1. **Status of the Revolutionary Development Plan:**

The most important casualty of the VC T&T offensive seems to have been the people's confidence in the ability of the GVN to provide security. In Vinh Long Province, the VC mounted a series of well-coordinated actions including a determined attack on Vinh Long City itself. The latter succeeded in penetrating, for a time, portions of the center of the town and caused large-scale damage throughout the city. In other areas of the province, the VC were equally successful in placing GVN forces on the defensive. Both of the AD units deployed in support of AD had to be withdrawn to bolster defenses of the province capital. In each case one Company was left in place in the AD areas. AD/RF forces in direct support of 1967 AD remained in position but their effectiveness was marginal during this period, with minor exceptions.

An accurate assessment of the damage suffered by the AD program cannot yet be made. However, a certain amount of reorganization in the AD effort planned for 1968 now seems inevitable. In this regard, the Provincial AD Chief is going to prepare a redraft of the plan for 1968. With the help of the AD advisor, he will assess conditions in each of the AD hamlets and adjust the plan as required. General guidance offered by advisors is designed to reduce the impact on the 1968 program.

Except for Binh Minh District, the AD teams have been withdrawn to the district towns. Over half the cadre now in the province are assisting with refugee relief in Vinh Long City. These emergency measures should be terminated as quickly as possible, and the teams redeployed to the campaign area as soon as adequate security can be provided. However, entry into the 1968 hamlets will have to be further delayed in Chau Thanh, Ta Gang Special Zone, Vung Kiem areas. In these areas it may be necessary to return to the 1967 hamlets to repair the damage done by the VC. In Tuong Tri hamlet, in Tra On district the same process may be necessary but damage appears minor at this time.

The VC have made no attacks on the hamlets in the Nang Thit area and we have had no indication of large-scale infiltration. However, the entry of the AD teams into the 1968 hamlets will have to be delayed until an adequate screening force can be deployed. This may be some time as Sector officials are still preoccupied with the protection of the towns and the mounting of a counteroffensive against the VC. The two AD hm's are still being employed as mobile forces.

In Binh Minh District, which is heavily Hoa Hao, the VC mounted no serious attacks and government services are continuing normally. In this area it should be possible to insert the Cadre into the 1968 hamlets immediately. It has been recommended that the second AD team, scheduled for Binh Minh in mid 1968, be inserted early.
The future of the RD program in Vinh Long Province is dependent on the neutralization of the VC offensive followed by the release of forces to provide adequate security in selected areas. In areas such as Einhinh where security is good, RD will go ahead as planned. In other areas where security is not adequate, RD activity will be curtailed until GVN forces can clear out the VC and provide the necessary protection against further incursions. The most difficult problem may be in gaining the people's confidence in the GVN's ability to guarantee their security. This confidence has certainly been badly shaken by the apparent ease with which the VC entered Vinh Long City and forced ARVN into a temporary defensive posture. Until this confidence has been restored little real headway is likely to be accomplished in pacification.

Reaction to the VC offensive has been good if somewhat slower than desired. This applies to both military and civil efforts. At the present time, all districts have taken to the offensive - some cautiously, others aggressively. Province has opened routes 4 and 7a to daily traffic and the My Thuan ferry is handling traffic with minimum delay. The VC continue their stepped up harassment of outposts but have been unable to mount a serious threat to District Towns or Vinh Long City since 19 February.

2. Project Takeoff:

a. Improve Pacification Planning: Working closely with GVN to minimize effects of VC offensive in 1968 program.

b. Accelerate Chieu Hoi: Chieu Hoi is slowly getting back into normal operations on the province level after having been snowed under with problems of emergency housing, locating scattered personnel, and feeding dependents. Some 150,000 quick-reaction type leaflets were printed and air-dropped in the latter part of the month. Six Hoi Chanh graduated from course held by the Sea Bees and jobs are available for them as soon as they get ARVN security clearance. Limited progress was made in attempts to get District Cadres back on the job. The Air-drop leaflet total for the month included 400,000 of one leaflet and 200,000 of another. The cost of printing, VND130,000, was paid from AIK funds.

c. Amount Attack on VC Infrastructure: No activity at this time. Advisory effort continues in this area but have been unable to forces GVN interest.

d. RD Cadre Action Program: Nothing significant

e. Increase Capability to Handle Refugees: Current situation has improved awareness. No change in routine handling.

3. Political/Psychological

a. The people have still not fully recovered from a state of inactivity following the VC TET primary and secondary attacks. Rumors abound, not a few of which are started by the VC whose propaganda is very effective in the present situation when the people are homeless and in need of food, clothing and work. The major problem is the refugees, about 27,000 of whom are located in 12 refugee camps. They have little to do there, and have practically no entertainment since only one camp has a TV set installed. The remaining are deemed too insecure to permit TV installations. Those refugees who have homes go to them during the day but return to the camps for security reasons during the night. They are waiting for the GVN to do something about re-building their homes or providing permanent dwelling, but they also feel that the VC will return. No love lost for the ARVN, the Rangers of the National Police. The people were told to leave their homes and lock them; yet when they returned they found the locks broken and the homes looted. They firmly believe the GVN forces did the looting, having seen national police trucks hauling the loot in the day time. The ARVN blame the looting on the VC. In spite of this, the people seem to believe that the VC did not do any looting. "They (the VC) would enter a house, even listen a while to the radio there, but would leave everything as they found it". ARVN tactics in combating the VC in built up areas received unpopular criticism. "Why destroy a house in order to get one or two rats; and even when the destruction is over there are no VC bodies because they ran away. The ARVN do not care about the people's property. They just want to defeat the VC quickly and impress higher headquarters. Some feel that the ARVN might do better now with their new M-16 rifles. The "big weapons" of the VC - the AK-47 and AK-50 "created fear among the ARVN, who had only carbines". In the districts, villages and hamlets, the VC propaganda apparently is highly effective. They tell the people that the GVN does not have control and that the Chieu Hoi program does not exist.

b. The VIS made 1370 mobile and station broadcast, using provincial loudspeaker system. The VIS cadres messages included general news, TET victory, and news about the GVN's effort to support victims of the TET attacks. VIS cadres made the rounds of the refugee camps explaining what the GVN was doing to help displaced persons. The cadres also explained why American helicopters fired rockets into their houses, e.g. that the helicopters open fire only on approval of Vietnamese authority. VIS cadres also distributed magazines, leaflets and posters in the refugee camps. In each camp they set up a radio broadcasting system to rebroadcast Radio Saigon. This system can also be used to desiminate announcements from provincial headquarters. Some 225,000 anticommmunist leaflets were distributed to people of the province. About 6,000 posters about the GVN supporting victims of the TET attacks are being distributed throughout the province. Some 5,000 copies of the districts' news bulletins are being printed by district VIS's for distribution at district levels.
c. Election activities: n/a

d. Minorities, etc: The Hoa Hao, as was expected, reacted vigorously to the VC attacks. They have volunteered to organize a PF company for use at Province level. Most of these volunteers have had prior military service. There was no significant reaction from other minorities.

4. Security

a. General

During the month of February the total number of incidents and their intensity increased markedly. (100 incidents in January and 400 incidents in February). At the beginning of the month the VC launched a concerted ground attack on both Vinh Long City and the airfield. A second and smaller attack was launched on the 18th of February, and lesser mortar and ground harassments of the city and airfield ensued throughout the remainder of the month.

The great increase in road interdictions in February (157) as compared with twelve in January and eighteen in December is indicative of the VC effort during the month. No military convoys were ambushed during February because of the severe limitation on travel due to these road interdictions. During the month of February military road travel was minimal and civilian traffic was greatly diminished.

The number of harassments and attacks on District towns (66) increased enough during the month of February to indicate that the VC still consider them to be of major importance.

In summary, during the month of February the VC clearly indicated their capability to launch major offensives against Vinh Long City and all the District towns, although not simultaneously. They have also demonstrated their ability to keep all major roads in the province virtually unusable for extended periods of time.

b. Enemy Situation

As indicated above, the activity of Viet Cong Main Force, local force and guerrilla elements greatly intensified during February, concentrating on Vinh Long City, the airfield and District towns. The number of outpost harassments and attacks greatly increased (70 in January and 210 in February).

The diminishing VC activity during the latter part of the month indicated their inability to resupply fast enough to maintain large scale offensives for an extended period of time; however, they do have the ability to resupply sufficiently to maintain pressure on the Province Capital while at the same time conducting an offensive against a selected District capital and surrounding outposts.
Viet Cong losses during the month of February are estimated at 900 men. Consequently, the Viet Cong have been forced to recruit and upgrade younger and less experienced personnel, thereby decreasing their effectiveness.

c. Infrastructure

Known Viet Cong plans continue to emphasize extending their control over the population in "contested" areas, and their influence over the people in "secure" areas. The Têt offensive has enabled the Viet Cong to conduct widespread proselytizing in the "secure" areas of the Province. They have been able to carry on their taxation almost at will.

During the first attack on Vinh Long City, it was reported that the Viet Cong had a shadow government present in the city ready to pick up the reins of government had the opportunity arisen. This is further proof of both the organizational effectiveness of the Viet Cong, and the exhaustive planning that preceded this attack. It has also been reported that high school students acted as guides for the attacking forces.

The attack on the Viet Cong infrastructure has been blunted by the Viet Cong Têt offensive. All attention and resources have been directed toward the maintenance of security. Once the threat of imminent attack upon the District towns recedes, the Phoenix (DIOCC) program should start to move forward once again.

d. Friendly Situation

The friendly situation within Vinh Long Province underwent drastic changes during the month of February. Due to the intensity of the VC attack, Sector forces were reinforced by elements of the 9th A\VN Division and for a short time by 2d Fde, 9th US Division. During the early days of the battle in Vinh Long City, A\VN reaction was slow and somewhat disorganized, but as fighting continued, A\VN leaders began to realize the gravity of the situation and effectively planned and executed appropriate operations to clear the city and surrounding area of the VC. RF and PF within the city had primarily defensive missions through the battle and performed creditably.

US forces committed to the Province gave an excellent account of themselves, both tactically and in their effect upon the morale of the people. There were no incidents of US troop misconduct detrimental to good civilian and military relations, which was rather exemplary considering the densely populated areas in which the US Forces operated.

During the attack on the city, 31 January - 4 February, there were several reports of looting of civilian establishments (to include US civilian compounds) by Vietnamese Rangers. The second attack on 18 February provided
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the stage for another brief rash of looting, this time by unidentified ARVN troops. After each instance both Sector and Division Commanders issued stern warnings to their troops as to the consequences of such actions.

Elements of the 9th ARVN Division, primarily the 15th Regiment, 1/16th and 2d Cav, continued to operate in and around Vinh Long City throughout the month, achieving several notable successes in contact with the enemy. Of particular note was the performance of the 3d Troop, 2nd Cav and 2nd Cav Hqs, which has been consistently outstanding.

During the first three weeks of February, District operational activity decreased sharply from previous months. This can be attributed primarily to the highly effective VC propaganda effort which had outlying District Chiefs convinced that his District town was surrounded by several battalions of VC. Contributing to the District Chief's problems was the resupply of his outposts. Due to limited ground mobility and helicopter assets during the critical first two weeks, resupply of many outposts was delayed. However, as helicopter assets have become more available and leaders began to regain their confidence, the number of operations has been increasing. Major lines of communication (Rt 4 and Rt 7) are being cleared daily and are once again open to traffic. The increase can largely be attributed to the vigorous efforts of the Acting Sector Commander to get his troops into the countryside to exhibit to the people that the GVN still exists and has not been frightened into hiding by the VC. He has provided the necessary impetus to several slow Districts through the relief of incompetent District Chiefs and by providing additional forces to others.

Activities in support of pacification have been almost non-existent during this period; however, evaluations are being conducted in each District to see exactly what is required to rejuvenate the program and what additional forces might be required to provide necessary security.

The 1st and 4th Ens of the 16th Regiment, which had been in direct support of RD along the Mang Thit-Nicolai Canal waterways were deployed during the first week of the month to Vinh Long City as reinforcements. Each unit left one company in its base camp. The 1st En remained in the Province throughout the month and is presently being used as a mobile strike force being sent to various districts to provide necessary operational forces within the district. The 4th En is presently located in Sadec primarily in a security and reserve mission. Plans call for both units to return to their RD mission prior to the end of March.

The newly trained 111 RF Company, replacing 275 RF Co, is now located at the Mang Thit Campaign Hqs in direct support of RD. The 275 RF Co is now at Vung Liem. MAT 7 has been assigned to the Mang Thit to assist 111 RF Co. The following RF Companies are in direct support of RD: 458, 698, 160 and 835. At present, there are a total of nine PF platoons in support of RD. All of these forces are located in 1967 RD areas.
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A close appraisal of the friendly situation within the province reveals a much brighter picture than recent events might indicate to the casual observer. The Tet Offensive, rather than demoralizing Sector forces as might possibly be expected, has awakened them to the realities of the war. The non-availability of helicopters has forced them to make use of their own assets, i.e., foot power and waterborne resources. If the momentum presently being generated can be maintained, definite improvements should be seen in the future, not only military but in pacification as well.

5. Economic:
   a. General:

   The commercial economy of Vinh Long has been severely crippled as a result of the Tet Offensive. The Vinh Long market and the surrounding commercial district which included several retail shops, were almost totally destroyed. Many other business and industrial establishments in other parts of the city suffered in the fighting. Some private rebuilding has begun, but the progress is slow. An open air market is operating and food including rice, is in plentiful supply in the city. Prices for most items have returned to near pre-Tet levels. The principal reason for plentiful supplies and steady prices is said to be the difficulty in getting these commodities to their normal market in Saigon.

   b. Material Resources and Transport.

   Route 7A to Nang Thit and Vung Liem and Route 4 south to Can Tho and west to the My Thuan ferry are again open to traffic. Mining incidents and roadblocks continue to harass travellers, but the frequency has decreased sharply in recent days. However, the threat of such incidents continues to keep traffic below pre-Tet levels. The My Thuan ferry is operational and open to commercial traffic including buses.
6. Provincial Resources in Support of Pacification

a. cadre - The cadre in Vinh Long were used to secure the district towns and for refugee control during February. Because the district towns were not hard hit the number of cadre KIA was low. Vinh Long had 6 KIA, 4 WIA, and 67 remain unaccounted for. The two teams that were scheduled to return in early February were delayed and should arrive in March, along with the 3 other teams due to return during this period.

The ADK's in Vinh Long were not targeted by the VC for ground attacks, however it is difficult to ascertain the psychological gains made by the VC. At this time the Headquarters Control Group is functioning normally and communications have been established with all of the teams. The missing cadre is our major unresolved problem, although it is felt most of them will return in the near future.

b. Census Grievance - Communication has not been fully established with the district cadre. The Chau Thanh cadre are working but the majority of effort concerns CB intelligence.

The CG Center was partially destroyed, including all documents, written records, and office supplies. The center has recovered; however, the question on the status of the districts remains unresolved. One CG cadre was captured by the VC, his future still unknown at this time. The cadre were not targeted by the VC in Vinh Long, although most of them are worried about their future prospects.

It will take an estimated 3 months to reestablish the CG program at its pre-Tet effectiveness.

c. Hamlet Self Defense Forces - During this reporting period, the effectiveness of the Hamlet Self Defense Forces is unknown and because of their low priority for support, future reliability as a fighting force is questionable.

d. Technical Cadre - Operating effectively in project recovery have not turned their attentions outside of province capital or district towns.

e. Police:

   (1) During this period the NP and NFFF gave an excellent account of themselves in the defense of Vinh Long.

Captured maps indicate that the VC battle plan assumed the capture of the Police station during the first day, January 31st, from which they would immediately proceed to assault the T.C.C. directly.

The VC assumed that the National Police had no machine guns (only submachineguns) and this, according to the T.E.E., was a correct assumption. However, the NFFF had been moved into Vinh Long just before TET to bolster NF forces, and the NFFF's two .30 cal. Machineguns were at the Police station and used effectively against the VC. This deficiency on the part of NF T.E.E. has been brought to the attention of proper authorities with recommendations to supply .30 Cal Machineguns to NF.
Vinh Long Province

29 February 1968

(2) Intelligence was consistent and accurate during this period, particularly considering the circumstances. The Intelligence Chief Vo Van CHUYEN, was wounded by a B-40 rocket on February 18th and succumbed to his wounds on February 23, 1968.

Generally FSE efforts were hampered through the month by the security situation. The FSE operations officer was KIA during the second attack on VL. He was considered a capable official.

The FSE have only recently begun to function again, and their intelligence reports are of a low quality at the present time.

The VL FSB has accepted the national plan to increase its agent net for reporting. It is planned that extensive use will be made of Foreign Aid funds to support the larger agent net with emphasis on payment for worthwhile information.

(3) During this entire period the NPF were engaged in the defense of Vinh Long. They are currently employed in this capacity because of the possibility of additional VC attacks.

Total Police losses during this period as follows:

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<th>K.I.A</th>
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<td>18</td>
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7. Provincial administrative Personnel and Organization:

a. Vinh Long lost no key provincial officials during the Tet offensive. However, the various service staffs are operating with "skeleton crews", mainly due to the fact that many civil servants have not yet returned to work. The Acting Province Chief, Mr. Dang, has proven his exceptional value to the Province during this time of crisis. Not all Province officials, however, have shown themselves to be equal to the task.

Some service chiefs, imbued with the worst attitudes of the "minor civil servant", have actually blocked needed action. A case in point is the Chief of Social Welfare and Refugees who has refused to begin distributing funds to refugees because he does not have enough money on hand to pay full allowances to all those eligible. The Acting Province Chief has encouraged him to make partial payments but the NSWR Service Chief refuses without specific instructions from his ministry in Saigon.

b. After the VC Tet attack on Vinh Long City the Provincial Government responded to orders from the Central Relief Committee/Saigon indicating that a similar coordinating mechanism was to be organized on provincial level. Structure of the Provincial Committee has followed that of the National Committee, i.e., sub-committees were formed to deal with the various aspects of relief and the reestablishment of essential services. The Committee initially concentrated on Public Works, Water Supply, Relief Food Distribution, Electrical System Repair, Public Health, and Local Economic conditions. A 100 kw generator to run pumps at the Water Works, was furnished through American channels. The water system is now functioning at normal capacity. With continuing cooperation from Seabee Team 1011, the electricity service was able to restore power to some areas of the city where damage to lines and equipment was not too serious. The Public Works Department made immediate temporary repairs to a damaged section of the bridge linking the old and new areas of Vinh Long City. The sub-committee for relief assistance pooled available resources and set up controls for the distribution of supplies to refugees. The Economic and Financial sub-committees made arrangements to purchase rice and soy sauce from Sadec for distribution to refugees. The rice purchase was made possible by a temporary loan to the Province administration by CORDS of 200,000 piasters. The loan was necessary as the Province had not received its allocated emergency funds. The Committee also has taken some initiative in planning the reconstruction of destroyed sections of the city. An earlier plan to rebuild one area of the city is to be used as the starting point for this action. The Provincial Government hopes to provide subsidized housing for several hundred families in this area, as well as streets, schools, and a new market center.

Aerial photographs of the city were taken by the Advisory Team at the Acting Province Chief's request. These will assist in refining the damage assessment and in planning for reconstruction.
One of the most frustrating aspects of the Committee's work has been the unresponsiveness of the Central Recovery Committee in providing promised relief funds and materials. In addition several plans for temporary housing for refugees have been forwarded to Saigon for approval and for funding. However, again no replies have been received.

The Public Health Service has given vaccinations - anti-cholera and typhoid, and makes regular inspections of the refugee centers.

An assessment of damage to all public buildings has been completed and minor repairs to lightly damaged structures has already begun.

Route 4 has been heavily damaged by mining. Emergency measures to repair the road have been taken by the ARVN 401 Engr Bn with assistance from Seabee Team 1011 and elements of the US 27th Engineering Group.

In the area of emergency relief, potable water was in short supply after the Têt attack. US Civilian and Military as well as ARVN units cooperated in hauling supplies of fresh water to refugee centers which had been established in a number of schools, churches and pagodas in Vinh Long City.

c. RD Councils:

Contributions by RD Councils have been minimal during the month of February due to operational requirements and the absence of several key officials for the Têt Holiday period.

d. Members of the Advisory Team have cooperated closely with the Provincial Relief Committee and the Acting Province Chief in providing advice and assistance in relief measures taken by the Committee and various provincial officials.

e. No accurate assessment has been made during February of the effectiveness of the GVN in previously pacified areas.

8. USAID/JUSPAO Section: No significant comments

9. Required actions: Specific requests for assistance have been forwarded through proper channels. Appropriate follow-up action at all echelons is the only action required at the present time.

Ronald A. Robeje
LTC CE
Province Senior Advisor
District: Binh Linh
District Chief: Lt. Le Quang Truong
Villages: 6 Hamlets: 25
Population: 66,985 Area: 230 Sq. Km

1. General Status of Pacification Within the District:
   a. Military Forces: The military forces which have been given the specific mission for support of revolutionary development are considered at the present time to be adequate. The observation is justified because the recent Tet offensive did not disrupt the RD effort within the District.
   b. Civil Administration Programs: The area continues to show improvement. The recent training given the local officials has been most helpful in accomplishing this objective.
   c. RD Program: The RD program is very successful now and has been in the past. One of the AID schedules for 1968 is well on the way to being a success. It is recommended and anticipated that the second AID for this year will start in the immediate future.

2. Reasons for Success or Lack Thereof: Due to the recent Tet offensive, the logistical support has been greatly limited psychologically and to some degree by transportation; air, land, and water ways.

3. Actions Taken Locally to Improve Pacification Effort: The District Chief has been convinced that there must be effective coordination between civil and military staff members to facilitate maximum accomplishments. The V-I-C Chief has been directed to concentrate more of his constructive effort toward pacification.

4. Assistance Required from Saigon Level: None.

/s/ W.R. Reynolds
/t/ W.R. REYNOLDS
Haj, Inf
District Senior Advisor
District: Chau Thanh
District Chief: Maj. Nguyen Binh Khue
Villages: 14
Hamlets: 45
Population: 112,881
Area: 211 sq Km

Period Ending: 29 February 1968

1. General Status of Pacification:

a. Military Popular Forces: Since 31 January the PF in this district have given up a total of sixteen outposts, one of which was a temporary one established subsequent to the initial VC offensive. Five of these outposts have been reoccupied. None of the outposts were lost to direct enemy action, i.e., overrun, but rather to orders from higher headquarters or at the initiative of the occupants. In Tan Hoa Village the village chief defected to the VC and ordered five outposts abandoned before his defection became known. (note: This man was KIA by ARVN when Ly Thuan was resecured and four of the outposts reoccupied.) Strength accounting for PF is very difficult at the present time and defections, desertions, etc., have not yet been determined.

b. Civil Administration Program: Efforts of village officials is necessarily directed toward emergency assistance to refugees and other programs are in limbo.

c. VIS: Since this is the capital district, the Province VIS is handling most activities. The district's speaker Lambretta has been active only in the city.

2. Reasons for Success or Lack Thereof:

a. The district has been successful in maintaining the flow of supplies to its remaining outposts by marshaling all district troops available and conducting operations to the outposts. Approximately 50% of our resupply operations have come under fire.

b. The district has been unable to mount offensive operations because of lack of assets. Operations have been conducted by sector and divisions.

3. Action Taken to Improve Pacification: There has been no activity in this area all month due to VC activity.

4. Significant Problems: The large number of refugees in the district, especially the city, present a significant problem. However, province officials are doing as much as can be done at the present time.

/s/ D. E. Jenne

D. E. JENNE

ITC, Infantry

District Senior Advisor
1. **General Status of Pacification Within the District:**

   a. **Military Forces:**

      (1) **Enemy:** The VC launched attacks on all outposts and watchtowers in the Cho Lach District, during this reporting period. Simultaneously, the VC mortared the District town. As a result of this action, people and GVN officials evacuated to larger cities. Small bands of VC guerrillas are present in approximately 25 hamlets.

      (2) **Friendly:** HF Company 833 and approximately 250 PF defend the District town and conduct offensive operations against the VC. Four Village outposts are still under GVN control and protect GVN officials at those locations.

   b. **Civil Administration:** Normal Civic Functions within 25 hamlets have temporarily halted. Until adequate security is provided and GVN officials return to village and hamlets, Civil Administrative functions will be confined to only four of the nine villages.

   c. **RD Program:**

      (1) **Chieu Hoi:** The program is functioning however recent VC activity has curtailed the effectiveness of operation. No returnees were taken during this period.

      (2) **VIS/PSYOPS:** A loudspeaker team is accompanying all military operations conducted by district forces. The purpose of this team is to tell people the GVN have returned to the area, and retrieve PF deserters. Normal psychological operations are being conducted by the VIS Chief within the district town, i.e., loudspeaker presentations, television, distribution of printed matter.

      People from outlying villages report that four television sets were seized or destroyed by the VC.

      (3) **Self Help Projects:** Because of VC activity self help projects have temporarily halted.

2. **Reasons for Success of Lack Thereof:** The PF forces occupying the outposts in the Western portion of the District abandoned their posts due to the exaggerated proportions of the VC TET offensive. The GVN forces concentrated on defending the District Town and within a period of a few days most of the lightly armed outposts and watchtowers were abandoned.

3. **Actions Taken Locally to Improve Pacification:**

   a. A new District Chief has been appointed to replace the present chief. The new District Chief arrived 17 February and is aggressive in pursuing the VC.
(b) Military operations are conducted daily by the District Forces to reestablish GVN dominance.

(c) The US Navy SEALS with selected VN individuals and advisors conducted two operations in the District in an attempt to surprise the VC in their base areas.

(d) A company of the 9th Division ARVN were assigned for five days to assist in clearing the lines of communications within the District.

/s/ Richard M. Drenzek
/t/ RICHARD M. DRENZEK
Major, Infantry
District Senior Advisor
District: Ninh Duc  
Period Ending: 29 February 1968

District Chief: Trung Uy Tran Dinh Hoe  
Villages: 8  
Hamlets: 24  
Population: 49,715  
Area: 175.5 sq. km

1. General Status of Pacification Within the District:
   a. The Military Forces Available are as Follows:
      (1) 3 RF Companies: 149, 160, 835
      (2) 585 PF in 20 Platoons
      (3) 3rd Plt of A Btry, 91st Arty Bn, 9th Inf Div ARVN
      (4) 2/16 RF Boat Co w/2 LCVP
   b. Civil Administration Programs: Each of the three Ap Doi Ap have elected hamlet officials. They are closely supervised by the village council and by the District RD Committee. The success of the program to train hamlet officials has not been uniform. Response continues to range from enthusiastic to just acceptable depending upon the individual. District admin personnel have not returned to work since TET.
   c. RD Programs:
      (1) There are presently two (2) TV sets within the District under the sponsorship of VIS however request for (5) five additional sets have been forwarded to Province. All villages have loudspeakers which broadcast morning radio programs. This is the only evidence of a VIS program.
      (2) The VIS and PSYOPS section assist the District Chief. Broadcasts are made by tape recording and radio, and leaflets are air dropped and handed out personally. There has been no activity during the past month.
      (3) The Chief for Youth Affairs continues to work with available resources to form athletic activities, however, the program suffers from lack of funds and equipment. There are table tennis, volleyball and soccer facilities within the district.
   d. Pacification Along Hang Thit River: Two Ap Doi Ap and three Ap Binh Dinh, border the Hang Thit River. There has been no progress since TET.

II. Reasons for Success or Lack Thereof: The general success of lack of success depends primarily on the hamlet populace and the RD Cadre. In locations where hamlets and RD team leadership is strong and aggressive the pacification program has evidenced great success. However where leadership and enthusiasm are lacking only close supervision has brought about any worthwhile results. The 1968 program should move along rapidly as the hamlets selected are relatively secure and have good leadership.
III. Actions Taken to Improve Pacification Effort: A greater effort has been made by the District Chief to visit all RD projects and areas to offer advice and criticism to the cadre and to demonstrate a renewed interest in the activity. Commodities have also been distributed to the cadre. Military training of the cadre with the PF outposts has been proposed.

IV. Significant Problems: Motivation is the primary problem that permeates the entire RD program. Motivation of the District Chief, of RD cadre and of the people is, in many cases, nonexistent. A renewed emphasis on the reasons for, methods, and expectations of the RD program may reap benefits. The greatest problem is getting the message to the people in a form which they can meaningful interpret; demonstrating advantages of programs as opposed to VC programs.

/s/ Clarence B. Hall, Jr.
/t/ CLARENCE B. HALL, Jr.
Major, CE
District Senior Advisor
1. General Status of Pacification:

   a. Military Forces:

      (1) Enemy: Enemy activity during the reporting period has been heavy within the District. Although actions against the District Town have been limited only to harassment, local intelligence sources have reported numerous large unit sightings (company & battalion size) moving through and assembling in the District. It is believed that Ny Lac Village, this District was used as a principal staging area for VC forces attacking Vinh Long City during the Tet offensive, and late reports indicate that it is still being heavily utilized by the VC. VC interdiction of the Bake Road has been mined in 6 places and numerous earth type road blocks constructed along it. OP's and watchtowers along the route received several attacks and numerous harassments, all unsuccessful in overrunning the positions. An OP south of the District Town, adjacent to our recently completed New Life Hamlet, Ap Tuong Tri (Tra On District) came under attack, a bridge connecting the OP with the hamlet blown, and the market place within the hamlet set afire. Damage to the market place was described as approximately 30%. A threat that VC forces will attempt an attack on the District Town is still imminent.

      (2) Friendly: Offensive operations against VC forces by District Troops have been numerous during the reporting period, District troops participated in 4 Search Operations, 6 Reaction Force Operations, and 7 operations employing search techniques with the purpose of resupplying OP's. Most of these operations gained enemy contact and resulted in light friendly casualties and 7 VC KIA, 52 POW's apprehended.

   b. Civil Administration: Those village and hamlet officials residing in their respective villages and hamlets prior to the VC Tet offensive maintained residence there throughout. The wife of one Village Chief was shot and killed by the VC.

   c. HD Program: The 3 RD Cadres presently within the District, and scheduled to move into their 1968 New Life Hamlets following Tet, have been successful in moving into these hamlets only during the day. They have accompanied District troops on operations but have been used in security of the District Town at night.

   d. Mono Tit - Nicolai Pacification: There has been no significant progress in this area during the reporting period, but we have managed to hold our own. With the completion of our OP resupply operations, it is anticipated that we will be able to resume our normal visit schedule to the outlying villages and hamlets.
2. Reasons for Success or Lack Thereof.

There appears to be an apathy on the part of the people here to support GVN efforts to protect them. Basically, they are scared stiff. They expect GVN protection but are not willing to jeopardize themselves in providing information on the enemy. The people however, continue to be enthusiastically willing to except GVN protection and US aid.

3. Actions taken to Improve Pacification: No change.

4. Problem Areas: No change.

/s/ William L. Stockman, III
/t/ WILLIAM L. STOCKMAN, III
Major, Armor
District Senior Advisor
District: Tra On
District Chief: Nguyen Huu liem
Villages: 11  Hamlets: 52
Population: 69,467  area: 246.25 Sq Km

1. General Status of Pacification:

   a. Military Forces: There was no significant change in the assigned
      strength of PF and PF personnel. An inordinate number of personnel were
      MOL during the first of the month. Presently there are 19 PF and 1 PF still
      MOL. District forces participated in four operations which resulted in a
      total of 9 VC KIA, 1 M-1 rifle and 1 thompson machine gun captured. District
      forces sustained 2 KIA, 7 WIA, and lost 1 carbine. Also, a VC attack of one
      district outpost resulted in 4 VC KIA and 2 AK-47 (Chi Co) weapons captured.
      The Mobile Riverine Force - 2nd Brigade, US 9th Infantry Division conducted
      a waterborne cordon and infantry search operation within the district and
      captured 25 draft dodgers, 2 VC guerrillas and 2 VC political cadre. Two
      district outposts were abandoned. They were abandoned primarily because of
      inactivity of district forces rather than because of a significant increase
      in VC strength.

   b. Civil Administration Programs: Only during the latter half of
      this report period have civil officials begun to function. During the period
      12-22 Feb., an interim District Chief was appointed to replace Captain Nguyen
      Van Kim. On 23 Feb Captain Nguyen Huu liem assumed duties as the permanent
      District Chief. The lack of a permanent leader contributed to the inactivity
      of civil officials and district forces. VC raided the district dispensary
      capturing 30% of the drugs and equipment and destroying 20%.

   c. RD Program: No progress in this area.

   d. Hung Thit-jucoloc Pacification: The VC Tet offensive combined
      with the curfew has essentially halted all traffic through the waterway.

2. Reasons for Lack of Success: No change

3. Actions Taken to Improve Pacification: No change.

4. Problems: None

/s/ L.J. Miller
/t/ L.J. MILLER
XJ, arty
District Senior advisor
1. General Status of Pacification within the District

a. Military Forces: The strength status of the Popular Forces took a slight reduction during this reporting period due to the loss of those killed in contacts with the VC during the Tet offensive and those who deserted the ranks because of VC pressures. One LF Company has been sent to the District town to give it additional support. VC activities against the District Town and the surrounding villages and outposts were intense during this reporting period. It seems that the assumption made in last month's report, that the prime target of the VC in this area would be Dong Thit, was erroneous. During the period 31 Jan to 21 Feb 68, the VC, through interdiction of route 7 and intense attacks on the District town and other village offices, were able to isolate various areas within the District. The isolation of various villages from the District headquarters and the means of resupply and aid, was a prime factor in the District losing 6 contested and reasonably pacified areas to the Viet Cong. In order to accomplish this feat the local guerrillas of the area had to be formed into one unit and VC units were brought from Cang Long into the Vung Liem district. After finding it near impossible to take the District town, the Cang Long forces withdrew on/or about 23 Feb back to their area, leaving the local guerrillas forces scattered through the area to carry on harassing actions. The District Chief is now formulating plans to recover the hamlets lost during this period and to clear the immediate areas of the local guerrilla units. The VC units during this period took heavy losses and are now understrength and in great need of medicine and food.

b. Civil Administration Programs: The civil administration during this period was at a practical stand still. Many employees and village council members were stranded in the areas they happened to be visiting when the Tet offensive broke out. In some areas where administrative force was available, they did aid in getting food and shelter for the people who had lost the same during the VC attack.

c. RD Programs: Many of the RD programs were inactive during this reporting period. The VIS continued to function in an attempt to keep the people informed as to what was going on and encouraging them to resist the VC and their propaganda. The main civilian dispensary in the District town was overrun by the VC and all medical supplies were lost, plus much of the equipment was destroyed.

d. Hang Thit Special Zone: No change.

2. Pacification Effectiveness:

The effectiveness of pacification during this period took a backward step, the reason being the sense of security was lost. Security for the people is the prime factor in a pacification program. As was previously stated in this report, the District lost 6 hamlets to the VC, two of which (Xuan Loc
A and Xuan Loc B), were scheduled for the new life hamlet project during this year. The enemy's isolation of various areas to prevent the resupply of the villages gave the sense of insecurity and the feeling of hopelessness. It is going to take a strong and aggressive program to prove to the people out in the hamlets that their government can give them security and can aid them during their times of despair.

3. Local Actions to Improve Pacification Effort.

To regain the villagers' confidence in the government forces and to promote the pacification effort, the District Chief, with the aid of his forces and those sent in support of his forces, is re-opening the roads to the various villages to allow uninterrupted flow of supplies and community traffic. Security plans are being revised in order to bring about greater security for the villages that was previously in effect, plus an attempt will be made to fulfill the immediate needs of the people prior to going into a "nice to have improvement program".

/s/ Edward I. Harris
/t/ EDWARD I. HARRIS
Major, Inf
District Senior Advisor