U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT "WORKING PAPER" ON THE VIETNAM WAR -- Part II - Annex
Sources:

Attached is a collection of more than 100 documents representing a sampling of a vast amount of intelligence obtained from the following sources:

1. Documents captured from Viet Cong and North Vietnamese forces.
2. Intelligence gained through interrogation of captured Communist troops.
3. Intelligence obtained from interrogation of Communist defectors.

Security in Interrogation Reports:

This material is authentic and as complete as security considerations permit. The reader will recognize that some sections or phrases have been removed from the record. Wherever such deletions or alterations occur, they have been made for valid security reasons, e.g., to protect the sources or their families from Communist retaliation. The following data have been stripped from the interrogation reports:

--Names of the source and his family members.
--Identification of his or her home village or community below the district level.
--Identification of source's military unit below the level of regiment, or in a few cases, battalion.
--Source's exact military rank or position.
--Precise place or date of capture.

In addition, there are deliberate changes of minor data, again for the protection of the source. For example, if a source has stated that his civilian employment was that of bookkeeper, he might now be described as a sales clerk. Except for the security measures described above, the interrogation reports appear exactly as they were received from the prisoner or defector.

Captured Documents:

The above-listed changes apply only to interrogation
Identification of Regiments and Divisions:

Identification of Communist regiments and divisions is unaltered. It should be noted, however, that such identification can be confusing, because of factors such as the Communist system of naming and renaming military units. For example:

The 174 Regiment of the 316 Division of the North Vietnamese Army should not be confused with 174-A Regiment or 174-B Regiment. And the 316 Division should not be confused with the 316-B Division. The 174 Regiment changed its name to "Worksite 3" and has been confirmed as operating in South Viet-Nam. The 174-B Regiment of 316-B Division has been confirmed as fighting against Laotian troops in neutral Laos, but had not been confirmed as operating in South Viet-Nam, as of 31 October, 1967.

Errors and Omissions:

In some cases omissions or errors occur where the original paper was unclear. In such cases every effort has been made to maintain accuracy and to call attention to such omissions when they occur. This is often done by the notation "words missing" or "unclear." Errors also can occur in translation. These too must be taken into consideration. Finally, corrections made by hand or typewriter have been done only to correct obvious typographical errors, not to change the sense of the text.

Missing Item Numbers:

Originally, 113 items were considered for publication and were assigned consecutive item numbers from 1 through 113. Of these, 22 were later eliminated as being repetitious or immaterial, leaving some gaps in sequence. A later shipment added sixteen documents which were assigned item numbers from 200 to 215. Thus, though the items are arranged in consecutive order, the following numbers in the 1-113 series are missing: 7-8-9-10-13-14-15-20-23-24-32-33-50-57-59-61-62-64-69-74-77-82-97-108-113.

There should be no break in the sequence of the series 200-215.

Three major documents--perhaps the most important of all--are listed as Item 301 (The CRIMP Document), Item 302 (LE DUAN Letter), and Item 303 (talk by General VINH).
ITEM 1

The following is a translation of a report prepared by the Central Executive Committee of the Indochinese Communist Party in 1948. It was captured by French forces in 1949.
I.- THE EXPANSION OF THE PARTY

1. The State of Development of the Party.

Effectives: a) Our Party developed greatly in 1948. Compared with the end of 1946, our effectives at the end of 1947 had more than doubled.

End of 1946: 20,000
End of 1947: 50,000 (an increase of 250 percent)

But in September 1948, we numbered 154,418 comrades—a total representing an increase of 300 percent.

Toward the end of 1948 the number of our affiliates in the whole country had risen to about 180,000. In effect, the figures for effectives indicated below for September 1948 can be raised since certain of them refer to earlier dates—the figures for namely, south Trung-bo (or southern Annam), of the 4th Zone of Cochinchina, and of Thailand. Thus, we have been able, by the end of 1948, to have one comrade for every 112 inhabitants, assuming the population of all Indochina is 20 million.

The effectives by "Khu" were as follows at the end of September, 1948.

- Zone 1 19,000 comrades
- Zone 10 13,800 comrades
- Zone 3 at least 70,000 comrades
- Southern Trung-Bo 13,000 comrades (May 1948)
- Southern Viet Nam 23,000 comrades (August 1948)
- Zone 4 at least 30,000 comrades

Furthermore, we can include:

- comrades in the Army approximately 20,300
- comrades in Thailand 354 (May 1948)

Important effectives of certain province:

- Thai-Binh and Hai-Duong hold the record with 17,000 Party members each.
- Provinces each having more than 5,000 members at the end of September 1948: Phu-Tho, Vinh-Yen, Hadong, Hatin, Thang-Hoa (more than 8,000). Nghe-An (more than 6,000)

b) Irregularities in Party development.

In Northern Viet Nam, the development of the Party has been very rapid. It has surpassed even the level fixed for the last five months of the year by the Central Committee.

The provinces of Zone 3 have had an increase of from 50-100 percent in the period July-September 1948. Altogether in northern Viet Nam we had more than 100,000 comrades as of September 1948. Of this number, Zone 3 alone registered more than 50,000 comrades.

Before the fifth conference of cadres, several provinces of northern Viet Nam were not yet on the course of development. However, this omission has been rectified, and, at the end of this year, work has not been neglected, except in the provinces of Ha-Nam and of Vinh-Yen.

In Zone 4, development is slow and does not yet equal that of North
c) Discipline and rewards.

The spirit of discipline has increased in the cells.

All in all, the number of comrades who have to be disciplined has diminished from day to day (except in certain cells of Phu-Tho and of Vinh-Yen which, having developed under bad conditions, were plagued with disciplinary measures in the middle of the year). The number of comrades and of cells who have been regarded has increased constantly. A large number of comrades and cells in the Army, in areas controlled by the enemy, and in guerrilla groups, have been rewarded or congratulated by their Sector or their Province.

In certain spots where discipline was not exactly applied in the beginning of the year, the "Comité de l'Echelon Regionale" has had to establish a Review Board of disciplinary actions (HaNam, Sontay) to lighten or revoke sentences pronounced unjustly.

On a par with the heightening of discipline in the Party, the education of comrades has been directed to making each member act as an "amélioration officer" and form the habit of self-criticism and self-control, conforming to that of President Ho Chi Minh. This orientation has been applied in nearly all cells, with a view to studying and improving working conduct (the movement "to force oneself to correct oneself", launched in all cells, contained in the "Bolshevik" letters to Phu-Tho, Vinh-Yen, etc.)

d) Purification of unworthy comrades (in conformity with a resolution of the 5th Conference of Cadres.)

The purification is in the course of realization, but it has not yet been established according to plan. At Vinh-Yen and at Phu-Tho, from September to November 1948, about thirty or forty comrades a month have been subjected to purification measures. But, in general, the execution has not followed a plan and the application of approved measures has not been done in rigorous fashion.

e) The "Comité des Affaires du Parti" and the "Comités d'Echelon", above all in zones 1 and 10, have concerned themselves with the work of forming cells. In Hung-Yen, Hai-Duong, and Thai-Binh, more than half of the cells have become autonomous in their work.

It is in regions controlled by the enemy that one finds the largest number of autonomous-action cells, and there are also many in the mountains.

However, the autonomous-action cells have not spread everywhere. In Nam-Bo (Cochinchina) the foundation itself of this method of organization failed. In Trung-Bo (Annam) no precise plan exists. In Bac-Do (Tonkin), conceptions do not correspond exactly with fixed conditions (The Central Conference of Cadres of Organization of 25 October 1948 corrected conditions of application by specifying that autonomous cells of action do not need responsible can-box, in matters such as:

- performing their regular activity.
- applying the diverse instructions and resolutions of the higher echelon.
- directing work of all sorts in their individual cadre (Party. "clear commun", resistance and the executive role, the people's militia, etc.).
In Hà-Tĩnh, the increase was only 946 comrades in the semester. Besides, in several huyon the effective diminished in great deal, due to insufficient development. That is the reason that the provincial committee ordered all the cells to organize a "week of Party development", with a view to reminding the comrades of the task incumbent on them.

Southern Viet Nam began a short time ago to cure itself of the malady of "Narrowness of development". In March 1948 this region had only 9,000 comrades; but, at the end of August, effective were increased to 23,000. Zone 8 itself had 11,000 comrades and 470 village cells for the 570 villages of the whole zone.

The number of members doubled and even tripled in the provinces of Sa' doc, Longxuyen, and My tho. At the end of this year, southern Viet Nam could have about 30,000 affiliates. Nevertheless, considering the four and a half million inhabitants and the two million members of the Viet Minh in South Viet Nam, the Party Section of South Viet Nam will have to make a greater effort and accelerate its development work in order to attain the same level as North Viet-Nam.

(We have not yet received reports relating to the organization of the Party in Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and southern Trung-Bo.)

2. The expansion of the Party in zones occupied and controlled by the enemy has made progress, but not sufficient progress.

a) From the day after the 5th Conference of Cadres, all sections of the Party, (with a view to building the Party), gave themselves the primary task of creating and developing their basic agencies in occupied regions. They have obtained results worthy of attention.

Zone 10. In the diverse areas in which the arrival of the French has led to dispersal of population, thanks to the fact that assault squads have reestablished their bases and thereby strengthened the possibility of aggressive activity, our can-bos have returned to the spot intending to pursue their activities and have there reconstituted organizations based among the people (cover Viet Minh, secret guerrillas) and organizations of the Party which have all begun to grow.

Already in the province of Lao-Kay there are work-cells and action squads in nearly all the huyon, and in Sơn-La 110 comrades and 15 cells (and quite a large number of "Thái" and "muong" cells) which direct more than 3,000 Viet Minh secret agents and 20,000 inhabitants in the zone occupied by the enemy. In Yen-Bay, basic agencies have been created in the enemy-controlled regions at Van-Ban and around Nghi-Lo.

Zone 1. Basic agencies have rapidly been developed in the areas of Hai-Minh and Hong-Quang (there is a cell at Moncay) in the region south of Bac-Ninh, which is where the enemy exercises the most violent terrorist repression. The movement of guerrillas and of the dispersal of council meetings is increasing (a result brought about again by the enemy offensive in the northeast; after this operation, conditions will certainly improve).

Zone 3. In general, in regions of zone 3 occupied or controlled by the enemy, we have basic covert organizations. These in the provinces of Ha-Nam, Nam-Dinh, Hai-Kien (the group Hai-Duong - Kien-An) and Hung-Yen are equal in progress.

In the provinces of Hai-Kien (the group Hai-Duong - Kien-An) half the total number of our cells (53) are situated in the region occupied by the enemy. A special executive committee has been constituted at Haiphong.
3. The Party is making great progress in the Army in North Viet Nam, but moving slowly in the south.

The expansion of the Party is in full swing, even in the ranks of the combatants. Leaving Zone 5 and moving up toward the north (that is, from the province of Khanh-Hoa through central and northern Annam, and throughout Tonkin), all the companies have their cell, all the sections their nest (tiêu tổ). There are sections in which a comrade (of the Party) only exercises his direction through three or four military men.
The Political Commissar-General to the Commissar of the General Staff and the Political Commissars in Zones 5, 7, 8, 9:

RESUME OF DECISIONS TAKEN BY THE PERMANENT CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE PARTY REGARDING THE ORGANIZATION OF THE PARTY IN THE ARMY.

Decision No. 38/60-TU,

I. Principles of Organization,

(1) The Party possesses but one system of organization.

(2) (There is hereby) abrogated the system of echelons of the Committee of Directors in the army (Directing Central Military Committee) (TQGU), the Central Military Directing Committee (CQGU), the Directing Committee of THU DOAN (THD-U) and the Military Directing Committee of THU DOAN (THD-U).

(There is hereby) established a Political Commissariat system which will represent the Party in and organize the Party's activities with respect to the army.

II. System of Organization.

(1) Middle echelons - zonal and THU DOAN (battalions of six companies).

(a) General Political Commissariat. This will control the affairs of the Party and direct the military affairs of the National Army. Elected by the Party's Central Committee, members will at the same time belong to the Central Committee.

(b) Inter-zonal Political Commissariat. Charged with Party affairs in the army, this body will direct military matters regarding inter-zonal troops. Its members will be nominated by the General Political Commissariat with the advice of the Inter-zonal Directing Committee. Members will be approved by the Central Committee. Members (of the Inter-zonal Political Commissariat) will at the same time be members of the Inter-zonal Directing Committee, although by appointment, not by election.

(c) Political Commissar of THU DOAN. Having an interest in the affairs of the Party in the army, (this commissariat) will direct the activities of the THU DOAN (battalions of six companies). Membership will be proposed by the Inter-zonal Political Commissariat with the advice of the General Political Commissariat and will be passed upon by the Central Committee. In urgent cases, the Political Commissariat of THU DOAN may determine that steps must be taken and will subsequently report to the Central Political Committee at the inter-zonal level. In cases where liaison has been rendered impossible, the Inter-zonal Political Commissariat may propose (action) to the Inter-zonal Directing Committee, which letter shall carry out (such orders), and report subsequently to the Central Committee.

(d) Central Military Committee. This committee is charged with the study of tactics and strategy to be followed in military affairs. The Committee shall be composed of officers designated by the Central Committee. The General Political Commissariat may (at any time) assume command over the Central Military Committee. The Central Military Committee shall exist at zonal and THU DOAN levels but not at (the highest) levels.

(e) Disciplinary Council. At the Inter-zonal Central Committee and THU DOAN, as well as higher, levels, this council shall be charged with supervising the application of disciplinary measures and the establishment of records. It shall be composed of comrades possessing lengthy terms of membership in the Party and of those who have contributed most to service to the Party. Membership at middle levels shall be proposed by the General Political Commissariat and approved by the Central Committee. At inter-zonal and THU DOAN levels membership shall be passed upon by the General Political Commissariat following nomination by the Inter-zonal and Provincial Directing Committees.
(f) Lower-level Auxiliary Committees of the General Political Commissariat. (Such) auxiliary committees, to be three in number, shall assist the General Political Commissariat with respect to the internal affairs of the Party as well as other matters of a political nature. These committees shall comprise: a committee of organization, a committee of propaganda and instruction, and a committee of control. Chairman of the above-designated committees shall be appointed by the General Political Commissariat.

(g) Special Commissariats. These special commissariats shall direct operations in such specialist branches (of activity) as the (operation of the) staff corps, recruitment of troops, troop education, information service, supply procurement, weapon procurement, medical services, engineering service, casualty supply and communications. Membership on such special committees shall be preceded by the General Political Commissariat. At the inter-zonal and Tỉnh or區 level (special committees) may assume both supervisory and participatory roles with regard to pertinent activities. The Council of Special Commissions, which shall render opinions respecting all activities of specialist branches, shall be composed of representatives from all such specialist branches,

(2) Secretary of General Political Commissariat (at various levels). The Secretary shall have charge of affairs respecting the (following) three branches of activity: interior, administration and council. It shall be named and directed by the General Political Commissariat.

(a) Liaison between the National Defense Board and the High Command, as well as that between the High Command and subsidiary army units, shall be directed by the General Political Commissariat. The chief of the Committee of Organization shall assist the Secretary (in the fulfillment of the latter's responsibilities).

(b) Liaison on regimental and lower levels shall be conducted by a Liaison Group which shall be elected by comrades of appropriate rank and be approved by the superior Liaison Group. Such organizational procedure shall apply to regiments, battalions, companies and down to the smallest military units.

(c) Specialist Activities. Liaison groups on superior and inferior levels shall have further responsibility with respect to specialist activities. Disciplinary activity shall be carried out by these groups on the Tỉnh or區 level (battalions of three companies) level and below; responsibility of the Disciplinary Council shall pertain to levels higher than that of the Tỉnh or區.

III. Responsibilities and Prerogatives.

(a) General Political Commissariat: Responsibilities. The Commissariat is responsible to the Party for the (proper) political orientation of Party and military affairs. In matters of the organization and direction of the Party the Commissariat occupies a status under the superior echelons of the Party (i.e., the General Committee). In cases of disagreement between the Commissariat and high party circles, the Commissariat shall take its orders from superior Party levels and shall render appropriate reports to such levels.

In cases where superior echelons of the Party discover that the Commissariat has ignored the (correct) political attitude of the Party in the issuance of instructions, (such echelons) will suspend execution of such orders and render appropriate accounting.

(b) Prerogatives. The General Political Commissariat has the responsibility of taking decisions respecting the fulfillment of the (correct) political attitude of the Party to affairs of importance. Nevertheless, in utilizing its prerogatives, particularly at decisive moments, the Commissariat must take into consideration the motives of comrades dealing with military affairs and must strive to encourage and to increase the prestige of such comrades.
On the TIERI DOAN DOC IAP and BAI DOI DOC IAP level (units comprising six to twelve battalions), the right to make decisions, military or political, shall be reserved to the political agent or to the commander of the unit, whichever is the more qualified with respect to (the matter in question). There shall exist no Political Commissariat on the battalion level as such; however, political agents shall have responsibility (for battalion affairs as outlined above).

(c) Central Military Committee. (This Committee) shall formulate tactical and strategic military plans and shall propose (action envisaged by such plans) to the Central Committee (of the Communist Party). The Central Military Committee shall possess a merely consultative character; all (actual military) decisions are to be taken by the Central Committee.

(d) Disciplinary Council. (Responsibility of this group) shall extend to the rewarding and punishing of Party members.

(e) Specialist Committees. These shall have the mission of aiding the General Political Commissariat in the formulation of proposals with respect to the internal affairs of the Party and to all matters regarding questions of political power. For example, propaganda work vis-à-vis Party and army members (shall be included in the above category of responsibilities).

(f) Specialist Commissariats. Specialist Commissariats, in their work of supervising such branches of activity as staff work, education (in Party and army), arms and supply procurement, medical branch, communications, engineering branch and related services shall follow the general outlines of activity indicated by the General Political Commissariat and shall be responsible to this latter. A Council of Specialists shall have the function of assisting the Specialist Commissariats. It can propose measures and offer similar counsel; however, final decisions are to be taken by the General Political Commissariat.

(g) Secretariat of the General Political Commissariat. (This body) shall be charged with the responsibility of assisting in the direction of activity (relating to the various bodies falling under the jurisdiction of the Commissariat). It shall have charge of files, of (the preparation of) reports, etc.

IV. Relations between Superior and Inferior echelons within the Party.

(a) Political Commissariats on the inter-zonal and TIERI DOAN levels shall work beneath the Political Commissariats on superior levels. They shall fall under the jurisdiction of the Central Committee of the Party and shall follow (that committee’s) directions with regard to affairs of Party organization and policy. In cases where liaison with superior echelons is cut, (such commissariats) shall fall under the direction of (remaining) superior Party bodies, such as Zonal and Provincial Directing Committees.

With respect to the TIERI DOAN, these will maintain liaison with Provincial Directing Committees of provinces in which encampments occur. Reports are to be addressed to superior echelon directing committees.

(b) Liaison and Sub-commissariats. These (commissariats) shall maintain contact with provincial and village Directing Committees, and in some cases membership (on both commissariats and committees) shall be interchangeable.

(c) Specialist Committees (Propaganda, Education, Organization and Control). (Such committees) shall maintain relations with superior and inferior (Party and army) echelons with respect to technical matters in which they have an interest and shall address all (pertinent) reports to the General Political Committee.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TRUNG DOAN</td>
<td>Battalion containing six companies (&quot;middle&quot; battalion)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TIEU DOAN</td>
<td>Battalion containing three companies (&quot;small&quot; battalion)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lien Chi</td>
<td>Liaison group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chi Bo</td>
<td>Cell or sub-division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAI DOI</td>
<td>Regiment (&quot;large&quot; company)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRUNG DOI</td>
<td>Company (&quot;middle&quot; company)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PHAN CHI</td>
<td>Cell</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TIEU DOI</td>
<td>One-ninth part of regiment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tien To</td>
<td>Branch or cell</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TIEU DOAN DOG LAP</td>
<td>Mobile group of six battalions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAI DOI DOG LAP</td>
<td>&quot; &quot; &quot; &quot; &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TIEU DOAN DOG LAP</td>
<td>&quot; &quot; &quot; &quot; &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRUNG DOAN LUU DONG</td>
<td>&quot; &quot; &quot; &quot;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DOAN</td>
<td>Battalion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOI</td>
<td>Company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHI</td>
<td>Sub-division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAI</td>
<td>Large</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRUNG</td>
<td>Middle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TIEU</td>
<td>Small</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TO</td>
<td>Organ</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ITEM 6

TRADUCTION

de documents récupérés à GOCONG.

---

No 6

Comité du Parti au Hô-Chi-Minh
Comité des Affaires Courantes

INSTRUCTIONS

I - AFFILIATION

Selon un accord des comités centraux des deux partis, la section chinoise du Vietnam relevée directement du Parti et les camarades chinois seront affiliées au Parti communiste indochinois. Dans le même esprit, le XU YU a décidé la création d'un commandement unique.

Il n'est pas question de vouloir appartenir au parti chinois ou au parti vietnamien car, le combattant communiste, dans quel pays qu'il se trouve, n'oublie que pour un idéal unique : réaliser le communisme.

Les camarades appartenant à titre vietnamien au parti et qui désirent être affiliés à titre chinois devront joindre une note relatant leurs origines (curriculum vitae) à leur demande. L'ancienneté au parti sera comptée comme d'ordinaire, exception faite des circonstances exceptionnelles ou des douteux.

II - ACTIVITÉS DES SÉCTIONS DU PARTI

Tous les camarades vietnamiens et chinois opérant dans une province seront réunis en une section placée sous le commandement direct du Tinh Uy. Si les nombres des membres vietnamiens et des membres chinois sont égaux, la section pourrait être divisée en 2 cellules. Un chef de cellule vietnamien et un chef de cellule chinois seront élus. Le chef de cellule sera chargé et de l'organisation et de l'instruction des membres. La Chi-Bo (section) est un "Secrétaire général" qui peut être un vietnamien ou un chinois. Ce secrétaire forme avec les deux chefs de cellule le comité dirigeant de toute la section. Ils s'attacheront à créer de l'esprit de solidarité et d'union étroite entre les camarades chinois et vietnamiens.

N.B. Dans l'action "Hue Van", à cause de la différence des moeurs et coutumes, il pourrait y avoir des malentendus entre les cadres chinois et vietnamiens. Il importe que la section "Hue Van" accepte l'accomplissement de l'action ("motrice" de la mission ?) devra s'attacher à resoudre tous malentendus, petits et grands venant des deux côtés. Le Tinh-UY devra donc envoyer chaque mois un cadre participer à l'activité de la section "Hue Van" en vue de resoudre toutes les questions litigieuses.

P. le comité des Affaires Courantes du XU Y
Signature

Copie à toutes sections
"pour information"

P. le Cé des Aff. Courantes
du Tinh-UY, de GOCONG Signé: Léa SAUS
ITEM 12

Interrogation in 1958 of a prisoner who had been active in the "Resistance" since 1945 until his capture by GVN forces in 1956. Some of the subject's views on the effectiveness of the Communist Party and Front among the populace were probably not reflective of the actual situation, but represent the Party propaganda line.
HISTORY OF THE LDP AND ITS FRONT ORGANIZATIONS

The Fatherland Front

1. At the very beginning, during the armed struggle against the colonialists, a need was felt to present a solid front against the enemy. This need resulted in the birth of the Lien-Viet Front. After the armistice in 1954, the fight changed form and became political. There was need to expand the "Front." It was necessary to include, besides the Lien-Viet veterans, new recruits from the religious sects and political parties who had formerly opposed the Communists, but who now felt that "peace, independence, and democracy were necessary to the nation." Thus the National United Front was formed, which the General Assembly of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) of October 1955 gave the name of the Fatherland Front.
Organization

a. The highest echelon is the Central Executive Committee of the Front, which is composed of 60 members: Honorary President Ho Chi Minh; President of the Executive Committee Ton Duc Thang; and one to three permanent committee members. The Executive Committee also includes representatives from various organizations such as the National Association of Peasants, the Youth Federation of Vietnam, the Vietnamese Women's Union, and the General Confederation of Labor; the military and administrative organizations; religious groups (Cao Dai, Hoa Hao, Catholic, Buddhist); the Vietnamese branch of the World Movement for Defense of Peace; ethnic minority groups; and representatives from South Vietnam and overseas Vietnamese groups.

b. Although the bylaws of the organization spell out the structure of the Front from the Central Executive Committee to the lowest level, this organization plan applies only to North Vietnam. Thus there is no Fatherland Front Executive Committee for South Vietnam, or for its provincial and district levels; but there are officials who are responsible for Fatherland Front activities among the general populace who are also charged with the development of a Front organization. The bylaws, program, principles, and manifesto of the Front were sent to South Vietnam around November 1955. From that date on the Fatherland Front began its activities in the south.

Propaganda Program [In South Vietnam]

c. Using the principles set forth in the manifesto of the Front, LDP workers engaged in active propaganda. They sought to persuade their listeners that to safeguard the peace it was necessary to bring about reunification of the country, and that this would be the only guarantee of a lasting peace.

d. Poor people from all walks of life were hungry for peace, which is one reason why they reacted warmly to the principles as set forth by the Fatherland Front; but businessmen and landowners had little sympathy for it. In the cities and provincial capitals, the propaganda failed to affect the masses of the people very deeply, because of the shortage of Party workers who were courageous enough to perform under the eye of the security services. If it was difficult to create acceptable propaganda for the masses, it was much harder to approach the religious sects and political parties. The Front had very little influence in these circles. Nevertheless, because of the devotion to duty of the Party workers, some results were realized. Thus from 50 to 70 per cent of the rural population were won over to the cause of the Front, but only two to three per cent of the city dwellers.

Young Workers' Federation [Labor Youth League]

e. This is the group which comprises the best among the young Vietnamese. This element of the Front is the closest to the LDP, and the group on which it bestows the most care. It is comparable to the Young Communist group in France and the Komsomol in the USSR.

f. Recruitment. The criterion for recruitment is quality rather than quantity. This is why its total membership is kept low. To be admitted to the Young Workers' Federation it is necessary to be a worker or a farm laborer.
Admission to the group also depends on the behavior of the prospective member as a candidate, his earlier behavior (during the period of armed struggle), and his current behavior (during the period of political struggle). The group is looked upon as the quintessence, destined to become the elite among future members of the LDP. As a result of its indoctrination and training, this group will be called upon to become the main force in guiding other classes of people in all areas of struggle.

6. Impact and General Effectiveness. The Young Workers Federation is most effective among workers and peasants, next among students, but has little influence on other segments of the population. The group has "gathered little fruit" in the cities, but in the country, and in factory and student circles, it has gained many members and has proved effective.

Political Structure of the LDP

2. The Central Executive Committee of the LDP, at its first General Assembly in 1951, elected 29 members, 19 of whom were permanent, and 10 alternate members. Included in the 29 were the following:

- President of the LDP: Ho Chi Minh
- Secretary-General: Truong Chinh
- Permanent Commissars: Nguyen Chi Thanh, Le Duan, Pham Van Dong, Vo Nguyen Giap, Hoang Quoc Viet
- "Official" Commissars: Chu Van Tan, Pham Hung, Ung Van Khien, Ton Duc Thang, Ho Tung Man, Ho Si Khang, Le Van Luong, Tran Dang Minh, Pham Duy Trinh, Nguyen Chanh, Van Tien Dung (possibly Nguyen Pham Duy, Tinh or Nguyen Duy Trinh)
- Alternate Commissars: To Huu, Do Muoi, Hoang Anh, Ha Huy Giap, Nguyen Thi Thap, Nguyen Van Kinh
Establishment of the LDP in South Vietnam

3. At one time, during the period of the War of the Resistance, in order to keep South Vietnam under its control, the Central Committee set up a branch office in the south called the Office of the Central Committee for South Vietnam, with five commissioners at its head. These commissioners were:

Le Dac Tho  
Pham Hung  
Ung Van Khiong  
Ha Trung Giau  
Nguyen Van Kinh

After the armistice in 1954, this Office was dissolved. It was replaced by the Central Committee for South Vietnam. This committee was in direct control of the provincial committees.

4. After the armistice, and after the regroupment of the Party's forces into two camps, the section of the LDP in South Vietnam lost much of its effectiveness. At first, the reason for this was the period of reorganization of active LDP workers and members in the north. Then came the suppression of the Party in the south with the arrest and detention in prison camps of its members; and the rallying of some "fanatical" elements to the Nationalist cause. There was also desertion and lack of cooperation by a great number of members who had been left without leadership. Nevertheless, the basic system of organization remained the same, from the Central Committee level through zone, province, and district to village level.

5. The activities of the Party (during this period) actually took place within the cells of the various federations and groups, such as the federations and unions of laborers and workers, peasants, youth, women, and the Fatherland Front. The main objective was to struggle to bring about general elections and reunite the country, by means of political action, rather than through the use of armed force.

6. Because of the chaotic situation in the southern section of the LDP, a census-taking of Party members was considered necessary. This work was completed on the village level. The count was based on three categories: active members; non-active members; and those who had withdrawn from the Party. Active members were assigned tasks more or less important, depending on the ability of the individual. The non-active members were treated with great caution. These people were assigned only tasks of little importance. No tasks were assigned those in the third category. However, they were not given up completely, but became the target of patient work with a view towards bringing them back into the Party.

STRUCTURE OF THE PARTY COMMITTEES (GENERAL)

Provincial /Party/ Committee

7. A provincial committee is directed by a provincial commissar or chairman, and is composed of the following elements:

a. The Secretariat
b. The Military Committee

c. The People's Committee [Party Activities Committee]

d. The Committee for Propaganda and Instruction

e. The Committee for Economy and Finance

District /Party/ Committee

8. District committees are directed by a district commissar or chairman whose principal function is to supervise LDP members and oversee the carrying out of instructions passed down from higher Party echelons. Depending on the importance of the district, a district committee may have one or more sub-committees.

Village /Commune/ Committee

9. The LDP on the village level is dependent on the district commissar. Villages have a commissar, but on this level there are no Party committees. Party functions are performed by the members of cells, composed of about three persons, more or less. If a commune has one or more villages or hamlets, each is placed under the control of a cell [See Annex, Page 15].

ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION OF THE GOVERNMENT IN NORTH VIETNAM

Officials of the Central Government

10. Officials of the Central Government are as follows:

President : Ho Chi Minh
Premier : Pham Van Dong
Vice-President and Minister of the Interior : Phan Ke Toai
Vice-Minister of the Interior : Phan Van Bach
Vice-President and Minister of National Defense : Vo Nguyen Giap
Vice-Minister of National Defense : Ta Quang Bui
Minister of Foreign Affairs : Ung Van Khiem
Minister of Labor : Nguyen Van Tao
Minister of Finance : Le Van Ri
Minister of Economic Affairs : Phan Anh
Minister of Health : Vu Dinh Hoe
Minister of 'Justice' : Tran Cong Tuong
Minister of Communications and Public Works : Tran Dang Khoa
Minister of Propaganda : To Huu
Minister of Agriculture : Ngo Tan Nhon
Minister of the Presidency : Pham Hung

11. In South Vietnam, however, a government administrative organization of this kind does not exist. In its place are only the LDP committees.
ORGANIZATION, STRUCTURE, AND FUNCTIONS OF LDP UNITS IN VINH LONG PROVINCE, SOUTH VIETNAM

The Vinh Long Provincial Party Committee

12. The Provincial Committee of Vinh Long has five commissars, listed as follows:

Secretary-General (more commonly called Chairman): Nguyen Van Phong, in charge of the Military Committee

Vice-Chairman: Le The Toi, in charge of the Committee for Propaganda and Instruction

Commissar: Trinh Ba Than, in charge of the Committee for Economy and Finance

Commissar: Muoi Vien, in charge of the Party Activities Committee

Commissar: Diep Ngoc Con, unassigned, who sometimes does office duties and undertakes special missions

Units of the Vinh Long Provincial Committee [See Annex, Page 17]

13. Secretariat. The Secretariat's function is to take care of mail and documents, prepare instructions and distribute them to lower Party echelons, and make reports to the next higher echelon. The Secretariat is also in charge of radio communications, picks up the news from Radio Hanoi, receives telegraphic messages relayed by the Central Committee for South Vietnam, and sends in radio reports. The Secretariat is directly subordinate to the Chairman of the Provincial Committee.

14. Military Committee. This committee ranks above all others in importance. Its activities are clandestine. The Provincial Committee chairman, in person, is in charge. It functions as follows:

a. Creates propaganda directed at the military to inculcate them with love of country and desire to unify it.

b. Carries out the principles of the Fatherland Front.

c. Promotes the idea of the necessity of a united army, once reunification of the country has taken place.

d. Avoids combating the religious sects.

e. Opposes any proposed "march to the 17th parallel" [from south to north].

f. Demands an increase in pay and allowances.
15. **People's Committee / Party Activities Committee**. This committee exhorts the people to put into practice the principles of the Fatherland Front, of which the two main platforms are "Peace" and "Reunification." It has the following subdivisions:

a. **The Proletariat Subcommittee**, which persuades the workers and laborers to demand the passage of laws to increase wages, shorten working hours, and provide for paid vacations and insurance against accidents. To gain its ends, the subcommittee uses workers' federations and unions to act for it. It cooperates with other political organizations to demand a preliminary conference to arrange for general elections and reunification.

b. **Peasants' Subcommittee**, which exhorts the peasants to combat any increase in farm rentals, and opposes the return of rice land to its former owners - land which has been cultivated by tenant farmers. It demands that the right of the people to move around the whole country freely be upheld; and it preaches "overproduction" and economy. In the fight against the government it hides behind legal organizations, such as the religious groups of pagodas and temples. In Vinh Long Province the Peasants Subcommittee is headed by a man named Muoi Chu, formerly a district commissar from Cai Ngaong.

c. **Youth Subcommittee**, which aims to guide youth of all different classes toward "the path of virtue." It fights against gambling, unwholesome activities and all kinds of vices. It organizes sports, theatricals, and healthy activities, with emphasis on the spiritual rather than the physical. Its "struggle" groups consist of sports leagues, musicians and singers associations, and philharmonic societies. This subcommittee is directed by Ham Son, a veteran worker from the Youth Committee of South Vietnam.

d. **Women's Subcommittee**, which encourages working women to demand their rights, insist upon wage equality with men, family allowances, paid vacations for maternity, etc. Among women of other classes it preaches good works and encourages the formation of welfare societies and societies for the protection of children, orphans, and widows.

e. **Religious Subcommittee**, which aims to lead the faithful from different religions toward the same path, that of uniting to keep the peace and bring about reunification. This subcommittee has a shortage of important workers. Thus its work proceeds slowly and it has had little success with the Catholics and the Cao Dalists, the two religions which are most prevalent in Vinh Long.

f. **Students' Subcommittee**, the aims of which are the same as those for the Youth Subcommittee, and those of the last committees mentioned. However, the Students program includes reorganization of instruction methods, and teaching materials. This subcommittee is at a low stage of development, and its activities are carried on only in the provincial capital, and in some colleges.

g. **Intelectuals' Subcommittee**, which aims to draw up, in behalf of the intellectuals, a "rule of conduct" advocating peace and reunification, and seeks to create a spirit of mutual cooperation between workers and intellectuals and their code of conduct as reflected in their book of principles. Action among the intellectuals is led by the Democratic Party.
After the arrest of Mai Van Lieu, its leader, the Vinh Long branch of this party seemed to lose strength for lack of workers, and since that time the Intellectuals' Subcommittee in Vinh Long has been inactive.

h. Political Parties Subcommittee, which seeks to gain the friendship of political parties, which, although they do not accept the cause of Communism, are nevertheless fighting for the reunification of the country. This subcommittee's workers are still infiltrating into other political parties in order to organize cells.

i. Civil Servants' Subcommittee. This subcommittee spreads the idea among government employees of the advantage of reunification of the country after general elections have been held. It encourages government personnel to demand "democratic liberty"; keep insisting on a government less pro-American, or unfavorable to Americans; demand acceptance of the principle that community councils must be elected by the communities themselves, and not be named by district chiefs (in this way, Communist workers will be able to maneuver themselves into being admitted as members of local councils); and to persuade security and intelligence services not to deal severely with guilty persons, and not to organize frequent clean-up operations against Communists.

j. Cambodian Subcommittee. Since there is such a small number of Cambodians in Vinh Long Province, this subcommittee does not exist in the area.

k. Refugee Subcommittee. Taking into consideration that there is a certain number of refugees who are discontented with conditions in South Vietnam, this subcommittee urges them to demand repatriation to North Vietnam; demand to be provided with work, and be given resettlement assistance; and oppose being moved somewhere else, once they have been established in a certain place.

Committee for Propaganda and Instruction

16. This committee has the following functions:

a. Create propaganda under instructions passed to it by the Central Committee for South Vietnam.

b. Set up a program of action against "enemy" propaganda.

c. Obtain documents for propaganda and study.

d. Put out the Information Bulletin for the province.

e. Watch closely over the opinions of the Party workers and officials /presumably thought control/.

f. Provide instruction.

17. The Committee for Propaganda and Instruction has the following subcommittees:

a. Study Subcommittee, which furnishes propaganda material, and items for publication in the Information Bulletin.
b. Printing Subcommittee, which takes care of stenographic chores and correspondence, and prints tracts and the Information Bulletin. Equipment is one typewriter and one Everest duplicator.

c. Evaluation Subcommittee, which checks on the effect of propaganda and instruction within the LDP and among the people. It helps the district commissioners with their propaganda activities, follows closely the ideas contributed by LDP members, reports to superior Party echelons, and proposes solutions of problems when appropriate. This subcommittee also follows the reactions of the public to propaganda themes from both sides, especially its reactions on the question of general elections, and In addition, checks the effects of propaganda on civil servants and officials and members of the armed forces.

18. Le The Toi, vice-chairman of the Vinh Long Provincial Committee directs the work of the Vinh Long Committee for Propaganda and Instruction. Other personnel are: Phuong (fnu), Study Subcommittee; two technicians (unidentified), Printing Subcommittee; Tran Ba Bau (Source of this report), Evaluation Subcommittee, and Hue (fnu) and Chat (fnu) of the same subcommittee.

Committee for Economy and Finance

19. This committee tries to accumulate sufficient funds to finance all branches of activity sponsored by the Provincial Party Committee. It raises money by engaging in business, rice growing, stock raising, etc. In Vinh Long this committee is directed by Trinh Ba Than, a provincial commissar. It has numerous other members, of whom the best known are Ba Hiem, a district level Party official who is a specialist in finance; Huynh Van Binh, a Party worker in finance; and Kiet (fnu), a former Party worker from the Cai Ngan District Committee, who was transferred, after the armistice, to the Provincial Committee for Economy and Finance.

Subcommittees of Directly Subordinate to the Provincial Committee

20. Each provincial committee has one or more subcommittees, depending on the importance of the province and the number of Party workers at its disposal. Since the province of Vinh Long is relatively small, its provincial committee has only one subcommittee, directed by Nuo Viem, a provincial commissar. This subcommittee is responsible for the "chef-lieu" district, the city of Vinh Long, and the Cho Lach district.4

ACTIVITIES OF THE LDP IN VINH LONG PROVINCE

Post-Armistice Conditions within the Party

21. Because of the difficult situation which existed, conditions within the Party in South Vietnam were most irregular. It was possible for members who were office workers and who had a fixed residence to organize meetings, but for mobile workers, who moved daily from one place to another, study meetings were rare, almost non-existent.
Training

22. During the post-armistice period courses of instruction could not be set up to train Party functionaries for work at provincial, district, and lower levels. When there was a need for competent leaders to engage in secret missions, it was necessary to transmit instructions from one individual to another.

23. The basic goals of these instructions were:

a. To impart to the Party workers an understanding of the hard life to which they were pledging their devotion.

b. To destroy the erroneous conception of over-optimism, defeatism, and opportunism.

c. To combat the idea of violent, reckless, and dangerous armed struggle.

d. To inculcate in each of the members the established aims of the Party:

   (1) To bring about "liberty and democracy"; (2) to consolidate the peace; (3) to raise the standard of living of the people; (4) attain reunification of the country; (5) bring about the complete independence of the whole nation.

24. During the 200 days which had been set for the regroupment of personnel from both sides, the Committee for South Vietnam did, however, organize a course of instruction to train provincial commissars. This course was conducted in Can Ha. Le The Toi and Diep Ngoc Con attended it.

25. Some time after the Provincial Committee for Vinh Long had been organized, the Committee for Propaganda and Instruction printed short study courses and sent them to Party workers of the lower echelons for their instruction.

Propaganda Activities

26. During the months of March and April 1956, Pham Van Dong, in the name of the Government of North Vietnam, sent a message to the Government of "Free" Vietnam requesting an agreement in regard to holding a preliminary conference for General Elections. When there was no response, the LDP contemplated working toward calling a second Geneva conference. But after the co-presidents in London declared that the 1954 Geneva Agreement was still in effect and that the governments of North and South Vietnam had to agree on the organization of a preliminary conference, the LDP decided that it would be better not to demand a second Geneva conference. Instead, the Party sponsored the slogan "The Vietnamese demand a conference for general elections and for the reestablishment of normal relations between the North and South."

27. The Central Committee for South Vietnam passed instructions to its lower echelons not long ago (probably in early 1956) recommending that they abandon the old method of struggle by conducting illegal activities, such as the distribution of tracts, holding meetings and demonstrations, hanging banderoles, etc., and adopt legal and peaceful methods, thus avoiding suppressive measures by government authorities. Terrorism was eliminated from the program.
28. There is a propaganda committee in each LDP echelon. There are not, so to speak, special organizations responsible for producing propaganda, however - only Party workers who are responsible for propaganda activities.

29. Word of mouth propaganda is the method employed the most, since it leaves no proof, no trace. It is passed along in conversations among two or more persons, at friendly gatherings, in business offices, in public transport vehicles. It is also passed from hand to hand in printed form, in bulletins and periodicals such as the review Tranh Da and the Fatherland Front publications.

30. Each community employs the kind of propaganda which suits it best, and the choice depends upon the means at hand. If there happens to be a lack of propaganda themes, those of the national government (South Vietnam) are used, and changed into counter-propaganda.

31. The district committee receive propaganda directives from the provincial committees, and they in turn send them to the local Party workers, in order to help them and control them at the same time. Party personnel in the villages are closest to the people and play an important part in the propaganda program. Each village cell represents a small propaganda center for the LDP.

Security Measures

32. The Vinh Long Provincial Committee has established a secret base in the Lo Co area, in the village of An Tuong, My Cam, belonging to the Canh Long (Tra Vinh) District. Party workers are not allowed to go there, and only the commissars have access to it.

33. Only the provincial commissars are authorized to carry weapons. However, their weapons constitute for them a means of defense rather than attack.

34. Special agents have been appointed to conduct liaison between province and district. One relay station has been established in the village of Long Bo, at the home of a man named Tu Cao. This relay station sends mail and messages to the villages, the city, to Cho Lach, and to the provincial committee. For mail going from the district to the province committee there are special routes in each district which are used for forwarding reports and correspondence from Party workers out on missions. From the villages to the districts, liaison is maintained by special routes known only to the committees for which these routes are reserved.

35. When a liaison agent is discovered or captured, the whole system of contact changes, and all the agents who have had contact with him must also be changed, as must all the secret symbols which have been used in the correspondence. When a Party worker is being followed or has been "noticed," he is transferred to another province. If he shows little courage for his work, he is detached from duty and sent back to his family for a time.

36. For purposes of secrecy, symbols are used for documents and organizations. The Vinh Long Provincial Committee is known as Chu Ut (Uncle Ut); and the district committees as Chi (Sister). Following this pattern of symbols, the Chau Thanh District Committee would be known as Chi Thu (Sister Thu); the Cai Nhum Committee as Chi Nhan (Sister Nhan); and Cho Lach as Chi Lan (Sister Lan). The
Personnel Practices

38. Provincial commissars are named by the Committee for South Vietnam, and district commissars by the Provincial Committee, with preference being given to workers, manual laborers, and poor peasants. Members who possess property of any kind are sent to work on the provincial level (sic). Village commissars are named by the District Committee, the selection being made from among poor peasants. Members who possess property are called to serve on the district level.

39. Provincial Party workers receive 200 plasters a month as an allowance, except those who are on extraordinary missions, who receive five or six months' pay all at once. These allowances are insufficient for their needs. In addition to their pay they must obtain aid and support from their families. Those who have no families live on the generosity of the people. The allowances are paid out by the provincial organization only. If a period of crisis comes up, and if the provincial organization runs out of funds, the workers are cut off from all financial aid and each one gets along the best he can. Membership dues for the LDP are five plasters a month.

Method of Approach to Foreigners

40. For LDP purposes, the French in Vietnam are divided into several categories, including anti-American, pro-American, those approving of the Geneva agreement, and those opposed. To persuade them to join the Party they are approached individually.

41. The LDP pays more attention to poor Chinese than to the rich, and to workers, manual laborers, and small businessmen. The method of approach is to explain to them that with the independence and unification of Vietnam will come liberty for the people and for the Chinese nation.

42. With the Indians, the LDP seeks to establish friendly relations. To Cambodians and Laotians the Party expounds on the principles of peaceful co-existence.

Approach to Other Political Parties

43. Because of the shortage of competent personnel, the LDP has developed few relationships with organizations such as the Dai Viet, Vietnam Phuc Quoc Eoi, Mat Tran Quoc Gia Khang Chien, Mat Tran Quoc Gia Lien Hiep, and Vietnam Quoc Dan Dang.

units of the Provincial Committee use the symbol Cau (Uncle) as follows:

Military Committee, Cau Ba; People's Committee [Party Activities Committee], Cau Dan; Propaganda and Instruction, Cau Tu Hau; and Economy and Finance, Cau Tal. On the village level, the symbol Co (Aunt) is used.

37. In the villages, security cells are organized, with the personnel selected from among the Young Workers' Federation [Labor Youth League]. Their function is to report to the commissars and be responsible for security at meetings. The most daring of the youths find secret places to hide the Party workers. There are a number of requirements governing the construction of these hiding places. Some of them are as follows: The place must be remote, safe from the eyes of indiscreet persons; it must be on high ground, to keep water out; it must not be in the open, since rain would render such a place uninhabitable; if inside of a house, the doorway must be well hidden to prevent discovery during a house search.
Military Organization

45. Since there is no organized government body in South Vietnam (see Paragraphs 10 and 11, above), there is no military organization.5

The Surete

45. The Surete organization, as it was during the period of the War of the Resistance, no longer exists. All the veterans from the old Surete have been transferred to other branches of activity. Those who lack ability or training are sent to work in the villages. In certain provinces where the Hoa Hao are numerous, the LDP committees organize the security service for the armed group of the sect.5

TRAN BA BUU'S VIEWS ON THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE NATIONAL INFORMATION SERVICE, CIVIC ACTION, AND THE CAMPAIGN FOR THE DENUNCIATION OF SUBVERSIVE COMMUNIST ACTIVITIES

46. If the propaganda activities initiated by the Government of South Vietnam do not coordinate with those of the armed forces (in clean-up operations, arrests, repressions, etc.) good results will not be obtained. Military operations are the most efficacious in demoralizing the Communists. These operations eliminate from the fight a good number of Party workers and cause them to flee far from their bases, or throw them into the Nationalist camp.

47. Government propaganda, especially among the general population in the country, is well spread out as to area, but it has no depth. The shows put on at the meetings for the denunciation of Communists are often too formal, and frighten the audiences, preventing them from taking part in the discussions. The people have not yet been won over to the Nationalist idea. Thus, at the movies and theatrical performances, they are more interested in the antics of the comedians than in the propaganda itself.

Headquarters Comments

1. According to available information, before the establishment of this Central Committee for South Vietnam, the provincial Party committees in South Vietnam had been directly responsible to the LDP Central Committee. With the change, they became directly subordinate to the Central Committee.

2. Other reports on a variety of Communist activities carried out in South Vietnam from 1955 to November 1957, bear out the premise that the LDP was the controlling force there, rather than the DRV Government.

3. The Democratic Party mentioned here was founded by the Vietnamese Communists in 1946, and is still in existence in North Vietnam as a front organization.

4. The type of subcommittee described here is not a unit of the Provincial Committee. It appears on the structural diagram (see Annex, page 15) on the same level as the district committees, and seems to fit in with the pattern commonly followed by the Communists in creating special committees for heavily populated or important areas such as the Saigon-Cholon area, and the one described in Paragraph 20 above.
5. The source probably does not mean that there is no military organization of any kind, but none which is administered by an executive arm of the DRV. There have been continuous reports that military and paramilitary Communist groups have been operating in South Vietnam since the armistice, supporting dissident movements, and fomenting strife on the Cambodian border. One such report, dated June 1955, described police, administrative, and military intelligence cells in the Saigon-Cholon area, and another described a "military intelligence committee" in each province. Also, according to a report from another United States agency, obtained from a GVN agency source, the LDP had organized armed guerilla groups in Long An and Dinh Truong Provinces by November 1957.
ITEM 17

Interrogation of two Vietnamese Communist captives picked up in 1956 by GVN forces.
ITEM 18

Interrogation of a former Viet Minh cadre who surrendered to GVN forces on 29 March 1956.
ITEM 22

Intelligence summary based on the reports of various informants who worked for the South Vietnamese Security Service in 1956.
Ranking leaders of the Viet Minh's covert apparatus in S. Vietnam, including LE DUAN, the Viet Minh Chief in S. Vietnam, and PHAN NGOC THAN (Field-word unclear—this name was also given as possibly being Phon Ngoo Than and Pham Ngoo Thao), a Cochinchinese who is the chief Viet Minh courier between Ca Mau and Hanoi by way of Cambodia, are convinced that they are waging a losing battle against the Government of Vietnam. These Viet Cong leaders, who maintain their base in the Plaines des Oiseau, in the vicinity of the Plaine de Ca Mau, believe that their situation has been steadily declining for the past year. They are disgusted with the current over-all policy for the Viet Cong apparatus in the GVN zone. The leaders of the VM group in the Ca Mau area are convinced that the DRV is wasting time building up public relations with the Indian representatives on the International Control Commission. Instead of such policies, these VM leaders believe the DRV must invade the GVN zone and forcibly overthrow the Diem regime as soon as possible if the DRV is to succeed in gaining control of Vietnam.
1. General Van Tien Dung, president of the Politico-Military Committee of South Vietnam (GWN), was at Go Bac Chien in the Plain of Jars in early November, assisting in the reorganization of Ba Cut's Hoa Hao combat units. He was at the same time infiltrating Viet Minh (VM) military cadres into the Hoa Hao to raise Hoa Hao morale, which had been low since the nationalist attacks in early fall.

2. General Dung was bringing together to form one regiment VM military cadres who had not gone to North Vietnam (NVN) for regroupment or who had recently come from NVN. The regiment, armed by Ha Oi Tri and the French, would join the Hoa Hao in launching an offensive against the nationalists. The principal aim would be to impede the supply of rice to Saigon-Cholon by destroying communication between the western region and Saigon.

Location of Ba Cut's Forces

3. Most of Ba Cut's forces had left Long Chau Ha to reassemble principally at Ba The, between the Triton and Rach Gia-Long Xuyen Canals, and at Ba Dau, Vinh Chanh-Vinh Phu, as of early November 1955. Three secondary encampments were in the regions of Canal No. 1, Thot Not, and Ngoc Chuc (arroyo Rieng).

4. In the region of Ba The there were the following units:

a. The Le Loi Regiment, along the Kinh Xang Moi Ba The Canal, was composed of three battalions of about 100 men each. The 205th Battalion was northward along the hill of Ba The; the 206th Battalion was at Can Dau, approximately nine kilometers in dispersal; and the 207th Battalion was from WD 150-390 to WD 152-365, about three kilometers.

b. The 7th Battalion camped along the Huan Bien Leo Canal to the Lung Mo Van route.

c. That Son, the strongest battalion, camped along a nameless canal to the right of the Ba The Canal.

d. The Hoa Chau Battalion was along Canal No. 7 and a canal connecting Canal No. 7 to the Lung Mo Van route.

e. The 20th Battalion, composed of the 20th Company from Bay Dom and the 66th Company from Le Van Tu, camped along the Long Xuyen-Rach Gia Canal in the Tan Hoi region.

5. In the region of Ba Dau-Vinh Chanh region there were the following units:

a. The Le Quang Regiment of about 250 men made its headquarters at Vinh Phu. The 2d Battalion formed a circle of about four kilometers around the village of Van Bu Dau. Another battalion, camped along the arroyo Mac Can Den Lon, sent its two companies to harass the guard posts on the Cai Song-Long Xuyen route and to collect taxes in the Cai Song region. Several aid stations and small units from the Le Quang Regiment were along the little canals of Rach Chuong Say and Chung Ray.

b. The independent Maxime Company of about 40 men was on the Bon Tung Canal the 30th Company from Co Banh, whose 60 men camped on the Ong Co Canal, Bon Tung, collected taxes and fired at autos between posts No. 6 and No. on the Rach Gia-Long Xuyen road.

6. The Thot Not region contained one battalion of the Bac Tien Regiment, plus: the 210th, which had about 100 men and was camped on the banks of the Thot Not Canal in the Thanh Loi region; four democratic-socialist companies; the 85th Company of about 70 men, which camped along the Rach 'Bi Cong; the Trinh Company, near the village of Ngu Tu; the 27th Company, called Nhung, at Rach Thanh; and the Phu Company, near Co Do.
7. In the Ngoc Chuc region (Giong-Rieng) there were about two battalions of the Nguyen Hue Regiment.

8. In the region of Canal No. 1, near the village of Binh Tu, there were the 209th Battalion and the 211th Battalion of the Le Quang Regiment and the 31st democratic-socialist company.

**Ba Cut's Supply Routes**

9. Since the region of Long Chau Ha did not produce enough rice, it was bought in other regions and transported to Long Chau Ha by two routes. From Ba Chuc it was brought along the Khang Chien Canal by Canal No. 1; from the Hoa Hao region of Nguyen Trung Truc it was brought along the Triton Canal or the Ba The Canal, passing by the Mac Cu Dung Canal as far as Canal No. 2. Rice came to the Ba The region partly from Rach Gia, along the Rach Gia-Long Xuyen and Tach Sol Bassac Canals, and partly from the Ba Dau region, which produced enough to supply troops at Ba Dau and in other regions also. The rice poured into Ba Dau from That Not and from the Hoa Hao zone of Nguyen Trung Truc.

10. Hoa Hao ammunition came from French boats that transported it as far as Hon Chong, from Cambodia through Long Chau Ha, and from the Nguyen Trung Truc forces (F-6). All displacements of Ba Cut's forces also were made in small boats. His supply routes usually passed Vietnamese National Army guard posts; the guards, either conniving or lazy, allowed the supplies to pass freely.

11. Rice fields waist-deep in water and swamps even deeper made the regions occupied by Ba Cut passable only in light boats, which followed the canals and arroyos. Boats could navigate the fields by separating the rice while passing through. It was possible to travel along the canals by foot; except when the water became too low, the canals of Bon Tong, Rach Gia, Long Xuyen, and Triton were navigable by LCVP-LCM-type craft. There were three light boats, called cang, on the Ba The Canal, one of which was at Mui Sap.
ITEM 25-A

Report of an informant who was employed by the South Vietnamese Security Service and in contact with a Viet Minh cadre from the Rach Gia area.
1. The Viet Minh general staff appointed General Tran Quang as chief of Viet Minh forces in South Vietnam in early December 1955. Tran replaced General Nguyen Van Tay, alias Thanh Son, in this post. This command change was effected on approximately 3 December at Rach Gia, Binh Vang. Among those present at the changeover ceremony were Le Duan, Dang Viet Chau, General Van Tien Dung, Muoi Tri and other senior Viet Minh military and political leaders in South Vietnam. Tran Van Soai was also invited.

2. Tran Quang was continuing Nguyen Van Tay's efforts to unify Viet Minh forces in South Vietnam into regimental units which would be used to form new divisions in accordance with current orders of the high command of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.

3. Viet Minh Battalions 307, 309, 311 and 410 were ordered by Tran Quang to reassemble from the western region to the Plaine des Joncs area. In its withdrawal to the Plaine des Joncs area, the 410th Battalion encountered the Vietnamese National Army 6th Parachute Battalion near Hong Ngu, Chau Doc, on the night of 18 December. The Viet Minh elements sustained heavy losses in men and arms.

4. The Viet Minh 307th, 309th, 311th and 410th Battalions were scheduled to form a new regiment under the command of Nguyen Huu Xuyen, who was Viet Minh commander of the western region in December 1955.
A. Viet Minh North of the 17th Parallel

1. Order of Battle Information

   a. G-2, ARVN received some reporting during the month of July generally confirming the locations of specific units of the Regular Army divisions in North Viet Nam. These confirmations or sightings include the following:

   (1) A confirmed report during July states that Hq, 36th Infantry Division has moved from PHU NHO QUAN to THANH HOA. There is no indication that the component regiments of this division have likewise moved.

   (2) As of 15 July, a well-informed source reported that Regiment 95, Division 325, had moved from LE THUY to VINH LINH. Same source reported Regiment 101, Division 325, is now stationed at LE THUY (between DONG HOI and VINH LINH).

   (3) Training Regiment 99 is reportedly presently stationed at QUANG YEN (having moved from HAIPHONG).

COMMENT: It is difficult to keep abreast of the reported movements of the units near the 17th Parallel, namely, the regiments of the 325th Infantry Division and the 270th Independent Infantry Regiment. Successive reports have these regiments moving back and forth within Lien Khu IV. At latest report, all regiments of the 325th Division and the 270th Regiment are in the DONG HOI - VINH LINH area. No further information has been received by ARVN regarding the activation of a 338th Infantry Division (see R-114-56 and R-126-56), nor has the previously reported existence of a 904th Regiment near demarcation line been confirmed.

   (4) An unconfirmed report to G-2, ARVN has indicated that the 9th Regiment, 304th Infantry Division, has moved south into Lien Khu IV.

COMMENT: This is another of the long series of unconfirmed reports claiming the presence of Division 304, or parts thereof, in LK IV.

   (5) Regiment 53, Division 350, is reported to be in HAIPHONG.

   (6) Regiment 148 is now reported to have one battalion stationed in THUAN CHAU (25 km North West of SON LA) and two battalions at DIEN BIEN PHU.

   (7) A confirmed report places the 280th Regiment, 335th Division, at SON LA.

2. Logistics and Communications

   a. Work continues on rehabilitation of the rail line between NAM DINH and THANH HOA. A minor bridge at Station CHO GANH has reportedly been repaired, but larger bridges across rivers at Station DO LEN and at THANH HOA are still un repaired. CHO GANH and DO LEN are railroad stations between NINH BINH (20° 15' N - 105° 59' E) and HA TRUNG (20° 00' N - 105° 51' E).
c. The designation of "Battalion" for the remaining HOA HAO units is continued primarily for ease of identification. Most of these "battalions" consist of 30-40 men. Total effective strength of remaining HOA HAO dissidents at end of July is assessed at 1,000 by ARVN, with 800 of these concentrated North of CHAU DOC.

d. The entire staff (7 officers) of the 207th Battalion, Le Loi Regiment, were captured 12 kilometers south of CHAU DOC on 22 July. Also during July, based on a tip from a HOA HAO deserter, a weapons cache containing 2 BARs, 13 rifles, and one submachine gun was recovered.

e. The senior HOA HAO commander is said to be NGUYEN MINH TAM, Regimental Commander of the "North Advancing Regiment".

2. CAO DAI Dissidents

a. Mopping-up action continues in the TAY-NINH area (Saigon-Cholon Sub-Division responsibility upon the dissolution of the TAY NINH Autonomous Zone on 1 July) against pockets of dissidents South and Southeast of TAY NINH. Elements of 5 Battalions of the old TRINH MINH THE Regiment (they now call themselves the HONG HUONG Regiment) were holding out at the end of the month in the river valley area Southwest of TAY NINH, and one battalion remains in the area Southwest of TRANG BANG, at the eastern edge of the Plaines des Jones. Total strength of these six battalions is estimated at 300. In addition Battalion 1 and Battalion 32 (about 150 men) are dispersed North of KATUM in Cambodian territory.

3. BINH XUYEN Dissidents

ARVN credits the BINH XUYEN with two platoons of bandits operating in the areas Northwest and Northeast of the town of BIEN HOA and totalling approximately 50 men. About the middle of July, one armed group of bandits purporting to be BINH XUYEN, halted ten cars on road between BIEN HOA and DALAT and after lining up the occupants, distributed anti-government propaganda leaflets. It is also reported that a VNA Captain was halted, classified documents taken from him, and his car, a French Peugeot, burned. The captain was released.
ITEM 26

Interrogations of five men who were members of the crew of a North Vietnamese sampan captured near Danang in 1961.
1. Source No. 1 was an officer in the People's Army of North Vietnam (PAVN). He was born in 1925 or 1926 in Duy Xuyan District, Quang Nam Province, South Vietnam (SVN). From 1945 to 1959 source engaged in the following activities:
   a. From 1945 - 1946 he was a member of the Viet Minh (VM) Tu Ve (militia or self-defense) force.
   b. From 1947 - 1954 he was in transportation units.
   c. In 1955 he was promoted to Lieutenant and was sent to a North Vietnam hospital to convalesce from malaria.
   d. In 1955 he was transferred to the 55th Regiment near Thanh Hoa.
   e. In 1956 he was transferred to the 305th Division as a member of the Camp Repair Battalion at Phu Tho.
   f. In 1959 he was trained as a Vietnamese Communist (VC) agent for conducting liaison with SVN. After two weeks of preliminary instruction, he was sent by sampan to SVN. In 1959 he was named chief of this cell under source no. 3.

2. On his first actual mission to SVN, he picked up an agent and took him to NVN. Two months later he brought the agent back to SVN.

3. In 1960 source was given a new sampan, so he told two members of his crew to take the old sampan back to NVN. Source and another crewman sailed the new sampan south where they turned it over to the commander of a liaison bureau. Source No. 1 stated that he did not know what became of this new sampan. Also, during 1960, he was named chief of the cell which used the captured sampan. He was still in charge of this cell at the time of his arrest in 1961. As chief of the cell and commander of the sampan, he had made six voyages to SVN prior to his arrest.

4. He maintained during his interrogation that only once did he receive order to make contact with a VC agent in SVN. This agent made contact with him at a museum in Da Nang and traveled to North Viet-Nam with him.
The agent was a native of NVN but spoke the dialect of SVN well. The agent stayed two months in NVN and then returned to SVN with source. Each time source came to Da Nan, he was to transfer messages written on 15 or 20 sheets of onion skin paper. These sheets were given him in NVN by a liaison officer. He passed these papers to a VC female agent.

5. In 1961, during his last trip to SVN, he made contact with the female agent in Da Nang; and after he had passed documents to her, he informed her that the contact point for the next meeting would be in Cholon a month later. She was to choose the contact point and inform his superiors in NVN of its exact location. The alternate contact point was to be a store in Da Nang several days later. On this last voyage to SVN, he was given a Minox camera with instructions to photograph identity papers, coastal maps and other types of documents to be sent to NVN. He stated that the only item he photographed was the identity card, which was on the film at the time of his arrest. He also stated that he had no mission other than that of liaison and the passage of documents between Liaison Bureau posts.

6. Source No. 2, a Warrant Officer in the PAVN assigned to a liaison bureau, was born in 1922 or 1923 in Quang Narn Province. His father, his mother, and his wife were still living in the village in June 1961. From 1945 to June 1961 his activities were as follows:

a. In 1945 was a member of a village liaison committee for several months.

b. In 1948 he was assigned to the VM 93rd Regiment but was later transferred to another Regiment as a squad leader in charge of the guard at the regimental depot.

c. In 1950 he was discharged from the PAVN because he had malaria and was sent back to his village as a Self-Defense force member.

d. In 1954 he was recalled to the army as a squad leader, and at the time of the Geneva Accords was transferred to a division at Nghe An, NVN.

e. In 1958 he was transferred, as a liaison agent with the grade of Warrant Officer. His commander, Chief of the liaison bureau, who
placed him under the command of Source No. 1. He subsequently made seven trips to SVN with Source No. 1 up to the time they both were arrested in Da Nang.

7. Source No. 3 was born in 1902 or 1903 in Quang Nam Province, SVN. In June 1961 his daughter, born in 1932 or 1933, was a nurse in NVN. He also had a son and daughter-in-law living in Quang Nam Province, SVN. From 1947 to 1960 his activities were as follows:

a. In 1947 he was chief of a committee which gathered rice for the VC.

b. In 1950 he became a member of the Lao Dong Party and was elected deputy chief of a committee in his locality.

c. From 1954 - 1957 he was employed as a fisherman and took part in no VC activities. In 1955, however, he was introduced to a 40-year-old VC agent in Da Nang by Source No. 1. Two months after the introduction the agent and Source No. 3 were together in Da Nang. In 1957 a second agent asked him to go to NVN. The latter, being fearful that the Government of Vietnam (GVN) would arrest all former VC, accompanied the second agent and eight other individuals to Vinh Linh, where he was given a six-day political course by the Fatherland Front. After the course, he was permitted to earn his living as a fisherman.

d. In 1958 his commander brought him Source No. 5, Source No. 4, and another fisherman in a sampan belonging to a fisherman from Hoi An. He told the group that this sampan would serve as a liaison and transport vehicle between North and South Vietnam and that the group would serve as its crew.

e. In 1959 the commander gave No. 3 the responsibility of making a trial voyage to Da Nang. A month after this task was completed the commander had him take a female agent to a city in SVN where she was to serve in a liaison capacity with the local VC organization. When he again voyaged to that city, she introduced him to a woman about forty years of age who was a native of NVN. On his fourth voyage, which took place one and a half months after he returned the woman to NVN, Source No. 1 replaced the other crew.
member who had become ill, he becoming chief of the liaison cell which ran the sampan.

f. In April 1960 No. 1 replaced No. 3 as chief of the liaison cell.

No. 1 and No. 3 then sailed the sampan South, where they picked up the two women agents, taking them back to NVN.

g. In June 1960 No. 1 and No. 3 took one of the female agents back to the South; the other remained in NVN.

8. Source No. 4 was born in 1930 or 1931. From 1948 to 1961 his activities were as follows:

a. From 1948 - 1951 he was a cadre in the VC youth movement.

b. In 1951 he was assigned to the VC propaganda and information service of Quang Nam Province, SVN.

c. In 1954, after the signing of the Geneva Accords, he was directed to remain in South VN to propagandize for strict application of the Accords.

d. In 1955 he ceased VC activities, being fearful that he would be arrested by GVN authorities.

e. In May 1956 he fled to NVN in a sampan along with five others. After arriving in NVN he went to Dong Hoi where he was given a 15-day political education course and then permitted to become a fisherman. Because of inclement weather, however, he was unable to fish, so he worked as a coolie until August 1956.

f. In August 1956 he met the commander at Dong Hoi. The commander placed him under the command of No. 3 as a liaison agent.

g. During 1957 the liaison cell repaired the sampan and did farm work. Their first mission using the sampan took place at the beginning of 1958.

9. Source No. 5 was born in 1928 or 1929 in Quang Nam Province, SVN. He had a wife and one child. His activities from 1949 to the time he joined the crew of the captured sampan were as follows:

a. From 1949 to 1950 he was a member of a VC youth organization.

b. From 1951 to 1954 he was a member of the VC youth and militia organization.
c. From 1954, after the Geneva Accords, he was directed to remain in SVN to propagandize the Geneva Accords.

d. In July 1955, being suspected of being a VC agent by the GVN authorities, he fled to an island off the Da Nang coastal areas and used as a port by fishermen. He remained on the island five to six days and met No. 1, who was then a VC agent responsible for sending people to NVN. No. 1 arranged to send him and 22 other persons to NVN from the island.

e. In 1956, he arrived in NVN, where he took a six-week political course. After the course he was sent to another village nearby where he carried stones used in road repair.

f. In December 1956 a VC cadre from SVN came to the area looking for fishermen. The cadre found him and introduced him to the commander. After the introduction No. 5 took a security procedures course and was then placed in No. 3's liaison cell. He took part in all seventeen voyages the cell made to SVN in the sampan.
ITEM 27

Preliminary interrogation of a man who handled Viet Cong agents at the time of his capture in 1964.
Source was born in 1917, GIA DINH Province, RVN. In mid-1947 he joined the Viet Minh Youth Group in his village; in September 1954, Source was not regrouped to the DRVN but was allowed to remain in the RVN, establish a legal residence and cover so that he could engage in the dissemination of Communist propaganda and recruiting activities for the Viet Cong. In that year, he was granted probationary membership in the Communist Party but was not accepted into full membership until 1963. In 1960, he was arrested by the Capital Police for VC recruiting activities and was released from prison after 18 months. He rejoined the VC in a Secret Zone. While residing in the Secret Zone, Source engaged in recruiting for the VC. He was assigned to proselytizing and organizing VC members within the labor organization in SAIGON, and he was engaged in handling VC agents within SAIGON. He was captured by the National Police in GIA DINH Province in 1964 while attempting to escape to the Secret Zone.

**Physical Condition and Attitude:**

Source is rather old and in a weak physical condition but his memory is good. He is disappointed that he did not attain a higher position within the Party and feels that this age and lack of education were the main causes for his failure to get a job of responsibility in the SGQGZ.

**Chronological Activities:**

1917 to 1945: Source resided with his family and attended school for three years in GIA DINH Province, RVN. After leaving school he helped his family in their agricultural/commercial enterprise near Saigon.

1945 to 1960: In mid-1947's Source joined the Viet Minh Youth Group and was employed in agricultural management. From 1952 to July 1954, the French Army controlled his village area so the Viet Minh moved to a village in HAU NGRIA Province. During this period Source continued his work. In 1954, Source studied the Geneva Convention for five days and was told to stay in the RVN and spread VC propaganda in preparation for the scheduled election of 1956. Source went to another village in order to obtain a new identity card and legalize his residence. (In 1950, the Viet Minh had assisted him in obtaining an identity card at this village.) A month later he returned to his home village and began working as a vegetable farmer. During this period, Source persuaded a number of young people to vote for the Viet Cong in the coming election (1956) and even induced some of them into joining the VC. Because of his activities, some of the local youths were arrested and Source had to flee to SAIGON where he lived in a small pagoda. While in hiding, Source continued to persuade young people to join the VC. As a result of his continued recruiting activities, he was arrested by the National Police in 1960.

1960 to 1964: After his release, Source returned to his former residence and his former occupation. During this period he was in contact on several occasions with VC cadre friends and they persuaded him to join the VC in a Secret Zone in 1962. For a year he worked as a recruiting agent for the VC and assisted in farm production of food supplies. After Source had completed a propaganda course, he expected to be named Chief, Propaganda Training for several Secret Zones (which during this period were combined into a Wing) but another VC cadre was given this position (he was considered more capable) and was later captured by the police in 1963. Following the 1 November 1963 coup d'etat Source was assigned to work in SAIGON to reinforce the agents working inside the Liberation Labor Organization. Source continued working with the VC agent network in SAIGON. When his unit moved, Source received orders to go back to SAIGON and continue supervising the old cells and try to establish a liaison-communications channel between himself and another area. In the Fall 1964, Source visited the home of a friend of his (also a VC cadre) only to find that he had also been captured by the National Police. Source became so fearful that he left immediately and went into hiding for three days at the home of a relative. On the afternoon of 22 September 1964, Source was taken prisoner by the National Police while attempting to escape to the Secret Zone redoubt area.