ITEM 35

Intelligence summary issued on February 25, 1960, containing information from prisoners and documents.
1. The chairman of a Vietnamese Communist (VC) district committee revealed after his capture in early January 1960, that the VC Nambo (Cambodia Cochinchina) Regional Committee had received directives from North Vietnam, which increased the scope of the jurisdiction of the Nambo Committee and outlined a more aggressive policy for the Nambo Committee in 1960.

2. According to the captured VC official interrogated by Government of Vietnam (GVN) officers of the 5th Military Region, the Lao Dung Central Committee in Hanoi had:

   a. Directed that the Nambo Region Committee would henceforth have jurisdiction over VC political, paramilitary, subversive and espionage activities throughout South Vietnam. Toward this end, the Nambo Committee was to expand its organisation to include a separate provincial Committee (Lien Tinh Uy) for the Central Vietnam (Pays Montagnarde du Sud) and one for the rest of Central Vietnam.

   b. Authorized the various technical and special staffs responsible to the Nambo Regional Committee, such as the staff for the military (Binh Van) and the staff for the enemy situation (Dich Tizh), to expand in order to take over correction of such activities in Central Vietnam.

   c. Indicated that the Nambo Regional Committee was to expand a scope of and become more aggressive in its guerilla effort and Southwest Cochin China during 1960, to the point that all but nominal control in the area would be (taken) from the Government of Vietnam.

3. Notes found on the body of a VC guerilla leader slain in another sector 5th military region in early January tended to confirm some of the statements made by the captured district committee chairman. Another indication that the Nambo committee would intensify its subversive efforts in the Southwest has been in the fact that 5th Military Region authorities have confirmed the presence of Huy Gimp in the Southwest.
Interrogation a Viet Cong recruiter who was captured by ARVN forces in 1964 in Hau Nghia Province.
In October 1963, the Central Office of South Vietnam (COSVN) sponsored the Civilian Proselyting Convention for South Vietnam at the mountainous region of TAY NINH Province. This convention was attended by approximately 120 persons, including the representatives from the seven Regional Committees and about fifty cadre from COSVN. This convention was held primarily (a) to survey the overall civilian proselyting operations in South Vietnam from 1954 to 1963, (b) to ascertain the strength and weakness of the civilian proselyting movement and to review its past activities in order to use them as a guide for future operation, and (c) to draw up a new civilian proselyting policy for South Vietnam.

The new operational policy adopted during the convention stressed that political agitation is of utmost importance and should be launched in conjunction with military actions to win the war. It stated that the immediate requirements of the political agitation are (a) the VC must stop the RVN troops from building strategic hamlets, and must oppose their mopping-up operations and their attack and hold policy, (b) the VC must consolidate its strength, disrupt RVN unity, and launch more attacks, and (c) the Communist Party must strive to provide proper guidance in order to win the final victory.

CIRCUMSTANCES OF OBSERVATION

1. Source was a member of Civilian Proselyting Section Special Zone Committee who attended the Civilian Proselyting Convention for South Vietnam, which was sponsored by the Central Office of South Vietnam (COSVN) from early October to late October 1963.

CIVILIAN PROSELYTING CONVENTION FOR SOUTH VIETNAM

2. The Civilian Proselyting Convention for South Vietnam was held in the mountainous region of northeastern TAY NINH Province. This convention was attended by approximately 120 persons, including representatives from the seven Regional Committees in South Vietnam and about 50 cadre from COSVN. The following individuals were elected to the Presiding Committee of the convention:

   Chairman: VO CHI CONG, representative from COSVN.

   Members: BAY CHIEU, cadre from COSVN; THI CHIBN (female), cadre from COSVN; TAR LY, Chief of the Youth Proselyting Section of COSVN; One unidentified montagnard cadre from COSVN; seven unidentified representatives from the seven Regional Committees.

3. In addition to the aforementioned persons, the following individuals attended the convention:

   HUYNH TAI PHAT, aka TAN CHI, cadre of the Civilian Proselyting Section of COSVN.

   TU THING, cadre of the Youth Proselyting Section of COSVN.

   TU HUNG, cadre of the Youth Proselyting Section of COSVN.

   BAY HIEU, chief representative from the SGDSZC Region.

   BAY AN, (female), representative from the SGDSZC Region.

   NAM XE, representative from SGDSZC Region.

   NGUYEN VAN TRON, Representative from SGDSZC Region.

   Approximately 15 unidentified representatives from the Eastern NAM-BO Region.

   Approximately 15 unidentified representatives from the Central NAM-BO.

   Approximately 10 unidentified representatives from the Western NAM-BO Region.

   Approximately 20 unidentified representatives, mostly montagnards from the 5th (Central Highland) Region.

   Three unidentified representatives from the I6 Region (territory unknown).

   Five unidentified representatives from the I10 Region, which included provinces located between the Eastern NAM-BO and the 5th Region such as PHUOC LONG, Binh LONG, and LAM DONG Provinces.

4. Immediately following the opening ceremony, VO CHI CONG announced that the convention was convened to discuss and resolve the following items:

   a. To survey the overall civilian proselyting operations in South Vietnam from the armistice in 1954 to 1963.
b. To ascertain the strength and weakness of the civilian proselyting movement and to review its past experiences in order to use them as a guide for future operations.

c. To draw up a new civilian proselyting policy for South Vietnam.

PROCEDURE OF THE CONFERENCE

5. The participants of the convention were broken up into cells of ten persons each. The members of these cells held discussion sessions so that each member could relate his experiences. At the convention hall a lecturer presented the operational plan for the civilian proselyting movement. This had been drafted by COSVN. All the participants were required to take notes of the proceedings. Any portions that were not clearly understood or could not be applied to a particular locale or situation, they were considered during cell discussions. If the problems could not be resolved there, it was brought up during the lecture at the convention hall where a general discussion was held to clarify and solve problems. Type-written copies of the operational plan were distributed by COSVN to each cell so that the members could discuss its contents and recommend changes to it. In many instances, they felt that any were required. The recommended revisions were then presented to the convention lecturer, who summarized the contents and presented them to the participants for general discussion and adoption.

6. According to Source, the majority of the participants in the convention reached the following conclusions:

a. The cadre of the Civilian Proselyting Sections from the various regions must strengthen their bonds of friendship with the low-landers and high-landers of Vietnam.

b. The discussion sessions of the cells helped the cadre to understand the situation in the different areas of South Vietnam; thus they were able to further enhance their knowledge and experience.

c. The convention enabled the cadre to recognize the importance of the civilian proselyting task in the current war; and, consequently, the cadre pledged to work harder to fulfill their missions.

CONFERENCE SITE

7. The convention was held in newly-built, thatched houses, which Source believed were built solely for the conference. The area consisted of a conference hall and ten small houses which were hidden among the trees. Their roofs were covered with foliage to prevent aerial observation, and plants and bushes were piled around the conference area to fence it off from the other area. Numerous trenches were dug around the area to afford the participants protection in event of air raids; however, there were no attacks by aircraft during the conference. Two groups of armed men encircled the conference area to protect the participants from RVN operations. Source did not know the number of armed guards present or their weapons. During the conference, the attendants were entertained twice by the Entertainment Group from COSVN.

SUMMARY OF PAST ACTIVITIES

8. The period from the Armistice of 1954 until 1958 was the darkest time for the VC in South Vietnam. The political agitation policy proposed by the Communist Party could not be carried out due to the arrest of a number of party members by RVN authorities. The people's agitation movement was minimized. However, the organizational system of the party from the highest to its lowest echelons survived, and, since the party remained close to the people, its activities were not completely suppressed. In 1959 the party combined its political agitation with its military operations, and by the end of 1959 the combined operations were progressing smoothly. In concert with this progressive development, the party established the National Front for Liberation of South Vietnam (NFLSVN) (Mat Tran Dan-Toc Giai-Phong Mien Nam) to gain recognition in the country and throughout the world.

9. In establishing rural administration and the realization of the people's democratic economy, the following was accomplished:

a. Rural administration was undertaken in areas not controlled by the RVN Government.
b. The economic policy, such as the distribution of arable land to the destitute farmers, the reduction of land rentals and interests, etc. was put into effect.

c. Cultivation techniques, which raised the farmers' living standards were improved.

d. Cooperatives were established among the farmers to ease their work.

10. On the basis of this economic policy, the party was able to develop its armed forces, especially at the 2nd (Central) Region and the 3rd (Western) Region. There the civilian proselyting activities and armed development had progressed favorably.

11. Basic experiences.

a. The cadre recognized the importance of the need for close relationship between tactics and strategy. For this reason, during the past years the tactics of the party had been applied flexibly and wisely to obtain step by step the goal of the strategy which is to defeat the American imperialists and their feudalistic lackeys in order to effect the independence and unification of North and South Vietnam.

b. The military and political arms must advance simultaneously. Although the civilian proselyting task is of utmost importance, the shortage of armed forces will prevent the political arm from achieving the desired results.

c. The following were the consensus of the cadre with regard to civilian proselyting activity:

(1) According to the party policy, the present world was composed of varied social classes; the civilian proselyting operation had failed to politically mobilize these different classes so that they would participate actively in the current struggle.

(2) The mass organizations were still loosely organized and lacked close control.

(3) The party's policy was not applied uniformly. The cadre underestimated the importance of the civilian proselyting operation and lacked enthusiasm in their work.

12. During the conference the attendants summarized the aims of the civilian proselyting operation as follows:

a. Civilian proselyting was an important and indispensable operation in South Vietnam.

b. The civilian proselyting operations must lead the political agitation of all social classes. In order to keep in close step with the military struggle, the civilian proselyting operation must maintain the initiative until the final victory is won.

OPERATIONAL PLAN

13. The following was the future operational plan:

a. The cadre must realize that political agitation is of utmost importance and should be launched together with military operations to bring victory to the revolution. The immediate requirements of the political struggle were:

(1) The VC must obstruct the RVN's establishment of strategic hamlets, and oppose the RVN mopping-up operations and the "attack and hold" policy.

(2) The VC must consolidate its strength in all fields, strive to disrupt the unity of the ARVN, and launch more attacks to create conditions favorable to themselves.

(3) The Communist Party, which is the vanguard of all political struggles, must endeavor to provide proper guidance. The party committees at all levels and its entire membership must strive to ascertain the situation at all localities and stages so that appropriate guidance can be provided in order to gain the final victory.

14. The following must be accomplished to consolidate the civilian proselyting organizational system:
a. Establish systems to control and lead all echelons of the mass groups, such as the farmers', youth, and women organizations.

b. Respect the independence of these groups so that they may operate efficiently.

15. The following was the Communist Party's policy regarding arable land in South Vietnam:

a. Safeguard the farmers' ownership of land given to them by the VC.

b. Distribute land to the poor landless farmers.

c. Recognize and tolerate the landowners. However, prevent them from exploiting the farmers. Allow the landowners to collect rentals to a certain extent but prevent them from collecting auxiliary rental as in the past.

d. Settle the ownership of lands, which were previously public land or which belonged to absentee landlords, return to reclaim their land.

16. From 1960 to 1963 the VC controlled large areas in the plains and mountainous regions, but no administrative authority was established there. The administrative tasks were carried out under the guidance of the party. For this reason, party cadre encountered many difficulties in the administration of the villages and hamlets. During the conference, the following decisions were adopted to facilitate the administration of the areas indicated:

a. Highland (Tay Nguyen) Base Area:
   (1) Using the Racial Autonomous Committee (Uy-Ban phu-trach dan-toc tu-tri) as a basis, elect the Village Liberation Committee (Uy-Ban Giai-phong xa).
   (2) Use the Village Liberation Committee as a basis and elect the Hamlet Administrative Committee (Ban Quan-Ly than).
   (3) If necessary, the District Liberation Committee (Uy-Ban Giai-Phong huyen) may also be elected.

b. Liberated area (controlled by the VC):
   (1) Organize the Village People's Council (Hoi-dong nhan-dan xa), similar to that which existed during the resistance war against the French. The council was to consist of from 18 to 27 members, one-half of which were to be party members, and one-fourth of which were to be members of the Revolutionary People-Youth Group (doan-vien Thanh-nien nhan-dan cach-mang).
   (2) The People's Council would then appoint the Liberation Committee (Uy-Ban Giai-Phong), composed of five to nine members, of which one-third were to be party members.
   (3) The Hamlet Administrative Committee (Ban Quan-Ly) was to be composed of five members, one-third of whom had to be party members.

c. Contented areas (where the VC's influence is weak). The party and the civilian proselyting sections of various committee were to administer the contested areas. The Party Committees were to assign specialists in military, security, economy, and finance, to assist in the administration of the contested areas.

d. The role of the Communist Party in the administration of the rural areas. Although the administration of the areas was to be popular and democratic, it would be more correct to any that it was mainly an administration in which the "dictatorship of the farmers and workers" prevailed, and which was under the leadership of the party through the medium of the party committees attached to the administration in order to provide correct leadership.

e. Leadership of the bourgeoisie and intellectuals. Every effort had to be made to disorganize the bourgeoisie to facilitate the control of the majority by the Communists. The SVN Government was to be prevented from utilizing the bourgeoisie to gain the support of the bourgeois class throughout the world. The party had to pay close attention to the psychology of the intellectuals and strive to gain their support. The intellectuals, however, did not wholly agree with the party policy. However, since they detested all dictatorships, they were more inclined to accept the
party than the property owners.

f. Urban areas operation.

(1) Use the masses at the lower level as the backbone of the upper class; do not neglect the upper class, such as the affluent and intellectuals.

(2) Operate under a long-range plan, protect the covert cadre operating in the capital.

(3) Pay close attention to the situation and take the initiative at the opportune moment.

(a) According to the party, the rural areas were important to the long-range war policy, but the urban areas would be the deciding factor for victory. Accordingly, operations in the urban areas must be aimed at sabotaging the RVN Government at the opportune moment and at fomenting a revolt in the urban areas in conjunction with one in the rural areas in order to gain victory.

g. Operational plan for the youth, farmer, and women groups. In this portion of the plan, the party studied the situation of each group, their role in the current war, and their operational policy. The party urged the consolidation of these groups in order to have all the people actively participate in popular mass war directed by the Communist Party.

BIOGRAPHIC DESCRIPTION OF CADRE RECOGNIZED AT THE CONFERENCE

17. BAY CHIEU: About 50 years old, native of RVN, cadre of the Farmers Association at the COSVN, believed to have a RVN 4th Form education (US 4th Grade), 1.65 meters tall, 55 kilos, stout, tan complexion, square face.

18. Nguyen Van TRONG: About 35 years old, native of RVN, cadre of Youth Proselyting section of SGDSZC Region, 1.60 meters tall, 53 kilos, medium build, tan complexion, round face.

19. THI CHIEN: About 40 years old, native of RVN, cadre of Women Proselyting Section of COSVN, 1.60 meters tall, 50 kilos, medium build, tan complexion, round face.

20. TAM LY: About 35 years old, native of RVN, cadre of Youth Proselyting Section of COSVN, 1.65 meters tall, 53 kilos, medium build, fair complexion, round face.

21. TU TRUNG: About 35 years old, native of RVN, cadre of Youth Proselyting Section of COSVN, 1.60 meters tall, 53 kilos, medium build, fair complexion, round face.

22. TU HUNG: About 35 years old, native of RVN, cadre of Youth Proselyting Section of COSVN, 1.65 meters tall, 53 kilos, medium build, tan complexion, round face.

23. UT THANH: About 35 years old, native of RVN, cadre of the Military Proselyting Section of COSVN, 1.65 meters tall, 53 kilos, medium build, tan complexion, bony square face.

24. THANH: About 35 years old, native of RVN, cadre of the Youth Proselyting Section of the 2nd (Central) Regional Committee, has a RVN 5th Form education (US 9th Grade), 1.65 meters tall, 53 kilos, medium build, tan complexion, square face.

25. THUAN: About 40 years old, cadre of Youth Proselyting Section of the 3rd (Western) Regional Committee, 1.70 meters tall, 53 kilos, slim build, square face.

26. TUONG: Cadre of the Farmer Proselyting Section of the 1st (Eastern) Regional Committee, 1.60 meters tall, 55 kilos, stout, dark complexion, square face.
active part in discussions in order to further Party leadership, sell Party policies, build up membership, and help comrades inside and outside the Party to advance.

Non-members should study with all their might, compete with one another in performing tasks, in killing enemies, so that after they are admitted into the Party, they could better serve the people and the working class.

B. Set up (good) practices in task performance

1. Importance of political tasks:

   Political tasks are of foremost importance in the Army. They make the rank and file love the proletariat, the people; hate imperialism and feudalism; love one another; resolutely overcome all difficulties; endure hardships; courageously fight and kill our foes and unconditionally serve the people.

2. Have respect for and eagerly perform political tasks.

   Political tasks are the soul, the strength of our Army, they warrant success or organization work and war operations; without political action the Army lacks strength to rout the enemy, and will fail in organization work and war operations.

   Political action is fundamental: All rank and file ought to take part in it with all their might, that is the only way in which we could help one another and boost political awareness, develop all initiatives, build up our fighting power in order to exterminate the enemy and serve the people well.

   In short, union is not possible without political action; without political action the Army could not become a revolutionary armed force and be strong enough to rout the enemy.

C. Fundamental Principles of Political Action

1. Union of cadres and soldiers of Army and people, subversion of the enemy.

   a. Union of cadres and soldiers:

      In the Liberation Army, cadres and soldiers are all sons or brothers of working people, having a common enemy, pursuing common war goals, having the same purposes and interests, loving one another like blood relatives, closely united at all levels.

      Cadres love the Army and train in it with all their heart, never stop enforcing democratic practices on an even wide basis, lend a ready ear
to soldiers' criticism and suggestions, promptly straighten all error in leadership.

At the same time they strive to avoid one-way union, hurting the other fellow's ego.

b. Union with the people:

Imperialist and feudal armies are created by tyrants for oppressing the people, the latter loathe them and are determined to exterminate them. Our Army is the creation of the people, it fights for the people's interests to the bitter end, is loved, respected and supported by the people.

The Army must endure all hardships and dangers, courageously fight and liberate the people and protect their interests; along with exterminating our foes, it must conduct propaganda in order to make the people realize that the Liberation Army is their Army. Fight for the people, never stop propagandizing by word of mouth; besides fighting, killing enemies, the Army must perform jobs helping the people in their rice-earning activities to show them that the Army at all times have their interests at heart; observe discipline in relations with the people, endear oneself to the people, to religious sects.

c. Subverting the Enemy:

Union of ranks and files, of Army and people, is an irresistible force, is a must for isolating enemy forces and makes them crumble before the onslaught of the Liberation Army and the SVN people, attacking My-Diem units, My-Diem administrators, My-Diem people oppressing agencies; for building up our political organizations through action directed at enemy military personnel to make their ranks and files crumble in confusion.

Subvert the enemy in order to step up victory, in the crucial hours of battle, so as to minimize our casualties: for achieving such results, all Liberation Army cadres and soldiers must at all times prove by their utterances and their actions the generosity of the Party and the people. In war operations, strictly abide by the Party's stand and policies as regards war booty, prisoners, the dead and the wounded.

In order to enforce strictly the three fundamental principles for political action of cadres and soldiers, our cadres should inspire all their thinking and activities with the three main democratic approaches in order to ensure success.
The three main democratic approaches: political democratic approach; military democratic approach; and economic democratic approach.

The purpose of these three main democratic approaches in the Army is to encourage the people to participate in the leadership and command of the Army. If the people are conscious of their responsibility, they will fully develop their gallantry in combat, trust in their leaders, commanding officers, and in their outfits. Strictly observe discipline, exalt compliance with orders, endure hardships, kill as many enemies as possible, protect your own life, promote people's revolutionary consciousness and awareness of their important role.

Lack of patience, lack of trust in the ability and mental level of the people (soldiers), cause officers to issue stern orders that have an adverse effect on soldier's morale, and democratic yearnings, instead of encouraging them to discuss politics, military and economic affairs, straighten their wrongful actions and thinking not benefitting the most efficient Army, people, and outfits.

GOAL SOUGHT

Point out qualities that a good soldier of the Liberation Army must possess. Criticize errors, study and amend oneself in order to become a good soldier and fulfill glorious tasks entrusted to one by the Revolution.

The six criteria for building up a good soldier, in accordance with the war goals of the Liberation Army.

1. Ceaselessly improve class consciousness and determination to pursue the Revolution to the end:

We volunteered to serve in the Liberation Army, out of hate for the wicked My-Diem regime. However some people have other motives for doing so. Also they bring to the Army some of their home life habits, different from workers' life, they have no profound knowledge of the American imperialists' invasion of South Vietnam, which causes them to be fearful of the Americans and lack strong motivation for an all-out struggle against My-Diem.

2. (Criteria No. 2 missing from document.)
3. Love of the fatherland, love of the people, love of the working class:

Our fatherland has been established and defended by the labor of the people through the centuries, with their blood and bones. The Americans and Diemists are now in the process of transforming South Vietnam into a military base, an American possession; they are planning to partition our country forever, ruthlessly oppress our compatriots, herding people into prison camps labeled "strategic hamlets," to have all facilities in drafting people for military service and forced labor, impoverishing them, seeking to cut off the revolutionary armed forces from the population, hopeful of restoring peace in South Vietnam within 18 months.

We patriots cannot sit back and coolly look at our people writhing under suffering, at our partitioned country, at the menace of American invasion.

Steaming from sections of the working class, we must love and respect labor and not be afraid of labor. We thus shall do our utmost to protect the property, life, fruit of labor of the people; we shall never unduly take from the population even such trifles as needles and sewing thread; the people's standard of living is very low, they live under the enemy's constant menace, yet they unhesitatingly give to the Revolution for supporting our Army; we must earn our own food and thus causing the people to have to contribute less for our support.

Love of country, of people, of the working class is a must for Liberation Army soldiers, if they are to realize fully their responsibility to fight and protect the country to enable the people to become powerful.

4. Resolutely carry out orders and observe discipline:

In our Army orders are issued in the interests of the people; the Army fights in order to protect the people's interests. All cadres and soldiers, if they want to serve the people well, must have a high sense of organization and discipline, and at all times comply with discipline regulations.

When carrying out orders, we must abide by rules and regulations, to display our class and revolution consciousness, our respect for the people's interests. Only if orders are carried out and if rules and regulations are strictly observed, could the Army be strong enough to fight our foes; on the contrary if orders are not fully carried out, if rules and regulations are scorned, we shall never be able to rout the enemy and protect the people's interests. We must criticize sincerely and prevent all ideas and acts contrary to
discipline, laxness in the performance of tasks contrary to organization principles of the Army; we must firmly resolve to carry out orders.

5. Union and mutual love:

Cadres and soldiers of the revolutionary armed forces comprising three branches of the Liberation Army, are united, love and support one another, make light of friction due to clash of personality, assist one another in case of need, overcome difficulties together, close ranks in the face of danger, together make sacrifices to perform their tasks and win victory.

6. Never cease studying in order to improve oneself:

The revolutionary is a vast enterprise that is spreading itself day after day, the responsibility of the Army gets heavier and heavier. Liberation Army soldiers wanting to fulfill properly their responsibilities must eagerly study in order to improve their class consciousness, their capacity, their skills in combat techniques; class consciousness makes them better serve the people, capacity helps them to do so efficiently; without combat skills, however hard they try, they could be of little use to the people.

We must unceasingly study all aspects of politics in order to improve our class consciousness and understand service to the people; we must study military matters the better to exterminate our foes. We must stretch ourselves.

Under all circumstances, let us study every day with ardor, in order to improve ourselves and perform well our glorious tasks. We strongly oppose the idea that soldiers who are liable to be killed at all moments need hardly study; we are against lazy people who do not want to make an effort to study, who are blind to the glory of tomorrow's light; if they shrank before difficulties, and do not absorb military knowledge, if they do not improve their political level, they will not progress and render good service to the people.

Enjoying the enlightened leadership of the Party, the support and confidence of the whole people, the Liberation Army will get stronger and stronger; we must make an all-out effort to study, to undergo training, to become excellent soldiers of the SVN Liberation Army.
ITEM 40

Interrogation of a former cadre with the Western Region Committee, who was captured by GVN forces in 1962.
1. In early 1961, the Vietnamese Communists (VC) established a committee of the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (NFLSVN) for the Western Region and concurrently set up Front committees in each of the six VC provinces comprising that region: Ca Mau; Bac Lieu - Soc Trang; Rach Gia - Ha Tien; Can Tho; Vinh Long - Sadec; and Tra Vinh. Later, several district and township committees were created throughout the region, with organizational structures similar to that at the regional level. Front committee leadership at all echelons included a number of Lao Dong (Communist) Party representatives who directed the implementation of the missions assigned to the committees.

2. By September 1962, the composition of the Western Region Front Committee was as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Name and Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chairman</td>
<td>Duong Van Vinh, a bourgeois representative from Tra Vinh (Vinh Binh) Province</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy Chairman</td>
<td>Tran Van Binh aka Bay Thong, deputy secretary of the Western Region Zone Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current Affairs Member</td>
<td>Nguyen Thi Duc aka Nam Ly, representative from the Women’s Liberation Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secretary General</td>
<td>Ngo Dai Do, leader of the Minh Chon Cao Deist faction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Members</td>
<td>Huynh Cuong, Cambodian intellectual, former secretary general of the Buddhist Studies Institute in Soc Trang</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Professor Khiet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nhon, from Tra Vinh (Vinh Binh) Province</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Thi Me, wife of Nhon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tran Van Thuan, youth representative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Muoi Thong, Cambodian</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Muoi Ly, student representative</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3. Members of the Western Region Front Committee were responsible for traveling through the provinces under the Committee's jurisdiction for a period of approximately six months to organize cells and disseminate directives of the NPLSVN. At the conclusion of their travels, they reported back to the Western Region Front Committee, which convened every six months.

4. From July to September 1962 the Western Region Front Committee had its base in the Trang Tram area, Tan Thuan township (An Xuyen Province). As of September, plans were being formulated to move the base to the vicinity of Long My (Chuong Thien Province).

5. While in theory the Western Region Front Committee assumed the directing role for the zone's military, political, economic, cultural and social affairs, in reality it did not enjoy very much authority. Its principal activity was that of conducting overt propaganda campaigns among the masses at each level of society. Among its other responsibilities were the preparation of slogans and resolutions for dissemination to each VC organizational unit and the transmittal of directives of the NPLSVN. It also decreed policies of amnesty toward Government of Vietnam prisoners and detainees.
gunfire and bombs, digging ditches, at the same time develop skills in massing troops by stratagems, artillery barrages and people's action directed at enemy troops.

TEACHING LESSON IV
BUILDING UP THE PARTY AND POLITICAL TASKS
IN THE SVN LIBERATION ARMY

GOALS SOUGHT

Realize the necessity of absolute leadership of the Party in the Army, trust in the Party, accept Party leadership. Do the utmost to perform political tasks.

Criticize the one-way military mind, authoritarian undemocratic commanding practices.

A. Building up the Party:

1. Only under exclusive leadership of the Party will the Liberation Army be the true armed forces of the People's Revolution.

The PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY PARTY OF VIETNAM is the sole Party entirely dedicated to the promotion of the people's interests, especially the working people's. Our Army must be led by the Party in order to attain our war goals, to achieve national independence, agrarian reform and ultimately, the establishment of socialism.

2. Absolutely trust in and follow Party leadership, and ceaselessly build up the Party, protect its purity and brilliance.

Under Party leadership our Army became more and more potent and won many victories. The more Liberation Army ranks and files respect the Party and feel grateful to it, the more they should trust in and follow the leadership of the chi-bo (cells) and Party local committees.

Our foes are seizing every opportunity to slander the Party and ultimately to exterminate it. By all means resolutely protect the Party's integrity and smash all efforts at enfeebling the Party.

Party members in the Army should never stop studying in order to better themselves, remedy their errors, set high standards in the performance of tasks, courageously kill our foes, do the utmost to prove one's worth as Party members; at meetings take an
C. Leadership of war: (Master ideas in)

In the conduct of war all ideas and plans of the Army should be inspired by the following thoughts:

1. All battles must serve immediate and long-range political goals, either directly or indirectly.

   All battles must result in destroying one part of enemy strength, beefing up ours, stimulate and push forward the people's struggle and dispirit enemy troops.

2. Be determined to exhaust enemy strength, boost our own by all means and plans of combat, and insure our survival.

   After exterminating the enemy we develop our strength: fight and build up at the same time, so that after every battle the enemy gets weaker, and little by little the scale tips in our favor. That is the main goal of war.

3. Fight only if one is sure of victory, never fight unless all and every measure had been taken to insure victory.

   After careful study of conditions, meticulous preparation and making up our mind, we must fight fearlessly, with cadres and soldiers' morale at top condition, corner the enemy and attack him fiercely so as to exterminate him entirely. After every battle, lose no time in reorganizing our forces, and prepare the terrain for continuing fighting.

4. Combine fighting with action directed at the people, make use of military success to support psychological action and propaganda directed at the population and enemy troops to fully exploit our victories.

5. Keep secret the number of our troops and their armaments, etc., and manage to catch the enemy off-guard, all attacks to be surprise moves, and all revolutionary moves to take the enemy by surprise.

In the western provinces of South Vietnam all battle-grounds are flatlands, and in areas next to enemy-held territory, he still is stronger than us, there ought to be no security leaks in our Army layout and movement, when in camp or on the move it must be ever ready for battle.

In the attack on enemy forts, the main thing is lightening concentration of the attack task force; our troops must be trained to fight in open field, in attacking trains, motor convoys as well as enemy positions. In techniques, strive to heighten efficiency in destruction of forts by
Therefore we must strongly push the building up of armed forces and tailor them to immediate requirements, taking into account our over-all potential and each region's potential.

The situation is rapidly changing, if the American imperialists foolhardily launched their armed invasion, or if conditions suddenly turned favorable to us, we must have all our forces ready to face up, so as not to be paralyzed.

3. Auto-defense forces, guerrillas, local forces ought to be built up along with a regular Army; all the different branches should be in proper ratio at all times and able to support one another.

4. Closely coordinate organization and combat, organization goals not to be separate from combat goals.

B. Combat approaches:

While focussing on guerrilla harassments we must exploit all favorable conditions and enemy shortcomings to launch large-scale guerrilla attacks then ultimately engage enemy forces in pitched battles.

Why our main action should be guerrilla harassments? They prelude to successful large-scale guerrilla attacks. Conditions compelled the SVN people to rise, make use of violent means, then of armed action. An underdeveloped agricultural people, for centuries ruled by feudalists and imperialists, then ceaselessly terrorized, slaughtered and oppressed by the My-Diem regime, South Vietnamese inflamed against My-Diem stood up in self-defense, armed themselves with clubs, knives and spears and fought against a powerful foe supplied by the American imperialists with the most modern weapons.

With such forms of fighting as ambush, sabotage, spikes, mines, booby traps, popular tricks and traps, etc...aiming at exterminating the enemy and boosting our strength, at the same time building up our Army's political level, combat discipline and organization, taking advantages of our favorable conditions and enemy shortcomings; that is all-out guerrilla warfare. If we confine ourselves to guerrilla harassment action, we could not develop armed action, and bring to a successful end the struggle of SVN people's revolution against the My-Diem gang, for in small scale guerrilla operations we inflict only limited losses that the enemy can easily make good; it could not change the picture and the tug-of-war between the two sides will go on.

Therefore we should strive to firmly advance to all-out guerrilla warfare in order to exhaust the enemy rapidly and beef up our own strength, and muster adequate armed might to wage a full-fledged war so as to upset the balance of strength in our favor within a short time.
As you well know, people are unable on their own to get a deep knowledge of the revolution and dedicate themselves entirely and selflessly to the revolution; they must live closely with the community, take part in class struggle, and be indoctrinated by the Party in Marxist-Leninist theories, in order to wake up, find out why they cannot enjoy the fruit of their hard work, while people who did not work have the authority to beat them up; only in fostering resentment against social injustice could people be prodded into fighting to the end for their own liberation and doing away with a depredatory society.

As regards the Army, the Liberation Army comprises many ethnic groups, many patriotic sections, therefore their motives for enlisting, their revolution and class awareness, their capacity for enduring hardships and fighting spirit could not be alike, so we must attend to their political education in order to improve their revolutionary level, and fully develop their potential and determination to perform well all revolutionary tasks entrusted to them by the Party and the people.

Between favorable and adverse circumstances, between life and death, between ardor and laxity, progress and backwardness, etc...we in turn see the good and bad sides of every individual; we must be able to figure out beforehand how people would respond under a given set of circumstances in order to lead them so as to get what is good in them, correct what is bad, in order to develop fully the potential of the revolutionary spirit, overcome all difficulties and rout the enemy. On the foundation of revolutionary awareness will be erected political sophistication.

At the same time we ought not to fail to push strongly combat discipline; only good discipline will permit skillful use of our weapons, detection of weak points of the enemy and direct our attack at them, lure enemy troops into tight spots in order to exterminate them, thus wearing out enemy strength; only by getting stronger and stronger could we quickly make the balance tip in our favor and come around General Uprising Day; political education, leadership of thought and building up of combat techniques must be conducted abreast, we could not give more weight to one and less to others.

2. Strongly and urgently tailor all regional potentialities with immediate requirements, in the whole South Vietnam. At the same time thoroughly prepare our forces so as to face up to any and sundry changes.

In the current situation in South Vietnam the revolution enjoys many fundamental advantages. My-Diem have many big shortcomings and will not avoid ruin and defeat.
branches including people's guerrillas, local forces and regular forces.

1. People's guerrillas:

Consist of young people with revolutionary spirit, with some combat experience, being a reserve for the armed forces.

Responsible for keeping close contact with the enemy, surrounding enemy forts and barracks, disrupting enemy communications and transportation, acting as core for people's auto-defense groups; when enemy forces conduct raids, guerrillas stick to them and harass them, protecting the people's security, and identify enemy units entering their village.

In the same way as local forces, guerrillas perform armed propaganda tasks, liquidate tyrants and subvert enemy hold on the population.

2. Local forces:

Set up by districts which lead them with the assistance of cadres and members of guerrillas with good character and combat records.

Their action varies with geographical conditions and enemy situation; they gather or scatter according to circumstances.

Routinely, penetrate deeply into enemy neighboring territory and stage armed propaganda meetings, destroy strategic hamlets, kill tyrants who oppress the population. Exterminate isolated troops at large, attack enemy land and river communication lines, blockade enemy forts and barracks. Therefore local forces must have more political and class awareness than guerrillas, and improve their tactical skills in accordance with local geographical conditions.

3. Regular forces:

Formed of young men with combat experience in guerrilla or local forces, who have been indoctrinated in class struggle, combat techniques, organization methods, coordination of Army branches, commanding skill on the battlefield; with high fighting efficiency, apt to strongly step up political action.

A. Methods for organization of the Liberation Army:

1. With political education as a fundamental, build up revolutionary spirit and at the same time develop fighting tactics.
QUESTIONS ON LESSON II

1. Why is it said that the Army is class spirited and is the chief instrument of one social class? (2 hours)

   The war is a class war, the Army is a class Army.

   The Army is the chief instrument of a social class for waging the war.

2. Why is it said that the SVN Liberation Army is the people's Army, essentially the proletariat's Army? (2 hrs. 30 min.)

   The leading role of the workers' class?

   Comparison with armies of feudal, capitalist class (imperialist countries' armies).

3. War goals of the Liberation Army? Reasons? (2 hours)

   Immediate goals, long-term goals? Reasons?

   Analyze the nature of the Liberation Army.

4. Organization and activities of the SVN Liberation Army (2 hours)

   Policies for building up the Liberation Army?

   Organization of the Army? Its requirements (needs)? Reasons.

   Fundamental principles of political action within the Army?

TEACHING LESSON III

METHODS OF ORGANIZATION AND METHODS OF ACTION OF THE SVN LIBERATION ARMY

GOALS SOUGHT

Military method, organization method, leading idea for war operations.

Criticism of lack of self-reliance in performing tasks foolhardy attack, passive resistance, fear of difficulties, fear of exposure, laxity in carrying out orders, too much concern for fighting and too little concern for organization, "localities."

In order to attain war goals and to fulfill the aforementioned duties, the Party organized the Liberation Army into three
the Army; they increase the fighting strength of the Army, they win over members of the enemy, subvert enemy morale and organization and ultimately completely annihilate enemy resistance.

6. Mental Attitude of the SVN Liberation Army:
   
a. Love of the fatherland, love of the people, love of labor, combination of true patriotism with proletarian internationalism, determined opposition to all depredatory forces, to all attitudes of contempt and subversion against labor.

b. In battle as well as in political action, always strive to destroy the enemy, ensure one's survival, to attain self-sufficiency, to overcome all difficulties in order to defeat the enemy.

c. With respect to all tasks as well as to all scientific and technical problems, politics must be given top priority. Deeply probe real conditions, get thorough knowledge of the people, always respect the human person and the Party; the ultimate object of the war, of science, of technical pursuits, is the human person. Oppose all overbearing attitudes, aloofness from the people, isolationist stand of the military and the technicians.

In short: By nature the SVN Liberation Army is a proletarian Army. This feature is displayed in all organizational aspects, in all ideas and policies carried out in the Army. It can be displayed in operations of war, in individual action of men. When one studies the nature of the Liberation Army of South Vietnam, one must study all the aforementioned aspects in order to get a clear view of the Party's stand in the building up of the Army, and then have every cadre, every soldier respect the fine nature of the Army and at the same time protect one's own political destiny. On the basis of this awareness, check again the goals of our struggle, our duties and responsibilities; find out and remedy wrongful thinking and action in order to serve more efficiently, to promote destruction of the enemy, and our own expansion, under the current emergency.

Directions: When teaching this lesson, argument must be supported by pointing out good points in the outfit. However do not call undue notice to weak points, for our present strong forces constitute a big advance. This is evidence of the excellent leadership of the Army provided by our Party in the course of the past few years. Weak points are unavoidable, but it is enough to pass them in review, without making much ado about them.
4. Two fundamental responsibilities of the SVN Liberation Army: To fight, to work and produce:

a. Our Army does not fight alone, it must unite with the people and rely on the people's support (on the People's Revolutionary Movement.) Our Army is most apt to prod the people into taking revolutionary action. Each soldier is a cadre for action directed at the people.

b. Our Army is fed by the people, but it ought to concern itself with the people's living. It should take on farming in order to alleviate the burden on the people, it must participate in economic development tasks; the Army is a collectivity with much scientific and technical capacities for economic development.

c. However the main responsibility of the Army is fighting, it must ceaselessly improve its morale and fighting power in order to earn ever bigger victories and bring to an early end the war with its hardships for the people.

5. Organization and rules of action of the SVN Liberation Army:

a. Organization must conform to political lines. Organization rules of the Party: workers and farmers constitute the main core, the other classes to be educated and made to have close relations with and devotedly serve the workers and farmers.

b. The organization of the SVN Liberation Army is a fighting one, it is therefore highly centralized, it demands that inferiors obey superiors, that commanding officers be obeyed by their units. But the Army must strictly carry out the policies of the Party vis-a-vis the people, and follow the Party's collective leadership. For this reason when one refers to the organization of the Army, one has to concern oneself with the organization of the Party. Associations and political action organizations as well as democratic organizations within the Army.

c. Fundamental rules of political tasks in the Army: close union between cadres and men, between the Army and the people, and subversion of the enemy.

It is of prime importance that these three principles be fully understood; they insure that military action is subordinated to political action; that the Army is united, and that the people are closely united with
ITEM 38

DIRECTIONS FOR USE OF TRAINING BULLETINS
(Lessons and Questions) on the
NATURE OF SOUTH VIETNAM'S LIBERATION ARMY

LESSON I: Birth of the South Vietnamese (SVN) Liberation Army

PART I:
The SVN Liberation Army owes its creation to Party thinking stemming from the Marxist doctrine.

Also to unfulfilled yearnings for peace and independence of South Vietnamese people and to the latter being subjected to terrorism and killings.

In support of the (foregoing) theory, one should produce concrete evidence from local conditions to illustrate and analyze the problem in order to throw full light on same.

For instance: are we members of the oppressing class or of the oppressed class?

Union in SVN:

My-Diem (U.S.-Diemists) represent a collection of capitalists, businessmen and landowners, and the ruling class which is feudalistic, reactionary and depredatory to the people of SVN.

At the present time workers, belonging to the oppressed class, are being subjected to cruel depredations (especially farmers). If you want to be liberated, it is evident that you cannot sit back and expect them (My-Diem) to willingly hand back your rights to you on a plate. They would rather lull you to sleep, urge you to feel happy with your condition and look forward to a better condition in your afterlife.

PART II: Past formation of the SVN Liberation Army

The people took a hand in the birth of the SVN Liberation Army: SVN people were deeply resentful of the My-Diem fascist regime which, with the support of its armed forces, oppressed and butchered them. This resentment caused them to stage armed uprisings, in order to crush their military might and liberate themselves, to exterminate the My-Diem regime. Hence the SVN Liberation Army stems from the people and fights for the people.

The Party also took a hand in the birth of the SVN Liberation Army: The Party built up, indoctrinated, and trained the SVN Liberation Army. After the cease fire, the Party decided (........?) When (Diem's) Bill No. 10/59 was enacted, the Party directed that the armed forces would back up political action, for political action is fundamental, the main thing. After the American imperialists foolishly sent their troops to invade.
SVN and started their undeclared war, the revolution responded with a combination of military and political action.

The SVN Liberation Army owes its rapid growth and development to the people and to the Party. This has been and remains a decisive factor of the SVN Liberation Army.

Remark: The above outline will help instructors to back up their own pattern of lectures with appropriate facts.

QUESTIONS ON LESSON I

1. How was the SVN Liberation Army born? Contributing factors of its creation (4 hours)

Marxist-Leninist doctrine applied to the creation of the SVN Liberation Army. State local conditions in your area and find out what (social) class is depredatory, and what class is the victim of depredations. (1 hour)

If SVN's people want to liberate themselves, win independence, unification of the country, and agrarian reform, can they expect My-Diem to grant them their wishes, or have they to take revolutionary action and exterminate My-Diem to get what they want (1 hour)?

Some comrades think that, after their village is liberated and enjoys security, they better request to be discharged from revolutionary service in order to go back and live there (what else would they do after the country is unified?). Others, not being happy with their present assignment, apply for another one. Find out how they have developed such ideas? (1 hour).

What are the aspirations of the SVN people? Why do they not get what they want? And do you harbor such yearnings too? What should you do to realize them?

2. Past period of the formation and development of the SVN Liberation Army (4 hours).

How did the people contribute to the birth of this Army? (1 hour).

How did the Party contribute? State revolutionary goals and policies for each stage. (1 hour)

The imperialist Americans are pouring ever more men and supplies into Vietnam in order to conquer it. Could SVN be pacified in 18 months? What have you been thinking about this problem? (1 hour, 30 min.)
Can the revolution achieve success if we count exclusively on foreign aid, on our Party, our armament, and not contribute our individual effort, or stop short, deeming that we had done enough? (30 minutes).

**LESSON II**

1. **Nature of the SVN Liberation Army:** Point out all the class spirit of the Army, make a thorough analytical survey of the workers' class, the farmers' class, which are the leading classes of the proletariat? (2 hours, 30 minutes).

2. **Dedication to the service of the people is the best discrimination criterion between friends and foes; stand united to serve in the framework of the Communist policies.** (2 hours, 30 minutes).

3. **Long term struggle's goals.** Why must we expect a drawn out struggle? How should we manage to fight until final victory is won? (2 hours, 30 min.)

4. **Immediate goal of our Revolution:** at the present time, My-Diem are our immediate target, only by exterminating My-Diem could we bring about independence, unification, distribution of land to farmers, security for SVN and peace in Southeast Asia (2 hours, 30 min).

5. **Responsibilities and nature of the SVN Liberation Army:** point out reasons for union of cadres and men, Army and people, between cadres and soldiers, and how to bring about subversion of the enemy. (2 hours)

Remark: Lesson II aims at pointing out the main points only. Questions should refer appropriately to each outfit's condition and circumstances.

**LESSON III**

Notions on revolutionary armed forces including people's auto-defense groups, people's guerrillas, local troops, regular Army. Responsibilities of each branch.

Methods of building up the Army depending on the enemy situation and our situation. Forward march of the revolution in SVN: state urgent needs, necessity of all-out and constant effort in all fields....reasons for failures, remedies.

Methods of fighting distinction between guerrilla warfare and preparation of war by guerrillas, notion of preparation of war by guerrillas. (promotion).

Guidance of war operations; point out interrelations of different units in recent operations, good and bad points.
QUESTIONS ON LESSON III

1. What are the responsibilities of the SVN Liberation Army, relations and interaction between the three branches?
   a. Composition of people's Guerrillas, responsibilities?
   b. Composition of local forces, responsibilities?
   c. Regular forces, composition and responsibilities?

   What flaws do you see in the above? (1 hour).

2. What must we do to build up the Liberation Army?

   Why political indoctrination is fundamental?

   Why immediate goals of the Revolution must be taken into account in the building up of the Liberation Army?

   Good points and bad points in the above (2 hours).

3. The Liberation Army's methods of fighting.

   Why the guerrilla's role is the most important.

   Why the utmost effort should be made to avail oneself of all favorable circumstances in order to wage guerrilla warfare.

   What is guerrilla warfare?

4. Of what does guidance of guerrilla warfare consist?

   Why should guidance rules pervade all guerrilla operations?

   Why must every guerrilla battle take into consideration immediate and long term goals?

   Why should all planning aim at exterminating the enemy and building up our strength?

   Why should we manage to fight only when sure to win, and never engage in battle without a thorough preparation having been made?

   Why must warfare be combined with action directed at the people? What is meant by promoting of action directed at people and at soldiers through armed action?

   Why are secrecy and surprise indispensable in the conduct of military operations and of revolutionary action?

   Relation between good points and bad points in theory for guidance of military action.
LESSON IV

Study thoroughly the following points:

A. Building up the Party:
   
   Only under the Party's leadership could the armed forces be truly the People's Revolutionary Forces.

   The Party is able to assume entire leadership of its armed forces.

   Make all comrades firmly trust in and follow Party leadership and protect Party purity and justice.

B. Promote work discipline of the Party

   Help other members realize the importance of political tasks (the Party's main tasks) and give themselves entirely to main tasks.

C. Fundamental rules for political tasks

   Help other members realize deeply the three fundamental rules of political action: union between cadres and soldiers, union between Army and people, subversion of the enemy.

   Help other members, especially cadres, realize the utility of the three main democratic aspects in the Army: military democracy, political democracy and economical democracy; cadres should realize that after these aspects of democracy are achieved, suggestions from the people will come forth to improve our capacity; ordinary members will eagerly discuss problems with cadres...to the best of our interests.

   Fight strongly overbearing attitudes, rigid military orders, undemocratic behavior of cadres towards inferiors, over-reliance of inferiors on superiors. (lack of initiative).

QUESTIONS ON LESSON IV

1. Why is it said that only under the Party's leadership could the armed forces become true revolutionary forces of the people?

   Why is our Party the sole party to faithfully serve the interests of the working class and the proletariat?

   Why must Liberation Army men entirely trust in, faithfully serve and protect the Party's purity and justice?

   What does it mean "to protect the Party's purity and justice"?

2. For what reason must one promote correct political action?

   What is political action?
Why should every soldier among us participate in political tasks with all his energy?

3. What are the fundamental rules of political action?

In order to realize fundamental rules of political action in the Liberation Army what should every cadre and soldier strive to do?

Relations between good points and bad points from the start up to the present, to what degree? (1 hr. 30 min.)

4. What are the three most important aspects of democracy in the Liberation Army?

What is military democracy?

What is political democracy?

What is economical democracy?

What must every cadre and soldier do to realize the three most important aspects of democracy in the Army? Wrong ideas, extent (3 hours).

5. What lessons did you study about the development of the SVN Liberation Army until the present period?

TEACHING LESSON I

GOALS SOUGHT

To realize that the Liberation Army was born in the righting stage of the proletariat in our country and at present is the People's Army, especially the working people; it is being organized and led by the People's Revolution, is supported by the people. The SVN Liberation Army is in the tradition of and is part of the heroic South Vietnam People's Army.

To realize the forward march of the Revolution, to elevate trust in the political and military policies of the Party, trust in Party leadership and policies will bring about victory.

To foster resentment against the My-Diem barbaric and fascistic regime on the above basis and properly criticize all dreamy thinking about class struggle, fear of the Americans, fear of difficulties, hardships, lack of faith in the people's strength, aloofness of the military and technical branches, lack of self-reliance, of self-purpose and individual effort.
HOW THE LIBERATION ARMY CAME INTO BEING

A. Just as an overflowing stream breaks its banks, oppression and depredation engineer antioppression and antidepredation struggle:

1. The Vietnamese people have been fighting against feudalism for thousands of years and against imperialism for some hundred years.

a. Under feudal rule:

Land was owned by a number of landowners, landless farmers had to pay land rents to landowners and feudal lords.

Vietnamese society was overbackwardish, economy and science were unable to develop.

Farmers and workers' life was miserable, they suffered from hunger and want.

b. Under the French domination

The French colonials took all the lands' riches and paid little for labor. Vietnam's proletariat at its birth was shamefully exploited, in the countryside they maintained the regime of landowners and farmers; they set up a feudal administrative machine that serve them politically and economically.

Vietnamese society developed little or not at all. Vietnamese farmers were subjected to two kinds of domination (the French and their lackey): hunger, wan ignorance, sickness prevailed, their life became even more miserable when Indochina was invaded by Japan.

c. Vietnam's working people had fought thousands of years against feudalism, over a hundred years against imperialism, after the proletariat of Vietnam set up the Communist Party of Indochina their struggle against depredation became more evident.

The Party made it clear to the people of Vietnam, that if they wanted to liberate themselves, Vietnamese workers must overthrow imperialists, feudalists and capitalists in the country. The Party's argument: as long as there are many social classes, there will be depredation, the struggle against depredation and oppression, i.e. class struggle, will be over only when one of the two classes: the oppressor or the oppressed, will be destroyed; Vietnamese society will develop only after the oppressor is destroyed, and only then Vietnamese workers will be free from
hunger and want and enjoy life.

In their struggle against imperialism and feudalism, the people of Vietnam established a Government after 15 years, after a 9-year long resistance, they liberated one half of the country. The northern half is now free from class division, from depredation, and the North Vietnamese workers enjoy well being and bliss.

2. The present struggle of the South Vietnamese people against My-Diem is a continuation and completion of the whole country's struggle against imperialism and feudalism.

a. Since the cease fire, the south of Vietnam has been transformed into a new style colony and a military base of the Americans; south Vietnam society is half colonial and half feudal.

The American imperialists poured their capital into Vietnamese economic projects in order to take over and corner all the rich resources of South Vietnam, at the same time making the country into a market for their leftover products. On the other hand, they are building up their armed forces, setting up many Army, Navy and Air bases, bracing themselves for an invasion of North Vietnam and an attack against the socialist Bloc.

In the countryside, they continue stripping farmers of their land which they sell to landowners, they set up a machine for quenching the Revolutionary Movement which demands peace, unification and democracy for the people of Vietnam.

The existence of the SVN people is very hard, they have lost all of their freedom. More and more workers in the cities are jobless, they are impoverished and made into hoodlums, in order to make it easier for My-Diem to draft them for military service and forced labor. In the countryside, farmers are being herded into agrovilles and strategic hamlets, stripped of their land and gardens. Former members of the resistance are subjected to reprisals and outlawed. All sections of the population of SVN have lost all their democratic freedom and live under the menace of war.

SVN society is afflicted with many conflicts: conflict between Vietnamese and American aggressors and My-Diem conflict between farmers and landowners, conflict between Vietnamese labor and capital, conflict between (people's) aspirations.
for peace and unification with warlike My-Diem, conflict between socialist doctrine and the majority of South Vietnam working people and My-Diem fascist, clannish regime. However the most acute conflict is between independence and colonialism, between war and peace, between democracy and fascism. South Vietnam society is like a suppurative ulcer, South Vietnamese people have to overthrow My-Diem in order to liberate themselves, there is no other way.

b. At present, with My-Diem resorting to armed might in order to quench the SVN Revolutionary Movement, South Vietnamese people must fight them with armed might and exterminate them:

As the Marxist-Leninist doctrine has it: the struggle of the proletariat must take revolutionary action and march forward. The people of SVN had made use of all peaceful ways of action for five years, but My-Diem obdurately resorted to every deceit, then to large-scale military operations, and in the end they started an undeclared war against SVN people and against North Vietnam, the peaceful struggle in the south therefore shifted to shooting war.

Since the end of 1959 South Vietnam has become a powder barrel ever ready to explode at the first spark of fire. The Party has pushed the people to arm themselves in order to break their fetters, and sparked a fiery Revolutionary Movement which swept out rural administration and enemy forts protecting the villages by wave after wave.

Ever since the South Vietnam People's Revolutionary Movement has been playing an important role in providing support for the political movement; at the present time it has earned equal stature with the latter and enabled the revolution to make big strides forward.

From now on, until My-Diem are overthrown, the SVN people's armed struggle must be stepped up to match the revolutionary goals of the over-all uprising. The immediate goal for the armed movement is to crush the American invading forces in South Vietnam: to this end, we must raise our voice in an articulate manner, build up our forces and inflict as much damage as possible to the enemy until we exterminate him.
B. The SVN Liberation Army, organized, led, trained by the Party, continuing the tradition of Vietnam popular army, supported by the South Vietnamese people, is provided with many human factors for success:

1. SVN Liberation Army: is a heroic armed forces of SVN's working people:

   a. SVN's working people made many sacrifices and fought gallantly in order to build up the present Liberation Army.

      In response to the Party's urging, SVN people killed enemy troops and seized their weapons in order to build up their strength.

      SVN people fed, protected and helped the Army fight and conquer the enemy.

      SVN people committed themselves to get their youngsters enlisted in the (revolutionary) forces and build up the latter in a short time.

   b. The SVN Liberation Army boasts of a tradition of bearing up with austerity, of effort at self-sufficiency and of heroic deeds:

      SVN Liberation Army, in its formation period, went through many hardships and want; it developed from scratch into a self-sufficient powerful force.

      SVN Liberation Army, a strong vanguard force, will perform many heroic achievements on the political and military fields.

      The development rate of SVN Liberation Army has never been matched in history.

2. SVN Liberation Army continues the tradition of South Vietnam People's Army during nine years of resistance:

   a. Although the Vietnam People's Army withdrew northward, its heroic fighting traditions still pervade every soul of enemy Vietnamese.

   b. Experience earned on the battlefields by the Vietnam's People's Army is a rich inheritance left to our present Liberation Army.

3. The Party has organized the present Liberation Army; it has led, trained and built up human factors for its success:
a. The present Liberation Army has been organized by the Party.

The Party directly led the Liberation Army and organized the three branches.

The Army mobilized its members and cadres into the Army.

The Party set up political cells, intercells, committee and political action system in the Liberation Army.

b. The Party guided the Liberation Army in successive stages, in methods of work, fighting and organizations which are bound to insure success.

c. The Party indoctrinated and trained the Liberation Army unceasingly and brought its political awareness to a high level.

d. The Party developed strongly the Liberation Army's patriotism and its determination to free labor from oppression:

Day after day the Party built up the Liberation Army's fighting spirit, its determination to be self-sufficient and strong.

The Party developed the SVN Liberation Army members into excellent revolutionary fighters, hard working, thrifty, honest, just, public spirited, selfless.

C. The Party pointed out permanent human factors for the Liberation Army's current fast development:

Five such factors are: the rural population, fighting spirit, equipment and material conditions, quantity, and quality of the men and cadres.

The excellent political lines of the Party helped develop the foregoing five factors.

D. Major lessons extracted from the history of the SVN Liberation Army's build up and development:

1. The SVN Liberation Army is a product of the SVN working people, which created it in the course of the struggle against oppression and depredation. We must serve the people with all our heart, be entirely on the people's side and fight all depredation; only in this way could we rout the enemy and become a respectable Army.

2. The Party military and political policies are factors insuring our success; every cadre and every soldier should study and resolutely carry them out properly.
3. Let us do our utmost to promote our tradition of heroic indomitability, self-reliance and self-sufficiency, be ever ready to overcome all difficulties stemming from lack of supplies and created by the enemy, in order to win the ultimate victory.

QUESTION ON LESSON I

Why is it said that the SVN Revolution is essentially a class struggle?

A class struggle, be it a peaceful struggle or a shooting uprising.

The people have been oppressed and struggling for thousands of years, but they are being guided by the Party since the latter was organized. One half of the country has been liberated, but the other half is still enslaved and exploited.

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TEACHING LESSON II

GOALS SOUGHT

Realize that the SVN Liberation Army is the people's Army, essentially the proletariat's instrument for carrying out a revolutionary war for SVN liberation, achieving the national and democratic revolution in the whole country. Realize the nature and the responsibilities of the SVN Liberation Army.

Augment faith in the Party leadership, in the people; build up a staunch revolutionary spirit; on the foregoing basis do away with all inconsistent ideas about the nature and responsibilities of South Vietnam's Liberation Army, fight all concerned for easy living, all fear of hardships, difficulties, of the Americans, the enemy, separation of the military sector from the technical sector, and elimination of all haughtiness, all "not getting along with the people" attitudes.

NATURE OF THE SVN LIBERATION ARMY

I. The war is a war of classes; the Army is a proletarian Army

A. The war is a war of classes:

1. War is a sequence of politics, it is a political struggle with the use of mortal weapons.

Politics aims at protecting class interests; each class's interests being different from other class's, pursues a different political course.
When class conflicts cannot be ironed out peacefully, war is used. Therefore war is a political struggle with both sides killing each other, in order to protect class interests.

2. Many classes may cooperate to fight a war, but only one of them is the leader.

B. The Army is the chief instrument of the proletariat for waging war, thus the Army is pervaded with class spirit:

1. The Army is the chief instrument of the proletariat:

   In order to wage war, or to establish its dominance over the other classes, if the proletariat has to resort to violent action, then the Army is its essential tool a professional tool.

2. The Army is the essential tool of the proletariat exclusively. This means that although several classes cooperate in warfare, only one class wields leadership. The Army serves only the interests of the leading class (proletariat). Hence the Army in its very nature is the proletariat's Army.

II. The SVN Liberation Army is a Proletarian Army

A. The Liberation Army of South Vietnam is the Army of the South Vietnamese people (comprising four classes) but it is essentially and above all the Army of the South Vietnamese working class, organized and educated by the Party.

Refer to Lesson I

The SVN Liberation Army, led by the Party of the proletariat is the Army of the legitimate Revolution; only under the leadership of the proletariat could the Army be absolutely loyal to the people's interests, only if the people enlisted in large number could the Army progress and become invincible.

B. War goals of the SVN Liberation Army

1. Long term goals: extermination of the predatory classes, setting up a peaceful, independent, democratic, and affluent Vietnam, ultimately a socialist, Communist state, then a Communist world, a one class world; for the multiclass structure is the cause of wars, "as long as there are several classes the Army is a must," armies survive or wane with multiclass states.
Only by fostering such a firm fighting spirit would the Army serve forever the interests of the working classes.

2. Immediate goal: Overthrow My-Diem, bring about peace, national independence, neutrality, and democratic freedom, preparatory to peaceful unification of the country; set up an independent, democratic and affluent Vietnam.

If we have to fight our way forward, to achieve victory piecemeal, it is because the Party had to build up the Revolutionary Movement in South Vietnam.

3. Nature of the SVN Liberation Army:

a. National: Including 36 ethnic groups, protects the interest of the nation, brings about national equality.

b. Democratic: Fights in order to bring about a democratic regime in the whole land. Within itself the Army contains "3 top democratic freedoms."

c. People's Army: Stemming from the people, united with the people and serving the people's interests (mainly working people).