Item 303

Talk of General Vinh

A talk by General Nguyen Van Vinh, Chief of Staff of the North Vietnamese High Command and Chairman of the Lao Dong's Reunification Department, made before the Viet Cong Fourth Central Office (COSVN) Congress in April 1966. It was captured by U.S. Forces in Ninh Thuan Province in early 1967.
Comrade Vinh's Talk

I. Presentation of the spirit of resolutions.

II. Some additional ideas.


IV. Support of the socialist camp.

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I. Presentation of the spirit of resolutions.

1) Introduction of the contents of resolutions.
2) Necessary conditions to be held fast.
3) Some ideas on the nature and characteristics of the war.
4) Strategic missions and guidelines.

A. Introduction of the contents of resolutions.

- Resolution #9 assessed the balance of forces between us and the enemy and set forth plans and guidelines to win the special war.

- Resolution #11 assessed the situation of the special war developed to a high degree and having the factors of a limited war.

- Resolution #12 noted the characteristics and nature of the special war developed into a limited war which still have the character of the special war. Determination of the party to win the limited war.

B. Necessary conditions to be held fast.

There are two points to be held fast:

a) Dialectics on ideological methods.
b) Steadfast determination and spirit of thorough revolution.
a) Dialectics on ideological methods:

It is necessary to pay attention to the difference between the natural world and the development of human society.

The rules concerning the development of the natural world can be asserted. For example, at 99.5 degrees water does not boil. It will boil at a fixed temperature. At zero degrees it will freeze and become ice.

As for the development of human society, there may be this possibility or the other. For example, we assert that when 200,000, 300,000 or 400,000 Americans have been annihilated, the enemy will be defeated. Yet, sometimes when a small number of the enemy has been annihilated, he is defeated; sometimes when a large number of the enemy has been annihilated, he is not yet defeated. The former resolution (11th) stated that victory would be won in a relatively short period of time, from several to four years. It was a flexible statement. The latter resolution (12th) also stated that decisive victory would be won in a relatively short period of time (a few years). This must also be understood as a flexible statement, since it is impossible to ascertain one or two years. However, the time must not be spoken of as unlimited, and in speaking of a protracted struggle one may not say it is protracted, unlimited. As far as thinking methods are concerned, if one thinks mechanically and inflexibly he will be unjustifiably optimistic, or become pessimistic when he has not yet seen victory. How long a time depends on subjective and objective factors, and on the evolution of these factors.

b) It is necessary to have a steadfast determination and a spirit of thorough revolution.

Speaking of war is speaking of the worst difficulties and hardships in life. To win the war is a very difficult undertaking which requires boundless energy. When we speak of achieving success within a relatively short period of time, it means that we assert our determination, and when we saw so, the difficulties have been taken into consideration. When we say that even if the Americans introduce such and such number of troops we still can defeat them, it means that we assert our determination to overcome all difficulties in order to achieve success. When we speak of winning the war, even though the Americans increase the number of their troops, and achieve decisive success within a relatively short period of time, it means that we are determined to overcome countless difficulties before success is achieved. Such a statement is not theoretical, but is 50 percent practical. It is on the basis of this statement that we strengthen our determination to defeat the U.S. aggressors. Therefore, it is necessary to have the spirit of thorough revolution and a very high determination.
With regard to the general offensive (TCK) and general uprising (TKN), it was requested that a concrete plan, including the quantity of weapons needed, the number of armed forces needed, etc., be made known in order to carry out the undertaking confidently. For secrecy's sake, it is not yet necessary to reveal information on these matters.

Therefore, we must firmly grasp the above two matters and express unanimous agreement with the TW (possibly the Lao Dong Party Central Committee), and, in the process of struggle, try to understand them better and supplement the resolution.

Execution of the resolution is a major requirement. Yet, the greater requirement is to execute the resolution creatively in the days ahead. In the course of the war, it is possible that some locality, district, or province may be levelled and may sustain serious losses.

3. Some matters concerning the characteristics and nature of the war.

There has been much discussion on the nature of the war—special, limited, colonialist, and neocolonialist. The matters which we discuss here have also been discussed in the North.

Speaking of the special war, limited war, colonialist, or neocolonialist war is trying to find answers to the following questions: Do the political and military war and the three-pronged offensive still exist? Do TCK and general uprising (TKN) still exist?

In general and unified terms, to speak of a just war and an unjust war. When a war develops, it is called variously an aggressive war, a national liberation war, a war among the imperialists, or a war between the two camps.

Formerly, we spoke only of limited war and world war. The scope of the war was then understood likewise. When we spoke of limited war, we took into account its scope. And when the U.S. imperialists began to change their war strategy (the "flexible reaction strategy"), they defined war as follows: world war, limited war, and the war whose scope is inferior to that of the limited war (special war). When they spoke of special war, we did not just follow him. In fact, the enemy actually changed his strategy.

The TW resolution said: in the Americans' view, the conduct of the special war relies mainly on the puppet army and administration. With the characteristics of the present situation, the war that is most
appropriate for a neocolonial policy in a country where there exists a national liberation movement is the special war. The special war is just a type of limited war, but its scope is inferior to that of the limited war. And since the special war takes place in South Vietnam, it bears the character of a conflict between the two camps, gradually becomes a limited war, and will develop to a higher intensity and larger scope. It is now obvious that the war has become a limited war, since the enemy has increased the number of his troops to more than 200,000.

At this point, how must the "special" concept be understood? Special war must be understood in the sense that it is a "separate" type of war, not in the sense ascribed by the Americans. Previously, there was an erroneous analysis: if the imperialists increase the number of their troops to 200,000, the war will become an old-type aggressive war. (In calling a war special the Americans take into consideration its scale—large or small—while we understand "special" or "separate" as the nature of the war). To speak of (words unintelligible) is to speak of the purpose of the war: it has a neocolonialist nature. Even if the number of enemy troops is increased to 300,000, 500,000 or 600,000, the purpose of the war remains to impose neocolonialism.

The fact that the imperialists firmly maintain neocolonialism is due to the following reasons:

- Old-type colonialism has been opposed and cursed by the peoples in the world and the oppressed peoples, and therefore, has no conditions for survival; and colonial systems have continuously disintegrated everywhere. The U.S. imperialists realized that if they did not resort to new-type colonialism they would not be able to maintain colonialism.

- Science and techniques have developed. Various countries which had won independence but which were under the bourgeoisie's control also needed aid to maintain their regimes. Therefore, the Americans have taken advantage of this situation to penetrate into these countries and gain net profits.

- The U.S. imperialists are wealthy imperialists. They have engaged in large-scale business, retail business. They possess ample capital, and could use money and merchandise to influence, dominate, and exploit many other countries using neocolonialist methods, and, thereby gain greater net profits. While no imperialist whatsoever could wage aggression through old colonialism, the imperialists could still deceive a number of people by waging aggression through neocolonialism.

Although the present limited war in the South still has its "separate" nature and still lies within the category of implementation of a neocolonialist policy, it still relies upon the puppet army and administration.
Formerly, during the French domination period, we had to defeat the French expeditionary troops, and only by basically defeating these troops could the French be defeated, whereas at present we must crush mainly the puppet army. As far as the American troops are concerned, we do not fight them in the same way as we did against the French.

To defeat the enemy in the South is to basically defeat the puppet army and to defeat part of the American troops, and, thereby, smash the Americans' aggressive will. If we fail to see the role of the puppet army and administration, we will fail to use our own forces to a certain extent to basically smash the puppet forces, and, thereby deprive the Americans of their military and political base. Likewise, without defeating an important part of the American forces we cannot crush their aggressive will. In reality, today the relations between fighting the Americans and fighting the puppets have become increasingly clearer. In the old colonialist period, only by defeating the aggressive army would the imperialists consent to being defeated. With neocolonialism, after defeating a greater bulk of the puppet army and an important part of American troops, we can push the Americans out of South Vietnam by coordinating the political struggle with diplomacy.

With regard to strategy, the situation in which the puppet troops have not yet been completely annihilated does also provide a condition for the Americans to withdraw. This is true with regard to the question of sovereignty: if we completely eliminate the puppet administration, there are no conditions for the Americans to withdraw. If we speak only of a local war, there may be errors in strategy and possibly in leadership over the strategy. Our advance must pass through many transitory steps.

Evaluation and comparison of the enemy forces and our forces:

So far, our evaluation has been correct. But at certain moments, certain people underestimated the U.S. imperialists and overestimated the heroism of the Southern people. Evaluation of the Americans is very difficult. Some people believe that it is difficult to defeat the U.S. imperialists, because it is often said that the U.S. imperialists are the most powerful imperialists: their manpower is great, their forces are large, and they have atomic weapons. In expressing this view, these people create the impression that the imperialists are strong. This is also a reality. The people who believe in this view are not few.

For years, there has been a constant discussion of this problem in our camp. Without the war in Vietnam, how can this problem be solved? How can one explain our victories over the U.S. imperialists who have a gross national product of 650 billion dollars against our gross national product of 1 billion, who have a population of 200 million against our population of 30 million, who have 3 million men in their armed forces against our armed forces of 1 million men in both zones?
Yet despite this big difference between the two sides—one side is too large and other too small—our small country dares fight the Americans and defeat them. It is difficult to make people believe that a small country such as ours can defeat the U.S. imperialists who have great economic and military potentialities. Therefore, our struggle is a great contribution to the discussion of the evaluation of and comparison between our forces and the enemy's. Usually, people easily discern the enemy's strong points and do not see his weak points. Only through defeating him can we see his weak points. For instance, intelligence services of various countries—no matter how clever they are—cannot know all the techniques of the U.S. planes. We know them because we have downed these planes and studied these aircraft, we have interrogated the captured pilots.

We know the enemy's material strength, his tactics and techniques. But there are things we cannot know even through our intelligence service or through documents which have been been supplied to us in order that we could understand and evaluate the enemy better.

It is said that U.S. planes are modern. If we do not attack them, they remain modern. However, if we attack and down them, they become outmoded. (The enemy has said that his planes have become outmoded)

Summarily appraising a small country such as ours which dares to fight against and win over the Americans is an important problem. As for estimating how many troops the enemy will introduce and at what rate, this task sometimes cannot be done thoroughly. Basically, our Party has evaluated the U.S. imperialists relatively accurately.

(At that time) our Party made such an evaluation. But later it changed its mind from time to time. Thus, it was afraid of the Americans and did not fight them. It kept on discussing and arrived at no conclusion. If it dared fight them, it would have been able to understand them better and evaluate them more correctly.

Under the present war situation, the forces of both sides have increased greatly. U.S. and satellite troops have increased quickly. Ours have increased too. Both sides have used these forces to fight each other. How the problem consists of finding the best way to compare the two forces. The fact that U.S. forces are strong is obvious to all. But against them are they fighting? They are strong, but are they capable of defeating us? To which side does the evaluation of the comparative balance of forces swing? It is obvious that the comparative balance of forces gradually swing in our favor. We may not imagine that we only have endurance. We must see that our strength is growing.
The Americans are stronger than us militarily and materially. Yet, how do they use this strength, and how are they fighting against us? We have main force units, regional troops, guerrillas, and the masses, whereas they cannot introduce into the South as large military forces as they want. As far as the material factors are concerned, we have to use a weak force to fight against a strong force. Yet, considering all factors combined, it is we, not the enemy, that are strong. Thus, a comparison of the forces of both sides shows that we are stronger than the enemy. Our victory over him is not chancy, nor is it temporary. Previously, we said we could defeat the Americans even if they had 150,000 or 200,000 troops. It was a theoretical statement. However, this statement has now become a fact which has been proved by realities.

In short, (two words unintelligible)), why are we victorious?

- We have the correct leadership of the Party.
- The Southern people and army, and the Vietnamese people and army are heroic.
- We firmly grasp the rules of the people’s war.
- We ensure self-reliance.
- We enjoy the wholehearted support of the peoples in the world, and of our camp.

If we speak only of the quantity of forces, other countries also have forces. Yet, if we go deeply into the realities, we find that the quality and combat value of our people are very great. Our fourteen million people are better than 70 million (Indonesian) people and the 700 million American people. This fact cannot be explained by the matter of quantity.

It does not suffice to say that we use a weak force to fight against a strong force. We must also understand how strong our main points are, and must explain under what conditions we are strong. Thus, we must say that our South is strong. Yet, our strength does not suffice to defeat the Americans. It is not yet to say that there can be no unlimited escalation in the North, and there can be no complete destruction in the present situation in the South.

In the Korean War, what was different from the situation in South Vietnam was that when the Americans introduced (520,000) troops (including satellite troops) into Korea, they sent them all to the frontline because their rear base was secure, whereas in South Vietnam, when the Americans introduced 100,000 or 200,000 troops, they cannot send them all to the frontline. Taylor recently said that "we should calculate
the number of troops we must introduce, and when and under what circumstances these troops must be introduced in order to defeat the enemy," and that "if we introduce our troops at a time when the adversary is strong, we cannot defeat him." Therefore, the Americans have realized that they did not introduce their troops at the right time.

The second condition is that when troops are introduced there must be a strong administration, which is nonexistent in South Vietnam. At present, the Americans still hold that because the number of Americans introduced into the South is insufficient they cannot win. Therefore, as long as they still believe that if they introduce more troops they can win, they will pursue the war. As soon as they see that no matter how many troops they introduce they are still defeated, then their aggressive will be crushed. Formerly, the French sent 250,000 troops to fight against us. After a period of time, they realized that they could not win even if they introduced more troops. In Algeria, with 700,000 French troops and 100,000 puppet troops, the French could not win the war. They realized that to win the war, the most important factor is not strength, but tactics.

Now we are fighting the Americans with the existing number of troops and weapons. In a war of position, they can defeat us. But with our present tactics, we will win, and they will be defeated. It is the same as if we force them to eat rice with chopsticks (if we eat rice with spoons and forks like them, we will be defeated; if chopsticks are used, they are no match for us).

Under these conditions, if they force us to surrender while we are not defeated, then they are defeated.

In combat, a number of localities and comrades may be hurt. But it is incorrect to base oneself on the fact that when some localities are damaged and some comrades are sacrificed, we are then defeated.

In South Korea, the enemy sent all his troops to the front. In South Vietnam, he has introduced between 300,000 to 600,000 troops who must fight on the frontline and, at the same time, protect the rear. But the latter can fulfill only one of these tasks. If they oppose our people's movement in the South, they will be unable to stop reinforcements from North Vietnam. If they concentrate their force to stop reinforcements from North Vietnam, they cannot stand firm on the front in the rear. If all their troops are sent to the front, their rear will be left unguarded. If they leave part of their troops in the rear, they will not be strong enough to fight us on the front. To fulfill both these tasks, they must have a million troops. To introduce a million troops into South Vietnam, the United States must double its mobilization rate.
If the war is expanded to North Vietnam, the balance of forces will be changed. The front will be changed too. The enemy will have to fight not only the Vietnamese people, but also the Chinese people. The enemy is still afraid of this outcome. Establishing their front in Laos is not an easy task. If the Americans attack Laos, because of the 1962 Geneva Accords they will face North Vietnam, the Soviet Union, and China which will join the war to a certain extent. They are planning to send their troops to Laos. But does this mean the opening of a new front? The Americans are capable of doing this. But they are weighing the pros and cons because if they send troops there, the form of the war will change.

The enemy has not achieved unanimity concerning the problem of expanding the war to Laos and North Vietnam; but they have achieved relative unanimity concerning the problem of introducing troops into South Vietnam.

Thus, they introduced troops at a moment when their special war had failed and they were in a state of strategic passivity. If they raise their strength to 400,000 men, this means that their 300,000 men have been defeated. But the introduction of 400,000 men into South Vietnam means that they would raise their strength to 700,000 or 800,000 men in order to be able to stop reinforcements from North Vietnam. Without doing so they will be unable to stop our growth in the South. That is why the Americans cannot thoroughly use their power in the war against us.

4. Strategic missions, guidelines, and leadership:

There are some misunderstandings concerning the strategic missions, guidelines, and leadership among the three problems.

Strategic missions are clearly stated in the resolution of the 12th Party conference. There are two strategic missions: the general strategic mission, and the strategic mission in South Vietnam. The strategic mission in South Vietnam consists of defeating the imperialists and feudalists, and achieving land reforms. Its immediate task consists of overthrowing the U.S. imperialists and their lackeys.

To what extent the war will develop? How must the Americans be restrained and defeated? The exertion of strategic leadership varies in each period of time. Yet, the strategic mission remains unchanged no matter how many troops the Americans may introduce into the South. Each time the enemy introduces more troops, some people contend that the enemy has not been fully evaluated, and that the strategic missions have not been clearly set forth. In fact, the strategic mission has already been set forth, and it remains unchanged. We continue to pursue it. As long as the war remains within the South, the strategic mission remains unchanged. When the war is extended to the North, the strategic mission will be different. Some people asked why we did not expect in advance that limited war would break out, so
that the mission we had set forth would not become out of date. This problem is not like having an ample shirt made so that it suits one when he grows up. That is not correct.

When the war in the South remains within the limits of a special war, we must restrain and defeat the enemy in this war, and must at the same time take precautionary measures against limited war. When the war has become a limited war, we must restrain and defeat the enemy in this war, and, at the same time, take precautionary measures against the enemy's expansion of the war throughout the country.

As far as the leadership is concerned, it is necessary to restrain and defeat the enemy in the above types of war in the South, not to allow the enemy to expand the war, and to restrict the losses he inflicts on the people. This effort is ours to exert. It is wrong to say that we failed to restrain and defeat the enemy in the South. We must see that we defeated the enemy's special war, and, as a result, the enemy had to introduce more troops to wage the limited war.

In speaking of winning victory over the enemy in the special war we did not mean a total victory, but a decisive victory. Today, in restraining and defeating the enemy in the limited war in the South, we also speak of achieving decisive success within a relatively short period of time. The contents of the guidelines and strategy involving protracted fighting and the contents of achieving decisive success within a relatively short period of time are not mutually contradictory. They are the same. In indoctrinating the cadres and party members ideologically, we must speak of protracted fighting and the determination to fight and win, and must not disseminate to the lower echelons the idea of achieving decisive success within a few years.

It is wrong to say that the Party leadership is not correct when the enemy sent part of his forces to the 4th zone or farther, while we estimated that there was little possibility of the enemy sending troops to the North.

At present, in terms of restraining and defeating the enemy in the South, the Party's strategic leadership remains correct. Although the enemy has not yet acquired the conditions for sending his troops to the North, we have to take precautionary measures. At present, we must understand that fighting a protracted war and achieving decisive success within a relatively short period of time remain the same. In a resistance war, it is right to speak of protracted war and self-reliance, and the urge to fight and win quickly represents a rightist tendency.
Today, it is a great error not to speak of achieving decisive success in a relatively short period of time. Therefore, we must achieve and are determined to achieve that objective. If we fail to achieve that objective, it is because of ourselves, not because of the socialist camp. We may not speak of protracted fighting as unlimited fighting. It is erroneous to understand protracted fighting as unlimited.

Contents of the significance of decisive victory:

These contents are stated in the resolution. To achieve the same solution as that in Laos, the contents of which we have already realized, the U.S. imperialists will agree immediately.

We want to achieve decisive victory which is: to exterminate and disintegrate the puppet authorities and troops to the point that the puppet force is no longer the military and political leaning point for the Americans, that the U.S. troops must play the main role and resort to political measures. When such a situation occurs, the puppet troops will not be strong enough to protect their regime.

But U.S. troops have been introduced. Thus we must wipe out an important part of them in order to defeat them.

There are three ways to achieve decisive victory:

- Wipe out the majority of puppet troops and foil the enemy's political goals;
- Wipe out an important part of U.S. troops and crush their aggressive will;
- Achieve the goals: national independence, democracy, peace, neutrality, and advance toward national unification. On the basis of wiping out puppet troops, we can, to a certain extent, wipe out part of U.S. troops. If the war is pursued for two or three years, we can do what the Koreans did: overcoming 380,000 Americans. The fact that southern guerrillas can wipe out the Americans—although not many Americans have been killed—is an optimistic event.

Ba's ideas: The introduction of U.S. troops into the South was not wanted by us. But it is an opportunity for us to defeat them. Sometimes the enemy can understand this only after fighting with us for several years. Thus, shortening this time is very important.

Some individuals have asserted that since the Americans have introduced their troops we cannot defeat them and that the Americans have caused us heavy casualties. These assertions are obviously belied by recent realities.
To achieve decisive victory in a relatively short period, we must concentrate our forces in both zones. We must not speak only of an unlimited period.

We will not do what Algeria has done. And we will not do what Korea did in using armed troops to liberate the South Koreans. We will do what the Soviet Union did in the war against Germany.

To achieve decisive victory, it is necessary to have very high determination. We must endeavor to achieve it and be convinced that we are able to achieve it. To do so, we must face very great difficulties, even difficulties we cannot anticipate.

The task of wiping out and disintegrating a large number of puppet troops must go along with the task of foiling the enemy’s reinforcement plan. Therefore, this task must be accompanied by mass struggle and military proselyting.

Our achievements in 1965 were very great. They can be regarded as big leaps, as a great progress (defeating from 8 puppet D—presumably, companies—in 1964 to 46 D is a great victory, causing the Americans to be frightened and to rush in to rescue the puppets).

It is necessary to prevent the enemy from increasing his troops, thus causing him to stop. In 1965, he wanted to increase his troops, but could not. In the future, it is necessary to prevent him from supplementing his troops in time. When the casualties of the puppets reach between D and regiments and battle groups and those of the Americans between C and D, the war will be settled. The enemy will be unable to stand firm in the rear, to pacify it. These are the basic causes of his defeat.

The greatest desire of the U.S. and other imperialists is to occupy the South, apply the neocolonialist policy, and check our Southern people's movement.

We will defeat the enemy: in several years, we will be able to wipe out and disintegrate 300,000 to 400,000 puppet troops and 200,000 U.S. troops. The Americans will be unable to introduce sufficient troops to fill the gaps left by the wiped out and disintegrated U.S. and puppet troops.

On the other hand, in introducing more troops the Americans must develop their logistic service. But, at the same time, we intensify our attacks against their logistic establishments, isolate their bases, cut off their transport roads. In the future, in certain areas puppet troops will have to eat soup for months. U.S. troops will also encounter difficulties. Thus, in the future, the attacks against logistic bases will be intensified by 10 times. This is a very important strategic mission.
The problems of general offensive and general uprising and fighting and negotiations.

General offensive and general uprising: uprisings have been carried out. How with the arrival of the Americans, what are the problems of the general offensive and general uprising?

In the past, we did not have any doubt about this capacity in the puppet-controlled areas. Now the areas where this capacity still exists are still large. The U.S. troops occupy only 15 important districts. Puppet troops occupy over 250 districts. We realize that since we have the capacity to defeat puppet troops, we have the capacity to carry out general uprisings and liberate these areas. We do have the capacity to liberate the district capitals and a number of provinces.

In the old-type colonial war, the enemy would not consent to being defeated and withdrawing until his vitality had been annihilated to a certain degree. In the new-type colonial war, when the greater bulk of the puppet army and an important part of the American troops will have been annihilated and disintegrated, the enemy has to agree to withdraw under definite conditions. For example, with regard to areas where American troops are stationed we use military and political means to attack them; in areas where they are still strong, we encircle them. When negotiations are held, the American troops may agree to withdraw from these areas, under definite conditions. We then proceed to solving the problems of the remaining areas. With regard to the centers such as Saigon and Cholon we must combine the old experiences with creative ideas to carry out the task.

Fighting and Negotiating:

The resolution of the Party's 11th conference clearly stated that in the process of achieving success, a situation where fighting and negotiations are conducted simultaneously may arise. At present, the situation is not yet ripe for negotiations. Fighting while negotiating is aimed at opening another front with a view to making the puppet army more disintegrated, stimulating and developing the enemy's internal contradictions, and, thereby, making him more isolated in order to deprive him of the propaganda weapons, isolate him further, and make a number of people who understand the Americans clearly see their nature.
In a war between a powerful country which wages aggression and a weak country, as long as we have not yet acquired adequate strength, a situation where fighting and negotiations are conducted simultaneously does not exist. Fighting continues until the emergence of a situation where both sides are fighting indecisively. Then, a situation where fighting and negotiations are conducted simultaneously may emerge. In fighting while negotiating, the side which fights more strongly will compel the adversary to accept its conditions. Considering the comparative balance of forces, the war proceeds through the following stages:

--The fighting stage.

--The stage of fighting while negotiating.

--Negotiations and signing of agreements.

Whether or not the war will resume after the conclusion of agreements depends upon the comparative balance of forces. If we are capable of dominating the adversary, the war will not break out again, and conversely. Therefore, fighting while negotiating also represents a principled step in the evolution of the war. Thus, a situation where fighting and negotiations are conducted simultaneously will unmistakably emerge. In our anti-French resistance, there were also times when fighting and negotiations were conducted simultaneously. The same situation had emerged in China.

At present, there are three viewpoints with regard to war and peace.

--The Americans find it necessary to negotiate, but negotiate from a strong position, partly because they have deceitful motives, and partly because the situation has compelled them to negotiate. Yet, they want us to make concessions to them.

--A number of countries want us to enter into negotiations, any form of negotiations--so that a big war does not break out and that the war can be ended--regardless of the interests of Vietnam. Some other countries wonder whether we can defeat the Americans, and if not, we should enter into negotiations. (Most of these countries are nationalist countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.) A number of East European socialist countries hold the view that conditions do prevail, and are ripe for achieving success (The Americans would withdraw their troops, and we will continue the struggle to achieve total success.) These socialist countries also posed a number of conditions: cessation of the bombing of the North; gradual withdrawal of U.S. troops from the South.
--China holds the view that conditions for negotiations are not yet ripe, not until a few years from now, and, even worse, seven years from now. In the meantime, we should continue fighting to bog down the enemy, and should wait until a number of socialist countries acquire adequate conditions for strengthening their main force troops to launch a strong, all-out, and rapid offensive, using all types of weapons and heed no borders. What we should do in the South today is to try restrain the enemy and make him bogged down, waiting until China has built strong forces to launch an all-out offensive.

--Our policy: to continue fighting until a certain time when we can fight and negotiate at the same time.

This is also a fighting method: repulsing the enemy step by step, and achieving decisive success.

The Party Central Committee entrusts the Politburo with the task of deciding on the time for negotiations.

The problem of choosing the opportunity and deciding to negotiate:

--Basing ourselves upon the actual situation in the South.

--Considering the opinions of the friendly countries which have provided us with quite a large volume of assistance, in order to gain their maximum support.

The future situation may lead to negotiations. Yet, even if there are negotiations, they are conducted simultaneously with fighting. While negotiating, we will continue fighting the enemy more vigorously. (It is possible that the North conducts negotiations while the South continues fighting, and that the South also participates in the negotiations while continuing to fight). Those who are in charge of conducting negotiations negotiate and those in charge of fighting continue fighting, because the decisive factor lies in the battlefield. The enemy wants us to stop fighting to his advantage. But we have to fight. Therefore, the enemy also fights. We must fight to win great victories with which to compel the enemy to accept our conditions. If we stop fighting (at that stage), no considerable successes can be achieved in negotiations. If we conduct negotiations while fighting vigorously, we can also take advantage of the opportunity to step up the political struggle, military proselyting, and activities in the cities. Thus, we will take advantage of the opportunity offered by the negotiations to step up further our military attacks, political struggle, and military proselyting. At present, the Americans have put forth deceitful arguments. Therefore, we must put forth conditions to prove that we fight for the aspirations and interests of the people, and, thereby, to win the support of various countries.
If the enemy wants to negotiate, he must accept a number of conditions, such as, to permanently cease their war of destruction against the North, withdraw his troops from the South, and dismantle his military bases. The failure to pose the above conditions is tantamount to implicitly accepting the Americans' presence in the South.

Depending on the situation prevailing at the time, we will impose conditions. For example, the puppet forces must be concentrated in barracks, must not repress the people, must not carry out espionage activities, must allow the people to move about freely or choose their places of residence, must not herd the people into strategic hamlets and concentration centers; the American troops must be stationed at the wharfs.

The basic situation prevailing in the South for the past years requires that we attack the enemy more vigorously. This front involves millions of people. While attacking, we must concentrate all our forces on fighting the enemy.

II. Some additional opinions:

1. Building of the armed forces and armed struggle.

Generally speaking, this is a difficult task, which must be continued. However, guerrilla warfare must be stepped up and developed further. In the recent past, the building of the regional forces, main force units, and guerrillas, on the whole, has continued to develop. Yet, considering the proportion, the building of these forces has been slow.

Previously, the guerrillas comprised 10 percent of the population.

In the western highlands, the highest proportion is only 3.5 percent, and, in some areas, the proportion is 1 percent.

Formerly, the French imperialists tried to find out why we had numerous mobile units while we had only (5 F's), whereas they had only a small number of mobile units (only ten to 15 percent) although they had large forces. The greater part (60 to 70 percent) of enemy forces have been dispersed to cope with the guerrillas, whereas they had large forces. The greater part (60 to 70 percent) of enemy forces have been dispersed to cope with the guerrillas, and 20 percent have to cope with the regional troops. Thus, only 10 percent of enemy forces are available to cope with our main force units.

As the Americans have increased the number of their troops, we must develop our guerrilla and regional forces to restrain and fight the enemy everywhere. We must thin out 60 to 70 percent of the enemy regular forces in order to enable our main force units to carry out their task of annihilating the enemy on the main battlefields.

We must firmly maintain and broaden our control over areas which have been liberated and which will be liberated. We have to do so because of the following reasons.
--In China, it was said that the annihilation of enemy vitality resulted in the liberation of the land.

--In our country, we must speak of annihilating enemy vitality and firmly maintaining our control over the liberated areas and enlarging the liberated areas.

If we speak solely of annihilating enemy vitality, and not of control over the liberated areas, sometimes a situation may emerge where the enemy has been annihilated but the areas under our control cannot be enlarged. In such a case, if the enemy is still strong he may still be capable of re-occupying these liberated areas. Therefore, after liberating an area, we must immediately organize its defense, and must enlarge it.

How should we best develop and deploy our forces to maintain our control? What has enabled certain areas to maintain their control? Experiences must be drawn.

By developing guerrilla warfare and pinning the enemy down, we will create conditions for our main force units to annihilate him.

The experience drawn is that it must be insured that the Party chapters and branches thoroughly understand the necessity of leading the guerrillas, and developing guerrilla warfare. The Party branch committees must build up the guerrilla force.

At present, there is a contradiction between build up of the guerrilla forces, the regional troops and the main force units. The building of the guerrilla force to supplement the main forces has not been satisfactory. There was a situation when the enemy would have been defeated if he could not supplement his forces. Yet, he could replace and supplement his forces. Although we have achieved successes and have the just cause, we have encountered difficulties in recruiting youths to supplement our forces. It is necessary to carefully consider why we cannot recruit youths to replenish our forces.

2. The enemy's use of aircraft and artillery, and spraying of poisonous chemicals.

How have the people endured and coped with the enemy's air attacks, shelling, and spraying of poisonous chemicals? What experiences have been acquired?

In addition to the ideological measures, it is necessary to:

--Dig trenches.

--Insure that dwellings are widely spread out.
-Narrow the enemy-controlled areas, hard him into the cities, and not allow him to concentrate his forces to attack areas under our control.

The TW is very concerned about the enemy's spraying of poisonous chemicals. It is necessary to collect the chemicals sprayed so that we can ask friendly countries to analyse them, and, thereby to find appropriate preventive measures. Party members in areas which are not subjected to the spraying of poisonous chemicals, or which are lightly sprayed, are urged to step up their production, and to cultivate many kinds of plants and many crops.

3. The cities:

We should introduce our forces into the cities in order to strengthen our forces there. We must conduct investigations of the urban situation. Everyone must carry out propaganda activities and enlighten the masses to a certain extent. We must take advantage of the enemy's internal contradictions to lead the masses' struggle, and make the masses understand the political significance of the struggle for the improvement of their living conditions and for democracy.

III. Situation of the defense of the North and reinforcement of the South.

The enemy advocated attacking us vigorously at the beginning of the year (February 1965) so that he could put forth his peace negotiations policy and compel us to negotiate. The enemy was firmly confident he could compel us to sit down at the conference table and the socialist camp would force us to negotiate. Taylor proposed that the Americans attack us continuously, so as to exert pressure on us. But the reality has emerged contrary to the enemy's expectations, and has made him more passive.

At first, due to lack of experience, we encountered difficulties and confusion. The greatest difficulty arose from the blockade of roads. After some months, we acquired experiences, and have strengthened our national defense forces.

At present, the air defense force in the North is a rather strong force in Asia. The density of the anti-aircraft net with conventional weapons is even higher than that of countries in our camp. The enemy himself said that "we danced on the muzzles of their anti-aircraft guns" when he ran into a dense fire net formed by conventional weapons. Our missile force also constitutes the strongest anti-aircraft force, as compared with Asian countries, including China.

We have MIG 17's and MIG 21's. MIG 21's have a speed comparable to that of the various types of modern aircraft used by the Americans to attack us. Yet, the above two forces are still insufficient. It is necessary to have a greater force, with better long range weapons, at least medium-range rockets. (We are trying to get these.)
At present, the enemy conducts his heaviest raids against the 4th military zone. In other areas, he only attacks us suddenly and then flees. Captured enemy pilots stated: "If we want to attack a wide area, we must have eight aircraft carriers, and many more air tankers and airfields. With five more aircraft carriers we can fly only 500 sorties at the most. If we want to attack Hanoi, we must have even more aircraft and must attack it in many phases."

Recently, our anti-aircraft force has achieved good results. The conventional weapons have contributed to fighting enemy aircraft flying at the lowest altitude. The missiles have an effective range from 800 meters to 35 or 50 kilometers. Recently we have downed many enemy aircraft with mobile missiles. (We have shot down a large number of enemy aircraft, but reported a small number). Though newly formed, this armed service has scored fairly good achievements. At the beginning, it took one to eight, or one to five missiles to shoot down one enemy aircraft. Now it takes one to two missiles to shoot down one enemy aircraft. The kill rate set by the Soviet Union was 100 percent. Due to the rapid training they had received, our missile units have failed to react in time in complex cases.

A missile has a bigger diameter than two arms' length, and is twenty meters long. It is radar-guided when launched. It pursues and catches up with the target because its speed is faster than that of the target. When firing missiles, members of missile units acclaim: "Dragons are pursuing aircraft." Although the speed of the MIG 17's equals 60 percent of that of enemy aircraft, they have scored great achievements, and, in some cases, downed two enemy F-105's. The enemy did not think that we dared use MIG 17's to fight him. Technically speaking, if our equipment is poor we cannot identify the enemy. Enemy aircraft always dodge our MIG 21's. Yet, the MIG 21's have not yet been widely used.

The enemy is afraid of us because we are both heroic and bold. We can counter enemy aircraft at any altitude. Cuba, the Soviet Union, China, and Korea, have voiced their readiness to help us, but we see that we are still able to fight alone.

There are some conclusions I want to present so that we can rejoice:

--The enemy has been unable to destroy our agricultural economy. Despite the fact that the youths have gone to the battlefields, the women and aged people have insured production and attained the planned norm of five tons per hectare. The youths have gone to the battlefield, the women have assumed the three responsibilities, engaged in all fields of activity in the rural areas, and simultaneously engaged in production and combat.
A team of women from a fruit factory, commanded by women cadres and equipped with machineguns, heavy machineguns, and 20mm and 12mm guns, put up a demonstration for women from foreign countries. The latter said that "if we were Americans we would have left Vietnam long ago." Another example: when she saw enemy aircraft appear, Miss Hang, a female guerrilla, rushed into the combat trench. But there was a snake in the trench. She wondered if she should fight the snake or shoot at enemy aircraft. She jumped into the trench and shot enemy aircraft. Only after shooting down an enemy aircraft did she return to kill the snake. The comrade Party Secretary concluded that Miss Hang had held firm to the Party's viewpoint: to direct the spearhead at the main enemy.

"Now we can conclude that no matter what the enemy does, he cannot destroy us. During the past year, our brother countries gave us a quantity of equipment larger than that provided during the previous five years.

Despite the present intensity of the war, the cost of living in the North has not risen. The masses' daily life remains normal. Our lines of communication are uninterrupted. At the beginning, we learned from the Korean Engineer Corps, but now the progress we have made far exceeds that of the Korean Engineer Corps. Owing to our strong defense system, the enemy has encountered difficulties in bombing our installations. Although the Ham Rong bridge has been riddled with bullets, it is still standing, and the people living in the surrounding area have not moved away.

Transportation is possible. Despite the fact that we are in a war situation, our transportation capabilities have doubled, and we are using all means available. Yet, we still fail to meet the requirements of the 4th zone and of the South. The transportation operations on the roads are almost non-existent in daylight. But at night, there are all kinds of transportation means, such as floating bridges, rafts, cable chains, rails installed on rafts for trains to cross over rivers, and so forth.

Although the Americans can destroy our industry to a certain extent, they cannot destroy our national defense industry, because we do not yet have a major one. The socialist countries' aid has been increased.

We can thus conclude that even if the Americans intensify their air raids, we will still stand firm to protect the North and reinforce the South.

UNCLASSIFIED
Reinforcements to the South:

The Northern citizens have clearly realized their responsibility with regard to this matter. Therefore, they have provided reinforcements to the best of their ability.

IV. International Support

On the one hand, we find that international support is fairly good, and, on the other hand, we are worried. The reason for this is that we are fighting the enemy at a time when there is a lack of unity within the socialist camp. This is a reality. Disunity still exists. We cannot just sit by and wait until the socialist camp is united to achieve decisive victory. On the contrary, we must achieve decisive victory within the next four years. Therefore, it is necessary to try to win maximum support. We say that our Party's leadership is correct and our people are heroic. Yet, without international support, our success would be limited although we still can achieve it. Generally speaking, the countries in the socialist camp unanimously agree with our line, and wholeheartedly assist us.

Since the downfall of Khrushchev, the Soviet Union has provided us with much assistance in all fields. Three fourths of the weapons sent to the South have been received from the socialist camp. Half of the South's budget has been provided by our camp, mainly China. The quantity of weapons provided has been so large that we could not transport all of them. During the past year, the quantity of equipment provided for the building of the North equalled that received during the five previous years. We have sent back those materials for which we did not yet have requirements, so that we do not lose them or have to maintain them. The socialist camp has agreed to construct mobile missile launching pads, and to establish factories to construct mobile missile launching pads for us.

Nevertheless, we are not satisfied in certain respects. If there were no disunity within the socialist camp, our success would have been greater. Yet, we also find that if we did not obtain the great assistance from our camp, we would not have been able to achieve such great successes. Our party has highly evaluated the support of the socialist camp. If we do not try to gain the support of the socialist camp, we will be guilty of our duty to our people. We cannot accept the line of this country or that country in order to obtain aid, nor can we accept aid from one country without accepting aid from another, because otherwise we will be guilty before the entire camp, and before our people.
V. Relations Within the Socialist Camp

China said: We must unite and insure the purity of Marxism-Leninism. Yet, only a number of countries have sided with China. The same situation also exists with regard to the Soviet Union. As for us, all countries in the camp, except Yugoslavia, are siding with us. Recently, our party did its best to contribute to the unity within the socialist camp.

At a time when there is a polemic among various countries, we must have an independent line. We must be confident in no one but our own Party. We advocate opposing revisionism, and, at the same time, must take precautionary measures against dogmatism, and must constantly preserve international solidarity.

China said: To positively oppose imperialism without positively opposing revisionism will finally lead to compromise with imperialism. That is not true. If one is revisionist, he does not oppose imperialism, and advocates peaceful coexistence with imperialism.

We do not hold the view that the Soviet leadership is as revisionist as the leadership under Khrushchev, and that it is somewhat more dangerous than Khrushchev.

We hold that the Soviet leadership still contains some revisionists, some indecisive elements, and also active elements.

China said Khrushchev fell because of external causes.

We do not think so. We think that Khrushchev fell because of internal causes, and, of course, the external struggle also was a very important contribution to his downfall.

According to China, things do not have two or three characteristics. This is true. Yet, in a transitional period when we are not yet positive about everything, we cannot attribute to environmental things this characteristic or another. Instead, we must continue to follow them up before we can draw a correct conclusion.