the Vietnamese war ended. But their actions can only result in a prolongation of the war.

They have had on Hanoi and Peking and Moscow.

The Washington Post on May 28 carried a report from Moscow, for example, that the Vietcong representative in Moscow, as saying that the pressure of American public opinion will drive the United States out of South Vietnam.

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are that has fostered this false impres-

Because I was deeply troubled by the disparity between the actual situation in Vietnam and the prevailing public impression of this situation, I addressed myself to this subject in a speech before the Cleveland Press Club on May 5, a few days after my return from the Far East. My remarks on that occasion received modest mention in the press but only a handful of people, I am afraid, read the entire text.

I was particularly gratified to note that the one dispatch from Vietnam commenting on my speech said that members of the press corps there conceded that there was some validity to my critique. I was further encouraged by a letter which I received from a distinguished Washington correspondent, urging me to repeat my remarks on the floor of the Senate and to send copies of them to every newspaper editor in the country.

Acting on this encouragement, and because I am convinced that many facts about Vietnam are not commonly known even to Members of Congress, I want to repeat before my colleagues certain of the criticisms that I voiced before the Cleveland Press Club, fortified by further examples of stories that have not been told at all, or stories that have been told with a misleading twist or emphasis.

The press—and criticism of the press

The press of our country has a healthy tradition of cynicism, iconoclasm, and general disrespect for officials and institutions. In developing their critiques, in hurling their barbs, our working press and our editorialists recognize no sacred cows. This is the way it ought to be.

I want to repeat that I do not depre-
cate the diligence of the press in criticizing Government officials or Members of Congress when they think we are wrong. No person and no institution should be immune to criticism. And there is nobody in public life so modest or so virtuous that he cannot benefit from a pub-

ic exposure of his weaknesses, or a public challenge to his viewpoint.

And, although we may complain about the excessive acuity of the press, I believe that every Member of Congress, in his more philosophical moments, would be prepared to concede that it does our souls good to be cut down to size occasionally.

But what is true for government, also holds true for the press. The press, like all human institutions, is fallible, and it has no more right to be regarded as a sacred cow than government or Con-

gress.

For understandable reasons, however, the press does not criticize the press. For understandable reasons, it is considered unwise for people in public life to criticize the press.

While I consider our press to be the best in the democratic world, I believe that it has suffered from this lack of criticism. Indeed, I will go further: I believe that this virtual immunity to criticism by an institution that claims the right to criticize everyone and everything is not merely wrong and unhealthy, but that it constitutes the greatest danger to the continuing freedom of the press.

This immunity to criticism has in turn been accompanied by a tendency, even on the part of informed and responsible members of our society, to regard the press as gospel. Thus, in a recent ad-

dress a distinguished public figure—whom I look upon as one of the most in-
celligent and cultured men it has been my pleasure to know—departed from his prepared text to praise American press coverage both in Vietnam and in the Dominican Republic. Among other things, he said that he often found it more accurate than the information he got from official sources.

My own experience prevents me from sharing this uncritical attitude.

The press, with all its virtues, is not gospel.

The most eminent newspapers have sometimes been the most of the most incred-

ibly miareporting and even downright misrepresentation.

Who, for example, would today be pre-
pared to defend Herbert Matthews' 1959 and 1961 book, Viet Nam, for a accurate portrayal of the situation in that country that is in certain respects inaccurate, in other re-

spects imbalanced, in still other respects greatly inadequate or even blank.

To the extent that it has failed to con-
vey to the American people an accurate appreciation of what is going on in Viet-

nam, the American press has gravely complicated the task of the administra-

tion.

I have tried hard to understand this failure of the American press to convey a balanced picture of Vietnam. I have discussed the matter with many people in Vietnam and in this country since my return. I do not pretend to have the entire answer. I have the impression, however, that the fault lies in part with the general tendency to avoid coverage of the Vietnamese people, in part with the tyranny of the deadline, in part with the overloading of the press, in part with our information officers.

I believe that if everyone concerned with the gathering and presentation of news on Vietnam could take time off for a critical evaluation of American newspaper coverage of the Vietnamese crisis, it would automatically result in a more balanced presentation of the news, which, in turn, would soon reflect itself in a greater degree of public comprehen-

sion.

Before I discuss what can be done about it, let me give you some specific examples to illustrate my argument.

The stories that should never have been told

In category No. 1, there are the stories that should never have been told for rea-

sons of security. Fortunately, the Ameri-
can press has not been guilty of this type of infraction in Vietnam. But it has happened.

For example, 2 weeks ago, a story from Da Nang Airbase mentioned the opera-
tion from the base of the Blue Streak reconnaissance drone. This was a top
secret matter. The correspondent in question was legally within his rights because there is no military censorship. In such situations the American administration leaders were obliged to go on the air to explain their position to irate citizens who accused it of violating the Geneva Convention.

Here is a case of a slight shift of emphasis, a change of sequence, a somewhat more thoughtful handling by the headline editors, who would have resulted in immediate public understanding. Instead, the lead sentence was drowned out by the much larger chorus of correspondents who slammed against the stream, and who reported that whatever the weaknesses of the Diem regime, the issue of religious persecution was completely out of their voices, however, were drowned out by the much larger chorus of correspondents writing in frequently lurid terms, about the supposedly intolerable persecution of the Buddhist religion by the Diem government.

In the month of November 1963, at the invitation of the Diem government, the United Nations General Assembly decided to send a fact-finding mission to South Vietnam to look into the situation. President Diem was assassinated as the mission was completing its investigation. Because of this, I believe that the questions that the persecution of the Buddhists was either nonexistent or vastly exaggerated and that the agitation was essentially political.

Ambassador Fernando Vello Jimenez, of Costa Rica, who had introduced the motion calling for the setting up of the UN mission, and who served as a member of it, told me that this had been his personal mission. Ambassador Pinto, of Dahomey, another member of the mission, publicly expressed himself similarly in terms.

Men of long experience in Vietnam are agreed that prior to the Buddhist agitation of 1963 there was no serious religious division in Vietnam and that relations between the various religious communities on the contrary, remarkably harmonious. The exaggerated accounts of the alleged persecution of the Buddhist religion which appeared in the American press were played back to the Vietnamese people by U.S.IA and by their own press and radio. Inevitably, they served to further embitter relations. In this sense, they contributed to the unfortunate division between Catholic and Buddhist today that exists in Vietnam and to the continuing political instability in that country.

The self-immolation of the Buddhist monk Thich Thich Nguyen Tu in Binh Dinh, in protest against the Communist occupation of his pagoda.

4. STORIES THAT LACK BALANCE

(a) Government Atrocities and Vietcong Atrocities

I believe that untold damage has been done to the democratic cause in Vietnam by stories that lack balance or which serve to create an unbalanced impression of the overall situation.

I am not suggesting that these stories are in themselves untrue. But, as we all know, it is possible to write the truth every day for an entire month—and if one has concentrated too narrowly on certain aspects of the situation and overlooked others, what will emerge at the end of that time is a completely imbalanced picture.

A sense of balance, or proportion, is the key to sanity. It is also the key to sound political and moral judgments. But the citizens of our country cannot be expected to make sound judgments on complex issues, if they are not provided with a balanced presentation of the facts.

Let me give you one example of what I mean. Over the past 6 months I recall seeing at least a dozen different photographs of Vietcong prisoners being subjected to the water torture, or being kicked, or otherwise maltreated by their Vietnamese captors in an effort to extract information from them. There was even a five- or six-page full-color spread in one of our major magazines on this theme.

These photographs and stories have resulted in widespread indignation. There was even a five- or six-page full-color spread in one of our major magazines on this theme.

While the press has been devoting this kind of attention to atrocities, it has neglected to print photographs, to the maltreatment of Viетcong prisoners, for some strange reason it has dealt with the massive, sys-
tematized terror of the Vietcong against the Vietnamese people in a manner so perfunctory, so impersonal, so statistical, as to be virtually meaningless.

Every once in a while, one sees a reference to the fact that Vietcong terrorists have been assassinating and abducting many thousands of victims every year—village chiefs, local administrators, teachers, children of government-militiamen, teenage boys and girls. But only on the rarest occasions do American correspondents take the trouble to visit villages where Vietcong atrocities have occurred and to gather material and photographs for an on-the-spot story.

The maltreatment of prisoners on the Government side no doubt does take place occasionally. For that matter, I doubt very much that there ever has been a war situation in which prisoners on both sides have not been subjected to some kind of physical duress in an effort to extract intelligence from them. But such incidents are certainly not characteristic of the general treatment accorded Vietcong prisoners or defectors.

In line with its "open arms" policy, the Vietnamese Government has, in fact, placed a very heavy emphasis in its troop directives on the importance of treating prisoners humanely. The Vietcong terror, in contradistinction, has from the beginning been a matter of general policy, claiming thousands of lives every year. In 1964 alone, 11,000 Vietnamese civilians were killed or kidnapped by the Vietcong. On a proportionate scale, this would be equivalent to 143,000 victims in 1 year in the United States.

Because of the heavy photographic emphasis on the maltreatment of Vietcong prisoners, however, I am willing to wager that you will find a much greater public awareness on this point than you will of the massive and merciless Vietcong terror.

While reading an article recently which was captioned approximately as follows: "Atrocities Abound on Both Sides in Vietnam War." In the opening paragraphs, the author described the water torture of a Vietcong prisoner in graphic detail. And then, in a single following paragraph, he made the point that there have been several thousand victims of Vietcong terrorist assassinations over the previous year.

In this way, I suppose, the correspondent was endeavoring to display his evenhanded repudiation of all brutality on either side.

I reject the moral implications of this equation.

It is simply not true that the physical abuse of a Vietcong prisoner, most probably in an effort to extract vital information from him, is an atrocity on the same scale as the deliberate assassination and abduction of thousands of innocent civilians.

It is impossible for the American people to understand what is involved in Viet-

nam and why the Vietnamese people are fighting as they are, without a comprehensive understanding of the scope and nature of the Vietcong terror.

They cannot get this from statistics, because statistics are meaningless. And, in my opinion, the American press has failed to report on the Vietcong terror in the countryside in a manner that brings it to life and makes it meaningful and comprehensible to the American people.

Most of the thousands of Vietcong atrocities that occur each year are on a small scale. But through USA, the American press corps in Saigon receives periodic reports listing some of the incidents—• a village chief assassinated in one district, three young men kidnapped in another district, a mother and child killed when a hamlet was fired upon, and so on.

Sometimes, the villages in question are difficult to reach. But not always. It seems to me that it would give balance and drama and new meaning to American press coverage of the Vietnam war if every American correspondent in Vietnam took it upon himself to visit the site of one of these incidents at least once a month and do a human interest story based on conversations with the victims or with their relatives, supplemented wherever possible with photographs.

I cannot accept the explanation that has been tendered by some members of the American press for the heavy emphasis on the maltreatment of Vietcong prisoners and for the relative lack of emphasis on the massive Vietcong terror in the villages.

As these members of the press have put it, the latter, they report impartially on acts of brutality wherever they come across them. Since they frequently accompany units of the Vietcong Army, they have no difficulty in photographing and reporting the interrogation of Vietcong prisoners. But since they cannot accompany Vietcong units, they cannot similarly report on and photograph the Vietcong treatment of South Vietnamese prisoners.

Moreover, so the explanation goes, minor acts of terrorism in villages scattered over an area as wide as Massachusetts are exceedingly difficult to cover, because confirmation can frequently not be obtained from official sources and because, so it is stated, the Vietcong might retaliate against correspondents. This emphasis on Vietcong atrocities and terrorism for fear of the impact it would have on civilian morale.

I can understand why the Vietnamese Government prefers so not to report on reports of Vietcong terrorism in its own press. But, I have received the most categorical assurance that the Government would not be impeded in the way of any American reporter who wishes to visit a Vietnamese village anywhere for the purpose of checking on such a report.

While I was in Vietnam, there was a major terrorist attack on a village south of Da Nang.

It was midnight and the men were working in the fields and the Vietcong, therefore, knew that their only victims would be women and children.

Knowing this, they opened up with heavy mortar fire on the village, killing some 10 women and children and seriously injuring 80.

I know that there was some minor reference to this incident in the Amer-

ican press. But I also know that there was no rush of American correspondents to take photographs and to interview victims for an on-the-spot story.

The press has made reference to the fact that in the recent fighting south of Da Nang, the bodies of Government soldiers were horribly mutilated by the Vietcong when they occupied the village temporarily. So far, there has been no photographic evidence of such incidents, although the press has not hesitated to print the most gruesome photographs of the self-immolation of Buddhist monks and of the torture of Vietcong prisoners.

Moreover, nowhere in the press have I seen it pointed out that Vietcong units have made it a frequent practice to dismember and otherwise mutilate the bodies of their victims.

Nor have I seen any reference to the fact that even American soldiers killed in action have had their bodies gruesomely mutilated by the Vietcong.

The incredible savagery of the Vietcong is something altogether alien to the American tradition. Most Americans fought both sides in the French war, and the Vietminh side—in the Vietnam war of national liberation, have assured me that both sides in this war respected the bodies of their fallen enemies, and that they could recall no instances of the kind of desecration and mutilation that is now commonly practiced by the Vietcong.

It is one of many facts that those so-called humanitarians who now comport themselves as open or hidden friends of the Vietcong, would do well to ponder.

I cannot insist too strongly that if the American people and the other peoples of the free world are to have a clearer understanding of the nature of the war in Vietnam than they have today, it is imperative that the American press make more effort than it has hitherto to bring the facts about the Vietcong terror in the countryside to light.

If there are difficulties, it is their duty to overcome these difficulties.

If there is lack of official cooperation, then I propose that each one of us do everything in our power to assist them in obtaining such cooperation.

And, if they are worried about missing a big beat on a coup in Saigon if they take off for a 1-week trip to several areas in the countryside, I think that this is a risk they will have to take occasionally if they are to give their readers a broad-based, balanced impression of the war in Vietnam.

THE IMPACT ON EDUCATION OF TERRORIST ACTIVITIES IN VIETNAM

One of the most damning documents on Vietcong terrorism that has yet been presented is a report entitled "The Impact on Education of Terrorist Activities in Vietnam," prepared by the World Confederation of Organizations of the Teaching Profession, and published in June 1962.

It is a report made by an international commission of 11 members, of which the vice president of the All India Federation of Educational Associations was a member. The commission, which made an on-the-spot study in Vietnam, was under the chairmanship of S. Nalawaran, vice president of the World Confederation and also vice president of the All India Federation of Educational Associations. The commission included Wilhelm Ebert.
president of the Congolese Teacher's Federation, and Denis Forestier, secretary-general of the National Teachers' Syndicate of France. Among the findings of the commission were the following:

That the Vietcong has been conducting since 1969 systematic attacks against the national schools system in South Vietnam, destroying and burning schools, school materials, and equipment, and threatening, kidnapping, and executing teachers.

This indicates that such action is motivated by the will to destroy the role played by the school from the national, educational, and political point of view. It is particularly observable in the outlying villages and in those places which are isolated because of difficulties of communication, or where security measures are not provided or are insufficiently provided.

That all the facts relate in a great insecurity for students, teachers, and schools, in a considerable reduction in the possibilities for education in Vietnam, and in parents being extremely anxious as to their children's educational future.

In the statement he submitted together with the report, Chairman Natarajan said that in two regions of the south, at least 10 percent of all the schools had been closed, and that schools in the remote villages where security measures were not adequate frequently had to be closed because of the Vietcong terror.

In An Xuyen Province, alone, the commission learned that 150 schools had been closed, of which 22 were burned to the ground. The teachers had been assassinated over the period. 24 children and 80 kidnapped; and that, as a result of the terror, the province was now left with only 38 schools, which meant that 18,000 children who were eager to go to school were denied the opportunity to do so.

We were told by the representative of the Women Social Workers—

Said the chairman—

that about 8 months before our visit, a party of Vietcong with knives while proceeding to school by bus from a neighboring village. The children were asked to go back to the village. 12 of the teachers had been assassinated over the period. 24 children and 80 kidnapped; and that, as a result of the terror, the province was now left with only 38 schools, which meant that 18,000 children who were eager to go to school were denied the opportunity to do so.

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Here is a story which in my opinion tells more about the true nature of the Vietcong than any reasons why the Vietnamese people are resisting them so heroically, than any story that has yet been printed in the American press.

The facts relating to this story would have been available to any American newspaperman who was willing to take a few weeks time to research them as the commission of the WCOPT did.

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would be exceedingly helpful if every account of Asian student demonstrations against our Vietnam policy were accompanied by a broad survey of Asian public opinion expressed in the host nations of Asian leaders and editorial columns, which I have quoted to you. Indeed, I can think of no greater service that American correspondents in the Far East could do at this juncture than to make a quick swing through Far Eastern countries, from Seoul to Singapore, and from Singapore to Karachi, to report on the attitudes of Asian leaders and the Asian press toward the war in Vietnam.

On the basis of my own experience in the Far East, I want to assure my Senate colleagues that American prestige among the free nations of Asia has never been higher than it is today.

The peoples of Asia fear nothing so much as the growing menace of Chinese Communist expansionism.

Our decision to deny the Communists privileged sanctuary, to bomb North Vietnam, and to commit whatever forces may be necessary to assure victory in the battle of South Vietnam, has convinced all of them that the future is not lost, and that we have both the will and the power to help the free nations of Asia retain their freedom and their independence.

If it is important for the American people to have a reasonably accurate idea of how the American people feel about American policy in Asia, it is equally important for the free peoples of the world to have a reasonably accurate conception of how much support and how much opposition there is for President Johnson's policy in this country.

Unfortunately, the American press, and in particular our great metropolitan newspapers, have lavished so much space and attention on every manifestation of opposition, that even sophisticated readers might be inclined to confuse the clamor of a tiny minority with the voice of the people.

Statements of protest signed by several hundred professors or the heckling of government speakers at campus meetings can be written up into exciting stories.

But even when they are completely truthful in detail, these stories frequently convey a completely erroneous impression. For example, on May 7, the New York Times carried an account of approximately 15 column inches on the student uprising at the University of Wisconsin.

The article was captioned "Students Heckle U.S. Truth Teams." The body of the article consisted almost entirely of a blow-by-blow description of the heckling and ridicule to which the State Department spokesmen were subjected. It also pointed out that "394 Wisconsin professors help the team with a full-page and in the university newspaper urging immediate end to the escalation of this conflict."

Then, in the final paragraph, the article added that "the three-man government team was not entirely on the defensive here. Students supporting the newspaper in Vietnam have formed a Committee to Support the People of South Vietnam."

The article, as it appeared in the first edition of the Times, contained a sentence pointing out that the petition supporting Government policy had obtained 6,000 signatures, as against 2,000 signatures on the petition opposing Government policy. This sentence was deleted from later editions. But, even with this sentence appearing in the last 2 inches of a 15-inch article, I say that the average discriminating reader would have come away with the impression that there was far more opposition than support for Government policy on the campus of the University of Wisconsin.

This impression, of course, would be completely false.

Another and more recent example of this kind of reporting appeared in the New York Times this last Sunday, June 6. The article, a full half page in the news of the week section, was captioned "Debate Over Vietnam Policy—and Views of Key Senators."

From a purely journalistic standpoint, I have anticipated a carefully balanced, two-sided presentation. Indeed, I can think of no greater service that American correspondents in the Far East could perform at this juncture than to make a quick swing through Far Eastern countries, from Seoul to Singapore, and from Singapore to Karachi, to report on the attitudes of Asian leaders and editorial columns, which I have quoted to you. Indeed, I can think of no greater service that American correspondents in the Far East could perform at this juncture than to make a quick swing through Far Eastern countries, from Seoul to Singapore, and from Singapore to Karachi, to report on the attitudes of Asian leaders and the Asian press toward the war in Vietnam.

There were photographs of the majority leader of the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, of the senior Senator from New York, of the junior Senator from New York, of the senior Senator from New York, of the senior Senator from Tennessee, and the senior Senator from Vermont—all of them printed over quotations indicating various degrees of disagreement or concern over our Vietnam policy.

There were a number of quotations from unnamed Senators. One of them, for example, was quoted as saying that the President is suffering from "over-briefing and under-consultation."

There were no quotations from the many Senators who have spoken in general support of our administration policy, and this list is a long one, including the senior Senator from Wisconsin, the senior Senator from Oklahoma, the senior Senator from Wisconsin, both Senators from Illinois, the majority whip, the senior Senator from Indiana, the senior Senator from California, and many others on both sides of the aisle.

Nor was there anything to suggest that, despite the criticisms and misgivings that may be members of this body, the overwhelming majority of the Senate are in basic accord with the administration policy in Vietnam.

Such was the report in the New York Sunday Times on the Senate "Debate of Vietnam Policy."

When this kind of exaggerated treatment is given to virtually every manifestation of opposition, the overwhelming majority of the Senate are in basic accord with the administration policy in Vietnam.

Thus, there is for President Johnson's policy in Vietnam, and there is for the American people. The peoples of Asia fear nothing so much as the growing menace of Chinese Communist expansionism.

Indeed, I can think of no greater service that American correspondents in the Far East could perform at this juncture than to make a quick swing through Far Eastern countries, from Seoul to Singapore, and from Singapore to Karachi, to report on the attitudes of Asian leaders and editorial columns, which I have quoted to you. Indeed, I can think of no greater service that American correspondents in the Far East could perform at this juncture than to make a quick swing through Far Eastern countries, from Seoul to Singapore, and from Singapore to Karachi, to report on the attitudes of Asian leaders and the Asian press toward the war in Vietnam.

Nor is it surprising that the press has failed to tell many stories that could and should be told because they relate to the most basic facts about the Vietnamese war. The telling of these stories would not only enhance public information, but would cast a more benevolent light on the Vietnamese war effort and on our own role in Vietnam.

I intend to tell you a few of these stories so that you may check them against your own reading of news from Vietnam.

The situation in the Mekong Delta

There are regions of Vietnam where the situation is still precarious and the Vietcong is dangerously strong. But there are other regions where the government forces have, since the beginning of the year, tremendously strengthened their position and where they now have the Vietcong on the run.

Perhaps the most dramatic improvement has taken place in the 4th Corps Area, with headquarters in the city of Can Tho, in the heart of the Mekong Delta. I know that the press has reported on one or two government victories there. But nowhere have I seen an overall evaluation of the remarkable progress achieved in the 4th Corps area in the course of the past 6 months.

The 4th Corps area was used to consider one of the regions of the war. But since last December 11, the Government forces have inflicted a series of six major defeats on Vietcong forces, in engagements that involved as many as three Vietcong main force battalions at a time.

In the last major engagement, which took place on April 4, 278 Vietcong bodies were counted on the battlefield and there is now hard information that the Vietcong casualties were, in fact, much heavier.

The serious drop in Vietcong morale in the 4th Corps area is attributed to the steadily increasing number of defectors to our side.

In the middle of last year there were only about 10 a month coming over. In December, 100 came over. In March, 160 came over.

The defectors include not merely conscripts but a lot of hard-core Vietcong. They have been retrained and their squads of hard-core Vietcong had come over to the Government side, bringing their weapons with them.

I think it is important to point out that this is the first time that I have seen the history of the insurgency that an entire squad of hard-core Vietcong had come over volun-
Another story which, in my opinion, has not received the attention it merits is that of the buildup of the Vietnamese Air Force.

The average American newspaper reader, is, I am certain, under the impression that virtually all of the sorties flown against the Communists, both in North Vietnam and South Vietnam, have been flown by the U.S. Air Force and Navy. If he is at all aware of the existence of the Vietnamese Air Force, he is almost certainly under the impression that none of the work in the air has been done by American boys.

The truth is, however, that the Vietnamese Air Force, although it got off to a slow start, has now become a formidable right.

In 1961, the Vietnamese Air Force was virtually nonexistent. By March 1963, it mustered 227 pilots all told. Today its pilot strength is approaching the 1,000 mark; and, by the end of next year, it is my understanding that it will be close to 2,000.

According to the American advisers with whom I spoke, the efficiency and morale of the Vietnamese Air Force are extremely high. Its pilots are skilled and aggressive and they are flying as many sorties as our own. Their maintenance record also compares very favorably with that of the U.S. Air Force.

The exact number of sorties flown by the Vietnamese Air Force in recent months is for some reason classified. But, again for some reason which I cannot fathom, the American press, with a few notable exceptions, has virtually ignored this entire dramatic story.

Let me quote a few of the essential facts about the Buddhist campaign against communism; and let me suggest that Senators check this account against their own press.

On April 12, the United Buddhist Association of Vietnam sent a communique to affiliated associations at all levels throughout the country—the equivalent of a national newspaper. Let me quote a few paragraphs textually, from this communique, because I consider it so remarkable.

Warning against "the danger of Communist dictatorship," the communique said:

In rural areas, the Communists have occupied pagodas, confiscated lands, forbidden religious activities, and executed local Buddhists to enter the army, indulged in savage denouncements, and arrested and killed loyal Buddhist faithful of the Buddhist association.

To protest against the Communists' activities, aimed at destroying the religion and weakening the people, High Priest Thich Thanh Nguyen Tu in Binh Dinh burned himself to death after the Communists had occupied his pagoda; and High Priest Phan in Quang Nam was killed following a denunciation of his activities on behalf of the Buddhist association. A number of others were threatened: High Priest Bao Hue and a number of Buddhist faithful in Binh Duong New Life Zone were arrested for having protested against arrests of innocent people and Buddhist faithful; many high priests, monks, nuns, and Buddhist faithful in Communist-occupied areas have been obliged to abandon pagodas and lands in order to evacuate to other places: they all are suffering innumerable hardships.

In the face of the extremely sorrowful situation faced with the Communist calamiity, the Vietnam United Buddhist Association issues this proclamation, strongly protests to public opinion at home and abroad against Communist plots to eradicate religion, and calls upon all Buddhist believers to close their ranks and to oppose Communist anti-religious plots wherever they might come from, by nonviolent means of struggle, in order to restore the Communist persecution of religion and freedom of faith. The Buddhist association also appeals to Communists that, said that the activities of their organizational ambitions, nor should they eradicate religion in order to establish a Communist dictatorship regime which would destroy the religion's fair and noble values.

The Buddhist Association sincerely prays the noble sacrifices of Buddhist priests and I am confident in the ultimate victory of religion and prays at the same time for the liberation of the nation and the religion from control and subversion by the Communists.

The venerable Thich Tam Chau, one of the most prominent of the militant Buddhist leaders, speaking on behalf of the Council of the Institute for the Extermination of the Dharma, "denounced before the public opinion at home and abroad the Vietcong killings of Buddhist faithful and the destruction of pagodas."

The Buddhist press printed reports and petitions from Vietnam detailing the persecution of the Buddhist religion. Thus, a report from the United Buddhist Association in Binh Thy New Life Zone, dated April 6, that the activities of their organization had come to a standstill because of Vietcong arrests and persecution. "Well aware of the Vietcong plot to eradicate Buddhism," said the report, "High Priest Thich Bao, head of the Buddhist Representative Committee, went on a hunger strike on March 28, 1965, demanding the release of all members of the Buddhist Representative Committee.

The report stated that on March 30 there had been a demonstration of some 800 Buddhist faithful, demanding the release of the Buddhist Association and led by the Communists, and that on the same day the Buddhist Youth Group had staged a hunger strike in Quang Minh Pagoda and indulged in prayers.

An article in the official Buddhist organ, Chanh Dao, on April 15 described the beheading and kidnaping of High Priest Thich Bao Hue on April 7, 1965. While traveling from the village of Can to Quang Minh Pagoda, the high priest and his two disciples were stopped by the Vietcong. The Vietcong demanded that he come into the jungle with them to bath, and when he refused, they shot him through the head. They then dragged him off and attacked the high priest physically. They pulled his string of beads from the high priest's neck.

Said the article: he had hanged clothes and dragged him off while other members of the party shouted and beat him savagely.
The article said that the two disciples at first struggled in defense of their master, but that they were not strong enough to resist and therefore, had to let the soldiers drag their master into the jungle.

I could go on and on with this documentation, all of it culled from official Buddhist sources.

These sources should have been available to the American press in Vietnam. At least I know that when I heard about these protests and statements while I was simply asked for translations and they were made available.

I am certain that all of my colleagues will agree that this is a story of the first magnitude, a story that should have been told with the kind of front-page attention that was lavished on the self-immolation of the Buddhist monks at the time of the anti-Diem riots.

The press corps in Saigon was aware of this material, but failed to report it. Then I would say that the press corps was at fault. If, on the other hand, USIA, having prepared these translations, failed to make them available to the press or to encourage their interest in the situation, then I would say that USIA has some explaining to do.

I am certain that my colleagues will share my mystification over why this story has not heretofore been told; and I want to assure them that I shall do everything in my power to get to the bottom of this situation.

Perhaps if this story had been told, at least a portion of the many thousands who protested so vigorously against the alleged persecution of the Buddhist religion practiced by the Diem government might now be induced to protest with equal vigor against the very real persecution of the Buddhist religion practiced by the Vietcong Communists in the territory under their control.

THE UNTOLD STORIES OF THE MANY FATHER HOA’S

My chief complaint against American press coverage of the war in Vietnam is that it has failed to bring the situation to life.

For the most part, the Vietnamese people—people who I seriously doubt that the average intelligent reader of the press, for example, would be able to identify a single Vietnamese outside of Prime Minister Quat.

And, with the exception of Saigon and Da Nang, the names of the towns and villages where so many bitter battles have been fought in recent years command as little attention as do the names of the Vietnamese leaders.

There is a tested formula for bringing such situations to life. The first requirement is that the story be told not in terms of people in general or people in the mass, but in terms of the life experience of individual human beings and the day-to-day experience of the community in which they live.

I can think of only two serious efforts that have been made to bring the story of Vietnamese resistance to life in these terms.

The first story, which dealt with the heroic resistance of Father Hoa and his “sea swallows” in the Camau Peninsula, was printed in the Saturday Evening Post on May 20, 1961. This article was followed by another article about Father Hoa in the Saturday Evening Post and by a condensed reprint in the Reader’s Digest.

Few more dramatic stories have ever been told than the story of how Father Hoa succeeded in setting up an effective regional defense of his district of Vietcong in one of the most heavily Communist-infested areas in South Vietnam, and how he and his peasant militia, many of them refugees from Red China, succeeded in robbing the Communists of territory and freeing substantial territory from their control.

The story of Father Hoa was by common consent an exceptionally good one, and it had great public impact. But I think it important to point out here that the original story about Father Hoa would probably never have been written and Father Hoa would probably never have been unknown until this day if it had not been for the interest of an American officer who visited Father Hoa in Binh Hung, was impressed by him, and reported on the situation in some detail to President Kennedy.

President Kennedy’s immediate reaction was that this was a story that had to be told precisely because it helped to bring the Vietnam situation to life.

He wrote a memo to the editor of the Saturday Evening Post—and the Post printed an article by the unnamed officer, under the caption “The Report the President Wanted Published.”

The second effort to bring the war in Vietnam to life was made by several private citizens in a documentary film, “The Village That Refused To Die.” But, unfortunately, this film has had very limited circulation, mostly to select audiences.

I am not suggesting that every American correspondent in Vietnam should see Father Hoa in Binh Hung.

But there are many Father Hoas, and many Binh Hongs, and many villages that refuse to die in South Vietnam, all of them waiting for their story to be told. I have been told, for example, by an AID official who has spent several years in Binh Dinh Province, that he could think of 10 or 12 villages in this province alone where correspondents could find dramatic and heroic material for human-interest stories on the Vietnamese resistance.

All of these villages sustained numerous attacks by the Vietcong—sometimes minor attacks, sometimes major attacks involving heavy casualties on both sides.

All of them have “refused to die,” refused to pay taxes to the Communists and to cooperate with them in any way, even though their situation was frequently desperate.

Even in the course of my own brief sojourn in Vietnam, I was able to visit one of these “villages that refuse to die”—the village of Chau Hiep in the Ho Phu area near Saigon.

I do not know the entire story of Chau Hiep, but I do know something of its story over the past several months—and this story can teach us all something of the daily heroism that has been the lot of this brave people ever since the Vietcong launched this cruel war.

A week before my visit, the hamlet was attacked by the Vietcong. Two members of the village militia were killed and six Vietcong were killed and one taken prisoner.

On April 15, the morning that I visited Chau Hiep, a land mine planted by the Vietcong exploded, seriously wounding four villagers. They were removed by ambulance as I left.

Last Thursday, I received a report that Chau Hiep had been attacked the previous night by two main force Vietcong companies, numbering some 300 men and equipped with heavy weapons. The village was defended by a popular force unit of about 80 men and a 63-man company of the 30th Ranger Battalion. Attacking by surprise just before 1 a.m., the Vietcong succeeded in seizing the western portion of the hamlet, which they held for about an hour. During this time, they tossed hand grenades into every house they could reach, killing popular force members or members of the Ranger company where known to be quartered.

In the course of the fighting, 6 civilians were killed and 35 wounded, while the popular forces and the Rangers lost 7 killed in action and 18 wounded. The Vietcong casualties were estimated at 50 dead.

The U.S. advisers on the spot have reported that the battle was a fiercely fought one in which the popular forces exhibited the greatest courage in defense of their own hamlet. The defenders were greatly outnumbered, and it was only their stubborn heroism and the assistance later made available by armed helicopters that kept the hamlet from being overrun.

I have told this story of Chau Hiep on the basis of a very brief visit and from my own meager notes.

But the epic of Chau Hiep is worthy of the talent of some far more competent reporter; and I hope that some day this epic—and many more like it—will be made available to the free people of the world by some enterprising American correspondents.

There is more than a tale of heroism involved here.

The story of Chau Hiep goes to the very heart of the Vietnamese war.

The Communists and the fellow travelers, and even some of our confused liberals, spend incessantly about the Vietcong and the social revolution that is sweeping Asia.

I do not know what they mean by social revolution.

The great social revolutions of history have been directed against tyrants, both domestic and foreign, or against intolerable economic and social conditions.

But the epic of Chau Hiep and the other thousands of villages that have suffered attacks by the Vietcong are not tyrants or capitalists or exploiters or the representatives of social injustice.

They are simple, greathearted peasants—kindly and open and God fearing
as the peasants in every country are, threatening no one, and desiring nothing more than to be left to live their lives as they see fit.

This kind of revolution is it that throws armed bands in midnight terror attacks against peaceful villagers, murdering and maiming and torturing in an effort to compel them to accept the revolution.

And what kind of humanitarians are they that now clamor for us to abandon the people of all the Bhinh Hongs and all the Chau Heips?

I am referring a statement in the press some time ago signed by a number of misinformed clergyman, which bore the caption "In the Name of God, Stop the Killing." Their appeal was directed to President Johnson.

My only comment in the light of Chau Heip is that they directed it to the wrong person and the wrong address.

The war in Vietnam would take on another new dimension in the minds of the American public if some of our very capable corps of correspondents could be persuaded to go out into the countryside in search of the many Father Hoes who unquisitively exist in Vietnam; if they would take the time and the patience to delineate these unarmcd heroes of the Vietnam resistance in a manner that would bring them to life and made them real people in the minds of their readers; and if they would take an occasional article from the field telling the story of one of the many thousands of Vietnamese villages that refuse to die.

SOME OTHER STORIES THAT HAVE NOT BEEN TOLD

I could go on and on listing stories which have not been told at all, or else in my opinion, have been told inadaquately.

There are stories to be told about the many evidences of improved morale on the Government side; about people again buying real estate and opening stores; about residents who have long been intimidated with information on the location of Communist guerrillas and Vietcong terrorism against the people of South Vietnam, to the hundreds of small but grimly fought battles which take place every day in the remote isolated villages and hamlets of Vietnam. It is in the Vietnames countrside that the war will be won or lost—and all the indications are that it is today being won there.

Partly because of the pressures to fucus on the big and the sensational, partly because of the "Saigon complex," there is a tendency among some correspondents in Vietnam, when combined, constitute a subject almost too big for the real war—to the daily acts of Vietcong terrorism against the people of South Vietnam, to the hundreds of small but grimly fought battles which take place every day in the remote isolated villages and hamlets of Vietnam. It is in the Vietnames countrside that the war will be won or lost—and all the indications are that it is today being won there.

Finally, as I heard from a number of people, there is a history of antagonism between the government and the press going back to the last U.S. phase. Whatever the merits of the controversy at that time, it is generally agreed that the press corps felt that they were not getting the straight news from either the Vietnamese Government or the U.S. Embassy; and whenever an opportunity arose to show that the government or the Embassy was wrong, the press was wont to seize upon it.

In this way, a tradition of concentrating on the negative aspects of the war grew up, and some of it persists to this day.

WHAT CAN BE DONE TO IMPROVE THE QUALITY OF PRESS COVERAGE?

I hope that no one here will construe my remarks as meaning that I favor censorship of the press, or even a voluntary censorship which ignores the bad and concentrates on what is good in reporting on our side.

My plea is for a broader view, for treatment in depth, for more balanced presentations, for less evidence on the sensational on the part of foreign news editors, for more thoroughness in the formulation of lead paragraphs and summaries, for more conciseness in the summary of information, for more even-tempered language, and for even more occasional visit to the Vietnamese countryside.

There is also the fact that the majority of the American correspondents in Saigon must function as one-man bureaus. Since Saigon is the seat of the American Embassy and American military headquarters, since it is the chief source of news for the press as a target for Vietcong terrorists, and since coup and rumors of coups are still considered top news, there is a tendency for these one-man bureaus to spend more time in Saigon, perhaps supplementing this with an occasional visit to Da Nang and an even more occasional visit to the Vietnamese countryside.

The tendency to stay put in Saigon is in some cases fanned by the fear that the press may be hauled on the carpet by their editors if they happen to be out of the city when a big story breaks.

But it is absolutely impossible to obtain a balanced and comprehensive view of the American war in Vietnam from the vantage point of Saigon.

The Vietnamese war is not a single large war with a frontline separating contending armies, but a war made up of many smaller wars which go on every day in the remote isolated villages and hamlets of Vietnam. It is in the Vietnamese countryside that the war will be won or lost—and all the indications are that it is today being won there.

I believe that a large part of the reason for the inadequacy of American press coverage of Vietnam is the traditional tendency of the American press to complete by focusing on the sensational.

In Vietnam, this has meant focusing, on the one hand, on genuinely dramatic big stories like the bombing of American billets at the Embassy or on the massive American air strikes against the north; and, on the other hand, it has meant focusing on things like the mis­treatment of prisoners and coups and rumors of coups.

The competitiveness of our wire services and papers is such that correspondents are under pressure to be the first, to be as sensational as their colleagues. And to come up with the standings daily in a situation where progress cannot truthfully be measured on a day-by-day basis.

This is done with the assumption that this is the public's want; that it does not have much interest in the thoughtful, balanced evaluation or in articles written with restraint and perspective.

There is also the fact that the major­ity of the American correspondents in Saigon must function as one-man bureaus. Since Saigon is the seat of the American Embassy and American mili­tary headquarters, since it is the chief source of news for the press as a target for Vietcong terrorists, and since coup and rumors of coups are still considered top news, there is a tendency for these one-man bureaus to spend more time in Saigon, perhaps supplementing this with an occasional visit to Da Nang and
present a balanced and comprehensive view of the situation in Vietnam. This is clearly impossible.

But I do not think it improper to suggest that correspondents and editors should seek to organize and balance their coverage of Vietnam so that at the end of 1 month's time, let us say, their articles, taken in aggregate, do present a balanced picture. I do not think it is too much to suggest that correspondents—even the one-man bureaus—be encouraged to spend more time in the countryside and simple Vietnamese peasants, and Vietcong defectors, and victims of Vietcong terror.

I am convinced that such a balanced presentation of the news would enable the American people and Congress as well, to make more balanced judgments about the situation in Vietnam.

I am convinced that it would help us to better explain our position to the free world, and to help dispel much of the confusion that is today undermining public support for our commitment in Vietnam and the world.

Competence, diligence, and conscientiousness can be found in abundance among the American press corps in Vietnam. As for the conscientiousness of American editors, about this I can speak from personal experience because I am proud to count many of them among my friends.

The one ingredient necessary to assure a more effective presentation of the Vietnamese situation is a determined effort to seek for balance. There have been correspondents and editors who have, despite the very great difficulties, managed to achieve a remarkable degree of balance in their handling of Vietnamese news. As of this moment, however, they are still in the minority. I would like to see them become the majority.

I also believe that the quality of American press coverage from Vietnam would be greatly improved if the present war between press corps in Saigon and USIA could be terminated by formal diplomatic agreement. Relations between the press corps and the USIA offices in Saigon have become a scandal of the first magnitude.

The press has assaulted the USIA in article after article, and it even came to the point of a full-scale denunciation of USIA by the president of the American Society of Newspaper Editors. Because of the limitations under which it must operate, the USIA has neither been able to defend itself publicly nor to counterattack.

While I have reason for believing that some of the press charges against USIA in Saigon have been very much exaggerated and that the press has been wrong on every point of difference and USIA has been right. But, whatever the merit of the case, I consider it most unfortunate that these differences should be aired before the world in vitriolic prose.

It seems to me that if the press has grievances against the USIA, there should be some kind of mechanism for discussing these grievances and endeavoring to adjust them, before American correspondents rush to their typewriters with their complaints before the world public. Perhaps it might be helpful if regular meetings were set up between USIA and an elected committee representing the American press corps in Saigon.

I do not pretend to any finality in my remarks. I have broached a subject which I believe requires public discussion. I also happen to believe that this discussion can best be pursued by the members of the American press themselves.

**The need for a fact-finding mission**

What I saw in Vietnam convinced me that the fundamental realities of the situation cannot be gleaned from a reading of the press. Because of this, I proposed, in the course of a press interview in Singapore, that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee dispatch a bipartisan fact-finding mission to make an on-the-spot study of the situation in Vietnam and to report back.

One of the reasons was quoted as saying when he was queried about the proposal that a fact-finding mission to Vietnam is unnecessary because the facts about Vietnam are known. What is needed now, he said, is judgment. Nothing could be further from the truth.

The facts about Vietnam are not known, and this is something that I hope I have emphasized in the course of my speech today.

Because nothing I have learned since my return has altered my opinion in any way, I have today sent a letter to the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, with copies to all of the members of the committee, formally proposing the dispatch of a bipartisan fact-finding mission to Vietnam at the earliest possible date.

I think it would be beneficial if the Senator from Oregon [Mr. Moss] and the Senator from Wisconsin [Mr. Culver] were to visit South Vietnam. I should like to have these respected colleagues go there and see for themselves what is taking place. I am confident that there would be a great change in their view of the situation there.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of my letter be printed in the Record at the conclusion of my remarks.

There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the Record. [See excerpt from Mr. Dodd's letter.]

**Mr. DODD.** If the national debate on Vietnam policy is to be conducted in a rational manner, it is essential that the facts be established and the nonfacts be laid to rest—especially as possible, but also as thoroughly and scrupulously as possible.

A bipartisan Senate committee could make a giant step in this direction. But there are many Obstinate errors that can be taken and should be taken at every level, public and governmental with a view to reducing the unfortunate domestic confusion which we are our friends and so encourages our enemies.

Among other things, I would like to see some of the more prominent critics of our Vietnam policy, including Mr. Walker Lippmann and Prof. Hans Morgenthau, invited to visit Vietnam so that they could get a firsthand look at the situation, and I would like to see additional factfinding tours through the countries of the Free East, so that they would better be able to weigh the human and political consequences of withdrawal on this entire crucial area.

I do not say that all the critics will reverse their position as a result of such a visit. But I am convinced that at least a number of them would find reason to pause and reconsider the stand they have taken.

I would like to see students by the hundreds, including student critics of administration policy, organized into a kind of summer time Peace Corps for service in Vietnam. As I was completing these remarks, I received the well-known information that such a plan, on a minor scale, is already in the works, and the administration has selected out of a total of more than 2,000 applicants to spend the summer working as assistants to American AID representatives in various parts of the world. I hope that this project can be multiplied many times over, and that the students who go there will be able to relate their impressions to their fellow students on their return.

I would like to see Vietnamese editors and professors and students and community leaders invited to this country by university groups and other private organizations so that they can tell the story and discuss their problems with us. In the teach-ins and debates that have thus far taken place, it struck me as strange that both sides were seeking to settle the fate of Vietnam without the presence of a single spokesman for the Vietnamese people.

I would not like to see Government spokesmen, especially ranking spokesmen, participating in public debates if that is what they may be called; first, because by so doing, they dignify the opposition and give it more coverage than it would otherwise receive; second, because the critics find it easy to discount anything that an official spokesman may say on the grounds that no employee of the Government could do other than defend administration policy.

Instead of teach-ins with the platform stacked heavily against administration policy, and where jeering, heckling, catcalling extremist cliques make it virtually impossible for pro-administration participants to speak, I would like to see the issue of Vietnam debated in the traditional American manner—in a calm and reasonable atmosphere, by men who are experts in the field, with an equal number of speakers and an equal amount of time for both sides.

I would like to see those who share the administration's conviction that we cannot find a peaceful solution to our problems in Vietnam because human freedom cannot be saddled along with so much corners of the world, and who have not earned and are not as forceful in the advocacy of their cause as the opponents of the administration are advocating retreat and appeasement.

I would like to see those who share the administration's conviction that we cannot find a peaceful solution to our problems in Vietnam because human freedom cannot be saddled along with so much corners of the world, and who have not earned and are not as forceful in the advocacy of their cause as the opponents of the administration are advocating retreat and appeasement.
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balanced will the world be able to comprehend what the American people really think.

My plea, then, is for light—for all the light that can be brought to bear on the subject.

Wrong information breeds wrong conclusions. Nor is the truth by itself enough, because inadequate information or inaccurate information can also lead to wrong conclusions.

What is needed is not merely the truth, but the whole truth.

And if we have the whole truth it will not merely enable us to discuss the question of Vietnam and southeast Asia more intelligently, but it will also help us to make the right evaluation in weighing the elements of our foreign aid program.

VINDIEN AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR OUR FOREIGN AID PROGRAM

In the current debate on Vietnam, I have been disturbed to find Dr. Hans Morgenthau, for whom I have, up until now, had the greatest respect to find up with those who urge withdrawal from Vietnam.

Dr. Morgenthau is neither an appeaser nor an extremist. He has, however, expressed terms conceptions of the cold war in terms that are, in my view, unpalatable and inconsistent with the principles of the United States.

For example, in the course of the debate on foreign aid, it was said that the area of Vietnam affected by the Mekong River plan is a part of the country that is not controlled by the Government, but by the Vietcong, and that it was not to be spending millions of American dollars in an area that is currently controlled by our enemy.

This assertion does not jibe with the facts. Certain portions of the Mekong Delta area are considered to be under Vietcong control. But very large parts of it are under Government control, and in operations which I described in my previous remarks, the Government has been expending and consuming its control since the beginning of the year.

I take issue with this stand, not merely because it is factually wrong, but because it is unpalatable. The war in Vietnam, if it is to be won, must be fought on two fronts simultaneously: the military front and the economic and social front.

To forgo major economic projects and not merely the truth benefits to the people of the area simply because the Vietcong may be in temporary control of certain areas would be tantamount to accepting defeat, because the war cannot be won by purely military means.

I believe the best answer to Dr. Morgenthau and those who share his pessimism would be the example of South Korea.

There we inflicted a decisive defeat on Communist aggression, and the solution to the problem of South Korea, although far from ideal, has at least held fast for some 13 years now.

If we can inflict a similar defeat on Communist aggression in southeast Asia, if we can purchase a pause of 10 years or 15 years or 20 years in this area, if we can hold the line against the expansion of Communist power at other points; then there is at least reason to hope that the extremists in Moscow and Peking will be discredited by their successive defeats, and that somewhat more moderate elements will come to the helm.

Short of accepting defeat on the installment plan, I see no plausible alternative to this policy of positive containment.

Several Senators have intimated that they plan to introduce amendments calling for cutbacks in our military assistance program.

Because I for one believe that the war in Vietnam can be won and must be won, and because I am not prepared to accept defeat on the installment plan, I want to say for the record that I intend to vigorously oppose any amendment of a total of approximately $100 billion we have spent for foreign aid, roughly one-third of which is for military assistance.

The bulk of this assistance has been directed to countries in Europe and Asia that live under the threat of renewed Communist aggression.

A total emphasis on economic assistance in the case of these countries would be self-defeating because, without military security, there can be no political security, and, without political security, economic progress may become impossible to achieve. Therefore, the most generous foreign aid program.

The relatively small amount we have been spending on military assistance each year has enabled the United States to maintain ground forces totaling 4 million men, air forces with some 8,000 operational aircraft, and approximately 1,900 naval craft of various kinds. These forces have constituted an important deterrent to Communist aggression in Europe and in Asia. To attempt to replace these forces with American forces would place an impossible drain on the American economy and manpower.

If anything, I believe that prudence dictates a substantial beefing up of our military assistance program, particularly in the countries of the Far East.

South Korea, it has just been announced, intends to send a full division of 10,000 combat troops to South Vietnam.

North Korea, on the other hand, has been linked with the Vietcong. The increasing tempo of Communist aggression throughout the Far East.

Let us by all means place primary emphasis on works of peace in our foreign aid as we have done in the past.

I do not say there should be no modifications in this program; but if we decide to modify it, let us set up a scale of priorities that helps the recipient nations to develop into more prosperous, more progressive, more independent communities, and which, at the same time, fortiifies our national security and strengthens the cause of freedom. Let us not be embarrased to reward our friends, to restrict our aid to those who frequently oppose us, and to eliminate aid to those who consistently oppose us.

If we can find a formula which so balances our foreign aid program many other problems will, I feel, soon take care of themselves.

But let us realize that the foreign aid program in many countries may, in the final analysis, depend on our ability to preserve freedom in South Vietnam.

EXHIBIT I

U.S. SENATE
WASHINGTON, D.C., June 10, 1965
Hon. J. W. Fulbright, Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Chairman: What I saw in Vietnam surprised me that fundamental realities of the situation cannot be gleaned from a reading of the press.

In the speech which I am making this afternoon, I set forth instances where the truth has been distorted by twisted or misplaced emphasis, or where important truths are not known because the story has been altered to fit a 'headline.
not been told at all or not been told widely enough.

I am convinced that to a very large degree the opposition to administration policy stems from lack of information or misinformation.

If the national debate on Vietnam policy is to be conducted in a rational manner, it is essential that the facts be established and the nonfacts be laid to rest—as expeditiously as possible, but also as thoroughly and scrupulously as possible.

Because of this, I wish to propose that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee appoint a Vietcong fact-finding mission to make an on-the-spot study of the situation in Vietnam and to report back.

I hope that this proposal meets with your approval.

I am taking the liberty of sending copies of this letter to the other members of the Foreign Relations Committee.

With best wishes.

Sincerely,

THOMAS J. DODD

Several Senators addressed the Chair.

Mr. MCGEE. I am glad to receive the congratulations of the Senator from Connecticut.

Mr. DODD. I yield first to the Senator from Wyoming.

Mr. MCGEE. First, I commend the Senator from Connecticut for his complete, personal, eyewitness report on his recent trip to southeast Asia, in which he has shared with his colleagues his judgment on the general perspective of the crisis in South Vietnam. This comes as a great help to all of us who are trying to make as wise a decision as possible in this matter. I assure the Senator from Connecticut that he has made that kind of contribution today.

Could the Senator from Connecticut share with us his impression of what he learned in Vietnam, when he was there recently, concerning the emerging leaders of the Vietcong? In the country, we hear nothing about any leadership. Does not the Vietcong have leaders? Is there a real Vietcong leadership, from, or is the leadership coming mostly from the north?

Mr. DODD. Mr. President, I believe that it is, to a great extent, coming from the north, although there are some in the Vietcong who are South Vietnamese. I was interested, for example, to learn from our military representatives in one of the villages that I visited that they had taken Vietcong prisoners on the day before who averaged 14, 15, and 16 years of age.

This is a shocking thing. I inquired about it. "Who is this an isolated example?" They replied, "No. This goes on all the time. They get the youngsters, who are really children." I suppose that some of them are lured by accessibility. Possibly some of them are under duress. I am confident, however, from all I have heard, that the leadership of the Vietcong comes from the north.

Mr. MCGEE. That is a point we tend to overlook at home. While we tend to dwell upon the implications of our presence there, we also bilhvely ascribe to the Vietcong a status of leadership as though there were a responsible group inside the Vietcong who had succeeded genuinely fighting a civil war. I believe that it is important that we make the distinction which the Senator from Connecticut has made so well.

Mr. DODD. Your suggestion did raise the point of clarifying the issue. It is important to know that General Giap, of North Vietnam, is recognized in east Asia as the leader and commander of the Vietcong. Nobody in that part of the world makes any pretense that the Vietcong are a truly local insurgency. Some people from that part of Vietnam belong to the Vietcong. However, it is entirely motivated, and almost entirely led, by the North Vietnamese Communist forces.

In Laos, as I said earlier, they do it openly. They do not pretend to any Laotian insurgency any longer. They have almost dropped the guise of the Pathet Lao.

Mr. MCGEE. Mr. President, is it not significant that the Vietcong are in control of some contiguous areas in which they have the responsibility for government? Mr. DODD. The Senator is correct.

Mr. MCGEE. And we find, up to now, no substantial evidence of any flight of South Vietnamese into the North Vietnam areas for refuge. On the contrary, they are coming south.

Mr. DODD. The Senator is correct.

Mr. MCGEE. I am informed that there are flight camps in South Vietnam which hold in excess of 200,000 people who have fled from the area under Vietcong control.

Mr. DODD. The Senator is correct. It is in excess of 300,000.

Mr. MCGEE. I am glad to receive the correction, even to the extent of that number. It is significant that the effort to cast that area as an apparently sincere local grassroots people who seek to obtain the right to govern themselves is quite a distortion of the facts.

One contribution, among the many made by the Senator from Connecticut, is significant bears on the impatience of many of our own people, the critics of our own country, over the fact that the conflict there continues to drag along, and that it has become protracted.

I feel that this impatience must be answered in a very substantive way. The Senator from Connecticut has done that. The people want to know why the North Vietnamese have not surrendered and gone to the conference table.

What the Senator from Connecticut has said reminds us that, at the very best, this must remain a long, tortuous, and painstaking operation. They are not about to give in if they can avoid it. The relentless pressure that we seek to impose upon them in order to hasten that decision must be kept up.

Some of the worst things that were supposed to happen when we planned the escalation in North Vietnam have not happened. I believe that the Senator from Connecticut will recall that when we debated the matter in February, it was claimed that the first thing that an escalation would do would be to unite the Russians and the Chinese. It was claimed that it would bring China into the struggle. It was claimed that it would bring Russia into the struggle.

We were informed that we would have to take into consideration the commitment of millions of American troops.

In it a fact that we have contained this conflict, up to now, within the dimensions outlined by the President in his early days, and that our only objective is to cut off the interference and the infiltration from the north so that the South Vietnamese might still arrive at their own decision?

Is that not still the case?

Mr. DODD. That is still the case.

I believe that it would probably be untrue in the sense that it would create an impression that would be a false one—namely, that there is really great...
and wide division among the American people and Members of Congress.

Mr. McEE. If there had been some significant, new decision to change the whole structure within which that conflict is being waged—which is not the case, as I see it—it would be possible that it would help a great deal if all of us were to try to do something. We firmly believe that if southeast Asia were to fall under communist influence of China, it would dangerously prejudice the balance of power. That has been true all through history. The British desired that area at one time. The Japanese started World War II to get control of the area. The French, Dutch, Germans, and Portuguese all sought to use that area as a means of power.

If southeast Asia were to fall into the hands of the Chinese, there would be an unfavorable effect on the balance of power in the world.

I believe that it should be understood that we are tried psychologically before the bar of public confidence in the world, as to whether we really intend to live up to our pledge of responsibility to balance the power in the world in the interest of peace, or whether we are also trying to remain there. We should stop for a moment and ponder the proposals coming from the critics who really oppose or object to what we are now doing on the assumption that if we stop what we are now doing, this would ball us out of our difficulties.

If we stop the bombings in North Vietnam, if we were to stop committing troops below the 17th parallel, everything would be all right, the critic says. Does he not believe that would be fortifying the critical area of the discussion the other day?

Mr. DODD. I certainly do.

Mr. McEE. Finally, the question on this floor is asked, "Why are we not honest about it?" I express it as to the effect of a declaration of war, and fear that it may create roadblocks to a negotiated settlement and a possible war, or to me this would rather than help our chances for ultimate peace in that part of the world.

I wonder if the Senator from Connecticut has in his annual report on war declared of war would be a good approach.

Mr. DODD. No. The Senator is correct.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. DODD. I yield.

Mr. SYMINGTON. I commend the able Senator from Connecticut for the work he has done on this statement, and wish more of our colleagues had been present to listen to it.

In his analysis of why he believes the press has not reported the war accurately, the Senator dwells on the point of sensationalism. He also mentions that some 35,000 South Vietnamese have been killed by the Vietcong, often murderously, in extraordinarily cruel circumstances.

I would ask the Senator, as a matter of information, why he believes there is no recognition of sensationalism in that story, since it tells of unfortunate things that have happened to the Vietcong.

Mr. DODD. I think it would be sensational. My report is it has not been covered more fully. The press should have pursued that story. I regret that it has not been emphasized.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Does the Senator believe the press could continue over a period of months, so far as the working press is concerned, unless they were receiving instructions from the home office?

Mr. DODD. I would think so. I think it could be done.

Mr. SYMINGTON. If there is sensationalism in the stories, and the war is being reported unilaterally over a period of months, does the Senator believe that possible without instruction from the home office?

Mr. DODD. Yes, there should be a better balance. The fact that 30,000 civilians have been killed or kidnaped should be told dramatically.

Mr. SYMINGTON. The Senator specifically mentions, several times, the New York Times. Has he discussed the matter with the executives of the New York Times?

Mr. DODD. I have not done so. I have not had an opportunity to do it. I doubt if I would have an opportunity.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Does the Senator intend to ask them about the matter he brings to the floor?

Mr. DODD. I have talked with several persons.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, if the Senator will yield, has the Senator talked with the editor of the St. Louis Post-Dispatch?

Mr. DODD. No, but I have talked with some others. I have talked with editors in Connecticut and others in the newspaper business.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President—

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the Senator from Connecticut yield the floor?

Mr. DODD. I shall yield the floor in a moment.

Let me mention one other matter to the Senator from Missouri. I have sent copies of what I have said about the Vietcong, at least in part, to the New York Times. Has he discussed the matter?

Mr. SYMINGTON. The Senator intended to ask them about the matter he brings to the floor.

Mr. DODD. I have talked with several persons.

Mr. MANSFIELD. I commend the Senator for his approach to this problem. It is a great newspaper, with great influence. Is the Senator going to ask the press to cover more fully, in advance, what I would say about the press in that statement?

Mr. DODD. I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record the remarks I made at the commencement exercises at Clarke College in Dubuque, Iowa, as they relate to the efficiency and effectiveness of the press.

There being no objection, the excerpt was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

This immunity to criticism has in turn been accompanied by a lack of proper press coverage in the part of informed and responsible members of our society, to regard the press as gospel. Thus, in a recent address a distinguished public figure—whom I look upon as one of the most intelligent and cultured men it has been my pleasure to know—departed from his prepared text to praise American press coverage both in Vietnam and in the Democratic Republic. Among other things, he said that he often found it more accurate than the information he got from official sources.

Actually, I did not depart from the prepared text of my speech, although certain press accounts have been suggested that such was the case. On the contrary, I thought through most carefully, in advance, what I would say about the press in that statement.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record the remarks I made at the commencement exercises at Clarke College in Dubuque, Iowa, as they relate to the efficiency and effectiveness of the press.
men and women who report the news. They do an excellent job even if I may sometimes suffer personally at their hands. The reporter is the light of the day, the sanity of the group which may be exposed. Management of news is to point up the facts as they see them—the strengths and weaknesses, the inconsistencies, the reasons for and reasons against our policies and our posture.

We will never safeguard this Nation by deprecating, in the name of national policy or of a superior governmental wisdom, the free press which is one of the principal institutions by which freedom is maintained. Government officials are almost always inclined to think, and, defensively, to ask whether they know better than the press what is transpiring in the world or any segment of it and, if so, to tell it. But that, at first and again events have indicated that on many occasions they do not. In this connection, I think, for example, of the work of American correspondents in Vietnam and the Dominican Republic which has been outstanding in every respect. One sometimes has the impression that the accuracy of the press reporting and some of the press analyses in both places may very well have been greater in many instances than the great flow of information which has come to Washington through official channels.

I believe that the reason for the decline of South Vietnam can be traced to the assassination of President Ngo Dinh Diem. But I think it is also true that we might disagree on questions of this kind, I recognize the effectiveness and the efficiency of the reporters. It is not necessary that they agree with me for me to recognize their worth. On one was perfect. But, on the whole, they were a good, sound, hard-working lot. They were doing their job, digging for information and relating it to American people. Let me say to the Senator from Connecticut that the remarks which I made at Clarke College apply to the press in general, to the press on balance, to those newspapers which, on occasion, have treated me kindly, no less than those which may not have been, on occasion, very kind. The remarks apply to those press reports, letters, and opinions which agree with my personal observations and conclusions, as well as to those which do not.

The press is not above criticism, as the remarks of the Senator from Connecticut made amply clear. The Senator is entirely within his rights to complain of the reporting from Vietnam, or anywhere else in the world, where, on balance, it does not add up to the same observations and conclusions he has reached, or for that matter, for any other reason.

But that does not change the basic issue as I discussed it in my remarks at Clarke College. Indeed, it would not change that issue even if the press reporting, on balance, had sustained the personal observations on Vietnam of the Senator from Connecticut.

The essence of the issue is that the press has its individual responsibility under the Constitution, even as Senators have theirs.

We may be criticized. We may be applauded. But, in the end, we are answerable only to our consciences and to our constituencies.

The press of this Nation is in much the same boat as any other group in many ways, but the one obvious fact is certainly not answerable in terms of conformity with official observations or policy. It is, in my judgment, a constitutional obligation of Government to facilitate the exercise of individual responsibility on the part of the press, but it is not the function of Government to direct the press as to how it should exercise its responsibilities.

After making allowances for the criticism of the press coverage, which the Senator from Connecticut had just advanced, some of which was constructive, very constructive—I would reiterate what I said at Clarke College:

"Taken as a whole, Government officials are almost always inclined to think, and understandably—that they know better than the press what is transpiring in the world or any segment of it and, therefore, to tell it. But time and again events have indicated that on many occasions they do not. In this connection, I think, for example, of the work of American correspondents in Vietnam and the Dominican Republic which has been outstanding in every respect. One sometimes has the impression that the accuracy of the press reporting and some of the press analysis in both places may very well have been greater in many instances than the great flow of information which has come to Washington through official channels."

Mr. PELL. Mr. President, as I understand that, without losing my right to the floor, I may yield to the Senator from Rhode Island briefly for any questions he may wish to ask of the Senator from Montana.

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that, without losing my right to the floor, I yield to the Senator from Rhode Island briefly for any questions he may wish to ask of the Senator from Montana.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Certainly.

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, the Senator from Rhode Island does not have any questions to ask but, I shall be glad to yield to him briefly—and I emphasize the word 'briefly'—without losing my right to the floor.

The PRESIDENT. Without objection, the Senator from Rhode Island may proceed.

Mr. PELL. Mr. President, I rise to support the words and the spirit of the remarks of the Senator from Montana.

While not knowing the Far East as well, as thoroughly, or in as great a depth as does the Senator from Montana, with his years of study about the Far East, and the deal of time he has spent there, I did accompany him on his last trip to the Far East, to the countries on the periphery of China, most specifically including Vietnam, where we saw President Diem. We wrote a report after our visit, which stands up remarkably well 2 years later.

I find myself in complete agreement with his views that, on balance, the thought of the policy of the United States is to reflect better the actual situation and the policies of the Government.

I remember that we felt that way at that time. Events have proved us to be correct.

I still feel the same way.

I congratulate the Senator from Montana on his speech and I agree with him.

Mr. MANSFIELD. I thank the Senator from Rhode Island.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, will the Senator from Pennsylvania yield to me for 30 seconds?

Mr. CLARK. I am glad to yield to the Senator from Oregon.

Mr. MORSE. I wish to associate myself with the statement of the Senator from Rhode Island. I am familiar with the report which he filed. It is too bad that the recommendations and suggestions in the report were not followed and made a part of the policy of our Government.

I completely support the observations of the Senator from Montana.
June 10, 1965

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Let me say that on my own time I shall give my reply to the speech of the Senator from Connecticut today.

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, the Senator from Connecticut (Mr. Dorn), I, in my judgment, served a useful purpose in initiating what I hope will become an orderly and extensive debate on our Vietnamese policy.

His speech is a carefully documented and calmly delivered exposition of the point of view of the Pentagon, General Taylor, the Bundy brothers, and to some extent the Secretary of State. I hope that his views do not entirely represent those of the President of the United States, for I find myself in profound disagreement with much of what my good friend the Senator from Connecticut has just stated.

During the course of debate on the $700 million appropriation for Vietnam, I undertook at some length to spell out my views on the floor of the Senate. Those views have changed little, if any. Nevertheless, I intend at an appropriate time to make a somewhat more detailed statement of what I conceive to be the middle road between two extremes in the Vietnamese controversy.

I have profound respect for the extremely articulate views which the Senator from Connecticut (Mr. Dodd) has taken. I also have profound respect for what I consider to be the other extreme, represented by my good friend the Senator from Connecticut (Mr. Morse) and Senator from Alaska (Mr. Gravel). I believe there is a middle ground. I believe there is a vast oversimplification of views at both ends.

Mr. President, we are deluding ourselves if we think we can win, in the foreseeable future, the Vietnamese war on the land mass of Asia. It is a war which we should never have gotten into, a war which I believe will be very difficult to win, if we can win it; and even if we do win it, it will result in thousands upon thousands of casualties of American civilians.

As was said not too long ago, the coffins are already coming home. There will be more and more coffins coming home as time goes on.

On the other hand, in view of the corner into which we have painted ourselves, I do not believe we can get out of Vietnam at present. I see no alternative but to stay there at least through the monsoon season, so that, by convincing our Communist opponents that they cannot throw us out, we will be able in due course to get to the negotiating table.

Therefore, I say again that I find myself in disagreement with both these extremes.

I should like to comment very briefly on two of the statements made by the Senator from Connecticut. The first is that there is overwhelming support in the United States behind the Pentagon-Bundy-Taylor policy. I do not believe that to be true. On the contrary I believe that the majority of the American people are confused. A substantial number of our people would like to see us get out. Perhaps a slightly larger number want us to escalate the war, thinking by this attack on what they refer to as "godless communism," we would be defending an important principle of our country.

Because the view I have just expressed is documented by the Gallup poll, which was published in the Washington Post of yesterday, I ask unanimous consent that a copy of that poll, as published in the Washington Post, may be printed in the RECORD at this time.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

THE GALLUP POLL: SUPPORT OF VIETNAM POLICY

From a Gallup poll conducted in Princeton, N.J., June 8—During a period of stepped-up military activity on the part of the United States in Vietnam, an increased number of Americans have come to agree with the administration's present policy in that country.

In the latest Gallup survey, 20 percent think the United States should continue its present efforts as compared with 13 percent a month ago.

It is true, however, that the size of the two dissenting wings—those who think we should discontinue fighting, and those who think we should do more—remains about the same as in May.

In considering the views of those who favor a more assertive approach in the Vietnam problem, it is important to bear in mind that a fairly sizable proportion in this group talks in terms of "all-out war," whether or not the President and our allies are prepared for it. Thus, either step up our activities and wage all-out war, or go out completely.

Opinions in both surveys were obtained by this question, in which persons interviewed were able to state their own views, whatever they were:

"In your opinion, what would you like to see the United States do next about Vietnam?"

The results, based on all adults in the sample:

[In percent]

Stop military action

Withdraw completely

Start negotiations, stop fighting

Continue present policy

Increase present efforts

Step up present efforts

Go all out, declare war

No opinion

Other responses

Norm.—Subtotals within categories add to more than the total for the category since some persons gave both answers.

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, the poll shows that 13 percent of the people want us to withdraw; 12 percent want us to stop fighting and start negotiations; 15 percent want us to continue the present policy; 25 percent want to increase the military efforts; 8 percent want to step up the present efforts; and 15 percent want us to go all the way out and declare war. It seems to me to be clear that there is no consensus.

Mr. President, in respect to the attack by the Senator from Connecticut on the press, I have not been one who has through the years been an unlimited admirer of our American press. Nevertheless, I must say that I believe the majority leader, the Senator from Montana (Mr. Mansfield), was entirely correct in the comments he made on the reporting of the press of the war in Vietnam. It has not been perfect. There is a tendency toward sensationalism which is a part of the remaining immaturity in many of our press reports.

However, I believe that on the whole the press has done a very good job. I agree with what the Senator from Rhode Island (Mr. Pell) has said. We have obtained more accurate information from the press on Vietnam than we have received from the American Embassy in Saigon, the Pentagon, or the State Department.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I, too, commend the Senator from Connecticut on his speech, and associate myself with the kind things that were said about it by the Senator from Pennsylvania. It is a well-organized speech. He has given us some views on what has taken place on the ground. It is valuable to have his reflection on this and on what some Asian leaders think about it.

However, I must also say, with all the deep respect and affection I have for the Senator from Connecticut, that when he tries to induce us to listen to him, to the President and allow the status quo to remain, to let the troops go in there to undertake whatever mission the President orders them to undertake and at the same time keep us in the dark, on the theory that the press is not reporting things right, I must depart.

This would be a mudslinging doctrine indeed in our country. I believe the press is doing an excellent job in reporting on this and other fracases of the same character.

It is clear that if we blanket out the press and the opposition, we deprive ourselves of what every judge and legislator wants to have, namely, a statement from the other side. We should be solicitors to get the view of the other side.

That does not mean that we must go along with people who do not agree with us, it might have been in direct conflict with our views. We are accustomed to fellow travelers, even in the civil rights cause. We can disregard such views.

I do not see that that permits us to say that we have no right to question, that the status quo should remain, and that we should rule out a strong opposition in this case. I want the press to rule both sides in. I want to hear them. I believe that the press and a strong opposition keep us on our toes and test the worth and value of our policies, and compel our attention to an alternative, even the very alternative which the Senator from Connecticut has advanced. He said we should at least send over a bipartisan fact-finding mission. That is already a step in the right direction.

I see no substitute for whatever may be of value in the views of those on the opposite side of the issue. I have made a point of standing with the President. However, I am the Senator from the State of New York, representing 18 million people. I want to know what is going on. I want my people to
know what is going on. I want my vote and the votes of other Senators cast in favor of or against what I call a major, bog-down war in Asia. It may be necessary, but I want something to say about it. I take the position that neither the backing of the press or the opposition as an excuse for allowing the status quo to continue and for keeping me and others submerged in the dark. There is no substitute for knowing. There is no substitute for debate. No one knew something about them. No one could think of anything more sensitive in terms of security than that subject. We can do the same thing. We can renew security and still know what we are doing and have an interest and participate in the decisions.

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. President. I rise to defend the free press of the Nation. I hope that statement will not cause any alarm that "the Vietnam war" has been stealing under the surface for quite some time. With the bankruptcy of the "special warfare" and the failure of the war blackmail against North Vietnam, this annoyance grew and broke out in an open battle of arguments.

American newspapers and journals have sounded the alarm that "the Vietnam war is coming to Washington" and "battles in a war that are already forming on Capitol Hill over the Vietnam problem" (Washington Evening Star, January 2) and "that "some of his own Democrats in the Senate opened fire on the President" and "Mr. Johnson is finding that the White House is a lonely place." (U.S. News & World Report, March 15.)

Since early this year an increasing number of influential masters minds, with solid backing, have directed their verbal fire at the administration's Vietnam policy. Compare with blandishments, Johnson has talked personally to more than 500 Congressmen and a great number of them led his aides in making scores of public statements or addresses to defend the policy of armed aggression against Vietnam. But all this had little effect on the mounting criticism in the country.

A report in the May 14 issue of the American magazine Time quoted Johnson as saying: "I am the most denounced man in the world - it's all right, I get two weeks of it - and occasionally I get two weeks up here at home." Then report said he talked himself hoarse trying to "explain and defend his decisions" that the United States must hold on to South Vietnam. Yet criticism of his administration, instead of being muffled, became more vociferous and the U.S. President was irritated by it.

A salient fact about this battle of arguments is that the number of critics of John- son's Vietnam policy should have done; namely, get facts on the scene. Clearly, this is what our allies need, but Johnson has been unable to do so.

But this did not satisfy the critics of American policy. They then said that President Johnson should offer to negotiate. He did this in his Johns Hopkins speech, and also, apparently, in negotiations with some of our allies. He has publicly stated that he would be glad to negotiate at any time with the North Vietnamese and the Chinese. The North Vietnamese and the Chinese have spurned these offers to negotiate and have rejected them in most brutal language.

Various criticisms have been made of President Johnson and many suggestions have been made to him. In the beginning, it was said that President Johnson should refer to negotiations. He did this in his Johns Hopkins speech, and also, apparently, in negotiations with some of our allies. He has publicly stated that he would be glad to negotiate at any time with the North Vietnamese and the Chinese. The North Vietnamese and the Chinese have spurned these offers to negotiate and have rejected them in most brutal language.

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Johnson met this criticism by offering to participate in a reconstruction of rural life and in relief activities in those sections of the Mekong Valley which were not controlled by the Vietcong. This proposal, however, did not satisfy the critics.

They then said that the United States should stop bombing. President Johnson did this for 6 days. It had no result in bringing about any response from the North Vietnamese or the Chinese Communists.

As the Senator from Connecticut [Mr. Dodd] observed, there is great danger that here at home we may grow tired of the hostilities in South Vietnam. These tests do create a severe emotional strain, and they may become more severe. But the quality which is needed at home is a readiness to stick with the policy and to keep on.

We should remember that at one time in World War II a victory by Hitler seemed almost certain after France had been knocked out and when Russia was still an ally of Hitler. If the British had resigned themselves to what was said to be the inevitability of Nazi victory, there would have been a Nazi victory. It is to the great credit of the British that at a time when everything seemed to be against them in late June of 1940, they kept on and resisted, and by their resistance gradually drew other nations into the struggle as their allies, and the free world was saved.

I hope that we shall display something of that same quality of sturdy resistance and determination in this struggle.

We owe a distinct debt to the able Senator from Connecticut for his address and his courage in this matter. I commend him.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that my remarks may be printed at the conclusion of the address by the Senator from Connecticut, and with a notation that they were uttered subsequent to his speech.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Dodd in the chair). Without objection, it is so ordered.