ITEM 28

Translation of a 1958 South Vietnamese counter-espionage report. The authenticity was borne out by subsequent events.
1. The Special Operations Corps of the Corps of the GVN Directorate of the National Police and Surete, operating in Saigon under the direction of Captain Duang Van Hiu, continued to develop investigative leads in the case of the VC espionage net under the erstwhile direction of Deputy Director Huong (fnu) of the Central Bureau of Intelligence of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV). These developments led to some further arrests, principally in the Saigon area. Another MAC employee, one Phan Khai, was arrested on 3 December 1958. The week before than an employee in the Government of Vietnam's (GVN) Ministry of Finance was finally arrested after identification by Captain Bieu's group as the author responsible for confiscated VC reports of the net, which included sections concerning the GVN tax structure, budget proposals, and amounts of American aid funds allocated to various departments of the GVN. In mid-November 1958, another agent was arrested in the Ministry.

2. Major developments in this case began in early 1958 with the apprehension in Central Vietnam of VC courier who had been given the responsibility of getting a pouch of VC reports from this net either across the 17th Parallel or by coastal boat from Tourane into North Vietnam. Subsequent interrogations led to the arrests of various individuals in the net, usually one by one; since it was necessary to work back through an operational chain somewhat obscured by the VC use of shifting meeting sites, letter drops, cryptonyus, and numbers of innocent contacts for subterfuges. It was a tremendous problem, for example, to identify the actual agent on the spot in each of the installations covered by various VC intelligence reports captured, even though captured reports clearly indicated access to installations such as MAC, the GVN Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Public Works, and the Vietnamese National Army (VNA) headquarters area. The captured pouch report cited above contained the subjects with the following titles on American and GVN targets in SVN collected for delivery to the DRV:


b. Some import and Activities of the National Bank.

c. Organization of U.S. MAC.

d. Activities of the Exchange Office.

e. Situation of Trade and Industry.

1) Politics
2) The Colombo Conference.
3) Land Deforms.
4) The Military Situation.
5) Administration.

f. General Situation of the (VNA) Engineering Corps up to August 1957.

g. Situation of the Regiment of Armored Troops up to 20 May 1957.

h. Situation in An-Zuyen Province up to 31 May 1957.

i. Soldiers of the Religious Dissident Sects.

j. Conscription.

k. Finance and Economy.

l. Deports and Home Trade.

m. Money Transfers and Exchanges.

n. Situation of the 3rd Division.

o. Situation of the 5th Division.

p. The Army Officers School in Dalat.

q. Attitude of Ngo Dinh Can's men toward the situation.

r. Financial activities in April and May 1957.

3. Regarding activities of Tran Tan Chi aka Thu ("Professor") Sinh, agent and net organizer of the VC within the compound of the U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group in Saigon, the following is a translation of a report submitted to the Office of the Presidency of the GVN.

Summary of Personal History and Activities of Tran Tan Chi aka Tran Thu Sinh, cadre of the Central Intelligence Bureau of the VC, who carried out operations from his home in South Vietnam.

Personal History Summary


Allies: Tran Thu Sinh (Tran Thanh Sinh)

Occupation: Secretary in an office of MAG, Saigon.

Place of Birth: Village of Ngoai-Lang, Thu-tri, Thai Binh, North Vietnam.

Address: #202 Tran Quoa Toan, Saigon.

Parents: Tran Tri Thong (Tran Thanh Tong), deceased; Nguyen Thi Yea (Yeau), deceased.

Education: Lycee diploma.

Religion: Atheist

Political Party: Lao Dong Party of Vietnam. He joined the party in 1948, served as a member of the Thai Binh Provincial Committee.

Family Status: Married, no children. His wife is Nguyen Thi, also resident at Saigon.

Present Activity: Agent of the Central Intelligence Bureau of the VC, currently active in Saigon (until arrest 8 November 1958.)

Summary of Chi's Activities

1945-46: Entered the Liberation Army and fought against the French.

1946-47: Member of a Youth Espionage Committee of the Viet Minh Liberation Force; later he worked for the committee as an inspector in the minting office of the Ministry of Finance.

1947-48: Member of the District Committee for the Viet Minh militia; later as a member of the Lao Dong (CP) Provincial Committee for Thai Minh, he wrote resistance stories and songs.

1948-49: Deputy Chief, later Chief of Zone III intelligence committee (sic)

1949-50: Trained in study of Chinese calligraphy to work as a translator interpreter for Chinese Communist Advisors with the Viet Minh forces.

1950-51: Volunteered to serve in the Cao-Bac-Lang theater of war.

1951-52: Served as interpreter for Chinese Communist advisers who were giving the Viet Minh training in intelligence techniques.

1952-53: Served as a training instructor (after being in the course) in a special class for intelligence experts conducted at Thai Nguyen for the Central Intelligence Bureau of the VC.

1953-54: Working as an agent of the Central Intelligence Bureau, he was named to operate within the city of Hanoi.
Activities Since the Armistice

1954-58: After a short period he was sent by the Central Intelligence Bureau to relocate and conduct operations in the Free South. This he did until the day of his arrest.

He sent situation reports on all aspects of affairs in the South to the Central Intelligence Bureau on numerous occasions. He sent documents by ship to Haiphong. He was in for two years to organize a net, there.

In Saigon he maintained direct contact with Huong (fnu), Deputy Director of the VC Central Intelligence Bureau in Saigon (who was earlier arrested) for exchanges of information and discussions of operational strategy.

4. On Pham Dang, also an employee of U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group in Saigon, the GVN Special Operation Corps submitted the following report to the GVN Office of the Presidency:

From: GVN Special Operations Corps in Saigon
Republic of Vietnam

Top Secret: Summary Report on Pham Dang’s activities in unclear

Personal History Summary

Name: Pham Dang (Phamj Dang)

Occupation: Office worker at MAG, Saigon.

Place of Birth: Tri Chinh, Tim-Son, Minh Dinh Province, North Vietnam.

Date of Birth: 29 December 1936.

Address: #64 Cho Phu-Tho, Colon.

Parents: Pham Iu (Thamj Iu)
Do Thi Thieu (Dquor Thij Thioen)

Family Status: Single

Economic Status: Owns small private property.

Religion: Roman Catholic

Political Party: None

Prior Arrests: None

Current Interest: He is associated personally with one Thu Sinh (Tran Tan Chi), "the Professor", an agent of the VC Central Intelligence Bureau at Hanoi. Subject was seized together with the aforesaid Tran Thu Sinh on 8 November 1958 as both were about to go off together.

Activity before the Armistice

1945-54: Still a student, he studied at the Tran-Luc School in Phat Diem, and subsequently at the Dung Loc School in Hanoi.

1955-58: After he came South as a refugee, he began to work for MAG in late 1955 and worked there up to the time he was seized by Operations Corps officers on 8 November 1958 in the company of Tran Thu Binh.

When the Operations Corps seized Thu Sinh enroute, they
also arrested Pham Dung because the latter was riding in the same vehicle.

According to a statement made by Thu Sinh, Pham Dung is a close friend and associate who worked in the same office (MAAG) and they often went places together socially. Thu Sinh said he deliberately built up this close association with Pham Dung in order to debrief him about news, documents on matters for which Pham Dung was responsible in his office, and other information at MAAG. Moreover, from the standpoint of operational organization, Thu Binh had not yet reached any definite relationship with Pham Dung. Therefore this leads us to believe, for the present anyway, that Pham Dung is really unwitting and innocent and that he is cooperative with us. On this problem of Pham Dung, however, the Operations Corps has many doubts, so he is being held for further investigation and debriefing.

This above is respectfully presented to the High echelon for evaluation.

Special Operations Corps

5. Concerning Phan Qui, former employee of U.N., Saigon and later an employee of U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group, Saigon, who was subsequently arrested on 3 December 1958 by the GVN Special Operations Corps, the latter group turned in to the office of the Presidency the following preliminary report on 29 November 1958.

From: HQ GVN Special Operations Corps in Saigon

Top Secret Summary Report: Documentation of the Activities of Phan Thai (Phan Khai) in the office of MAAG.

Source:

a. Debriefing report of Phi Ngoc Thach (Phi Ngoci Thacj) an agent of the VC Military Intelligence Service, formerly a Peoples' Army of Vietnam (PAVN) battalion commander, who was recently operating in the South as an agent until his arrest by the Special Operations Corps on 7 May 1958 in Saigon.

According to a statement by Vu Ngoc Thieu (Vu Ngoc Thieus) aka Phi Ngoc Thach, he previously knew Phan Khai, a current employee of MAAG Saigon, as a VC agent, but he did not know for which branch or what service Thai worked.

After Khai had been a while in Saigon, he was arrested by officers of the National Police and Surete, ironically enough, simply because of the personal hostility of an individual. After an investigation of the circumstances, comparison of notes, study of Khai's documents, it was decided that there were not enough facts on which to base any prosecution of Khai. He was therefore released a few days later.

After Khai's release, Phi Ngoc made contact with Khai in order to find out more about him and how he was doing. Knowing Khai's background, he wanted to join in the organization with Khai which had the code name "Phung." Khai would not give Thach the address which he knew for
contact because Khai was not familiar with Phi Ngoc Thach's record of operations.

b. Source: Debriefing report of Tran Thu Sinh (aka Tran Tan Chi), espionage agent of the VC Central Intelligence Bureau, seized by the Special Operations Corps in Saigon 8 November 1958:

According to a statement made by Thu Sinh, Khai is an agent of the VC Central Intelligence Bureau under control and direction of Duong (fnu), Deputy Director of the VC Central Intelligence Bureau in Saigon, until the latter's arrest. Pham Khai's house was used for meetings between Thong and Tran Thu Sinh so that two important leaders could exchange reports on their situations and duties and map out operational tactics. Duong met Thu Sinh three or four times in Khai's house. After Duong's arrest Thu Sinh took up the contact with Than Khai and guided him directly until his own arrest.

Khai is a Communist Party member, deeply involved in the intelligence activity. After he had arrived in South Vietnam in 1954, he sought employment with the United States Information Service. After working there a couple of years, he later secured employment in the film translation office. It had been decided by Duong and Thu Sinh that Khai should change jobs because of lack of access: he was instructed to seek a transfer to employment at the United States Operations Mission where it was believed he could do more for the Intelligence branch. He had not been able to accomplish this by the time Duong was arrested nor by the time of Thu Sinh's arrest shortly thereafter.

Other statements by Thu Sinh verify those of Phi Ngoc Thach's information and show that Phan... is an agent of the VC Central Intelligence Bureau who has been long active in South Vietnam.

The Operations Corps respectfully requests that this be presented to the Higher echelon for review.

(signed) Duong Van Hieu.

6. A report by the GVN Special Operations Corps on results of the interrogation of Tran Van Truong, employee of Air Vietnam in Saigon, is translated as follows:

From: HQ GVN Special Operations Corps in Saigon.

Top Secret Report: Summary of Personal History and Activities of Tran Van Truong, who operated a VC net base inside Saigon.

Personal History Summary

Name: Tran Van Truong (Truanf Vown Truwong), 30 years old, Identity Card 28X 019.593 issued in the 4th Arrondissment of Saigon, 19 August 1955.

Place of Birth: Thanh N, Ben Tro, South Vietnam.

Address: 303/5 Do Thanh Ngon Khonh-Hoi Sector, Saigon.

Parents: Tran Van Kha (Truanf Vown Khaf) Le ThiBach -(Lee Thij bachj).

Education: Elementary School education only.

Religion: Buddhist
Family Status: Wife and two children.

Current Interest: He runs a VC operations net in Saigon.

Summary of Activities


1946-48: Entered the National Salvation Youth Corps.

1948-49: Sent by the Viet Minh to the Than-Phu Training Barracks in Dan Tre.

1959-50: Worked in the office of the National Salvation Youth Corps, at Cho-

1951-54: Returned to Saigon and went to work for Air Vietnam in 1954 where he worked until the day of his arrest.

After the Armistice

1956-57: He was arrested along with Vinh by the Police Specials of the National Police and Surete. He was imprisoned two days before being released.

1957-59: He ran a net inside Saigon under direction of Sau Loc, a member of the Ben Tre Provincial Committee for organization.

7. Arrest of Tran Van Truong was accomplished in late October 1958 by a separate section of the GVN Operations Corps pursuing a different segment of the VC espionage organization in South Vietnam. The name of a Nguyen Van Truong, another employee of MAG at Saigon, had come up later as a contact stationed in one phase of the interrogations of the VC penetration agents within the MAG compound which were being conducted by other officers of Hieu's group. Tran Van Trung had been picked up making an operational contact with another VC agent, not as a result of surveillance on himself. Whatever facts were obtained regarding his personal history were the result of his interrogation. When queries were made by the American Embassy regarding Nguyen Van Truong, MAG employee, age 31, born in Ben Tre, who disappeared 27 October 1958 from his home, a confusion resulted between the two, based on similarity of background. When leading officers of the Special Operations Corps learned of this they assumed that Tran Van Truong might even be identical with Nguyen Van Truong. They were able to verify Tran Van Truong's employment at Air Vietnam, however, and other details proved that this theory was incorrect.

1. Headquarters Comment. In late March 1958, Captain Duong Van Hieu and a group of 25 security agents from the Central Vietnam Surete established themselves at 331 Quyn Van Don, Saigon, as a result of an agreement between Ngo Dinh Can, President Diem's brother and political boss of Central Vietnam and Tran Kin Tuyen, chief of the Vietnamese Intelligence Service (SEPES). The agreement specified that Can would permit Tuyen to carry out intelligence activities in Central Vietnam that Tuyen would reciprocate by assisting in Can's Surete functions in the South. (See CS-3/553,029, by a Vietnamese official with access to information on security matters.) By early April 1958, the number of men in Hieu's force increased to 200 Central Vietnamese agents.
Evidence of exclusively counter-espionage activity by Hieu's so-called Special Operations Corps, including the arrest and torture of a Vietnamese United States Information Service (USIS) employee was contained in CSSB-3/638,927, and COHB-3/638,937 - all by the same source to offer evidence in connection with the October-November 1958 arrests, of the extent that Can's men have taken over the counter espionage function of the Southern Surete in and around Saigon.

Field Comments

2. See CSSH-3/638,428. No further identification of this organization can be made other than to say that it may refer to all or a segment of what has been otherwise reported as the National Secret Service of the DRV, an organization which is known to have been in existence since 1955.

3. A copy of this fifty-one page report in Vietnamese is now under translation and relevant portions of it will be subject of later disseminations.

4. Headquarters Comment. The spelling of the name that appears in parentheses, after the regular condition of the name, in Vietnamese cable spelling. It is not phonetic. This is being adopted in an effort to show discriminative marks, and thus arrive at a more accurate method of filing and indexing.

Field Comments

5. Records of another American agency confirm Tran Tan Chi's date and place of birth, current address, ID card data, and employment. A previous address given at one point was 19/25 Kien oc Cu, Thutho, Cholon. He was a bookkeeper for the Unit Recreation Fund, MAAG Vietnam, doing typing work, bookkeeping, and also issuing and receiving supplies. He has no direct access to classified information. He was originally employed commencing 1 June 1956 by MAAG as an accountant in the comptroller's office and was sent to Pan Ho Thuot to work at Military Region Headquarters on 15 June 1956. In October 1956 he asked either to be transferred to Saigon or to resign. Chi's resignation was accepted but he was subsequently processed for hire at Saigon in November 1956 for his current duties. On 3 November 1958, Chi was reported absent from work without permission for the first time.

6. Records of another American agency confirm Pham Dung's date and place of birth, school record, and employment from 12 December 1955 to 7 November 1958, when he failed to show up in the afternoon and was missing thereafter. His address in 1955 was given as 56 Quarter II Thu Tho Refugee Camp, Cholon. He worked in the Purchasing and Contracting Division of Support Branch in MAAG as a bookkeeper, typist, file clerk, and accountant. His work record was exemplary. It is interesting to note, in view of Dung's disappearance on 7 November 1958 (and prior to that of Tran Tan Chi and Thu Sinh on 8 November 1958), that the arresting agency tentatively considered him merely an unwitting tool of Cal's.

7. CSSB-3/638,428. by the same source, erroneously stated that Dung's place of birth was at Thai Binh.

8. Higher echelon refers in this instance to Ngo Dinh Can, the Counselor of Central Vietnam.
9. Records of another American agency confirm the facts of Phan Dai's employment first with CSIS from November 1954 to November 1956 and subsequently with MAAG. These records further show that he was born 13 October 1920 in Thai Binh, lived from 1944-54 in Thai Binh and Ennoi and from 1954 to present at 86 Nguyen Tan Nghiem, Saigon. According to his statements he was single, a former teacher at the Bacta School in Ennoi.

10. Records of another American agency confirm generally the facts of Khai's earlier arrest. He was arrested on 5 October 1956 by the Police Speciale de l'Est on charge of VC activities. The investigation was based upon charges in an anonymous letter written out of jealousy by a man who was in love with Khai's girl friend. When this was determined, Khai was released 20 October 1956.

11. Source has commented that although there is no news of Nguyen Van Truong, it is possible that Nguyen Van Truong, under an alias, may also be under arrest. It is quite definite that he is not identified with Tran Van Truong. At first, when inquiries were made about the whereabouts of Nguyen Van Truong, there were many superficial similarities leading to mistaken identity: the names were similar; both had been born in Ben Tre and were about the same age; both had come to Saigon at about the same time; Nguyen Van Truong disappeared about the same time Tran Van Truong was arrested. Details on the addresses, identity card, physical description and other points definitely showed, however, that the two were not identical. See CSDB-3/638,428 from the same source, which reported arrest of Nguyen Van Truong.
ITEM 29

Translation of a Lao Dong Party
document acquired on November 29, 1954,
in the Saigon-Cholon area.
Lao Dong Party
Eastern Interzone Delegation

To: All Provincial Committees

From: Eastern Interzone Subcommittee

Democratic Republic of Vietnam
Independence-Liberty-Happiness

Following are the directives which the Interzone Subcommittee addressed to the Provincial Committee of Thu Blau on 26 November 1954 to serve as a guide. We have extracted notes and are communicating them to the comrades for study and execution.

I. Questions on Propaganda and Instruction.

In the new period we must completely reform the old cadres and form new cadres who will have a firm grasp of the new formula and the new tactics.

a. Basis of the training. Great zeal must be shown in training the cadres in the following activities:

(1) Acquiring a clear view of the new situation and the new tactics in order to be able to detect attempts to sabotage the Geneva agreements.

(2) Implementing the five phases of preliminary revolutionary activity: inquiry; propaganda; organization; training; and struggle.

(3) Organizing and directing the masses for the struggle; teaching them to establish liaison; how to institute legal actions and collective accusations; how to assemble the people to protest contraventions of the Geneva agreements; and how to prepare for intervention by the International Control Commission, the Mixed Commission, and the Movement for the Defense of Peace in case of contraventions of the agreements.

(4) Training in how to earn a living, on displacement, on work, on regularizing identity papers, and on how to answer the enemy in case of arrest.

b. Center of gravity of the training:

(1) Confidence in the Party, President Ho Chi Minh, and in victory.

(2) Alertness against secret maneuvers of the enemy; objectivity in judging the enemy; and awareness of subjectivity, over optimism, and under estimation of the enemy.

(3) Avoiding thoughts of tranquility, of difficulty, of misfortune, and of waste.

(4) Awareness of the organization, of discipline, and of responsibility towards the people and the Party.

c. Classification of cadres slated for training:

(1) Personnel of Party organizations, cadres, and wounded veterans and soldiers must be transferred into active cadres.

(2) Training can be given immediately to persons fulfilling the desired conditions; other persons must participate in special study sessions organized in each commune.

(3) Training must not be overlooked during the periods when the cadres are in regroupment zones, guerrilla zones, or zones not yet reoccupied by the enemy.
d. Form of training. This must depend on the actual situation in each area. In regroupment zones large groups can be trained together; in zones occupied by the enemy, training must be given to dispersed groups. In order to assure total confidence in the leadership of the party and in President Ho, and in final victory of the revolution, every individual must understand that the signature of the Geneva Convention was a victory.

e. Training documents:

1. All official documents on the Geneva, the Trung Gia, and Phung Hiep conferences.

2. The communiques of the International Cease Fire Commission and radio broadcast information from the Nam Bo (South Vietnam), Vietnam, Peiping, and Moscow radio stations.

3. Sets of questions must be drawn up on the new struggle.

4. Examples of victorious struggles and of failures must be taught.

f. Procedures and plans:

1. Group education. Although its use must depend on the local situation, group education is valuable because people learn collectively and from each other.

2. Individual training. There must be a plan for training each individual. Training for each family should be organized; rebel soldiers and notables should be trained separately.

3. Installation of training personnel. Persons who have already been trained should be placed in or near rebel families, notables (especially the enemy's future notables), and persons of popular influence.

4. Use of the enemy press. Articles on the Geneva accord, the International Cease Fire Commission, and others from the enemy press must be used to instruct rebel soldiers and notables.

5. Use of people from the same village in training. This is especially useful in training rebel soldiers and authorities.

6. Means of getting our literature into enemy hands. Train reliable men on methods of getting in touch with the enemy. When they have established mutual sympathy they can pass on our books and newspapers.

7. Organize the program so that everyone can study. Be sure that after one training and propaganda phase is finished in a commune there is no one left who does not understand the new struggle. Revise the program on any points that are not well understood. When an individual is sufficiently trained, he must be given a training function in his own family or in connection with a rebel notable. If the training has been adequate, the trainee will be able to act on his own initiative in propagandizing to those who need it.

Summary. At the present time the principal activity of propaganda is widespread on the Geneva Accord, and since this is our political line, we must exert every effort to disseminate a thorough understanding of it to everyone,
including the rebels. If this is accomplished, we will dispose of an infinitely large and strong force which will guarantee the exact execution of the Geneva Accord. The enemy is making every effort to change the meaning of the Geneva Agreement in order to prevent the enemy troops from understanding its meaning. This is why in many areas we still meet with difficulties. If we can enlighten the notables and rebels they will become less enthusiastic, for our policy will conform to their interests.

(8) Distribution of books and newspapers. Some comrades, fearing that the circulation of books and newspapers is a violation of the Geneva Accord, limit our propaganda forms. This is a big mistake. Clandestine circulation must continue because our aim is such that it does not constitute a violation of the Accord. We must try to publish new books and newspapers and get them into enemy hands while concealing the literature already published. We must try to use public newspapers as propaganda instruments for instructing the masses. We could easily do this if we controlled the public press services entirely, but even if we can only control them partially, we can accomplish something in the way of mass instruction.

II. Question of the Party Organizations and the Mass Organizations.

See Instructions Nos. 16/CT-K of 24 September 1954 and 43,45/CT/TWC. Note that the central leadership has ordered that the agricultural associations not be made public.

III. Question of the Struggle.

The struggle is directed at insuring that the "mad buffaloes," i.e., the French imperialists and the warmongering puppets, will leave our country within the next two years. Despite our impatience, we can accomplish this no sooner. The Geneva Accord holds the buffaloes in leash, the International Cease Fire Convention and the Mixed Commission being their keepers. We must wake up the masses who are at the base of our organization so that their vigilance will prevent the escape of the buffaloes. We must be patient, firm, long-suffering, and flexible. We must be able to caress and cajole our enemies on the one hand, and on the other, to beat them with whips if they stray from the straight and narrow path of executing the Accord. We must not provoke them by noisy manifestations which might lead them to retaliate against the people. Later on, when the Geneva Accord is on the point of fulfillment, we will fight more openly for more speedy fulfillment. We will gain nothing by being impatient or overbold; we must fight reasonably so as to achieve execution of the Accord without causing difficulties, for the population.

a. Examples of flexible struggle. Rebel soldiers were walking in a village, talking gaily with some civilians who asked, "Peace is restored, both sides have signed the Agreement; why, then, are you carrying heavy arms around?" The soldiers, ashamed, did not walk around with guns anymore.

In a certain village, rebel soldiers were stealing chickens from the inhabitants. The inhabitants said, "You know nothing and are still stealing as before. It is a villainous act. If you want to buy the poultry, we will sell it." Everyone in the crowd had his say, and finally the soldiers paid for the stolen chickens.
In one village, when rebel soldiers steal something at night, the inhabitants sound the gong, surround the evil-doers, and lead them to the chief of the post, who has no alternative but to beg the people's pardon and punish the soldiers.

b. How to fight by means of lawsuits:

(1) Drawing up a petition. This must be done with neatness, care, and precision. To initiate a suit, all the proofs must be available. The facts must be objective and clear: What happened? Where? Who did it? Name of victim? Value of goods involved? Witnesses? Proofs?

(2) Sending the petition. Depending upon the circumstances, the petition may be addressed to the local council of notables, to the military post chiefs, to the administrative delegate, to the province chief, to the general staff, to the commands of the French troops and of the puppet troops, to the International Cease Fire Commission, to the Nam Bo Mixed Commission, to the regional Mixed Commission, to the Committee for the Defense of the Peace, and to newspapers.

(3) Who should draw up the petitions. Able men must be designated in each village who can go to the Mixed Commission or the International Cease Fire Commission to find out how to draw up and introduce petitions in the way that will produce the quickest result. The villagers can contribute towards a fund to defray expenses for these men who will be able to accompany and guide individuals in their petitions. Experience has shown that pregnant women, accompanied by children, and old men and women presenting petitions arouse much sympathy. To win a suit, one must have patience and to go through all the necessary steps from presenting the petition to instituting the suit, demanding a judgment, etc. Witnesses must be briefed so that their statements agree with the truth of the matter. Under no circumstances must the people assemble and demonstrate; experience has shown that this will provoke the enemy to repressive measures against the people, who will then grow uneasy and lose confidence in our leadership. Any manifestations will indicate a lack of objectivity on the part of the cadres, who must thoroughly learn how to fight flexibly and reasonably.

c. The nature of self-defense:

(1) The theory of self-defense. Currently, our slogans used in the south are to strengthen the peace, to work for the triumph of democracy, and to achieve independence and unity. In the present situation the strengthening of the peace demands concrete guarantees of the security of the people's lives and their possessions, and the maintenance of security and order, which will permit the population to earn their living peacefully. To accomplish these tasks we must know how to organize and carry out self-defense, how to make use of the police, the notables, and the self-defense troops to defend ourselves against the bandits who disturb the peace and against violations of the Geneva Accord.

(2) Procedures for self-defense. This will vary from region to region. In some places it is sufficient to sound the
alarm gong at night; in others, to raise the cry, "To the village!" in the daytime. Here the police and the notables can join the population to fight the bandits. Violent procedures will not be used, but everyone will act so as to make the enemy fear the possible action of popular forces if they should commit acts of piracy.

(3) Organization with types of self-defense. We will start with local experiences which can develop into mass movements. For example, we will try to set up a legal formation of youth groups for self-defense, legally recognized and approved by the notables. A boxing teacher in a village could assemble a group of young men for classes in anticipation of defending the village. Thus a popular movement could be created little by little until there would be an association of youths for protection of property against bandits. Guerrillas and former members of the Sureté also can become clandestine self-defense troops. While they are earning their living they can be trained to communicate intelligence, to betray enemy spies, to give secret signals, etc. The youth groups and the former guerrillas must be the backbone of the self-defense movement.

(4) How to adapt existing revolutionary capacity to the new situation. The aim of the guerrillas, the members of the agricultural associations, and the comrades of the Sureté is no longer the same, but their capacity must not be allowed to atrophy. Each man must be given a new responsibility applicable to the present situation. He must be taught to use the legal struggle in camouflaged organizations and to become secretly the basic element in such organizations, which will be ready for the fight on the great day of the revolution. It must be remembered that old revolutionaries have undergone tests in the struggle against the enemy and they have more resistance than new recruits. The cell group (Chi Bo), the Party authorities of the provincial subdivisions (Huyen Uy), and the cell group leaders (Chi Uy) each have their tasks in assigning new roles to the old cadres and in training them for action through the establishment of self-defense organizations.

(5) How to combine masses' self-defense and the use of police and notables. It is necessary to depend primarily upon the masses for support, and to use the police and the notables only for our own advantages. Otherwise we will risk becoming dependent upon the latter. We must use the police and the notables and the rest of the enemy's administrative apparatus principally to insure implementation of the Geneva Accord. Wherever possible, the people should try to solve their own problems without recourse to the enemy authorities. For example, mutual complaints should always be brought before popular assemblies rather than before the notables and police for settlement.

IV. How to use the Notables, the Councils of Notables, and the Police to our Advantage.

First, a distinction must be made between the present and former organizations & the councils of notables and the police. Formerly they were devoted to administration, terrorizing the revolutionaries, and to oppressing the people. For these reasons, we tried to destroy
them. Today, another conception is necessary. We have often stated
that the activity of these organizations is in accord with the Geneva
Agreement, for we are convinced that during the next two years, until
the general elections, it is necessary to have an administrative machine
to provisionally arrange the affairs of the country which is occupied
by the enemy. Such a machine is indispensable for the South Vietnam
zone. Thus, we must adopt a different attitude toward the enemy
authority than was formerly held.

Previously, our aim was to destroy the councils of notables, and so
had placed our men among them for this purpose. We must still
introduce our men into the councils, but to serve our own cause.
Therefore, we are placing our men into the puppet national assembly
and into the administrative machines from the provinces to the villages.
We are benefiting from this administrative machine by guaranteeing
the liberty of the people and the exact application of the Accords
and later by facilitating the national elections.

In any case, we must recognize that the puppet administration carries
within itself, to some degree, reactionary elements. For this reason,
in the areas where the puppets cannot install notables, we will
not install them either, for councils of notables carry the stamp
of imperialism and feudalism. In places where the puppets plan to
install new councils, we must take the first step to insure that our
men are so placed that our revolutionary spirit can neutralize their
reactionary one. In certain places we must try to delay the formation
of these councils, and if they are set up, to prevent them from
functioning. However, care must be taken that our chicanery is not
indefinitely prolonged so that the enemy becomes suspicious and fills
the vacancies with cruel men brought from other areas.

The enemy, for their own benefit, take men who were in the resistance
to form councils of notables (because these men have the authority
to command the people), and they are used as the enemy's lackeys. We
do not approve of sending our administrative cadres into the councils
of notables; we prefer to introduce our men secretly into the councils.

How are men sent to the councils of notables? Primarily, great efforts
must be made to send agricultural workers and poor peasants to the
councils. If they refuse, we will have to send elements of the rich
peasantry and of the land-owning class, providing they are comrades.
But such people must be of worker or poor peasant origin or they will
be too interested in the question of land and rice paddies. If the
enemy will not accept these elements, as a last resort we will have to
send to the councils former notables with activities we can supervise.
In general, the men we send to the councils must be known by the masses
and by our comrades as being completely ours.

V. The Course to Pursue towards Each Individual.

a. These whom we know will be notables or police agents. First a
list of such people must be drawn up in order to prepare directives
for them. If some of them are dishonest, popular pressure must be
brought to bear on them to force them to withdraw their candidacy.
If some are undecided, they must be persuaded to fulfill all their
obligations to us so that after two years they will have earned the
glory of the revolution. They must subscribe to the following
actions:

(1) To oppose all who violate the Geneva Accords.
(2) To guarantee security, order, life, property, and partition of rice lands and of land liberated during the resistance period.

(3) To preserve the rights of democratic freedom for the people and to insure protection of cadres.

Then those initiated must be supervised, educated, and their progress examined.

b. Former notables. In general, these people are hesitant and perplexed since the Geneva Convention. Some of them have been contacted without preconceived points of view. This method of "touch the hand and let go of the tail" is to be avoided. These notables have depended on former members of the resistance, but once in power they could change their attitudes and make difficulties for the people. We must, therefore, make serious efforts to instruct them in the merits and to teach them the spirit of the Geneva Accords. They must be educated to the point where they see clearly that it is to their own interest to place themselves on the side of the revolution, and so that they will take note of their former faults, amend their ways, and serve the revolution. To accomplish this, we must have a plan for managing each individual concerned:

(1) Those who were once dishonest but have returned to the fold repentent must be used, but their actions will be supervised to insure their progress.

(2) Direction might be made toward reactionaries and pseudo converts who have profited from the revolution so that the people will review their faults, denounce them, and have them dismissed, replaced or accused by the enemy of delinquency in office. Demarches must also be made to their families and neighbors to force these resignations.

(3) Fence-sitters who wish to contact us and who ask to work must be watched closely by cadres. Great efforts must be made to have comrades available among the members of their families or among the local people to serve as intermediaries between us and the fence-sitters, to advise the latter, give them work, and at the same time to watch them closely.

(4) If those who have committed many offenses against the people are undecided and wish to work for us, we must tell them frankly that we are well aware of their misdeeds but that we will not denounce them on condition that they atone by performing outstanding deeds for us. We will make them understand that to work with the imperialists is to walk the road of death, but to march with the revolution is to march the road to glory. In two years the revolution will have triumphed!

(5) For the rebel soldiers we should preserve the old cadres for making revolutionary demarches in order to avoid confusion in their ranks. It is not necessary to send many of our men among them, but we should spread our propaganda designed to incite them to desert. If they cannot do this, we should ask them to uphold the movement in favor of the execution of the Accords, to protect our cadres, and to refuse to harm the people or destroy their property. Basing our pleas on the principles of the Accords, we should persuade the soldiers that they must oppose oppressive measures ordered by their superiors.

In summary, with respect to the enemy authorities, we must carry on the struggle by using their administrative machine to guarantee that our political programs are carried out, and we must put into
office the men necessary to assure leadership of these projects. How should we fight until the general elections to gain seats in the enemy administrative machine?

(1) By eliminating the people who oppose us and by replacing them with men sympathetic to our cause.

(2) By overthrowing completely the council of notables in a region and replacing them with new councils, or by waiting until the rebel authorities organize new elections so that we can put up men whom we have prepared in advance.

In waging our struggle we must proceed step by step, work hard to place our people strategically, and use every effective means at our command. We must not be content with a few successes but must seek to gain success in each individual undertaking. The number of men we place into the council at the beginning is not too important, but we must gradually increase that number. Little by little, reactionary elements will be eliminated but the enemy will try to eliminate our people also. For this reason, we must constantly take precautions, consolidate each success gained, and prepare to meet any eventuality.
ITEM 30

A U.S. Department of State Intelligence Brief issued on July 11, 1957.
This report is based on information available through July 1, 1957.

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THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENTS IN VIETNAM AND KOREA

Abstract

The armistice agreements in Vietnam and Korea succeeded in bringing about a cessation of hostilities but have failed conspicuously to control the armament of the forces to the north of each demilitarized zone. Experience in the operation of both agreements has demonstrated that their failure derived primarily from deliberate Communist efforts to evade and obstruct the control systems established in the agreements. The International Commission for Supervision and Control (ICC) in Vietnam and the Military Armistice Commission (MAC) and Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC) in Korea exist today essentially as symbols that neither side is ready to resume open hostilities.

Known increases of Communist armaments have never been certified through the established international supervisory commissions. In both countries the Communists have introduced military equipment in violation of the terms of the respective armistice agreements, including introductions at unauthorized points, and in both countries they have employed flat refusals to cooperate and the existence of loopholes and ambiguities in the agreements to render ineffective the operation of the control systems in the northern zones. Communist members of inspection teams in both countries have tried to expand the control operations as much as possible in the southern zones while supporting the severe restrictions placed on the teams by the Communist authorities in the north. The Communists have exploited the control activities in the southern zones to provide bases for propaganda charges of armistice violations by the non-communist nations, to collect military information, and, at least in Vietnam, to maintain liaison with the Communist clandestine network in the south.

The differences between the Communist performances in Vietnam and Korea stem in large part from differences between the respective armistice provisions concerning armament control and evidently not from differing attitudes toward the concept of control. One such difference is the composition of the respective supervisory organizations. The tripartite ICC in Vietnam, despite its limited achievements, was more effective in the initiation of investigations and in the negative task of assigning responsibility for the failure of the control mechanism than was the NNSC in Korea, which had no provision for a deciding vote by a neutral nation acceptable to both sides.
I. VIETNAM

A. Background

The 1954 agreement on the cessation of hostilities in Vietnam assigned broad responsibilities to the International Commission for Supervision and Control (ICC), but did not give the ICC the powers, rights, and privileges necessary to carry out these responsibilities. Consequently, the Communist "Democratic Republic of Vietnam" (DRV) has been able to violate the agreement with impunity and the ICC has been prevented from observing most of these violations. Although the only sanctions available to the ICC in the event of violation of the agreement by either side are public condemnation and/or a report to the Geneva co-chairmen, these have proved effective to some degree in those instances when the ICC has been able to prove the existence of a violation or has decided against the party involved. On the other hand, numerous violations by the French Union forces and subsequently the Republic of Vietnam have been recorded even though they have complied more strictly with the agreement, because they have been more open in their actions and more easily observed.

1. The Cease-fire Agreement. The basic provisions of the cease-fire agreement included: 1) the establishment of a military demarcation line at approximately the 17th parallel with a demilitarized zone extending five kilometers on each side; 2) a cease-fire and the phased withdrawal of forces to the north and south of the line; 3) the prohibition of the introduction of military personnel or material from outside Vietnam except on a replacement basis, the establishment of new military bases or military bases under foreign control, and adherence to any military alliance; 4) the liberation and repatriation of all prisoners of war and civilian internees; 5) the establishment of a Joint Commission by the two signatories to facilitate the execution of the agreement; and 6) the establishment of the ICC. The agreement was signed by France and the DRV; South Vietnam refused to sign and specifically took the position that it was not bound by the agreement.

Several lesser provisions have assumed great importance at various times including: an undertaking by both parties to refrain from reprisals for hostile activities during the war (14c), a guarantee of freedom of movement from one zone to the other during the 300-day period of regroupment of troops (14d), a prohibition of interference in local civil administration (15d), and a statement that "the signatories and their successors in their functions" are responsible for executing the agreement (27). The proposal for internal elections in July 1956 in the Final Declaration of the Geneva Conference was also an issue of great importance, but this is not an integral part of the agreement. The only mention of elections in the agreement is a statement that "pending the general elections," the civil administration in each zone will be under the party whose forces are regrouped there.
The circumstances in which the agreement is presently operating are substantially different from those envisaged at the time it was signed. In April 1956 France withdrew as a responsible party to the agreement after the evacuation of its military forces from Vietnam. South Vietnam, while refusing to become France's legal successor, has become informally and to a limited extent the second party to the agreement. The Joint Commission formed by the French and DRV high commands has ceased operating because France has refused to participate except as a disinterested party offering its good offices. The DRV has been unwilling to accept this new status for France and no meetings of the Joint Commission have been held since the spring of 1956.

2. The Duties and Powers of the ICC. The ICC was assigned general responsibility for the supervision and control of all provisions of the agreement and, in certain instances such as the control of troop rotation and replacement of war material, its duties were specifically outlined. The principal duties of the ICC are described in the following articles:

15e. The Joint Commission and the International Commission shall ensure that steps are taken to safeguard the forces in the course of withdrawal and transfer.

16g. The International Commission, through its inspection teams, shall supervise and inspect the rotation of units and groups of personnel and the arrival and departure of individual personnel as authorized above at the points of entry enumerated in Article 20 below.

17f. The International Commission, through its inspection teams, shall supervise and inspect the replacements (arms, munitions, and other war material) permitted in the circumstances laid down in this Article at the points of entry enumerated in Article 20 below.

29. An International Commission shall ensure the control and supervision of this execution of the agreement.

36. The International Commission shall be responsible for supervising the proper execution by the parties of the provisions of the agreement. For this purpose it shall fulfill the tasks of control, observation, inspection, and investigation connected with the application of the provisions of the agreement on the cessation of hostilities, and it shall in particular:

(a) control the movement of the armed forces of the two parties affected within the framework of the regrouping plan;

(b) supervise the demarcation lines between the regrouping areas, and also the demilitarized zones;

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(c) control the operations of releasing prisoners of war and civilian internees;

(d) supervise at ports and airfields as well as along all frontiers of Vietnam the execution of the provisions of the agreement on the cessation of hostilities regulating the introduction into the country of armed forces, military personnel, and all kinds of arms, munitions, and war materials.

40. When the Joint Commission is unable to reach an agreement on the interpretation to be given to some provision or on the appraisal of a fact, the International Commission shall be informed of the disputed question. Its recommendation shall be sent directly to the parties and shall be notified to the Joint Commission.

a. The ICC's Powers. The powers and privileges guaranteed to the ICC are not comparable in scope to its responsibilities. Article 25 requires the two parties to afford "full protection and all possible assistance and cooperation" to the ICC, but the vagueness of these requirements has left them open to varying interpretations. The ICC is authorized to establish fixed teams, composed of an equal number of officers of the three member states, at the 14 seaports and border towns listed as points of entry and exit for troops and war material. The location of the fixed teams can be altered only with the agreement of the party concerned. No rights of supervision and control, however, are specifically assigned the fixed teams.

The ICC is also given the right to establish mobile teams of similar composition which are guaranteed the right to move freely in the regions bordering the land and sea frontiers, the demarcation lines between regrouping zones, and the demilitarized zones. For movement beyond these zones, however, the teams are required to have the agreement of the party concerned. The two parties are also required to give the inspection teams all the facilities needed for fulfillment of their tasks (e.g., personnel, access to necessary documents and witnesses, security, freedom of movement), and to provide such "modern means of transport, observation, and communication as they may require." The agreement does not clearly state, however, that these rights apply equally to both the fixed teams and the mobile teams and, consequently, it appeared for a time that the Communists would insist that the fixed teams could be established but had no rights that would permit them to operate. Finally, the ICC is given the right to have its inspection teams undertake investigations, "both documentary and on the ground," on its own initiative as well as at the request of the Joint Commission or one of the parties.

The only sanction available to the ICC is in Article 43 which provides that the ICC shall inform the members of the Geneva Conference if one of the parties refuses to put into effect an ICC recommendation or hinders the activity of the ICC. As a matter of practice, however, the ICC
has directed all reports on its activities and problems to the co-chairman of the Geneva Conference, the UK and USSR.

The agreement does not outline in detail the organization or methods of operation of the ICC. A few procedural articles provide that: 1) the Indian representative will preside; 2) inspection teams will report on their activities to the ICC and include the conclusions of each member in case of disagreement; 3) if an inspection team is unable to settle an incident, or considers there is a violation or threat of a serious violation, it shall inform the ICC which shall, in turn, inform the parties of the measures to be taken; and 4) the ICC can adopt recommendations by a majority vote except in dealing with violations which might lead to a resumption of hostilities, when the vote must be unanimous.

The provision for a majority vote has prevented the developments of a complete deadlock in the Commission, but its composition has not been conducive to clear-cut action. The Indian chairman have sought unanimity whenever possible and have therefore worked constantly for compromise solutions. The Polish members have supported the DRV, sometimes openly and sometimes behind a facade of disinterestedness. The Canadian members of the Commission, while considering the use of similar tactics in support of South Vietnam repugnant, have attempted to bring the DRV's violations to the attention of the Commission and to protect South Vietnam from Communist excesses. South Vietnam has not made the Canadian task easier by refusing to cooperate with the ICC for the first year and half after the cease-fire.

3. Organization of the ICC. The Organization of the ICC includes the Commission composed of the Canadian, Indian, and Polish ambassadors; the Commissioners' alternates and military and political advisers; and in secretariat stationed in Hanoi. The secretariat has three main branches: administrative, operations, and petitions. Three standing committees: administration, operations (composed of the military advisers), and freedom (composed of the political advisers) -- supervise the work of the three secretariat branches. Various ad hoc committees are appointed as necessary. In addition, there are sub-offices in Hanoi and Saigon and 14 fixed teams, seven in the north and seven in the south, each of which has an element operating as a mobile team. Additional mobile teams are formed from headquarters personnel as needed.

The Commission intended to spend alternate years in Saigon, but this move has never been arranged, although it visits Saigon from time to time.

The Indian delegation is the largest, currently about 726, because India supplies the support personnel. The Canadian and Polish delegations comprise 100 and 143 persons respectively. The costs of the ICC are divided several ways. The salaries and allowances of the delegations, except...
the support personnel, are paid by the participant states; local operating expenses for the various teams are paid by the two parties to the agreement; and the common overhead expenses are shared by four members of the Geneva Conference, the UK, France, the Soviet Union, and Communist China.

4. The Operation of the ICC. As there was no time to work out details of its rights or procedures in advance, the ICC began operations on a crash basis within three weeks of the signature of the agreement, the day the cease-fire became effective throughout Vietnam. Although in principle it was responsible for the supervision of all clauses of the agreement, inevitably the ICC in practice concerned itself with the questions immediately at hand. In the first months these questions concerned the disengagement, regroupment and withdrawal of the opposing forces, the exchanges of prisoners, and graves registration and transfer. By the fall of 1954 the foremost question was the right of the inhabitants of either zone to move to the other. In the spring of 1955 the final withdrawal of forces took place, and the movement of population from one zone to the other ended in July. A crossfire of complaints under Articles 14c and 15d continued, thereafter, but the major preoccupation of the ICC became the position of South Vietnam vis-à-vis the agreements. On the grounds that it was not bound in any way by the agreements reached at the Geneva Conference, South Vietnam refused to consult with the DRV on elections as proposed in the Final Declaration, and, furthermore, refused to cooperate with the ICC. Although the question of consultation and elections was not necessarily of direct concern to the ICC, South Vietnam's failure to cooperate, and its connivance in actual attacks on the ICC, became more and more important as the French military were gradually withdrawn from Vietnam.

With the dissolution of the French High Command, one of the parties to the agreement, and the absolute refusal of South Vietnam to be considered as its successor, the problem became critical, and in April and May 1956 the ICC asked the advice of the co-chairmen as to what action to take. This crisis was resolved when the co-chairmen asked the ICC to continue operating despite its difficulties, and South Vietnam offered to cooperate with the ICC. The problem of elections was postponed by the tacit recognition by the Soviet Union, in its capacity as one of the Geneva Conference co-chairmen, that the elections would not be held for an indefinite period. Currently, the ICC is placing greater emphasis on the "disarmament" provisions of the agreement, primarily in South Vietnam, and is engaged in a battle with South Vietnam over Article 14c.
The lack of procedures and the vagueness of the terms of the agreement have involved an endless number of decisions for the ICC, and, given the composition of the ICC, countless delays before decisions could be taken even by majority vote. As each new problem has come up, the ICC's first move has frequently been to have a study made by its military or legal advisers, e.g., to establish procedures for recording armament imports or for controlling military bases, or to order a reconnaissance survey of the border, airports, or offshore islands. Each survey or study has postponed the necessity for action, and in several important cases no procedures have as yet been set up. For example, an effective system of "bookkeeping" to record war material used up or shipped out to be credited against imports still does not exist, despite the fact that the Commission ordered a study of this early in 1955 and several subsequent studies of the subject have been made. Similarly, the ICC requested in December 1954 a study of procedures to be established for controlling new military bases under Article 18, but apparently no such procedures have yet been set up.

In all its operations the ICC has been hampered by its limited prerogatives and its great dependence on the cooperation and goodwill of the two parties. Nevertheless, the presence of the ICC has undoubtedly resulted in stricter compliance with some parts of the agreement than would otherwise have been the case. For example, the ICC forced the DRV to permit some northern residents to move south, although the DRV was able to prevent thousands of others from doing so. The ICC has probably been of greatest value, however, as a deterrent to further aggression through its mere presence in Vietnam.
B. Armament Control

Probably the most abysmal failure of the ICC has been in its capacity as a "disarmament" commission. According to the records of the ICC, the DRV has not imported any ammunition, armament, or war material even to replace worn out or expended equipment since the ceasefire. This would be patently impossible even without expansion and reequipment of DRV forces, as North Vietnam does not produce the military material needed by any armed force in being. Furthermore, the DRV regular army has increased from approximately 144,000 at the time of the ceasefire to 268,000 at present. According to the DRV's own propaganda, this army is being modernized to replace the basically guerrilla-type organization which existed during the war. Similarly, the DRV has not admitted, and the ICC has no record of, any foreign military personnel entering North Vietnam except an entertainment group, although it is known that Communist Chinese and Soviet military advisers are in North Vietnam.

The expansion of the DRV regular army has undoubtedly entailed the creation of new military bases in contravention of Article 18 but none have been discovered by the ICC. Available information indicates that the ICC has not made a serious effort to determine whether, in fact, new military bases have been established in North Vietnam. The only active consideration given Article 18 by the ICC appears to have been in connection with Communist charges against South Vietnam. Such control is rendered more difficult by the fact that the ICC is not allowed to visit military areas except with the permission of the party concerned. Article 19 prohibits the establishment of foreign military bases and adherence to any military alliances. There is no proof that the DRV is violating these restrictions, but an alliance in the usual sense would have little meaning among Communist states in any event.

In contrast, the armed strength in South Vietnam has been reduced by the withdrawal of more than 100,000 French Union troops and huge quantities of military equipment. Replacements of military equipment have not been needed or imported, except for repair parts. Similarly, there has been no need to increase the number of military bases. The permanent U.S. military mission has not exceeded the number present at the time of the ceasefire, despite greatly increased needs for U.S. military personnel created by the U.S. assumption of responsibility for training the Vietnamese army. The U.S. has, however, sent a Temporary Equipment Recovery Mission of 350 men in addition to the permanent MAAG to recover stocks of military equipment in danger of being lost because of the withdrawal of the French military hitherto responsible for inventoring and caring for it. The ICC was notified of the U.S. intention to send this mission prior to its arrival in May 1956, but has not yet rendered an opinion as to whether it contravenes the ceasefire agreement. Furthermore, Vietnam has not become a member of SEATO because of the prohibition of alliances in the ceasefire agreement.
1. **The Facilities for Control.** The major activity of the fixed teams was undoubtedly intended to be to check on the introduction of additional military personnel and material. The locations specified are the seaports and border towns given in the agreement as points of entry for rotation personnel and replacements of material. The signatories are required to give the ICC two days advance notice of arrivals and departures of men and equipment so that the inspection teams can supervise and inspect the shipments and assure themselves that no violation has occurred.

The ICC attempted to get its fixed teams in place as soon as possible after the ceasefire, but the last teams were not actually established until mid-December 1954. The mere presence of the teams, however, did not assure their effective operation, and a long series of restrictions and harassments have prevented both the fixed and mobile teams from achieving their purpose in North Vietnam.

A number of fairly reliable reports indicated that during the first months after the ceasefire the DRV was receiving large shipments of war material from Communist China, although none were ever discovered by the ICC. During this period the DRV restricted the movement of the ICC teams, particularly those stationed on the Chinese border, by numerous means. Even on those few occasions when the teams near the Chinese border were permitted to move, and saw truck convoys, they were not allowed to investigate the goods being shipped.

These restrictions led to a long argument over the rights of the ICC teams to move freely, which was not resolved, even in principle, until December 1954. The Canadian member of the Commission, and at first the Indian member also, argued that the ICC teams must have the right to move freely throughout all Vietnam in order to carry out their responsibilities, and that the entire territory of Vietnam should be divided into 14 zones of action corresponding to the 14 fixed teams. The Polish member argued that the zones of action of the ICC teams were limited by the agreement and that the principle of complete freedom of movement had been specifically rejected by the DRV at the Geneva Conference. France had requested such freedom of movement but withdrew its request when it appeared that this would prevent the conclusion of any agreement. The Poles further argued that the mobile teams could not be expected to have the right to move continuously and at will even within their zones of action described in the agreements. It took several months to hammer out ICC instructions to the teams, and in the meantime the Communists attempted to argue that because the zones of action of the ICC teams had not been delineated the fixed teams could not operate at all, and mobile teams could operate only with the agreement of the party concerned.
a. **Instructions to Teams.** The instructions finally drawn up by the ICC regarding the zones of action for the fixed and mobile teams interpret the agreement strictly as desired by the Communists. The fixed teams are assigned specific zones of action, i.e., airfields, port facilities, cross-roads, railway lines, and river traffic, where they have the right to exercise powers of control and investigation and are supposed to have complete freedom of movement. The fixed teams were originally instructed to control these points daily, but later some teams' instructions were modified, and less frequent control was specified. They are required to give one-half hour's notice to the liaison officer before undertaking an inspection. In areas through which the fixed teams must pass to reach their zones of action, the teams are limited to observation only, although this is specifically stated to include the right to receive petitions.

The instructions also provided that an element of the fixed teams could operate when necessary as a mobile team. The zone of action for these mobile teams is limited to an area equal to 10 kilometers from the land and sea frontiers of Vietnam. In these areas the mobile elements of the fixed teams have the right to control and investigate. In areas outside the 10-kilometer strip through which the teams must pass, because of communication or other difficulty, to reach parts of their zone of action, they have only the right to observe. Observation in this case is described as including such activities as noting down convoys seen, requesting information from the liaison officer concerning a convoy, contacting local authorities, speaking to the local population, and receiving petitions. These mobile teams are required to give two hours' notice for a trip to be completed in a day, and twenty-four hours' notice for longer trips.

The ICC referred the instructions to the DRV and the French High Command for their agreement. The French accepted the instructions without comment, but the DRV made several reservations. The ICC decided, however, that the instructions would be effective January 1, 1955, regardless of the DRV position.

Mobile teams formed for specific investigations can be dispatched only with the agreement of the party concerned. The ICC instructions outlining the purpose and scope of each team's investigations have also provided opportunities for the Communists to delay and hamper investigations by forcing debates on the meaning of the instructions and the procedures to be followed.

When difficulties arose over who should accompany teams on control trips or investigations, the ICC ruled that if a team is sent out at the request of one of the parties, it should be accompanied by a liaison officer and interpreter from each side. If the team is sent on the initiative of the ICC, only a liaison officer and interpreter from the party concerned is required.
2. **Border Control.** Soon after the fixed teams were established it became obvious that a large gap in the coverage of the Chinese border probably existed because of the absence of ICC fixed teams at Cao Bang and Lai Chau, through which supply routes from Communist China passed. At the request of the French, the ICC undertook to make a reconnaissance survey of the North Vietnam-Communist China border. The DRV granted permission for the ICC to make such a survey, but was unwilling or unable to supply air transportation for this purpose and refused to permit the ICC to use French planes. By forcing the ICC team to go by road, the DRV was able to assure long advance warning and "adequate" preparation for the team's visit.

When the ICC established that, in fact, a gap did exist in the surveillance of the border at Cao Bang, it requested permission to send a mobile team to Cao Bang. This was accepted by the DRV only after the ICC agreed to send a mobile team to an additional border town in South Vietnam also. The Canadian and Indian ICC members eventually decided that a mobile team should be established at Phuc Hoa, near Cao Bang, and within the 10-kilometer zone, on a continuous basis, but the DRV has refused to agree to this. It has prevented the mobile teams sent to Phuc Hoa from becoming, in effect, a fixed team by withholding all support and supplies from time to time, thereby forcing the team to return to headquarters.

Similarly, the seacoast of North Vietnam has not been subject to effective control and supervision by the ICC. The DRV has prevented ICC control primarily by failing to supply suitable transportation. The geography of the coastline has assisted the DRV in that the harbor depths are frequently not adequate for large ships, and hence it is the custom to lighter ashore much of the freight. Numerous islands along the coast provide excellent protected anchorage. The ICC teams at the ports of Haiphong and Tien Yen requested ships that would be able to go far enough from shore to investigate ships at anchor, but with a shallow enough draft to allow them to approach the shore. To date the DRV has not supplied ships meeting these specifications, although the Commission, over the Canadian members' objections, has accepted as a substitute a small launch and a lumbering tug for the Haiphong team. Another serious complication is posed by the fact that the DRV claims that the barges and small craft lightering cargo ashore are engaged in internal transportation and therefore not subject to ICC control.

South Vietnam's borders and coastline do not offer similar opportunities for evading ICC observation, even if it should be attempted. Neither Laos nor Cambodia can provide military material, and transit trade to Vietnam is unlikely as both are dependent on foreign ports. South Vietnam's coastline makes lightering dangerous, if not impossible, and its foreign trade is concentrated in the easily supervised port of Saigon.
3. The Demilitarized Zone. The ceasefire agreement provides for the withdrawal of all military forces, supplies, and equipment from the demilitarized zone, five kilometers on either side of the demarcation line, and limits entrance into the zone to persons concerned with civil administration and relief and those specifically authorized to enter by the Joint Commission. Also, no one is permitted to cross the demarcation line except with the permission of the Joint Commission. The administration of the northern and southern parts of the zone is assigned to the two parties to the agreement, respectively. However, South Vietnam assumed de facto responsibility for the southern part following the dissolution of the French High Command.

The ICC has established a mobile team permanently at Dong Hoi, just outside the southern half of the zone, to supervise execution of the provisions concerning the demarcation line and the demilitarized zone. The DRV has objected to the establishment of a "permanent" mobile team and has endeavored to persuade the ICC at least to change the numbered designation of the team from time to time to make it appear that a series of teams have been assigned. The ICC has resisted DRV demands, which are undoubtedly based on its contention that a mobile team cannot be established permanently at Phuc Hoa.

The DRV has kept up a constant stream of accusations against South Vietnam for violations in the southern part of the zone, claiming that it has permitted unauthorized civilian and military personnel to enter the zone and allowed reprisals. More recently the DRV complaint has been that South Vietnam is preventing the residents of the demilitarized zone from crossing the demarcation line. However, neither side has attempted to maintain uniformed military forces within the zone. The DRV is reported to have some 300 military personnel in civilian dress at the northern part in excess of the 150 police authorized by agreement of the Joint Commission. South Vietnam has sent "village cadres and workers" into the southern part in addition to its 150 police.

4. Communist Obstructionism. The issuance of instructions for the fixed and mobile teams did not end the Communist obstructionism, although they could no longer claim the teams did not have the right to move freely in their zones of action. The DRV has attempted to hold the ICC teams' area of movement, frequency of control or inspection, and number of objectives to an absolute minimum in North Vietnam. When it has proved impossible to prevent the teams from taking any action, the DRV has attempted to ensure that notice of the teams' movements was available long in advance and to force them to adhere rigidly to planned schedules.
The DRV has found an endless number of excuses to prevent the movement of teams: Lack of communications, accommodations, and transportation, insecurity, refusal of the Polish team members or DRV liaison officers to work on religious or national holidays, refusal to permit a fixed team to go on control trips while its mobile element was in operation elsewhere, feigned illness on the part of the Polish team member or DRV liaison officers, absence of DRV liaison officers or the Polish team member, and, not infrequently, a blunt refusal to permit the team to move. DRV authorities once refused to let a team move on the grounds that the only vehicle available was assigned solely for recreational purposes. Some of these same excuses have been used to reduce the frequency of the teams control trips, but, in addition, the Polish member has fought hard in the Commission to keep down the required frequency of inspection trips to installations in North Vietnam. As a result, the airport in Saigon is controlled every day, while the airport in Hanoi is subject to control only every two months.

The DRV has limited the objectives of the ICC by maintaining that civilian vehicles, barges, and small craft in the port areas, warehouses, and other points are not subject to inspection; by refusing to produce ship manifests or permit inspection of customhouse records or airport registers; by refusing to permit ICC teams to travel outside their zones of action in order to reach other parts of their zones of action; and by simply refusing access to the places to be controlled, in some cases even when the team was acting on standing or special instructions from the ICC. The Haiphong team was prevented from visiting one of its established control points first on the grounds that there was a Soviet cultural mission there, and subsequently by the claim that it was a military zone.

When movement could not be prevented it has been delayed on various pretexts. On occasion the Polish member of a team has refused to undertake a certain trip as a one-day trip in order to assure the DRV of longer notice. Once en route, DRV officials have maintained at various times that the teams could not stop for observation outside their zones of action, and could not change their return route. Sometimes drivers have been instructed to drive the vehicles carrying various members of a team so fast or so far apart that no member could signal the others that he wished to stop to observe or inspect.

The DRV has also tried to interfere with ICC personnel assignments by maintaining that visits of senior ICC personnel to the teams must be cleared with the DRV in advance, and that understudy officers or advisers could not be attached to the teams except for one week and then only with advance notification to the DRV. It has assumed the prerogative of deciding which ICC technical personnel could accompany the teams on trips. The DRV has also made difficulties for locally hired ICC personnel with regard to their pay, movement with and use by the teams.
The ICC has decided in most instances, usually over the pro-
tests of the Polish member, that the DRV was wrong in trying to re-
strict the activity of the teams, but for the most part has limited
its action to letters of complaint to the DRV requesting that correc-
tive measures be taken. A threat to report to the Geneva co-chairmen
under the terms of Article 43 has not infrequently been sufficient to
bring at least a show of compliance. The ICC has reported, in
general terms, the delays, obstruction, and lack of cooperation on
the part of the DRV in interim reports to the co-chairmen on the
activities of the Commission. However, such reports have always
been balanced, or overshadowed, by similar reports concerning South
Vietnam.

Both the French High Command and South Vietnam have also been
guilty of using a number of pretexts and excuses to prevent the ICC
teams from operating, although generally for different reasons.
During the first year and a half after the ceasefire, South Vietnam
refused in principle to cooperate with the ICC. It also objected
to the presence of DRV liaison officers accompanying the teams on the
well-founded belief that the DRV cadre took advantage of their
position to work with the clandestine Communist network in the south.
No comparable problem existed in the north where French Union
liaison officers were French. More recently South Vietnam has pre-
vented ICC teams from investigating DRV complaints under Article
14c because the DRV has attempted to use this prohibition of repri-
sal to protect its still active clandestine network in the south.

5. Violations Charged by the Two Sides. The DRV has successfully
prevented its violations of the ceasefire provisions dealing with
the introduction of military personnel and material and the establish-
ment of new military bases from becoming known to the ICC. The
French High Command made some complaints to the ICC on the intro-
duction of military personnel and material into North Vietnam, but
when asked for additional specific information concerning a charge
it usually was unable to comply, and the case would be dropped on
the grounds of insufficient evidence. Neither the French High
Command nor South Vietnam has had sources for detailed information
on movements of personnel and material or the establishment of bases
in the north. In those instances when the ICC investigated these
charges against the DRV, no evidence has remained of the violations.

On the other hand, the DRV has gathered detailed information on
troop movements, commodity shipments, and military bases in South
Vietnam from its clandestine network and liaison officers in the
south and Polish ICC members. It has used this information to
prefer an endless stream of charges against South Vietnam which has
served as propaganda material for its campaign to persuade the public
that the Vietnamese Government is plotting with the U.S. to turn
South Vietnam into a vast U.S. military base in preparation for
attacks on the DRV and Communist China. The numerous charges also
overload the ICC machinery and have succeeded in forcing it
to concentrate in recent months on South Vietnam's alleged violations to the exclusion of most other activities. Some of the more absurd charges by the DRV are made in high-level letters to the ICC and even to the co-chairmen, subsequently published and discussed in DRV media, but not followed through when the ICC asks for more specific charges or details.

The DRV has no trouble, however, in supplying sufficient details on the entry of military personnel and material to persuade the ICC that an investigation is in order. Although the French High Command and South Vietnam did not attempt to comply fully with the requirements for notification on military personnel and material for some time after the ceasefire, France reported external troop movements from the beginning (not always accurately) and military material movements after the Joint Commission agreed on the specific items to be considered as such in January 1955; South Vietnam is currently trying to fulfill these provisions. Nevertheless, DRV informers are able to find numerous technical or possible violations to bring to the attention of the ICC, as for example: military aircraft arrivals not reported two days in advance because their schedules were not available or known to the Vietnamese Government; arrivals of military personnel on courtesy visits considered within the sphere of diplomacy by the Vietnamese Government; shipments of goods such as aircraft parts actually destined for civilian use which might be used for military purposes; and equipment returned from repair and maintenance abroad. The utter confusion surrounding the "procedures" for reporting on military personnel and material, obtaining credit for departures of personnel, and shipments or expenditures of material further assists the DRV in begging down the ICC with masses of paperwork. In recent months the DRV and the Polish representatives have been able to involve the ICC in investigations of the U.S. military missions, MAAG and TERH, to determine whether they are violating the agreement. In this connection the Polish representatives have argued that the ICC must give permission for the entrance of military replacement personnel rather than just receive notification, and that only French military personnel can be rotated under the agreement.

The ICC has not investigated all the charges made by the two parties to the agreement. Its first action in all complaints is to refer them to the opposing party. The DRV has simply denied charges of violations whenever possible, whereas the French High Command and South Vietnam have attempted to explain or refute charges preferred against them. The ICC has tended to accept denial as prima-facie evidence that a charge is untrue, whereas explanations have led to further investigation.

The ICC has not formally decided that violations have occurred in many of the cases it has considered. After the ICC receives further details from the administration making the charge, comment from the administration charged with the violation, and a report from a team sent to
investigate, the final result is often a decision that there is insufficient evidence or possibly a "technical" violation. With the Canadian and Polish members divided on most issues, the Indian chairman usually casts the deciding vote and the result is frequently a compromise, perhaps a "strong letter" to the authorities involved pointing out that correct procedures had not been followed, rather than a clear finding that a violation had or had not occurred.

Almost everything in the clauses on armament control, therefore, has tended to play into the hands of the DRV. The final ICC action, if any, after months of correspondence does not dull the propaganda affect of having had the opportunity of raising the charges, and the charges keep the ICC too busy to investigate other matters.

(Remainder of report devoted to Korea.)
ITEM 31

An intelligence report from an agent of the Government of Viet-Nam who had contact with Vietnamese Communist Party members in the Saigon area in 1956.
1. In a closed conference in early April 1956 about a dozen leaders of the Viet Cong underground in South Vietnam in Plaine des Jonos area, Le Toan, chief of the Viet Cong agrarian action programs for South Vietnam, and Le Duan, the presiding officer of the conference, reached the following conclusions:

   a. In accordance with the September 1955 instructions of the Central Committee of the Lao Dong Party, tactics of violence are to be applied by the Viet Cong in South Vietnam concurrently with political operations. Through the end of February 1956, however, tactics of violence had achieved no satisfactory results, mainly because of the fact that various dissident-sect leaders were rallying, each in turn, or preparing to rally to the Government of Vietnam (GVN).

   b. From a diplomatic standpoint, the situation in South Vietnam does not favor a pursual of violence by the Viet Cong underground. Since the elections and the formation of a national assembly, it has become even more difficult for an international propaganda standpoint to pursue a policy of violence.

2. For these reasons, in about March 1956, the Party's Regional Committee for South Vietnam proposed to the Party's Central Committee that overall Viet Cong tactics for South Vietnam be changed to permit a more effective exploitation of the current GVN. Thus military emphasis must be subordinated to the economic struggle. The Central Committee approved this proposal and specified that the approaching rainy season be exploited with a new tactical approach having as its objective the control of agriculture in South Vietnam, under the action slogan "Liberate South Vietnam through its Fields."

3. Le Duan instructed cadres that the struggle tactics for the Viet Cong underground apparatus during the rainy season be based upon the following factors:

   a. GVN officials visit the outlying countryside less frequently in the rainy season because of difficult travel conditions and other hardships.

   b. Rural residents are unwilling or unable to leave villages during this season.

4. If both of these factors are properly exploited, the prospect of success of both political and economic efforts will be enhanced.

5. On the political level Le Duan gave cadres the following instructions:

   a. Develop communal support basis in order to gain control of all organs of local popular administrative committees.

   b. Popularize the propaganda themes of the patriotic front to win over the mass of landlords and rich farmers.

   c. Urge organization of agrarian youth groups to serve as a base for their transition into popular forces as needed.

6. On the economic level, cadres received the following instructions:

   a. Establish secret warehouses for the storage of paddy for use in seasons when it is scarce.

   b. Urge strongly through all possible propaganda media that rural masses not be forced by the GVN to sell paddy to the government against their will.

7. Le Duan summarized the over-all economic situation under the Diem regime with the claim that USA is vital to subsistence since normal trade has been blocked; the US is totally engrossed in its own 1956 elections and must sharply reduce aid to the GVN; Diem will thus be obliged to issue raw currency which could force the cost of living up 300% per cent in the next few months. Thus if the Viet Cong succeeds in gaining control of agriculture
and cornering the economy in order to deny employment to the mass of workers, victory in the south will be assured without recourse to military force.

8. Le Toan is to be responsible for involving new agrarian struggle tactics within three months to permit launching of an all-out struggle for peace in July 1956. The conference sent instructions to all Viet Cong intelligence organs to engage in diversionary activity in towns and cities so that GVN security agencies will be concerned with the subversion threats in urban centers, thus leaving agrarian organs free to carry out assignments in rural areas.