1. A vigorous, imaginative and flexible prosecution of the war within acceptable limits.

2. Through free and honest elections establishing a broadly based stable, functioning, constitutional government.

3. An expedited pacification program which will win the allegiance of the Vietnamese people including the Viet Cong, and which offers them the opportunity to become part of the social fabric of the country.

4. Reorientation of the mission of the Vietnamese Armed Forces and their revitalization with increased emphasis on improvement and quality.

5. The optimum use of available manpower.


He was basically optimistic about the progress of the military war:

In a series of splendidly executed offensive operations undertaken by General Westmoreland since late April in which a total of over 12,000 of the enemy have been killed in action, the enemy has been kept off balance and his time schedule has been disrupted. It seems apparent that the main effort of the enemy to achieve his summer campaign objectives has been postponed from May at least until July. General Westmoreland’s strategy of anticipating enemy threats has paid off handsomely and is one which he intends to continue in view of what he foresees as an intensification of enemy attempts to achieve his summer campaign objectives.

An encouraging element of these recent operations has been evidence of increased effectiveness of the Vietnamese Armed Forces. In a number of heavy engagements throughout the country ARVN units have turned in highly creditable performances. They contributed materially to the success of the initial operations in the DMZ, killing 342 enemy with a loss of only 31 of their own forces. In a total of 14 other operations in the I Corps area during the past six weeks, ARVN units accounted for 1,400 enemy killed in action. In the II Corps area they also have given a good account of themselves and recently in the Delta
area of IV Corps conducted a highly successful operation. I believe that where the ARVN is weakest, however, is in their pacification role where motivation and performance still leave much to be desired. Here, of course, the Regional and Popular Forces are also important elements and all are getting increased attention. While ARVN morale and performance have been improving there is evidence that that of the VC has been declining. It has had increasing difficulties in recruiting and a growing share of the enemy war effort is being assumed by Hanoi.

But he too saw that the crux of the military problem was how to choke off the North Vietnamese infiltration. To him doing this, which he fully believed feasible, carried at least three primary advantages:

a. It would drastically reduce the dimensions of our problem in South Viet-Nam. Militarily we would be dealing only with the Viet Cong whose problems of recruitment and supplies would be enormously multiplied lacking the assistance and reinforcements of North Viet-Nam. I believe the result would be that the Viet Cong would eventually wither on the vine.

b. When the infiltration is choked off, it should be possible to suspend bombings at least for a period and thereby determine whether there is substance to the statement in many quarters that Hanoi would then come to negotiations; we should at least call their bluff.

c. Tensions now existing between the U.S. and Viet-Nam on the one hand and Cambodia on the other should be, over a period of time, relieved and our relations with Cambodia improved, even though initially Sihanouk might continue to allow the NVA/VC to use Cambodia as a haven and a source of certain supplies.

He realized full well that the means employed to achieve such an objective, of course, presented many difficult and delicate problems, both military and political, but he expressed confidence "that with imagination and ingenuity, these can be met...."

What is involved, of course, are operations within Laos but I do not believe this fact should present insuperable obstacles. The North Vietnamese Government is a signatory to the 1962 Geneva Accords but its forces have been in Laos both before and since the signing of the Agreements. It is now using Laos as the main route
for infiltration into South Viet-Nam. Is it not logical and reasonable, therefore, that South Vietnamese troops should oppose and combat North Vietnamese offensive action by whatever method can be devised in order to prevent the invasion of their country? Guarantees, of course, would have to be given to the Laotian Government by the South Vietnamese, and I believe should be underwritten by us, that Vietnamese troops were on Laotian territory for defensive purposes only and would be withdrawn immediately when peace is secured. The operation, especially in its preparatory stages, should be carried out with as much security and secrecy as possible. I have made some recommendations as to methods we might use to achieve these objectives. This is a matter which I believe we should pursue with the utmost concentration. 57/

These views, of course, accorded with those which the military had been pressing for some time. COMUSMACV was fortunate in having such a staunch ally in his battle for expanded operations into the sanctuaries as well as the moral support for a more intensive war effort. Bunker concluded his short introduction by outlining his current assessment and summarized by saying that Hanoi's stance was one of determined inflexibility until the situation developed more clearly in favor of either the United States or the North Vietnamese. Under these conditions, he concluded that Hanoi might consider the next six to ten months a crucial time of testing of wills. The period coincided with the monsoon season, most favorable to the VC militarily and this, combined with electoral pressures in South Vietnam followed by the pre-electoral period in the United States with its mounting pressures for resolution of the Vietnam conflict, seemed to indicate to Hanoi that a crucial period of developments was emerging. Bunker estimated that Ho Chi Minh held to the expectation that the United States could not significantly curb infiltration or destroy the VC's military and political capability in the next six to twelve months, and that by their domestic and international political pressures would dominate the course of events demanding some sort of resolution of the war unfavorable to United States interests.

COMUSMACV, who followed the briefing by Ambassador Bunker, interpreted United States overall strategy as one of applying such pressure on the enemy as would destroy his will to continue the aggression. In COMUSMACV's words,

...we must convince the enemy that he cannot win, that time is not on his side. I believe that this strategy will succeed, provided we step up the pressure by reinforcing our mounted successes. The grueling success of our air and sea offensive is being matched by the less dramatic success of our ground campaign. Although our
strategy in the South is necessarily defensive, our tactics are decidedly offensive. 53

Of particular importance General Westmoreland felt was that the enemy had been refused strategic or significant tactical success:

> It has been my objective to frustrate the enemy's plans, therefore I have given overriding attention to maneuvering troops to deny them battlefield successes and psychological opportunities.

During the past year, the enemy has --

a. Been forced by our naval operations to abandon plans to bring in large tonnages by sea.

b. Had to resort to use of the long rugged land supply route through Laos.

c. Been denied recruits in the numbers required from the populated areas along the coast, thereby forcing him to supply manpower from North Vietnam.

d. Been denied rice from the coastal provinces of I and II Corps in the quantities required, thereby forcing him to transport rice from North Vietnam or to buy rice from Cambodia. 59

In summary, COMUSMACV believed that North Vietnam was paying a tremendous price with nothing to show in return. In his words: "The situation is not a stalemate; we are winning slowly but steadily and this pace can accelerate if we reinforce our successes. Therefore, I believe we should step up our operations in pacification in the south, increase the pressure in the north, and exercise new initiatives in Laos." 60

The J2 estimate which followed COMUSMACV's overall assessment concluded that:

Overall, the enemy must be having personnel problems. His losses have been heavy, and his in-country recruiting efforts unsatisfactory. He is probably attempting to make good his losses by heavy infiltration, but we cannot conclusively prove this, nor do we know how successful he has been. We hear frequently of
the so-called "Cross-over point" --- that is, when we put out of action more enemy per month than we estimate he brought into country and recruited for that month. This is a nebulous figure, composed as you have seen of several tenuous variables. We may have reached the "cross-over point" in March and May of this year, but we will not know for some months; 61/

and that the enemy could be expected to:

(1) present a constant threat in widely separated areas, (2) attrite US, RVN and ARVN forces, and (3) gain military victories for propaganda purposes.

If our analysis is correct, his Main Forces have failed to carry out their part of the enemy's campaign plan. He has maintained his Main Force units as a threat-in-being, largely at the sacrifice of the other MF tasks. His immediate problem then, must be to improve his MF capabilities and operations.

From this analysis, what can we expect of the enemy in the future?

North Vietnamese leadership in III CTD is increasing with the introduction of NVA units and political cadre. Senior Generals in COSVN are North Vietnamese. The B-3 Front and MR 5 are commanded by NVA generals. We have seen an increase in the number of personal taken from MR III in NVA whereas most of his personnel previously came from MR IV. This indicates an enemy willingness to draw down on his strategic reserves in the North to restore the situation in the South. Another indication of growing NVA control is the increased professionalism of his operations. His equipment is better, he uses heavier and more modern weapons, and his techniques (infantry - artillery coordination) more polished. It is obvious that the NVA effort has increased and will continue to increase as the VC effort falters.

Second, since we foresee increased NVA participation, we believe that the enemy is now, or will shortly, bring in significant numbers of NVA infiltrers or units. He must attempt to reinforce the units in the coastal areas. He must attempt to regain the initiative around the periphery of SVN. He must attempt to attrite us. To do this he will need more strength than we now see at hand.

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To support this build-up the Laos corridor becomes increasingly important to the enemy... You know of the location of base areas in the Laos Panhandle which serve as logistical, rest, and training bases and permit the orderly movement of both men and material to SVN. There has been heavy truck movement through the Laos Panhandle which began in November and December and continued throughout the dry season. To improve his capability of supporting the war in SVN, he has constructed numerous by-passes at critical points along roads throughout the Panhandle, extended Route 922 east into the A Shau Valley, and improved and extended Route 96 south to Route 110 and Base Area 609.... Prior to the onset of the Monsoon Season, Route 110 was a heavily used, main supply route leading from Cambodia, through Laos into SVN.

Use of Cambodia will also be increased.... The enemy has established a Military Region 10 in SVN which extends into Cambodia. He has stated that MR 10 is to become the biggest base area of the war. He has formed a replacement and refitting center reported to be 8,000 strong, in the Fishhook Area for units badly mauled in SVN. An agent recently reported a VC arsenal in the Parrot's Beak which produces assorted mines, and repairs weapons. We do know that the Parrot's Beak area is often used by the VC in moving men and supplies between Tay Ninh Province and the Delta. 62/

Such an analysis held little prospect for the fading away which had been predicted for this time of year in 1967. Furthermore, these trends carried with them significant developments in terms of future enemy operations and these operations tended to shape the strategy which CINCPACV was planning to pursue for the remainder of the year. The J2 summarized by noting, first, the advantages and disadvantages of the so-called enemy "peripheral strategy," an exercise which emphasized that the Laos and Cambodia sanctuaries were becoming increasingly important to the enemy:

What does this mean in terms of future enemy operations? From peripheral base areas in NVN, Laos, and Cambodia, he can launch attacks designed to draw us into the border areas.... These operations can be mounted from terrain which is most difficult for our intelligence effort to penetrate. When forced to withdraw, the enemy will have sanctuaries into which he can move to break contact, rest, refit and train. This arrangement gives him flexibility in choice of operational objectives. For example, he can launch offensive operations through the DMZ, he can attempt to seize the two
northern provinces; he can attempt a thrust through the Central Highlands from Base Area 609 toward the coast, he can threaten Pleiku and Dariac; he can launch an offensive from MR 10 toward Phuc Tuy Province. Obviously, he can combine several of these options. When he encroaches from the sanctuaries in force, we must go to meet him. We cannot permit him to win territory, intimidate the people, and move freely about the countryside and thus, gain the psychological victory he wants.

This enemy "peripheral strategy" has disadvantages, too. He will have to move supplies from secure areas in Laos and Cambodia to those units located deep inside SVN, where once he might have supported them with relative ease by sea. Weather conditions impose restrictions upon his land lines of communication, especially during the wet season. POL and wheeled vehicle requirements are increased as is his maintenance needs. Inside SVN, he will be hard pressed to support large scale military operations along the coastal plains because of his long, insecure, LOC's. Thus, he will find it difficult to make his main force presence felt in the heavily populated areas. In turn, this will reduce his access to maneuver, rice, and other supplies normally procured from these populated coastal areas.

SUMMARY

In summary, here are the significant elements of the enemy situation as we see them:

1. His strategy of the war of attrition is unchanged, and his determination to carry it out is evident.

2. He has been hurt, particularly in the coastal areas of II Corps and around Saigon.

3. His Main Forces have not carried out their part of the enemy's strategic plan.

4. His Main Force units require additional strength to carry out their role.

5. The war is becoming more and more an NVA war, and Laos and Cambodia are becoming increasingly important to him. 63/

The J3 briefing continually emphasized that a major redispersion of U.S. forces had been required to take full advantage of the opportunities to engage the enemy. This was especially true in I, II and
III CTZ's, primarily in the DMZ area, in the Qui Nhon and in the border regions at the juncture of Kontum and Pleiku Provinces. After a brief discussion of the different force packages which had been requested by COMUSMACV/CINCPAC, the J3 went on to outline the major tasks to be accomplished. They were:

1) Contain enemy at borders  
2) Locate and destroy VC/NVA  
3) Neutralize enemy base areas  
4) Maximum support to RD  
5) Open and secure LOC  
6) Interdict enemy LOC  
7) Secure key installations  
8) Emphasize Psy Ops

J3 then presented a comparison of friendly and enemy maneuver battalions projected thru 30 June 1967. Then, he compared maneuver battalions, this time applying a weighted factor of 3 to each U.S. and Free World battalion and a factor of 1 for each RVN AF or VC/NVA battalion. These tables are shown on the following page.
### Maneuver Battalions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>U.S.</th>
<th>FM</th>
<th>RVNAF</th>
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<tr>
<td>31 Dec 66</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 Jun 67</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>262</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

837 RF Co's and 4028 PF Plt's

| 30 Jun 68            |      |    |       |       |
| Prog 4               | 111  | 24 | 154   | 289   |
| MEP                  | (8)  |    |       |       |
| MEP                  | (18) |    |       |       |

### Maneuver Battalion Comparison

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>VC/NVA</th>
<th>US/FM/GVN</th>
<th>EN Equivalent Ratios</th>
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<td></td>
<td>M1V R  BE1S</td>
<td>M1V R  B1S</td>
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<tr>
<td>End FY 66</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>220</td>
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<tr>
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<td>162</td>
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<tr>
<td>End FY 68</td>
<td>162 (?)</td>
<td>289</td>
<td>3.5</td>
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</table>

* 1 US/FM En Equivalent to 3 VC/NVA En
... Using these figures as a basis for comparison the J3 then detailed what the enemy threats appeared to be especially in light of increased or continued enemy infiltration. To meet these threats he listed three roles in which our forces were deployed. One, containment or anti-invasion forces, countered the threat along the DMZ and were needed for deployment opposite enemy sanctuaries in Laos and Cambodia. Two, pacification and security forces required for support of RD and security of base installations in LOC's; and three, offensive forces required to defeat the enemy in the main force war and to invade his in-country base areas. Under Course of Action A (Minimum Essential) - 21 battalions were required for containment; 168 for pacification and security; and 100 for main force offensive, for a total of 289 by the end of FY 67. These were, in the words of J-3 "within the time frame under discussion a fixed overhead or a down payment on winning the war which must be paid." 66/ 

Under Course of Action B (Optimum), the J3 estimated that containment forces would be increased to 27, this being based on the need to counter the expected increased build-up of enemy forces along the DMZ, in Laos and in Cambodia, all assumed possible because of restraints on air interdiction plus the enemy's continued freedom of action in the trans-border sanctuaries.

Of the 42 U.S. battalions then committed to pacification/security, 16 were in support of RD, 13 were in combined pacification/security roles, and an additional 13 were assigned base and line of communication security missions. Of the 22 free world battalions, 21 were on pacification and security roles and one on a security role only. Of the 80 ARVN armed force battalions 53 were assigned RD support roles and an additional 27 were assigned security missions. Of the total number of maneuver battalions available at the end of FY 67, 25 U.S., one Free World and 71 ARVN battalions were considered available for offensive operations. Then, using the battalion equivalents which he had quoted earlier, the J3 analyzed what he had labelled Courses A and B:

For a discussion of offensive capabilities under course of action A and B, let us turn to the second slide (UU). It summarizes the previous one and shows the aggregate number of US, Free World, and GVN battalions by the role to which committed. Note that the 97 battalions available for offensive operations at the end of FY 67 increases to 100 under course of action B. However, these numbers do not give the true picture. By applying the battalion equivalent ratio of 3 for a US or Free World battalion and 1 for an ARVN battalion, the offensive
capabilities at present are 149 ARVN bn equivalents. Course of action A represents a 33½ increase (200 bn equivalents) over our present offensive capability. Course of action B represents only a 17½ increase (155) over our present offensive capability. These offensive forces are what remain after commitment of forces to containment of the enemy threat and pacification and security. (The end FY 67 column was the actual distribution of units as of 30 June 1967. However, during any given week the forces in the containment and offensive roles, and to a lesser degree, those performing pacification/security missions will vary. It would be misleading to say they represent precise estimates, rather the numbers are representative of the basic distribution of our forces to varying roles and illustrative of the type of war we are fighting.) It is possible that additional forces may be required for containment since the 27 battalions represent only an estimate of what will be necessary. If so, we may be required to take units from the pacification and security or offensive roles. Should this be required, course of action A provides a greater operational flexibility for offensive action or reinforcement of our containment forces. Under course of action B, however, response to contingencies must be met at the expense of forces committed to pacification and security or offensive roles.

In summary, the reduced forces under course of action B; the limitation of air operations north of 20° latitude; and the restriction of ground action to South Vietnam could reinforce Hanoi's determination to prolong the conflict. In particular, the restriction of out-of-country air and ground operations would increase the enemy's capability to concentrate his defense, maintain his LOC's and require us to divert additional ground forces to the containment role. Under these circumstances, we present the enemy increased options to prolonging the war. Course of action B does not provide us with reasonable assurance that, given the present objectives, there would be any prospects of an early settlement of the conflict. This is not to imply we might not eventually win the war of attrition but it would be a long drawn out process and would postpone the time when US forces could redeploy from South Vietnam. 67/
The sum total of the briefings did not vary from what McNamara had heard so many times before: that there was an increasing NVA presence in control of the war; that it was increasingly becoming a main force battle; that the sanctuaries were becoming increasingly important to the enemy both for the logistics and tactical advantages they offered. It was clear that MACV's view of the war in these terms, as increasingly a main force battle to be fought by American units, had considerable influence upon the strategies that they pursued, as well as their calculations of resources required to carry them out. By the final day of his visit in Saigon no resolution of the ground force requirements had really been arrived at. However, on the final evening, Secretary McNamara and General Westmoreland, accompanied by General Abrams sat down after dinner and worked out what seemed to be an equitable provision of forces below the mobilization level. In this, they took what was commonly accepted as available, approximately the 3-2/3 divisions outlined by Enthoven, and subtracted those which the COMUSMACV had stated were possibly available for civilianization during the next year, some 14,400. Computed, this came to approximately a 45,000 force increase, since part of the PRACTICE HINTHE barrier brigade had already been included in the Program 5 total.

The events of the next week, July 8-13, indicated that COMUSMACV was not completely prepared to support the 525,000 level which was agreed upon, a level, incidentally, which coincided with the old Program 4 optimum request submitted by COMUSMACV in the fall of the previous year. General Dunn, who was General Westmoreland's force planner, worked his staff throughout the night prior to the Secretary of Defense's departure on the 9th. He prepared a rough troop list under the 525,000 limit which he had carried back to the Joint Staff for refinement. 68/ 6.

6. The Compromise--Slightly More of the Same

At the point of Secretary McNamara's return to Washington, planning on force structures travelled along two parallel tracks for the next week. As General Dunn conferred with the JCS and the Joint Staff and they tried to refine the forces within the 525,000 level, Secretary McNamara initiated a study in Systems Analysis to flush out the 525,000, or as so often was the case, to prepare the OSD position with which to compare and evaluate the JCS recommendation which would come. According to Mr. McNamara's instructions to Secretary Enthoven, the 525,000 package would include 19 battalions in addition to the 37 already included in Program 4 through the previous March. The sources of the 19 battalions were to be as follows: 3 PRACTICE HINTHE barrier brigade; 3 from the 9th MAB, 6 from the deployment of the 101st Airborne Division; 3 from the 11th Infantry Division (the Brigade in Hawaii), and 4 new battalions formed in lieu of the 24 rifle companies proposed in the ARCOV recommendation. In addition to these 19 battalions, 9 ARCOV rifle company equivalents, equivalent to three more battalions in foxhole strength, would be.
approved if they could be included in the 525,000 ceiling. (This accounts for the original ARCOV total of 33 battalions dropping out in the subsequent figures and planning for Program 5). The 525,000 also included five TFS, 3 Air Force and two Marine. Of these squadrons, two Air Force would be scheduled to move. The other three would be included in the plan but without a movement schedule, although as a footnote, "their availability when needed" was recognized. Enthoven proceeded by directing that Program 5 should be prepared for publication with a strength of 525,000 minus the strengths of the three air squadrons now scheduled for deployment. 69/  

Another subject which occupied much focus of attention in early July when Program 5 approached final approval was how to go about obtaining additional troops from our allies in South Vietnam.
On 20 July, the Joint Chiefs of Staff responded to the request from the Secretary of Defense for the detailed troop list providing the specified forces for CONUS/MACV within the ceiling of 525,000. Significantly in this JCSM, the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not concur in the inclusion of the elements of the 9th MAB and the non-deployed tactical fighter squadrons in the Republic of Vietnam ceiling. They argued that the 9th MAB was already included for PACOM under Program 4 and that it had never been included as part of the MACV force structure and was not added in the RVN spaces in MACV's package 5 alternative force structure. They wanted to maintain a string on it since the brigade was ticketed for the PACOM Reserve and subject to employment in other areas depending upon the criticality of the contingency. The Chiefs wanted the 9th MAB when ashore in RVN to be carried as a temporary augmentation as was being done under Program 4. Similarly, they wanted the Tactical Fighter Squadrons to be maintained in a "ready to deploy status" outside of RVN, included in the RVN ceiling only if and when they deployed in-country. They also expressed doubt as to whether MACV could recruit suitable civilian personnel in the competitive market on a civilian direct-hire basis to replace 8,100 military spaces. They believed "that the forces included in the attached roop list will contribute significantly to the prosecution of the war, but are less than those recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in JCSM 218-67, dated 20 April 1967, Subject: Force Requirements -- Southeast Asia, FY 1968. The views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as set forth in JCSM 288-67 which also provided an assessment of U.S. worldwide military posture are still
considered valid." This was, of course, reaffirming a force requirement of 2-1/3 divisions "minimum essential" and the add-on 2-1/3 division for the "optimum" in FYs 68 and 69 respectively.

On 21 July, Systems Analysis prepared a comparison of the JCS recommendations as contained in JCSM 416-67 and those proposed by OSD. The OSD proposal was actually prepared in Systems Analysis per McNamara's earlier 13 July directive. The major differences between OSD & JCS occurred both over the MAB and the TFS battalion which we just outlined and the civilianization issue with the JCS recommendation requiring over 12,000 civilianization slots and the OSD recommendation not quite half that number. A summary table of the two recommendations appears below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>JCS Recommendations</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Program #4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 68 Added Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army: 323,735 a/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy: 30,039 b/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AF: 56,148</td>
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<td>MC: 74,550</td>
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<td>Program #5</td>
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<td>Army: 358,133 d/</td>
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<td>AF: 59,528</td>
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<tr>
<td>MC: 62,073</td>
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<tr>
<th>OSD Recommendations</th>
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<tr>
<td>Army: 351,618</td>
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<tr>
<td>Navy: 33,461</td>
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<tr>
<td>MC: 62,073</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total: 525,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| a/ Includes the 198th Brigade (3 Infantry battalions)     |
| b/ Includes the 101 Div (-), 11th Brigade and 3 separate  |
|     battalions (13 infantry battalions)                   |
| c/ Includes 9th MAB, currently authorized in SVN until    |
|     1 Sept. (3 infantry battalions)                       |
| d/ Less Service portion of civilianization to be determined. |
| e/ OSD estimate of Service breakout of civilianization.   |
|     Actual breakdown is undetermined.                    |

There were several decisions which Enthoven in his memorandum to McNamara recommended be deferred for the time being. These included an Army intelligence augmentation and a MACV headquarters JTV, a Navy request for two mobile construction battalions, two construction battalion maintenance units and various staffs as well as an Air Force A-1 TFS civil engineer squadron and UG 123 herbicide augmentation. JCSM 218-67 which recommended the original MACV "minimum essential force" included certain out of country forces also, primarily three tactical fighter
squadrons in Thailand, five additional destroyers and two battleships and two cruisers for naval gunfire support. Although these forces were not specifically addressed in the latest JCSM 416-67, Enthoven recommended that they be addressed at that time. Accordingly, he recommended that the TFS recommended by the JCS be unfavorably considered since he felt it would not contribute significantly to our effort in Southeast Asia and that one battleship be authorized and that other than that the increments in JCSM 218-67 be disapproved. These recommendations were approved by Secretary McNamara in a memorandum for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, dated 10 August. In it, he wrote:

I tentatively approve for planning the forces as recommended for SVN in the enclosure to JCSM 416-67 dated July 20, 1967 except for those units and augmentations listed in the enclosure, pending submission of adequate justification. The 9th MAJ, the rotational APB, and tactical air squadrons ready for deployment will be included in the 525,000 SVN U.S. strength ceiling. Deployment authority for the two VMFA Marine squadrons will be considered separately.

The table below summarizes the approved force levels.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Army</th>
<th>Navy</th>
<th>AF</th>
<th>MC</th>
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<td>56,148</td>
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</table>

*Includes transfer of 1 APB (199 personnel) from offshore to in-country.*

I recognize that the FY 68 troop list has not been refined. In order to provide for timely budget actions, please submit for my detailed review your refined troop list, with detailed justification by September 15, 1967. Your submission should include a monthly schedule of civilianization/tradeoffs, identified by unit and Service, in order to insure that U.S. forces in SVN do not exceed 525,000. For planning purposes, Program #5 will reflect a total civilianization, trade-off schedule as follows:
Any added requirements in your refined troop list including deferred units should be fully justified and accompanied by corresponding civilianization or trade-off spaces.

The additional out-of-country forces proposed in JCSH 218-57 are not approved except for the 5 additional destroyers for gunfire support. These destroyers are approved providing they can be made available from existing active fleet assets. In addition, I am considering the activation and deployment of 1 battleship in a separate action.

This was in the ratification of Program 5 which was to be formally published on 14 August. 71/1

The final decision in mid-August came as no surprise to either the public or to the Secretaries or to anyone included in the distribution of this finished program for that matter, for in his tax budget message to Congress on 4 August President Johnson had disclosed plans to dispatch between 45 and 50,000 troops to Vietnam bringing the total to 525,000. A New York Times article noted that it was a "compromise between the 70,000 men sought by Westmoreland and the 15-30,000 men suggested by Secretary of Defense, Robert S. McNamara." That it was. However, the announcement was greeted in both the public press and in the public consciousness with a certain resignation which bordered on apathy. Clark Clifford and General Maxwell Taylor had already been dispatched to the Far East, ostensibly to visit allies and to explain the course of American policy in the war, but there was little secret that they were out scrounging troops and trying to induce commitments from some of the nations which had already contributed or those which were being reluctant to contribute more. Their return on 6 August only increased the public pressure for they reported "wide agreement among allies fighting in South Vietnam to increasing pressure on the enemy."

A day later, Johnny Apple's article on "stalemate" broached the subject in the public press. In it, Apple outlined in consummate detail the infiltration figures showing that the United States was failing to "win" the big war because of the ability of the North Vietnamese to reinforce faster than we could kill them; he quoted the infiltration statistics both official and those which he had derived from his time in Vietnam from "unofficial sources," all quite accurate. He cited the constant need for reinforcements as a measure of our failure. The article which received wide circulation both in Vietnam and especially in the decision-making circles of the Pentagon merely confirmed what many had been saying officially and unofficially for some time -- that infiltration was a
crucial variable; that there was no indication that the North Vietnamese had lost stomach for the war; nor did the NVA lack the capability to reinforce at a much higher level than we had anticipated.

As Program 5 broke almost as if programmed, General H. K. Johnson announced in his visit to Saigon that there was "a smell of success in every major area of the war." In a Senate Preparedness Subcommittee report given by Senator Boren he repeated their incessant demand that we have a sharp intensification of the air war over North Vietnam in an attempt to stem the infiltration. General Cao Van Bien, Chief of Staff of the Viet Cong, said "we are convinced, however, that bombing North Vietnam would never adequately control infiltration. That "we have to solve the problem of Laos and Cambodia and the sanctuaries or the war might last 30 years."

The program which emerged and was ratified in this environment, of public debate and concern, was essentially the result of the circular path traced far back to the optimum request of Program 4. Its origins and its limits can be traced to one primary factor -- that of mobilization. When the President and the Secretary of Defense, as well as other Congressional leaders and politically attuned decision makers in the government began to search for the elusive point at which the costs of Vietnam would become inordinate, they always settled upon the mobilization line, the point at which Reserves and large units would have to be called up to support a war which was becoming increasingly distasteful and intolerable to the American public. Domestic resource constraints with all of their political and social repercussions, not strategic or tactical military considerations in Vietnam, were to dictate American war policy from that time on.

7. Follow-Ons

Hardly had the ink dried on approval of Program 5 deployments, when pressures began to build for the acceleration of these deployments to Vietnam. On 6 September 1967, the Acting Chairman informed the Joint Chiefs of Staff that he had been queried as to what could be done to speed up or accelerate Program 5 deployments. Although ostensibly the reason for accelerated deployments was to meet the threat in the DMZ and I CTZ, the Acting Chairman indicated he had been specifically asked to look at:

a. What could be done prior to Christmas.

b. What could be done prior to March 12, the date of the New Hampshire primary election.

The Chiefs were to look into the subject on an urgent basis and to provide their views to the Acting Chairman by 9 September 1967. 75/
A Director's Memorandum to the Acting Chairman, in response to this
inquiry, was forwarded on 9 September. This Memorandum indicated that
the refined Program 5 troop list then being developed by the Joint Staff
indicated that a total of 62,132 Program 5 forces had not been ordered
deployed as of that date. Of these, approximately 9% were scheduled
to be deployed in Calendar Year 67, 33% to be deployed 1 January to
1 March 1968, and the remainder scheduled to be deployed after 1 March.
Most of the forces scheduled to deploy in FY 1969 were controlled by
long lead time equipment and were not subject to acceleration into the
January-February 1968 time frame. A hurried analysis, however, indicated
that about 1,700 Navy personnel, scheduled to deploy after 1 March, might
be accelerated to January-February 1968 deployments. Since neither the
Air Force nor the Marines had an appreciable number scheduled to deploy
after 1 March 1968, the fruitful area for further exploration quickly
turned to the Army capability for accelerating deployment. The bulk of
the Army combatant units was scheduled to deploy in February-March 1968.
These included the 101st Airborne Division (-), and the 11th Light
Infantry Brigade in February 1968, and 4 separate infantry battalions in
March 1968.

The Army indicated that 1 brigade task force plus the division head-
quartes, approximately 4,500 personnel, of the 101st Airborne Division (-),
could, in fact, be accelerated to arrive in-country by 15 December 1967,
and the remainder of the division (-), approximately 5,500 personnel,
could be accelerated to arrive in-country on 31 January 1968, under the
following conditions:

a. Movement by air would be required and would cost $15M
more than movement by surface;

b. Non-divisional support units which were planned to accompany
the division could not be accelerated; therefore the support must be pro-
vided by in-country resources.

c. Additional unit training in-country of approximately four
weeks would be required before the units would be fully combat ready.

The 11th Light Infantry Brigade could be accelerated for arrival
in-country by 31 January 1968, if it were to be deployed by air.

The Director's memorandum listed several possible actions to be
explored with the Services which might speed up Program 5 deployments.
Among these were:

1. Delay commencement of civilianization program until
after 1 March 1968. Thereafter use personnel released
by civilianization for fill of skeleton units or for
in-country activation of new units.
2. Deploy unit without equipment to join like unit in South Vietnam for double shifting on the available equipment. This pertains primarily to service support type units.

3. Withdraw deployable elements from existing combat/mission ready units in CONUS and Europe for deployment to South Vietnam. Replace these units by others presently being readied for South Vietnam.

4. Draw down personnel and equipment from existing units in CONUS (including reserve equipment) and Europe as required to expedite readiness of units for deployment.

5. Substitute ready units located in CONUS and Europe for early deployment to South Vietnam for those units which cannot be readied by 1 March 1968.

6. Deploy units to South Vietnam in substandard readiness condition in personnel, training and/or equipment. Raise the unit to satisfactory state of combat/mission readiness in South Vietnam prior to commitment to combat or combat service support role.

7. Deploy units to bases in PACOM (Hawaii, Guam, Okinawa, Philippines, Japan and Korea) in substandard readiness condition in personnel, training and/or equipment. Raise unit to satisfactory state of combat/mission readiness at these bases and then move them into South Vietnam.

8. Establish training facilities at PACOM bases and in Vietnam or use existing AFVN facilities there to complete training of units deployed under conditions defined in 6 and 7 above.

9. Services expedite funding and equipment and material procurement so units can be equipped ahead of present Program 5 schedule.

10. Surge air and surface transportation means in cases where transportation is pacing factor to early deployments.

11. Provide inducements to reserves with desired skills to volunteer for active service.

12. Accelerate and compress training schedules.
The Acting Chairman (General Johnson) apparently took the Director, Joint Staff Memorandum to the White House on 12 September. The nature of the discussion is not known. However, upon his return from the White House, General Johnson indicated that the President desired the Joint Staff to indicate recommended actions, within present policy limitations, which would increase pressure on North Vietnam. Nothing was said concerning accelerated deployments, and the Joint Staff did not further consider this subject.

However, on 16 September 1966, in a memorandum to the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Army indicated that the Army had re-analyzed its capability to deploy the 101st Airborne Division (-) to Vietnam and had determined that a brigade task force and a headquarters and control element of the division (approximately 4,500 personnel) could be deployed by air to close in Vietnam before Christmas. The remainder of the division (-) could either deploy by surface to close in Vietnam before February or could deploy by air in mid to late January 1968 to close before TET (31 January 1968).

On 22 September, the Secretary of Defense approved the plan to deploy the brigade task force and headquarters element by air in December 1967, but indicated that a decision on the accelerated deployment of the remainder of the division would be made at a later date.

In the meantime, on 15 September, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved and forwarded to the Secretary of Defense the refined troop list for the "tentatively approved FY 1968 additive forces for South Vietnam and a civilizational schedule to remain within the specific military personnel strength ceiling of 525,000." Civilization, the 525,000 ceiling, plus Program 1 trade-offs, permitted an additive force structure of 50,773 for FY 1968, which was allocated as follows: Army 32,365; Navy 7,163; Marine Corps 969; and Air Force 3,161.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff pointed out again, however, that even with the high civilizational goal, many requirements still could not be accommodated.

For example, a Marine Corps requirement for 6,124 spaces plus integral Navy personnel to permit III MAF to be manned at full strength is not included in the troop list. This requirement is based on modification of existing T/Os and augmentations caused by the nature of operations being conducted in I CTZ, the introduction of newer and more sophisticated equipment, and the expanding functions and responsibilities being assigned to III MAF. The Marine Corps has indicated that approximately 3,500 of these additional Marines could be provided by December 1967. Also, both the Army and Air Force identified additional priority requirements that could not be incorporated within ceiling; approximately
3,000 spaces for the Army and 1,000 for the Air Force. These requirements, and others, now outside the ceiling, will be the subject for future recommendations.

Inclusion of elements of the 9th Marine Amphibious Brigade, which CINCPAC plans to operate ashore in South Vietnam only on a temporary basis, of nondeploying tactical fighter squadrons, and of the 1,161 spaces for the augmented hospital facilities for civilian war casualties, as directed by references, has further reduced the force level recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in JCSM-218-67, dated 20 April 1967, subject: "Force Requirements - Southeast Asia FY 1968 (U)," and prevented inclusion of high priority units and personnel, some of which are now available for deployment. 80/

The major differences in the refined troop list were the addition of 3 light helicopter companies, 2 C-140 jet aircraft for the Ambassador and visiting dignitaries, a Radio Research Aviation Company, and a Marine fixed-wing reconnaissance squadron. Additionally, the helicopter requirements included ambulance detachments and helicopters in the supporting aviation headquarters for the 101st Airborne Division and the Americal Division. Other lower priority units were deleted.

The Secretary of Defense, on 5 October, approved for deployment those forces listed in JCSM 505-67, and indicated that subsequent requests for additional high priority units should be accompanied by appropriate trade-offs to insure forces remained within the total personnel authorization of 525,000. 81/

On 28 September, General Westmoreland forwarded to CINCPAC and the JCS his plan for reorienting in-country forces for the northeast monsoon season. This reassessment of planned operations and force deployments was necessitated, COMUSMACV indicated, in view of the accelerated deployment of the 101st Airborne Division and the heavy enemy pressure in I CTZ. COMUSMACV indicated that his overall fall-winter objectives were to:

A. Relieve the 1st Cav Div in Binh Dinh and commit it to successive country-wide offensive operations...

B. Reinforce I CTZ to the extent practicable without unduly retarding other progress.

C. Move additional elements of the 9th Inf Div to the Delta.

D. Reinforce III CTZ so that we can attack during favorable weather...and force the enemy into a vulnerable posture away from populated areas. 82/
The prospective early arrival of the 101st Airborne Division, General Westmoreland indicated,

...will now allow for initiation of planned operations in III CTZ while diverting the 1st Cav Div to I CTZ as required by the intensified enemy situation there. To insure adequate combat ready forces for III CTZ operations, I now plan to delay the movement of additional 9th Div elements to the delta; however, a Vietnamese Marine battalion will deploy to IV CTZ to reinforce our mobile Riverine operations planned for that area.

3. (TS) These moves are carefully planned to preclude any regression in the vital coastal areas of II CTZ; to insure that the ultimate posture of forces required to meet objectives for next year is not changed significantly; to do that is necessary to relieve and reverse the situation near the DMZ; and to conduct large scale operations in selected areas when weather is favorable. By this reoriented effort I desire to preempt the enemy strategy of attempting to tie down forces and denude the pacification shield. \[81\]

General Westmoreland indicated that higher authority could provide in the following additional assistance to help accomplish his strategy:

A. Accelerate the deployment of the 101st Div to close all major elements of the Div prior to 20 December 1967. This will facilitate early combat readiness of this force and allow its employment in late January...

B. Continue the retention of the elements of 9th MAB now in-country. My evaluation now of the situation in I CTZ indicates a continuing requirement for this force through the spring of 1968.

C. Accelerate deployment of 11th Separate Infantry BDE to arrive in-country during December 1967. Early arrival would permit early release of the 173d AEB Bn which would be employed in II CTZ. A consideration in all accelerated deployments is the possibility of an extended holiday moratorium resulting in an agreement of status quo on force deployments. \[84\]

In a memorandum for the President on 4 October 1967, the Secretary of Defense indicated the actions taken to date on COMUSMACV's recommendations, to include:
(1) **Recommendation:** Accelerate the deployment of the 101st Division to close all major elements of the Division prior to 20 December 1967.

**Action:** Deployment of a brigade task force (3 battalions) of the 101st Airborne Division had already been accelerated from February 1968 to December 1967. The Army now believes that deployment of the remaining brigade can be accelerated from February 1968 to January 1968.

(2) **Recommendation:** Retain the elements of the 9th Marine Airborne Brigade now in-country.

**Action:** The current deployment plan authorizes this action.

(3) **Recommendation:** Accelerate deployment of the 11th Separate Infantry Brigade from February 1968 to December 1967.

**Action:** The Secretary of the Army believes this date can be met. 85/

The Army, meanwhile, continued to assess the possibility of accelerating deployment of its Program 5 combat units.

On 16 October 1967, in a memorandum to the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Army indicated that the remainder of the 101st AB Division could be deployed by air to close in Vietnam by 20 December 1967. This accelerated deployment would require the completion of four weeks of training in-country prior to commitment to combat. Additional transportation costs to the Army would be $10 M, and support of the element in South Vietnam over the COMUS cost for the same period would be approximately $5.3 M. The acceleration, however, would not provide General Westmoreland an operational element earlier than now programmed, but would ensure the Division's early closure in South Vietnam in the event of an extended moratorium on deployment at Christmas. 86/ In response to this memorandum, the Secretary of Defense asked: ""Why spend $15M without an earlier operational capability"? 87/ On 20 October the Secretary of the Army indicated that, contrary to his earlier assertion, the Division would be available for operations in South Vietnam five weeks earlier than the Program 5 availability date.

The Program 5 availability date, using surface transportation and allowing for one month's in-country orientation, is 1 March 1968. Using air movement and conducting the normal one-month orientation concurrent with completion of training will provide an availability date of 22 January 1968. 88/

On 21 October, the Secretary of Defense approved the Army recommendation to deploy by air the remainder of the 101st Airborne Division (-) in December 1967. 89/
On 31 October, in a memorandum to the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Army replied to General Westmoreland's request for the deployment of the 11th Infantry Brigade to arrive in Vietnam before Christmas. He stated that the Army Staff had determined that the Brigade could be deployed on or about December 10, by surface transportation from Hawaii to close in South Vietnam by 24 December. It would be necessary for the Brigade to have the same kind of in-country training on arrival in South Vietnam as the 101st Airborne Division (—). The only additional costs involved would be the slightly increased operating costs from having the unit in South Vietnam one month earlier and being combat ready in January rather than in February. 90/

On 6 November, Secretary of Defense approved the Army request for the early deployment of the 11th Light Infantry Brigade by surface transportation to South Vietnam in December 1967, and directed that necessary in-country training should be conducted in a low risk area. 91/

In the meantime, on 17 October 1967, the Joint Chiefs of Staff forwarded to the President through the Secretary of Defense their reply to the questions raised by the President at the White House luncheon on 12 September concerning what military actions consistent with present policy guidelines would serve to increase pressure on North Vietnam, thereby accelerating the rate of progress toward achievement of the U.S. objective in South Vietnam. 92/

The Chiefs considered that North Vietnam was paying heavily for its aggression and had lost the initiative in the South. They further considered that many factors indicated a military trend favorably to Free World Forces in Vietnam. However, they again concluded that if acceleration in the pace of progress was to be achieved, an appropriate increase in military pressure was required.

The Chiefs then reiterated the policy guidelines established for the conduct of military operations in SEA to achieve U.S. objectives, among which were:

a. We seek to avoid widening the war into a conflict with Communist China or the USSR.

b. We have no present intention of invading NVN.

c. We do not seek the overthrow of the Government of NVN.

d. We are guided by the principles set forth in the Geneva Accords of 1954 and 1962. 93/

In a rather resigned tone, the Joint Chiefs indicated that they considered the rate of progress to have been and to continue to be slow largely because U.S. military power has been constrained in a manner...
which had reduced significantly its impact and effectiveness. Limita-
tions have been imposed on military operations in four ways, they
indicated:

a. The attacks on the enemy military targets have been
on such a prolonged, graduated basis that they enemy has ad-
justed psychologically, economically, and militarily, e.g.,
inured themselves to the difficulties and hardships accom-
ppanying the war, dispersed their logistic support system,
and developed alternate transport routes and a significant
air defense system.

b. Areas of sanctuary, containing important military
targets, have been afforded the enemy.

c. Covert operations in Cambodia and Laos have been
restricted.

d. Major importation of supplies into NVN by sea has
been permitted.

The Chiefs indicated that they considered that U.S. objectives in
SEA could be achieved within this policy framework providing the level
of assistance the enemy received from his communist allies was not
significantly increased and there was no diminution of U.S. efforts.

However, the Chiefs concluded pessimistically that progress would
continue to be slow so long as present limitations on military operations
continued in effect and, further, at the present pace, termination of
NVN's military effort was not expected to occur in the near future.

The Joint Chiefs then listed a series of actions which could be
taken in the near future to increase pressures on NVN and accelerate
progress toward the achievement of U.S. objectives (see table, p. 224)
and recommended they be authorized to direct these actions.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff recognize that expansion of US
efforts entails some additional risk. They believe that as
a result of this expansion the likelihood of overt introduc-
tion of Soviet/21oc/CPR combat forces into the war would be
remote. Failure to take additional action to shorten the
Southeast Asia conflict also entails risks as new and more
efficient weapons are provided to NVN by the Soviet Union
and as USSR/CPR support of the enemy increases. 24/

Information indicates that the President reviewed this paper and
stated that it was not what was desired, that it recommended actions
which had previously been denied and would not now be approved.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACTION</th>
<th>SPECIFIC ACTION</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Remove restrictions on air campaign against all militarily significant targets in SVN (excluding Hanoi).</td>
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<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Mine SVN drop zones.</td>
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<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Mine inland waterways and estuaries in SVN north of 20° N.</td>
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<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Extend naval surface operations (SEA DRAGON).</td>
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<td>5.</td>
<td>Use HC-130 (PAINTER) from ships against combat aircraft.</td>
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<td>7.</td>
<td>Eliminate operational restrictions on B-52s with regard to Laos.</td>
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<td>9.</td>
<td>Expel operations in Cambodia.</td>
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<td>10.</td>
<td>Expand and extend SVN covert program (PROMETHEUS (2)).</td>
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<tr>
<td>AIMS/TECHNIQUES</td>
<td>RESULT/IMPACT</td>
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<tr>
<td>Greater destruction of NVA war-supporting facilities.</td>
<td>Charges of escalation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increased destruction of air defences including airfields.</td>
<td>Increased use of GNP airfields for storage or training, but not for combat training.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reduce logistic support of NVA/VC.</td>
<td>Increased GNP AV and Engineer support in NVA.</td>
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<tr>
<td>More efficient use of available forces.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Frequent contact with GNP friendly occupying forces, particularly in critical 1 Corp/44th area.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Frequent firing against targets of opportunity.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Reduce import of war-supporting materials.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Interdict internal waterway LOCs.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Destroy waterfront logistic craft and block channels.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Require great NVA warning effort.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Reduce JOH and other cargo distribution.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Interdict coastal water traffic.</td>
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<td>Reduce use of land LOCs by harassing gunfire.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Increase destruction of enemy air forces.</td>
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<td>Deprive enemy air operations.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Increased interdiction of LOCs and reduction of supplies to NVA/VC.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Greater operational efficiency and quicker reaction time for B-52s.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Disrupt sanctuaries.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Increase efficiency of interdiction.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Reduce supplies to NVA/VC.</td>
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<td>Reduce supplies to NVA/VC.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Discourage use of Cambodia as sanctuary for NVA/VC forces.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Provide self-defense of US forces.</td>
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<td>Erase NVA within country.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Require NVA to divert resources to internal security.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Soviet Union may cancel existing negotiations with the US and initiate propaganda campaign.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Possible Soviet actions to increase tensions in other parts of the world but NVA confrontations would be unlikely. GNP would increase defensive posture and may increase military aid to NVA; unlikely to initiate offensive air or surface actions.</td>
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<tr>
<td>No specific military reaction from communists.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Some increased propaganda against US action.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Possible naval and air reaction by NVA in northern waters.</td>
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<tr>
<td>GNP or Soviet might provide additional patrol craft.</td>
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<tr>
<td>NVA air and surface attack possible.</td>
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<tr>
<td>USSR or GNP might provide NVA with coast defense missiles.</td>
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<tr>
<td>No immediate reaction other than propaganda.</td>
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<tr>
<td>No Laos reaction.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Possible political reactions.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Possible increased NVA forces and activities in Laos.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cambodia would protest expansion of operations to Cambodian soil and might seek to defuse its territory.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Adverse political reaction.</td>
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<tr>
<td>NVA would accuse the United States of attempting to bring about downfall of Government of NVA.</td>
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</table>
**ANALYSES**

**NORTH/INVEST**

Create destruction of NVN war-supporting facilities.

Increased destruction of air defenses including airfields.

Reduction of CCP/VC support of NVN.

More effective use of available forces.

Favorable impact on reducing friendly casualties, particularly in critical I Corps/Minh area.

Permits timely reaction against targets of opportunity.

Reduce import of war-supporting materials.

Interdict internal waterway LOCs. Destroy waterborne logistic craft and block channels. Require great NVA sweeping effort. Reduce oil and other cargo distribution.

Interdict coastal water traffic. Reduce use of land LOCs by harassing gunfire.

Increase destruction of enemy air forces. Inhibit enemy air operations.

Increased interdiction of LOCs and reduction of supplies to NVA/NCC.

Greater operational efficiency and quicker reaction time for NVA/NCC.

Disrupt sanctuaries. Increased efficiency of interdiction. Reduce supplies to NVA/NCC.

Disrupt sanctuaries. Reduce supplies to NVA/NCC.

Improve intelligence. Discourage use of Cambodia as sanctuary for NVA/NCC forces. Provide self-defense of US forces.

Force NVN within country. Require NVN to divert resources to internal security.

Increase of escalation.

Increased use of CCP artillery for storage or tracking, but not for combat missions.

Increased CCP Artillery support in NVN.

Soviet Union may cancel existing negotiations with the US and initiate propaganda campaign. Possible Soviet action to increase tension in other parts of the world but major confronations would be unlikely. CCP would strengthen defensive posture and may increase military aid to NVN; unlikely to initiate offensive air or surface actions.

No specific military reaction from communists. Some increased propaganda against US action.

Possible naval and air reaction by NVA in northern waters. CCP or Soviets might provide additional patrol craft.

NVA air and surface attack possible. USN or NAV might provide NVA with coast defense missiles.

No immediate reaction other than propaganda. No Laos reaction.

Possible political reactions.

Possible increased NVA forces and activities in Laos.

Cambodia would protest expansion of operations to Cambodian soil and might seek to defend its territory. Adverse political reaction.

NVN would assure the United States of attempting to bring about downfall of Government of NVN.
However, Administration actions to find a way to accelerate progress in South Vietnam continued. On 7 November 1967, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff indicated, in a memorandum to the Director, Joint Staff, that he had been urged again to take all feasible measures to deploy Program 5 forces at the earliest possible date. He directed that the Joint Staff explore what further foreshortening of the deployment dates could be accomplished. 25/

On 8 November, at the White House luncheon meeting, the Secretary of State recommended that the Department of State and the Department of Defense prepare a joint policy document which would govern political and military operations in Southeast Asia for the next four months. Secretary Rusk's proposal was expressed in broad terms. He considered that parameters should be established for political, military, and economic operations over the upcoming four months' period in order to preclude the need for weekly examinations of many small and short-range operations. This proposal was agreed to by the principals at the meeting, and the Chairman directed the Joint Staff to prepare as a matter of priority the recommendations of the JCS for military operations in SEA over the cited time period. He directed that the recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff cover the following as a minimum:

a. Air operations against North Vietnam --

Fixed targets important to our air effort against North Vietnam; authorization for re-strike of important targets; allocation of air effort between North Vietnam and South Vietnam.

b. Ground operations --

Large ground operations in South Vietnam to include operations in the Delta region; ground operations in Laos; ground operations in Cambodia; and possible ground operations against North Vietnam.

c. Bombing Pauses --

In addressing this subject the Joint Staff should take note of American Embassy Saigon to State cable #10563. Ambassador Bunker reported that Vice President Ky believes that bombing pauses of 24 hours each for Christmas and New Years and 48 hours at Tet should be announced in the near future by the allied forces. 26/

In reply to the Chairman's request to explore foreshortening of deployment dates, the Director, Joint Staff on 21 November furnished the following resume:

225.
Army - Based on a comprehensive capability study recently completed, Army concludes it is not in a position to make further accelerations without jeopardizing capability to deploy remaining units in Program 5 in an orderly manner.

Navy - The bulk of the 3000 Navy forces scheduled to deploy after 1 March 1968, are linked to ship/waterborne craft conversion or construction. They are susceptible to little acceleration and cannot be accelerated into the JAN/FEB 68 time frame.

Air Force - Excluding the TFS maintained in CONUS ready for deployment, the Air Force has only 760 personnel scheduled to deploy after 1 March 1968. These include a CE Squadron (scheduled for civilianization had funds been available) and 6 UC-123 herbicide aircraft. The CE Squadron must be activated and equipped and the aircraft must be spray equipped.

Marine Corps - Contingent upon Department of Defense approval (which is expected in the near future) of a PCR for additional end strength increase to deploy and sustain 800 CAC personnel, the Marine Corps will have only 164 Program 5 spaces remaining for deployment after 1 March 1968. The 164 personnel are associated with an observation squadron for which pilots and aircraft are not available.

On 27 November 1967, the Joint Chiefs of Staff provided the Secretary of Defense their views on planned and recommended military operations to be conducted in Southeast Asia over the next four months. They concluded, rather pessimistically again, that:

There are no new programs which can be undertaken under current policy guidelines which would result in a rapid or significantly more visible increase in the rate of progress in the near term.

The Chiefs recommended against a stand-down in military operations for any of the forthcoming holidays, as progress during the next four months would be dependent upon the maintenance of pressure upon the enemy.

Any action which serves to reduce the pressure will be detrimental to the achievement of our objectives.

While progress toward U.S. military objectives was expected to be sustained during the period under consideration, the Joint Chiefs held that additional gains could be realized through the modification and expansion of certain current policies. Thus, they recommended that current policies for the conduct of the war in SEA during the next four months be modified and expanded to permit a fuller utilization of our military resources.
On 22 December 1967, the ASD/ISA, in a memorandum to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, forwarded the joint comments of the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State on the JCS recommendations. Their comments were:

a. recommend against aerial mining or bombing of North Vietnamese deep water ports. Possible military gains are far outweighed by risk of confrontation with Soviets or Chinese.

b. recommend that strike authorization for high density population centers of government and domestic commerce continue to be controlled at the highest level of Government which is most closely in touch with the political significance of air attacks in these areas.

c. every recommendation for authorization of a new target should be considered on its own merits. The military significance of the target is, of course, a dominant factor in the evaluation of a target recommendation, but our policy is to minimize civilization casualties and this consideration must be weighed in every determination. Recommend no change in this policy.

d. recommend authorization for use of CS in rescues in Laos. Effectiveness of such use can be evaluated against possible adverse public reaction to use of agents combined with firepower if conducted in NVN and given propaganda play by NVN.
1. Draft Memorandum for the President, Subject: Future Actions in Vietnam, 19 May 1967. A series of drafts revealed that McNamara had been working on the basic memorandum since late April or early May. The drafts as they took shape began to incorporate not only the views of the CIA which we mentioned, especially those related to the effects of the bombing in the north and the so-called ratchet effect, where actions in the bombing in the north were having little effect on the outcomes in the south, the views of the State Department, such as those incorporated in the Bundy memo on the bombing, and even those of the White House, primarily ones prepared at Walt Rostow's direction. Throughout the period, the same basic six arguments continued to be developed and expanded until they appear in the finished document on 19 May. See Memorandum dated 16 May 1967, Subject: Arguments Opposing Further U.S. Forces for South Vietnam (McNaughton papers -- draft prepared for 19 May DPM); and McNaughton papers - hand written draft, subject: Issues to Add to Paper, dated 5 May 67.

2. Memorandum for the SecDef from ASD(ISA) McNaughton, Subject: "My Comments on the 5 May 'First Rough Draft'," dtd 6 May 67.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid.


6. Ibid.

7. Ibid.


9. Memorandum from the Deputy SecDef to Chairman, JCS, Subject: Operations Against North Vietnam, dated 26 July 1967. JCSM 286-67 was forwarded to the President on 20 May with a note from Secretary McNamara stating that he would forward to the President his comments on the document after more extensive analysis of the proposals.

11. Ibid. The appendix to this JCSM indicated changes or additions to ROLLING THUNDER which were also interesting. Among these were to delete the 10 n.m. radius Hanoi as prohibited areas; to reduce the 30 n.m. restricted area around Hanoi to 10; to reduce the 10 n.m. radius of Haiphong restrictive to 4. And also to authorize armed reconnaissance throughout North Vietnam and adjacent coastal waters against North Vietnamese military targets except in populated areas in the ChiCom buffer zone and restricted area.


13. Ibid.
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid.
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid.
20. COMUSMACV message 230940S March 1967 and JCS IN 93855.
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid.
25. Ibid.
26. JCSM-312-67, 2 Jun 67, Air Operations Against NVN.
27. Ibid.

30. Ibid.

31. Ibid.

32. Ibid.

33. Ibid.


36. Ibid.

37. Ibid.


39. Draft Memo for the President from ASD(ISA), Subject: Alternative Military Actions Against North Vietnam dtd 12 Jun 67, with summary DPM attached.

40. Ibid. Secretary Brown's recommendation was partially based upon detailed analyses which his staff had been preparing on the subject of anti-infiltration bombing in the North and in all route packages of the Air Force target complex. In a study which he forwarded to the SecDef on June 9th, Mr. Brown commented on the quantitative analyses which had been made of the effectiveness of the bombing:

One can use the same cost and casualty estimates to make the subjective judgment in a different set of units. The above cost figures for troops and for the air campaign out-of-country in dollars can be expressed by saying that the out-of-country air campaign has paid for itself in dollars if it has saved us from having to send 35,800 more ground troops into South Vietnam in order to achieve the same situation in SVN that we have now. Or, it has paid for itself in lives if it has saved us from having to send 19,000 more ground troops.

Alternatively, one can compare air and ground
campaign casualty costs by saying that if for every 123 attack sorties in Route Packages IV through VI, or for every 557 sorties in Route Packages I through III, or for every 881 attack sorties in Laos we have reduced allied deaths in the South by one, they are worth their human cost.

In terms of dollar costs, if every 1000 attack sorties per calendar year in out-of-country operations reduce the requirements for US ground troops by about 300, they pay their way. If the proportionality of friendly force increments to enemy force increments is a correct concept, this means that, to pay their way, every 1000 out-of-country sorties per year must account for 37 of the infiltrators who could have come in but didn't.

(Memo for SecDef, June 9, 1967, from Dr. Harold Brown, Secretary of the Air Force re Possible Courses of Action in SEA.)

41. Memo for SecDef from ASD Robert N. Anthony, Subject: Effect of Increased Southeast Asia Deployment on Balance of Payments, dated 9 June 1967. Anthony's office used the round figure of $50,000 per year, per deployed man in SVN. This was the same figure which the SecDef and the Under SecDef used in their rough calculations of cost increases for recommended deployments. (SecDef Control No. X-4239, 11 Jul 1967.)

42. Memorandum for SecDef from ASD(SA), "Increased Use of Civilians for U.S. Troop Support (C)," 13 June 1967.

43. Memo for CJCS from SecDef, Subject: "Increased Use of Civilians for U.S. Troop Support (C)," 13 Jun 67.

44. Ibid. See also, Memo for SecDef from ASD(SA) Alain Enthoven, Subject: Increased Use of SVN Civilians for U.S. Troop Support (C), dated 10 Jun 67.


46. Memo for the Secys of the Army, Navy and Air Force from Deputy Secretary Vance, dated 23 June 1967; Memo for the SecDef from the Secy of the Navy, Subject: Jim Lucas Article, Partial Mobilization, dated 26 June 1967; Memo for the DepSecDef from Secy of the Army, Subject: Lucas Article, dated 28 June 1967; Memo for the DepSecDef from the Secy of the Navy, Subject: Lucas Article, dated 29 June 1967.

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48. Ibid. Memo for SecDef from Stanley R. Resor, SecArmy, 5 July 1967.

49. Memo for SecDef from AsstSecDef Enthoven, Subj: Holbrooke/Burnham Study on Binh Chanh, dtd 4 Jul 67.

50. Discussion concerning adding an additional rifle company to 33 battalions already deployed had persisted since early May when Secretary McNamara questioned the Secretary of the Army about the seventy battalions in Program 4 and discovered that approximately 30 had moved with only three companies. If this was so, he asked should not a fourth be added? (SecDef Control No. X-2537, Memorandum for the Secretary of the Army from the Secretary of Defense, dtd 2 May 67.)

Secretary of the Army, Stanley R. Resor, replied that according to the Army there remained 33 airborne infantry or airborne infantry battalions in or approved for deployment to the Republic of Vietnam for which a fourth rifle company had not been approved. He subsequently recommended that a fourth company be added to these 33 battalions. To provide and sustain this increase in capability he projected that an increase of 7,903 spaces in the Army trained military strength would be required. Of this, 5,577 were required for the companies themselves and 3,326 were for the sustaining base. After detailed deliberation, however, McNamara disapproved the request stating that although he was "inclined to approve the deployment of these companies it would not be possible to find space trade-offs for the 5,577 personnel involved." (Memo for SecDef, Subj: Program 4 Strength Increases, dated 20 May 67, ASD(SA) 6-1733; Memo for SA from SecDef, Subj: Rifle Companies for South Vietnam, dated 15 Jun 67.)


52. Ibid. Interview with Mr. Philip Odeen, Southeast Asia Programs Division, OASD(SA), 20 Jul 1968.

53. Saigon Briefing Notes, 7-8 July, Prepared by OASD(SA), 18 Jul 67.

54. Ibid.

55. Ibid. (Bunker's source here, of course, was MACV.)

56. Ibid.

57. Ibid.
58. Ibid.; CONUSMACV's Overall Assessment.
59. Ibid.
60. Ibid.
61. Ibid.; "J2 Assessment."
62. Ibid.
63. Ibid.
64. Ibid.; "J3 Briefing."
65. Ibid.
66. Ibid.
67. Ibid.
68. Interview with Mr. Philip Odeen, 20 Jul 68, and Memo for Record, Subject: Fallout from SecDef Trip to South Vietnam, dated July 13, 1967, signed by Paul Enthoven.
69. See also Memo for Record, ESSM, Subject: SEA Deployments, dtd July 14, 1967, which outlines the decisions made in Saigon and directs work priorities and assignments for OASD(SA).
70. Memo for SecDef from Mr. Richard C. Steadman, DASD, Subj: Additional Third Country Forces for Vietnam, dtd 13 Jul 67, with memo for Secys Rusk, McNamara and Mr. Walt Rostow and Under Secretary Katzenbach, Subj: Messages to Manila Nations dtd 13 Jul 67 attached.
71. Ibid.
73. OASD/SA/Podeen, Memo for SecDef, 21 Jul 67, Subj: FY 68 Force Requirements for SVN (Program #5).
74. Memo for CJCS from SecDef, Subj: FY 68 Force Requirements for South Vietnam (Program #5) dtd 10 Aug 67; and Memo for Secys of Mil Depts, CJCS, ASD from the ASD(SA), Subject: SEA Deployment Program #5, 14 Aug 67.
75. Note to Control Division, DJS, 6 Sept 1967, Subject: Examination of Speed-up in Program 5 Deployments.
76. DJSM 1118-67, 9 Sept 1967, Subject: Examination of Speed-up in Program 5 Deployments.

77. CM 2640-67, 12 Sept 1967.

78. Secretary of the Army Memo for Secretary of Defense, 16 Sept 1967, Subject: Deployment Schedule for 101st Airborne Division (-)

79. Secretary of Defense Memo for Secretary of the Army, 22 Sept 1967, Subject: Deployment of 101st Airborne Division (-) (U)


81. Secretary of Defense Memo for Secretaries of the Military Department and CJCS, 5 October 1967, Subject: FY 68 US Force Deployments, Vietnam (U)

82. COMUSMACV Msg 31998, 281500Z Sept 67, Subject: Reorientation of In-Country Forces.

83. Ibid., p2

84. Ibid., pp 3-4

85. Secretary of Defense Memorandum for the President, 4 October 1967.

86. Secretary of the Army Memo for Secretary of Defense, 16 Oct 1967, Subject: Deployment of 101st Airborne Division (-).

87. Secretary of Defense Note for Record, 17 October 1967.

88. Secretary of the Army Memo for Secretary of Defense, 20 Oct 1967, Subject: Early Deployment of the 101st Airborne Division (-).

89. Secretary of Defense Memo for Secretary of the Army, 21 October 1967, Subject: Deployment of the 101st Airborne Division (-), (U).

90. Secretary of the Army Memorandum for Secretary of Defense, 31 Oct 1967, Subject: Deployment of the 11th Infantry Brigade.

91. Secretary of Defense Memorandum for Secretary of the Army, 6 November 1967, Subject: Deployment of the 11th Infantry Brigade.


93. Ibid.

94. Ibid.
95. CM-2743-67, 7 November 1967, Subject: Program 5.

96. CM 2752-67, 10 November 1967, Subject: Policies for the Conduct of Operations in SEA over the next four months.


99. Ibid.