ITEM 70

Interrogation of a mountain tribesman from Quang Tri Province, who entered South Vietnam posing as a refugee in October 1961, and later during interrogation confessed to being a Viet Cong agent.
1. In October 1961 a tribesman from Quang Tri Province, crossed into South Vietnam by swimming the Ben Hai River; after routine questioning at the border post of Xuan Hoa, he was sent to the Quang Tri security service to be interrogated more thoroughly. In February 1962, he was turned over to the Refugee Reception Center in Hue, where he finally admitted that he was a Vietnamese Communist (VC) agent and that this was his fourth operational mission to South Vietnam. Fearing reprisals by his teammates, he escaped from prison but was recaptured two days later. In 1962, he was turned over to the Saigon Refugee Reception Center for further interrogation and possible trial.

2. Source was born in 1940 of a poor tribal family in Huong Hoa District. During his youth, he attended educational courses whenever he had the opportunity. Thus, besides reading and writing Vietnamese, he also learned Lao and was fluent in many mountain dialects.

Special Training

3. From February 1957 until January 1958, Ngam attended a cultural and political improvement course. This school was organized by the Communist (Lao Dong) Party Committee of the zone and the directing committee for the mountain region. Over one hundred mountain tribesmen who attended the course received not only free food and lodging but also 15 dong per month for incidental expenses. The instruction included cultural and political subjects, as well as the study of the organization of the Labor Party and methods for the improvement of agricultural products.

4. Before being admitted as a member of the Communist Labor Party, source was selected to attend a short refresher course, organized by the local Party Committee and by the technical section of the Directing Committee for the Mountain Region. After completing the course, he was given a Party name, and his salary was raised to 40 dong per month.

5. Some of the instructors of political subjects were:

Ho To, aka Tong Ka To, Vinh Ling Zone deputy of the National Assembly;

Chai, chief of the directing committee for the mountain region;

Brai, assistant chief of the directing committee for the mountain region; and,

Chien and Cam, two Vinh Ling district cadres.

6. In 1958, he received a fifteen-day training course, preparatory to his mission in South Vietnam. The course was attended by about 50 other students, most of whom were mountain tribesmen native to Quang Tri and Thua Thien Provinces. This course included such subjects as methods for the establishment of bases in the mountain regions, operation of secret bases, propaganda, and the organization of the masses. In addition to the instructors named in paragraph five above, some of the subjects were taught by Nguyen Chi Thanh and Le, both cadres of the Vinh Linh security service.
First Mission - 20 March to late September 1958

7. Together with two other mountain guides, and four Communist cadres, he left for South Vietnam in March 1958, for the purpose of establishing liaison bases with North Vietnam.

8. During six months, they operated in seven hamlets of Long Hoa and Cam Lo Districts.
   a. At one hamlet they helped in the election of a hamlet committee.
   b. At two hamlets, during their three-month stay, village committees were elected; and permanent bases were established.
   c. At another he contacted the secretary of the district Party committee. After a few days, he continued his trip alone, leaving his collaborators behind.
   d. At one hamlet, a base was established with the help of two tribesmen cadres, Song and Nai.
   e. At another, together with the tribesmen cadres, he organized a base and a village committee.
   f. At another hamlet, hamlet tribesmen assisted in establishing a liaison base; from there one of the tribesmen led him to a village, where, for the next two months, a Communist Party member, and Communist tribesmen, helped to organize committees in three other villages.
   g. Before returning to North Vietnam, he spent a month in another hamlet where he also organized a liaison base.

9. From October 1958 to January 1959, he was debriefed. At that time he was paid 600 dong, representing his salary for the past eight months and a special achievements award. He was then permitted to spend a few weeks at his home for the Chinese New Year's celebrations.

Second Mission - March 1959 to November 1959

10. In March 1959, he and his two teammates were again ordered to escort two VC cadres to South Vietnam. They were also to check the previously established bases and organize new units wherever possible. On this occasion they took a new route. At Quang Ha, the party was supplied with documents, weapons, and rice; they crossed Rao Quang River near Dong Lip, and Tao Thanh River near Dong Kiang; from there they continued south.

11. At one stop the team worked for about a week to establish liaison bases in the nearby hamlets. Using a base, they operated for more than a month in the hamlets north and south of route 9.

12. He and his teammates went on a tour of the previously established bases. They remained in the area for more than two months, organizing a conference and strengthening a liaison network to the North Vietnamese border for which the Communist tribesmen were made responsible.

13. After his return to North Vietnam in November 1959, he remained until early 1960 for debriefing. He was given several month's leave and returned to his home to spend the holidays.
Third Mission - Spring to Fall 1960

14. In the spring of 1960, he and his team again crossed into South Vietnam, leading ten VC cadres to meet Communist tribesmen of Hoang Hoa District.

15. The team remained at one village (N 16-28, E 106-44) for two months; and, with the help of local tribesmen, they constructed barracks in the forest which were to serve as future encampments for VC troops.

16. In the summer he continued his trip to Xanasclo where he met a liaison agent and inspected the various neighboring bases.

17. He returned to the village; the tribesmen had assembled 100 Rhade children native of the Ban Ho Thoat and An Khe region. He was charged to bring those children, aged between 10 and 18 years, to North Vietnam for political and military training. After preparations for the trip were completed, he and his team marched the children through the forest hills back to NVN.

18. During the last part of 1960 he was debriefed by technical agents of the security service, and by the directing committee for the mountain region. In 1961, the directing committee, together with the Communist Party district committee, organized a four-week conference attended by all of the VC teams which had been operating in the Highland regions of South Vietnam. During the conference, a plan was discussed aimed at establishing a model region for the improvement of the general standard of living of tribes in Quang Tri and Quang Binh Provinces. The last week of the conference was reserved for reviewing the achievements of the various teams; source was cited for special merits, awarded a certificate, and given many gifts for his accomplishments.

19. After spending two months leave at his home, he was put in charge of establishing production cells and cooperatives in the mountain region. He and his team operated in the area near the Lao border. During their stay there, they often observed VC troops moving from North Vietnam to Laos along the new road from Hoi An, Le Thuy District, near Long Dai River, to Ben Trie.

20. In the summer of 1961, he was ordered to attend a two-month refresher course for Communist tribal cadres. The course started in August and was attended by twenty students. With the exception of a few old acquaintances, he knew his fellow-students only by their code numbers.

Fourth Mission and Arrest

21. Later he was called to the office of the Provincial Party Committee and given his new assignment. He was to enter South Vietnam as a bona fide refugee, together with another cadre. After his release from the Government of Vietnam (GVN) refugee center, they would both be contacted by his former teammates, and by other cadres who would make themselves known by prearranged recognition signals.

22. Having once obtained legal GVN identification papers, he could travel freely; and he was then to inspect the previously established bases in the mountain region and create new ones. He was to organize cooperatives and collective farms, which would be ready to contribute to the resupply of North Vietnamese troops assigned to assist in the liberation of South Vietnam. With the help of the tribesmen, he was to construct barracks and shelters in the forest for the use of these VC troops. All of the liaison bases were to be provided with permanent agents, and armed guerrillas and propaganda teams were to be organized.

23. In October, he left, and on the following day they swam across Ben Hai River. After having destroyed all VC permits and identity cards they surrendered to the security point at Xuan Hao.
ITEM 71

Interrogation of a man who was arrested on the southern side of the Ben Hai River separating North and South Vietnam in 1962. He was a member of a North Vietnamese border crossing team charged with supplying the Viet Cong with medicines, ammunition, and other material.
1. During reinterrogation in March 1963, source gave an account of his activities as a member of a North Vietnamese border-crossing team charged with supplying the Viet Cong with medicines, ammunition and other material. He also described the infiltration routes, his team members and the liaison agents in South Vietnam.

Biographic Information

2. Source, a Buddhist farmer, was born in 1936 in the Vinh Linh Zone. He joined the Vanguard Youth in 1950 and the Hamlet Reserve Youth in 1952. After his marriage in 1954, he volunteered for the labor group, and from 1956 to 1957 he was acting as hamlet information and propaganda member. In early 1961 he was admitted as a candidate member and in late 1961 as a full member of the Lao Dong (Labor Party).

3. In 1958 he was selected to join a special border crossing team operating in Vinh Linh Zone. Since he became ill after his first mission, he was reassigned to his hamlet and, until the end of 1959, he was secretary of the labor and hamlet defense group.

Special Border Crossing Teams

4. Each of the special border crossing teams in the villages in Vinh Linh Zone consisted of 10 to 15 members. The teams were used to transport drugs, food and other necessities across the border by way of the mountain forests; these supplies were destined for the Viet Cong (VC) operating in South Vietnam.

5. Source's village team had been organized by the village basic Party unit under a committeeman and operated under the leadership of:

   Team Chief, native of Quang Nam Province and resettled to North Vietnam, a member of the Vinh Linh basic Party unit.

   Assistant team chief, native of Thua Thien Province and resettled to North Vietnam.

The team had nine members, including source.

6. In January 1958 source first participated in a mission. The eleven team members were each carrying a sealed tin containing drugs, food, ammunition, newspapers, and documents. The team stopped at the following way stations:

   a. In North Vietnam:

      (1) Bai Ha forest.

      (2) Choi Mot hamlet.

   b. In South Vietnam four way stations used were off Route 9.

Border crossing missions from source's village were undertaken every two months; at no time did the team come in contact with the teams from other villages.

7. In January 1960 the chief of the hamlet Party committee admitted source to a new border crossing team. This team consisted of only four members including source.

   Team chief.
   Assistant team chief.
   Team member.
8. The team was directly responsible to the village Party committee. It was charged with transporting supplies and propaganda material across the Ben Hai River and with bringing back intelligence information and documents from South Vietnam. Each month one or more members of the team made two or three border crossings.

9. The contact agents in South Vietnam were:
   a. One, about 35 years old, native of Kinh Mon, married; he had been a VC security agent before 1954, but remained in Tan Kinh Dong acting as a contact agent. He was about 1.62 meters tall, heavy set, square faced and of light complexion. His house had a secret cave.
   b. Another, about 40 years old, native of Kinh Mon, had been village administrative committee member during the resistance against the French and was still operating in that village. He was 1.63 meters tall, of fair complexion, with a pointed nose, blackened teeth, and a big mole on the upper lip.
   c. Another, about 32 years old, native of Giang Phao, had been a village information service chief during the resistance. He was a member of the hamlet committee and acted as contact agent in Cao Xa village, Trung Luong District.

10. Contact with any of these three agents was usually made in a hut, located on the mountain slope near a village. Since all the members of the border crossing team were well acquainted with the contact agents, no special recognition signals had been arranged.

11. After crossing Ben Hai the team was usually met by one of the following liaison agents:
   a. One, 30 years old, native of Vo Xa; he had been a member of the resistance troops and had for some time been a member of the Hai Cu hamlet guard in South Vietnam. He was about 1.63 meters tall, thin, of dark complexion and elongated face.
   b. Another, about 28 years old, younger sister of one Dac living on the northern side of the Ben Hai River. She was a member of the National Revolutionary movement in South Vietnam. She was about 1.50 meters tall, thin, of fair complexion, oval face and gracious personality.
   c. Another, 40 years old, married and a member of the Hai Cu hamlet committee.

12. During the dry season (spring and summer) the teams usually crossed the border during the night when the moon was not shining. In fall and winter, because of rain and cold, the border guards in South Vietnam were less alert and the teams usually crossed during the noon or early afternoon hours. After each successful crossing and according to the importance of the mission, he received an award of 20 or 30 dong.

Events Leading to Source’s Arrest

13. In 1962 he was charged with transporting a plastic bag containing five kilograms of medicine (mostly sulfadiazine and vitamin B1) across the border. The team chief accompanied him to the Ben Hai River and told him that he would be met at noon by the first liaison agent near Hai Cu. He waded across the river and, while waiting for the agent, hid his package in a bush. A short time later he hailed an approaching man and only too late realized that it was a South Vietnamese border guard and not his liaison agent. He was immediately arrested and turned over to the authorities in Hue.

14. Preliminary interrogation revealed that he had the following relatives in South Vietnam:
a. A brother-in-law, 28 years old, living in Trung Luong District, Quang Tri Province.

b. An uncle, a Chinese herb doctor living in Quang Tri.

c. A maternal aunt, 28 years old, address unknown.
Control Unification Committee

1. A of July 1959, offices connected with the Central Committee for Unification were located in Hanoi at 49 Phan Dinh Phung Street, 103 Quan Tho Nh Street, and Ch Ly Nam Pe Street. The offices were as follows:

a. 49 Phan Dinh Phung, Street, the head office a two-story house which combined housing and office space. Chief of the Central Committee was Pny Can, a native of Quang Tri Province, about 34 years of age.

1) Ho Lien, in charge of personnel assignments.

2) Tro, responsible for processing of personnel.

3) Hien, a People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) officer for liaison work between the Committee and the PAVN.

4) Minh, a chauffeur.

5) Hha, a guard.

6) Pias Tao, nursemaid to the children of committee officers.

b. 103 Quan Tho Nh Street, a subordinate office whose functions included receiving and forwarding books and newspapers to South Vietnam. Members of this office were the chief of the unit, Chanh; Le My, who processed the books and papers; and his assistant Huan. The office was housed in a two-story building; the ground floor had the offices, a storage room and one empty room.

c. 63 Ly Nam Pe Street headquarters of Group 559. There were two two-story buildings; one had no entrances or windows opening on the street. The chief of this section was Colonel BAM; assistants were Tam, an officer of battalion level in charge of propaganda, training and political affairs; Chung, a battalion cadre in charge of administration and logistics; and Thuong, a battalion cadre in charge of planning and organization.

Group 559

2. Group 559 was formed in May 1959 following orders of the Lao Dong Party Central Committee, dated April 1959, to the PAVN General Staff that such a group be organized to support the depleted Vietnamese Communist base in South Vietnam. Its designation as Group 559 was taken from the date of its establishment in May 1959, i.e. 5/59. The group was actually directly under the Party Central Committee and in close liaison with the Ministry of Security, the PAVN General Staff and Logistics bureau and the Central Committee for Unification.

3. Vo Bam, the head of Group 559, was born in approximately 1912 in Quang Ngai Province. He served as Political Commissar of the 803rd Regiment of Inter-zone V from 1953 to 1954 and studied abroad from 1954 to 1956. In 1957 he became director of the Doch Mai collective farm of the PAVN and in 1959 transferred to the PAVN General Staff prior to taking charge of Group 559.
4. Cadres for what was to be the 603rd Battalion were drawn from the PAVN 605th and 24th Divisions of resettled southerners, the 325th Division and the "Central Defense Bureau." On 1 July, 117 officers and soldiers were assembled at the PAVN General Staff. Captain Luu Pac was designated as chief of the unit, Captain Ha Van Ha as Political Commissar; and Lt. Long, Assistant Commissar. From 8 to 25 July, the group was trained at the barracks of the Left Bank Military Zone Headquarters, located on Phan Dinh Phung Street in Haiphong. The training consisted of study of the Party Central Committee's 15th resolution on the struggle for unification of North and South Vietnam. After training, ten men were returned to their former units because of ill health and the rest moved by truck to Thanh Khe (approximately N 17-42, M106-29) where, as the 603rd Battalion, they set up a base. Barracks were completed by October.

5. Organization of the battalion was as follows:

   a. Company 1, in charge of administration and maintenance, was commended by 2nd Lt. Dinh Dat. Sections were:

      (1) Radio section, five men led by 2nd Lt. Phuc.
      (2) Shipbuilding and repair section, seven men led by 2nd Lt. Dinh Y.
      (3) Warehouse section, seven men led by Warrant Officer Huan.
      (4) Material Supply section, six men led by Warrant Officer Phan.
      (5) Provisions supply section, six men led by Sergeant Lu.
      (6) Secretariat, consisting of Warrant Officer Tuyen and an assistant.

   b. Company 2, in charge of transporting equipment into South Vietnam, comprised 62 men divided into three platoons. Commanding Officer was 2nd Lt. N'guen Bat; Assistant Commander 2nd Lt. Le Quang and Political Commissar 2nd Lt. Dong Yen. The platoons were each divided into three squads.

6. The battalion base was armed with four pistols, ten MAT 49 submachine guns with 100 cartridges each, 18 MAS rifles with 40 cartridges, and 124 grenades with safety handle the shape of a duck's bill.

7. Training was continued at the base with political, military, naval and practical training. The political training included further study of the Party 15th decision, strengthening of Party units, and the need for security precautions. Military training included target practice, rifle shooting at 100 meters and submachine gun firing at 50 meters. Naval training included all aspects of navigation by junk as well as secure and secret transportation of goods.

8. The base at Thanh Khe was about 500 meters from a sawmill maintained by the 325th Division on the south bank of the Giang River and east of National Route #1. The whole was surrounded by barbed wire. Buildings of the base were as follows:

   a. Reception center for relatives of the troops, which provided meals and sleeping accommodation for four. Civilians were not allowed on the base.
b. Sign reading "Barracks of the Democratic Army."

c. Sentry Box.

d. Garage for trucks coming from Hanoi. The battalion had only four bicycles for its use. Occasionally the garage also housed the jeep belonging to Vo Bao.

e. Warehouse and weapons depot. The warehouse consisted of one room, eight by six meters, in a wooden building with thatch roof and wooden floor. About five tons of goods were being kept in the warehouse in November 1959. Guards 'slept' at the warehouse at night. The weapons depot, a wooden, thatched-roof building, measured eight by six meters and held about three tons of weapons like those assigned to battalion members.

f. Barracks.

g. Barracks.

h. Mess hall and provisions depot.

i. Office building.

j. Well for drinking water.

k. Flagpole, ten meters high.

l. Barracks.

m. Barracks.

n. Recreation hall, 12 by 18 meters, provided with books and newspapers.

o. Radio shack, measuring 4 by 4.5 meters, with radio, a hand generator and two antennas.

p. Dispensary, measuring 4.5 by 4 meters, a wooden, thatched building in the charge of one warrant officer.

q. Barracks, measuring 4.50 by 4 meters, for workers used in building the junks.

r. Well for washing.

s. Latrines.

t. Junk-building yard, measuring 15 meters square, a separate enclosure surrounded by a barbed wire fence which would be removed on the river-side to permit the launching of junks.
ITEM 73

Interrogation of a Senior Sergeant, a member of the Viet Cong 5th Military Region. He was captured in 1964 in Tra Bong District, Quang Ngai Province, by ARVN forces.
SUMMARY AND HIGHLIGHTS:

A VC senior sergeant and a member of a transportation company of the VC 5th Military Region states: VC Transportation Group 70 was responsible for moving infiltrators, and the supplies of ammunition, weapons, clothing, medicine, and foodstuffs that were necessary to maintain them, along the infiltration corridor, within its areas of responsibility which extended from the southern part of the DRVN, through Laos, and into THUA THIEN province. The organizational structure of Group 70 including its twenty stations were explained along with the operational regulations in effect along the infiltration corridor. The series of depots maintained by the group along the route in order to supply the infiltrators are also discussed in detail.

SOURCE DESCRIPTION:

He was born in 1936 in PHU YEN Province, Republic of Vietnam (RVN). Source completed the Viet Cong (VC) 7th Grade (equivalent to RVN 4th Class High School). By profession he was considered a wealthy farmer. In 1953 he joined the Viet Minh forces of TUY HOA District, PHU YEN Province. In May 1955 source was regrouped to the DRVN with the 363th Battalion, 803rd Regiment. In May 1961 source was transferred and was placed in charge of a Switchboard. Source was promoted to sergeant in 1961 and became senior sergeant in 1962. Source became a provisional member of the Communist Labor Party in 1962 and was admitted to full membership in 1963. In 1962 source departed from XUAN MAI and accompanied his group infiltrating the RVN. He began his infiltration of the RVN late in 1962. In early 1963 source and a number of other cadre were assigned to the VC 5th Military Region. In April 1964 he was captured by the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) forces in TRA BONG District, QUANG NGAI Province. He arrived at the National Interrogation Center in August 1964.

CIRCUMSTANCES OF OBSERVATION:

1. This information was gathered during the period between May 1961 and September 1962.

BRIEF HISTORY OF GROUP

2. This organization was established in May 1959. It was then referred to as "Battalion 70," stationed in LE THUY District, QUANG BINH Province, and used the P.O. Box Number 9641. Its strength was then over 300 men who originally were taken from Division 305 and Division 324 which had been regrouped to DRVN from the South under the 1954 Geneva Agreements. By early 1961 Battalion 70 was reinforced with 1000 men who were regrouped Southerners working in state farms and work camps. The unit then changed its appellation to "Group 70" and was incorporated in "Group 559," a division-echelon organization commanded by Colonel VO BAM, subordinate to the PAVN General Headquarters. Group 70 received additional reinforcements of some 700 men by the end of 1961. These were all natives of the North who had volunteered to remain in the army after having completed their military service duty. By the end of September 1962 Group 70 was ordered to use a number of its own members, natives of the South, to organize a new unit, "Group 72," destined for infiltration into RVN.

FUNCTIONS OF GROUP 70

3. It was the responsibility of Group 70 to receive weapons, ammunition, mail, and supplies, etc., from HANOI (no idea as to exactly where) and transport these to Station 20 (aka Mr. VAN's Station); then they were to be turned over to the agency (subordinate to the 5th Military Zone) in charge of supplies for the RVN National Liberation Front. Another function of Group 70 was to escort units infiltrating from the DRVN into RVN. Group 70 was also responsible for transporting sick and wounded personnel from THUA THIEN to QUANG BINH. The route assigned to Group 70 for carrying out these tasks was the one from LE THUY District, QUANG BINH Province, to the provincial border between THUA THIEN and QUANG NAM Provinces, via Laos.
ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF GROUP 70

4. The organization structure of Group 70 is as follows:

a. Command:

   Commander: Major VU (40, medium build, slightly dark complexion, native of NGHE AN, had lived many years in BINH THUAN Province).

   Political Commissar: Major DÅNH (over 40, skinny, fair complexion, native of QUANG NGÄI Province).

b. Staff:

   Chief of Staff: Captain TU (37, native of QUANG TRI Province).

c. Political Section:

   Political Officer: Captain TUYEN (38, native of QUANG NGÄI Province).

   (1) The Political Section consisted of the following elements:

      (a) Sports Subsection.

         Assistant: (No information)

      (b) Youth Subsection.

         Assistant: Captain HUNG (34, native of BINH DINH Province)

      (c) Cultural Subsection.

         Assistant: Lt. DAT (Over 30, native of the RVN).

      (d) Recreation (Club) Subsection.

         Assistant: Lt. CAN (33, native of DALAT)

d. Logistical Section.

   Section Chief: Captain THIET (30, native of QUANG NGÄI Province).

   (1) The Logistics Section consisted of the following elements:

      (a) Financial Subsection.

         Cadre in Charge: Lt. VIEN (35, native of QUANG NGÄI Province).

      (b) Equipment Subsection.

         Cadre in Charge: Lt. BAN (34, native of QUANG NAM Province)

      (c) Ordinance Subsection.

         Cadre in Charge: Lt. DANH (36, native of BINH DINH Province)

      (d) Supply Subsection.

         Cadre in Charge: Warrant Officer DOAN (32, native of BINH DINH Province).
5. The organizational structure of the subordinate units of Group 70 is as follows:

a. Battalion 1

(1) Commander: Senior Captain SIEN (40, native of QUANG NAM Province)
(2) Strength: Approximately 800 men
(3) Weapons: Automatic rifles and smaller weapons (no further information available)
(4) Assigned Area: Battalion 1 was in charge of ten stations (tram), also referred to as "San" (tribal villages), which were numbered "1" to "10". Station 1 was located some 9 kilometers south of Mount 1001; Station 2 was located at the foot of Mount 1001; Station 3 was located nearby. The other seven stations were scattered along the Vietnamese-Laotian border with station 10 located approximately 6 kilometers south of National Highway #3. The average interval between two neighboring stations was about 10 to 12 kilometers. The following is what source knows about Stations 1, 2, and 3, all of which were located in the DRVN:

(a) Station 1

Chief of Station: Lt. TRUONG (36, native of QUANG NGAI Province).  
Political Cadre: Senior Lt. GIAI (34, native of QUANG TRI Province).  
Strength: Approximately 60  
Weapons: Automatic rifles, submachine guns, and individual rifles (no other details)  
Location: approximately 9 kilometers southwest of Mount 1001.

(b) Station 2

Chief of Station: Senior Lt. XUAN (34, native of QUANG NGAI Province).  
Political Cadre: Senior Lt. QUYEN (38, native of QUANG NAM Province).  
Strength: In excess of 110  
Weapons: Automatic rifles and smaller weapons (no further information available)  
Location: At the foot of Mount 1001, near the upper part of Sa Rak stream.

(c) Station 3

Chief of Station: Senior Lt. TOAN (36, native of QUANG NGAI Province).  
Strength: In excess of 80  
Weapons: Automatic rifles and smaller weapons (no further information available)  
Location: Just between Mount 700 and Mount 800.
(5) Functions. Battalion 1 was responsible for transporting weapons, ammunition, mail, and other kinds of military equipment and supplies, as well as guiding infiltration units along the itinerary from the base installation of Group 70 to the vicinity of National Highway #9, via Laos. This battalion was also responsible for the movement of sick and wounded personnel along the inverse itinerary (i.e., from the vicinity of the National Highway #9 to the base installation of Group 70, via Laos.)

b. Battalion 2.

(1) Commander: Senior Captain BONG (37, native of QUANG NAM Province).
(2) Strength: Approximately 800.
(3) Weapons: Similar to Battalion 1.
(4) Assigned Area. Battalion 2 was also in charge of ten stations, numbered "11" to "20." Station 11 was located a little over 5 kilometers north of (the Laotian portion of) National Highway #9. The remaining nine stations were scattered along the Vietnamese-Laotian border, with Station 20 (aka Mr. VAN's station) right next to the border and within THUA THIEN Province. The average interval between the two neighboring stations was about 10 to 12 kilometers.
(5) Functions. The functions of Battalion 2 were exactly the same as those of Battalion 1, as conducted within its assigned part of the infiltration route (i.e., between the National Highway #9 and THUA THIEN Province, via Laos), and consisted of conveying weapons, supplies, etc., guiding infiltration units, and evacuating sick and wounded personnel. From Station 20 southwards, the above functions were assumed by the VC 5th Military Zone.

c. Company 1. This was a combat unit, with a strength in excess of 100 men. It enjoyed an autonomous status on the operational side, and was responsible for the protection of the infiltration corridor along the Vietnamese-Laotian border against possible ARVN surprise attacks on infiltrating units. Through gossip among his colleagues, source gathered that this company was generally stationed in the jungle along the Vietnamese-Laotian border within the Lao Bao area in order to provide protection for infiltrating units while they were crossing National Highway #9. Source, however, cannot pinpoint the exact location of the various subordinate platoons of this company.

d. Company 2. This unit's strength also exceeded 100 and it was assigned to block the Tchepone area in order to protect the infiltration corridor within Laotian territory from possible attacks by General PHOUMI NOSAVAN's troops on infiltrating units (further details unknown).

e. The Transmission Element.

Commanding Cadre: Lt. MINH (34, small, skinny, rather dark complexion, native of BINH DINH Province).

Strength: Approximately 25.

Equipment: 3 Red Chinese-made 15-watt transmission sets (assigned to the Group Headquarters, Battalion 1 and Battalion 2).
1 Red Chinese-made telephone exchange set.
6 Red Chinese-made Telephone sets.

(1) Composition:

(a) Telephone Exchange:

Cadre in Charge: Senior Sergeants DOAN, LOT (28 average, medium complexion, native of THU YEN Province).
Assistant: Sergeant THANH
Other Personnel: Corporals NHA, SACH, NHAM

(b) Transmission Squad/Battalion 1, and
Transmission Squad/Battalion 2: Details unknown

(c) Cryptography Unit:
Cadre in Charge: Warrant Officer CANH
Other personnel: None

OPERATIONAL REGULATIONS ALONG INFILTRATION CORRIDOR

6. Guide procedures. Each infiltrating unit was supplied with two liaison agents from Station 1 to serve as guides. One of them was positioned at the head of the infiltrating group while the other took up his position at the rear of the formation. The liaison agents had to take the infiltrating group to a predetemined place in the vicinity of Station 2 (this station was not responsible for guiding infiltrators) where the group was met by two liaison agents from Station 3 who then guided the infiltrators to Station 3 where they spent the night. Thus, an infiltrating unit might not necessarily see all the stations operated by Group 70. When an infiltrating group arrived at a station, the liaison agents took the commander of the group to the chief of the station to whom the commander of the group presented his credentials. The other members of the group camped out about 200 to 300 meters from the station. Finally, the infiltrating group was turned over by the guides of Group 70 to those of the VC 5th Military Zone, at some place between Station 20 (of Group 70) and the first station operated by the VC 5th Military Zone.

7. Transportation Procedure. The various stations of Group 70 were responsible for receiving weapons, ammunition, mail, equipment and supplies from the DRVN, and transmitting them to the VC 5th Military Zone, which in turn delivered them to the NLFSVN. The above cargo was transported from station to station. Group 70 was also responsible for receiving wounded troops from the VC 5th Military Zone and evacuating them to DRVN through the infiltration corridor.

DEPOTS

8. Source was able to gather the following information about the various depots of Group 70.

a. The Depots.

(1) Foodstuffs Depot (See Attachment 2)

Superintendent: Warrant Officer DOAN (Native of QUANG NGAI Province)
Staff Members: 6
Location: Within the base installation of Group 70 (see attachment 2), at the bifurcation of LONG DAI River (about XD 620 920).
Contents: Permanently available at this depot were 40 to 50 tons of rice, and about 20 tons of peanuts, sesame, sugar, green beans, milk, salt, canned fish, etc.

(2) Rice Depot (See Attachment 3)

Superintendent: Lt. TRUONG (who concurrently functioned as Chief of Station 1).
Staff members: Approximately 60.
Location: Within the site of Station 1.
Contents: Permanently available at this depot were 100 to 150 tons of rice.
(3) Weapons, Ammunition, Clothing, and Medical Supplies Depot (See Attachment 3). It was confirmed by source that Group 70 had a depot of weapons, ammunition, clothing and medical supplies to be issued to the NLFSVN. This depot was located next to the rice depot at Station 1. Furthermore, if necessary, the station could also contact Group 70's headquarters by telephone and request emergency support. However, no such incident ever happened to these depots during the period from 1960 to September 1962.

INFILTRATION GROUPS

9. In August 1961, source saw an infiltration unit composed of 100 men. It was the first infiltration group that he saw. Then, during the dry season which extended from December through May (this also corresponds to the dry season in Laos), once every three days he saw an infiltrating unit of from 80 to 100 military members, or from 20 to 30 civilian members. It is confirmed by source that these groups consisted almost entirely of South Vietnamese members who had been regrouped to the DRVN under the 1954 Geneva Agreements. Later on, he heard that infiltration units during 1966 also included many members who were born in the DRVN and had always resided there. Although he saw many infiltration units, source was not allowed to contact their members (even those who were his acquaintances). Thus he has no idea as to the designations of those units.

(a) Clothing Supplies. Over 100 bales, each containing 25 clothing sets made of NAM DINH drill (Khaki material).

(b) Medical Supplies. Over 30 boxes (aluminum, painted light blue, 40cm x 60cm) containing drugs (Further details unknown).

(c) Weapons and ammunition. About 100 tons, consisting of the following items (the amount of each item, however, is unknown):

- Recoilless guns and ammunition.
- 81mm mortars and ammunition.
- Machine guns.
- Automatic rifles.
- Submachine guns.
- Individual rifles.

All those weapons were wrapped in nylon and waxed cloth, and ammunition was contained in small boxes of various sizes which were made of aluminum and painted green.

b. Physical installation of depots and measures taken for their protection.

(1) Foodstuffs Depot. This depot was built on the site of Group 70's headquarters. It was about 12 meters in length, 4 meters in width, and 5 meters in height. It had wooden walls and a palm-leaf roof. Its interior was divided into compartments for storing various types of food stuffs.

(a) Protective Measures. Being located right in the middle of Group 70's base installation, the foodstuffs depot did not require any guards of its own. At night there were only a couple of soldiers making their rounds about the depot.

(2) Weapons, Clothing and Medical Supplies Depot and the Rice Storage Depot.

(a) The weapons, clothing and medical supplies depot was built on a piece of open land. The building itself was about 25 meters in length, 7 meters in width, and 5 meters in height. Its roof and walls were all made of palm leaves. Its interior was divided into three compartments in order that each of the three aforementioned commodities might be stored separately.
(b) The rice storage depot was located next to the aforementioned depot. It was 16 meters in length, 7 meters in width, and 5 meters in height. The building had wooden walls and a palm-leaf roof. Its interior was divided into two compartments for rice storage.

(c) Protective measures. Station 1 was responsible for protection of these depots and the transport of their commodities. During the day a permanent guard was maintained by a squad within a radius of 3 to four kilometers from the station. At night patrol units (of two men each) made the rounds of Station 1. Each patrol lasted for 2 hours. A wooden fence surrounded Station 1 through which there were four entrances. Station 1 had sufficient strength to ensure protection of these depots in case of an emergency.
ITEM 75

Interrogation reports of Viet Cong agents dispatched by the maritime infiltration unit of Hanoi's Intelligence Directorate. The unnamed individuals were captured aboard a junk in July 1961.
The 603rd Maritime Infiltration Battalion

1. In early July 1961 the 603rd Battalion, a special battalion of the People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN), which transported military supplies and Vietnamese Communist (VC) agents by sea to South Vietnam under the direct orders of the PAVN General Staff, was commanded by Captain Ho Van Xa. The battalion's activities were supervised by Colonel Nguyen Bam, who was also commander of the 324th Division at Do Luong (approximately N 18-53, E 105-19). The battalion was stationed at Quang Khe (N 17-42, E 106-29), also known as Thanh Khe, at the mouth of the Song Giang in Bo Trach District, Quang Binh Province.

2. In December 1959 the 603rd Battalion had 11 infiltration cells, equipped with one boat each. Two cells operated from the mouth of the river at Dong Hoi; three operated from Cua Sot, the river mouth just north of the city of Ha T.; three from the Badon city wharf on the Song Giang and three from the Song Giang (sic). Each cell usually contained six men, who were military persons.

Research Office Maritime Infiltration

3. In July 1961 the maritime subsection of the Communications Section of the Lao Dong Party's Research Office had three communications posts (tram), each of which directed several infiltration cells. Each post had one boat. Post 1 was in Ha Tinh Province; Post 2 was at Tam Toa on the northern outskirts of Dong Hoi city; Post 3 was at Ho Xa in Vinh Linh Zone. The Dong Hoi post had five cells which were based at different spots in order to conceal and facilitate their activities. There were two cells at the mouth of the Song Ron (N 17-52, E 106-23); one at Phu Ho (N 17-31, E 106-35), a few kilometers north of Dong Hoi; and two at Dong Hoi. The Song Ron cells were engaged in communicating with Nha Trang and Phan Thiet in South Vietnam, the Phu Ho cell communicated with Phu Yen Province and the Dong Hoi cells communicated with Da Nang (Tourane) and Qui Nhon.

Lao Dong Party Provincial Committee Maritime Infiltration Organization

4. In July 1961 another maritime infiltration organization, organized and directed by a provincial committee of the Lao Dong Party for infiltrating VC agents into South Vietnam was based at Cua Tung (N 17-01, E 107-06) in Vinh Linh Zone.
ITEM 76

An intelligence summary based on the interrogation of numerous Viet Cong agents captured along the coast of South Vietnam during June and July 1961.
Vietnamese Communist Maritime Infiltration

1. Since 1959 the Vietnamese Communists (VC) have used two principal organizations for maritime infiltration of South Vietnam. The first organization is a special battalion of the People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN), the 603rd, whose function is to transport military supplies and personnel to the southern coast. The second organization is the maritime subsection of the Communications Section of the North Vietnamese Lao Dong Party's Research Office (cuc aghian cuc), the Communications Section being that organ primarily concerned with establishing and maintaining clandestine liaison with Party elements in South Vietnam. The Research Office resulted from an amalgamation of the former military intelligence service (quan bao) and the civil intelligence organization (tinh bao); as a major Party organ, it reports directly to the Party Central Committee. The activities of both the Research Office and the 603rd Battalion are coordinated in the PAVN General Staff, but the 603rd Battalion is in effect a regular PAVN military unit in contact with guerrilla forces in the South, while the Research Office conforms more nearly to the definition of a clandestine intelligence service and is in contact with Party cadres and clandestine agent nets.

2. The 603rd Battalion is commanded by a captain and supervised by a colonel who is also a division commander. Administratively it is part of the division, but operational orders and guidance are received directly from the PAVN General Staff. Soldiers of the 603rd Battalion consist only of non-commissioned officers born and raised in the south who have had some experience as seamen and whose loyalty is considered proven. Almost all the officers in this battalion are naval officers who have been trained for at least one year in a naval school in China. The battalion consists of about 258 men divided into three companies. The first company, called the reserve company (dai-doi du bi), is attached to the 603rd Battalion headquarters within the division organization. It provides logistic support (including material to be sent south) to the infiltration, or border-crossing, company (dan-doi vuot-tuyen). Since the infiltration company (like the preparing company) is maintained at a permanent site apart from the division, this support effort is considerable. The reserve company comprises about 108 men. The second or preparing company (dai-doi chuan-bi) builds and remodels boats, makes and mends sails and fishing gear, and in general provides services and equipment of a maritime nature to the infiltration company. It consists of about 90 men. The personnel of these first two companies are trained to replace infiltration company personnel on an individual basis as needed, but the three companies are thoroughly compartmented from each other. The third or infiltration company is the action element and contains about 60 men divided into ten equal cells. Each cell is led
by an officer whose rank is that of a section leader (1st or 2nd lieutenant) in the PAVN. Each cell has one boat, and the cell leader is sometimes also captain of the boat. Even when he is not concurrently captain, the cell leader, whose Party rank is equivalent to secretary of a section (chi-bo), remains in charge of the operation. Each boat is equipped with radio transceivers for contact with North Vietnam, one mounted machine gun, and a submachine gun for each crew member.

3. The following operating procedures are used by infiltration boats of the 603rd Battalion:

a. Recognition signals are used for identification by the North Vietnamese Navy. One signal consists of two pieces of cloth of different colors about the size of a towel fastened to the stern of the boat. Such signals are known only to the cell leader and the boat captain.

b. In proceeding southward the infiltration boats occasionally go far out to sea. Whenever they meet ordinary fishing craft, fishing nets are lowered and the boats cruise until the area is clear.

c. Upon reaching the infiltration point, the boat is sailed back and forth several times under pretense of fishing while the area is observed. Debarkation and contact with shore elements is effected after dark. Twilight hours are considered more suitable for landings because, in addition to the natural cover afforded by darkness, the area normally is clear of fishing craft by sunset and shore patrol activities by South Vietnamese coastal defense units are reduced during the evening dinner hour.

d. Departures from the beach take place at 0300 or 0400 hours in order to avoid notice by fishermen or villagers. This applies also to the departure from North Vietnam.

e. If South Vietnamese patrol forces are encountered on the open sea, the infiltration boats attempt escape. If capture appears imminent, the VC fire their weapons in an effort to disable the engines of pursuing patrol boats.

f. If a lone South Vietnamese patrol boat is encountered close to the 17th parallel, the infiltration boats attempt to capture it.

g. When South Vietnamese patrol forces are encountered in southern waters near the shore, an effort is first made to escape, but in no case are firearms used. If the infiltrating crew feels capture is likely, all military
supplies and other evidence of their mission are thrown into the sea. If arrested, they use counterfeit identity papers showing them to be South Vietnamese fishermen. If the capture occurs in waters sufficiently near the 17th parallel, the false papers are thrown away and the crew declare themselves to be refugees from North Vietnam.

h. Various dodges are used to make identification difficult after entering southern waters when the infiltrators feel they may have been noticed by patrol forces. These dodges include raising or lowering sails and even repainting portions of the boat or the sails.

i. If surprised by South Vietnamese security forces in the act of landing, the infiltrators jettison everything and make an all-out effort to escape to the open sea. Once ashore, however, the infiltration crew is under the control of the local reception committee which unloads the boat and conducts incoming military cadres to a place of safety.

4. The maritime infiltration element which is part of the Communications Section of the Research Office is headed by a major whose Party rank is that of a standing member of the provincial Party committee (thuong-vu tinh-uy). He commands three units called posts (tram), and each post is directed by a professional intelligence officer whose military rank ranges from officer candidate to captain but whose Party rank is that of standing member of the district Party committee (thuong-vu huyen-uy). Each consists of two or three cells and each cell is a self-contained maritime infiltration unit. Each cell has a boat and, as in the 603rd Battalion, the chief of the cell is in charge of the boat. Cell chiefs have the Party rank of secretary of a section (chi-bo) committee and the military rank of a section commander (1st or 2nd lieutenant). A boat crew consists of five men, the captain (cell chief), and four sailors, all of whom come originally from South Vietnam, are experienced seamen and faithful Party members. The boats are of the type used in the target area of South Vietnam and are small, 3 to 4 ton cargo vessels. Since these boats are meant to withstand close inspection by South Vietnamese authorities, they carry neither radio nor weapons. Such compromising documents as are carried are easy to conceal, and the identity papers for boat and crew are skillfully forged. The principal purpose of these infiltration units is to carry instructions, reports, and money, but occasionally VC agents are also transported to or from South Vietnam. The crew members are given a training course lasting about two months, which includes political indoctrination, and are given additional training at sea, including dry runs to South Vietnam, over a period of from four months to a year before being sent on an operational mission.
5. Procedures followed by these infiltration units of the Research Office are in general similar to those of the 603rd Battalion, but have the following differences:

a. Relying upon their disguise and counterfeit papers, and having no military supplies aboard, the Research Office boats make no effort to avoid South Vietnamese patrol boats.

b. They mingle with South Vietnamese fishing craft and do not avoid them as 603rd Battalion boats do. During the day, they follow a regular fishing routine and come to shore only in the afternoons to sell their fish, obtain provisions, and make their operational contacts.

c. At night they anchor, usually close to a city or town, and make their contacts with liaison agents of the national organization in the city; they do not contact the regional or rural elements which are the principal contacts of the 603rd. Upon entering a port, they take care to report to local control offices to show their papers.

d. Only three days are allowed in a port for making liaison contacts. The boat leaves the port, weather permitting, after this period of time has elapsed even if no contact has been made. Liaison contacts are made on the average of once a month and each boat contacts only one liaison counterpart. These meetings are professionally clandestine and prearranged; the participants do not know each other's true identity.

e. The small boats of the Research Office cannot work between August and December because of bad weather; they therefore average only seven or eight trips a year.
ITEM 78

Interrogation of a Viet Cong deserter who had been a communications cadre prior to his desertion in June 1962.
Son Tay Training Center

1. In 1960 Source attended a course at a People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) training school at Son Tay, 40 kilometers north-west of Hanoi. The school was situated on a hill called "Hill D" near the Chemical Battalion (sic), and consisted of a large thatched house, a mess hall, a kitchen, and two dormitories. There were shock troops (ho-do) stationed in the area and numerous residences scattered about 200 meters from the school, which itself could not be mistaken for any other building.

2. Courses given at the school included political studies and the handling, dismounting, and mounting of various weapons (carbines, MAS-36's, pistols, machine guns, submachine guns and automatic rifles.) Communications (signal) was not taught at the school; however, he had heard that signal, artillery, infantry, armor, i.e., all subjects of Army branches, were taught at the Son Tay Officers' School. The training lasted over two months, with eight hours of classes every day except Sunday.

3. Instruction was given by members of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam) Central Committee's National Reunification Commission who were sent to the Son Tay training school from Hanoi. The following persons were among the instructors: Lieutenant Colonel Lo, instructor of a course called "Party Members! Moral Codes"; 1st Lieutenant Truong, instructor in weapons; and Captain An, in guerrilla warfare. Students came from various Army branches. There were no high-ranking officer students and no radio operators studying there; such men attended a school somewhere in Hanoi. Upon completion of the course, the students were sent to South Vietnam and assigned to various units according to their respective military branches. (To Adjutant Hong, and Aspirant Man, all signal men, were sent back to the signal element of VC Military Region 5).

4. The 60 members of Source's class were divided into two platoons. The leader of the first platoon was Senior Lieutenant Trang, who by mid-1962 was a company commander in the VC 9th Battalion (in the Na Mieu area, Tra Dong District, Quang Ngai Province); assistant platoon leader was 1st Lieutenant Vinh (a political commissar of VC 9th Battalion (in the southern area of Quang Ngai Province). The leader of the second platoon was Senior Lieutenant Hieu, whose regular assignment was assistant commander of the 90th Battalion; the assistant leader was 1st Lieutenant Tuan, chief of the "fighting training" section of the 90th Battalion.

5. When Source's class had completed its training and was ready to move into South Vietnam, it was divided into four groups of 15 men each. They moved out, one group at a time, in one-day intervals. Each group was armed with a carbine, a submachine gun, a ston gun, and a MAG-36; they had no signal equipment and did not maintain any kind of communications with Hanoi en route. While traveling through the mountains, the groups were helped by guides from one resting post to the next. They stopped at the resting posts each night to sleep and eat. When ambushed or attacked suddenly, they would disperse and later regroup at a place designated beforehand by the nearest station or post. The four groups were, respectively, under the following commanders: Captain Quang, aka Nam; Captain Trang; Captain Hien; and Captain Vinh, aka Tam.

6. The Source received no salary in either North or South Vietnam. In North Vietnam he received only an allowance of 20 North Vietnam dong, the equivalent of about 400 South Vietnamese piasters. Prior to leaving for South Vietnam, he entrusted the sum of 150 dong to the "org n in charge of infiltrating men" (presumably the National Reunification Commission), because, due to the restrictions on his movements imposed at the end of the Son Tay course, he was not able to spend all of this money or to send it to his family.
Miscellaneous Information

7. The following miscellaneous information was supplied by Source.

a. Under combat conditions, PAVN units were strengthened and the number of weapons issued to them increased. For example, a squad was increased from seven to nine men. PAVN signal officers received the same pay as officers of comparable rank in other branches.

b. When he was assigned to a signal company, under the Liaison and Communications Section of the Staff Bureau of the VC 5th Military Region, he had no propaganda duties as such; however, he had instructions that whenever he was in "the peoples' area" (SIC) certain propaganda activities were to be carried out. These included exhorting the people not to build strategic hamlets; liberating the people; asking them not to let their children enlist in the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) because ARVN troops killed the people; etc.

c. Until early 1960, all VC who came to South Vietnam used cover names. They were permitted to choose their own names; if a chosen name was already in use, a new name could be chosen, after approval of the unit commander. Since early 1966, only cadres from the North with the rank of major or above used cover names; others were known by the true names registered on their birth certificates.
ITEM 79

Interrogation of a Viet Cong soldier who infiltrated into South Vietnam in April 1962. He voluntarily surrendered to GVN forces early in 1963 in Quang Ngai Province.
Background

About February 1955 Source was regrouped to North Vietnam. He was assigned to the 324th Division of the People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN) which was under the command of (Major) Giap Van Cuong in Thanh Hoa Province. In early 1960 the 324th Division was ordered to move to Nghe An and there began the operation of infiltrating men into South Vietnam.

Infiltration of Source’s Group

About March 1962 a group of about 30 men commanded by Lt. Nguyen Son, left Nghe An by automobile for western Quang Binh Province. They crossed the Bon Hai River. They passed through Thua Thien, Quang Nam, and Quang Ngai Provinces in South Vietnam, following Route No. 1. In late May 1962 he joined VC 2nd Regiment (also called Work Camp 2) at the Tho Lo River, where he was assigned.

Composition of the VC 2nd Regiment

The VC 2nd Regiment under the command of Major Khanh, comprised the following units in late 1962.

a. VC 95th Battalion, said to be stationed in the Song Re area.

b. VC 80th Battalion, said to have come to Quang Ngai around June 1962.

c. VC 300th Battalion, located in the Nuoc Che area.

d. The Special Operations Company 406.

e. A reconnaissance company.

f. A logistics unit.

g. An anti-aircraft unit.

h. The army engineer unit 47.
ITEM 80

Further interrogation of a former officer of the North Vietnamese Army and Viet Cong Army Officer. He surrendered to GVN forces in 1963.
SOURCE DESCRIPTION

Source is a former member of the People's Army of Vietnam and VC Army officer who surrendered to the Government of South Vietnam in 1963.

SUMMARY:

The Ministry of National Defense, Democratic Republic of Vietnam, operates a school for units scheduled to infiltrate into South Vietnam. The school is located near the town of XUAN-MAI and is under the immediate control of the 338th Brigade.

CIRCUMSTANCES OF OBSERVATION:

1. Source obtained the following information at the Xuan-Mai training Center, from 1961 to 1962.

LOCATION:

2. The Xuan-Mai Training Center is located near the town of Xuan-Mai, southwest of Hanoi on National Route #6.

HISTORY:

4. Originally the training of VC units and individuals for infiltration into the Republic of Vietnam was conducted at four different locations in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. The 324th Division ran a school in Nghe-An Province, the 305th Division ran a school in Phu-Tho Province, and the 83rd Division ran schools in Hanoi and at Xuan-Mai. The system was changed in 1961 (Note: The exact date is not given). At that time the 338th Brigade was placed in charge of the entire program, under the control of the Ministry of National Defense, centered at Xuan-Mai. The Xuan-Mai Training Center is divided into four areas: The Headquarters and infantry and artillery training areas at Xuan-Mai, an infantry training area in Quoc-Oai District (coordinates unknown), an infantry training area at Dong-Mit (coordinates unknown), and a training area for engineer, signal, special missions, and mechanized (details unknown) units at Hoa-Binh.

MISSION:

5. The mission of the Xuan-Mai Training Center is to train officers who lead units infiltrating into the Republic of Vietnam and to provide facilities and guidance to these officers in training their units.

ORGANIZATION:

6. Headquarters and staff:
   a. Commanding Officer (of the center and the 338th Brigade): Lt. Col. NGOC
   b. Political Officer: Senior Colonel BAO
   c. Deputy Political Officer: Lieutenant Colonel THAI
   d. Chief of Staff: Major DUC
   e. Deputy Chief of Staff: Major QUANG
   f. Staff Sections:
      (1) Political Staff: Lieutenant Colonel THAI, Deputy Political Officer
      (2) Administrative Support: Major TO
      (3) Staff Office: Major DUC, Chief of Staff
      (4) Cadre Office: Major QUANG, Deputy Chief of Staff, and Senior Captain DAN
7. Instructors:

a. Infantry Tactics:
   (1) Senior Captain DAN: Military Theory, Demonstrations.
   (2) Senior Captain PHAN (and staff of 10): Raid Tactics.
   (3) Senior Captain BA (and staff of 10): Ambush Tactics.
   (4) Senior Captain TUYEN: Water Crossing Tactics.
   (5) Captain TUNG: Reconnaissance Tactics, Vanguard (sic) Operations, Observation Operations for Detached Units.
   (6) Senior Captain SAU (and staff of 10): Individual and Small Unit Tactics and Techniques (Map Reading, Bayonet Training, Clearing Obstacles, etc.)

b. Artillery Instructors:
   Senior Captains TUNG, HONG, and HA-TRI: Service of the Piece:
   81mm, 106mm (sic), and 120mm mortars; 75mm howitzer; 57mm and 75mm DKZ, and 105mm cannon (sic).

c. Mechanization (sic) Instructor: Senior Captain THAI

d. Special Missions Instructor: Major TRU

e. Foreign Instructors: None seen by source.

8. Defense Company: One Company, approximately 200 men, is in charge of maintaining security at the center (Note: No further information given).

STANDARDS OF ADMISSION:

9. In order to be admitted to the center, candidates must be Communist Party members and, in addition, should be:
   a. Southerners or Northerners with extensive combat experience in the South.
   b. From poor farmer or hired farm labor families.
   c. Experienced in combat.
   d. Students who have done well in other military courses.

TRAINING PROGRAM:

10. General: Since the students have already been trained previously, the course at the center is designed only as a refresher course.

11. Infantry Program:
   a. Individual and Small Unit Tactics:
      (1) Individual and Small Unit Tactics.
      (2) Movement under Fire.
      (3) Small Arms Training.
      (4) Movement Security and Reconnaissance.
      (5) Guard Procedures.
      (6) Clearing Obstacles, Crawling.
      (7) Camouflage.
b. Unit Tactics:

(1) Attacking and Blocking Enemy Supply lines.
(2) Meeting Engagements.
(3) Ambushes.

c. Military Theory:

(1) Combat Rules (sic)
(2) Tactical Rules (sic)
(3) Armed Propaganda Groups
(4) Guerrilla Warfare

12. Artillery Program: This program involves training on the artillery pieces listed in paragraph 7.b above.

POST REGULATIONS:

13. Each unit is responsible for its own area security, and no trainee is allowed to remain outside his unit area without special permission.

SCHEDULE:

14. Study Hours:

0700-1130
1330-1700
2000-2200

In addition, a discussion on current affairs is held on Tuesday evenings and classes on party matters and politics are held on Friday evenings.

METHOD OF INSTRUCTION:

15. Officers are given a refresher course separately by the instructors at the center. After completing their course, these officers are responsible for the training of their units with the technical assistance of the center staff.

16. Generally, after the trainees receive classroom-type instruction on a tactical problem, they are given an examination and then they watch a demonstration by a demonstration team. The final step is practical training by the trainees themselves. The main emphasis is placed on this practical training.

17. The length of the training course at the center is set at six months.

WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT USED IN TRAINING:

18. The equipment used at the center is the organizational equipment of the 338th Brigade. Weapons used are Soviet, Communist Chinese, French, or U.S. French and U.S. weapons are preferred because these attract less attention in the Republic of Vietnam and ammunition resupply, after infiltration, presents less of a problem.

SECURITY:

19. A security company is responsible for the overall area security at the center (Note: no further information given).
20. Each trainee unit provides guards for its own area.

21. The ID card carried by each trainee states his unit and quarters area. No trainee is allowed to enter another unit's area.

22. Only personnel with special permission may enter or leave the Center.

PERSONAL AFFAIRS:

23. Food: Three meals are served to all trainees each day. Breakfast generally consists of cooked rice or rice gruel, bread and meat, and tea. Lunch and supper consist of cooked rice and four other dishes which are varied from day to day. The school allows $2.40 for each enlisted man and $3.00 which includes cigarettes and tea, for each officer. An enlisted man is also allowed a $.40 snack when he goes on a night problem.

24. Pay: Trainees receive the following monthly pay:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Pay</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Master Sergeant and below</td>
<td>$50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warrant Officer</td>
<td>$60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Junior Lieutenant</td>
<td>$65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenant</td>
<td>$85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>$100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior Captain</td>
<td>$125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major</td>
<td>$155</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

25. Recreation: Each trainee unit has its own recreational club and the center has established a cooperative store to sell food, clothing, pens and other such items to trainees.
ITEM 81

Interrogation of a former officer of the North Vietnamese Army. He surrendered to GVN forces in 1963.
SUMMARY:

Source partially identifies 24 VC battalions and eight other units which trained at XUAN-MAI and infiltrated into the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) during the period early 1961 to early 1962.

CIRCUMSTANCES OF OBSERVATION:

1. Source obtained the following information at the XUAN-MAI Training Center, from July 1961 to February 1962.

LIST OF UNITS:

2. 29th Battalion
   a. Organization: Unknown
   b. History: The 29th Battalion was formed in 1953 and was the main VC unit in Quang-Nam Province prior to 1954. After the armistice it was regrouped to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and enrolled as part of the 108th Regiment, 305th Division.
   c. Strength and Weapons: Source places the battalion's strength at about 1,000 men and states that they are sufficiently armed (sic).
   d. Combat Proficiency: Source rates this battalion as excellent at guerrilla warfare.
   e. Date of Infiltration into RVN: Early 1961.

3. 59th Battalion
   a. Organization: Unknown
   b. History: The 59th Battalion was formerly (Note: Date not given) part of the 108th Regiment, 305th Division.
   d. Combat Proficiency: Excellent, particularly in ambushes.
   e. Date of Infiltration into RVN: Early 1961.

4. 39th Battalion
   a. Organization: Unknown
   b. History: This battalion was formerly (Date not given) a part of the 108th Independent Regiment and then (Date not given) became part of the 893d Regiment, 324th Division.
   c. Strength and Weapons: Unknown
   d. Combat Proficiency: Excellent
   e. Date of Infiltration into RVN: Unknown.

5. 20th Battalion
   a. Organization: Unknown
   b. History: Before 1954, the battalion was an independent battalion in the VC Quang-Nam provincial forces. After the armistice, the battalion became part of the 108th Regiment, 305th Division.
c. Strength and Weapons: Unknown

d. Combat Proficiency: Excellent at ambushes.

e. Date of Infiltration into RVN: After 1961.

6. 32d, 36th, and 94th Battalions

a. Organization: Unknown

b. History: Members of these battalions were drawn from the 84th, 94th, 96th, 108th, 803d, and 210th Regiments of the 305th and 324th Divisions. (Note: Source did not state which regiments belong to each division.)

c. Strength and Weapons: Unknown

d. Combat Proficiency: Excellent at guerrilla warfare.

e. Date of Infiltration into RVN: After early 1962.

7. 30A and 30B Special Missions Battalions

a. Organization: Unknown

b. These battalions contain former members of the pre-armistice VC special missions units from the former VC Inter-zone V.

c. Strength and Weapons: Unknown

d. Dates of Infiltration into RVN:

   30A: Late 1960
   30B: Early 1961

8. Thua-Thien Battalion

a. Organization: Unknown

b. History: Unknown

c. Strength and Weapons: Unknown

d. Combat Proficiency: Unknown

e. Date of Infiltration into RVN: After early 1962.

9. Artillery Battalions: Source stated that 17 artillery battalions taken from the 305th, 304th, 330th, 335th, and the 338th Divisions infiltrated into RVN during 1967. He supplied no further information.

10. Traffic Obstruction Units (sic): Eight groups, consisting of from 45 to 65 men each, were sent to RVN during 1967. Source supplied no further information.

PATTERN:

11. Source states that units organized from elements of the 305th and 394th Divisions of the People's Army of Vietnam are generally sent to operate in VC Military Zones V and VI. Units organized from Divisions 330, 335, and 338 are sent to the VC Eastern, Central and Western Zones.
ITEM 83

Interrogation of an officer in the 60th Battalion, 1st Viet Cong Regiment. He deserted and turned himself in to GVN forces in April 1963.
The information contained in this report was received through interrogation of an officer in the 60th Battalion, 1st Regiment. Source defected to RVN in 1963.

SUMMARY:

The following interrogation report contains information on the organization and training cycle and general information about Group 34 (aka 60th Bn) from Nov 1961 to Mar 1962.

CIRCUMSTANCES OF OBSERVATION:

1. Source, an officer in the 60th Battalion, 1st Regiment, infiltrated into SVN in early 1962. Source gained his knowledge by being in the unit and taking part in the training procedure at Xuan Mai, Ha Dong Province, NVN.

BACKGROUND OF GROUP 34 (Group 34 is Battalion 60)

2. Group 34 was formed in Xuan Mai Training Center during the period September-October 1961. Source did not know the reason why VC designated it as Group 34. Source thought that the group might be the 34th unit preparing to infiltrate SVN. The unit was composed of approximately 500 men, 10 percent of whom were drawn from regular military units (mostly officers) while the other ninety percent were recalled from factories, farms and business establishments. The overwhelming majority of the recalled soldiers and cadres were former Interzone V members who were regrouped in the North during the period 1954 to 1955. Eighty percent of the men of Group 34 were party members.

3. Recruiting Program:

a. In order to recruit well-qualified cadres and soldiers for Group 34 as well as other infiltration units, the General Staff sent recruiting teams to contact the directorial boards of agricultural farms, factories and business establishments and to study the individual files of employees and interview them personally.

b. Those who fit the following standards and lived near Hanoi were summoned by the General Staff to assemble at the Central Re-unification Board in Hoang Van Thu Street:

(1) No civil convictions
(2) Good physical condition
(3) Belief in NVN liberating SVN
(4) Willingness to infiltrate to SVN

c. Those selected were briefed on the situation in SVN and their future assignments. The Government also helped them solve their family or financial difficulties. In the beginning, many civilians believed that they would be allowed to hold their positions as civilian cadres; but later were unhappy on learning that they would be converted into military cadres.

4. Group 34 was organized as an independent battalion and subordinated directly to the General Staff. It consisted of three infantry companies (each with four platoons) and two combat support companies (each with three platoons). Each platoon consisted of three squads; each squad consisted of nine men. There were also some other support units, such as signal, engineer and reconnaissance companies.

5. On the day of infiltration into SVN, every member of Group 34, except officers, were promoted to the next higher grade. The ranks in Group 34 were:

Two senior captains
Three captains
Four lieutenants
Twelve warrant officers
Approximately 470 master sergeants and sergeants.
No corporals or privates
TRAINING CYCLE:

6. The Training Program was composed of the following types of courses:
   a. Military Tactics:
      (1) Ambush,
      (2) Raid,
      (3) Offensive action against a fortified military post,
      (4) Mobile attack.
   b. Practical work:
      (1) Building fortified positions.
      (2) Familiarization with weapons.
      (3) Familiarization with grenades.
   c. The political situation in RVN and the mission of the liberation forces:
      (1) Favorable factors,
      (2) Difficulties.
   d. Technical subjects (only for cadres and soldiers who were in the particular branch)
      (1) Signal courses
      (2) Engineer courses
      (3) Artillery support
      (4) No training on motor vehicles or tanks.

7. The military portion was the most important part of the training program. It was aimed at improving the trainee's technique of handling weapons and inspiring them for the hardships of guerrilla warfare.

8. Group 34 was provided with a general training program from the General Staff and this was sent down to the subordinate units to be used as guides in preparing the training program of the units. The instruction was conducted by either the battalion or company level cadre. Occasionally instructors from the Military Academy would go to the Training Center to inspect the training program.

9. The training cycle lasted for four months. Two-thirds of the period was spent on military and technical subjects; the remainder was reserved for political indoctrination which was usually conducted by the political officer of the 338th Brigade. The hours of training were the same as normal working hours, eight hours daily.

10. During the period of political study, Senior General Nguyen Chi Thanh, Chief of the General Staff, and Lt. General Nguyen Van Vich, Deputy Chief of Staff; and Lt. General Tran Van Ngoc, Deputy Chief of Staff, came to visit the Center and meet with the trainees.

11. Upon completion of the training course, trainees were ordered to turn in their materials and notebooks to the center for destruction.

DAILY LIFE AT THE TRAINING CENTER:

12. Pay and rations:
   a. During the period of training, trainees were furnished four meals a day. The cost for the meals was 21 dong (NVD) a month. The meals were good and there was an abundance of milk, wine, sugar, tea, flour, and beans. Two or three days prior to infiltrating into SVN, Group 34 moved to an area called the "Concentration Area." Here the food was much more delicious and plentiful than the meals at the training area.

   b. Each member of Group 34 was paid 60 dong (NVD) a month, except some officers who were paid according to their rank. On receipt of his pay, a trainee had to pay back 21 dong for meals, leaving 39 dong for his personal use.
c. If a trainee in Group 34 had children, then the child received a monthly allowance of 20 dongs, provided the child was not receiving other allowances from the government or party. Wives were not granted allowances, but they had priority in employment by public offices or cooperatives.

13. Recreation and leaves: Cadres and soldiers who were transferred to Group 34 were granted an annual leave of 15 to 20 days depending on the traveling distance. On Sundays trainees were allowed to rest. According to a rule of the VC, only two thirds of the trainees might leave the center to visit their families and friends. During the period of training, Group 34 was divided into various small groups of one or two companies each and allowed to visit Hanoi and Haiphong. Some units were allowed to visit Nghe An and Haiphong by planes which took off from the Gia Lam Airport. The center also provided films and plays weekly.

14. Correspondence: Throughout the period of training, cadres as well as soldiers of Group 34 depended on the postal service of the center to correspond with their relatives and friends.

SUPPLIES:

15. Military clothing: Each member of Group 34 was provided with a knapsack to carry the following types of clothing (total weight about 10 kilograms):

a. Two sets of khaki clothes, type II Nam Dinh (Type I was reserved for senior ranking officers).
b. One set of Vietnamese traditional clothes (black collarless shirt and black pocketless trousers)
c. Three sets of underclothes.
d. One woolen shirt (made in Haiphong)
e. One khaki hammock, 1.60 meter x 2 meter (senior-ranking officers were provided with hammocks which were made of a kind of fabric used for parachutes).
f. Two pieces of nylon cloth.
g. One roof-like covering (shelter half).
h. One pair of home-made socks.
i. One cloth hat.
j. One pair of rubber sandals.
k. One knapsack.
l. One canteen.
m. Two rice hags (Chinese type which ties around the waist)

16. Medicine: Each member was provided with a waterproof nylon bag of medicine which weighed about one kilogram and was supposed to be enough for three years. The bag contained the following medicines:

a. 100 white quinine pills
b. 100 yellow quinine pills
c. 10 aureomycin pills
d. 100 cough pills
e. 100 salt-pepper pills
f. 100 aspirin pills
g. 100 diarrhea pills
h. 100 dysentary pills

(All the above were made in the NVN)
i. 200 Vitamin Bl and B12 pills
j. 2 sterilized bandages (Russian made)
k. 2 boxes of panacea ointment (Communist China)

17. When the group infiltrated to SVN, one doctor and four medical specialists accompanied them. This medical team was assigned to VC Zone V and took with them operating instruments and many different types of medicine. The medical specialists brought with the medicine for emergency cures, remedies for snake bites, plaster of paris, etc.

18. Weapons and ammunition: The senior captain and captains were armed with a German made pistol, P-38, and carried 20 rounds of ammunition each. The lieutenants were armed with American Colt 45s and carried 20 rounds. Warrant Officers and Master Sergeants usually had French-made submachine guns, Mat 49, with a modified barrel (Russian made) and carried about 400 rounds. The specialists carried breast-plate rifles marked MP 36 with 700 rounds. The specialists were equipped with medical instruments and bandages.

19. Infiltrating units had to carry their own individual supplies, which weighed from 20 to 25 kilos each.

20. Individual possessions: All individual possessions such as clothes, wardrobes, suitcases, towels, blankets, radios, and so forth were disposed of prior to infiltration. Most of Group 34 sent their belongings to friends or left them with the Rear Service Section of the Battalion. Some of the VC cadre left their money with the Rear Service Section, who in turn deposit the money in a bank to collect interest. Receipts were signed by the leader of the unit to which the depositor belonged and put in the custody of the Central Re-unification Board. If the depositor was killed in action, then his relatives could collect the money. The average amount of money deposited by VC was estimated by the source to be 500 dongs (NVR).

21. Identification: Members of Group 34 were asked to change their names. A certificate was given them which read: "Destination Work Area 4 Bac An" and "Liberation Force!" This was beneath a small mark or stamp. The certificate was signed with the name "Con."

OTHER GROUPS TRAINING AT XUAN MAI TRAINING CENTER:

22. Group 36 was composed of approximately 500 men. The organizational structure of it was similar to that of Group 34. Among the cadres of Group 36 Source knew his company commander, and his company level political officer. Due to the compartmentation methods applied in the center source did not know other cadres of Group 36. Source heard that Group 36 left Xuan Mai about 18 March 1962 to infiltrate SVN.

23. Group 52 was newly organized and had only the nucleus cadre assigned. Usually a period of 2 or 3 months was needed to recruit enough soldiers to form a standard unit.

INfiltration to South Vietnam:

24. On 8 March 1962, Group 34 began its infiltration to SVN. The groups' destination was Work Area 4, Bac An. (This meant that the group was to join the VC Regiment 4 in Quang Nam Province, VC Military Zone V), but, on 31 March 1962, when the group reached Bac An Station in Quang Nam Province, it was found that the orders had been rescinded and that the group was to join Work Area 1 (aka 1st Regiment Quang Nam Province). Upon joining the new unit Group 34 changed its name to Work Group 65 (65th Battalion, 1st regiment). In October 1962, work Group 65 or 65th Battalion changed its designation to 50th Battalion. Source felt certain that 65th Battalion and 50th Battalion are the same unit.