HISTORY OF VIETNAM WAR -- U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

(1968 Working Paper)

PART TWO - Captured Documents:

1. "Crimp" document
2. Le Duan Letter
3. Gen. Ng V. Vinh
The CRIMP Document

Attached is a copy of the so-called CRIMP document, which takes its name from the fact that it was captured by allied forces conducting Operation CRIMP north of Saigon in early 1966. Internal evidence suggests that it is the notebook of a high level political cadre recording his impressions of various Communist policy statements. It amounts to a history of the early stages of the insurgency as seen through knowledgeable Communist eyes. The document is hard to date but from internal evidence it seems to have been written some time around early 1963.
PART I

EXPERIENCES OF THE SOUTH VIETNAM REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT DURING THE PAST SEVERAL YEARS

During the past nine years, under the enlightened leadership of the Party Central Committee, the people and the Party of South Vietnam have experienced many phases along the difficult and complicated path of struggle but they have also gained many victories and experiences while pushing the South Vietnam liberation revolution and creating the conditions for peaceful reunification of the country.

Based on the resolutions and directives of the Central Committee, and at the same time based on the practicalities of the movement, we wish to review the calling problems:


After the armistice, the South Vietnam people reverted to political struggle through peaceful means by demanding personal rights, freedom and negotiations concerning general elections in accordance with the stipulations of the Geneva Agreement so that the country could be peacefully reunified. The Party apparatus in South Vietnam also became covert. The organization and methods of operation of the party were changed in order to guarantee the leadership and forces of the Party given the new struggle conditions.
The changes in the direction of the struggle, organization and activities were very appropriate and correct during this beginning period but according to our way of thinking were only valid from a tactical viewpoint.

From the end of 1954 until 1956 several important changes occurred in the South Vietnam situation. Imperialist America ousted and replaced imperialist France, turning South Vietnam into a colony (a new type of colony) based on U.S. military power. The Ngo Dinh Diem government was clearly shown to be a government composed of bureaucratic, dictatorial and family-controlled feudalists and capitalists who committed crimes for the American imperialists and massacred the people, massacred revolutionaries and massacred the oppositionists. Both the Americans and Diem. Both the Americans and Diem made every effort to oppose the implementation of the General Agreement and made every effort to subvert the peaceful reunification of our fatherland.

Faced with this situation, particularly after 20 July 1956, the key cadres and Party members in South Vietnam asked questions which demanded answers: "Can We Still Continue The Struggle to Demand the Implementation of General Agreement Given the Existing Regime in South Vietnam? If not, then what must be done?" A mood of skepticism and non-confidence in the orientation of the struggle began to seep into the party apparatus and among some of the masses.
At the end of 1956 the popularization of the volume by Comrade Duan entitled "The South Vietnam Revolutionary Path" was of great significance because the ideological crisis was now solved. After analyzing the character of the South Vietnam society, the character of the American-Diemist enemy etc., the volume outlined a new strategic orientation for the South Vietnam revolution, a strategic mission in which everyone could have some confidence: It is necessary to continue the national democratic revolution in South Vietnam and it is necessary to use force to overthrow the feudalist imperialist regime in order to establish a revolutionary democratic coalition and create the conditions for the peaceful reunification of the Fatherland.

After the Resolution of the Fifteenth Conference of the Central Committee was issued all of South Vietnam possessed a clear and correct strategic policy and orientation. The Resolution of the Fifteenth Conference of the Central Committee clearly delineated the general responsibility of the Vietnam revolution, analysed the special characteristics of the South Vietnam situation, clearly spelled out the revolutionary tasks in South Vietnam and at the same time outlined the path which the South Vietnam revolution should take.

Thanks to this correct and clear delineation of the strategic orientation and path, the South Vietnam people and party clearly understood the aims and enlightened path to follow. As a result they solved their ideological worries without confusing the tactical and strategic aims, clearly understood the basic problems of the revolution, boldly
struggled against the rightist thoughts which were based on vague and incorrect appraisals of the enemy and over confidence in the legalism of the Geneva Agreement, began to seek new measures to implement the revolutionary struggle and oppose the revisionist thoughts of simplistic peaceful political legalism. The volume "South Vietnam Revolutionary Path" and the Resolution of the Fifteenth Conference of the Central Committee provided the cadres and Party members with a pair of wings with which to fly and lamps to shine upon the path ahead, a feeling of encouragement and confidence, a determined will because the goals were clear and the path bright. At the same time these documents also improved the practical and theoretical level of the cadres and of the Party members. This was a great experience which proves that when the strategy is not clear the orientation of the struggle will not be clear and the policies, thoughts of the cadres party members and masses will be adversely influenced. And errors cannot be avoided in the methodology and character of the struggle.

Therefore the setting forth of the basic responsibilities of the South Vietnam revolution was a basic victory of our Party and created the basis for many succeeding victories. If there had been no Resolution of the Fifteenth Conference of the Central Committee then there certainly would never be a victorious revolutionary movement in South Vietnam as exists today.

As to whether this matter proceeded too slowly or was taken up at the correct time is another problem which will not be mentioned here.
B. IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT THE APPEARANCE AND PROCEDURES OF THE STRUGGLE BE TRULY COORDINATED WITH THE ORIENTATION AND PROGRESS OF THE REVOLUTION.

The Resolution of the 15th Conferences of the Central Committee officially and concisely specified the responsibilities and strategic aims of the South Vietnam revolution.

But problems still existed: how were these responsibilities, aims, and progress of the South Vietnam revolution to be implemented? What must the main forms and procedures of the struggle be? Although the Resolution outlined some of these factors, at the time of the Conference, the details of the South Vietnam movement as well as revolutionary experiences of friendly nations were not sufficient enough for the Conference to formulate a precise program. Only 2 years later, were there sufficient factors available. Based partly on the experiences of Laos but mainly on the experiences of South Vietnam revolutionary movement, the Central Committee was able to formulate a clear and concise program concerning these problems. (The Resolution of January 1961 and succeeding resolutions and directives.)

Based on the resolutions and directives of the Central Committee and on the practicalities of the movement, we wish to make the following observations:

The matter of formulating the responsibilities and strategic aims of the revolution is very important but the matter of determining the forms and struggle procedures and of determining the direction of the progress of the revolution in order to establish the strategic aims is no less important. Experience has proven that if there are no
definite struggle appearances and procedures and no definite direction of progress, then it is impossible to develop the revolutionary movement, impossible to strengthen our side and weaken the enemy's, impossible to transform the relationship of forces to our advantage, impossible to guide the revolution to the bulls-eye which is to overthrow the enemy and impossible to implement the strategic responsibilities.

The appearances, procedures and methods of the struggle as well as the orientation and progress of every stage of the revolution, must be based on the objective realities of the enemy and our-selves, on the objective realities of the revolutionary struggle and its character on the contradictions which exist between the classes and the revolutionary and counterrevolutionary forces in the revolution. Moreover they must be based on the contradictions as they develop and in the degree to which they develop.

The external international situation exerts a very important but not decisive influence on the situation. The general strategic responsibilities of the world also exert an influence and exert a degree of control as do the revolutionary experiences of enlightened countries but neither are decisive factors. In addition the struggle procedures of each phase of the revolution in a given country will not be identical.

Thus what changes have occurred in the revolutionary struggle in South Vietnam since 1959? What is the situation, the character of the revolutionary struggle and the progress of the revolution in South Vietnam? What decisions were made concerning the appearance of this struggle and the progress of the revolution in South Vietnam?
1. The characteristics of the contradictions between the enemy and ourselves in South Vietnam, the degree of development of these contradictions, and the necessity to launch the armed struggle.

a. Characteristics of the contradictions.

The characteristics of the contradictions between imperialist America and the Diemist bureaucratic capitalists and feudalists on the one hand and the South Vietnamese masses led by our Party on the other meant that sooner or later it was unavoidable that force must be used to oppose force.

Since 1954 the South Vietnam people have been living under the domination of the Americans-Diemists. The Americans and Diemists were very obstinate and cruel but were very weak and greatly isolated in regard to political matters. The weaker they became the more political failures they encountered; and the more force they used the more they had to rely on this force to survive. Since the restoration of peace the Americans-Diemists used guns to suppress the movement and since the beginning, in reality, they have used force and used warfare in order to oppose the masses even though the masses only used their hands, so that the political struggle would not continue.

The Party and South Vietnam people have passed through a challenging period and long term struggle in opposing the imperialists and feudalists heroically and unyieldingly. They have accumulated many rich struggle experiences both legal and illegal, political as well as military. The struggle against the Americans-Diemists has moved to a point where our
people have achieved many resistance victories, half the country has achieved independence and is advancing towards socialism. Therefore the people and the South Vietnam Party have great confidence in the victory of the great revolution and possess unceasing high morale. The people rely on the Party and the Party stays close to the people and has established bases everywhere. The Americans-Diemists engage in cruel terrorism but are unable to destroy the movement and unable to exterminate the Party.

Because of the characteristics of the enemy and ourselves in South Vietnam, because of the nature of the class opposition and the decisive opposition of the nation the enemy was obliged to use force in order to survive. As a result the people and the Party if they did not wish to yield and be destroyed were obliged to use the revolutionary force to oppose the counterrevolutionaries. This is an essential stipulation.

b. But force cannot be used at any given time in a revolution. The contradictions between the enemy and ourselves must have developed to a decisive degree before an armed conflict with the enemy can begin.

Immediately after the re-establishment of peace the responsibility of South Vietnam was to use the political struggle to demand the implementation of the Geneva Agreement. The struggle responsibilities and procedures were appropriate for the situation at that time and corresponded with the desires of the great majority of the masses who wished for peace after nearly 10 years of difficult resistance.
At that time, although the Americans-Diemists used cruel force to oppose the people and the revolution and the masses struggled decisively against this repression in many places and at many times, the contradictions had not yet developed to a high degree and the hatred had not yet developed to a point where the use of armed struggle could become an essential and popular struggle tactic. In South Vietnam since 1955, thanks to the armed movement of the sects, we were able to avoid the construction of an armed propaganda force since we only had a few former bases which were needed in the political struggle and for the creation of a reserve force.

From 1957 to 1958 the situation gradually changed. The enemy persistently sabotaged the implementation of the Geneva Agreement, actively consolidated and strengthened the army, security service, and administrative apparatus from the central to the hamlet level, crudely assassinated the people, and truly and efficiently destroyed our Party. By relying on force the American-Diemist regime was temporarily able to stabilize the situation and increase the prestige of the counter revolutionaries. At this time the political struggle movement of the masses although not defeated was encountering increasing difficulty and increasing weakness; the Party bases although not completely destroyed were significantly weakened and in some areas quite seriously; the prestige of the masses and of the revolution was lessened. But in reality, the years during which the enemy increased its terrorism were also the years in which the enemy suffered major political losses and the social contradictions
which existed became increasingly evident; the resentment of the masses became more deep seeded and many individuals who formerly supported the enemy now opposed them. The masses, that is to say the peasants, now realize that it was impossible to live under such conditions and that it was necessary to rise up in drastic struggle. Faced with the fact that the enemy was using guns, assassinations and imprisonment to oppose the people in their political struggle, many voices among the masses appealed to the Party to establish a program of armed resistance against the enemy. Within the Party, on the one hand, the members were saturated with the responsibility to lead the revolution to a successful overthrow of the enemy but on the other hand the majority of the party members and cadres felt that it was necessary to immediately launch an armed struggle in order to preserve the movement and protect the forces. In several areas the party members on their own initiative had organized armed struggle against the enemy.

Since the end of 1958, particularly after the Phu Loi Massacre, the situation truly ripened for an armed movement against the enemy. But the leadership of the Nam Bo Regional Committee at that time still hesitated for many reasons but the principle reason was the fear of violating the party line.

The directive of the Politburo in May 1959 stated that the time had come to push the armed struggle against the enemy. Thanks to this, we overly followed the actual situation in order to formulate a program which we felt to be essential and in October 1959 the armed struggle was launched.
Was the armed struggle slow in coming? We realize that it was not possible to launch the armed struggle too soon, before the situation had ripened. At any rate a short period of time was lost because although many areas were engaged in armed propaganda up to this time it was limited to armed propaganda and insufficient strength existed to maintain continual opposition to the enemy. Although slow in coming, it was not too slow because there was still time to transform the situation into one where the proper conditions existed. However if the change had been even slower even more difficulties would have been encountered and the change in the movement would not have been as easy.

c. What was the armed movement?

Even though the concept of an armed movement existed it was necessary to launch an appropriate type of armed movement. This was a very important problem.

This problem now seems very clear but at the beginning it was a very difficult one because, as we know, many opinions and many hesitancies.

Previous to this point we had focused on the problem whether we "must use force or not" and not whether we "wished to use force or not," so the objective of the movement at this time was to decide what type of force must be used, not what type of force we wish to use. This problem was based on one hand on what type of force the enemy had decided upon and on the other hand what type of force we could use given our capabilities.
Up to 1959, in South Vietnam, the Americans-Diemists had fully constructed a large army, equipped with modern weapons, along with a large and well armed administrative, police and security apparatus. During the years in which the masses were only using political struggle the Americans-Diemists used the military, security and administrative apparatus to launch various campaigns to terrorize, mop up and oppress the movement, no different during the period of warfare. Because they were determined to crush the revolution and control the people at every moment, they could not avoid using every type of repression.

In opposing such an enemy, simple political struggle was not possible. It was necessary to use additional armed struggle, but not merely low level armed struggle such as only armed propaganda which was used to support the political struggle. The enemy would not allow us any peace and in the face of the enemy operations and destructive pursuit, the armed propaganda teams, even if they wished to avoid losses, would never be able to engage the enemy in warfare and would never be able to become an actual revolutionary army. This is an essential fact of the movement and the actual movement in South Vietnam illustrates this fact. Therefore at the end of 1959 when we launched an additional armed struggle in coordination with the political struggle against the enemy it immediately took the form in South Vietnam of revolutionary warfare, a long range revolutionary warfare. Therefore according to some opinions at the beginning of 1959 we only used heavy armed propaganda and later developed "regional guerrillas". Also according to these same opinions by 1962 the revolutionary warfare
had not developed correctly and had to be re-examined.

Peoples warfare, the new revolutionary warfare, in South Vietnam at this time although having many new characteristics, most notable that it combined the political and armed aspects to attack the enemy, in regards to the armed aspects the movement never failed to follow a number of basic principles of peoples warfare and revolutionary warfare in agricultural and colonial countries such as: the necessity to develop a long range military struggle (at present it is combined with the long range political struggle); the armed forces must progress from small to large from weak to strong and three types of armies must exist; the revolutionary army must genuinely be the army of the people, developed from the people, serve the people, be in close liaison with the people and have the support and participation of the people; in the warfare the enemy must be eliminated, the weapons and equipment of the enemy must be seized in order to supply one's own army so that the enemy gradually becomes weaker and your own army gradually becomes stronger; activities must progress gradually from guerrilla warfare to higher types of warfare and greater numbers of the enemy must be eliminated in order to serve the general political needs and responsibilities; it is necessary to possess local bases which must continually be consolidated and expanded, etc.
At present our revolutionary struggle has several new characteristics and a revolutionary orientation which differs from the period of the resistance. Therefore in regards to our armed struggle a thorough examination would reveal many new factors which are not entirely similar to the resistance. But the basic principles noted above were never abandoned and the practicalities of the armed movement in South Vietnam during the past several years has illustrated this fact.

In regards to the problem as the whether we possess the capabilities of leading the armed struggle to the level noted above or had the ability to withstand a long term struggle, the realities of today answer this question clearly. Here we only wish to recount a few experiences concerning our appraisal of the enemy in South Vietnam as it relates to this problem:

In regards to the enemy: If we are unable to fully appraise the obstinacy and wickedness of the enemy then we are also not able to fully perceive what we must do to cope with the enemy and what form and level of warfare will be most effective in opposing the enemy. On the other hand, if we fully appreciate the obstinacy and wickedness of the enemy but do not fully appreciate his strengths and weaknesses, under what circumstances he is strong and under what circumstances he is weak, then we will waver in trying to determine the most advantageous forms of struggle to oppose the enemy. In South Vietnam the enemy was aggressive but very weak (because it was weak politically it had to use force but this force had many shortcomings). While we were only engaged in a simple political struggle the weaknesses of the
enemy becomes his strengths and created severe difficulties for us, but when we launched the revolutionary force to oppose the enemy, the enemy's shortcomings were revealed.

Concerning ourselves: the South Vietnamese masses and Party possessed many strengths and capabilities, having a long tradition of struggle, having had many struggle experiences, possessing a high revolutionary morale and possessing forces which were organized on a relatively strong and widespread scale. In facing such an enemy, which has become weak but is still cruel, if we do not have the appropriate forms of revolutionary struggle to oppose the enemy at the essential times then our strength will become weakness and it is even possible that the movement could fall into a protracted and severe dilemma. But if we have the correct struggle procedures which are used at the precise time and at the precise level then immediately the strength and capabilities of the masses and the parties will be fully manifested. The ideological struggle during the period when changes were being made in the movement became a struggle against the rightest and hesitant thoughts of people who did not dare to push the armed struggle because they had incorrectly appraised the enemy. These people did not fully appreciate the violence of the enemy and at the same time did not fully appreciate the enemy's weaknesses and therefore they overestimated the enemy and feared him. These people also did not fully appreciate the capabilities of the masses, of the Party, and of the movement and therefore did not dare mobilize the masses in order to seek every means to oppose the enemy.
In addition we also had the experience of opposing the following dogmatic mechanical thought: after becoming convinced that arms were necessary some individuals wished only to follow the style used during the period of the resistance.

II A Parallel Armed and Political Struggle is the Most Appropriate Means of Mobilizing Every Combat Capability of the People and the Party.

The South Vietnam revolutionary movement during the period when we had not yet pushed the armed struggle had the characteristic, under the cruel terrorism of the enemy of suffering prestige while the prestige of the enemy increased. As a result the political struggle movement of the masses encountered difficulties, obstacles and losses. But when the armed struggle was pushed the prestige of the masses increased and that of the enemy suffered. The political struggle did not suffer losses but regained the conditions to expand and develop.

In regards to the political movement we wish to report concerning several problems:

a. The South Vietnam revolutionary movement during the past several years, like any revolutionary movement, possesses certain characteristics: We are just while the enemy is unjust:

Through the cruel policy of the enemy, through the correct leadership of our party and the struggle experiences of the masses, through the history of the Vietnam revolutionary struggle since the day the Party was founded and particularly since the resistance, the righteousness of our cause as well as the lack of righteousness of the enemy's cause was clearly exhibited. The great majority of
the masses realized this and many people in the ranks of the enemy also could not deny it. This is a basic advantage and strength of ours and is a basic shortcoming and weakness of the enemy.

Certainly because of this, even though the movement suffered years of terrorism and difficulties in face of the enemy, the masses even though fearful, greatly hated the enemy and continually searched for means to oppose the enemy and continually had confidence and hope in the leadership of the party and continually protected the party members and cadres. As a result the enemy could never completely smash the movement and could never destroy the Party bases as it had hoped to do.

When we began to change to an armed struggle, although the enemy military forces were 10 times or 100 times greater than ours, the enemy continued to lose and we continued to be victorious because of our absolute political strength and because, although we were pushing the armed struggle, we continued to pay attention to the development of the political factors in order to attack the enemy. To the present, although our military forces are much stronger than during the beginning phase, in comparison with the enemy they are still deficient but we have still been able to inflict losses on the enemy in its prosecution of the special aggressive warfare. This is certainly due to the fact that we have developed our political strengths to attack the enemy on two hands: the political and the military. The political aspect is truly the basic one.
The Central Committee of the Party is very enlightened and has many times clearly explained this characteristic so that the ideological leadership of the South Vietnam Party will advance even though at times the movement will encounter difficulties. Even more enlightened was the fact that when the strong armed movement was launched the leadership was determined that South Vietnam stabilize and develop all the political strengths of the masses and coordinate them with the armed movement in order to oppose the enemy.

This clever and enlightened direction awakened the South Vietnam Party apparatus to discover new and dynamic methods of political and armed struggle.

b. Where were these new forms instituted?

The revolutionary movement, no matter what the time or place utilizes the political factor as the origin, as the base: the political factor is the basis and must be developed.

But during every period it must be developed in a different manner.

During the resistance against the French armed struggle was the main instrument but the political continued to serve as the origin and the base. Nevertheless the development of the political at this time was limited to utilizing propaganda in order to uphold the righteousness of our cause and expose the lack of righteousness of the enemy's cause both within and outside the country, to mobilize the people and the party, to gain the positive participation of the army, and to gain the participation of production in the rear areas to serve the front lines, etc.
At present in South Vietnam a political movement still fulfills these responsibilities but the new and different aspect of the political movement at the present time is that alongside the armed forces of the masses are the political forces of the masses, both attacking the enemy at the front lines. Alongside the armed activities and closely coordinated with them are the various aspects of the political struggle, both surfaced and unsurfaced, rushing along like the tide with all the meaning, contents and special action.

Although the masses are now using arms to defeat the enemy and to destroy the township and village regime of the enemy in order to establish a liberated one they continued to struggle to maintain legality and to use all surfaced and unsurfaced aspects of the political struggle in order to defeat the enemy.

At the present time the political and armed struggle is very closely coordinated during each phase, during each stage of the struggle, during each battle and during each phase of opposition; during attacks against the enemy as well as in defensive situations in which we are opposing the enemy in order to defend ourselves. Whenever the leadership splits these two factors we immediately see difficulties and losses arising.

At the present the political struggle is also to attack the enemy.

In leading the masses in the political struggle it is necessary to apply the forces, to probably arrange the organization and ranks, to have leadership and guidance, to have precise requirements and objectives and to have a plan of attack and withdrawal just as the military ranks would have in attacking the enemy.
At present the political struggle is also to lead the masses to the front lines to attack the enemy. The effects of the political struggle are very great. It manifests itself as an attack upon the enemy by the masses. It not only preserves the interests of the masses but strikes at the enemy's morale and forces the enemy to disperse his armed forces and posts in order to cope with the problem. In coordination with binh van activities (binh van activity is one form of political struggle and when the masses are engaged in political struggle they are also engaged in binh van activity) it has the effect of splitting the enemy military and administrative personnel, of isolating the coup individuals from the good ones, of inciting contradictions, and of causing the disintegration of the enemy armed forces in regards to both morale and organization. Struggles in place and counter-operations activities are not only designed to protect the lives and possessions of the masses but also to impede the operations of the enemy, to engage in binh van activities, and to threaten the enemy forces. Many times the enemy's operational plan has ended in failure and conditions have been created so that our forces could attack the enemy. When the masses move into enemy held areas, and cities and towns to struggle in addition to demanding their rights and thereby causing confusion among the enemy ranks it also has the effect of influencing the expansion of the revolution in areas where the movement is still weak.

When the masses rise up in political and military conflict to overthrow the enemy administration in the townships and hamlets the situation becomes very tense but when the enemy resorts to terrorism
the masses know that legality and reason must be maintained in the struggle so that their prestige can be maintained, the tenseness of the situation can be reduced, and the terrorism of the enemy will be restricted. By using both armed and political tactics the movement has the ability to achieve victory and retreat, to be determined yet flexible and drastic yet gentle.

Nevertheless the legal situation and the political struggle movement of the masses since the end of 1959 has not been limited to that of a general political struggle movement in which only demands for increased salaries and for reforms of the oppressive authoritarian domineering regime were made, but is a political struggle movement against the enemy in which the masses rise up with arms in their hands to crush the enemy village and township authorities and to take control of villages and townships on a wide scale. As a result the political struggle movement possesses a revolutionary struggle and content and possesses a form of legalism in which the masses use the power of the struggle to force the enemy to make admissions and to "legalize" its illegal acts. (For instance the masses should tear up and not use the identity cards of the enemy, should not hang banners denouncing Communism, should not pay taxes, and should not repay agricultural credit loans and on the other hand the masses must recognize the digging of tunnels as their main endeavor. They should also plant spikes, destroy bridges, and restrict canals in order to impede the operations of the army.)
c. In contrast with the opinions of the majority of the cadres at the beginning of this period, some tended to think that if the armed struggle were pushed then the political struggle and the continuance of legalism would suffer or on the contrary if legalism and the political struggle are maintained and pushed it would then be impossible to push the armed struggle. But experience has proven that the political and armed struggle are not in contradiction to each other but on the contrary complement each other in strengthening the struggle. A strong armed struggle does not impede the political struggle but on the contrary causes a reduction of enemy prestige and an increase of prestige of the masses thereby allowing the masses to maintain a position of legalism and to strengthen the political struggle. Wherever the political struggle movement is strong the armed struggle will have the capacity to develop.

From this reality it is possible to draw the following conclusions:

In South Vietnam at the present and in the future, as long as the basic conditions and characteristics of the struggle between the enemy and ourselves do not change, the armed and political struggle will continue to be the two important basic forms of struggle and will continue to exist side by side.

To say that the political and armed faces are parallel and exist side by side does not mean that at every time and in every place these two forms and two forces will be actually equal in a mechanical way whereby if you have five of this you must have five of that. On the
contrary, activities must be applied which are appropriate for each area in accordance with the three area principles spelled out by the Central Committee and which are appropriate for each period of time.

How will the political and armed forms of the struggle change as the South Vietnam revolution progresses? Will the phases proceed along the following course? In the beginning the political struggle will be the essence supported by armed propaganda, later the political and armed phases will be side by side and finally it will progress to the point where the political struggle will be reduced and the armed struggle will become the main form. We do not believe this to be so.

After several years of oppression, our party changed its struggle methods and precepts and the South Vietnamese peasant masses rose up to break the enemy grip and destroy the enemies administration in the rural areas in order to liberate them and control them. The masses gradually increased the liberated area while waiting for the appropriate moment to overthrow the entire enemy regime. In order to accomplish this from the beginning (since the end of 1959) the masses have used the political and armed forms of struggle side by side in a dedicated and decisive manner. Thus at the beginning we did not merely combine armed propaganda with the political struggle and then later place the political and armed aspects side by side. When the enemy launched type 3 warfare, a crueler and higher type of warfare, the level of our revolutionary warfare also had to increase and become more decisive. Thus both the political
and armed aspects of the struggle increased in intensity and in decisiveness. This is the actual fact. It is not as some seem to think that the decision to use arms is made when we enter an actual battle. Even when the factors exist in the South Vietnam revolution for the general uprising and the general attack both the political and armed forms of struggle of the masses will be used, uniting the rural masses with those in the cities. Also armed, political, and Binh Van struggle fronts will be used to overthrow the enemy (Binh Van is basically a political activity). When we gain local victories then it is necessary to increase the armed and political forms of struggle, closely united with each other under various forms of activity. (Both fighting and negotiating at the same time).

In summary, no matter what the situation of the revolution, these two forms of struggle will exist side by side and will develop in accordance with the demands of the situation. They will not contradict nor oppose each other.

We realize that at the present time it is very important that the leadership of the South Vietnam revolutionary movement completely grasp the concept of the political and armed struggle existing side by side. Experience has shown that wherever and whenever the cadres and party members, because of mechanical, dogmatic or unrealistic reasons, isolate these two aspects of the struggle, one of the aspects will suffer causing disadvantageous consequences for the movement.

3. The situation demands that we seize authority in the rural
areas and maintain it in order to gradually advance to the overthrow of the entire American-Diemist regime.

a. The masses that followed the party in revolting to overthrow the imperialists and feudalists, had seized power, and had engaged in a bloody armed struggle for ten years in order to maintain this revolutionary authority but when peace was restored they were forced several years under the cruel yoke of the American-Diemists. During this time they looked towards the half of the country which had been liberated and was reconstructing freedom and happiness. These masses, who previously had been entrusted by the party to launch revolutionary warfare, who previously had arms in their hands, and who previously had used every method to oppose the enemy armies certainly were determined not to allow the reactionary regime any peace. In this situation where the relationship of the forces did not yet permit the overthrow of the entire regime they were however eager to overthrow the enemy at his weakest point--the villages and townships.

Since the end of 1959 the agricultural masses throughout South Vietnam from the mountains to the delta have time and again risen up using armed and political means to overthrow the local administration, even the traitors, disperse the self defense units etc. They had revolted in the rural areas.

As in the majority of peasant uprisings, the uprising of the South Vietnam peasants did not occur at one time through the land but occurred in various places at various times when the conditions were present. The movement gradually expanded and after a little more than a year had advanced
close to the cities and close to the strategic communication routes. The self defense units and village authorities of the enemy dispersed in disorder or retreated to the posts. Nearly all of the enemy outposts remained but in the face of the movement the morale of the enemy soldiers plunged and they only worried about their own heads. The grip of the enemy was broken, the masses were able to freely work and live and pay only light taxes. They became encouraged and were determined to spill their own blood to oppose the enemy and were determined not to allow the enemy to regain the rural areas. They were determined to participate in the revolution and to advance towards the overthrow of the entire American-Diemist regime whenever conditions were favorable in order to complete the liberation.

The situation had developed exactly as summarized in the Resolution of the Poliburo at the beginning of 1961: The period of the temporary stabilization by the American-Diemist regime had now passed. The period of continued crisis and severe decline had begun. The shape of the guerrilla warfare and the rural uprising had emerged.

But the American-Diemist regime continued to survive and it was determined to use every means to repacity the rural areas which had been lost. Thus began a fierce tug of war between the enemy and the masses for the control of the rural administration. In many places the masses had to uprise many different times. At present the enemy is making every effort to construct strategic hamlets and the masses are seeking every means to destroy them. This is a continuation of the struggle in even a fiercer form than before.
b. Because the South Vietnam people forces did not yet have the capability of swiftly overthrowing the entire American-Diemist regime immediately, because it was necessary to maintain the advantage while the struggle lapsed into a tug of war between ourselves and the enemy over the control of the rural administrations, because the revolutionary armed forces were still weak at this time even though the number of township and hamlet authorities of the enemy who had been overthrown had expanded greatly, the masses only used the form of autonomy and did not yet overtly construct a revolutionary government. Thus in one sphere the masses still "recognized" the enemy regime but used the strength of the struggle to restrict the enemy's sphere of control, forced the enemy to recognize the just rights of the masses, and force them to admit that their village and township administration was in a sorry state.

Through this policy which was both decisive yet clever and flexible, at the present time it appears that there are our areas and enemy areas but in reality no such division or delineation has taken place between our areas and the enemy areas as had been the case in the resistance period. There are many rural areas which are now under our control, where the enemy cannot control the people, cannot draft soldiers, cannot draft laborers and cannot collect taxes (if the enemy wishes to draft soldiers, draft laborers or collect taxes they must use mop-up operations and terrorism) but as far as the term is applied, any area which is considered an "enemy area" is composed of "enemies." Although our armed forces were very active, although many bridges and roads were destroyed, and tunnels were more
constructed in the villages, travel between the enemy area and our area still existed, commerce between the two areas continued as normal and except during periods of mop-up operations the masses continued to engage in their normal pursuits, continued to live legally and continued the political struggle with the enemy. In the past and at present the maintenance of such a situation in the crowded delta areas (and even in a number of mountain areas where the population is situated near the enemy) is very advantageous. It causes the level of the warfare to increase in intensity and, although victory is not continuous, the level of hardship diminishes. In addition the capability of the masses to endure a prolonged struggle increased.

Recently the enemy tried to install a counter-plot by dividing the areas in many places, particularly those on the edge of base areas in order to establish a belt to surround, isolate, and constrict the liberated areas and our base areas in order to eliminate us. But because of our able leadership and because of the determination of the masses this plot failed.

However, will this situation continue? Will be be able to continually maintain this situation? Until when? In what areas? Even though we may wish to maintain such a situation the enemy would not allow us to do so. At what time and in what places will the movement develop to a point where it will be essential to establish a revolutionary regime in order to answer the increasing needs of the movement and the increasing needs of the revolutionary warfare? When will be have enough power, particularly
armed power, to completely delineate the areas and have enough strength to protect the masses? Is it possible for us to establish some type of revolutionary government whereby we would be able to continue the struggle using the strength of the masses and not allowing the enemy to divide the areas as had been done during the resistance? Above are a number of problems which must be spelled out and studies from a theoretical point of view so that conclusions can be soon reached and a program to guide the movement can be instituted.

c. By the end of 1959, the seizure of authority in the rural areas had expanded considerably and posed an urgent problem for the movement. The contradictions between the South Vietnamese people and the Americans-Diemists had developed to the point where the South Vietnamese masses only had two roads to follow: Should they rise up and destroy the grip of the enemy in the rural areas or should they suffer for a long period under the iron heel of the enemy? The contradictions between the Americans-Diemists and our Party also posed the problem as to whether our Party should launch a peasant uprising in the rural areas in order to maintain the movement and to protect the revolutionary and Party bases or should the party allow them to be destroyed and the movement to be crushed. The situation had ripened and the conditions among the masses as well as among the cadres and Party members were present, only waiting for the answer from the leadership of our Party.

But at times we have procrastinated and not boldly led the movement in this direction. Above all by not appraising the urgent demands of the movement and not fully appreciating the revolutionary capabilities of
the masses and the Party, particularly not correctly estimating the conditions within and outside of the country in order to correctly to appraise imperialist American, we have over-estimated the enemy, fearing that guiding the South Vietnam revolution to agricultural revolt would cause imperialist America to help Ngo Dinh Diem destroy the movement and the revolution. Some people wish to restrict the uprising in the rural areas, only construct bases and large armed forces in a number of mountain areas while the compatriots in the rural delta areas only push the political struggle with armed propaganda support, keeping the situation normal and the areas under enemy control intact, instead of developing the movement, constructing bases, expanding forces, inflicting losses on the enemy and isolating him, and creating the conditions for the advancement of the armed uprising such as the August Revolution when the opportunity presents itself.

But thanks to the general feeling that the advancement of the revolution along such a path in South Vietnam at the present time is not possible and must follow a different path in which the masses are mobilized to destroy the enemy grip, push armed warfare and push the political struggle based on the realities of the situation and on the enlightened experiences of the masses and thanks to the overall leadership and guidance of the Central Committee the movement in South Vietnam has progressed in the proper direction.

In addition we have also been able to gain many lessons concerning the leadership of the mass line, the true situation of the masses and of the movement in order to return the leadership to the masses and to the movement, listen to the masses, and clearly understand the movement in
order to avoid subjectivism which would impede the movement and reality.

d. The armed and political movement, the movement of the rural uprising in South Vietnam, has developed different revolutionary forms in the three strategic areas: the mountains, the delta, and the cities.

The mountain areas, which is composed of the entire Tay Nguyen (western highlands) area and runs into a portion of the Eastern Nam Bo region is a dangerous area and along with Lower Laos is a strategic military area vital to all of South Vietnam and all of Indochina. This area is a solid base of the South Vietnam revolution through which communication with North Vietnam is maintained. In this area we are able to construct large, strong armed forces which are capable of destroying many enemy forces. In this area we are able to endure a prolonged struggle against the enemy even under the most difficult of circumstances and at the same time have the capability of every day engaging in activities in the delta areas particularly those in the Fifth Region and when the opportunity presents itself to advance into the heartland of the enemy including Saigon.

The enemy is also aware of this vital area and therefore has and will use every scheme to compete with us in this area. If we allow the enemy to consolidate and expand his control in this area not only would our basis be reduced and destroyed in this area but the enemy could use the area as a means to divide and isolate the South Vietnam from North Vietnam, attack the delta areas in South Vietnam especially those in the Fifth Region and oppress Lower Laos and the other areas (of Vietnam).
Because of this, the assertion of the Central Committee that the South Vietnam revolution must take over the mountain areas is most correct. In implementing this position the Party apparatus in South Vietnam during the past several years has made strong efforts to launch the mass movement - particularly among the minority peoples, to increase production, to launch guerrilla warfare, to actively construct a large armed force, to construct and expand the base areas and to link them together, to open and consolidate the strategic communication routes in the Tay Nguyen region up to the Nam Bo region, to actively apply the work concepts in the mountain areas, etc. These activities have yielded decisive results but it is also necessary to make even greater efforts. Particularly in the area from Southern Tay Nguyen to the border of the Eastern Nam Bo Region all aspects of the movement are deficient. To the present our mountain base areas, particularly the base area in South-eastern Tay Nguyen and in the Eastern Nam Bo border area, cannot be said to be truly strong and extensive in every aspect. This is a major weakness which must be overcome decisively and rapidly.

Nevertheless it must be realized that the South Vietnam mountain area has several objective shortcomings: The economy in the area is poor and the area must rely heavily on the delta and cities; the area is thinly populated and in some places there are no people; although the terrain is advantageous the area is elongated and narrow and particularly in South Tay Nguyen and in Eastern Nam Bo the area is divided by many strategic roads, plantations, settlements, and cities of the enemy. We see the situation as follows:
The construction of adequate bases involves many difficulties which must be overcome. We should not think that this construction will be easy or rapid. Even though we are determined to overcome these problems we must realize that capabilities are limited (such as economic and manpower resources) and in wishing to construct large and strong mountain bases reliance upon the deltas and the movement in the delta cannot be avoided.

Although in general the concept of our struggle in the mountain areas is principally an armed one the methods applied must be appropriate for the particular area and at the particular time. Generally speaking we must take over the mountain area. After we have clearly and definitely taken over the mountain area we should expand the area close to the strategic roads, cities, settlements, plantations, etc. But as to whether we should attack the towns or settlements or strategic roads must be studied carefully. How we should take over the mountain areas and what concepts should be used in the construction of our mountain bases, at the present time and in the future, are problems which must be discussed carefully.

The rural delta areas, particularly the delta area in Nam Bo, are well populated and have sufficient resources. In this area the revolutionary movement and bases are quite strong and uniform. In a number of places such as the delta area of the Fifth Region, although the movement has developed slowly and many of the bases are still weak, the situation is progressing well and many capabilities exist there.
The characteristic of the movement in the rural delta area of South Vietnam is that there are no large areas which are entirely white (enemy controlled areas) for a long period of time. The white areas which do exist are continually being diminished or contain bases of the movement and the masses in these areas are under the influence of the movement in the liberated area. In these areas also exist bases and groups which oppose the enemy. Even in a number of Cao Daist and Hoa Hoa areas, which during the Resistance period completely followed the enemy, now either completely follow us in opposing the enemy or have joined neither us nor the enemy or are sympathetic to us and oppose the enemy.

Another characteristic is that at the present time, because of the strong political and armed movement, even though large scale base areas do not exist as during the Resistance period and although the enemy posts are still found everywhere, the area under the enemy rural administration has been dispersed and paralyzed thus creating a certain type of liberated area and base area for us; a large area which is near strategic roads, cities, towns, and the strategic hamlets of the enemy. Thus the cadres, party members, revolutionary organizations and armed forces are able to find shelter and engage in many activities in these areas. In addition we are able to obtain much manpower for the construction of the revolutionary forces in the delta areas and manpower which can be sent to the mountain areas. At present, the guerrilla forces have developed and are still able to develop on a wide and strong scale but at the same time the concentrated local military forces and the concentrated regular forces have also possessed the capacity and conditions (foodstuffs and
manpower are more available than in the mountain areas) to develop and exterminate the enemy even in delta rural areas, particularly in areas where the terrain is relatively advantageous such as U Minh and Dong Thac.

The situation is improving. The ration of the enemy armed forces and ours is becoming more balanced, the enemy has been forced to abandon a number of delta areas and because of this our base areas will become larger and the ability to construct larger armed forces will increase and our capacity to defeat the enemy will be greater.

Based on the above situation we can make the following observations:

The assertion of the Central Committee that we must compete with the enemy to regain the entire delta area is most correct.

If the delta areas are taken over then the mountain areas will not be isolated, the enemy exploitation of the people and their possessions will be restricted, and the people and their possessions can be used to develop our forces in the delta and mountain areas.

If our delta areas are expanded then we will advance close to Saigon and the other cities and close to the important strategic communication routes of the enemy. Upon achieving this, it will be possible, along with the forces in the mountain areas, to support the movement in the city and the enemy controlled areas and when circumstances permit to directly attack the heartland of the enemy.

Generally speaking, the delta is a disputed battlefield on which we will wear down and exhaust the enemy in prolonged warfare but the mountain area is a battlefield on which we have the ability to
eliminate the enemy in order to change the relationship between the enemy forces and our own and push the enemy out. Nevertheless the capabilities of the delta for the construction of bases and liberated areas, the capabilities of the delta for the construction of large forces to a predetermined degree, the capabilities to continually eliminate the enemy, even large enemy forces when the opportunity arises, must not be overlooked during the present movement.

In a rural country the authorities cannot be concentrated and it is possible to construct bases in the mountain areas which can exist for long periods of time and gradually mature. However, in South Vietnam at the present time construction of bases only in the mountain areas and abandonment of the delta areas would be very dangerous. As a result the development of the movement in the mountain areas and in the delta areas side by side is a very important leadership concept.

In addition we also must have a clear and definite concept concerning how the liberated areas and bases in the delta areas can be expanded and what will be most advantageous at the present and in the future. This is an important problem which must be discussed thoroughly.

The city areas in South Vietnam, although continually under the grip of the enemy since the period of the Resistance, although under strong enemy control and oppression, are composed of masses who have a relatively high degree of awareness, realize who the enemy and the friends are, and continually have their hearts with the revolution. Such thoughts are found not only among the laboring masses, the poor city classes, the petty bourgeoisie, and the students but also among a number of intellectuals,
university students and national capitalists, although the degree of comprehension will differ. As a result, they are continually seeking ways to struggle against the enemy, particularly at the present time against the oppressive American-Diethist regime which has created increasing difficulty for all classes of city dwellers. They have a fierce hatred of the present regime and an ardent desire to change it. Living directly under the wickedness of the enemy has created special living conditions and the masses in the city are unable to participate in a strong struggle as the masses in the rural areas do. But whenever the opportunity arises they push ahead decisively on the struggle path and at the appropriate time they will have the capability of uprising and working for the revolution. The historical experiences and struggle traditions of the cities in South Vietnam, particularly Saigon-Cholon, have proven this fact.

e. Capabilities of the South Vietnam Revolution

Since the end of 1959 the actual South Vietnam revolution has followed the path of mobilizing the rural masses to engage in political and armed warfare in order to destroy the enemy's bases and administration in the rural areas and establish liberated areas and bases on an increasingly expanded scale. The revolution has relied on the mountain and delta rural areas to push the protracted struggle with the enemy step by step gaining victories and forcing the enemy to flee causing changes in the relationship of the forces, particularly the military forces, so that when sufficient conditions exist and the opportunity arises, the enemy can be completely overthrown and South Vietnam liberated.
Since 1962, in order to save the Diem regime which had become perilously weak and in the hopes of crushing the South Vietnam revolution, imperialist America expanded its direct aggressive intervention and instituted three types of warfare in South Vietnam. As a result the level of warfare has increased and expanded, the South Vietnam revolutionary struggle has been prolonged and greater complications have been encountered. But exactly as the Central Committee had realized, the new intervention of imperialist America was not able to upset the relationship of the forces between ourselves and the enemy, was not able to upset the situation and there was not yet any reason to change our basic concepts. The revolutionary struggle in South Vietnam will be protracted and difficult but it is certain that the enemy will suffer total defeat and we will gain total victory. As the South Vietnam revolution progresses against the enemy we will possess many capabilities as the Central Committee has specified.

When the South Vietnam cities, particularly Saigon-Cholon, are able to rise up in coordination with the rural areas the South Vietnam revolution will have the capability of overthrowing the enemy through the means of a general uprising. At this time we are unable to affirm how the general uprising will evolve. But it is certain that it will be an uprising of the rural masses moving into the cities, composed of armed forces which have been organized and have been in combat for many years and of political forces of the rural and city masses which will at that time rise up in armed revolt with every type of weapon at their disposal; it will not explode at the same time as
every place but will encompass many periods: Perhaps it will begin after several large battles have changed the ratio of the enemy military forces in comparison to ours, encouraging the masses everywhere particularly in the cities and causing disorder in the ranks of the enemy after which the masses could immediately rise up everywhere and the liberation army could move in (particularly into the enemy military strongholds, the larger cities, and Saigon-Cholon) to continue the mass revolt. Relying on the strength of the revolutionary army and the mass forces of the revolt, the forces could engage in Binh van activities in order to cause the disintegration of the enemy army entice the majority of the enemy army to follow the revolution, under the slogan at the federation of the workers, peasants and military which will play a large role at that time.

Less the revolution to overthrow the enemy will have both the character of a general uprising and the character of a general offensive in which the revolutionary army forces and the political forces of the masses would engage in armed revolt and the Binh Van forces would work to split the enemy military ranks. The general uprising and the general offensive will be a situation in which the South Vietnam people fight against the enemy. The enemy has a strong well-equipped military force and therefore in wishing to be victorious over the enemy the revolutionary military forces must have enough strength and must have had numerous continuous victories in which the majority of the enemy military forces were eliminated thus creating the conditions for the people to rise up and for the binh van forces to split the enemy ranks and gain total victory.
In addition to the capabilities of the general uprising and the general offensive, it is also possibility that certain capabilities will arise which are not due to our victories. It is possible that we can force the enemy to discuss and recognize a number of our democratic national rights and because we would not have sufficient conditions to overthrow the enemy and gain total victory we could gain victory through a step by step process until complete victory is ours. Even though the character of the struggle of the classes and the nation in South Vietnam is very drastic, because imperialist America is trying to make South Vietnam its important strategic location in Southeast Asia, and because imperialist America is trying to use South Vietnam as a testing ground for its new type of aggressive warfare, the South Vietnam revolution will only be able to gain victories step by step, victories which will not come easily or rapidly. In the patriotic warfare of the South Vietnam people against the aggressor at this time the enemy is suffering many losses, the enemy is becoming bogged down and has suffered personnel losses in major battles. At the same time on the international front imperialist America and its lackeys have been wrongly denounced by world opinion. Within the United States public opinion is fervently demanding the end of the aggressive warfare in South Vietnam. With this can develop into a special victory for us. If South Vietnam gains such a special victory, then it is very possible that through some method a complete revolutionary victory can be accomplished quickly and advantageously. If it also possible that imperialist America will intervene militarily in South Vietnam on a greater scale than at present but without causing civil war. If this occurs, victory for
the South Vietnam revolution will only be achieved through a
difficult and long struggle.

If Imperialist America could incite civil war in South Vietnam
although at present it would be difficult to do so but we must prevent
this.

Although the South Vietnam revolution will advance in accordance
with its capabilities the essential factor in the struggle to victory
is that we must have strong political and armed power, particularly
armed power. At the same time we must a flexible strategy for our
activities within and outside of the country.

At present the most essential matter for us is to that we
must know how to restrict the enemy and defeat the enemy in type-3
warfare in South Vietnam, mainly through the efforts of the South
Vietnamese people but with able assistants to some degree from
North Vietnam and our faction.

The South Vietnam revolutionary leadership must make people
aware of the possibility of a long and difficult struggle to defeat the
enemy and must prepare the conditions essential for a long and
difficult struggle. Given the present world situation, given the
characteristics of the enemy in South Vietnam, given the unbroken
and serious contradictions within the enemy ranks, it is possible
that the South Vietnam revolution has the ability to sweep to create
victories and to advance the revolution rapidly. We must spot these
factors in advance so that we will not miss any opportunities.

In regards to the problem concerning the capabilities of the
revolution, generally speaking, we are in unanimous agreement with the
recent directives and resolutions for the Central Committee. It is
only necessary to discuss and make additional comments concerning
particular circumstances. Above we have only foreseen and discussed a number of possible circumstances but it is not certain that the future will unfold exactly as we have predicted. Therefore it is essential to closely follow the situation and to have timely programs of activities for each actual period.