ITEM 41

Translation of a document turned in by a Viet Cong deserter who subsequently led GVN forces to a buried cache of Communist documents on training and propaganda. The translation was verified as accurate by intelligence authorities.
1. Beginning on page two of this report is a translation from Vietnamese of a document on the struggle movement in the Saigon-Cholon area. The document was obtained through a Vietnamese Communist (VC) who voluntarily surrendered to the Government of Vietnam (SVN) and subsequently led security authorities to a buried earthenware jar which contained VC documents on training and propaganda.

2. The document describes the strategic importance of Saigon-Cholon to both sides in the struggle for South Vietnam; points out relative strengths and weaknesses of both sides in the area; details the tasks involved in achieving success; and finally, describes in detail the methods to be used, including investigation and study, propaganda, organization (overt, semi-overt, and secret), training, and actual struggle activities. It states that the struggle for Saigon-Cholon will be a long, difficult task, but if the people are properly guided, the movement will gain sufficient force for a general uprising. It states that the people are more and more revolutionary-minded; that increasing rural area revolutionary movement is stimulating the struggle movement in Saigon-Cholon; and that the leadership of Party cadres operating in Saigon-Cholon is becoming more mature and experienced.


**Purposes.**

To make the party members and members of the Revolutionary Front understand:

1. The characteristics of the city of Saigon-Cholon; and their revolutionary duties in the city.
2. The mottoes, approaches, and operations in the city.
3. The methods of revolutionary action.

The above should be well understood so as:

a. To develop one's sense of responsibility to fulfill one's noble task; to believe in the urban people's capacity to carry out revolutionary activity and political struggle; to have an accurate idea of the enemy's points of strength and of weakness;

b. To correct erroneous attitudes such as: hesitancy, fear of the enemy, dread of long hardships, lack of confidence in the urban people, excessive reliance on armed action and on the rural population; and

c. To develop efficient methods and approaches for action upon the population.

1. Position and characteristics of the city of Saigon-Cholon.

The Saigon-Cholon area is a very important strategic position for the enemy and for us because:

1. It is the place where the key organizations of the US-Diemicts and the counterrevolutionary forces of South Vietnam (SVN) are concentrated. It is also the seat of many imperialistic intelligence organizations in Southeast Asia. It is the stepping stone for the enemy to attack rural areas, and also their key and ultimate military base. The movement in Saigon-Cholon, if intensified, will deal a direct blow at the enemy and will lead them more rapidly into a general crisis.

2. The city includes a large amount of resources and over two million people, which we have to struggle very hard to win from the enemy.
II. Points of strength and weakness of the enemy; our advantages and difficulties in Saigon-Cholon.

A. The enemy.

1. Saigon-Cholon is directly under the enemy's central organization. Enemy resources and facilities are consolidated there to undermine the revolutionary movement in every respect.

   a. He uses the army, the police, security and intelligence agents, and paramilitary forces to control the population, to arrest, imprison, and kill them; and to demoralize them; he tries every means to divide and disorganize the revolutionary forces, and to infiltrate our ranks.

   b. Meanwhile, the enemy is making political schemes to consolidate counterrevolutionary forces and to force the people into reactionary political organizations. He tries every day to cover up the successes of the revolutionary movement and uses plunderous and deceptive propaganda and psychological warfare to glorify his reactionary regime and to disorganize our revolutionary movement. The enemy's purpose is to develop political prestige within the masses so as to turn the latter into a counterrevolutionary instrument.

   c. The more the scope of enemy control in rural areas narrows, the more he will try to extort and oppress the people of Saigon-Cholon. He will make efforts to impoverish them; to deprive them of all livelihood so that they may easily be drafted for the Army and for labor; to utilize them as lackeys; to make living conditions so trying that the people will have no time to think of the revolution; and finally, to force the working people out of the city.

   d. Saigon-Cholon is also the place where the enemy is implementing concepts, hoodlum behavior, and hood living. In carrying out his anti-Communist policy he revives mystic and deceptive doctrines of "labor and personalism"; promotes "delusive national independence"; and propagates existentialism among students to sow pessimism in their minds. Meanwhile, the enemy tries every means to stifle education by limiting examinations and the number of schools and creating difficulties for the students so as to facilitate their drafting into the Army.

   2. However, the recent past has clearly shown the major weaknesses of the enemy. These weaknesses keep worsening and will increase the difficulties of the enemy.

   a. The enemy is more and more isolated: Saigon-Cholon is the place where the people, the Army, the police, and civil servants can see clearly the DIemists' invasive and treacherous schemes, their fascist regime, and their extortive and repressive policy. The differences between the various strata of the urban population and the enemy are more and more acute. Diem's regime of "family rule" is increasingly resented by all strata of the urban population. The enemy not only has to face the people's movement, but also to cope with the opposition within its own ranks in the GVN and the Army.

   b. In Saigon-Cholon, the enemy's internal differences keep increasing and have manifested themselves in the form of military clashes such as the coup on November 11, 1960 and the bombardment of Dien's Palace on February 27, 1962. For positions and privileges, the enemy contends with, retaliates upon, and suspects one another. In spite of his efforts, he is unable to settle his internal dissensions and to assemble counterrevolutionary forces.
c. The enemy is unable to cover up our successes and his failures in SVN. Defeated troops, police personnel, and civil servants from various areas continue to flock into Saigon-Cholon. Life is becoming increasingly difficult for them morally and materially. Facts have shown that, as the enemy is weakening, our movement is strengthening in rural areas; and in Saigon-Cholon, the more the enemy increases his defense and oppression, the heavier his defeat will be. Politically, he will be weaker and more isolated. His efforts may create difficulties for the revolutionary movement but will not be able to stop its progress in Saigon-Cholon.

d. In view of the special political position of Saigon-Cholon in Vietnam as well as in the world, the US-Dimintets are much afraid of the explosive strength of the city people. In spite of their efforts to repress the movement, they are still unable to eliminate a number of people's organizations such as trade unions, students' associations, etc., and each time the people's struggle movement manifests itself strongly, the enemy will still have to meet certain revengeful actions of the masses without daring to kill them cynically, as is done in the rural areas.

ii. Our advantages and difficulties.

1. Generally speaking, the difficulties of the enemy are our advantages. Moreover, we also have the following advantages:

a. The people have had a long experience in revolutionary activities, and the movement in Saigon-Cholon, merely the continuation of a revolution, is increasing. The history of the revolutionary movement in Saigon-Cholon is directly connected to the history of the Party. In 1930, workers went on strike to demand higher salaries and reduction in working hours, to oppose terrorism, and to support the struggle movement in Nghia An, etc.; in 1936-1938, a movement took place to demand democratic rights and freedom of the press; in 1940, there was an uprising in SVN; and, in 1945, the coup d'etat succeeded. During the resistance, political struggle was carried out along with military activities (millions of people attended the funeral of student On; tens of thousands of people participated in the anti-US student demonstration on March 19, 1950). Since peace has been reestablished, in spite of many difficulties, the struggle has been carried on. Various strata of the population participate, particularly in the workers' movement and the students' movement. Because the people are more conscious of politics, because their aspirations are more urgent, and because they have acquired more experiences, their struggle movement is becoming more extensive and is carried out by "destroying fences in defiance of enemy laws" as well as by refined forms such as trade union meetings, people's meetings, strikes, use of violence to oppose the enemy, etc.

b. The movement in Saigon-Cholon and the movement in rural areas are closely related and have a very rapid effect upon each other. Saigon-Cholon and the rural areas are closely connected by economic and political bonds and most of the people in Saigon-Cholon come from the rural areas. An intensified movement in the rural areas will stimulate the movement in the city.

2. However, we will have to cope with many difficulties. The position of Saigon-Cholon is of extreme importance to the enemy and he will hold on to it until the last moment and will make all efforts to destroy our revolutionary organizations. The more defeats he suffers, the more cruel and tyranic the enemy becomes.
In view of the enemy’s activities, the people are more resentful and fight more fiercely. However, because of enemy terrorism and oppression and because our propaganda in the city is still limited, the people’s understanding of the revolution is still insufficient, and many are still afraid of the enemy, particularly the upper strata of the population. Some are still being bribed, deceived, and forced to join the Army or to serve the enemy. The long-standing, difficult and complex character of the revolution in SVN is most obvious in the Saigon-Cholon Front; but in spite of difficulties, the revolutionary movement in the South and in Saigon-Cholon continues to gain ground.

III. The struggle in Saigon-Cholon: tasks and mottoes.

A. The policies and aims of the SVN revolution.

Our long-range and basic task in Saigon-Cholon is to build up our forces and to develop conditions for a general upheaval. This task should not be separated from the task of intensifying the struggle movement. However, this struggle should absolutely not be detrimental to the building up and preservation of our forces. All immediate and long-range activities should be intensified, but they should be subordinated to the basic long-range task. We should understand thoroughly the following immediate and long-range Party tasks:

1. Intensify the struggle movement and prepare for the general upheaval.

2. Carry out self-defense and armed activities in combination with intensified action upon the Army, for the purpose of inflicting political defeat on the enemy and isolating him completely.

3. Prepare the people ideologically so that they will be ready to stand up for the general upheaval.

B. Our mottoes and our activities in Saigon-Cholon.

1. Our general mottoes and activities in Saigon-Cholon are: constantly build up and preserve our revolutionary forces; operate secretly and singly with the population to carry out a long-range struggle; be ready to take advantage of every opportunity; and develop and maintain the movement by steady steps.

IV. Methods for action upon the population in Saigon-Cholon.

The five-step operation (investigation, propaganda, organization, training, and struggle) is the basic method for every cadre to carry out action upon the population. These five steps should be adapted to the city population so as to induce the latter to carry out the revolutionary tasks and the mottoes in Saigon-Cholon.

A. Investigation and study.

1. Why do we have to investigate and study? It is only through investigation and study that we can gather accurate data and be able to carry out other activities such as propaganda, organization, and struggle, in a consistent and efficient manner.

2. What should we investigate and study?

a. When investigating an individual for recruitment as an active member of the revolutionary organization, we should secure the following data:

- Social class, occupation, ideas, and aspirations;
- Family relations: parents, wife, children, relatives, friends;
- Cultural background, religion, political affiliation;
- Attitude toward the revolution, the people;
- Attitude toward the enemy, imperialism, and feudalism; and,
- Fighting spirit as regards the struggle for daily rights, the struggle against the US-Diem clique for reunification of the country.

This data will serve as a basis for us to propagate and work on the individual to induce him to participate in the struggle.

b. Investigating an industrial concern,
- Location of factory; products manufactured;
- Number of employees, male and female;
- The owner; his social class (Vietnamese, U.S., or French, capitalist, a lackey of the enemy);
- Enemy political organizations and activities within factory;
- Severe regulations imposed upon the workers;
- Scale of salaries and allowances; status of the employees; their ideas and aspirations; their attitude vis-a-vis the revolution;
- Attitude of the employer toward the employees, the revolution, the enemy;
- The workers' struggle movement in the past;
- Trade unions, relief organizations, or other organizations;
- Attitude of the workers toward these organizations;
- Activities of these organizations;
- Differences between the workers, the employer, and the enemy; and
- Most acute differences.

c. A worker's dwelling area,
- Geographic situation, population, occupations;
- Enemy policies and regulations; government organizations, other organizations; attitude of the members of these organizations; which ones are refractory evil-doers (give their names, addresses, activities, and attitude of the people toward them); and
- Social classes and religions of refugees in the area; their living conditions; their ideas and aspirations; their spirit of solidarity; their fighting spirit; and, the people's struggle movement in the area.

d. A market.
- Location, number of people gathering daily at the market;
- Activities of the enemy, of contractors; methods of extortion, fines, etc.
- Attitude of the manager toward the enemy, toward the merchants; attitude and activities of police agents, tax collectors; names and addresses of evil-doers; attitude of the people toward them;

- Daily business situation; living conditions of the merchants; their aspirations; their fighting spirit;

- Differences between the merchants and the enemy, between the merchants and the manager; most acute differences;

- Struggle movement at the market in the past and in the present; and,

- The people's legal and semi-legal organizations; activities of these organizations; attitude of the people toward these organizations; capacity of development of these organizations and of revolutionary organizations.

3. What should be our methods and attitudes to ensure the success of our investigation?

a. When conducting an investigation, we should have a specific idea of our objectives and of the information desired.

b. Methods: The investigator should try to have direct access to the object of the investigation and with the people who are familiar with the said object. If direct access is not possible, information may be obtained from press materials, from enemy documents, from "infiltrations", or from friends within the enemy organizations.

c. The information gathered should be studied and analyzed carefully, and a conclusion should be drawn up.

d. Attitude: The investigator should be objective; get a thorough understanding of all details, and assume the proletarian standpoint of the Party to observe and analyze.
B. Propaganda and education to stimulate the people.

To urge the people to participate in the revolution, it is most essential to make them conscious of their rights, discriminate between friends and foes, understand their revolutionary duties, and believe in success.

1. What should be the topics of our daily propaganda?
   a. Denounce enemy schemes, designs, policies and crimes. Refute enemy propaganda.
   b. Make the people understand the objectives of the revolution and the policies of the Party and the Front.
   c. Propagate news of our successes in SVN and of the movement of liberation of people in the world, etc.
   d. Doctrine and policies of the Party; role of the Party and the Front; the power of the North; support given the South by the bloc of socialist doctrine.

Propaganda should not only aim at the people in general, but also at each specific class and group of the population.

2. What forms of propaganda should be used to ensure good results?
   a. In the city, our organizations are inadequate in view of the large population. Our illegal methods of struggle are limited by the enemy, and in carrying them out, we have to be very careful not to disclose our organizations. However, with so crowded a population, it is possible for us to rouse public opinion rapidly and to use certain legal forms of propaganda. We should also use illegal methods of propaganda; our revolutionary organizations should carry out propaganda verbally, through tracts, newspapers, pamphlets, posters, etc. We should make the best use of legal means such as trade unions, people's organizations, newspapers, reviews published by these organizations, meetings, etc. Those legal and semi-legal propaganda processes will also give us the opportunity to investigate, and to win friends, with a view to shifting to illegal propaganda.
   b. Make use of the people, whose essential interests are at stake, to carry out propaganda and create movements of public opinion.
   c. Efforts should be made by the propaganda systems to propagate their materials more widely. Meanwhile, overt propaganda should be carried out in bus stations, ports, markets, schools, workshops, etc.
   d. Utilize all people connected with rural areas, particularly those engaged in business activities between the city and rural areas, to rouse public opinion and propagate rural news in the city.
   e. We should closely observe the effects of propaganda on the people; correct or readjust our approaches; and take advantage of every favorable opportunity provided by current political problems to rouse public opinion.

C. Organizing the people.

1. After the people have been given propaganda and education, they should be gathered and organized in order to become a force. As the struggle becomes more desperate, it is essential to build up forces properly organized and adequately trained.
2. How should we organize the people in Saigon-Cholon?

In the present situation in the city, covert revolutionary organizations can be developed only to a limited extent. In order to assemble the people for a comprehensive struggle movement to cover our secret organizations, to establish comprehensive contact with the masses, and to create such conditions as are favorable to the building up and development of secret organizations, it is necessary to develop overt and semi-overt organizations. Semi-legal organizations are also useful in that they enable more thorough education of the people and may afford the possibility of developing legal organizations. Overt and semi-overt organizations should have secret systems within them in order to be able to last and develop. These three types of organizations are closely interrelated. The motto for organizing the people in Saigon-Cholon should be:

"Endeavour to develop overt and semi-overt organizations while building up, developing, and strengthening covert organizations as foundations for the above organizations."

3. How should overt organizations be developed, maintained, and used to our advantage?

a. We should educate the people to make them realize the use and necessity of the organization to protect their essential rights.

b. We should always start from the essential rights of the masses as a basis to assemble and organize the people; we should demand legal status for the organization, freedom of action, the right of public meeting; we should lead the people to set up organizations regardless of enemy interdiction. In addition, we should promote solidarity and mutual assistance. The organizations set up should be consistent with the various classes and groups of the population.

c. We should make the use of the people's cadres by assembling the people whose interests are at stake as the main forces of the organization. Our covert systems should never operate apart, overtly, in the people's stead.

d. We should build up our secret systems as the foundation of the organization and as control over the lower echelons; we should also have cadres to control people at the upper echelons.

e. When the people are seething, we should guide them in time to make sure that when they struggle for their essential rights they will use appropriate methods and slogans.

4. How to build up, develop, and maintain semi-overt organizations.

We should educate the people to the purpose of such organizations and make them conscious of their essential rights. We should use them to build up the people's forces and guide their activities. On the other hand we should not be too particular about appearances; in time, we should be able to settle the differences between the people within the organizations.

5. How to build up, develop, and strengthen "Liberation Associations."

a. The process of investigating the people, giving them propaganda and education, and gathering them into legal and semi-legal organizations for struggle activities, gives us the opportunity to select and test the people with the view of organizing them into "Liberation Associations."
b. Building up and developing the associations.

1) We should have in mind the goals of the revolution; each association should also have its specific objectives, and comprehensive propaganda should be published to promote them.

2) What should we do to recruit an individual in the association?

- The individual should have an unblemished background, an enthusiastic spirit, a good relationship with the people, be well liked by the people, and adhere to the rules of the association, so that he joins the association voluntarily.

3) At the time of admission, no complicated ritual will be necessary, but a solemn declaration should be made; and further education should be given the individual to strengthen his sense of responsibility.

4) After admission, he should be closely supervised and subject to the training program as people's cadre.

c. Organization, activities, and working methods of the association.

The trainees will be instructed on the type of organizational system under their charge.

Absolutely separate, tightly compartmented secret cells of three members each will be set up. (If a cell has four members, one will be don tuyen (Sic, don means alone; tuyen means propaganda).) The members should be thoroughly conscious of their daily duty to give propaganda and education to the people, to gather the people into overt and semi-overt organizations, to function as cadres in these organizations, to recruit new members, to lead the people and struggle with them, to participate in secret self-defense units, if necessary.

The members should develop for themselves a system of "revolution sympathizers" who can be educated covertly, and can establish good overt relationships with the masses.

Meetings should be held regularly (branch executive committee, once every 15 days; cell, once a week) to review the activities; to make plans; and, to give specific assignments to the members.


a. This is a secret organization whose task is to protect struggle movements, propaganda campaigns, surprise attacks. They are ready to operate during a general upheaval. When necessary, they will secretly combine with paramilitary cells for activities, but they will not operate overtly. In addition they have the same daily responsibilities as other members of "liberation associations."

b. Secret self-defense corps members are selected from enthusiastic, efficient, and valiant members or from people qualified for membership but not yet admitted. They are organized in three-member cells, completely separated from one another. They receive the same education as members of "liberation associations" plus the necessary technical training.
7. How should the Front's activities in Saigon-Cholon be carried out?

Since Saigon-Cholon includes different social classes and is the political center of SVN, the People's Liberation Front should be organized and operate in Saigon-Cholon.

a. Characteristics and composition of the Front.

The Front is a national organization under Party leadership, uniting together all anti-imperialist and antifeudalist forces in SVN: workers, farmers, large and small-scale proprietors, and nationalists.

b. Policies of the Front.

Win over anti-US-Diem people, neutralize undecided people, and isolate pro-US capitalists and reactionary proprietors, with the general policy of "Peace, Neutralism, Independence, and Nationalism." Our neutralism has a revolutionary character, stands against imperialism and feudalism, and opposes the invasive war of the US imperialists. "Peace and Neutralism" is not a propaganda slogan, but a slogan for action, pertinent to all classes and aiming at protecting the rights of all the people.

c. Activities to be carried out:

Propaganda and education on the role of the Front, in order to gather together all classes of the population for the common struggle and promote solidarity and mutual assistance.

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Unite farmers and workers forces as the foundations of the Front; develop student, proprietor, artist and intellectual, refugee, and religious groups; and, in addition to "liberation associations," develop political organizations such as the Democratic Party, the Socialist Party, and groups dedicated to and neutralism, etc.

peace

Work on progressive personalities, on government employees, and on the Army in SVN.

d. These activities are the task of every "liberation association," cadre, and Party member. Therefore, in addition to the task of building up their own organizations, Party members and "liberation associations" members should be thoroughly acquainted with the Front, and should carry out efficiently the above mentioned activities of the Front.

D. Training activities.

1. Why do we have to educate and train cadres and members? Most cadres and members newly engaged in revolutionary activities are enthusiastic but still inexperienced and politically immature. They need education and training as well as courage and a revolutionary spirit to be able to fulfill their tasks.

2. What should they be taught?

a. Revolutionary theories, policies, and responsibilities,

b. Methods for revolutionary activities,

c. The philosophy, courage, and ethics of Communism.
Depending on the time, the place, and the type of cadres and members, appropriate education will be given.

3. How should education be given?

a. Most cadres and members of "liberation associations" have to have a legal cover and earn their living while carrying out revolutionary activities.

Thus, past experience has proven the following methods practicable:

- Provide the individual with study materials for self-education. When self-education is completed, arrangements will be made for education by cells to clarify important subjects.
- Set up classes to train cells and individuals on the spot in areas where this is feasible.
- Open classes in base areas and send cadres and members there for study.

b. Things to be remembered.

Daily activities should be surveyed to determine the shortcomings and difficulties of each organization and the needs of the trainees.

Teaching should be illustrated by concrete examples from the experiences of the trainees and of the movement.

The trainees should be given guidance to evaluate their personal experiences on the basis of the study materials. Problems should be discussed and solved with them.

E. Struggle Activities.

Leadership of spontaneous movements and in places where we have no structures: In case a struggle movement breaks out which is not initiated or led by us, all cadres and Party members have the responsibility of assuming leadership in time to guide the struggle to success; meanwhile, they should penetrate deeply within the population to build up and develop "structures." Past experiences have shown that we can assume the leadership of spontaneous movements by disposing our men cleverly and by utilizing overt organizations to establish contact with the people in the places where a struggle is being carried out.

1. Steps to be taken for a struggle movement.

a) We should anticipate the developments of the struggle and the reactions of the enemy and take preliminary precautions.

b) Structures should plan to assume leadership of the struggle and to build up (vaste) during the struggle. Specific assignments should be given to each individual. In building up structures, we should select the people carefully and educate them before and after the struggle. In case of an important struggle movement, plans should be made to have a leading section: communications, liaison, protection, first aid, relief sections, etc.
c) Then the time of the struggle will be scheduled.

2. When the struggle breaks out.

1) The structures should stick to and mingle with the people.
2) Excite public opinion and extend the influence of struggle by working upon the people in crowded places, such as markets, stations, schools, workshops, etc.
3) Propagate rapidly news of successes, through verbal propaganda, press reports, overt publications, and secret news bulletins. Try to win favorable opinion of the foreign press.
4) Follow closely the developments of the struggle directly or through observers.
5) Lead the people in action upon the Army, etc. Encourage the people to demand liberation, and stir up the people's resentment, with a view to carrying out such forms of struggle as are consistent with the people's state of mind. Constantly maintain the initiative and lead the people according to our goals; do not let the enemy provoke us to change the course of the struggle.
6) When the aims are attained, the struggle should be stopped in time. During the struggle, consider the developments of the situation. Discontinue the struggle when enemy repression is too powerful or when the people weaken, even though the goals are not fully achieved; intensify the struggle when the people are seething and the enemy is in a difficult position.

3. After the struggle.

1) Review and evaluate the struggle. If good results are achieved, news should be propagated among the population and they should be encouraged to intensify their struggle against enemy repressions. If the struggle does not achieve the contemplated goals, we should analyze the reasons, and continue to struggle without being discouraged by failure.
2) Demand indemnity payments for the wounded and maimed; demand that the enemy keep his promises. We should constantly oppose arrest of people by the enemy.
3) Review and evaluate the morale and activities of the "structures".
4) Report results on the results and on the activities to continue the struggle against submission to higher echelons.
ITEM 42

Interrogation of a Senior Lieutenant in the North Vietnamese Navy torpedo boat fleet, who was captured after his boat was sunk in an engagement with US Naval forces in the Gulf of Tonkin in 1966.
Summary

In August 1966 North Vietnamese Senior Lieutenant—a Lao Dong (LD) Party member, who was captured in 1966, said that the aims of the LD include the withdrawal of United States and Allied Forces from South Vietnam, guaranteed neutralization for, and the unification of, all Vietnam. In North Vietnam, Hồ Chí Minh and the LD are supreme, and they will be also for all Vietnam when the country is united. Two other parties exist in North Vietnam, but they lack experience and political rectitude. A South Vietnamese representative of one of these parties is Nguyễn Văn Huu of the Democratic Party. He is a leading intellectual and has the correct ideas. He represents the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (NFLSVN) in Havana. The Lao Dong and the People’s Revolutionary Party (PRP) are one and the same. Once North Vietnam has won the war, the LD/PRP will organize South Vietnam; and the NFLSVN, as well as the other political parties in North and South Vietnam, will disappear. As the Lao Dong moves towards the neutralization and unification of all Vietnam, it does not fail to support French President Charles de Gaulle when he speaks out on ending the Vietnamese war and neutralizing the country.

1. In August 1966 the source made the following statements concerning the LD, its aims, and its relationships with other political parties in North and South Vietnam:

2. The immediate war aims of the North Vietnamese LD Party for North Vietnam (NVN) and South Vietnam (SVN) are: the withdrawal from all of Vietnam of United States military forces (and of all other non-Vietnamese forces); cessation of bombing of NVN by United States planes; peace for NVN and SVN; internationally guaranteed neutralization of all of Vietnam; and unification of NVN and SVN. Once NVN has achieved these objectives, the LD will turn its attention to the political organization of a unified Vietnam.

3. Hồ Chí Minh and the LD ("they are one and the same") are today supreme in NVN and will be so in SVN, once NVN has attained the objectives set forth above. "Hồ is the supreme leader; the LD is the supreme organization. Both are the leaders and rulers of NVN," The chief duty of LD members is to render unquestioning obedience to Hồ and the LD. "All Vietnamese desire unification" today and have passionately done so ever since the signing of the Geneva agreements in 1954. Neither Hồ nor the LD
could possibly agree to any settlement of the war which did not provide for the unification of NVN and SVN, "because they are Vietnamese and because all Vietnamese insist upon unification." Any other solution is completely unacceptable and even unthinkable.

4. Ho and the LD hold all the power in NVN today, because they have (since 1930 and in particular since 1945) gained the "necessary experience and the correct methods and ideas" to expel the French and then to organize society and government in NVN. The other parties which today exist in NVN (the Democratic Party (DP) and the Socialist Party (SP)) have not had such experience and lack the correct political and social ideas. Consequently, although the LD Party Congress has given those parties the right to exist and to be represented in the NVN Assembly, they can never aspire to rule or even to share in political power.

5. Although the DP and the SP play a gelding's role in NVN, they exist because of "Nguyen Van Huu, the Democratic and the Socialist Parties in SVN, and the NFLSVN." Nguyen Van Huu is "a leading intellectual" and a member of the DP of SVN. Although not a member of the LD, Huu is tolerated by the latter, because he "has correct ideas and represents the people of SVN who are struggling for freedom and who have a complete (unclear)

6. Huu is now living in Havana, Cuba, where he functions as the NFLSVN representative. At first glance, it might seem illogical, given the existence of the LD in NVN and of the PRP in SVN, to have NVN represented in Cuba by an LD member while SVN, (that is, the NFLSVN) is not represented by the PRP. It is perfectly logical, however, to have such representation, because Huu and the LD represent the same things. Huu is tolerated because of his recognized public stature and his eloquent interpretations of the ideas of the LD.

7. The LD and the PRP are one and the same organism; Ho Chi Minh is the supreme leader of both. When NVN and SVN are united to form one country, the PRP and the LD will emerge into the open as one party, just as they now secretly form one single party under Ho's authority. The PRP in no way, shape, or
manner constitutes an independent Communist Party. The PRP "is nothing but the South Vietnamese branch of the LD Party." The identity of the leader of the PRP is of no importance whatsoever, because Ho Chi Minh is the real leader of the PRP and is its supreme authority. The LD and the PRP are merely two visible manifestations of an indivisible whole and certainly are not two distinct entities. The visible LD Party apparatus governs and controls the clandestine PRP in SVN. Once NVN and SVN are fused into one country, the PRP will disappear and only the LD will remain throughout Vietnam. Emphatically, the LD and the PRP constitute "one party, run by Hanoi." All the foregoing is standard LD doctrine and well-known to all LD members. It is inconceivable that anybody should think that anything else is the case.

8. Once the war has ended on NVN's terms, the mission of the LD (and the former PRP, its "southern branch") will be to organize SVN according to the principles of Communism and Communist practices as now enforced in NVN. A Communist government, society, and party will rule throughout Vietnam. This development is inevitable, because the LD is the only party able to rule and to "carry forward the Revolution."

9. Once SVN has been "liberated" (that is, once the war aims of NVN have been achieved), the NFLSVN will suffer the same fate as did the Viet Minh in NVN, after independence had been gained from the French. That is, the NF will atrophy and will quickly disappear. The same fate awaits the DP and the SP in both NVN and in SVN. Individuals like Nguyen Van Huu will continue to be treated as "leading intellectuals", tolerated and used because of their articulateness. Neither the DP nor the SP can possibly long survive the unification of NVN and SVN, however, because they subscribe to false principles. Since the "mission of the LD is to educate and propogandize the people," and since LD principles are the only valid ones, no destiny but extinction can possibly befall the SD and the DP.

10. In striving toward their war objectives, the LD leadership, as well as Labor Youth Group (LYG) leadership have been publicizing to their membership since 1963 the recommendations by French
President Charles de Gaulle that all of Vietnam be neutralized under some form of international guarantee and inspection. Although the French President and his government are, in the eyes of the LD and the LYG, an unsavory group of imperialists and colonialists (just as any French government, in view of French activities in Indochina, must, ipso facto, be considered imperialist and colonialist) and on that account are to be hated and despised, de Gaulle, in this instance, is "thinking correctly" and is expressing ideas of merit. For these reasons, therefore, and for these reasons alone, de Gaulle must be supported when he speaks of bringing the Vietnam war to a close and of neutralizing the country.
ITEM 43

Translation of a document acquired by intelligence operatives in Kien Hao Province in February 1966. The translation was verified by intelligence authorities on February 12, 1966.
DIRECTIVES ON THE PARTY FOUNDING DAY ANNIVERSARY

MEANING—March 3/66 is the 35th anniversary of the Indo-Chinese Communist Party Founding Day. This historic day under the present situation has an important meaning to us.

Our party is one year older. The Revolution in South Vietnam, in general, and the revolution in Central Nam-bo region, in particular, have achieved great strategic victories which caused the total failure to the enemy. Generally speaking, in the past years especially in 1963, 1964 and 1965, in the plan to smash attempts of setting up strategic hails of Staley Taylor and of pacifying important areas of Mac Namara in our province, so as to force the enemy into passive and defensive position, we have liberated more villages and hamlets. At present, we have occupied 3/4 of the land in the province, and achieved strategic victories.

This fact has shown the party's effective leadership as well as its perfect political policy, and undaunted fighting spirit of the whole party members in unit UZX and technical branches, just enhancing the stone-like confidence in the party of all strain, particularly poor workers in towns and farmers in rural areas. On the other hand, in face of the situation and historic duty the party has to undertake in bringing the South Vietnam revolution and the resistance war to the final victory, party members who are working in every branch should make efforts in the struggle to complete the hard but proud duties.

THE PARTY'S NEEDS—In the above spirit, the ceremony should be organized to attain the following aims:

— to help the labour youths operating in various branches and among various circles and all the Party members, be conscious of their lofty missions so that they make greater efforts to fight and subdue all difficulties in order to well implement the Party's 1966 resolutions.

— to help the masses understand the Party's line; to help them believe in the Party, and further respect and protect the party by contributing to the nation-saving resistance with man-power and material.

— to consolidate the solidarity between the Party and the masses.

In accordance with the above-mentioned needs the Provincial Education-Indoctrination Committee should set forth the following practical demands:

Within the internal structure:

Solemnly proceed the celebration in the Party Chapters, putting much stress on the gist of the ceremony.

Teach the Party members, cadres, and the labor youths to clearly understand the meaning of the ceremony, in particular, the Party's revolutionary tradition. Afterwards, organise many talks on the history of the Party among the labor youths, agricultural associations and the masses who have sympathy with the Party.

At the ceremony the Party Chapters should make a major review on our internal structure, in particular, the implementation of the
Party's policies and resolutions on the problems of solidarity and our leadership of the masses, on our attack on the enemy. We should strengthen our forces with many achievements and by correcting our mistakes, by making efforts to well fulfill our political missions for 1966 (describe in the Tet congratulatory letter from the Steering Committee for SVN), and to follow the glorious examples of our heroes.

Vis-a-vis the masses:

Select those Party members who have friendly relations with the masses, who have the latter's confidence, and who embody the Party's nature; and ask them to organize talks on the history of the Party to persuade the people to like, respect and protect the Party more and more. Under such circumstances those Party members must convince the people that the Party only can lend them out of numerous difficulties and win many victories, and that in such conditions only can the peasants have their own land for their cultivation, can SVN be liberated, and can our country be reunified.

Request the masses to join in their ideas in criticizing the mistakes done by Party members and to counter all kinds of enemies' new plots causing division between the Party and the masses. On this occasion, the masses who have good sympathy towards the Party, should be well informed that the Indochinese Communist Party, the Vietnamese Labour Party or the Vietnamese People Revolutionary Party are the one Party headed by the Central Executive Board with the respectable Chairman Ho as the head (with much reservation in disseminating this news to the bad elements).

Simultaneously, we should send men to visit and console the sacrificed cadres' families and the aged Party members, mobilizing them to carry on the struggle.

The Document: talks about the Party history in reference to the summary of the Party background in materials concerning general knowledge of the world and the nation.

The main task of Party member cadres is to acknowledge fully the responsibilities of building up the Party (suggested by Permanent member Lo Duc-Tho).

Propagandize widely among the rural masses, the "Rural Revolution for People's Democracy" task (?), and the Party's Agrarian System (in Than Dan Paper No. 4).

Particularly, the District Propaganda and Training Board should extract and publish immediately the necessary materials mentioned above so as to send them timely to the Party Chapter (who are preparing the celebration of the Party Anniversary).

Time: Generally regulate a period of 15 days — from 5 February—20 February 1966 — to carry out this instruction. Any can proceed to celebrate the anniversary as soon as they receive the instruction.

On 25 February 1966, all Chapter Committees, technical branches, H2X (?) must make reports of all the results to the District Propaganda and Training Board.
ITEM 44

Translation of a document captured by members of the U.S. 1st Battalion, 503rd Infantry, on September 21, 1965. The accuracy of translation was verified by the Document Exploitation Center, US MACV HQ, Saigon, on November 8, 1965.
For information
For reading by everyone

To: Various C's....

Recently, C431 made a true copy of Message #6/2 from C to C451, to distribute to various T's (possibly Regions) through the above action, Nam Truong noticed that C451 has violated a number of secrecy preservation regulations, as follows:

1. Article 3 of the Directive #52/CT in the part: "Receipt of message from B2/C55" says: "It is strictly forbidden to make true copies of the message...", but C451 has disseminated 350 copies.

2. At the top of the copy of the message the line "Ministry of DRVN Public Health Department to South Vietnamese Civilian Medical Section," signed by Pham Ngoc Thach was clearly noted. This is another disclosure.

C451 should review this affair and report to Nam Truong. Nam Truong also requests various C's to draw experience and execute well regulation #52/CT and other secrecy preservation regulations.

23 March 1965
For T.V. Nam Truong
s/Hai Van
TO: Districts and U Propaganda and Training Section.

Following this a party letter from T. concerning some stratagems to be corrected:

Recently, the Liberation press agency and radio referred much to uncle No, Party leadership, class struggle etc. Seeing that such an open propaganda on alive subjects is not appropriate. The Central Party Committee directs that propaganda should rather praise nationalism, patriotism, revolutionary heroism and the role of the National Liberation Front. Indoctrination and propaganda referring to Uncle No, Party, class struggle etc...should be conducted orally within internal organizations and among the people only.

Province Party Committees must comply with our current strategy. In the press, information and news broadcast in plain words, propaganda on the above directed subjects should be paid special attention. Party flag and portrait of Uncle No can be hung only in conferences held by Party Chapters, District and Province Party Committees while it is better to hang the Front flag and portrait of NGUYEN HUU THO (if available) in other conferences held by branches, in congresses of cumulative soldiers in political struggle, in killing the enemy and production.

Cinematographic terms should not film or photograph uncle No and the Party flag for projection and exhibition.

Districts and the Propaganda and Training Section should study and comply with this stratagems.

13 April 1966
For U Current Affairs Committee

S/Phan Van Trang
ITEM 47

Interrogation of a former Viet Cong officer in the military instruction section which ran rehearsals of military operations, wrote field manuals, and summarized tactics after operations. He deserted and turned himself in to GVN forces in the spring of 1967.
I. In 1967, 12th DTA delivered a returnee. He was born in 1928. He was a resident of QUANG NGAI Province. He was a former Senior Captain, who received orders to act as the leader of an infiltration group which infiltrated from NVN into the mountain area of QUANG NAM in 1965. He assumed the function of CO of a battalion in QUANG NAM until 1966. He then received his reassignment order to assume the responsibility of running rehearsal of operations, writing field manuals and summarizing tactics.

He rallied one K.54 submachinegun, his wife, and his daughter.

After the interrogation the following information was recorded:

II. Reason of his return:

Disagreement on party and concept.

Disagreement on the execution of the policy.

III. VC MR 5:

Territorial division:

The Communist bloc strategy called for annexation of NVN in order to unify both regions under the same socialist regime. When the war first started to execute the above strategy, the territorial division for MR 5 was composed of two phases.

Phase I: (When MR 5 was newly activated).

1959 - 1965

During this phase, MR 5 was composed of QUANG TRI, THUA THIEN, QUANG NAM, QUANG NGAI, BINH DINH, PHU YEN, KHANH HOA, GIA LAI, KONTUM and DABAC Provinces.

Reason: - Due to the sphere of the special war.
- Armed forces were not highly developed.
- Main purpose was to solve the problems on destruction of strategic hamlets.

Combat target: Civil war.

It was due to the above reasons that MR 5 had appropriate leadership capabilities over a large area.

Phase II: From Jun 65 to date.

Reason: The war was both . . . aggression and civil war type.

Regional war.

The war in both regions but under different aspects:
(NVN big rear line)
(NVN big front line)
(Timely reinforcements from NVN)

Sensitive leadership and conduct suitable with the war.
It was due to the above reasons that there was a new division of territory which had war leadership value.

a. TRI THIEN - Central LAOS MR, Commanded by Brigadier General LE CHUONG. He was also the Political Officer of the region.

b. Western highlands - Lower Western LAOS MR was composed of the provinces of GIA LAI, KONTUM and DARIAC. It was commanded by Brigadier General CHU HUY MAN.

c. MR5: was composed of QUANG DA, QUANG NGAI, BINH DINH, PHU YEN and KHANH HOA Provinces. It was commanded by General HOANG VAN THAI.

The above three military regions were directly subordinate to the People’s High Command in HANOI.

Military Region Committee: In charge of the leadership of the Party in the Military Forces of the Region.

MR5: Secretary General HOANG VAN THAI

Office: General DON

Deputy Secretary, St Officer of Region Committee

31. Commanding Officer of MR5:

Commander: Major General HOANG VAN THAI, alias AN, former First Deputy Chief, Joint General Staff and concurrently Military Affairs Deputy Secretary, Central Committee, infiltrated into RVN in August 1966 to replace General DON, General THAI belongs to warlike and pro RED CHINA Party.

Deputy Commander: Senior Colonel (Sr COL) NGUYEN CHANH alias BINH.

Political Officer: General THAI.

Assistant Political Officer: Sr COL THAN HA KHUE.

Chief of Staff: COL LE TRUC (former Commanding Officer 3d Division transferred to MR5 about December 1966.

Deputy Chief of Staff: Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) NGUYEN LIEN (former member of MR5 Committee, Chief of MR5 Rear Services Section).

There were two other LTC. who had just come from NVN to assume the function of Deputy Chief of Staff, but source could not identify them.

311. Staff Directorate: THON AN 501.

Seal: Unit 502

3111. Combat Section:

Chief of Section LTC TRAN TIEN QUANG

Deputy Expert Major NGUYEN CAN

Guerrilla Warfare Senior Captain (Sr CPT) HAI

Battle expert/Secretary of MR5 Commander: Maj. DUONG.

And six other senior captains whose names were forgotten.

3112. Military Instruction Section:

Chief of Section MAJ HUYNH CU alias QUOC SON
3113. Signal Section:
Chief of Section LTC SOAN

3114. Military Personnel Section:
Chief of Section LTC (just come from NVN-his name was forgotten).
Deputy MAJ LE CUONG BOA
Members Sr CPT LANH and six others whose names were forgotten.

3115. Artillery Section.
Chief of Section LTC NHII, had just come from NVN to replace LTC TUAN who was killed by Artillery bombardment at SON TINH in 1966.
Deputy: MAJ THROI.
Assistant: Sr CPT BUU.

3116. Engineer Section:
Chief of Section: Not available.
Deputy: MAJ YEW.

3117. Cipher Section:
Cadres’ names were forgotten.

3118. Intelligence Section:
Chief of Section: LTC TICH.
Deputy: MAJ VIET
Eight assistants but their names were forgotten.

3119. Reconnaissance/Sapper Section: (Activated in August 1966):
Chief of Section: LTC TINH.
Eight other officers but their names were forgotten.

3120. Operation Section:
Chief of Section: Sr CPT TONG.
And 15 unidentified managers.

3121. Guerrilla Warfare Section:
Chief of Section: LTC UNCLEAR
Deputy: MAJ HONG TUONG.

Member: MAJ TAN, also Director of Guerrilla Warfare School, Sr.CPT HO VAN, Sr.CPT THAC, CPT DE and six other officers but could not identify them.

3122. Chemical Section: Unidentified.

32. Political Directorate: THON AN 410, Seal: Unit 503.
   Director: COL LAP, aka TRUONG.
   Deputy: LTC TAN, aka

321. Organization Section:
   Chief of Section: LTC THE.
   Deputy: MAJ THANH.

322. Propaganda and Training Section:
   Chief of Section: LTC unidentified.
   Deputy: MAJ DUC (newly reassigned as Assistant Political Officer of Worksite 21).

323. Civilian Proselyting Section.
324. Military Proselyting Section.
325. Guard/Security Section.
326. Cadre Section.
   (Did not know any cadres' names).

33. Rear Services Directorate: AN 310, Seal: Unit 504.
   Director: LTC TRUNG.
   Deputy: LTC GIA G and LTC THANH.

331. Planning Section: Unidentified.
332. Medical Section: Surgeon LTC TU.
333. Military Discipline Section: MAJ HUNG.
334. Quartermaster Section: Unidentified.
335. Commo-liaison Section: In charge of logistical transportation from NVN to the region.
   Chief of Section: LTC THANH.

336. Transportation Section: Unidentified.

34. Technical Service Units:
341. 402d Sapper Battalion (Bu):
   It's area of activities was BINH DINH and Highway 19.
342. 408th Sapper Bu:
   It's area of activities was QUANG NGAI area.
343. Engineer Bn: Just infiltrated from NVN in August 1966.

344. Two signal battalions:
   - One inner perimeter (NOI TUYEN) battalion.
   - One outer perimeter (NODAI TUYEN) battalion.

345. Two guard/security battalions:
   - One battalion for MR commander by CPT DUONG.
   - One battalion for Region Committee (commander unidentified).

346. Sapper Company: (Co) (about 100 men, activated since the establishment of CHU LAI Base to take care of the area).

347. Chemical Company: About 100 men, in charge of chemical detection and anti-chemical actions.

348. 12.8mm Anti-aircraft (AA) Company:

349. 120th battalion: Montagnard unit, in charge of the protection of the command posts.

Three command posts were established for each campaign; for instance, the Winter-Spring had three command posts and the coming Winter Campaign will also have three command posts in accordance with the rules of battle leadership.

Rear Command Post or Basic Command Post:
   Commander: HOANG VAN THAI.
   Assistant Political Officer: Sr COL TRINH DUC KHUC.
   A number of assistants.

Forward Command Post: In charge of QUANG NAM, QUANG NGAI and BINH DINH:
   Commander: Sr COL BINH aka CHANH, COL LAP.
   A number of assistants.

Forward Command Posts: In charge of PHU YEN and KHANH HOA.
   Commander: COL TRUE.
   LTC MAI TAN.
   A number of assistants.

Units subordinate to MR5:

Agricultural Site 3: Area of activities: QUANG NGAI and BINH DINH.

Agricultural Site 2: Area of activities: QUANG NAM and QUANG TIN.

Agricultural Site 5: area of activities: KHANH HOA.

NOTE: Source also stated that:

a. After, he had infiltrated into RVN he was promoted, and after the 1966 Winter-Spring campaign he heard that MR5 recommended
him for promotion. These promotion orders were not received yet.

b. In November 1966, due to the expansion of the war over the two regions, North and South, HANOI High Command decided to change all directorates subordinate to JGS into Departments (Tong Luc) and all Sections subordinate to Military Region into Directorates (Luc).

35. Location:

Presently MRS moved to the location within the following quadrilateral area:

Approximately BS 125825 - 12581 - 150820 - 150825.

Campaign Command Post: Quadrilateral area: 36 329430 - 325420 - 335420 - 335430.

36. Activity Concept:

Situation Estimation: (Based on Resolution 12 of Central Party Committee).

From June to 65 to date the war happened in both regions - North and South - and the regional war started in June 1965.

RVN is the big front line - NVN the big rear line. In this respect, the resolution discussed that when the war becomes bigger and bigger in RVN, all the military units in NVN will go to RVN creating the opportunity to liberate the whole region. Meanwhile in the North, RED CHINA will be read with three million troops to meet the war requirements in the North if US troops go into the region. That is why in the past, RED CHINA was ready to concede the three provinces of KWANGTUNG, KWANGSI and YUNNAN for VIETNAM. (This is a good reason for Red Chinese troops to be present in NVN.)

Deploy all efforts to win the war in the South and simultaneously be ready to win the war when it occurs in NVN and RVN.

Weak points of the RVN Government and its Allies:

VC consider the war in RVN as:

A war of wrong cause.

Vietnamese climate does not suit the Americans.

Peoples of the world and Vietnamese people will not agree.

Lack of morale.

Lack of "people's mind and heart" factor.

VC superiority:

VC consider that the war which they are running in RVN is:

A war of right cause.

Has all "people's mind and heart" factors.

Brave soldiers endure hardships, but are (?) scared by sacrifice and violence.

Victorious tradition of the Army.

Believe firmly in the leadership of the Central Party.
After the above resolution had been made public, MR5 convened three conferences.

First conference:

On Sep 66 at MR5 Command Post.

Participating Elements: Commanding Officer and Political Officer of regiments and higher headquarters.

Agenda:

a. Estimation of RVN capabilities.
   
   Armed forces increased to one and one-half million men.
   
   Superior in aircraft, artillery, transportation facilities, communication facilities, surprise capabilities but all these are not decisive factors.
   
   The more the US and NDK troops, the higher degree of popular disagreement among ARVN officers and men happens.

b. Solution for (VC) Tactics:
   
   Attack and destroy.
   
   Attack posts and intercept reinforcements, destroy (RVN Government) forces at the outside of defensive positions.

Campaign Leadership:

Attack continuously.

Try to win the first attack.

Take the initiative to end the battle.

End the battle in a violent and victorious way.

Tactics Applied

Re-study NGO DAI NANH Regiment's plan for destruction of objective DAT KUT-GIA LAI in 1965 (this regiment already moved to RVN). The 1st and 2d attack at CAN KNE conducted by Worksite 1 in 1965. Also make overall study of the 1965 Dry Season campaign to extract combat experience.

From the above viewpoint, the following concept was extracted:

1. Initiate destroy attacks, small, big and continuous, attack in a positive way, take the initiative in offense.

2. Combined attack at three areas: US stationary areas, rear bases and order areas.

3. Push forward guerrilla warfare movement, push forward axis sabotage.

4. Push forward sapper warfare activities and transform the sapper into an army branch.
5. Shoot at any aircraft in the sky.

6. Develop the tactic of those two-footed and three-pronged attacks which means to initiate political and military attacks simultaneously (two-footed attack) with military, political and military proselyting activities (three-pronged attack).

7. Initiate compulsory movement in the entire army, cadres must at the same time demonstrate their determination.


Participating Elements: Commanding Officer and Political Officer of province units and higher headquarters.

Agenda:

- Study the independent attacks of district regional forces.
- Study offensive tactic of guerrilla warfare, initiate guerrilla warfare movement.
- Construction of combat villages.
- Develop guerrilla capabilities.
- Initiate a movement for shooting down aircraft among the guerrilla lines.

Third Conference: Mountain area conference in Jan 67.

Participating Elements: Same as in the 2d Conference.

Agenda: Same as in the 2d Conference but the following points were added:

- Building up of forces.
- Building up and reinforcement of bases for protracted combat capabilities.
- Conference of all schools: The returnee did not attend this conference.

Refresher Training on Resolution 12:

Contents:

- the capabilities of both sides during the dry season.
- Initiate revolutionary heroic pride.
- Determine to win the battle during the dry season.
- Push the organization for denunciation and creating hatred against RVN government among the people.
- Study messages of President HO CHI MINH and of MR.
- Confirm the objectives and troop departure during the coming Winter-Spring-Summer campaign.

Agricultural Site 2, or VC 2d Division:

Main objective: SON TINH area, QUANG NGAI.
Secondary objective: Areas of TAM KY, QUE SON, QUANG TIN.

Agricultural Site 3, or VC 3d Division:
Main objective: Area of BINH DINH and QUANG NGAI.

Agricultural Site 5, or VC 5th Division:
Main objective: Area of PHU YEN, Secondary objective: Area of KHANH HOA.

Future activity concept of MR5:
MR5 main objective: South QUANG NGAI and North BINH DINH.
MR5 secondary objective: Areas of QUANG TIN, QUE SON.

Concentrated VC 3d Division will be responsible for main objective area. VC 2d Division will simultaneously disperse to take care of the secondary objective.

Immediate activity objectives: Sapper will be responsible for this type of activity. The attack will be initiated as soon as preparation is made, need not to follow the plan for the campaign.

GO HUYNH, BS 584726.
CAU CHAY, BS 623865.
NUI TROM, BS 515760.
SCN TRUONG, BS 582770.

Objectives for Summer Campaign:
The tactic of attacking the posts and intercepting reinforcements will be applied to the attack at RA TO, SON HA and PHUOC to destroy ARVN forces.

37. Provincial Forces:
QUANG NGAI: Two battalions.
803d Bn in charge of DOC PHO area.
7 Bn in charge of SON TINH area.
QUANG TIN: 72d Bn and a newly activated battalion.
QUANG HA: Two battalions (one of them was activated in Aug 66). Heavy weapons battalion.

DAMANG City:
Two sapper battalions.
402d Sapper Bn.
Another activated in Aug 66.
One heavy weapons battalion activated in Aug 66.

BINH DINH: Two battalions.

PHU YEN: One battalion.

KHANH HOA: One battalion.

38. Information Received:

381. Ammunition Supply:

50% by sea.

50% by land.

Western MR received rice from CAMBODIA, ammunition and weapons from NVN carried in by land.

382. AA Battalions:

On/about Jul 66 NVN had ten AA battalions infiltrate. They were equipped with eighty 12.8mm AA weapons and dispersed along the central corridor from north of the 17th Parallel to KONTUH (THONG NHAT Route).

383. Red Chinese Military Group:

Red Chinese Military Group infiltrated into RVN (MR5) in Aug 65. The group was conducted by a Red Chinese Sr. COL. It was filmed DASHANG City.

In Mar 66 another group also conducted by a Red Chinese Sr. COL. came to MR5 to inspect the area.

Sometime in 1966 there was a group conducted by a North Korean officer which came to MR5. The returnee did not know whether this group went to the delta area or not.

384. Strength Replacement:

Actually, MR5 planned to improve the infiltration of units from NVN for replacement of its existing units. No new units would be activated.

It was known that late in Apr 67 Worksite 1 would receive 300 NVA soldiers who would come from NVN.

385. Bombardment by B.52 Stratofortresses:

Normally, MR5 was informed six - 12 hours prior to the bombardment. The information was sent in by radio but the returnee did not know from where. Based on the messages, MR5 could know the take-off time of B.52s at their base. MR5 was responsible for passing the information throughout the entire RVN.

Effectiveness of B.52 Bombers:

Bombardment by B.52s was very effective only during the time they bombed DUONG YEN - DUC. At that time, 50% of the bombs were of the underground-burst type and the remaining 50% were on ground-burst type. Later bombing was not much effective because air-burst bombs were used.
Actually, the VC were very scared of surprise night air raids.

Artillery battleground to destroy US base and Headquarters 2d Infantry Division:

Early in Feb 67 (the day was forgotten) MR5 ordered a team of four cadre conducted by MAJ CON, Deputy Chief of Staff of Worksite 5, to go to North TRA KRUC River reconnoitering the battleground for heavy weapons to destroy the US Advisor base and Headquarters of the 2d Infantry Division in QUANG NGAI.

This mission was accomplished in ten days. The reconnaissance team decided to use vic of BS 655745 for positioning of four 81mm mortars and four 75mm RRs to use concentrated fire for destruction of the above two bases. This plan was approved by MR5. Weapons were ordered to be moved to deep areas for execution of the plan in Mar or Apr 67.