FOURTH CORPS REPORT ON TET OFFENSIVE - 4/68
HEADQUARTERS
US ARMY ADVISORY GROUP, IV CTZ
ADVISORY TEAM 96, APO 96215

MEMORANDUM

8 APR 1968

SUBJECT: Historical Summary of VC Tet Offensive IV CTZ

COM: USMACV

FROM: MACOI

APO 96222

1. References:
   a. Confidential Hq MACV Msg 07226.
   b. Confidential Hq MACV Msg 03789.

2. In compliance with above references the attached historical summary of the Viet Cong Tet Offensive--IV Corps Tactical Zone is submitted.

FOR THE SENIOR ADVISOR:

L. E. LIONS
Captain, AGC
Asst. AG

1 Incl

as
On 29 January 1968 the Senior Advisor, IV Corps Tactical Zone had issued a warning to all subordinate elements in the IV Corps that during the impending Vietnamese lunar New Year Tet holiday cease-fire period the Viet Cong were expected to resupply and move into position for a post-Tet offensive. This warning was based on past experience during cease-fire periods and recent intelligence reports indicating this type of action was planned. On 29 January the following message, based on intelligence, was sent: "Desire immediate dissemination of following information to all provinces without delay. There are a number of positive intelligence indicators that the enemy will deliberately violate the truce by approaching friendly installations during night of 29 January or early morning of 30 January. All provincial senior advisors will take action to insure maximum alert posture through the Tet period. Be particularly alert for enemy deception involving use of friendly vehicles and uniforms." At approximately 1000 hours 30 January 1968 the SA IV Corps was informed by HQ MACV that the Tet holiday truce had been cancelled. This information was immediately disseminated to all IV Corps elements.

b. At the outset of the Tet offensive there were thirty-nine ARVN maneuver battalions available to the IV Corps Commanding General for combat. The 41st Ranger Battalion was in III Corps at the Ranger Training Center and participated in the battle of Saigon until its return to IV Corps on 20 February 1968. Due to the liberal leave policy of ARVN during the Tet holiday period, ARVN units were below normal operational strengths. Also available and used during the period were the assigned US combat support units and elements of the 9th Infantry Division (US).

c. Within the first 24 hours, commencing approximately 0230 hours 31 January 1968, ten (10) of the eleven (11) Viet Cong designated province capitals and several district towns were under attack. Within forty-eight (48) hours all Viet Cong province capitals had been attacked and some occupied. In the same forty-eight (48) hour period thirteen (13) of sixteen (16) Government of Vietnam province capitals had been struck. The following chronological listing of events from 31 January 1968 through 14 February 1968 outlines the major events that took place in the IV Corps Tactical Zone:

(1) In the I4th Special Zone, initially, intense fighting broke out in Chau Doc, Moc Hoa and Tri Ton. In both Chau Doc and Tri Ton the heavy fighting lasted approximately thirty-six hours. Both cities were infiltrated by Viet Cong units but in neither case were the Viet Cong able to capture
military or political installations. They were rapidly driven out of position and by 0200 hours the situation was quiet except that supply operations in the province were disrupted for the next few days. The next day, at 0315 hours, Cao Lanh was mortared but no ground attack occurred. By 0700 hours the same day ARVN units trapped an estimated three hundred man Viet Cong force outside the city. Airstrikes and gunships were called in and an estimated two hundred Viet Cong were killed. On 4, 6, and 9 January Cao Lanh and the province capital headquarters were attacked again. However, the attacks were not pressed and died out by nightfall in all three cases. Three other district towns were also hit during the initial period but were not seriously threatened.

(2) In the Upper Delta Area the two hardest hit cities were My Tho and Ben Tre although practically all of the province and district towns received either a mortar or ground attack. My Tho and Ben Tre were both infiltrated during the evening of 30 January and fighting started at 0300 hours on 31 January. Two Viet Cong units, 261 Battalion and 207 Company, entered My Tho from the northwest penetrating at the PBR and RAG bases. The 261st Battalion attacked My Tho from the north, engaging the 32nd Ranger Battalion, and 514 Battalion attacked from the west. Heavy fighting raged through the city until dawn of 2 February when the main Viet Cong units disengaged. The next day clearing operations started and on 4 February heavy fighting took place again in the city. By 5 February the Viet Cong units had been pushed out of the city but operations to clear the area surrounding the city lasted well into the middle of the month, with moderate to heavy fighting north of the city.

Highway #4 was interdicted in sixty-two locations and six bridges were damaged from 6 to 8 February. Efforts to open the road were begun on 11 February and by 16 February the route was open from the III Corps boundary to the Mekong River. The route has remained open for at least a portion of each day since that time.

The Viet Cong also infiltrated two battalions into Ben Tre on 31 January occupying key locations near US and ARVN installations. Mortar and ground attacks against the city started at 0300 hours and heavy fighting lasted for the next two and a half days. By nightfall on 2 February fighting had subsided and the next morning search and clear operations started. From 3 to 14 February sporadic contact was made with Viet Cong units but the danger to the city gradually diminished after the initial onslaught.

Go Cong, the capital of Go Cong Province, was mortared at the outset of the offensive but not until 5 February did it receive a ground attack. During the attack, which lasted only one day, the Viet Cong liberated one hundred prisoners from the city jail. Another half-hearted attack was launched against the city on 8 February but was quickly beaten off.

During the fighting in the 7th Division area two US brigades assisted the ARVN units in My Tho and Ben Tre. Two battalions of the 1st Brigade were in Ben Tre on 1 and 2 February and two battalions of the 2nd Brigade supported by a firm support base were in My Tho on the same dates.
(3) In the 41st DTA the two primary objectives of the Viet Cong were Vinh Long City and airfield, and Tra Vinh City. Heavy fighting lasted in Vinh Long from 0330 hours 31 January until 4 February when the city was cleared of Viet Cong soldiers. The following units were sent to reinforce the city on 3 February: 4/16, 3/10, 3/2 Cav, 43rd Rgr and Recon Bn. Additionally, on 4 February, two companies of the 9th Division (US) were inserted south of the city to clear the Viet Cong units in this area which were threatening the airfield.

By February the situation in Vinh Long had been restored to near normal and no major threat occurred after that date.

Tra Vinh City was also attacked on 31 January, although not as strongly as Vinh Long and by the next day, 1 February, it was clear of major Viet Cong units although minor activity continued until 6 February.

(4) In the 42nd DTA determined efforts were made by the Viet Cong to take Can Tho and Can Tho airfield, and Soc Trang and airfield. Lesser attacks took place against Ca Mau, Rach Cia and on 31 January. Soc Trang, Ca Mau, Rac Lieu and Rach Cia had been cleared by 1 February but heavy fighting raged in Can Tho until 5 February when the Viet Cong forces were finally routed out of the university. From that day until the present periodic heavy fighting has taken place in the area west of Can Tho. The Viet Cong units in the area seem determined to remain and harass the airfields at Can Tho and Binh Thuy, which they do two or three times a week. On 13 February the Mobile Riverine Force of the 9th Division (US) joined the ARVN units in their efforts to clear the Viet Cong out to the Ba So Road and thus expand the Can Tho defensive perimeter to safer limits. The Mobile Riverine Force remained under operational control of the Senior Advisor, IV Corps until 4 March.

2. CASUALTIES AS OF 14 FEBRUARY 1968:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VIET CONG</th>
<th>ARVN</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KIA</td>
<td>5252</td>
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<tr>
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<td>MIA</td>
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FIREMAP

KIA - 2 (K8X)

VC WEAPONS CAPTURED

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ARVN WEAPONS LOST</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>246</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
a. Personnel absences must be more stringently controlled. Positive steps must be taken to regulate the number of personnel authorized to "miss days" so that the unit combat strength is not depleted during special holidays or future truce periods.

b. Major population centers should have counterattack plans identifying in a minimum the control measures on an overlay. These plans should be coordinated to units in consonance with security.

c. Infantry and armored cavalry units must be trained to operate as engineer arms and to fight in built up areas. This training should include instruction on techniques and principles of mutual support, assault and reduction of positions, clearing of buildings, employment of supporting fires and security of an area once it has been cleared.

d. Coordination must be conducted between provincial forces, government agencies and ARVN to better control the civilian population. Civilians in cities contributed to the confusion experienced by the reaction forces during the first day of the offensive, additional, they were used as intelligence gathering sources by the Viet Cong. This was particularly evident on 31 January and 1-2 February, during the mass exodus from Nha Rueu. A check point or traffic control system must be established to keep the civilians from interfering with military operations.

e. Defensive positions in compound areas or base locations must be continually maintained and improved. Improvements include: Rebuilding and strengthening bunkers, installations of communications trenches, installation of barrier materials to include flame mines, trip flares and booby traps, construction of overhead cover, and increased alertness of the personnel occupying the positions. The casualty rate during the days following the offensive was extremely low because the above mentioned actions had been taken.

f. When practical, engineer personnel, equipment, and material should be prepositioned along LOC's so that they can be immediately responsive to interdictions of the LOC.

g. Emergency landing facilities capable of receiving landing craft medium, landing craft utility or tactical military rafts should be constructed adjacent to critical ferry sites.

4. LOGISTICS:

a. General.

(1) Pre-Tet Preparations, ARVN. Logistically, stocks of POL, ammunition and other supplies were not present in sufficient quantities or dispersed adequately enough to react to an offensive of this magnitude, so resupply plans and procedures were not adequate to stage, transport, and issue supplies to ARVN units under the impact of the Viet Cong offensive.
(2) Pre-Tet preparations, US Combat Support Units. The Army aviation units in combat support had pre-stocked ammunition and Class IIIA. However, the replenishment of stage fields was overly dependent on commercial deliveries. The result was over reliance on combat emergency and emergency resupply airlift to sustain combat operations.

(3) Supply support for MACV Advisory Teams and attached US units. Adequate supply support for MACV advisory units and immediately after the Tet offensive was unreliable. The interdiction of the lines of communications severely affected ARVN's ability to resupply MACV advisory teams. Logistical support of advisory teams and attached US units through US 1st Logistical Command channels had to be accomplished on an emergency, rationed basis for items such as POL due to inadequate stocking at Can Tho and other 1st Logistical Command supply points in the IV CTZ. Lack of adequate US transportation assets delayed movement of US supplies into the IV CTZ.

b. ARVN Logistics.

(1) Disruption of lines of communication. The most detrimental obstacle created by the VC Tet offensive was the extensive interdiction of the LOCs within the IV CTZ. All forms of land and water transportation were either halted or so contained that the movement of supplies and services to ARVN forces and the MACV advisory units by these modes of travel was greatly curtailed. Both commercial and ARVN land transport terminated during the first two weeks of the offensive. Water transport was limited to ARVN RAG assets which were considered inadequate to support logistic needs and were stifled by the interdiction of nearly all canal traffic by the Viet Cong.

(2) Discontinuance of normal supply. During the period of 31 January to 14 February, normal ARVN supply was non-existent. The VC besieged many major supply points destroying many supplies and damaging logistical installations. Supply of ammunition and POL became immediately critical. To resupply all 72 artillery sites with ammunition, and ARVN and Province units with small arms and mortar ammunition MACV IV Corps air assets (3 C7A Caribous, 3 Otters U1A and 3 CH-47 assault helicopters) had to be used extensively. Prior to the Tet offensive ARVN forces relied entirely on commercial and military truck and in some cases RVNAF RAG boats to move POL. During the offensive normal POL deliveries were halted. The IV Corps Advisory Group air assets had to assume the mission of delivering emergency POL supplies for ARVN.

c. US Combat Support Requirements.

(1) IV Corps Fixed Wing Air Assets. The Tet offensive caused the diversion of the C7A aircraft assigned to the IV Corps from their regular passenger and cargo service to support of the MACV advisory effort, ARVN forces, and US combat support units within the IV CTZ. In order to return stranded ARVN troops to their units and relocate ARVN units for tactical operations, the C7A's were tasked to accomplish these missions. In addition, medical evacuation of wounded and resupply of emergency ammunition and POL were accomplished using these aircraft.
(2) Support requirements of the 164th Aviation Group. The capability to support the main US Army airfields and various staging fields used by the 164th Aviation Group for combat support operations was severely taxed during the Tet offensive period and continued to present a problem after this period. Normal POL and ammunition resupply could be provided to sustain US operations at an acceptable level. To replenish stocks consumed by combat operations, it was necessary to rely completely on combat and emergency resupply missions to support air operations in the IV CTZ. Utilizing the C-123 and C-130 aircraft for these missions, 3,131.26 tons of cargo were flown into the IV Corps airfields. During this period, a cargo consisted of 35,000 gallons of AVGAS, 530,000 gallons of JP4,44,028 3 inch rockets, 11,163 flares, 43,320 40mm shells and 5,680,000 7.62mm rounds.

d. Logistical support of US personnel in the IV CTZ.

(1) ARVN support of US Advisory Teams. Current policies prescribed at ARVN furnish POL, ammunition and barrier materials to MACV advisory units. US logistical support for MACV IV Corps advisors and other US units provided by the logistical support activity, Can Tho. Class I, II, III, IV supply, and maintenance support is provided by this activity.

(2) Due to ARVN's dependency on commercial contractors to furnish POL, the ARVN logistical system, the road interdiction by the VC prevented the supply of POL through the ARVN supply system. Commercial carriers would not deliver as long as the VC reprisals existed. POL products in the IV CTZ dropped below safe levels. The MACV advisory teams had to depend on the US logistic system to provide POL. Combat emergency and emergency resupply airlifts were used for delivery along with aircraft dedicated to the IV Corps Advisory Group. The IV Corps aircraft transported POL and ammunition to MACV advisory teams and US units.

(3) The supply and delivery of barrier material by ARVN to MACV advisors was virtually non-existent during the Tet offensive. As a result, any US advisors were unable to adequately repair defenses damaged during the Tet offensive.

e. US Support of MACV advisory teams and other US units in the IV CTZ. Prior to the Tet offensive, US support to advisory teams consisted of Class I, II & IV supplies being requested through the 1st Logistical Command and distributed by THA - (Transportation Management Agency). During the Tet period, the shortage of water and air transportation limited the quantities of supplies received by the Logistical Support Activity, Can Tho, and placed the burden of distributing supplies on the limited IV Corps Advisory Group air assets. Rationing POL products, shortages in rations and demands on the US logistics system not normally provided by the US to MACV advisors occurred.

f. Signal Communications for Logistics.

As a result of the Tet offensive, telephonic communications were severely damaged. Communications with advisory teams was even non-existent
Advisors to the 4th ALC moved their essential operations to the new G-3 office where one telephone was operational. In turn, liaison was established at the Can Tho Airfield and ARVN ammunition depot to insure coordination of critical C-4 Activities.

g. Prestocked stage fields within IV CTZ.

(1) The thirteen stagefields customarily used by IV Corps units as bases of operations have established stockage objectives for JPL, aviation gas and Class V ammunition. The fields are normally resupplied by commercial vehicles contracted from the Shell and Esso Oil Companies. Prior to Tet, the fuel levels averaged about 80% of the authorized levels. Anticipating fewer than normal deliveries during the Tet holidays, emphasis had been placed on achieving as high a level in each of the products as was possible. When the VC initiated their simultaneous attacks on most of the major cities in the Delta, the civilian contracted POL facilities ceased all deliveries. It was discovered that traffic of that nature had been prohibited by the VC from travelling the highways. The prestocked fuel was steadily depleted by numerous air-mobile operations; however, because the VC were massing in the proximity of ARVN Troop bases, a lesser quantity was consumed per reaction operation in comparison to pre-Tet air mobile operations.

(2) The following actions were taken to lessen the effects on curtailed commercial fuel deliveries.

(a) Fields with less than C-123 capability received limited use. All fuel resupply was by US air or water transportation. Since boats could only resupply Dong Tam, Vinh Long and Can Tho, all other airfields required either C123 or C130 aircraft support.

(b) The major Army airfields of Vinh Long, Soc Trang and Can Tho required several emergency airlifts for resupply of JPL, AVGAS, Diesel and Mogas. This support was adequate to sustain defensive operations but did not permit a buildup to regain the pre-Tet levels.

(3) From the period 29 January 1968 to 14 February 1968, commercial POL distributors provided no support to US or ARVN forces. During this period the Esso terminal located at Cai Rang, west of Can Tho, was isolated from Can Tho by the VC. Fuel to support the Army airfields located at Can Tho was obtained from either US storage facilities on the field or from the Shell terminal in Can Tho.

(4) Lessons Learned:

(a) It may be expected that future VC attacks will again disrupt normal contractor services. Therefore, utmost efforts must be taken to prestock stage fields to authorized stockage levels.

(b) Emergency resupply by air is available, but with the volume of requests that can be expected, delivery dates will be filled three to five days from the date the request is initiated.
There is a requirement for US Army tanker and truck support to deliver of PCL during similar periods in which the VC succeed in disrupting normal commerce.

(d) Class V (air) supplies must continue to be prestocked to maximum extent possible consistent with security available. This will require a higher ammunition allocation to the 164th Aviation Group, to ensure a realistic level without diminishing fire support required for operations.

h. Engineering Activities and effects:

(1) Effect on military - public engineering. The VC Tet offensive was particularly punishing to military, public engineering activities in the IV CTZ. VC deliberate destruction was directed primarily against the land lines of communication, National Route Highway 64, and Interprovincial Routes 31, 7, and 6A. Damage to airfields, fortifications and cantonments was a by-product of ground fighting and by comparison to LOCs, relatively insignificant. There was no damage to the canal system in the Delta. During the period 31 January through 14 February, Highway 64 was interdicted constantly. Seven (7) bridges were destroyed and seven (7) damaged.

(2) Highway 64 (QL4) Interdiction. On the nights of 31 January and 1 February, Highway 64, Provincial Roads 6A, 7, 8, and 31 were interdicted in sufficient number of places to close the roads to any but the most localized traffic. The initial lack of security elements to accompany military engineer effort to restore the trafficability on the routes resulted in a period of about 10 days before any significant sections of Highway 64 were open to traffic. While the many craters and cuts in the road required extensive engineer effort to fill and repair, the limiting factor to opening sections of Highway 64 was the repair/replacement of destroyed and damaged bridges. Although engineer effort to open the roads was continuous, repeated nightly VC interdiction in the form of mining, cratering, burns, obstacles and hand labor digging caused much of the initial repair work to be repeated. Thus, section of Highway 64 were finally opened to at least one way traffic, as follows:

10 February - Vinh Long to Sadec
12 February - My Tho to Ciao Duc
14 February - Vinh Long to Can Tho

(a) At the end of the reporting period Highway 64 was open to both commercial and military traffic each day, although a combination of security requirements and engineer effort reduced the useable time period to generally the afternoon hours.

(b) At the beginning of the period all US Engineer elements in the IV CTZ area voluntarily placed themselves under the coordinating control of the IV CTZ Advisor. Fortunately, emergency repairs of other US installations and on Highway 64 were not so urgently required as to commit US
Elements in support of ARVN and Public Works engineering forces. US Engineer units in the Dong Tam area were heavily committed to repairs on Highway #4 while other elements further south supported ARVN efforts by hauling fill material and providing loading equipment.

(3) VC interdiction followed several noticeable engineering trends:

(a) Route interdiction was heaviest on Highway #4, reasonably heavy on military important Provincial Roads 6A, 7 and 31 and of little or no consequence generally north and west of Highway #4.

(b) Interdiction was highly destructive the first two nights, dying off rapidly to just enough to effectively close the road each day and expand the majority of available engineer efforts.

(c) Primary damage was in economically important Dinh Tuong Province, with diminishing interdictions south on Highway #4.

(d) Highly trained and professional Rappel units were employed in Dinh Tuong Province where it appeared that interdictions further south were by local forces not specifically trained in demolitions work.

(e) Extensive use was made in all provinces of local civilians to dig ditches across the road and move the soil 50 meters away to construct a berm across the road.

(f) Repeated craterings in the same area appeared part of a propaganda play to show the uncommitted population that the enemy could interdict at will. In these areas the road base was so weakened that progressively less demolitions would be required to produce an adequate crater.

(g) When working outside of secure compounds ARVN and US engineers were only about 50% effective. The lack of adequate security frequently disrupted work. The requirement to form security units each day and the requirement that the security withdraw to the city each night reduced the effective working hours for the engineer element to about 6 daily.

(4) Summary:

(a) In the final analysis ARVN and US engineers performed in a highly commendable and professional manner, leaving only the paucity of units to be deployed. The coordination and cooperation between ARVN and US elements and Public Works are worth of praise. Although Public Works had difficulty mustering its work force, all available engineer elements reacted to the Tet challenge with speed, confidence and aggressiveness.

(b) The overall impact of the Tet offensive was to delay normal engineering projects by 30 days, the period during which only emergency repair and combat support activities were conducted, and an estimated additional 60 days of 100% engineering commitment, to rebuild or rehabilitate the roads, fortifications and military facilities damaged during the month of February #3.
1. Air Support of the IV Corps:

(1) Reliance on the air mode of transportation. As discussed above, all ground and water lines of communication in the IV CTZ were interdicted during the Tet offensive. ARVN could not transport either ammunition or other requirements in the IV CTZ. The MACV advisors and attached US units had to receive their ammunition, POL, food and other emergency supplies by IV Corps air assets. This reliance on IV Corps aircraft was the only alternative to take in order to minimize the damage inflicted by the VC and repulse the VC offensive.

(2) CH-47 Assault Helicopter support. The three (3) CH-47 Chinooks assigned to the IV Corps Advisory Group accepted the burden of delivering artillery ammunition to the majority of the artillery sites dispersed throughout the Delta. In addition, the supply of isolated ARVN, MACV and US teams and units in the IV CTZ with food, ammunition, POL, etc. required CH-47 delivery. The delivery of artillery fire, the ability of signal sites to communicate and the resupply of MACV and US personnel was accomplished by the direct contributions of the CH-47 operations.

(3) Fixed Wing Aircraft support. As previously mentioned, the C7A aircraft assigned to IV Corps Advisory Group were diverted from their missions for emergency air movement of supplies and personnel. This is also true of the three (3) U1A Otters assigned to the IV Corps Advisory Group. The movement of ammunition, POL, rations, personnel and medical evacuation were accomplished. Not until 10 February 1968, was it possible to assign one C7A to carry passengers and mail for IV Corps advisors from Saigon to Can Tho. During February 1968 the C7A's flew 632 sorties, 9387 passengers, and 702.68 tons of cargo. From 1-14 February 1968 alone, the IV Corps fixed wing aircraft flew 304 sorties, 3000 passengers, and 334.60 tons of cargo.

j. Medical Service during the Tet Offensive.

(1) Initial phases of the offensive. At the onset of the Tet offensive each RVNAF medical unit acted as trained; the frontline medic evacuated, platoons treated, and the hospitals admitted patients. The medical facilities were tasked by prior planning in the form of expansion plans and mass casualty planning paid great dividends. Fortunately the hospital commanders and the Corps Surgeon are extremely competent men. As problems arose they were handled. The staff members absent for Tet filtered back rapidly, they were given special priority on air transportation means. The military medical system treated both civilians and military casualties. The number of wounded was actually far less than was expected for actions so large. The RVNAF medical system responded well to the entire emergency period and can be justly proud of their accomplishments.

(2) Latter phase of the offensive.

As time progressed, shortages in critical medical items occurred. The Corps Surgeon took action to impound all oxygen available on the civilian market so that it could only be sold to authorized civilian or military medical facilities. Response from outside of Corps was generally poor. Oxygen ordered on the 2nd of February did not arrive in the users hands still
Timely action taken by the Corps Surgeon solved the
problem. Very few emergency requests were received from ARVN units. These
requests were handled expeditiously by the 761st Medical Depot. Close
cooperation between ARVN and civilian medical depots was also made
between the ARVN and civilian medical depots in
coordination with the ARVN and civilian medical depots in

As there is no

The joint medical supply facility in IV CTZ and the US supply point at Long Binh

As the situation developed, shortages of whole blood were

realized. Pre-planned blood programs went with effect. Medical and pay-war
assets were used, so a result any shortages were short-lived and blood was
not a particular problem.

Aero-Medical Evacuation.

The cornerstone of medical support in IV CTZ is medical evacuation.
The existing assets, one US helicopter ambulance detachment (82nd Med Det
(GRA)) and several from the general mission pool of the 217th Helicopter Sqd,
were soon strained to the breaking point. The men and machines were strained,
the system deteriorated slightly. Medics were placed on cargo aircraft so
that back haul could be made of wounded after cargo was delivered. Until
further support is provided for this CTZ the problem of a taxed system will continue. Evacuation of US wounded was not a problem and no delay occurred as the first priority for evacuation by the US Army
helicopter ambulance detachment goes to the US military and civilian personnel.
The 217th Helicopter Sqd VNAF did everything in its power consistent with the
restrictive regulations imposed on it to accomplish its medical evacuation
mission.

Medical support of refugees.

Immediately it was noted that refugee problems would occur. Orders
were sent from the Corps Surgeon to all medical units in the CTZ to assist the
civilian medical system as much as possible in refugee support, and without
exception this order was followed. Medcap teams were sent out, preventive
medicines and immunization programs started. The prompt action of the Corps
Surgeon allowed the government to initiate and maintain an effective program.
As the civilian system got back on its feet the role of the military phased out.
All action needed was responsive and timely to the problem.

As patients were reaching the convalescent stage, the problem of
returning them to their units arose. Again timely action by the Corps Surgeon
caused a convalescent center to be organized in empty buildings at the Can Tho.
Every effort was made to return discharged troops to their homes and
Air, water, and road convey, when possible, were used. As transpor-
tation became available patients were returned to duty.
(7) Utilization ARVN and US Medical Assets.

ARVN and US medical assets throughout the CTZ were used to treat injured civilians and military throughout the emergency. Mass casualty situations occurred and were treated. No napalm injuries were recorded in the entire CTZ. The majority of burns treated resulted from VC action when they burned homes and hamlets. In Can Tho for example, ARVN ambulances and medical and pay-war personnel, on many occasions went in under fire to extract the wounded from VC burned areas.

(8) Appraisals of ARVN and US Medical Systems.

The ARVN and US medical system in the Delta responded well. Prior emergency planning was the key to success. The prompt action taken by medical commanders at all levels was a great assistance. The entire system was closely coordinated and although each hospital was able to handle the load presented to it, they, when necessary were mutually supporting. The entire medical load was sustained by inter-zone assets. Again, for the amount of action generated by the Tet offensive the casualty load was not considered excessive.

(9) Performance of Medical Personnel and Advisors.

(a) Incidents of heroism among medical units were many. Especially worthy of note were the actions of the 32nd Medical Company in Vinh Long and the Sector Hospital at Ca Mau, there units defended their positions when attacked, accounted for numerous of the enemy KIA and continued in their medical missions. Without exception the medical facilities were not exempt from attack, the ARVN facilities at Ca Mau and Vi Than have suffered extensive damage.

(b) US medical advisors also responded well to the emergency. They advised, coordinated and when necessary, did that which was required to effect a cohesive medical service in the IV CTZ during the Tet offensive.

5. PACIFICATION:

a. Revolutionary Development.

(1) General: The Tet offensive in IV Corps had a devastating effect on the Revolutionary Development Program. It is not possible yet to accurately evaluate the damage that has been done on a province-by-province basis. During the final half of February, RD officials, U.S. and GVN, were assessing the degree of remodeling that will be necessary in the 1963 plans. These will vary from drastic revision to no changes in others. It is noteworthy that few RD areas and hamlets were attacked by the VC in spite of reduced security. To what extent, if any, the VC infiltrated RD hamlets during the periods of reduced security has not been assessed. Extensive damage was done to provincial towns by friendly forces in their efforts to dislodge VC elements from populated areas. Performance of military units in support of RD during the month was generally good with several exceptions. Numerous reports were received of extensive looting in Vinh Long by elements of the 9th ARVN Division and the Rangers.
2. Initial Assessment: All 1968 RD Plans will hinge on the provision of adequate military security forces. Initial damage and security estimates indicate that:

(a) An Giang, An Xuyen, Bac Lieu, Chuong Thien, and Sa Dec provinces were undamaged or lightly damaged in RD areas and are capable of proceeding with 1968 RD Plans.

(b) Kien Hoa, Vinh Long, Ba Xuyen, Vinh Long, and Kien Tuong received damage to the degree that restoration is needed in 1967 RD hamlets, but limited activity will be possible in development of 1968 RD hamlets.

(c) Kien Phong, Chau Doc, Kien Giang, Phong Dinh, Dinh Tuong, and Go Cong, received damage to a degree which will require major reassessment of RD plans.

3. ARVN in Support of RD: Of the 14 ARVN battalions assigned to RD support on 31 January 1968, six battalions or elements of the battalions were assigned new security missions in defense of Province Capitals. Status of RD battalions during February is indicated below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RD BN</th>
<th>PROVINCE</th>
<th>ASSIGNED RD POSITION</th>
<th>TET OFFENSIVE POSITION</th>
<th>REMARKS</th>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>4/32</td>
<td>Bac Lieu</td>
<td>Vinh My</td>
<td>Vinh My</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4/31</td>
<td>Chuong Thien</td>
<td>Duc Long</td>
<td>Vi Thanh</td>
<td>Replaced by 1 RF Co.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/11</td>
<td>Dinh Tuong</td>
<td>Tam Hiep</td>
<td>Tam Hiep</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4/12</td>
<td>Go Cong</td>
<td>Hoa Phinh</td>
<td>Go Cong</td>
<td>Replaced by 1 RF Co. and 2 PF Platoons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/31</td>
<td>Kien Giang</td>
<td>Kien Thanh</td>
<td>Rach Gia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/10-2/10</td>
<td>Kien Hoa</td>
<td>Ba Tri</td>
<td>Ba Tri</td>
<td>Replaced by 1 RF Co. and 1 CIDG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4/11 (-)</td>
<td>Kien Tuong</td>
<td>Kien Binh</td>
<td>Noc Hoa</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/33</td>
<td>Phong Dinh</td>
<td>Cau Nhia</td>
<td>Bac Lieu</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/16 (-)</td>
<td>Sa Dec</td>
<td>Chau Du Tru</td>
<td>Chau Du Tru</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/14 &amp; 4/14</td>
<td>Vinh Binh</td>
<td>Gang Long</td>
<td>Gang Long</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4/16</td>
<td>Vinh Long</td>
<td>Xang Thit</td>
<td>Vinh Long</td>
<td>2 Co's. remained.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4. Revolutionary Development Cadre:

(a) Many of the RD Cadre were brought into the province cities or district towns at the beginning of the offensive. Some were quickly returned to their 67 Phase II hamlets, 55 teams at the end of February. Some were in 68 Phase I hamlets, 18 at the end of February. Seventy-two teams were still in province or district towns at the end of February. Forty-five teams were in rural areas other than 67 or 68 pacification hamlets (38 village teams of An Giang, 2 each in Bac Lieu, Ba Xuyen and Go Cong, and 1 in Phong Dinh). A total of 190 RD teams. The fact that the team was listed as being in a hamlet is more that the flage was there, not necessarily that the full team was there. For example, in An Xuyen, two-thirds of the 5 teams listed in Phase II 67 hamlets were in fact in Ca Mau City. In Kien Hoa, on 23 February there were 11 teams listed in the Phase II 67 hamlets of Ba Tri RD area, but the total cadre present for duty was 45, the balance were either in Ben Tre or were missing.

(b) During February approximately 90% of the cadre that were accounted for were involved in security and/or relief-refugee work. All provinces were moving the teams out into the rural areas as soon as the local situation stabilized. This had to be a provincial decision due to the varying conditions. Orders were issued that all teams would be returned to RD areas as soon as possible but not later than 1 April.

(c) Strength data for the month of February was as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROVINCES</th>
<th>STRENGTH</th>
<th>KILLED</th>
<th>CAPTURED</th>
<th>OTHER</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
<th>TOTAL GAINS</th>
<th>STRENGTH</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>An Giang</td>
<td>737</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>766</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>An Xuyen</td>
<td>379</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>379</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ba Xuyen</td>
<td>765</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>630</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bac Lieu</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chau Doc</td>
<td>986</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>925</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chuong Thien</td>
<td>472</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>465</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dinh Tuong</td>
<td>498</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>511</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Go Cong</td>
<td>937</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>926</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kien Giang</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>633</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kien Hoa</td>
<td>545</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>542</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kien Phong</td>
<td>347</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>209</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phong Dinh</td>
<td>786</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>632</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sadoc</td>
<td>620</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>450</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vinh Binh</td>
<td>469</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>731</td>
<td>293</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>8293</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>680</td>
<td>731</td>
<td>293</td>
<td>7855</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. RF/FP in Support of RD:

(a) Many RF/FP units were shifted from RD areas in order to provide protection to district and province towns. Detailed data as to day-by-day changes were not retained, however, status of 21 February is felt to
be typical of the period. On 21 February, 44 RF Companies of 62 were still in direct support of RD areas. On this same date 94 PT Platoons of 105 were still listed as in support of RD areas.

(b) Units exhibited expected performance, with certain reluctance by leaders to leave the relative security of district and province towns in order to carry the fight to the VC in the countryside. Approximately 360 outposts and watchtowers were overrun or abandoned during the period, many of which were not defensible because of location or size. As of the end of February plans were being made to re-establish critical outposts, (55 of them area already reoccupied). A number of cases involving unauthorized abandonment of small PF outposts and watchtowers were reported. The majority of OPs and watchtowers abandoned during the month appear to be the result of district chiefs regrouping forces to protect district towns.

6. Static Census Grievance:

(a) The majority of the SCG program in the provinces continued to function adequately during the VC offensive. The emphasis was of course on military order of battle information. Total effectiveness was precluded by the loss of control of the lines of communication in most provinces; hamlet cadre were unable to pass whatever information they had collected. The last half of the period found an increase of aspirations and grievances being submitted to the province chiefs for solutions; most of it, if not all, pertaining to battle damage sustained by the population.

(b) The entire record base of Vinh Long and Dinh Tuong Provinces was lost to the VC in the first attacks on those province cities. The SCG Study Center in Vinh Long was destroyed, in My Tho it was damaged. Most office equipment in those two centers was either lost or destroyed.

(c) Except for the two provinces listed above, there was no measurable set-back in the SCG program once the lines of communication were opened.

7. Provincial Reconnaissance Units:

(a) There was very little PRU activity against its primary target, the VC infrastructure, during February. Early in the month the PRU were used primarily by the province chiefs for static defensive missions in and around the province capitals. In all cases the PRU showed themselves to be highly motivated, disciplined, effective fighting forces that made their presence known by their aggressiveness and staying power; in many instances filling the void left by other ineffective GVN forces.

(b) After approximately one week most province officers were able to get the PRU cut on reconnaissance missions, attempting to locate, and maintain contact with, main force VC units; their mission being to call in the locations for air strikes and artillery fire missions. This activity continued throughout the balance of the reporting period. Many of the units did close
with the VC, inflicting extremely heavy casualties on the enemy as compared to their own losses.

(c) Even though the VC infrastructure was not the primary target during the month, some key members were eliminated by the action of the PR after the infrastructure had surfaced itself during the attacks on province cities.

6. CIVILIAN CASUALTIES, REFUGEES, AND PROPERTY DAMAGES:

(1) Civilian Casualties, Refugees, and Property Damages: Initial reports (1-10 February) of casualties and property damage were greatly inflated and were largely estimates. Data is still being collected and is changing; however, figures since 9 March have not changed radically and are considered to be the best available for losses during the Tet offensive.

### Temporary Houses Destroyed

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROVINCE</th>
<th>KILLED</th>
<th>WOUNDED</th>
<th>REFUGEES</th>
<th>SHELTERS</th>
<th>100%</th>
<th>50%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>An Giang</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>17,164</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>An Xuyen</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>650</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ba Xuyen</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>231</td>
<td>1,764</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1,469</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bac Lieu</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>7,857</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>966</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chau Doc</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>7,195</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1,038</td>
<td>205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chuong Thien</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>766</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>222</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dinh Tuong</td>
<td>528</td>
<td>1,219</td>
<td>35,000</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4,510</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Go Cong</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kien Giang</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>188</td>
<td>2,129</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kien Hoa</td>
<td>459</td>
<td>784</td>
<td>37,332</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5,043</td>
<td>730</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kien Phong</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>254</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>395</td>
<td>630</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kien Tuong</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phong Dinh</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1,706</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sadee</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>3,146</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>269</td>
<td>352</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vinh Binh</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>738</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>199</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vinh Long</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>283</td>
<td>30,740</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>3,431</td>
<td>1,016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>1,913</td>
<td>3,908</td>
<td>170,031</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>20,209</td>
<td><strong>3,932</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) Military Dependent Casualties and Property Damage: Table below lists casualties among military dependents. The property damage (hourses destroyed) are either personally owned or rented.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>KILLED</th>
<th>WOUNDED</th>
<th>REFUGEES</th>
<th>HOUSES</th>
<th>100%</th>
<th>50%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IV IV Corps and Can tho</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>2,846</td>
<td>577</td>
<td>119</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper Delta DTA</td>
<td>221</td>
<td>386</td>
<td>18,425</td>
<td>2,317</td>
<td>655</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41st DTA</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>233</td>
<td>6,693</td>
<td>1,153</td>
<td>312</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42nd DTA</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>342</td>
<td>7,536</td>
<td>1,091</td>
<td>162</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44th SPZ</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>5,550</td>
<td>533</td>
<td>93</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>550</td>
<td>1,115</td>
<td>31,300</td>
<td>5,896</td>
<td>1,316</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

16
(3) **Military Dependent Housing:** The following damage to military dependent housing camps was inflicted during the Tet Offensive:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>PREFAB DESTROYED 100%</th>
<th>50%</th>
<th>OTHER DESTROYED 100%</th>
<th>50%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IV CTZ HQ and Can Tho</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>06</td>
<td>03</td>
<td>06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th AIC and Dependent Units</td>
<td>1,040</td>
<td></td>
<td>160</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper Delta DTA</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41st DTA</td>
<td>19</td>
<td></td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42nd DTA</td>
<td>230</td>
<td></td>
<td>250</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44th SPZ</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>24</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,495</strong></td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
<td>452</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(4) **Damage to Provincial Hospitals:**

a. During the period 1-15 February damage to provincial hospitals was light. The hospitals of An Giang, Ba Xuyen, Bac Lieu, Go Cong, Kien Giang, Kien Hoi, Kien Phong, Kien Tuong, Sadec, Phong Dinh, and Vinh Binh were undamaged or damage was so slight that it was not reported. The hospital at An Xuyen had many windows blown out and one hole was blown in the roof. The Chau Doc hospital suffered major damage to the administrative building and slight damage to the electrical generator. The Chuong Thien hospital was not damaged, however, two ambulances were damaged but are repairable. The Dinh Tuong hospital received one mortar round on the maternity ward roof. One doctor's house and the dental clinic at the Vinh Long hospital were completely destroyed.

b. On 5 March the VC attacked the city of Ca Hau in An Xuyen Province. During the attack the provincial hospital was severely damaged. Of the five hospital buildings two were totally damaged, one was forty percent destroyed, and two received minor damage. Five of six hospital vehicles were totally destroyed.

7. **Refugees:**

(1) **General:** This section is devoted to a discussion of the refugee situation in general with primary emphasis on the performance of MSW/R officials and the generation of refugees. Total statistics are contained in Section III. Refugee support and care is discussed further in Section V. Normal refugee programs were abandoned during February. A complete mobilization of forces to provide immediate care of Tet refugees was affected.

(2) **Performance of GHQ Officials:**

a. The Tet disaster produced classic examples of the "I-have-to-ask-Saigon" syndrome. Authority comes from Saigon and so do all decisions. With few exceptions service chiefs, and recovery committee too, refused to act unless in possession of specific and unambiguous instructions. At times the service chiefs were not conversant with MSW/R regulations and procedures. Advisors who were offering advice affecting refugees were even less aware of restrictions imposed by the regulations.
b. For the most part, effective refugee relief was handled by one or two outstanding men in the provincial government. It was heartening to see and hear of personal dedication and bravery which many individuals gave during the time of crisis.

c. Camp administration was almost non-existent. Service chiefs and cadre showed a complete lack of knowledge in establishing control, sanitation facilities, health and recreation facilities, food distribution and utilization of available official and refugee personnel in assistance.

d. In no camps were makeshift classrooms or recreational facilities provided. Children were a nuisance or worse as they roamed through the crowded camps. Adults were not encouraged to help in keeping the camps clean and orderly. The average Vietnamese refugee has an amazingly high tolerance of dirt and discomfort. The average SWR chief is content to let him reach that degree.

(3) An Giang:

a. The Province was largely untouched by the Viet Cong during the Tet offensive (19 incidents were reported in the province during the month). An Giang has been able to function at close to 100% normality. Ninety-nine houses were destroyed in Vinh Hanh Village, Chau Thanh District, by friendly air strikes but within 24 hours the people were back and rebuilding.

b. Approximately 22,000 refugees moved from Kien Phong and Chau Doc Provinces into An Giang, Cho Moi District. Commodities were distributed though not nearly enough were available. The situation which these refugees have created was becoming more acute at the end of February. They were expected to return to Kien Phong but as the security in that province has worsened the refugees were reluctant to move.

(4) An Xuyen:

a. The capital city of Ca Mau was attacked on 31 January, the Viet Cong entered the city and, though ground fighting was fierce, air strikes were not necessary to drive the VC back. The result, no houses destroyed and 9 official refugees. Seventy three families moved from surrounding Viet Cong controlled territory into SVN controlled hamlets in Hai Yen and, if the government can give adequate protection to these, a few more families were reported ready to move.

b. Ca Mau paid for their stout defense when the VC returned to attack during the first days of March, six hundred and twenty-eight houses were burned by the VC using incendiary grenades; air strikes were not used in this area. Temporary care of refugees was going very well by comparison to other areas. The largest of the three camps is on the grounds of a Catholic church and school and is ably administered by the priests and hamlet officials. Refugees have been registered but the recovery committee, after admitting that they have received three million plasters from Saigon, hesitate to spend any of it because of fear of rigorous accounting procedures.
c. Commodity support for immediate needs was quick in coming and a satisfactory distribution system was quickly established.

(5) Ba Xuyen:

a. Nine hundred and eight refugee families have been registered and an estimated 2,500 more are still unregistered. Of the refugees registered, the majority are in Soc Trang. Approximately 310 families are still in the 5 temporary centers in Soc Trang.

b. The majority of the refugee support has been handled by the Provincial Recovery Committee through the fact that refugees gravitated toward their religious centers certainly made the job easier. The social welfare kitchen, almost immediately, began free distribution of food and water.

c. CORDS province advisors emphasized the necessity for the GVN to fulfill its promise to provide reconstruction materials. Again, due to lack of definite instruction from Saigon, the Province Recovery Committee was inert. Province officials refused to issue available tin roofing because it was programmed for WRC projects. Word was received through U.S. channels that all available resources were to be used for refugee relief but the Province Chief would not release it unless authorized through GVN channels.

(6) Bac Lieu:

a. The February 10th attack left 850 homes destroyed or damaged and some 6,500 refugees. The Refugee Service in Bac Lieu Province, long considered weak and indecisive, did an outstanding job of organizing relief activities. The majority of the homeless found shelter with friends and relatives; refugees will soon be moved out of the schools and into permanent temporary camps until such time as rebuilding plans are made definite. The proposed plan is to develop a new urban area adjacent to the burnt out area for one-half of the displaced persons. The remaining families would return to a less crowded area.

b. In the early days of the crisis commodities were badly needed in Bac Lieu. Flour and oatmeal borrowed from Phong Dinh Province stocks proved to be contaminated with weasels and bugs resulting in wasted effort and embarrassment to CORDS advisors.

(7) Chau Doc:

a. The VC occupied and held numerous buildings for some hours; approximately 1/10 of the total city area was destroyed. Over 1,000 homes were destroyed and 7,000 refugees were generated. Province officials reacted quickly in setting up a Provincial Relief Committee. With the exception of the Province Chief no appointed officials were acting as committee heads; all were representatives of religious groups and elected provincial office holders. While the fighting still continued in the streets the Social Welfare kitchen was preparing hot meals for the homeless. These meals continued for two weeks.
b. Response by the populace was quick; donations were received from all religious groups, merchants, townpeople and neighboring villages and hamlets. Immediate availability of AID and USAID support impresed funds has to be counted as a real reason for the successful response to refugee's needs.

(8) Chuong Thien:

a. The province capital, Vi Thanh, was not hit hard at Tet but Kien Huu District town was under informal siege all of February. Over two hundred homes were burned in the province. GVN reaction has been good. Commodity distribution and plaster distribution has been made in two districts but the SAR service chief can take but little credit for the quick reaction. He showed little initiative toward providing relief. He moved only after the Deputy for Administration directed him to.

b. Normal refugee programs have never had much opportunity to prosper in Chuong Thien. The program will get no worse in the future but neither will it improve. There are no pockets of security to which refugees can flock.

(9) Dinh Tuong:

a. My Tho suffered major damage; 4,510 houses were destroyed indicating at least 22,500 refugees. Official figures show 5,674 families (39,499 persons) were, and most are still, refugees. 8,569 persons are in the temporary camps. Province officials early limited assistance to those persons in camp, leaving those who sought shelter with friends or relatives to help themselves.

b. Realistically this was a wise choice in that registration and administration for the large number of refugees would have been extremely difficult. However, the people outside of camps required the same assistance as those inside of camps. CORDS discouraged this policy as being non-conducive to getting refugees out of schools and public buildings.

c. The reconstruction of destroyed houses has not yet began. No payments have made and no rebuilding commodities issued. The Provincial Recovery Committee has given to Public Works the job of assessing damage to homes and determining who is to be paid.

d. The Social Welfare Service Chief demonstrated ability and courage during the Tet attacks. He responded quickly with what he had available. The confusion over funds which permeated the air all over IV CTZ prevented the Province Chief from spending 100,000,000 for needed sleeping mats.

e. Temporary housing, being built by the Seabee Team, will be on school grounds and at the hospital. The soundly built structures will eventually be used as classrooms and hospital housing.

(10) Co Cong: In comparison to the disaster suffered in other provinces, this Province was untouched. The largest number of refugees were not those generated by the VC Tet attacks (less than 700 people) but some 2,000 refugees from communism who fled the VC impressive efforts.
11) Kien Hoa:

a. The city of Ben Tre suffered major damage. The Tet offensive generated over 30,000 refugees in Ben Tre and Mo Cay District. An estimated 6,000 houses were destroyed. Large areas around the province capital are insecure; the people have left and are afraid to return.

b. Registration of refugees as done by Government Cadre was completely unsatisfactory. A Refugee Mobile Cadre Team was assigned to Ben Tre to help with registration and rebuilding. Their work has been hampered by an uncooperative province recovery committee.

c. The recovery committee itself has produced lengthy debate but little action. The SWR Service Chief was equally ineffective. The latter was accused by the advisory teams of being guilty not only of indifference and incompetency but also of diversion of USAID commodities. The charges were handed directly to the Ministry for Social Welfare/Refugees during a visit to Ben Tre. The Service Chief, in a written defense to the Minister, substantiated by the Province Chief, has a logical explanation. The Service Chief has been recalled to Saigon but if the accusation is false, as it appears to be, US Advisors will have lost some proverbial "face".

12) Kien Giang:

a. This province suffered moderate damage with 364 houses destroyed, with over 2,000 refugees generated.

b. The SWR service chief has been replaced due to a long standing feud between him and other province and refugee officials. He had worked more productively assisting Tet refugees than at any previous time. He started a little too late.

c. The Soc-Son resettlement center, still being avidly pushed by the US team, and reportedly with strong backing of the Province Chief, has not been halted for the simple reason that it was never begun. Security at Soc-Son is such now that construction will be delayed even more. Any gains in psychological aspects of the resettlement center have been lost.

13) Kien Phong: Seventeen thousand refugees from Kien Phong are in An Giang; 10,000 more are on the border of Sadec. Cao Lanh Refugees are being adequately cared for though not in temporary camps. It is among the refugees from Kien Phong that a problem has arisen. The KSWR has allowed one week assistance to the 2,000 refugees in An Giang; to give them more would encourage them to stay. What will happen now that the seven days are up and the number of refugees has increased by 5,000 is unknown.

14) Kien Tuong: Damage at Tet was minimal. All refugees are being cared for adequately.

15) Phong Dinh
a. This province received heavy damage with over 2,000 homes destroyed. Over 15,000 refugees were generated as a result of the Tet offensive.

b. Refugee support in general was completely unsatisfactory. Initial support during the initial period was to furnish bread. Reports indicate that a major portion of the bread was taken by ARVN troops.

c. COROS provided 500 cases of C-rations. Two Americans delivered them and unloaded them. The SWR cadre did a miserable job of distribution. This distribution and subsequent distributions took place amid a mob scene. In the next week control was the least of the problems; however, sanitation, water supply, and availability of food and other commodities were a constant source of worry to advisors and some GVN officials. SWR cadre did almost nothing.

d. Remnants of a Refugee Mobile Cadre team in Can Tho were not used to advantage; official money and contributions were not used at all until total disaster appeared.

(16) Sadao: This province has recovered well as far as refugees are concerned. The province is ready to begin rebuilding as soon as commodities become available. Allowances have been paid to victims of the Tet attack.

(17) Vinh Binh: All of the one thousand homeless people have been given their initial $3,000 GVN; some have gotten their rebuilding allowances and rebuilding commodities. The SWR chief reacted quickly in paying out the immediate relief allowances, death and injury benefits, and distributing commodities.

(18) Vinh Long: Considering the staggering amount of damage and members of refugees in Vinh Long City, temporary camps were well run. Sanitation, water, and health facilities were much better than would have been expected. In contrast to other provinces camps are orderly and organized, not mob ruled. A major problem remains; additional temporary housing is necessary to move refugees out of the schools.

8. AGRICULTURE:

(1) General: The damage to the agriculture program and the agricultural segment of the national economy will be fully realized only after another several months. Immediate damage appears slight with a few isolated incidents such as the destruction of the rice experiment station at My Tho. Hamlet projects and private sector accomplishments were apparently not subjected to Viet Cong destruction.

(2) Agriculture Economics: Emphasis prior to the Tet offensive had been on increasing production of rice and high protein foods. The rice crop harvested in late 1967 and early 1968 showed a significant rise in production.
Transformation of the increased into actual cash profit for the farmer has become a major problem due to enemy interdiction of roads and canals. The bare merchant-speculator can explain and justify a relatively low purchase strike on the basis of the uncertainties and risks involved in moving the rice to metropolitan markets. Pork and fish projects which were also showing considerable promise will necessarily be cut-back. Reductions in the CORDS staffing of these two areas is already in progress. The resultant reduction of the potential of these priority aspects of agricultural development are a serious blow to the program.

(1) Rural Attitude: Limited but valuable research among the rural population of IV Corps indicates that the farmer's confidence in the market was not seriously damaged by the Tet offensive. The majority of those questioned indicated their intention to continue efforts to increase production. Desire for fertilizer, improved seed, breeding stock, small agriculture machinery, and irrigation works was as evident as ever among those who were aware of the advantages offered by such aids. In summary, this segment of the population remains psychologically ready for further development in the interests of economic betterment.

9. CHIEU HOI:

(1) General: Despite good advertising and some improvement in the product, attractiveness of the GVN has never been a major cause of Viet Cong defection. The two most important factors in bringing rallyers remain, a reason for wanting to desert the Viet Cong, and, a reasonable physical possibility of doing so. The illusion of Viet Cong power and victory plus the actual control of party participants and rural population resulting from the general offensive initiated on 31 January has virtually eliminated both these factors, and the flow of returns as well.

(2) Mechanics of the Program: Although several provincial Chieu Hoi Centers were attacked the overall damage did not detrimentally affect operations. The incoherent pace and quality of vocational and political training of Hoi Chans continued but was not attributed to the Tet offensive. Deplorably little use was made of the Hoi Chans during the period of increased tactical missions. Education, recreation, and employment programs for returns were not influenced by the increased enemy activity. One problem which was surfaced, however, was the lack of adequate armament for defense of the Chieu Hoi Centers. Automatic weapons were recognized as critical for the defense of the centers in the event of renewed ground attacks.

(3) Immediate Future of the Program: In provinces such as An Ky where an active and honest Province Chief backed by a good HUCCDRS team came to grips with the problem the returns figure rose despite the handicaps of enemy military successes. Timely counterattacks coupled with imaginative psyops would have crumbled many already shaken Viet Cong units. The tendency toward a defensive posture rose as a result of the recent attacks and most service chiefs at best only desired a return to the pre-Tet dreamland.
10. LABOR:

(1) General: The impact of the Tet offensive on labor will be seen largely through the effects of the mobilization of manpower resulting from the increased military action. Indiscriminate conscription of men further crippled small industries in IV Corps and thus slowed economic development. It is still too early to know the extent of the influence this will have on wages. Rice farmers with larger holdings complained of the effects that the drafting of the remainder of the prime labor group will have on planting and harvesting.

(2) Ministry of Labor Activities: MOL offices showed little activity in the offensive. Many officials found transportation problems too difficult to overcome and remained away from post throughout February. Others, present for duty, were pressed into refugee or reconstruction work. Thus labor was denied a spokesman or official representation at a point critical for its interests.

II. NEW LIFE DEVELOPMENT:

(1) General: The majority of the activities carried on under the general heading of new life development have been given separate coverage elsewhere in this account of the Tet offensive. Several programs not covered elsewhere are presented here. IV Corps NLD branches were oriented for the most part toward effort in the rural areas. Viet Cong activity thus profoundly affected this CORDS Division. Lacking any capability for independent security these programs were drastically slowed or stopped completely after 31 January, and can return to normal only as security can be provided.

(2) Education: Considerable damage occurred to school facilities in Kien Hoa, Vinh Binh, Dinh Tuong and Vinh Long Provinces. Due to teachers not returning from Tet and poor state of security, it is almost impossible to assess school facility damage in all provinces. In Dinh Tuong Province, 59 elementary and primary school classrooms and 30 secondary school classrooms were heavily damaged or destroyed. Also, 7 teachers were killed, 9 injured, 162 left homeless; and 3 were kidnapped. The education development program in the IV CTZ FY1968 was set back for at least 6 months and may not get off the ground in some provinces. If refugees can be removed from the classrooms; elementary, primary, and secondary schools are scheduled to open April 1. The destruction of the new university at Can Tho was the most serious single blow to education in IV Corps. No estimates are yet available as to when higher education may be resumed at this institution.

(3) Youth Affairs: Organized youth groups were utilized in the handling of refugees early in the emergency and continued such work for the duration. Lack of security cut communication with the district organizations. The extent of dissolution or infiltration that has taken place during this period of Viet Cong control of the countryside is not known.
Community Development: The Tet Viet Cong onslaught brought to a standstill the implementation phase of the Community Development Program in almost all the provinces in Region IV down to the hamlet level. The self-help activities in the provinces were paralyzed. The efforts of the people involved in the implementation of the self-help program were diverted and harnessed to carry on the much needed relief activities to alleviate the immediate needs of refugees that flooded the district towns. At present, the provinces least affected by the enemy offensive are gaining their former footing and have gradually launched an effort to accomplish original goals.

PSYOPS:

(1) General: The multiple Viet Cong attacks on the various provincial cities in the Delta were almost exclusively responsible for the shaping of the political attitude that dominated the period of the Tet offensive. People in the urban areas were appalled at the timing and power of the attacks. There was also shock at the realization that they were suddenly involved in the fighting. Admiration for the GVN success in repelling the enemy was seriously marred by the wide spread looting that took place in many provinces. There were instances of reputable citizens reporting that people wanted to bear arms as much for protection against ARVN as against the VC. Another adverse factor was the opinion of some residents of IV Corps that loss of life and destruction of property that took place in many cities in the Delta was unnecessary. Perhaps the most definite example was the reaction to the bombing of the University of Can Tho. Most informed residents of that city felt the destruction of the university was wrong. Although the people probably held the VC primarily responsible for their suffering, it should be recognized that this was not universal, that some people disagreed and that some felt both sides (including the U.S.) to some extent are at fault. The drawbacks listed above did not injure the GVN cause beyond redemption. Despite dissatisfaction and resentment against the GVN by some a very real opportunity existed to mobilize popular support. An efficient energetic performance could have harvested the GVN more support and confidence than it had yet enjoyed.

(2) Refugee Factor (PSYOPS): The refugees created by the VC attacks represented a significant segment of the population. While grateful for emergency assistance provided to them, they soon wanted to know when and how the government will help them rebuild. In too many cases they were content to sit and wait, exercising no initiative toward returning to normal living. A positive note was found, however, in the speedy and effective recovery efforts achieved in Chau Doc, Dinh Tuong and Vinh Binh where the displaced persons had concrete evidence of the GVN's concern and ability to rebuild.

(3) Enemy Propaganda: The VC continued to push the propaganda theme of an imminent coalition government. This concept, always repulsive to Vietnamese, was dreaded in the period of crisis more than ever.
the uneasiness was the persistence of rumors that the United States was departing with the VC prior to Tet. Another theme was that the US knew on attack was imminent, but did not warn the Vietnamese. Explanations for this alleged behavior were many, but the variety highlighted the irrationality of the planning. Some say the US wanted a coalition government and withdrew from the defense of the north for the first few days of the crisis in order to put pressure on the VC for reunification. Others maintained that the news about the attack was leaked in order to show the world and US opinion the necessity to coordinate with the VC. Other alleged motives were: to trap the VC in the cities, to legitimize ARVN, and to force Vietnamese to choose between the GVN and VC. This web of confusing and sometimes contradictory explanations indicated the contradictory nature of the Vietnamese mind. These notions were very widespread during the first days of the attack, but subsided after clear proof in many provinces of the depth of the American commitment.

13. PUBLIC HEALTH:

(1) General: The obvious area of greatest concern was the impact of the military operations on the public health programs. To describe this impact it is necessary to divide the program into the areas discussed below.

(2) Provincial Hospital: All hospitals in this CTZ operated at maximum capacity during this entire period with the exception of the short periods that two were in enemy hands. The influx of 7,000 casualties created the necessity for the institution of emergency steps in order to handle the load. Immediately all except critically ill were discharged and all elective admissions were stopped. Medical and pediatric wards and personnel were marshalled to the casualty care effort. As a result this massive influx of casualties was handled entirely within the corps. Three patients were evacuated from the area during the Tet offensive.

(3) Medical Personnel:

a. Many key GVN/ARVN personnel were missing for part of the critical period. Records reflect that there were 190 such persons missing from duty subsequent to Tet visits and inability to return to post. There were several reported instances of outstanding voluntary assistance from physicians and nurses unable to return to their posts.

b. U.S. and Free World Medical personnel were shifted to meet the changing exigencies of the situation. Almost all personnel functioned admirably. The Iranian Medical Team in Kien Hoa elected to evacuate and remain in Saigon. They were replaced by an excellent Korean PHAP team from other corps areas.

c. Evacuations of U.S. nurses and VPVN's occurred from Vinh Long, Vinh Binh, and Chau Doc at the discretion of the PSA's. All such personnel returned to their duty station within a few days. No VPVN's were evacuated until 2 February when the two ophthalmologists were removed from Vinh Long.
1. Evacuation plans for other provinces were in existence with first priority given to northern Hanoi. These plans were to be instituted in the order of the PTA's when series dissolution of security occurred.

11. Medical Logistics: The Central Medical Logistic Depot was able to fill virtually all critical and routine requests resulting from the Tet offensive from available resources in Hanoi. This amounted to shipping from Hanoi to the 16 provincial health services 77 tons of medical supplies. This massive effort was made possible by the support and cooperation of the Central Medical Depot in Hanoi and the CORPS/IV CTZ Air Operations.

11. Rural Health, Public Health, and Preventive Medicine:

a. Health services to the approximately 148,000 urban refugees was a very major concern. Most refugees camps had minimally acceptable efforts in clinical care, immunization, and sanitation. These efforts were fraught with problems of absent key SVN personnel, poor organization, and confusion as to responsibilities of Ministry of Health versus ARVN Medical Units. Despite these problems most acute curative medicine needs were met. No epidemics or outbreaks occurred and 41,000 immunizations were given.

14. ECONOMICS:

(1) General: Economic activity dropped to an extremely low point within hours of the shock of the Viet Corp Tet offensive. Between 1 February 1968 and 15 February 1968, there was a near 100% drop in the exchange of hard goods. By 16 February some recovery was evident and between then and the month's end an estimated 60% rise in the sale of hard goods had taken place from the mid-month low. Delta towns in nearly all cases remain open to the flow of produce from the immediate surrounding area and are thus presently well-supplied with food.

(2) Manufactured Goods: The closing and interdiction of principal land and water routes has reduced the supply of manufactured goods to a minimum. Petroleum products, tobacco, condensed milk, sugar and medicines are in large demand but scarcely available at all. Cafes and bakeries, however, are experiencing a considerable upsurge in activity. One factor blamed for slowing those segments of the economy that continue to function at least partially is the curfews that have been in effect in nearly all province and district towns. The hours of the curfews vary, but apparently not in relation to the various degrees of security that now exists in the cities and towns of IV Corps. Kien Giang presently prohibits any but authorized traffic after 1500 hours.

(3) Prices: Prices on most staple items have been held close to pre-Tet levels. The exceptions are those on the hard goods mentioned above as in short supply. In instances these have risen from 50% to 125%. Rice, due to difficulties of transport, has remained in the area of production, causing a sharp fall in price. Paddy, as of this date, is 270$VN per gia.
Most of the rice in the Delta is either owned or being purchased by merchant-
speculators. By conservative estimate they expect the price to rise to
$100/gia within 90 days. Despite statements displaying little faith
in the GVN, farmers who are well above subsistence level operations, indicate
no intention of reducing production. Fertilizer, seed and simple machinery
are as much in demand as ever. Of more than 100 such farmers questioned,
each stated his desire to continue to push production to whatever heights
possible.

15. PUBLIC SAFETY:

(1) General: The National Police directed almost exclusive attention
to the various phases of the defense and clearing of provincial cities.
In 15 or 16 Delta Provinces the police received high commendation for
their performance. Police Chiefs of An Nuyen and Kien Giang were recommended
for awards for leadership demonstrated in the defense of their provinces.
Casualty records for IV Corps, show 111 National Police killed in action,
277 wounded in action, and 16 missing during the initial 30 day of the
offensive. Police and police buildings and equipment appear to have been
a major objective of the Viet Cong during the attack. One U.S. advisor was
killed in the campaign.

(2) Post Offensive Policy: The advantages accruing to the Viet Cong
from their ability to infiltrate the towns with men, arms, and ammunition
caused the National Police to direct their attention to a more careful
screening of the movement of people into the cities and to the family
census operations. The influx of refugees has created control problems
that also received priority attention. The National Police were heavily
involved in the increased emphasis on intelligence gathering, collation
and dissemination resulting from the recognized pre-Tet failures in this
field. Increased mobilization also required National Police support in
rounding up draft evaders. Generally National Police activities were at
an all time high for the Tet offensive and performance was of an
exceptionally high caliber.

(3) NPFF: The nature and magnitude of the Tet offensive made it
impossible to use the NPFF companies completely within the guidelines of
the concept. When forced into an orthodox combat situation the NPFF proved
very effective. As in the case of the National Police the Field Force
units found themselves poorly armed for an encounter with Viet Cong automatic
weapons and rockets. Also, as above, the post-Tet emphasis on intelligence
has lead to increased NPFF activity in the theoretical role.

16. RECOVERY EFFORT:

(1) General: Recovery activites are covered throughout other sections
of this narrative particularly in Section 17, Refugees. This section covers
only those subjects which are not covered under other sections.
Recovery Funds: On or about 15 February information was received from the MFA/R, MORD and the Central Relief Committee had allocated funds for refugee relief as indicated below. Although allocated, all funds were not received until 10 March 1968. Provinces had received information that they could expend Provincial Treasury Funds, for refugee relief which could be reimbursed with ministerial allocations; however, as indicated by expenditures, Province Chiefs were reluctant to expend money until actually received. Obviously, this seriously delayed much much needed immediate relief for refugees. Allocations in the following table are in thousands of piasters. Expenditures are as of 2 March 1968.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROVINCE</th>
<th>MSK/R</th>
<th>CRC</th>
<th>MORD</th>
<th>EXPENDED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pho Ng Dinh</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>700,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chau Doc</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>900,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dinh Tuong</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>8,000</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>720,725</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kien Hoa</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>8,000</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1,674,511</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ba Xuyen</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>150,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>An Xuyen</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>594,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kien Giang</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>433,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kien Tuong</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>439,376</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kien Phung</td>
<td>1,000</td>
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<td>100</td>
<td>605,350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>An Giang</td>
<td>2,000</td>
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<td>100</td>
<td>3,500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chuong Thien</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>260,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bac Lieu</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>3,500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vinh Long</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1,601,855</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sadec</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>452,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Go Cong</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>95,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vinh Binh</td>
<td>1,000</td>
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<td>1,488,257</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOTALS</td>
<td>21,000</td>
<td>64,000</td>
<td>1,600</td>
<td>14,245,874</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Civil Defense Groups: As a result of the Tet offensive a program was initiated to organize and arm civilians. The groups were classified as civil servants and ordinary civilians. Selection of individuals was as determined by Province Chiefs. Status of this special program as of 9 March 1968 was as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROVINCE</th>
<th>CIVIL SERVANTS</th>
<th>ORDINARY CIVILIANS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ORGANIZED</td>
<td>ARMED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>An Giang</td>
<td>567</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>An Kuyen</td>
<td>713</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ph Kuyen</td>
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<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thu Lieu</td>
<td>368</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chau Doc</td>
<td>437</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chuong Thien</td>
<td>193</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dinh Tuong</td>
<td>730</td>
<td>235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Go Cong</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kien Giang</td>
<td>313</td>
<td>216</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kien Hoa</td>
<td>469</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kien Phong</td>
<td>265</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kien Tuong</td>
<td>228</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phong Dinh</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saced</td>
<td>340</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vinh Binh</td>
<td>371</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vinh Long</td>
<td>620</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>6,930</td>
<td>1,079</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(4) IV CTZ Project Recovery Committee:

a. The IV CTZ Recovery Committee has been an ad hoc group searching for efficient means of recognizing and dealing with problems of recovery. Its primary difficulty lay in its ad hoc nature; it has had to continually try to refine its organization and method of operation to deal with problems of recovery.