Item 302

Translation of a letter dated March 1966, presumably written by Le Duan, First Secretary of the Lao Dong Party Central Committee and member of the Hanoi Politburo. It was captured by units of the 173d Airborne Brigade, January 21, 1967 during Operation Cedar Falls.

Released to the press by the U.S. Mission at Saigon March 15, 1967.
FROM: Anh Sau
TO: Anh Tam

Dear comrades, the revolutionary problem in the southern part of our country is inherently a difficult and complicated one, because our people are fighting the arch imperialists in the world. At present, the U.S. imperialists have brought their aggressive war in the south to a new phase, and thereby, made the situation more serious. The political bureau and the party central committee had discussed at length the war situation in the south and reached a unanimous agreement. This unanimity of minds is of decisive importance to the final success of our people's anti-U.S. national salvation undertaking.

Today, I present to you a number of basic matters with the hope that you will grasp more firmly the basic contents and spirit of the resolution. I will not expressly deal with concrete matters. I think it is not certain that talking at length about concrete matters will help you thoroughly understand the basic spirit of the resolution, because the concrete matters are numerous, have many aspects and forms, and always develop in a complex way. Therefore, it is necessary to grasp the general points in order to easily understand the concrete matters.

To clearly and thoroughly understand the basic matters contained in the resolution of the 12th conference of the party central committee, first of all each of us comrades must have a thoroughly revolutionary spirit, a warm love for the country and people, engrave deep in our bone our life or death hatred for the U.S. aggressors and their country-selling lackeys, and assert our clear-cut stand that no matter what sacrifice we have to make or what hardships we have to undergo, we are resolved to fight and defeat the Americans. Only on the basis of these revolutionary sentiments and will can we realize the problem clearly and without hesitation. Furthermore, we must have a correct thinking method: the materialist dialectical thinking method. To understand the sociological reasoning method, we must do our best to distinguish it from the mechanical reasoning methods. To speak of revolution and war is to speak of politics. Politics is a science and "an art of possibility" (art du possible — Le Duan). In a definite historical epoch, social facts may develop according to this possibility or another, within the scope of the definite conditions of this epoch. In the face of a changing environment, we
Marxists-Leninists cannot but base themselves upon the development of this environment's internal contradictions and upon the subjective and objective conditions it generates to anticipate its development possibilities, and, on that basis, to set forth the lines and policies which are appropriate to our requirements and goals. In the actual process of this development, we must always grasp firmly and in time the new development and the sudden changes in the situation in order to apply our revolutionary lines, policies, mottos, and methods in a lively manner and in conformity to our goals. Yet, things do not necessarily always develop in strict accordance with our subjective judgment and intentions. A lively example of this is the guidance provided by Lenin/the Russian October Revolution.

Lenin considered that in the period from February to July 1917 there were possibilities for the revolution to develop peacefully. But in July of that year, Lenin considered that the peaceful possibilities no longer existed, and advocated preparations for an armed uprising. Why did Lenin's line have to be changed so rapidly and so radically within a few months? The time when Lenin advocated that efforts be exerted to insure the peaceful development of the revolution (even though the possibilities were very few -- Le Duan) was the time when the worker-peasant administration, which existed at the same time as the bourgeois administration, "had the maximum legal capability," and when "weapons were in the hands of the people without any outside coercion against them." Yet, from July on, after the provisional government and the Menshevik valets handed power over to the militarists, the Soviets went completely bankrupt and powerless, and, consequently, the conditions for insuring the peaceful development of the revolution no longer existed.

Under the above two revolutionary circumstances, Lenin's realization was correct, and the application of his strategem was very creative and Marxist. However, those who made subjective and mechanical inferences failed to understand the outstanding correctness of Lenin's realization.

Social sciences are different from natural sciences, and social rules are not the same as natural rules. Each social phenomenon always has many causes which interact, contradict, and influence one another. These causes, themselves also evolve and develop. Man cannot fully grasp these causes. Therefore, we cannot and should not assert in a hasty, inflexible, and unalterable manner matters which are in the process of evolution and development. While studying social sciences, if we reason in a simple and mechanical manner we can by no means find out the rules governing the dialectic development of things, and, of course, cannot manipulate this development so that it is consistent with our purposes and requirements. As shown by the revolutionary realities, mechanical and inflexible reasoning will lead to errors that are detrimental to the
revolution. Since the end of the 11th conference of the party central committee, the situation in the southern part of our country has undergone new changes resulting from the U.S. imperialists' introduction of nearly 200,000 U.S. and satellite troops into the south. The resolution of the 12th conference of our party central committee emerged from this new situation.

In our 9th resolution (the part dealing with South Vietnam -- Le Duan) and 11th resolution, we set forth three major policies:

1. We must defeat the U.S. Imperialists and their lackeys in the special war.

2. We must try to restrain and we can restrain and defeat the enemy on the southern battlefield.

3. We must be prepared to cope with and fight the enemy in case the U.S. imperialists send U.S. and satellite troops to the south to participate in the war.

In setting forth the strategic trend to determine to defeat the enemy in the special war, we realized that there were two possibilities. On the one hand, it is possible to restrain the enemy in the special war in order to defeat him. This is the best way to defeat the enemy. On the other hand, we also anticipated that if the U.S. imperialists are defeated in their special war, under certain conditions, they may resort to limited war and send expeditionary troops to directly participate in the war in the south. In the first phase they may send 150,000 to 200,000 troops, and later the number of their troops may be increased to 300,000 or 400,000. But whether the war in the south remains within the scope of a special war, or exceeds this scope and becomes a limited war, we will still be capable of restricting and we must restrict the war within the limits of the south in order to defeat the enemy. Thus, the essential contents of the requirement to restrain the enemy and our important strategic trend are to restrict the war within the limits of the south in order to defeat the enemy mainly on the southern battlefield. It is also necessary for us to clearly understand that we restrain the enemy but we must defeat him. Our aim is to defeat the enemy at all costs. As for restricting the war within the limits of the south, it is aimed at defeating the enemy in a way that is advantageous to the revolution in our country and in the world. If one understands otherwise, he fails to thoroughly understand the basic contents of the above policies.
Following the southern armed forces and people's victory at Bình Gia, the U.S. imperialists began to see that they might be defeated in the special war. In early 1965, the U.S. imperialists adventurously waged the war of destruction against the northern part of our country, with a view mainly to overcoming their defeat in the south. At that time, the infantry war was still restricted mainly to the southern battlefield. The enemy's strategic trend remained basically unchanged. The war of destruction spread over the north on a larger scale, but it failed to attain the goals set forth by the enemy. In the meantime, in the south, the puppet armed forces were facing the danger of complete disintegration. In the face of their situation of being passive and confused, the U.S. imperialists had to massively send U.S. combat troops to the south. This showed that their special war strategy went basically bankrupt.

Thus, all the above situations developed in accordance with our anticipation, and clearly showed that the policies and inferences formulated by our party central committee and contained in the 9th and 11th resolutions have been basically correct. This does not mean that these resolutions accurately anticipated all details and concrete facts. We cannot give a 100 percent accurate prophecy of the situation, and the spirit of the above central committee resolutions should be understood in a similar manner. It is necessary for us to grasp the basic spirit and contents of these resolutions in order to implement them, and apply them to the realities of the revolution. Only in the actual revolutionary process can we realize things more deeply and clearly, and manipulate them more accurately. We had correctly estimated the situation and set forth correct lines and policies. Therefore, we were neither caught by surprise nor passive in the face of the U.S. imperialists' escalation of the war in the south during the past. On the contrary, we have still mastered the situation and held the initiative in directing the war according to our strategic intentions in the new situation.

One thing which must be clearly seen is that the situation of the southern revolution has often developed more rapidly than we anticipated. I mean, so far the situation of the southern revolution has developed more rapidly than anticipated. And from now on, the situation of the revolution will not necessarily develop so rapidly. We were determined to win and were confident that we could defeat the enemy in the special war but we had not been able to anticipate that the U.S. imperialists and lackeys failed so rapidly. Within only one year following the resolution of the 9th party central committee conference, the southern armed forces and people destroyed more than three-fourths of the strategic hamlets, rapidly enlarged the liberated areas, and radically changed the situation of the battlefield in the 5th inter-zone. Since the Bình Gia battle,
the puppet army suffered continued and extremely serious defeats. An important part of the puppet regular troops was annihilated, and a substantial part of them disintegrated. It was obvious that the situation of the war developed more rapidly than we had anticipated. At that time, we had not yet acquired adequate conditions to cope with the rapid development of the situation, and to make the puppet army disintegrate in a basic and irreversible manner. And once the puppet army had disintegrated to such an extent, the U.S. imperialists' massive introduction of troops into the south would undoubtedly have met with many difficulties.

While we were winning and were going to defeat the enemy in the special war, the U.S. imperialists sent their expeditionary troops to the south to directly participate in the war in an attempt to alter the situation. The emergence of such a situation was due to the following causes:

1. We were not fully capable of making the puppet army disintegrate, really disintegrate, to an irretrievable extent. This means that we were about to defeat the enemy, but had not yet definitely defeated his special war.

2. The U.S. imperialists were the international gendarmes. They were still very obstinate in their scheme of holding on to the southern part of our country. They were the wealthy and powerful imperialists who still possessed ample capabilities of expanding the war.

3. In the face of a situation where our camp's unity was seriously impaired, the U.S. imperialists gradually realized that even with the introduction of a few hundred thousand expeditionary troops into the south, the foreseeable situation would not drive them into being involved in a major limited war which required that they coped with the strong reaction of the entire socialist bloc.

Of the above three causes, the first two were the main ones because they manifested the balance of forces between us and the enemy, and reflected the power of both sides on the battlefield. The points I presented above are aimed at recapitulating in a general manner some major policies set forth in the resolutions of the 9th and 11th conferences of the party central committee. Now I would like to add some opinions about the basic matters contained in the 12th party central committee conference resolution.

The southern part of our country is the convergence center of the basic contradictions in the world: contradictions between the national independence movement and imperialism, contradictions between the oppressed and exploited and the oppressors and exploiters, contradictions between the two blocs, and contradictions between peace and war. The U.S. imperialists' aggression against the southern part of our country has been aimed at implementing their neocolonialist policy and their policy of serving as an international gendarme in Southeast Asia and in the Orient. The meeting between us and the U.S. imperialists in the southern part of our country is an objective inevitability of history. We are coping with the imperialists who possess the strongest economic and military potentials in the imperialist world. Coping with them is not only a pressing and inevitable requirement, but is also a result of our party's correct evaluation of U.S. imperialism. We have realized that it is necessary for our people to defeat the U.S. imperialists' aggression on our country, and we are fully capable of defeating the U.S. imperialists.

In war as well as in the formulation of strategy and tactics of the world revolution in general, and of each country in particular, the problem of prime importance is to know the enemy and ourselves, and to evaluate the balance of forces between us and the enemy. In the world today, the evaluation of U.S. imperialism is an extremely important matter. In viewing the world situation, there were cases in which the forces of imperialism, particularly U.S. imperialism, were evaluated too highly. In 1947, comrade Zhdanov stated in the communist international press forum agency that we (the communists -- Le Duan) had evaluated U.S. imperialism too highly. In the present international communist movement, there are still many disagreements of which the different evaluations of the forces of U.S. imperialism constitute an important matter.

Our country is small. Therefore, it is even more difficult and complicated for us to evaluate U.S. imperialism. Previously, to understand and evaluate U.S. imperialism we had to discuss it with the fraternal countries. Today, through our collision with the U.S. imperialists, although this collision has occurred on a limited scale, we have been able to evaluate their schemes and capabilities on our territory. For more than 10 years, the realities of the revolution in Laos and in the southern part of our country have permitted us to evaluate U.S. imperialism more and more accurately.

We know that the U.S. imperialists have their own global strategy, which was formulated since the end of World War II. After World War II, the
U.S. imperialists held the monopoly over nuclear bombs. Their economic and military strength developed very rapidly. As for the other imperialist countries, they declined more seriously than ever before and became indebted to the U.S. imperialists. As a result, the U.S. imperialists became the leader of the capitalist world. As for the Soviet Union, it won the anti-fascist war but had suffered serious losses. It was in this situation that the U.S. imperialists plotted to dominate the whole world. The Marshall Plan and the Truman Program were manifestations of the U.S. imperialists' global strategy. But after the Soviet Union had rapidly rehabilitated its economy and after the success of the Chinese Revolution, the world situation developed in a direction unfavorable to the U.S. imperialists. In the world, a powerful socialist bloc came into existence comprising more than 1,000 million people. The colonial and semi-colonial countries rose up to get rid of colonialism, and formed a national independent force comprising more than 50 countries. The U.S. imperialists lost their monopoly over nuclear weapons, and it was obvious that they sustained one defeat after another. They were defeated in China, Korea, in Vietnam together with the French, Cuba, and Laos, and are now being bogged down in the southern part of our country. At present, the contradictions within the imperialist bloc have developed more and more acutely. This fact constitutes the cause of the bankruptcy of the aggressive NATO bloc, and of the confusion of the other military blocs, such as the CENTO and NATO blocs. The U.S. strategists' shift from the strategy of "massive retaliation" with nuclear weapons to the strategy of "flexible reaction" with three kinds of war has served as evidence of the U.S. imperialists' strategically passive and weakening position. Many leading U.S. imperialists themselves had to admit this fact. Although the U.S. imperialists are still the cruel international gendarmes, they obviously are in a weak and passive position. Therefore, their global policy can be no better -- it is also in a weak and passive state. On the contrary, speaking from a strategic point of view, the international proletarian revolution is in an offensive position, and is repulsing step by step and smashing part by part the forces of imperialism headed by U.S. imperialism, in order to move forward to destroy the entire imperialist system. The forces of the proletarian revolution and the revolutionary national independence forces are whipping up a storm shaking imperialism and the capitalist system to their roots.

We must not only accurately evaluate the balance of forces on a world-wide scope, but must also evaluate the balance of forces in each region, because the balance of forces varies from one region to another in the world. The U.S. imperialists' interests are not concentrated in Southeast Asia. Yet Southeast Asia is the center of the world revolutionary storm,
and is the convergence point of the most acute contradictions in the world. This is due to the fact that Southeast Asia is a region which is inhabited by more than 600 million people and is adjoining the Chinese People's Republic with a population of 700 million people, and where the revolution is seething and the national independence movement is developing in a direction leading to socialism, following the examples set by the socialist countries in Asia, such as China, Vietnam, and Korea. If the proletarian revolution is successful in this region, and if the densely populated countries -- such as India and Pakistan with nearly 550 million people, and Indonesia with more than 100 million people -- also move toward socialism, then, as Lenin predicted, "there is no doubt about the conclusion of the struggle on a world scale," and this will constitute an extremely great source of encouragement to dozens of other national independent countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. It is for this reason that the U.S. imperialists set foot on the region with the hope of checking the revolutionary tide there. But do they have adequate strength to successfully check this revolutionary tide? Definitely not.

Through the realities of the revolution, our party has clearly identified the strong and weak points of the U.S. imperialists. On the basis of the realization that the world revolution was in an offensive position, we formulated the strategy of defeating imperialism step by step and destroying it part by part, that is, we must carry out a revolution to destroy imperialism. However, we must know how to defeat the imperialists in each region and each country in accordance with the requirements and intensity dependent upon the balance of forces prevailing in each area, at each moment, and in each position in the world. This strategic line coordinates the two tasks of simultaneously stimulating the development of the revolution for the liberation of the laboring people and the oppressed peoples throughout the world, and protecting world peace while opposing the aggressive policy of the U.S. imperialists in order to drive their global strategy into bankruptcy. Our strategic line has been aimed at achieving gradual success for the revolution and deepening the contradictions among the imperialists, in order to defeat them from one position to another and one by one. It is an organic coordination of the objectives of the struggle for peace, national independence, democracy, and socialism in our age.

The line of the southern revolution has been imbued with the above-mentioned common direction and we hold that the southern revolution must progress through some defined transitional periods before advancing toward national reunification and leading the entire country to socialism.
and that the first period is aimed at striving to achieve the basic objectives which are independence, democracy, peace, and neutrality in the south.

The countries in the socialist camp, the communist parties, the proletarian movements, and the national liberation movement in the world are increasingly cooperating with us in the common cause against U.S. imperialism. As far as the sympathy and support of the world for us, in particular, our socialist camp’s assistance is the major one and has the greatest effect. This proves that the resolution of our party’s 9th congress (the portion dealing with international affairs -- Le Duan) as well as the common line of the communist movement noting that the socialist camp is the decisive factor of the development of human history at present is completely correct. Great successes recorded in the southern revolution prove again that our party has correctly evaluated the balance of forces between the world revolutionary movement and imperialism, and has correctly realized the strength of the socialist camp, the international proletarian movement, and the movement for national independence.

At present, the U.S. imperialists have sent nearly 200,000 U.S. and satellite troops to the southern part of our country. Their policy of war escalation step by step testifies to both their stubborn and bellicose nature and their weak, isolated and defensive position. In war, there are two sorts of escalation: escalation in the victorious and offensive position, and that in the defeated and defensive position. Formerly, the fascists had escalated the war step by step when they were on the offensive. In the first stage of World War II, the German and Italian fascists escalated the war after they had resisted the revolutionary movements in Spain, Ethiopia, and Czechoslovakia. The Japanese fascists escalated the war after they had won in Manchuria. In the current situation which has undergone a change, the fact that the U.S. imperialists send their troops to participate directly in the South Vietnam war is a step of their war escalation. But they have escalated the war in a defeated and defensive position.

In fact, in Vietnam in general and in the South in particular, the U.S. imperialists have suffered a failure. The first failure occurred in their intervention in the Indo-Chinese war. Since 1950, they shouldered eighty percent of military expenditures for the French colonialists, yet, during the last years of this war, they have together with the French colonialists suffered an ignominious failure in the Dien Bien Phu battle and in the 1954 Geneva Conference.

Since they directly participated in the war of aggression against the southern part of our country, the U.S. imperialists have again suffered
successive failures. They have failed in their attempt to use the Ngo Dinh Diem fascist administration to crush the southern revolutionary movement. It was when the enemy was frenziedly resorting to the most barbarous maneuvers to repress the revolution and when the revolutionary movement seemed to be unable to survive that we realized that the U.S. imperialists and their henchmen had basically suffered a political failure, and that we had been fully capable of urging the masses to rise up part by part in the rural areas to seize power for the people. The development of the southern revolutionary movement since then to now has proven that the aforementioned evaluation is completely correct and it is clear that the revolution is on the path to success.

Since 1961, the U.S. imperialists have carried on the special war to continuously fight the southern revolution, and hoped that they could destroy the armed forces of the southern people in a short time, but the result has been contrary to their expectation. The "Special War" strategy has basically gone bankrupt, along with the dismissal of Taylor, the father of that strategy. This is the third failure of the U.S. imperialists.

Their fourth failure is their carrying out of the sabotage war against the northern part of our country. They have failed to shake the determination of our people throughout the country, and have been unable to extricate themselves from their complicated and passive situation, while sustaining ever growing heavier failures in the south.

In Laos, the U.S. imperialists have had a rather powerful puppet army compared with the Pathet-lao Army. In 1962, the U.S. imperialists mobilized a part of the Seventh Fleet's forces in landing U.S. troops in Thailand, but they did not dare enter the war. On the contrary, after the defeat of the right-wing army in Nam Tha they were forced to sit in the Geneva Conference in 1962 and to recognize a coalition government with the participation of the Laothian communists.

It is clear that the U.S. imperialists have escalated the war in a defeated and passive position, and this sort of escalation is different from the escalation in a victorious and offensive position. Escalating the war in such a disadvantageous position, the enemy cannot succeed in expanding the war on any scale at any time. We are constantly ready to fight the enemy should he escalate the war by ground force to the north. At present, however, he does not largely possess such capabilities. But even if that situation may occur, it does not mean that the enemy can extricate himself from his passive and defeated position in the south.
In short, the U.S. imperialists are the ring leaders having much greater economic and military potentials than we, but the more they engage in the aggressive war against the southern part of our country, the deeper they are bogged down. It is they who have confessed that they happen to find themselves in an "endless tunnel." In the present stage, with the balance of forces between us and the enemy in the south, in Southeast Asia and the world over, in the face of the might of the socialist camp, the international proletarian movement, and the national independence movement, and confronting acute contradictions among the ranks of the imperialists, the U.S. imperialists are entering the war in a dilemma.

Therefore, the more the U.S. imperialists escalate, intensify, and expand the war, the more they will be defeated and isolated, and at length they must fail. Faced with two failures, either small or big, they must choose the one which costs them less losses, otherwise they must suffer a bitter and heavier failure and cannot predict all dangerous consequences waiting for them.

II. About the Nature of the War.

What change does the U.S. introduction of some hundred of thousands of troops into the south bring about with regard to the nature of the war in the south?

Speaking of the nature of the war, we Marxists, up to now, have made a distinction between two types of war only: just war and unjust war. The revolutionary and anti-aggression war is a just one. The aggressive and counterrevolutionary war is an unjust one. One can rely on the content of each war to give it different names, such as war for the defense of the Fatherland, national liberation war, imperialist war, and civil war. With regard to the scale of the war, it might be large or small, or it might be a regional or worldwide war. As for the concepts of "regional war," "special war" which we are dealing with here, they have been invented by the U.S. imperialists in their "flexible responsive strategy war." In practice, from the viewpoint of the scale of the war, we can say that the regional war or special war is a sort of limited war. The special war or regional war is merely the U.S. imperialists' war of aggression along the pattern of neo-colonialism, but a noteworthy thing is that the special war is a war of aggression in which the puppet administration and army, equipped and commanded by them, are used as a major tool to repress the national liberation movement.

Previously, we had said that if the U.S. imperialists sent 150,000 - 200,000 U.S. troops to South Vietnam the war would have exceeded the limit of a special war and would have become a regional war along the pattern of old colonialism. But now, through several discussions and deliberations, we
have come to realize that although the U.S. imperialists have sent U.S. expeditionary troops to participate directly in the war in South Vietnam, they continue to pursue the goals of neo-colonialism, and the "special" character of the war still exists and is still an important factor. In the war along the pattern of old colonialism, the major object for combat operations is expeditionary aggressive troops, but in the special war, the major object for combat operations is puppet troops. At present, although the U.S. imperialists have sent 200,000, 300,000, or 400,000 U.S. troops, their war of aggression in the south is still a neo-colonialist war because their political and military objectives are not merely to invade South Vietnam, but to maintain a powerful puppet administration and army under the cloak of false independence serving as a shield for them. That is why the object for combat operations of the southern armed forces and people is not mainly U.S. troops, but both U.S. troops and puppet troops: We should not give light consideration to anyone of these forces.

U.S. troops and puppet troops are two strategic forces used by the U.S. imperialists in carrying out the war aimed at achieving their political and military objectives. U.S. troops have become a core force for the puppet army to rely on. Their duty is to strive to keep the puppet army and administration from disintegrating, at the same time, to occupy some strategic areas, to maintain their strong position on the entire battlefield, and to search to destroy the core force of the southern liberation army. However, the puppet army is still a big force whose duty is to serve as a supporting point for the puppet central and local administrations. Its other duty is to recapture the lost areas, to restore a number of puppet disintegrated administrations, to win back the right to rule the rural areas which have been seized by the local and guerrilla armed forces and together with U.S. troops to launch mop-up operations on a large scale to fight back our main-force units so as to take their initiative on the battlefields.

To defeat the political and military objectives of the U.S. imperialists' war, we must foil the enemy military strategy and smash his two military forces. We must fight the Americans, destroy much of their strength, break up the puppet core force, and make U.S. troops unable to protect the puppet army and administration, that is, the puppet army will be unable to carry out its political and military direct duties, and itself will be defeated. To destroy U.S. troops has become a realistic and necessary matter for the southern liberation army to take initiative on the entire battlefield. But the most important thing is that we must continue to basically annihilate the puppet army, regarding this as an important factor to collapse the puppet administration, to defeat the political and military objectives of the U.S. imperialists and at the same time to frustrate their scheme for aggression along the pattern of neo-colonialism.
Without thoroughly understanding the neo-colonialist character of the war, we would give light consideration to the important strategic duty, that is, to disintegrate the puppet army. With regard to the four-point stand of our government, the Johnson clique said they would take into consideration the withdrawal of U.S. troops. These are merely empty words, because they continue to intensify U.S. forces in South Vietnam, and thereby, they have not yet given up their scheme for aggression. They have stubbornly refused to recognize point three of our government's stand and this means that the U.S. imperialists are still persistent in maintaining their neo-colonialism by continuing to strengthen a powerful puppet army. That is why we must not only annihilate the strength of U.S. troops to force the U.S. imperialists to withdraw their troops from the south, but disintegrate the puppet army basically. Only by doing so can we force the U.S. imperialists to accept our terms. Furthermore, if we give light consideration to the strategic duty of disintegrating the puppet army and administration, we would not firmly grasp the motto of armed struggle combined with political struggle in the south at present, we would not thoroughly understand the worker-peasant-soldier alliance slogan, we would not be determined to urge the puppet soldiers together with workers and peasants to rise up to overthrow the puppet administration, and we would not inflict a basic failure upon the U.S. imperialists on the entire South Vietnamese battlefield to ensure the realization of such objectives as true peace, neutrality, independence, and democracy in the south.

III. Can we defeat the U.S. imperialists militarily?

Since the U.S. imperialists sent U.S. and satellite troops to South Vietnam, the southern liberation army has triumphed over U.S. troops in a number of battles. Although these are the first battles, they constitute a great importance. We have been able to base ourselves on these realities to analyze every aspect of the situation, and thereby we have come to a final conclusion that the southern armed forces and people are fully capable of fighting U.S. expeditionary troops and puppet troops in the war of aggression waged by the U.S. imperialists. This awareness is of great importance and of great realistic value toward the anti-U.S. and national salvation struggle of our people, and at the same time, is of great historic significance toward our nation, our socialist camp, and the world revolutionary movement.

The U.S. imperialists have introduced into South Vietnam a force of U.S. troops tantamount to the U.S. force that they had used in the first stage of the aggressive war in Korea, but U.S. troops now participate directly in the war in the southern part of our country under circumstances and conditions quite different from those in Korea formerly.
1. We find that the U.S. imperialists dispatch U.S. troops to the south at a time when they have failed in their special war strategy, at a time when the puppet army and administration are being threatened to disintegrate and collapse completely, while the southern revolution is on the offensive in both political and military fields.

Indeed, after a period of fierce struggle with the U.S. imperialists' fascist puppet administration, the southern revolutionaries from 1959 to 1960 have stood up to mount attacks on the enemy, have carried out uprisings part by part, have seized power for the people in the large rural areas, and have launched the guerrilla war on a widespread scale. From then to the end of 1963, the revolution has taken place fiercely in the two forms of struggle: political struggle combined with military struggle at the same time, and the overthrow of the Diem-Binh Cruel and dictatorial administration has proven that the U.S. imperialists have suffered an ignominious political and military failure.

From 1964 to now, especially after Binh Gia victory, the U.S. imperialists' military failure in the special war strategy has become all the more evident.

2. The U.S. imperialists introduce their troops into South Vietnam at a time when the force of the southern revolution has grown up in all aspects. Despite the fact that the southern armed forces and a number of cadres have regrouped in the north, the southern people are in the victorious position because they have taken part in the general uprising of the August revolution and in the nine-year-old resistance war against the French, have made contributions to the common victory of the entire country, and have been masters of a great part of land and rice fields. That victorious position has created a great moral and political strength for the southern people. When the enemy has resorted to his military force and fascist power to repress and fight back the revolution, the revolutionary forces have had to withdraw temporarily. Although the revolutionary forces have suffered heavy losses, the southern people when shifting to the offensive position have stood up to carry out the uprising with a force much more powerful than that of the 1945 general uprising. The enemy cannot understand such a strength.

Today, that moral and political strength has turned into a material and military strength. The southern people have had their own party and army, and the front has been serving as a true people's power. Militarily speaking in particular, that strength is not only embodied in quantity, but also in quality, that is, in technical, tactical, combat, leadership, and organizational levels, and in the organic relationship between three types of troops as well as in the close cooperation between them and the people.
3. The U.S. imperialists introduce their troops into South Vietnam at a time when our armed forces comprising three types of troops have developed all over the south from the 17th parallel to Ca Mau point, have set their steadfast foothold in the mountains, in the forests, in the rural areas and in the Delta, and even around and in the towns and cities. The southern main force units have mastered the important strategic areas and have firmly maintained their initiative and mobile position on the entire battlefield. This is the reason why with nearly 200,000 U.S. troops the U.S. imperialists still cannot save themselves from the strategic passive position on the southern battlefield. Recently, the U.S. aggressors have tried to concentrate their military strength to counterattack the liberation army, but they still have failed to attain the initiative position; on the contrary, they still are on the defensive in coping with successive and ever stronger attacks by the southern people's armed forces. In the future, no matter more than 300,000 or 400,000 U.S. troops, whatever amount of troops, they will be unable to turn the tide of strategy in their favor on the southern battlefield. A number of Americans have had to confess that the U.S. imperialists' introduction of U.S. army divisions into the south to fight with the southern guerrillas is just like stabbing the water because when the sword has been pulled out of the water, the water remains unchanged.

In war, if one can master vital strategic areas and deploy one's forces on the entire battlefield, he is already half-successful, because military strength depends not merely upon the number of soldiers but, most important of all, upon whether or not the armed forces can stand firm and take initiative on the battlefield. One can set foothold on the area adjacent to Saigon, or one can maintain its mobility on a strategic ground of the western highlands. All this means that those forces can stand firm on the important strongholds which they have secured, relying on political strength, manpower, and resources of the locality to fight the enemy at any time, and can fight forever with enemy troops who outnumber them five or ten times, thereby putting the enemy on the constant defensive.

That is why no sooner had U.S. troops landed in the south than they were encircled, separated and dispersed. On the one hand, they must use an important part of their forces to protect their bases. On the other hand, they must disperse their forces to cope with the guerrilla war network all over the southern battlefield. Consequently, they have failed to concentrate all of their forces into a mobile force to attack the southern liberation force units, or to fight back when attacked by the southern liberation main force units.
The enemy strength depends, in the main, upon his air strikes and upon the high mobility of his tanks, helicopters and all other sorts of aircraft. We should not underestimate the mobility ability of U.S. troops as well as the superiority of their weapons, but should clearly realize that U.S. troops are not only strategically, but also technically and tactically deadlocked, because they are forced to fight the tactics necessary of our people's war and because under the present circumstances, the southern people's armed forces have taken the initiative in their strategy. Accordingly, U.S. troops must passively cope with our attack and cannot fight in their own way. Furthermore, the unjust character of the war waged by the U.S. imperialists makes them lose all of their political basis and the morale of their soldiers, which has been weak, become all the more weak. Another important thing is that since the modern U.S. expeditionary troops carry out the war far from their rear area, the logistical problem is a life-and-death problem, and therefore the more the U.S. aggressors expand the war, the more they meet with difficulty.

As for the southern liberation army, each category of troops has created its own ways of fighting suitable for the battlefields of all terrains; in towns and cities, in and around enemy bases, on the mountains, in the forests, and in the Delta, and has recapitulated precious experiences of great value in the technical and tactical fields and in tactical leadership.

If in the war for the defense of the Fatherland of the Soviet Union, the battle of Stalingrad was a turning point proving that Hitler's fascist troops could not win, we can regard the battle of Van Tuong as a turning point testifying to an eloquent proof that the southern liberation army is fully capable of defeating U.S. troops under any circumstances, even though they have absolute superiority of their fire power compared with that of the liberation army. Indeed, the battle of Van Tuong in August 1965 for U.S. troops is just like the battle of Ap-Bac by the end of 1963 (?) for the puppet army. U.S. troops took initiative in choosing Van Tuong, a coastal battleground in their favor. They mobilized 8,000 troops with the coordination and support of Air and Navy units in an attempt to destroy one force of the southern liberation army 7 or 8 times smaller than their force. But just as in Ap-Bac, the helicopter-supported tactics and armoured car-supported tactics of the U.S. imperialists were defeated and more than 900 Americans were buried together with the bulk of iron and steel which the U.S. military used to brag about. It is clear that the Van Tuong battle was followed by successive glorious victories recorded by the southern liberation army, for instance: in Bau-Bang, the southern liberation army has applied the guerrilla
tactics to destroy more than two battalions of U.S. troops within a few hours; in Plei Me, the liberation army could fight for months, destroyed and put out of action three battalions of the U.S. First Air Cavalry Division and five or six battalions of puppet troops, etc.

During the past ten months of fighting, since the U.S. expeditionary troops participated directly in the aggressive war against the southern part of our country, the southern people's armed forces have annihilated more than one-tenth of their strength, and one-sixth of their total battalions. The southern liberation army is now taking the initiative on the entire battlefield. It has defeated U.S. troops in several battles in the jungles as well as in the Delta, has foiled a large number of U.S. troops' mop-up operations or joint operations carried out by U.S. troops and puppet troops. Ahead, although the war will take place more violently, the southern liberation army will certainly win greater and more basic victories, will certainly destroy a large proportion of the strength of U.S. troops and puppet troops, will certainly defeat the U.S. aggressors in the military field, and smash their will for aggression.

How will the war take place in a new future?

It is clear that at present with 200,000 U.S. expeditionary troops and half a million puppet troops, the U.S. imperialists have been, and are now being, defeated. In the immediate future, the enemy will increase his troops, in the main, U.S. troops and the troops of a number of satellite countries, such as: South Korea, Formosa, the Philippines, etc. Regarding the puppet army, it will increase its numbers, but not fast enough to replace puppet troops both destroyed and disintegrated.

If increased, U.S. troops may establish a number of bases in the coastal areas, in the Western Highlands, and in the jungles north and northeast of Saigon, adjacent to the Cambodian border, and together with the puppet army gradually occupy the rural areas to carry out pacification tasks and wrest back the lost areas, but enemy strategic intentions are nothing but the following points:

1. The enemy will concentrate his strength to cope with the southern liberation army, primarily, the main force units in vital strategic areas in an attempt to destroy the core force of the liberation army.

2. The enemy will step up the pacification of the rural areas, first of all, the most important strategic areas, and associate mop-up operations
with air attacks on liberated areas with a view to carrying out the "open area" (Chieu Hoi) program, to muster the population, strengthen, and rebuild strategic hamlets so as to restrain the people.

3. The enemy will pay special attention to mounting attacks on the supply corridors in an attempt to isolate the south from the north.

4. The enemy will exert all-out efforts to strengthen the puppet army, and at the same time, to stabilize and protect the puppet central government.

Before the first years of the war, the U.S. imperialists and their henchmen had carried out these tasks, but they failed, though at that time they had half a million troops, while the southern guerrilla force was composed of a few groups only and armed with two or three thousand rifles. Therefore, with the balance of forces at present, how can the enemy realize such strategic intentions?

In the situation ahead, the war may possibly be restricted on the southern battlefield as a major battlefield. The enemy will launch more violent attacks and fight on a larger scale, will use artillery and air force to a higher degree, spray toxic chemicals and poison gas on a larger area in order to strike liberated areas including the areas adjacent to towns and cities. Although they may resort to such barbarous means of war, the U.S. imperialists will be unable to turn the tide of the offensive position which has been in the hands of the southern people's armed forces. Furthermore, they will be resisted more violently by our people, be condemned by the world's people including the American people, thereby becoming all the more isolated, and their soldiers will, therefore, be increasingly demoralized.

The U.S. imperialists may increase their troops either step by step or as quickly as possible from 200,000 to 300,000 or 400,000. But they will fail to achieve their objectives, if they hope to use manpower to defeat us. At length, in war, whoever has the resources will win. Our people's war itself has inexhaustible resources. Furthermore, our entire country is fighting the U.S. imperialists.

South Vietnam's resources in manpower and materials is in the north. Even if the U.S. and its satellites boost their troops to 300,000 or 400,000 the balance of power does not change in the least in their favor, and the U.S. imperialists are not capable of taking the initiative on the battlefield. If they are bold enough to widen the war to a larger scale and to convert the present war into an ideological conflict, our resources can never be exhausted considering that we have on our side the socialist bloc, the full potentiality of the Chinese people, and our own direct resources.
In broadening the war in South Vietnam, the U.S. imperialists may use their troops to invade central and lower Laos in a move to cut off the supply lines from the north to the south -- the enemy's entertaining this attempt -- and the attack on central and lower Laos would not bring them any strategic advantage. The occupation of the Western Highlands is a tough job but the attack on central and lower Laos is a still tougher one. If a small force is used, the problem remains insoluble. The U.S. may face a series of difficulties in the military, political and logistic fields if a larger force goes into operation. In effect, an attack on central and lower Laos would mean the opening of another front nearer to North Vietnam, and then the U.S. troops would have to clash with the North Vietnamese main force. In the meantime, they could not escape the unavoidable defeat in South Vietnam. Politically, the problem is even more complicated. The U.S. will be severely condemned by the people all over the world and the anti-U.S. movement will turn out to be stronger.

Even Thailand dares not adventure itself to become entangled in a conflict which can be extended to the Thai territory. Phnom Penh has recently raised a strong protest against the war for fear that Laos' soil would become the scene of an atrocious war bearing many consequences. But the U.S. imperialists are an international gendarme. Their war potential is still great and they will not allow themselves to be defeated easily. Therefore, we must be constantly ready to face any eventuality, particularly in the provinces of the former IV inter-zone. If the U.S. troops invade central and lower Laos, North Vietnam, particularly those provinces in the IV Zone, has to cope directly with the enemy in the west, and, at the same time to be ready to face the enemy from the sea direction.

We must also be ready to face a U.S. infantry attack on the north -- although there is very little probability that the enemy will do so. In case the U.S. imperialists would frenziedly launch a ground attack on North Vietnamese territory, the U.S. imperialists and their lackeys would certainly suffer heavier losses than they are suffering in South Vietnam. At present, we are holding that the best way to safeguard North Vietnam is to provide a strong backing to South Vietnam. That means North Vietnam must be in close cooperation with South Vietnam to fight and defeat the U.S. imperialists on the southern battlefield. This also means that while we are making the utmost efforts to fight the enemy under any circumstances, we are also resolute in restricting the U.S. imperialists' activities, and we have every possibility of doing so, and to defeat them militarily on the South Vietnamese battlefield is our main task. This strategic direction must be the guideline to determine our policy in the military, political and diplomatic fields. We are fully determined to safeguard the north and convince the socialist bloc to side with us for the protection of the north. We must be resolute to inflict crushing defeats on the U.S. imperialists in the south and persuade the socialist
bloc to be also resolve like us to foil the U.S. aggression in the south. At present, the problem of Vietnam in general and the struggle against U.S. aggression in the south in particular are not only the concern of our people but also that of the socialist bloc and the entire world. In the present struggle against the U.S. imperialists for national salvation, we must primarily rely on our own strength, and at the same time, we must also rely on the assistance of the socialist bloc. The defeat of the U.S. imperialists in the south by us constitutes then the fulfillment of the task of liberating the country from foreigners, protecting the north and, at the same time, contributing to thwarting the dark schemes of the U.S. imperialists aimed at preventing the growth of the socialist bloc and the world revolution.

IV. How to fight and defeat the U.S. imperialists?

1. On the principle of waging a long-range struggle, tremendous efforts are to be made to obtain decisive victory within a relatively short period of time.

Previously our strategy in South Vietnam had been to wage a protracted war, primarily by our own means. Such a strategy was based on the following facts:

1. We are fighting against an enemy far more superior in strength.

2. We have the capability of developing the size and nature of the war through our fighting with the U.S. imperialists, a strong and bellicose enemy.

3. From the start when the basic tasks of the National Democratic Revolution in South Vietnam will be completely fulfilled and national reunification achieved, and in the light of the above comparison between the conflicting forces, we have to wage a lengthy war and pass through specific transitional phases.

The strategy of a protracted war is the guideline for the "limited" war in South Vietnam and even for the war which may widen all over the country. In the previous war of resistance against the French colonialists, and in the present war against the U.S. imperialists, we adopt the strategy of a long-range war. Basically, such a strategy consists in opposing the strong enemy with a small force. Therefore, it is necessary to gradually build up the strength, from the bottom up. Since the outbreak of war in South Vietnam, much time has been spent in the strengthening of our forces, but the situation in South Vietnam is not the same as that of the entire country during the war of resistance against the French colonialists in the past.
1. The south had fought a war of resistance along with a drawn-out political struggle.

2. Backed by the north, the revolution in South Vietnam scored much progress. As a result, the revolution did not cease to come to maturity in all fields of activities.

As in the past, we are firmly adhering to the principles of a protracted war, at present and in the future.

On the basis of the above developments, and in view of the acute crisis in the special war being waged by the U.S. imperialists, the principles of a protracted war had been heavily stressed by the 9th conference of the Party Central Committee. We had set forth the principles of racing against time in an effort to achieve the ultimate victory in a relatively short period of time. We had clearly emphasized that these two concepts are not in the least contradictory with each other considering that fighting a protracted war and gaining victory within a relatively short period of time conduce to developing rapidly the real strength of the South Vietnamese revolution in every respect, particularly the military force in order to tip the balance of power in our favor.

In the past, some comrades had mistakenly believed that, once the revolution was started, it would develop itself. They failed to realize that the movement should be promoted and then could make great strides. For this reason, efforts were not appropriately made to give strong impetus to the movement so that the war situation could be rapidly changed. The South Vietnam situation clearly demonstrated more than a year ago that this strategic leadership by the Party Central Committee had pushed forward the revolutionary war in South Vietnam and shown effectiveness through resounding victories over the enemy. Within only a year, the army and people of South Vietnam had overfulfilled the norm for destruction of strategic hamlets and substantially widened the liberated areas. They also took the lead in changing thoroughly the military situation in T-5 and thus tipping the balance of power in favor of the revolution.

Now, strategically, we are asserting the principles of a protracted war; ideologically, we must be fully aware of the necessity of fighting a protracted war. When speaking of protracted war, this does not mean war in the immediate phase is only at its beginning. The problem of strategic leadership must be correctly posed according to each phase of the war. At present, we are on the offensive and not on the defensive. For this reason, in the field of strategic leadership, let us make the utmost efforts to gain the victory within a relatively short period of time. Such strategic leadership is not in itself hazardous because we do not
start our resistance from now on nor is the South Vietnamese revolution in its early stage of a sporadic guerrilla warfare, but the South Vietnamese liberation army has actually taken the initiative and its military power is much different than before. During the resistance in the past, many rightist-oriented comrades dared not think of a protracted war. In the immediate period of the war of anti-aggression, we would make a mistake if we dare not fight a protracted war for fear of the huge potentiality of the U.S. imperialists to the extent of ignoring our capability of winning over the enemy within a relatively short period of time. Being self-confident, we are resolute to overcome our shortcomings and we do not miss the opportunity of obtaining final success.

The above is our strategy as long as the war is restricted to the south and we have the capability of limiting it and defeating the U.S. imperialists on the South Vietnam battlefield. The situation may be changed if the war extends to the north, and thus, the theory of a victory within a relatively short period of time is no longer valid.

2. To understand more thoroughly the principles of combating the enemy both militarily and politically.

For us, the problem to be solved is to defeat the enemy both militarily and politically. At present, victory on the battlefield is a decisive factor for solution of the overall war. For this reason, we must urge the whole army and people to be more determined in the conduct of the war, to develop the creativeness of the people's war, to relentlessly attack and counter-attack, to annihilate as many U.S. and puppet troops as possible, particularly to restrict the activities of the enemy main forces, to check all enemy attacks and mopping operations and to frustrate all enemy schemes.

To this end, we must be fully determined to maintain the initiative all over South Vietnam. According to the characteristics of each battlefield, tasks are to be properly mapped out and activities of the entire battlefield are to be closely coordinated to firmly launch attacks on the U.S. and puppet troops.

We must step up the building up of the armed forces including three types of forces and not underestimate any one of them. Let us try to quickly develop the specialized branches and properly deploy the three forces on each battlefield and strategic center, to closely coordinate the activities of these forces and to use combat tactics in a flexible manner. Let us develop the strong points of the people's war and capitalize on the enemy's weaknesses.
We must strive to strengthen and extend our control over the jungles and lowland areas, to keep a tight hold of the ground to fight the enemy. Let us develop guerrilla warfare everywhere, and, at the same time, direct our attack against specific targets along with the political struggle, by combining the three-pronged attacks to annihilate the enemy in a move to broaden the liberated areas, thus narrowing the enemy-controlled regions.

At the present juncture, the military action is of major importance and has immediate conclusive effects. But the military action yields the greatest results only when it is closely combined with the political struggle. Some people have erroneously believed that the military action is no longer 'compatible' with the political struggle when there is a massive influx of U.S. troops into South Vietnam, that the political struggle cannot be promoted and then has no more effect. While pushing ahead the military action, we must clearly realize the necessity and possibility of pushing ahead the political struggle to a higher level.

The introduction of U.S. and satellite troops into South Vietnam boosts rather than lowers the possibility of rallying various political forces and push forward the political struggle of the South Vietnamese people. At the same time such an influx of troops will intensify the enemy's isolation and cause a heavier setback in politics, as far as the puppet government and army are concerned, in particular.

The more U.S. troops that are introduced into South Vietnam, the more military bases are set up throughout the country, the more they use barbarous means to kill our people, the sharper the differences between the U.S. imperialists and their lackeys on the one hand and various segments of the South Vietnamese population, on the other hand, will be. The people will be seething with hatred, the internal situation of the puppet leadership will become more divisive, the nationalist spirit of the majority of the puppet troops and public servants will be considerably awakened. Against this background, the situation will favor the possibility of widening the movement for political struggle, rallying on a broad basis fresh forces into the Resistance Front, thus contributing to the isolation of the U.S. imperialists and their lackeys and to the rapid disbandment of the puppet army and government.

The increasing massive influx of the U.S. troops spreading over various cities is contributing to the disruption of the economy and finances of South Vietnam. As a result, the cost of living is skyrocketing and the urban dwellers' life turns out to be more and more unbearable because of repeated terrorism, looting, and forced drafting into the puppet armed forces. More and more the true color of the Thieu-Ky clique as country-sellers and the puppet government's incompetency and rottenness are
revealing themselves out in broad daylight. In the meantime, the guerrilla warfare and military activities around and inside the cities are developing and raging everywhere. All this leads itself to the furtherance of the struggle movement of the urban population. There have been a series of popular uprisings in various immense rural areas, and at the same time, there have been acts of violence in Saigon, Hue, Danang and sporadic revolts within the ranks of the puppet army. Greater victories are looming high in the foreseeable future; both the U.S. and puppet troops will suffer more heavy losses. Then the sporadic uprisings in the countryside, like a chain reaction, will spark other sporadic uprisings in the villages, provinces and cities. Particularly within the ranks of the puppet troops, the anti-war movement is expected to become widespread and there is great possibility that major enemy units will rise up and side with the people to deal smashing blows at the U.S. aggressors for national salvation. Of course, to obtain the expected results, we have to further develop the army-people's movement for political struggle in the countryside and cities as well and further intensify the puppet troop proselytizing. We have to thoroughly understand the new strategy on the enemy proselytizing which consists in isolating the enemy and directing the spearhead against the U.S. aggressors, their lackeys and devilish soldiers and neutralizing the wavering elements and rallying to our cause those servicemen who have sympathy for the revolution. We must know how to use the three-pronged tactics to stir up the revolutionary movement not only among the population but also among the misguided elements within the puppet troop ranks to side with the population to save themselves and their country.

3. War and negotiation.

In the world there are many cases of how to defeat the aggressive war of the Imperialists. The USSR defeated the Nazis by forcing them on their knees into unconditional surrender. In the past, we defeated the French colonialists by destroying their potential and thus foiling their military and aggressive schemes, and this case has been particularly illustrated by the resounding victory of Dien-Bien-Phu. There is another case such as that of Algeria. Although the Algerian revolutionary army did not score any victory of decisive character, the revolutionaries, however, succeeded in frustrating the military and political plan of the French colonialists, thus forcing them into abandoning their plan of aggression.
The victory of the Laotian revolution in the Nam THE battle which resulted in the 1962 Geneva Conference was also another case of success in attaining the balance of power between the Pathet Lao and the U.S. imperialists and their henchmen.

When speaking of defeating the U.S. imperialists, we do not mean we have to defeat their entire "genocidal policy" all over the world nor do we have to defeat their military and political potential throughout the world, but actually we have to defeat them within the framework of a war of aggression in South Vietnam. When speaking of defeating the U.S. imperialists, we mean we are advocating the policy of destroying as much of their potential as possible, checking their military purpose, crushing their aggressive scheme, thus preventing them from enraging and protracting the war of aggression, and forcing them into submission on specific conditions and finally getting them out of South Vietnam. We are setting forth some tasks of decisive character for the immediate phase in answer to the following requirements:

a. Let’s destroy as much enemy potential as possible, smash the imperialists’ military and political plans and check their strategy of wiping out the main force of the liberation army, winning back the control of the population, strengthening the puppet army and government and isolating the south from the north.

b. Let’s stop the enemy troops from their bases so that they can no longer be the support for the central communist government and are no longer able to restore the lackeys’ power in the south.

c. If we can comply with the above requirements, we will defeat the U.S. imperialists’ new type of war of aggression and the more troops the Americans dispatch to South Vietnam to broaden the war the greater will be their defeat.

Between two defeats -- the light and the heavy ones -- the U.S. imperialists have to choose the light one; there is no other alternative. The warmongers in the White House and Pentagon have had the same reasoning when they were defeated in China, Korea and Cuba. Since the time they invaded South Vietnam, the U.S. imperialists said they would stay in South Vietnam for a long time. But, after being repeatedly defeated in several battles by the liberation army, they changed their tune by saying that they would respect the 1954 Geneva Agreement. This is obvious evidence that U.S. aggressive schemes remain unchanged and unchecked. But the basic problem is to defeat the imperialists on the battlefield, to foil their political and military plan, to destroy as much of their potential as possible, and undermine the puppet army. Only when we comply with the above requirements can we break up their plan of aggression.
As far as the general strategy is concerned, we are advocating that the revolution in South Vietnam has to pass through several transitional phases prior to advancing toward national reunification and socialism. With regard to struggle, we stand for joint political and armed struggle, that is to say, the armed struggle must be simultaneously conducted with the political one. Heavy emphasis is to be placed on the political struggle which includes the diplomatic struggle, which is of prime importance.

As a consequence, the strategy on war and negotiation must be properly used to efficiently serve the political and military aims of our strategy on fighting the weak and the strong.

The problem of war and negotiation is not quite new in the history of our country. Nguyen Trai had once used such a strategy to defeat the feudalist elements of King's dynasty. Our comrades in China had also adopted the "fight-and-negotiation" policy in their struggle against U.S. and Chiang (Kai Shek). The same strategy had been used in the Korean war.

However, this problem is very complicated considering that, at present, when speaking of negotiations, the views are quite divergent. The U.S. views hold that negotiation is to be conducted from a strong position. Some countries which sincerely support our struggle but, in view of diplomatic reasons and their domestic administration and misunderstanding of what the situation in our country want to see us at the conference table in order to forestall aimless sacrifice on our part. There are those who hold the view that the political struggle is of major importance, but such a viewpoint is different from ours as to degree and time to use this strategy.

At present, the U.S. imperialists, on the one hand, are attempting to widen the war in a move to save them from the sad predicament and quagmire but, on the other hand, are trying to force us to the negotiation table for some concessions. As for us, we must constantly take the initiative, our strategy on negotiation must serve in a practical manner our concrete political aims. For this reason, the Party Central Committee has unanimously entrusted the Politburo with the task of carrying out the above strategy in conformity with the policy of our Party and on the basis of the situation between us and the enemy whenever necessary.

Dear comrades,

Our present struggle against the U.S. imperialists for national salvation is a very great undertaking and, at the same time, a very arduous task because the U.S. aggressors are quite cruel and cunning. But we are more vigilant and clear sighted than ever, and believe that our people
will undoubtedly defeat the U.S. aggressors because our people are heroic and the people’s war conducted by our Party is unchallengeable. In addition, we are unanimously backed by the whole world. As to the U.S. imperialists, though they are wealthy and aggressive, their strategy and tactics are inefficient, their organization is disarranged, their morale is low and they are quite isolated in the political field.

Our country has never been reunified since the outbreak of the brotherly conflict between the north and south. It is now or ever the time to achieve reunification and bring the people’s democratic revolution to success. In the past, our ancestors had inflicted a crushing defeat on the Mongols, the most powerful and warlike aggressors in the world’s history. Nowadays, we are fighting and are determined to defeat the U.S., the number one ringleaders of the imperialists. The victory over them will be the most brilliant achievement scored by our people and by Marxism and Leninism on our soil in the present times. This war must be won by all means, at any price for the survival of our fatherland, the proletarian class, and the revolutionary movement all over the world.

The resolution issued by the 12th Conference of our Party Central Committee is a document of historic value. It is the symbol of our nationalism through thousands of years in the past and, at the same time, the crystallization of our people’s unswervingness, intelligence and creativeness at this juncture and it will be the most glorious page in history for the generations to come.

Le Duan

-We will certainly liberate South Vietnam.
-We will certainly reunify the fatherland.

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