ITEM 52

Translation of a Communist document captured by U.S. forces on March 10, 1967 during Operation Junction City in Tay Ninh Province. The translation was verified by the Document Exploitation Center, USMACV HQ, SAIGON, on April 4, 1967.
I. Situation of propaganda activities and Foreign Affairs

Since the founding of the NLF to date, the propaganda and foreign affairs of the Front have brought about satisfactory results and have greatly contributed to the struggle against the Americans, to the liberation of the country and the world revolution.

Up to 1961, the propaganda activities and foreign affairs of the Front, under the guidance of the Central Committee were restricted to international political struggle in the form of official documents (statements on the Geneva Conference on Laos; on the neutrality policy; and on the occasion of July 21, 61, etc.), to the release of Liberation News Agency Information bulletins in foreign languages, and to the writing of articles for foreign newspapers, especially the Weekly Herald Magazine in Paris and for a number of newspapers in Phnom Penh and the motivation of American troops to support our policy. These activities were intended to support our international political struggle.

At that time the propaganda and foreign affairs machinery was not available and the propaganda task was taken care of by a number of cadres. Due to the lack of reference documents, diplomatic correspondence was not well prepared. It contained an aggressive attitude but lacked intelligent reasoning to convince (others) or to preserve the good name of the southern revolution. The press articles dealt with long and uninteresting political subjects. The information bulletin failed to reach the international requirements.

Propaganda activities and foreign affairs started to develop since 1962. The majority of propaganda activities and foreign affairs of the Front in SVN were undertaken by the Central Committee. COSVN formed a foreign propaganda element in accordance with the directive of the Central Committee. This element was co-located with The Liberation Radio Broadcasting Station. The task of Chin Nam (COSVN) propaganda and foreign affairs element was to:

- Prepare documents and reports for international conferences (Afro-Asian Writers (Permanent) Bureau, World Federation of Democratic Youth, International Union of Students, etc.) and maintain contact with organizations and individuals in Cuba, the USA, France, Indonesia, Greece, etc.

- Prepare propaganda documents denouncing the crimes of the US and its henchmen concerning the construction of strategic hamlets and Montagnard concentration camps, the prisoner of war policy and the documents used in re-educating US prisoners.

- Publish the Liberation News Agency Information Bulletins in French and English languages.

- Write articles for French and Cambodian newspapers.

- Conduct a daily news broadcast program in French and in English (15 minutes in French and 15 minutes in English) and a special weekly broadcast for the US Troops in SVN and for the French residents.
At that time the US imperialists and their henchmen distorted the significance of South Vietnam's revolution. However, thanks to the extent foreign policy of the Daily, the assistance of the Central Committee and the efforts of Chin Nam foreign propaganda element, the NEISV secret significant achievements in foreign propaganda and affairs. The SVN revolution was widely known to the world and we gained the support and sympathy of many countries.

The peoples of the world have realized that a war of aggression is being waged by the US in SVN and that SVN is being ruled by a dictatorial and fascist government of the Americans.

Unable to bear a savage policy of oppression, the South Vietnamese people have no choice but to initiate an armed struggle against their counter revolutionary war of aggression of the US imperialists and their henchmen.

The peoples of the world are fully aware of the Front policy, its role, its position, and its mass character in the southern revolutionary movement.

The Front delegations, in good will visits and international conferences have enhanced the prestige of the Front in the world.

Socialist countries such as China, Russia, Korea, the Democratic Republic of Germany have assisted us in laying bare the US imperialists true face and creating conditions favorable to enhancing the prestige of the Front in the World. However, we fail to see all the difficulties and complexities in the relations with socialist countries, thinking that these countries will readily and wholeheartedly support the Front policy.

The national liberation movement and the peoples of nationalist countries: Asian countries have great admiration for our anti-American aggression movement.

- Cambodia: Through newspapers, radio broadcasts and documents of the Front, the Khmer people are very sympathetic towards the Front. Due to the difficult situation, the Cambodian Government has not officially declared its support for the Front even though it has greatly respected it.

- Indonesia: The people and a number of government personnel and President Sukarno have wholeheartedly supported us.

Afro-Asian and Latin American Countries: All these countries have displayed their support for our national liberation movement to different degrees.

- Algeria: We set up an office of representatives in Algeria since the Independence ceremony on 1 November 1962.

- Mali, Ghana, Guinea, Tanganyika, Nigeria, Senegal, etc... have expressed their deep sympathy for the Front. The Mali radio station has broadcast the /Front/20 July Declaration. The governments of these countries consider that our popular movement has no characteristic of a government.
Other African countries are still under the French, English and American influence. They more or less have relations with Saigon (Tunisia, and Morocco which have a diplomatic bond with Diem; Congo (Belgium), Middle Africa, Dahomey, Cote d'Ivoire, Malaysia, etc.... have diplomatic relations with Saigon and not with us.

Latin American Countries: Cuba has maintained close diplomatic relations with the Front for a long time.

- The popular movements and mass organizations of other Latin American countries have expressed their deep sympathy for our struggle.

The Peoples of Capitalist Countries

The French, English and American peoples have expressed their sympathy and support for our national liberation movement. They have opposed the French and English Governments because the latter failed to properly fulfill their mission with regard to the implementation of the 1954 Geneva Agreement on Vietnam.

Generally speaking, in 1962 and 1963, our propaganda and foreign affairs have brought about significant results. We rose from the dark and created a good image in the world.

However, propaganda and foreign affairs were still slow and confused. They failed to reflect the success in the country which would create an international influence.

The support for the national liberation struggle and for the national revolution has been obtained more or less from foreign countries and efforts have been made to associate the struggle in the country with the solidarity of peoples of the world. These separate activities fail to closely associate the struggle in SVN with the political activities outside the country.

Propaganda and Foreign Affairs in 1963 and 1964

On 15 March 1963, the Liberation Radio station stopped its program in foreign languages. The foreign affairs element was separated from the radio station and The Foreign Propaganda Sub-Committee subordinate to the Central Executive Committee was then formed. This committee consisted of eight cadre and two personnel. One element of this committee, composed of one cadre and two personnel, operated in P.P. (Phnom Penh).

Mission of the Foreign Propaganda Sub-Committee

To conduct international propaganda, continue to publish information bulletins in English and French, booklets concerning the spraying of poisonous chemicals, documents in memory of 20 July, 20 December and the Second Congress of the Front, write articles for foreign newspapers (NVN and the element in P.P.).

At the beginning, keep abreast of the current world situation and prepare international political struggle documents or documents on national affairs, which affect the world in order to denounce the American attempts and crimes, introduce the policy and achievements of the Front and support and associate the national struggle with international movements.
Conduct talks with French reporters, explain our policy to foreign countries and maintain contacts with international organizations such as the Committee for the Protection of World Peace, the Committee for Solidarity with Afro-Asian Countries and related international popular organizations.

Conduct English courses to help cadre translate documents written in English to exploit documents and to motivate US troops.

**Propaganda and Foreign Affairs from 1964 to date**

In early 1964, after the Second Front Congress and the Conference of the Central Executive Committee, the Foreign Propaganda Sub-committee was reorganized and its mission was redefined as follows:

1. Study international propaganda activity and maintain cultural relations with foreign countries.


3. Publish information bulletins in English and French languages for distribution to foreign countries.

4. Translate and publish propaganda and cultural documents for distribution to foreign countries.

5. Publish a newspaper on foreign policy.

6. Provide photos, and films to foreign countries.

7. Maintain contacts with newspapers, cultural organizations and famous foreign personalities.

The cadre of the Committee increased to twenty and personnel to ten. It was broken down into three offices:

- Current situation study office.
- Information and propaganda office.
- Newsmen and foreign guests management office.
- A secretariat.

In addition, the Committee also maintained an element in P.P. to distribute documents to foreign countries. It carried out, in the country, propaganda activities in accordance with the local conditions and available facilities and collected information and documents necessary for the study of the world situation.

Due to a lack of experienced personnel, the propaganda and foreign affairs machinery in SVN fails to meet the ever increasing requirement of the situation. Therefore, propaganda and foreign affairs are in large part undertaken by the Central Committee. In South Vietnam, with individual efforts the propaganda and foreign affairs section have contributed greatly to the success of the foreign affairs branch, in spite of the new organization and lack of facilities.
II. Review and evaluation of the foreign propaganda and relations during the recent past

Based on the resolution of the Central Committee concerning the South Vietnamese Revolutionary mission, the leadership of the Executive Committee, the coordination of the SVN and NVN foreign propaganda efforts, and the relationship between various branches in charge of foreign propaganda, the missions of the Foreign Propaganda Section are defined as follows:

Pay more attention to the propaganda and motivation of the various peoples in the world than to the diplomatic problems. The main purpose is to gain the political, moral and material support of the world for our patriotic war against the Americans.

Bring out the important role and the position of the NFLSV in the international political stage.

Denounce the enemy's cruel and barbarous schemes.

Isolate the US imperialists and lackeys, to the high degree, actively contribute to the fruition of the Party political tasks, and frustrate the enemy's military and political plans.

Enthusiastically support various wars of liberation, anti-imperialistic movements and movements asking for peace and democracy in the world.

The International Propaganda policy is essentially designed to strengthen the solidarity between the Front and the socialist sister countries, the Communist Parties, and the workers; to gain the sympathy and efficacious support of the African, Latin American and Asian countries, especially the Indo-Chinese and Southeast Asian nations; to take full advantage of the dissension among the enemy ranks; to gain the support of France in all aspects; to prevent the US satellite countries from interfering in the SVN war; to intensively isolate the US imperialists and lackeys and to sharpen our point of attack at them. We must also try to gain the support of the US, French and British progressive people and the people of other capitalist nations.

Thanks to the correct line, direction, and foreign policy of the Party, we have achieved great successes in foreign policy and propaganda. It is a fact that under the leadership of the Party these successes resulted from the efforts of various NVN and SVN diplomatic branches, including the SVN International Propaganda element.

1. International Propaganda Policy

a. Socialist Countries

We have given proper attention to the strengthening of solidarity between our nation and our sister countries so as to gain their spiritual and material support in our efforts to prevent the US Imperialists from enlarging their war of aggression.
Many friendly countries, especially China, Cuba, Korea, East Germany, Russia and East European nations, etc. have helped the SVN Revolutionary Force in many aspects, especially in the political field. They have brought out our just case and denounced the enemy's crimes through broadcasting, press, demonstrations, etc.

Our main support is the socialist countries and we have failed to fully exploit this resource. Our friends can do much more than issue documents and books about us. However, ineffective support from them would result from our poor information service, which fails to disseminate all the news concerning our activities.

At present, the deep disension between Russia and China and the contradiction in anti-American concepts have ruined the consistency of action of the pro-Vietnamese Socialist bloc.

b. Asian, African and Latin American Countries

We have also paid special attention to the motivation of the Asian, African and Latin American countries which are more or less sympathetic to the SVN patriotic war. In countries where the national movements for independence are strong, the peoples are enthusiastically sympathetic to our anti-aggressive war. The Neo Lao Haksat Front and especially the Cambodian Government have recently shown their good will to help us. In some nationalist countries such as Indonesia (formerly), Burma, Algeria, Congo (Belgium), Tanganyika, Venezuela, Dominican Republic, etc. In Latin America, strong movements have been initiated to give support to us.

In capitalist countries, such as the United States, we always keep abreast of the American people's opinions and try to motivate youths, intellectuals and religious sects to protest the war of aggression waged by their government in Vietnam. At the same time, we motivate families of the US troops dispatched to Vietnam to protest this sending of troops. In addition, we actively support the anti-American movements in US satellite countries which also have troops in SVN, such as the Philippines, South Korea, etc... while we have highly appreciated the movements against the US imperialists' warmongering and aggressive policy and for peace, democracy, and support to Vietnam, launched by the peoples and political parties of Japan, France, Great Britain, and a number of North European countries.

Through various international conferences, international democratic organizations, and committees for solidarity with Vietnam against US aggression, the world peoples' anti-US Front has taken shape, aimed at mobilizing the mass movements for support to Vietnam in every country, and aimed at isolating the US imperialists to a high degree.

The formation of the Indo-Chinese peoples' Front and the spiritual and material support from various peoples of the world (drugs, money, blood, manpower, weapons, etc...) have great political significance and have dealt a heavy blow to the US aggressors and their group of traitors.
We support various struggles for liberation in countries such as Cuba, Venezuela, Dominican Republic, Korea, etc.... by staging demonstrations and motivating our people to contribute money and materials.

The large number of nationalist countries demands an intensification of our propaganda and foreign activities.

The Central Committee and agencies representing the Front have made great efforts in this field, but in South Vietnam, our propaganda and foreign activities are weak due to our limited capabilities. A noteworthy fact is that very few countries know about us and some countries have relations with the US imperialists and the Saigon government. Therefore, we have to increase our propaganda effort in order to gain the support of neutral countries.

The support of the National movements for liberation in countries such as Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, Malaya, etc.... is still weak. In these countries, we have conducted our propaganda campaign but in launching a widespread mass movement there, not yet associated our task of fighting at home with that of solidarity with the peoples of other countries, and not yet made full employment of the South Vietnamese Revolution's prestige which would produce a great effect upon our criticism toward the enemy, and upon the mass movement of those countries.

2. Foreign Propaganda and Activities

The main purposes of our foreign propaganda policy during the past were to denounce the enemy's crimes; make our position known to the world; and gain the support of the world in our patriotic struggle.

a. Denouncement of Enemy Crimes

We succeeded in condemning the US war of aggression and unmasking the United States new kind of colonialism and their fascist and dictatorial regime in Saigon. We frustrated the enemy's distorted propaganda efforts and false attempts to establish peace in Vietnam.

The peoples of the world are becoming more and more aware of the nature of the aggressive war waged by the US imperialists and their lackeys in South Vietnam. There is a wide protest against the American violations of the Geneva Agreements and their repression of various South Vietnamese liberation movements. The Americans are enemies not only of Vietnam but of all the world.

b. To introduce our Movement the world we have clearly pointed out the just cause of our struggle and made clear that the southern revolution is an integral part of the national liberation movements in the world. We also insist that the NFLSV is the sole genuine representative of South Vietnamese people. The Saigon puppet government is merely an instrument of US imperialism. We have also proven that our political and military struggle is justified. In view of our successes we have made sure that we will win the final victory and that the US imperialist will suffer a total defeat in their war of aggression.
Because of our effective propaganda effort, the peoples of the world now understand the struggle of our people more clearly. Liberation movements in various countries now have more confidence in their efforts. Our war has become an example to the oppressed people. Therefore, the prestige of the NFLSV has increased in the international arena.

c. Apart from the attempt to gain the world's support, our foreign propaganda policy is also designed to help out anti-imperialist and anti-colonialist struggles, and the movements for peace and democracy in various countries. We also try to take full advantage of the suggestions of various international democratic organizations and friendly nations in order to harmonize the action of the common struggle.

The fact that we have raised our voice to protest the Americans and their henchmen for threatening Cuba, to condemn them for intending to invade Cambodia, and to support the struggles of the Congo and Venezuela, and the movements of the American people and the North European countries against the US ruling circles aggressive policy, has strengthened the militant solidarity and the friendly relations between our people and the peoples of other countries, thereby creating favorable conditions for the stepping up of the struggles of the world peoples' anti-US Front.

In review of our international propaganda activities, we find much left to be desired. The content of our propaganda task is not yet truly sharp and concrete, thereby taking a limited effect only. We have not yet made clear to world public opinion, US neo-colonialism, our line and policy of struggle, the assessment of the enemy weak points and strong points, and his dark design in peace swindles. A careful study of our past activities reveals that our propaganda themes are still superficial. We have failed to enumerate all the crimes committed by the Americans in South Vietnam, and to insist on the cunning and barbarous character of their military activities in our country. In addition, we have not set off the role and position of the Front to the world and ruined the diplomatic relations between the Saigon puppet government and various nationalist countries. Our people's struggle movement is very intensive but we have failed to conduct a systematic propaganda of our military, political, cultural and economic successes, etc. . . .

The Front's major policies, especially those concerning independence and neutrality, were not widely disseminated.

Concerning the coordination of our struggle with the common contribution to the movements waged by the world's peoples, we have not appropriately fulfilled the carrying out of international obligations. We have not, in some instances, enlisted the support at home in favor of the friendly countries in response to their backing of our cause. We have not turned our support for friendly countries into the deeds accomplished by the masses.

3. Propaganda and Foreign Activity

At this juncture, propaganda activity directed at foreign countries in South Vietnam was centered on the dissemination of information and propaganda, which, in turn, was based on the development
of the situation and depended on available facilities. The propaganda on the international level was performed in the following manner.

a. With a view to introducing news in the military and political fields, the liberated area, major domestic events, the Front's diplomatic activity, and major international events, we published periodical news releases in French and English and special news bulletins on major issues.

b. With respect to propaganda on the major events at home and international solidarity, we published several booklets and a bilingual French and English gazette.

c. Some time ago, we increased the delivery of documents, newspapers, photos, films, pictures, music sheets, stories, etc for the purpose of widening the scope of propaganda. (These propaganda media were most effective in convincing people.)

d. One important aspect of diplomacy was the diplomatic documents. In this connection, we resorted to such forms as messages, letters, declaration, reports, etc to publish the major events at home and abroad, coordinate our struggle with that of the friendly countries, support the struggles waged by other countries, win friends, and isolate the enemy. Our correct position in this matter enhanced our prestige in several countries.

e. As regards the possibility of employing the propaganda "capabilities" of the world's organizations, newsmen, writers and officials in foreign countries, we also received and arranged activity schedules for several visiting foreign newsmen and cameramen. These people helped us a great deal in propaganda after they returned from their visits to South Vietnam. In addition, we furnished information, documents, films to a number of major international organizations, and foreign personalities who sympathized with the revolution in South Vietnam.

f. With respect to denouncing the enemy and introducing ourselves for enlisting international support, we knew how to conduct concerted propaganda to bring about strong repercussion at home and stir up opinions abroad. This was designed to exert vigorous political pressure, favorable to our cause and detrimental to the enemy's.

The overall picture was that several good propaganda resources remained untapped. Information and propaganda work was not consistent with the psychology and feelings of each specific foreign country. The documents were inaccurate and devoid of scientific grounds, the films were less denunciating and less convincing. Superficial research and study gave poor quality to the documents whose contents were not properly written. Some delays were still noticed. No proper emphasis was placed on the full exploitation of the propaganda capabilities of the international organizations, and international comrades who had entered South Vietnam. As a result, there was an irregularity in the supply of propaganda materials, and full exploitation of the propaganda capabilities of the above organizations and individuals could not be achieved.
4. Organization of the apparatus for propaganda and activities abroad

The activation of the "machinery for propaganda directed at foreign countries" was done concurrently with the expansion of the (propaganda) task. Despite the cadre shortage, limited skills, and the volume of the work, everyone displayed great efforts and concentrated on the tasks of realistic propaganda values.

In addition, a foreign propaganda branch was established in Phnom Penh for the purpose of publishing documents to be sent to foreign countries. This branch reprinted the news bulletins and documents by using locally available means in order to insure timeliness of the information and expansion of propaganda. Also, it met the propaganda and materials requirements at home with the view to strengthening the international research task.

This propaganda machinery, being shorthanded and weak, failed to measure up to the propaganda tasks, even to the immediate and urgent tasks. The organization and task, although delineated clearly by the conference on Propaganda and Training, COSVN, 1964, still lacked the essential elements to conduct study and propaganda work. This organization, being inconsistent with the assigned task, failed to accomplish the main duties. Some works could be done on time, but the most important ones remained unsolved.

The study, documentation, editorial and translation tasks were the poorest ones. As a result, they had considerably restricted the sensitive and accurate nature of the propaganda task which had to be performed carefully and patiently, step by step.

The cadres and men in the foreign branch in SVN performed their duties under the most trying conditions, because there was a lot of special and prolonged tasks and the agencies were newly activated, with newly assigned personnel. These agencies and personnel performed along the patterns of certain combat units. But, on the whole, thanks to the Party Chapter and Group Chapter, they performed their duties with a high sense of dedication and enthusiasm and made significant progress in ideology and specialization. However, there still existed no solid unity of spirit. Individualism still prevailed. Training, refresher courses, and the replacement of cadres were not given proper consideration. In the propaganda task and activity directed at foreign (countries), we did not pay attention yet to those strategies which revealed the independent nature of the revolutionary movement in South Vietnam.

Some tasks were patterned after those performed in North Vietnam. In the ideological field, a tendency for dependence and an inferiority complex affected somewhat the expansion of the work and activation of the agencies.

Information and propaganda directed at foreign countries were tasks of vital importance, demanding centralized guidance, close coordination with several agencies and branches concerned in SVN, as well as clearly delineated functions between the "foreign" propaganda agencies in SVN and those in NVN to avoid shortcomings in performance. In the past, coordination of action among the agencies concerned was not close enough. The assignment of tasks between the North and the South, information on plans, reports, etc., was not regularly done. The lack of a common plan of action and a specific periodical propaganda plan directed at foreign countries resulted in a standstill in performance, lack of concentration, and discontinuity.
In short, propaganda and foreign activities in the South had previously made some initial progress. Yet, in spite of some good achievements, shortcomings still existed.

The results obtained could be attributed primarily to the leadership of the Central Government COSvN, and Propaganda and Training Section over foreign activities. Secondly, they were brought about by the growing influence of the Revolutionary movement in South Vietnam. Finally, they were brought about by the concerted efforts of foreign branches in the South, in the North, and all other foreign branches concerned. In view of the above development in association with the development of the struggle being waged by the South Vietnamese people, one might say that the foreign activities were bound to achieve far greater successes.

In reality, although the present situation brought many complicated problems to foreign affairs, it favored us if we care to review experiences and concentrate our efforts on exploiting all untapped resources. In so doing, we could improve and step up propaganda and foreign activities in the days ahead.

III. Direction for Immediate Information and Propaganda Tasks and Foreign Activities.

1. The Characteristics of the Situation.

The more the enemy suffers setbacks, the more he widens and escalates the war. At the same time he resorts to machiavellian political tricks in an effort to save the deteriorating situation. The US and puppets have shown their extremely reactionary faces. On the one hand, they intensify the war, committing additional crimes against our people in their attempt to gain a "strong position" on the battlefield. On the other hand, they implement their extremely mischievous political schemes in the hope of gaining some influence should a political solution [to the Vietnam conflict] materialize. Although the strategy of the Americans and their puppets is more fierce and cunning, they are being more confused than ever, and they are bound to suffer heavier military and political defeats.

At present, as the Revolution in South Vietnam is on the upswing, new developments are bound to occur. We are fully able to defeat the enemy in the foreseeable future. We might alter the balance of power to our advantage, thus creating conditions for eventual victory in a relatively short period of time.

Along with the ever increasing victories on the political and military fields in SVN, the international situation has become favorable to us. The peoples of the world give us their full support. This is a good opportunity to step up propaganda activities and foreign affairs, launch the campaign of reunification and isolate the American imperialists and their henchmen. However, the situation in the South is very confused. There still exists, all over the world, differences on international matters, especially a solution to the Vietnamese problem. Therefore, the foreign affairs have to be intensified to better serve the strategic plan of the Party during the forthcoming period.

2. Directions.

Based on the COSvN resolution concerning revolutionary tasks in South Vietnam in 1966, the general policy on information and propaganda activities and foreign affairs is designed to serve the strategic objectives of the Party, which are as follows:

Strive to enlist support and assistance from the socialist camp, the peoples of the world, the Americans, the Khmer peoples, the Lao, the neutralist government of Cambodia and Laos.

Concentrate all efforts on denouncing the US aggression in Vietnam. Denounce the inhumane acts perpetrated by the Americans, such as the use of chemicals, gas, artillery and airstrikes to decimate our people. Lay bare the US deceitful peace offensive. Play up our just cause and the prospect of inevitable victory. Enlist the sympathy and support of the socialist camp, the peoples of the world, including the people of the United States of America. Isolate the Americans and their lackeys.
3. Information and Propaganda Tasks and Foreign Activities in the Days Ahead.

a. Promptly denounce American schemes and activities aimed at widening their aggressive war in the South. Condemn their cruel activities. At the same time, continue to lay bare the puppet and American false peace.

b. Widely develop military, political and diplomatic successes scored by the people in the South. Let them know that we have every possibility to defeat the US imperialists under any circumstance. Stress the reasons why the Americans will be defeated: they seem to be strong outwardly but actually they have many basic weakpoints; sharp contradictions in their internal situation and acute crisis in their strategy.

c. Place heavy emphasis on the role of the Front at home and abroad. Stress that the Front is the only and genuine representative of the people in the South. Denounce that the puppet government in Saigon is anti-revolutionary and is the American tool. Clearly set forth the Five Points of the NFLSV and the Four Points of NVN for solving the South's problem. Attach importance to the Front's strategic slogan for a neutralist peace in South Vietnam.

d. Make sweeping efforts to enlist support and aid from our friends throughout the world. Widen the imperialists' difference on the SVN problem. Isolate the US imperialists.

Make sweeping efforts to enlist support and aid from the socialist countries, especially the Chinese and Russians. Emphasis is to be laid on the correct viewpoint and stand of the Southern Revolution. Clearly understand that the Revolution in the South is of great importance for the safeguarding of the socialist camp and world peace.

Make sweeping efforts to enlist sympathy and support from the Afro-Asian and Latin American countries for our present liberation movement.

Make every effort to persuade the people of America and its satellites to support us to oppose the US Government's aggressive policy, and to exploit the anti-war spirit of American and satellite soldiers in the South.

Consolidate friendly relations with the people and governments of neutral Cambodia and Laos so that these two countries will support us and join us in the fight against the Americans.

e. Policy towards the imperialistic countries: widen further the internal contradictions among the imperialistic countries. Enlist sympathy from France and study measures to be taken to cooperate with the pro-French groups. Following Britain's neutrality toward the US, warn the US satellite countries of their intervention in the SVN revolution with the objective of creating divisiveness among them, and fully isolating the US. Direct all our political, military and diplomatic activities at the US extremist and warlike faction.

f. Make sweeping efforts to enlist support from various peoples all over the world fighting for the same cause like us (national liberation, peace and democracy) with a view to forming a front of unified action against the imperialists and colonialists whose leaders are the US. Emphasis is to be laid on strengthening the Indo-Chinese People's Front against the Americans.

g. Accelerate the setup of friendly relations with various international democratic organizations or countries, and with foreign journalists, writers, and important personalities who have sympathy for the SVN Revolution. Urge them to try by all available means to support our struggle for national liberation and peace, and stand against war, imperialism and colonialism.

4. Immediate Tasks.

Step up political propaganda and create international opinion in order to:

Frustrate the US-puppet plans of intensifying their war of aggression in SVN and their political scheme for a false peace.

Introduce to the world by all available means the SVN revolutionary struggle, the role and position of the Front, based on the objective and strategic task of the Party in 1966.
Foreign Policy

1. Intensify propaganda activities by providing foreign countries with information and documents.

   Continue to publish bulletins containing selected news of SVN in particular and of international value. Improve the editorial work.

   Write and translate various books dealing with political, military, city (sic), troop proselyting activities, etc.... Improve the substance and the form of books and magazines.

   Help foreigners investigate the situation by providing them with documents and newspapers. Books and magazines must be published on the occasion of great days such as 20 July, 20 December, etc....

   Disseminate photos, films, pictures, poems, songs, plays, etc.... of high documentary value.

   Combine with the Liberation News Agency to directly disseminate information to the whole world.

   Study the plan of establishing an Information Hall in Phnom Penh of information dissemination. Prepare a plan of activity for reporters of the News Agency, cultural and press attaches at the Front Agency in Phnom Penh, and at the same time, maintain and consolidate the secret section for propaganda and foreign activities in Phnom Penh.

2. Study and step up the international political struggle.

   Investigation must be thoroughly made so that we can be fully aware of the international situation and have timely action to take initiatives in international political struggles.

   Improve the methods of writing correspondence dealing with foreign affairs to ensure good diplomatic results.

   Try to initiate a propaganda phase in which our military achievements and diplomatic successes, and the US-SVN crimes are to be popularized. We can thus consolidate the prestige of the Front, drive the enemy to passivity, and isolate them politically.

   Work out a plan to support the national liberation and revolutionary movements in various countries. Study particularly a number of forms of activities of informative nature so that we can both educate our people and gear our political activities with those in foreign countries.

   Pay attention to the propaganda task. Motivate the American people to protest against the [US] crimes, and request an end to the war of aggression in South Vietnam. An effort should be made to motivate the soldiers' dependents to launch anti-war demonstrations and to request repatriation.

   Promote good relations the people and government of neutral Cambodia and Laos; motivate through propaganda these peoples to strengthen the Indochinese People's Front against the Americans.

3. Establish contact with newspapers, international democratic organizations and important personalities of other countries and motivate them to support us.

   Organize and furnish the above organizations and individuals with suggestive documents and information aimed at exploiting their capability and means to give substantial support to our struggle and to develop general forms of propaganda.

   Invite or authorize a number of foreign writers, newsmen, cinematographers to visit SVN and use them as propaganda channels to support us. Attach importance in inviting reporters and newsmen of Cambodia and Laos. The immediate action is to closely coordinate with the activities of the USSR and China's Cinematographer group.

   Study and develop cultural relations with other countries. Provide conditions and necessary suggestions for our observer groups to attend CANEFO and the SVN Paywar Entertainment Group to perform in Cambodia.
b. Coordination Between SVN and RVN Foreign Affairs Branches for Propaganda and Diplomatic Activities.

1. Work out joint plans to promote the information-propaganda tasks and international political activities between SVN and RVN foreign affairs branches.

   a. The SVN foreign affairs organization is still at its rudimentary stage, understaffed and lacks experience to carry out its heavy task. The bulk of the propaganda and diplomatic activities is assumed by NVN.

   The SVN foreign affairs organization, in its present condition, can accomplish only part of the information and propaganda task, namely immediate international political struggles or necessary cultural exchanges, which are the most important activities in foreign affairs in SVN.

   b. In the information and propaganda field, SVN performs such specific tasks as publishing information bulletins, booklets and magazines under the name "Liberation Publisher" with the main purpose of disseminating information, documents, editorials, photos, films, pictures, etc.... NVN has all means for writing, translating, printing, and publishing under the name "Foreign Language Publisher".

   c. As for liaison and foreign affairs, SVN assumes part of the international propaganda task concerning political struggles and domestic problems in connection with international activities. It is recommended that SVN provide suggestions with international activities. It is recommended that NVN provide suggestion on the viewpoint, stand and limits, also the substance and form of documents for better results, and give us suggestive information on new problems.

   Major problems of strategic and tactical nature are settled by the Party Central Committee, and the Front's Party Group, under the guidance of COSVN.

   To avoid possible shortcomings, it is recommended that routine messages (commemorating celebration days, congratulating personalities on new assignments, expressing sympathy, etc...) be made by SVN. With regard to those matters which should be handled in the South, please cable us.

2. Coordination for International Political Activities

   a. Toward socialist countries.

      Try by any means to induce socialist countries to have unity of action to support our struggle in all fields. Great effort must be made to motivate them to recognize our (unclear) as the legal and unique representative of the SVN people. They must be motivated to unanimously support our cause while settling the problems in Vietnam.

      Study the forms showing union and friendship between people and those of the socialist countries. Organize visits, step up the activities of the Committee for the Support of Vietnam, and attend Solidarity Conferences.

   b. Policy on the National Liberation Movement and on Nationalist Countries.

      Step up propaganda and diplomatic activities of the Front aimed at increasing the influence and prestige of the Front. Further motivate the governments and people of the above countries to tighten their relationships with us, at the same time, strive to propagandize the political line of the Front.

      We must:

      Work our way into the conferences of the anti-imperialist countries of the 3 continents; pay attention to the activities of the Committee for the Solidarity of the Indochinese people and the Committee for the Solidarity of the Afro-Asian countries in Cairo, and the Committee for the Solidarity of the 3 Continents in Havana.
Reinforce the Front's Representative Agencies in big countries as to enlarge our scope of activities there, with particular attention to our installations in Cambodia, Algeria, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, etc.

Study and promote plans for solidarity and mutual support among Asian, African, and Latin American countries in their struggles for national independence and safeguarding independence of Anti-American Imperialistic nations in order to isolate the Americans and shatter the influence of the puppet government of Saigon.

c. In Imperialistic Countries.

Such as USA, England, a number of countries in northwestern Europe, and US satellite countries having soldiers fighting in Vietnam, we must use all the available means of propaganda to kindle a widespread anti-war movement among the people. At the same time, we must try to create pressure on the ruling circles of the above countries to request the US to halt its war of aggression in Vietnam.

Combine all plans and efforts of the SVN and NVN foreign activities and never miss an opportunity to initiate political attacks on the US enemy, denouncing, protesting and laying bare their crimes and attempts in order to isolate them from the world and gain support for our own struggle.

Wisely arouse acute internal dissension among the imperialist countries—chiefly between France and the US—to win the support of France and her supporters. Following the neutrality of England, we must be ready to welcome any of their acts against the US and also we must always be ready to protest and counter any of their imperialistic plans.

3. Establishing and reinforcing the foreign activities organization.

The increasing growth of our peoples' struggle and the present situation call our attention to the problem of improving our foreign activities and building machinery suitable for resistance conditions in order to ensure the success of our information and propaganda activities abroad.

Review the existing organization of cadres. Work out plans for improvement and development of cadres to meet the requirements of necessary work such as documentation, writing and transition; these are among the most important tasks at present.

Have plans for the selection and activation of cadres within South Vietnam to strengthen the foreign activities branch. We also suggest that the Foreign Activities branch in North Vietnam make proper assignments of officials in this branch in order to help strengthen and gradually build up the initial stage of Foreign Activities branch in SVN where there is change in the development of the situation.

In order to create favorable conditions for our Foreign Activities branch in SVN in the development of their activities within the above mentioned scope, we suggest that we should immediately set up in Cambodia agencies which can operate in the area. These agencies will deal with foreign information and propaganda activities. In the meantime, we must also maintain our existing agencies there with sufficient personnel for adequate activities.

Date: 15 June 1966

Subcommittee for Foreign Activities
ITEM 53

Translation of a Communist document captured by elements of the U.S. 1st Infantry Division on June 4, 1966, in Bien Hoa Province. Translation was verified by the Document Exploitation Center, USMACV HQ, Saigon, on June 14, 1966.
Definition of Command Relations Between Agencies at Village Level

Organization Plan for 4th quarter of 1965 and 1st quarter of 1966, prepared by the Organization of U3 (Bien Hoa) Province on 10 November 1965. The plan consisted of three (3) main parts. The first part discussed the development and improvement of Party agency, namely the Party chapter at various levels. The second part defined the government machinery at village level and the third part clarified the relations between the Party and specialized agencies as well as agencies of popular (Front) organizations.

1. Development of Party Agency

Main efforts would be directed at the establishment of Party Chapters in RVN controlled cities, areas surrounding strategic communications axes and Cao Su District. Members of the SVN People's Revolutionary Youth Group, guerrilla units etc. ... would be the selected targets for such development. The document emphasized the members of the SVN sponsored organizations and those people who worked for the GVN as spies, secret service agents etc. ... would not be admitted into the Party.

The document also revealed some common weaknesses of Party Chapter members. These include escapism, rightism, lack of aggressiveness and failure to activate new Party organs in newly liberated and contested areas. Some of the Party Chapter members were not fully confident in the people's capabilities. They were also overly zealous in indoctrinating the people.

Confronted with the increasing expansion of liberated areas (sic) the following criteria were selected for the establishment of local administration:

- Strengthen Village administration.
- Lessen District administration.
- Improve Province administration.

The rural government must be the dictatorship of workers and farmers.

The official title for this government will be the "PEOPLE'S VILLAGE LIBERATION COMMITTEE".

Regarding the subordination of various village agencies, the following chain of command was determined:

a. Subordinate to village administration will be: The village unit, finance-economy section, propaganda and information section, supply procurement section, culture and social welfare section, health section, and the security section.

2. Relations between the Party Organs and Specialized and Popular organization:

Specialized agencies and popular organizations are subordinate to the immediate Party Organ on matters pertaining to the implementation of policies and resolutions of the Party. All chiefs of specialized sections, branches and chairman of popular organizations are responsible to the Party for all activities of their organizations. Party Chapter members are encouraged to respect the specialized activities of each branch of service. Specialized organizations and popular organizations must also respect their technical channel of command.

The Party Organs established at various staff agencies at province and district levels are not authorized to give orders in specialized matters.