SA DEC PROVINCNE -- CORDS REPORT 2/68
1. STATUS OF THE REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT PLAN.

a. Sadec's Revolutionary Development effort has nearly attained the level of activity that existed prior to Tet. The one exception is the provincial priority area in Duc Ton District. The District is, at the present time, resuming its RD program. While the tactical situation permits, the 9th ARVN Div. plans to commit one battalion in support of RD in this area. The district should be able to make up for the last time when this battalion is in place. After evaluating our situation it appears our 1968 plan has been set back approximately one month. The Province Chief has directed that maximum effort be exerted by both provincial and district staff toward fulfillment of the Revolutionary Development Plan.

b. As of this date excellent progress in the 1968 program has been made. 17 Self-Help Projects have been approved at a cost of 400,000$VN. During the recent Tet offensive the RD area in Duc Ton District received the greatest amount of damage. It is estimated that 60 homes were burned by the Viet Cong and more than 65 were destroyed by friendly forces firing on Viet Cong positions.

c. The most significant problem effecting the provincial RD plan is that of equipment and technical manpower to augment the Public Works Service. This problem has yet to be resolved.

2. PROJECT TAKEOFF:

The following are considered noteworthy activities:

a. PHOENIX: In a month that found the efforts of PHOENIX agencies directed primarily toward the VC guerrilla at the expense of the infrastructure program, some noteworthy progress was recorded. Listed below is a review of the monthly report of PHOENIX priorities for 1968:

(1) Complete construction of the PHOENIX building in the city of Sadec. Work has been resumed, furniture and equipment have been ordered and we look forward to completion of the project during the month of March.

(2) The establishment of two DIOCC's in the first part of 1968. Lt Thomas arrived in Duc Ton On 27 February 68. Although his files are already operational, the constant VC pressure in and around the district town, finalization of the necessary coordination will require two weeks to a month. Chau Thanh District DIOCC will be housed in the PHOENIX building when it is completed. Liaison with the remaining two districts has increased and we foresee no problems in establishing DIOCC's in these localities.
(3) Direct operational efforts towards the Pacification Program are in progress. The RD teams are back in the field, and a meeting has been planned with the RD Cadre with whom we will have direct contact.

(b) Efforts to redirect action agencies towards the identification of VC infrastructure are realizing successes. During the month of February, the National Police, and MSS did an outstanding job in screening the city for VC liaison and intelligence cadre. Field operations have been directed against the guerrillas during the military crisis period.

(c) To target key infrastructure personnel, PHOENIX has collected valuable information which has confirmed and expanded our existing files. Targeting has now fully begun.

b. REFUGEES.

(1) Efforts during February were directed toward the assistance of temporary refugees that were a direct result of the Tet offensive. More than three fourths of the refugees in the Province originate from Duc Ton District because the VC concentrated their major efforts in this area. Rice, clothing material and bulgur wheat have been distributed and plans have been made for reconstruction of houses that were destroyed. It is anticipated that perhaps three or four thousand people who left their home for fear of life and limb will return to their homes in March. Many have already returned to northern Duc Ton District. The 1200 people whose homes were destroyed by air strikes, PBR fire or VC arson will remain homeless until their houses can be rebuilt.

(2) During the Tet offensive over one thousand people fled to the village of An Tich. It was gratifying to learn that the citizens of this village raised 8,000$VN to present to the refugees as a rice allowance.

c. OTHER AREAS

No significant comments.

3. POLITICAL/PSYCHOLOGICAL:

a. General: It is concluded that the VC Tet offensive delayed the pacification program in Sa Dec Province. The extent of the delay is not insurmountable. In support of this claim, the following facts are offered:

(1) RD Cadre teams returned to work the March 21 on 22 Feb 68.

(2) Canal and Road traffic is seen as 70% of normal.

(3) Farmers are seen working in the fields all over the Province.

(4) The market places are full of people, and food items that were scarce are again appearing.
(5) Fuel products are becoming more plentiful.

Positive attitudes from the people of Sadec are apparent. Sadec city has established a 5-house self-defense and warning system; one person from each five house group stands guard during the hours of darkness. ARVN/RF/PF soldiers are welcomed in people's homes in an effort to show appreciation. Many citizens have requested arms from the Province Chief. A request for these weapons has been submitted. The Province Chief is reacting vigorously to get the 1968 program back on track. He has given firm guidance to his staff and his District's Chiefs. He has instructed them to get RD projects started and see that all schools are opened as soon as possible. All RD teams will sleep in their respective hamlets and the Province and District Chiefs will, on occasion, sleep in the Ap Doi Mois'. The actions taken by the Province Chief are more positive and in most cases, of his own initiative.

Sadec is almost back to normal. Anything the Province is more united in its efforts than it was prior to the Tet offensive because of the contempt the people now hold for the VC.

b. VIS: VIS has devoted its full energy in support of the Province Chief and District Chiefs in providing information to the people during the recent emergency. VIS now has revived itself somewhat and is working on a Provincial Unity 'Campaign and supporting CORDS/CFW programs.

c. Election Activities: No comment.

d. Minorities, Political and Religious Groups: The people of Sadec Province have rallied behind their Province Chief in an admirable manner. Many groups have volunteered money and manpower for mutual defense. Some groups have even asked for weapons to protect their homes and villages.

4. SECURITY

a. General. As in most of Vietnam, the security situation in RD areas deteriorated badly at the outset of the VC Tet offensive. RD teams were withdrawn from their hamlets and stationed in Sadec. It became apparent in the early stages of the VC offensive that activity in Sadec was of a secondary nature compared to the attacks on Vinh Long. The VC activity in Sadec was undoubtedly being conducted to deter our moving reinforcements to assist Vinh Long. The only concerted attack in Sadec was conducted the morning of 4 February against the Duc Ton District headquarters compound. This attack was reported primarily due to the heroic efforts of PBR patrols from River Section 513 stationed here in Sadec. The first two weeks of the reporting period, ARVN and provincial forces deployed in and around key cities, primarily Sadec. The enemy most assuredly held the initiative in the country side. In the last two weeks operations were conducted and reported with considerable success. Our most successful operation was conducted in Lap Vo District by RF and PF. This operation resulted in 32 VC KIA, 12 captured and only 1 of the friendly forces were WIA. The success of this operation was attributed to (1) very tight security regarding the operation (2) troops were deployed during the early morning hours on the day of the operation.
PRDVDTCE REPORT (Cont'd)

(3) strong leadership excited friendly forces to close with the enemy and eject him from his bunkers. It is felt that now is the time to discontinue our defensive tactics and take the initiative away from the enemy. We are convinced that when aggressive operations are planned and conducted, ARVN units can and will inflict prohibitive casualties upon the enemy. Enemy activity has been directed primary against Duc Ton and Chau Thanh Districts. The security situation in Lap Vo and Duc Thanh Districts remains comparatively stable. Revolutionary Development continues in these districts according to plan. RD Cadre teams have returned to their hamlets; however, in Duc Ton a great deal of time will go towards rebuilding. The security situation in Duc Ton is still rather tenuous, and people who fled the area at the outset of the offensive are slowly returning. It is imperative that continuous, well-planned operations be conducted in Duc Ton and Chau Thanh in order to stabilize the security situation.

b. Enemy Situation.

(1) The first nine days of February were a continuation of the VC Tet offensive which began 31 January 1968. The main effects of the VC in their Vinh Long Province, which encompasses the GVN provinces of Sadec and Vinh Long, were against the city of Vinh Long and the American airfield in Vinh Long. The VC activities in Sadec Province during this period were aimed at and succeeded in keeping the maximum number of GVN troops in Sadec Province to reduce the number of troops available for reinforcing Vinh Long GVN units. Forty of the eighty-one VC initiated incidents in the month of February in Sadec province occurred during this nine-day period. There were numerous reports of a second VC offensive which was to have begun this month, but to date no such offensive has materialized.

(2) It is significant that the VC are forcing young boys in rural areas under 16 years of age to serve in their units. Several of these young boys have been captured this month. Information received recently from prisoners, Chieu Hois, and other sources indicates that these young boys presently comprise 40-50% of many VC units. These same sources have stated that many VC from local guerrilla units have been integrated into the main force units due to recent severe personnel losses.

(3) The VC have continued to place pressure on the Duc Ton District Compound. There were six instances of the compound receiving 82mm mortar fire in February. One of these was an all out attack on the compound that failed due to the support rendered by the PBR's and helicopter gunships. The VC are attempting to destroy this GVN position in order to increase their control on highway 8A between Sadec and Vinh Long.

(4) There have been numerous sightings of a large unidentified unit in the Y. It has been reported that there is a new VC battalion located there with the mission of reinforcing the D857 Bn. and defending the Y base area. This unit has been reported to be either the 3rd Regiment or 306 Bn. from Vinh Long or a new unit that has infiltrated down from III Corps area.

(5) The VC can be expected to continue their attacks/harassments on outposts/watchtowers and road interdiction in Sadec Province. They
will continue to put pressure on the DUC TON District Compound. Due to heavy personnel losses in recent weeks, the VC are expected to continue forcing youths to leave rural areas and serve in their units. It is anticipated that the VC will now concentrate their efforts on resupply, recruitment, propaganda, and taxation.

c. Infrastructure.

(1) VC infrastructure activity worked in coordination with and with the support of VC military forces. Behind the shield of rumor, threat, and propaganda, VC guerrillas initially took over large portions of land which they had seldom penetrated before. Once inside these areas the indications are that political operations were immediate and intensive.

(2) Because most intelligence agencies were tasked with providing Order of Battle information in the face of imminent attacks throughout the province, it is difficult to piece together the full picture of VC political activity during the offensive. Reports filtered in from field interrogations, civil service bureaus, and although less frequently than in normal circumstances, from agent reports.

(3) It was learned that the VC launched a massive taxation program in the newly acquired areas. Whenever a VC force took control of a hamlet, the tax collections followed in its footsteps. In Phu Huu village (DUC TON District Town), the rich were forced to pay 3000 VN outright, the poor 1000 VN. In Binh Tien Village (an RD village), the rich paid 5000 VN, the poor 1000 VN (Refugee Chief). It was also learned that the VC walked right up to the city's defensive perimeter at night to collect taxes in Tan My Hamlet, Tan Vinh Hoa Village (ICX C/2), and in An Tich Village (PSB C/3). One source added that if the families did not have money, the VC would take the approximate amount in material value - food, clothing, medicine, etc.

(4) Reports from other areas are not available, but it is reasonable to assume that the taxation procedure was the norm when hamlets were left defenseless by the VC military threat.

(5) Information about rice collection is also scarce. It was reported in the middle of January 1968, that the people in VC controlled areas were allowed to move only 1/3 of their production to market and that the VC established check points along the canals to insure that this policy was upheld (PSB C/2). It was reported that nothing was moving into Cai Tau Ha Market, little into Binh Tien and Nha Man Markets, and only produce from the immediate environs into Sadec City's market. One report stated that the VC were attempting to stop everything moving by water from their controlled areas and at the same time block the roads to prevent road shipment (PHU C/2). The flow of goods to market has increased during the past week, but is still not believed to be normal.

(6) In line with this general taxation and rice collection campaign, reports indicate that a great number of the civilians who were kidnapped by the VC were being held for ransom. Several children, village officials, and some women were taken from Phu Huu Village in DUC TON District and were being held for some undisclosed amount of money or material (PSB C/3).
Similarly an unknown number of people were taken forcibly from Binh Tien Village (Refugee Chief). The 3/16th Regiment Commander reported that as many as 30 boys from 12 to 14 years old were kidnapped from Tan Duong and Hoa-Thanh Village areas, although no mention was made of ransom in this case. Isolated reports indicated that families of PF soldiers were being held as hostages, but this information is unconfirmed. The VC also carried out terror and kidnappings in An Tich Village where as many as 20 civilians were thought to have been kidnapped and one RD Cadre killed. There are currently 8 RD Cadre known to have been kidnapped by the VC.

(7) Census Grievance and other sources have reported a civilian detention area on the east leg of the "Y" in Duc Ton District. CG said that the civilians came from Vinh Long and Duc Ton District Town (C/2). We also received reports of the presence of a large detention area on the west leg of the "Y" where detainees are categorized as ransom bait, important civilian officials, and military (C/2). The presence of a third detention area is believed to be in Tan Duong Village (VN S-2), and there was a report (unknown source) that the VC were to hold a demonstration in that area to execute 22 ARVN soldiers captured 11 Feb 68 in Tan Duong Village. This report also has never been confirmed. Latest reports from two separate agencies indicate several civilians are being held in Phu Long Village, including the RDC Leader of Team #2, Sadec Province. He reportedly appealed to his team in Tan Huu II on the night of 26 Feb 68 by loudspeaker to desert the RD Program and GVN.

(8) Reports of VC propaganda have been vague. There does not appear to be a general theme other than "Americans must get out of Vietnam: the GVN is toppling; this is the year of the liberation". Loudspeakers were used on four occasions in Duc Ton in appeals to the defenders: "U.S. is number ten, GVN is number ten; give up and join us or we will kill you all". (American interpretation). Loudspeakers have also been used against the Chieu Hoi Center, the message being, "Return to your brothers". The Chieu Hoi Chief, of course, has pulled out his own loudspeaker in response, "Return to your brothers".

(9) Field interrogations and inquiries discovered that the VC had made nightly propaganda appeals in the area immediately southeast of the city, in RD area. The VC political apparatus was confirmed to have been operative in Ap Phu An, Ap Dong, Ap Tay, and Ap Phu Hoa. The VC claimed that Sadec City had been occupied, the GVN was falling, and that the only recourse was to join the successful liberation. The VC spread rumor and propaganda throughout the other rural areas which they have newly occupied. No definite assessment of the political attack can be advanced until the GVN has reclaimed its area from VC terror and control. This is slowly being accomplished. The area southwest of the city has been cleared to an appreciable degree, and GVN operations have started to push the VC back to the normal base areas west of the city and along the LOC's.

(10) The most important psychological appeal has been the economic and military harassment which the VC have dealt the populated areas. If the cities have become insecure, return to the rural areas (and the VC). If we are unable to get food from the markets, return to our relatives in the farmlands. The whispering campaigns promising attacks and the few sniper rounds fired in proximity to the city make the people believe that the VC are
really there in force. The people are terrified and bewildered; soon they will lose morale and want to give up. No, not here in Sadec - yet; think of the cities that were hard hit. These attacks were economic and political all over the country. It is just easier to see it in Sadec than in other province... (ARVN officer - no evaluation). During the past week pressure on the city has been significantly reduced.

(11) The Tet offensive in Sadec province was of secondary importance to the attacks on Vinh Long. The VC objectives in Sadec were the same as those proposed at the beginning of the "Winter - Spring Campaign". It was the national attack in general that gave the offensive in Sadec its significant political thrust and enabled the VC to achieve what they did with the relatively small number of committed forces. VC propaganda in Sadec could only take hold because they had made good their threats in other provinces and in other cities.

(12) The attack has been more intense in Duc Ton for several reasons. This was strategically located on route 8, it was a large refugee center, and it had two RD hamlets in progress. More significant is the fact that the liberation in Duc Ton District has always been at a more advanced stage and support a much larger military effort than elsewhere in Sadec Province. One source offered the opinion that the VC could not attack Sadec Province because the VC do not have the secret political apparatus to plan and carry out the attack from within, i.e. to hide weapons and ammunition, to house infiltrators in secrecy, to confuse the forces within the city while the mass infiltration was executed from without. A comprehensive study would probably show that the VC pushed the liberation forward one logical step in each of the four GVN districts in Sadec Province. This appears to be the secondary role that the Vinh Long Provincial Committee chose for its western area while the main attack was directed against Vinh Long. VC success can be evaluated in terms of their "Winter - Spring" objectives:

(a) To cut LOC's: The VC succeeded in isolating military forces and in stopping commercial traffic. Route 8 between Sadec and the My-Phuan Ferry has been impassable or at best insecure since the offensive began. Route 23 between the Cao Lanh Ferry and Sadec had 50 roadblocks on 22 Feb 68. This success can be seen in terms of excluding reaction capabilities to the Vinh Long attacks and of accomplishing far-reaching economic and, eventually, political objectives. LOC's have been opened again in Sadec Province, but commercial traffic is below normal.

(b) To return refugees to VC controlled areas: Duc Ton District Town and Binh Tien Village are two sizable refugee areas. The VC occupied these areas from the outset. The population left in great numbers, but it is not believed that they decided to return or were compelled to return to VC controlled areas. The VC further displaced refugees, but they did not regain them, as the VC put them to work in the VC fields.

(c) To stop RD, to diminish GVN influence: Five RD hamlets were occupied for three weeks, and two RD hamlets almost completely destroyed. RD hamlets scheduled to begin in June 1968, northwest of the city, were the
scene of heavy fighting and VC occupation. All RD teams were pulled into Sadec and only recently returned to their work sites. The population's confidence in the GVN's ability to secure it from VC terror has been lost in the countryside and reinforced in the province capital. It is felt, however, that the VC's terror tactics and forceful occupation of GVN influenced areas may have offset any psychological loss on the GVN's side in the rural areas. (Info/Psyps Officer). It is highly doubtful that the VC came close to winning any permanent support of the population with their propaganda per se. They must hold their ground and hold the roads and putting the economic bite on the population before they will be in a position to win the people; they will not be won by woo, but by want.

(d) To increase guerrilla strength: There are indications that the VC will keep the young boys they have seized from the countryside. VC confirmed losses for B/Sadec, B/LeHa, the Sadec city platoon, and B/Lap Vo total over 100. It is reasonable to assume that other units involved in heavy fighting have taken losses. It is impossible to estimate at this time how many GVN soldiers were recruited by the VC since the offensive began, but the figure is thought to be negligible.

(e) To increase tax collection: The VC have taxed extensively in the areas they have recently occupied. Infrastructure losses for the month may be high. Many political cadre were moving with or directly behind guerrillas. NGUYEN VAN TAN, aka: Hai Tan, Phu Long Village committee secretary has been reported missing from the VC ranks since 20 Feb 68. Said by an informant to have been captured, he may have been killed at Ap Dong. HUYNH VAN HONG, aka: SAU VAN, Binh Tien Village secretary, was seriously wounded in Ap Dong, as was TAM MOT, guerrilla leader in the area.

(f) Friendly Forces:

1. ARVN: ARVN units located in the Province have had the primary mission of defending the Provincial capital. During the reporting period they conducted 16 regimental, 2 battalion, and 33 company operations, however, none of these operations were for more than 8-10 hours duration.

2. Regional Forces: One RF Company has been used in the security of Sadec and it has accompanied ARVN and other RF/PF units on operations. Four RF Companies are in Duc Ton, two of these are located at the District Headquarters and the other two are at or near key areas along Route 8. There is one Company each in the District Towns of Lep Vo and Chau Thanh and one located at key points on Route 8 between the two Districts.

3. Popular Forces: These forces have been used extensively in road clearance operations, and they continue to set numerous ambushes, run patrols, etc.

4. US/FWMAF. There are no US/FWMAF involved in direct support of RD within Sadec Province.
5. ECONOMICS:

a. General: Because of the VC offensive and the resulting paralysis of the larger cities, interdiction of key LOC's, imposed curfews and refugee movements, the general economic health of the province experienced a temporary setback. The province still has an inadequate fuel supply. Because of this commercial consumers such as transportation agencies and production have not been able to operate at full capacity. Initially prices of basic commodities moved drastically upwards; however, with the imposition of price and ration controls, most prices have returned to normal and have remained reasonably constant. Due to shortage of fuel, a significant number of farmers who mill part of their rice into flour were forced to cease operations. Producers with more than 4 pigs experienced a shortage of feed (rice milling residue) and they sold at lower prices than normal. Saedic, which has an average rice production of 86,000 metric tons, is expected to harvest some 96,000 metric tons in 1968.

b. Material Resources and Transport: As stated above the most significant problems have resulted from inadequate fuel supply, which is normally brought in by tank truck. This deadline nearly all forms of transportation until 26 Feb when producers began hauling again both in and out of the Province. Transport statistics are not normally kept, however, the Province Chief has instructed that this now will be done. On 29 February, 13 trucks departed for Saigon with 79 tons of rice and fruit.

6. PROVINCIAL RESOURCES IN SUPPORT OF PACIFICATION:

a. RD Cadre Teams:

1. It was not until the middle of the month that enough of the cadres had returned from Tet to provide even a nucleus of the teams. Since that time a surprising number of cadres have reported for duty. At this writing there are only 17 cadres who have not returned to duty. Eight of these are believed to be captured. The only missing team leader has been confirmed as captured and has been broadcasting VC propaganda to his former team over a loudspeaker.

2. All teams remained in defensive positions in the Province capital of Sadéc. On the 24th and 26th of February, five teams moved back to the near vicinity of their hamlets but remained in a defensive posture. At this writing all teams are attempting to re-establish their presence in the hamlets.

3. In general, the programs of the teams have been completely halted during the month. However, only the two Ap Doi Moi's near the Duc Ton District capital have been significantly retarded.

b. Static Census-Grievence:

The Static Census-Grievence program produced very little during the month. This was due primarily to the lack of transportation and the strictly enforced curfew. On 26 February the study center was able to begin a training course for the hamlet cadre.
c. Self-Defense Forces:

There has been little change in the status of self-defense forces from the previous month. Province officials did organize various other types of forces for the defense of Sadec city. The most significant type was that composed of civil servants. These forces consisted of four teams of approximately 40 men each armed with weapons loaned to them by the RD Cadre Chief. A passive force has been organized in several hamlets located near Sadec City, and this force consists of local citizens without arms.

d. Technical Cadre: Nothing significant to report.

e. Police:

(1) National Police: The National Police are maintaining check points to control entry of personnel and material into the city as previously reported. In addition numerous combined cordon and search operations were conducted with NPFF, Police Special Branch, MSS, and Quan Canh. These operations in conjunction with the control points have been effective. To date no terrorist acts or VC attacks have occurred within the city. Prices have risen in conformity with national price increases for commodities. Traffic has began to move and is estimated at this time to be 50% of the pre-Viet traffic load.

(2) Intelligence: No change from last report.

(3) PFF: The 419th NPFF Company undertook no direct infrastructure missions during this reporting period due to PHOENIX personnel concentrating on order of battle information because of the security situation. There is still no change in the living conditions of the company. Due to poor security conditions no work was accomplished on the proposed camp site. The company has operated at maximum performance consistent with current strength. The company has been a part of the combined operations conducted within the city with PSD, MSS and Quan Canh, they have also operated with District Forces outside the city units. Existing supply problems will be solved upon receipt of items from the supply point. The retraining program scheduled for this reporting period was not conducted due to the security situation. Personnel shortages are critical and recruiting efforts have been negative due to the rise in the minimum age limit of 28 years by the Ministry of the Interior, and the shortage of a male labor pool within Sadec.

7. PROVINCIAL ADMINISTRATIVE PERSONNEL AND ORGANIZATION:

The provincial administrative personnel have performed admirably during the present crisis.

8. USAID/JUSPAO SECTION. No comment.

9. REQUIRED ACTIONS:

a. Request that a re-evaluation be made of the programmed employment of available dredges and See Bee teams. It may be desirable to reprogram these
assets to the more secure provinces where they can best be utilized.

b. To date this headquarters has received no indication when the Sadec Province Mechanized Platoon will be returned. Request action be taken to have this platoon returned as soon as the tactical situation permits.

RICHARD C. DAVIS
Acting Province Senior Advisor
Sadec Province.
PERIOD ENDING 29 February 1968

1. Successes, failings, status and activities of pacification within Duc Thanh District.

   a. The 1968 Pacification Program in the district has not been seriously affected by the Viet Cong during the TET offensive. RD team activities in the hamlet were suspended to permit effective resources and population control, and a coordinated military effort. The suspension of work in the Ap Doi Moi will cause a delay in scheduled project completion date. Nevertheless, the 1968 program can be completed during the calendar year because sufficient time was allocated in initial planning to offset delays caused by unforeseen circumstances. Prior to the TET offensive, 6 of the 98 tasks had been completed and 11 others were in working stages.

   b. There have been no attacks on the district by organized units. However, the TET offensive did bring about increased activities from local guerrillas. During the period, the district succeeded in organizing and equipping a reconnaissance unit to attack local VC and provide more reliable information on VC activities. Since 5 February, 22 local guerrillas have been killed in scattered actions throughout the district.

   c. If there were any fears or anxieties on the part of the people, as a result of the TET offensive, they have diminished considerably. This is evidenced by the fact that (1) self help projects continued to be processed at local levels, (2) increased boat and vehicular traffic (95 per cent of normal rate), (3) opened schools, (4) continued harvesting of rice crops, (5) thriving market places, (6) no evidence of anti-GVN or anti-American sentiments and (7) markedly increased number of day/night operations, patrols and ambushes.

   d. With the indications in paragraph c above pointing the way, the RD team moved back into the hamlet on a permanently working basis on 26 February.

2. Significant problems which are delaying pacification within Duc Thanh District. Excepting the TET offensive there are no significant problems which are delaying the 1968 Pacification Program. However, there are two deficiencies which decrease the district's ability to provide territorial security. These deficiencies have been reported in previous reports:

   a. Inadequate area coverage by assigned artillery. Attempts are being made to supplement artillery coverage with 4.2 inch mortars.

   b. Insufficient troop support. Two additional RF companies are required. Two companies have been recruited and equipped. One company is in training and the other one is scheduled for training. Estimated availability dates for RD support are April and July, respectively.

   Genear Nonconcur
   Province Senior Advisor
   Sadee Province

   JULIUS PARKER
   Maj., Inf.
   Senior District Advisor
PERIOD ENDING: 29 February 1968

DISTRICT CHIEF'S NAME
Grp. Tran Phat Minh

1. Successes, failings, status and activities of Pacification within LAP VO DISTRICT:

The 1968 Pacification Program in Lap Vo District was slowed down during the month of February due to the VC offensive. RD Cadre Team #7, working in Vinh Binh Hamlet, returned to work on February 24, 1968 and has completed seventeen (17) steps of their Ap Dsti Noi Program as of this date. The Construction Specialist went to work last week and has been busy planning the School Construction Program and assisting in Self-Help Projects. The initial shipment of cement and rebar for self-help projects was received this month and district officials are now in the process of getting the material out to the projects.

In the area of District security, Lap Vo conducted various operations during the month to keep the VC elements off-balance and unable to attack in force. One District operation resulted in the killing of thirty (30) VC (body count) and the capture of numerous prisoners and weapons. The unit engaged is believed to have been VC platoon B/Lap Vo. If this proves correct, this district has made progress during the month in the elimination of district VC forces.

It is felt at this time that the RD Program in this district has not been hurt to any degree by the VC offensive. The attitude of the people appears good and interest in Self-Help Projects is still improving. Provided the material and necessary support is given to this district, the 1968 program should be completed on time with outstanding results in overall pacification within the district.

2. Significant problems which are delaying pacification within Lap Vo District.

The VC offensive as of this date.

Concur/Nonconcur

James R Hoover
Maj, Inf
Senior District Advisor

Province Senior Advisor
Secdec Province
CHAU THANH DISTRICT REPORT
SADEC PROVINCE
ADVISORY TEAM: # 65
APO 96357

Period Ending: 29 February 1968
Dist. Chief's Name: Capt. Duong Huu Nghia

1. Successes, failing, status and activities within Chau Thanh Dist.

   a. The 1968 Pacification program in the District has suffered a loss of momentum as result of the withdrawal of the RD Teams during the recent Tet offensive. This will necessitate adjusting the planned completion dates of several individual projects, but will not significantly effect the overall program. Sufficient time was initially allocated to each phase to allow for such contingencies, so the 1968 program will be completed within the original time frame. RD Teams #1 and #6 returned to their respective hamlets on 26 February, and work is progressing steadily. In other areas, several hold-over self-help projects which were delayed because of the Tet offensive have been completed.

   b. Since the Tet offensive began the primary emphasis has been on the security of Sadec City. There was increased VC activity throughout the District particularly in the Binh Tien Village area and along highway 23. There were, however, no concentrated attacks in any area during the VC Tet offensive.

   o. The recent VC Tet offensive has polarized the people behind the GVN as evidenced by the civil defense force organized in Sadec City. The VC offensive has caused hardships of varying degrees throughout the District, but open support of the GVN (ie people openly reporting VC movement and activity) has increased substantially. There has been no evidence of open support of sympathy on the part of the people for the VC.

2. Significant problems which are delaying pacification within Chau Thanh District. The present troop deployment and artillery support does not provide adequate territorial security for the pacification program. The following increases are required if the pacification program is to progress as planned.

   a. Troop requirements: Two RF Companies are required in order to provide adequate security for the 1968 RD program. One RF Company has already been authorized and its currently under going training. A second RF Company will be required for RD support of second phase hamlets because of increased VC activity in the Tan My, Tan Kanh Tay, and Tan Duong Villages. In order to be available by June 1968, this Company must be authorized and begin training immediately.
PERIOD ENDING: 29 February 1968  DISTRIC'T CHIEF'S NAME: Nguyen Van Than

1. Successes, failings, status, and activities of pacification within Duc Ton District:

   a. MAJ John E. Albright, the Senior District Advisor, was medically evacuated for hepatitis and was replaced by MAJ Gerald O. Anderson.

   b. The RD cadre were released on leave prior to the TET holiday and were unable to return to duty in this district until 24 February because of the security situation. As a result, no appreciable RD progress was made this month.

   c. The TET offensive was concentrated primarily against the District Headquarters. During this month the headquarters was mortared a total of eight times and attacked by an estimated battalion size VC unit. During one period of time, the VC controlled the District town for five days. Two ADM hamlets adjacent to the District Town were the scene of much fighting and several airstrikes. The hamlet people evacuated to the Province Capitol and are only now beginning to return to their homes. Approximately 125 family dwellings were destroyed during the fighting. Refugee relief commodities and monies are being provided these people. Noteworthy was the fact that there was no increase in VC activities in two 1967 ADM hamlets, Tan Huu I and Phu Nhuan.

   d. The TET offensive has resulted in the district RF/PF strength dropping from over 700 present for duty to 600 due to combat losses and desertions.

   e. Progress in the completion of the 98 steps of the RD 11 point criteria are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>HAMLET</th>
<th>STEPS COMPLETED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Phu My Luong</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phu Hoa</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tan Huu II</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tan Huu Dong</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

   f. The situation is expected to return to Pre-TET standards within the next few weeks. Commerical traffic is slowly returning to normalcy, the Refugee Service is making relief supplies available as required, and the District Chief has regulated the price of food to prevent inflation.
2. Significant problems which are delaying pacification within Duc Ton District:

The success of the VC stems from our lack of military initiative. The District RF companies are all in direct support of RO teams. The District Chief is unable to mass a sizeable military force because of this, and therefore, he will not conduct an operation without a reserve force. The additional RF companies programed for this district should provide the required military forces to operate in this district.

Gerald O. Anderson
Major Infantry
Senior District Advisor

CONFIDENTIAL