ITEM 89

Interrogation of a member of the 9th Battalion, 18th Regiment, of the 325th Division of the North Vietnamese Army. He was wounded in the arm and wrist during an attack on a South Vietnamese government post in Binh Dinh Province in January 1966, and captured by South Vietnamese forces after the attack.
SUMMARY AND HIGHLIGHTS:

This report contains information concerning the infiltration and activities of Battalion 9, Regiment 18, Division 325 in South Vietnam.

BASIC BIOGRAPHICAL DATA:

Source is a North Vietnamese, born in 1943 at HA TINH Province, NVN. He also was a member of the Youth Labor Group in his native village. He is a follower of ancestor worship and has no formal education; however, he can read and write Vietnamese. Source's occupation was that of farmer, he worked in the salt marshes. In November 1964 he was drafted and sent to Recruit Battalion 9 stationed in PHU TACH District, HA TINH Province, NVN. In December 1964 Source was assigned as a replacement to Battalion 9, Regiment 18, Division 325 stationed in TUYEN HOA District, QUANG BINH Province, NVN. On 12 March 1965 Source accompanied his unit to infiltrate into SVN arriving in the area of KONTUM Province, SVN on 5 April 1965. Since that time, Source's unit has been located in the following areas: VINH PHUC forest, VINH TANH Village, HOAI NHON District, BINH DINH Province; PHU BON forest near Route 7; a forest at KIM SON Village, HOAI AN District, SINH DINH Province; AN DIEN and AN TAY Villages, DUC PHO District, QUANG NGAI Province; and then they returned to the forest at KIM SON Village. Early in 1966 Source was captured by SVN forces in the battle attacking a post in BINH DINH Province, SVN in which he was wounded on the right hand and wrist.

PHYSICAL CONDITION AND ATTITUDE:

Source is in good health (his wound has healed), has a fair intelligence and memory.

CIRCUMSTANCES OF OBSERVATION:

Source was assigned to Battalion 9, Regiment 18, Division 325 from December 1964 until the date of his capture. He infiltrated into South Vietnam and participated in several battles with this unit. Because of his experiences, he is able to furnish the following information.

INFILTRATION AND ACTIVITIES OF BATTALION 9, REGIMENT 18, DIVISION 325.

Pre-Infiltration: Prior to infiltrating into South Vietnam, each member of Battalion 9, Regiment 18, Division 325 was issued the following equipment: One rucksack; one khaki blanket; one cloth mosquito net; two yellow khaki uniforms; one set yellow underclothes; two sets of black pajamas; one set of black underclothes; one pair of rubber sandals; one 2.60 meter piece of nylon; one khaki hammock; one sweater; one canteen; one khaki hat; one belt; two rice bags; and one tin bowl. In addition to the above, they were issued the following foods and medicines: one can of salt meat (CHICOM); one can of milk (NVN); 300 grams of sugar; one bag of tea; 200 grams of salt; 200 grams of green bean powder, 300 NIVAQUIN pills; one tiger balm; one roll of bandage; one box containing 20 water purifying pills, 20 anti-diarrhea pills; and 20 cough drops. Each Battalion also received 400 grams of seasoning made in North Vietnam.
Travel in North Vietnam:

For infiltrating into SVN, Battalion 9 was broken into two groups. The first group, which consisted of the 1st and 3rd Infantry Companies, one transportation platoon and the Signal Platoon, under the leadership of Battalion Commander DUO and Political Officer Chief LE QUANG TU, departed for South Vietnam in March 1965. The second group, which consisted of the 2nd Infantry Company, Combat Support Company 4, one Transportation Platoon and the Battalion Headquarters, under the leadership of Chief of Staff KY and Deputy Political Officer Chief CHIEU, departed for the South in March 1965. Both of the groups started at HA SON TRANG village, TUYEN HOA district, QUANG BINH Province, with all their weapons. Source witnessed the separation and the departure of both groups. Because his unit was assigned to the second group, Source did not know the infiltration route of the first group. Source's Group departed at 16.00 hours and walked until 19.00 hours when they reached the MINH CAM ferry boat landing stage in the TUYEN HOA district Capital, QUANG BINH Province, NVN. After a rest and dinner, the group crossed the river. When it was completely dark, a convoy of trucks (6 wheels, 3 axles, some covered with canvas, some uncovered, their loading capacity unknown) were brought up for loading. After the group boarded the trucks, the convoy started at 21.00 hours in the direction of National Route 1. They turned South on National Route 1 and passed a ferry boat landing stage at GIANH estuary. When they arrived at the BO TRACH district Capital, they left National Route 1 and went Southwest until 0500 hours when they reached a forest near the PHU QUI plantation. After the soldiers disembarked, the trucks parked in an area favorable for camouflage to prevent their detection by airplanes. The group encamped at the edge of the forest, about 100 meters from the PHU QUI Agricultural Site and rested there for a day. At 21.00 hours, the trucks returned and transported the group until 0500 hours of the following day when they arrived in HO village. The village consisted of only one big barracks newly built by the VC. It was not a village where people lived so it could not be identified on the map. This place was located about 3 or 4 hours walk from Mountain 1001. When he arrived there, Source heard that the first group of the Battalion had just left and were climbing over Mountain 1001. Source's Group rested in HO village for three days. During that time, the cadres instructed the soldiers on the "theory of carrying guns in climbing over the pass", and the slogan "Resolve to attain the objective and protect my weapon". On the third day, the VC organized a ceremony to hand the Liberation flag to the infiltration group. At 0700 hours, the Group started from HO village. After walking for three hours they reached the foot of Mountain 1001. They reached the top of the mountain in the evening and rested at a station containing four or five thatched houses. The group cooked rice for dinner and remained over night. On the following morning they went down the passes and reached the foot of the mountain in the evening. The following day, they continued to travel by day and rested in the evening. They rested 10 minutes for each hour walked. Later, the group crossed a rope bridge over the BEN HAI river.
Travel in LAOS and South Vietnam:

About a week later they crossed National Route 9 and the SEPOINE river into Laotian territory. From there, the group walked on a 5 meter wide road which was being cleared and enlarged by the VC engineers. On this road, Source saw that many civilian laborers were carrying merchandise on bicycles. At night, Source also saw many truck convoys which were covered when coming in and uncovered when returning. Source did not know what was loaded on the trucks. He did notice that they ran only at night. From there, they continued walking by day and rested at night. For every four days spent walking, they rested one day. Rice was cooked at night for all of the following day. Although they passed many roads, because of fatigue, Source could not remember the dates and the names of places, so he could not accurately identify the infiltration route. Source recalled that they rested overnight at stations in the deep forest, about 1200 meters from the route. They received rice from way stations. Source also remembered that from the SEPOINE River to the South, the group, after walking for 20 days, came to the end of the large road and entered a trail. They then walked for about 10 days more and reached KONTUM province. After they crossed the Vietnamese Laotian border into KONTUM provincial territory, they followed another route leading to the Southeast. Then the group went through KONTUM territory into QUANG NAM provincial territory. In late April 1965, when the group arrived at a station (70 in a forest in QUANG NAM province, Source's DKZ platoon was ordered to separate from the group and to wait there to change weapons. After waiting for 4 days, they changed their three 75mm DKZ weapons for three 57mm DKZ weapons and ammunition. In May 1965, Source's platoon arrived in the VINH PHUC and VINH THANH forests at the boundary of BINH HKE, HOAI NHON and PHU CAT districts, BINH DINH province where they met the entire Battalion. When he arrived there, Source learned from his comrades in arms that the ARVN troops had just launched a mopping up operation on the Battalion and had killed two persons. On the following day, the Battalion headed to the South, crossed route 19, went through PHU PHONG and LONC LE villages, PHU YEN province. Then the group walked through thatch and rubber forests into PHU BON Province (Western Highlands).

Activities in South Vietnam:

In early June 1965, the Battalion encamped at a forest situated at the left of route 7 parallel to the BA river in PHU BON province. After arriving there, the Battalion took up positions to attack the M'ROK post which was occupied by ARVN forces. They fired on the post, and when they entered and recognized that it was empty, they hurriedly retreated into the forest to prevent detection by airplanes. Later they cut trees to build a barracks. This barracks was located in a forest about a 7 or 8 hour walk from National Route 7. The Battalion quartered there for two months. During that time, they continued to harass communications on National Route 7, thereby threatening the AI,NU, M'ROK, and BA MLA posts and ambushed ARVN troops or convoys moving on this route. In early August 1965, the Battalion received orders to evacuate the wounded from THUAN MAN district (PHU BON province) to a military hospital (?) in PHU YEN forest. Because Source was sick, he could not participate in the evacuation of the wounded. Source heard only that there was about one platoon of wounded (unit unknown) which had engaged
the RVN Armed Force in THUAN MAN district. In early September 1965, the Battalion went along the same path used on their infiltration back to PHU YEN province, through Route 19, VINH PHUE - VINH THANH forest, AN LAO valley and quartered at KIM SON village, HOAI NHON district, BINH DINH province. From early September 1965 to November 1965, while quartered in KIM SON village, the Battalion engaged in there battles at PHU CU and DEO NHON, but they were defeated and sustained heavy losses. In early December 1965, the Battalion was ordered to move to AN DIEN and AN TAY villages, DUC PHO district, QUANG NGAI province. There, the battalion engaged in two battles which occurred fifteen days apart. In the first battle, they provided anti-aircraft support for Battalion 7 in attacking DOI VANG on the left of National Route 1. In the second battle, they attacked the MY TRANG post, near National Route 1 and about two kilometers Southwest of DOI VANG. In both battles, the battalion was defeated. On 10 January 1966, the battalion received another order to leave AN DIEN and AN TAY villages (QUANG NGAI) and move to the old location in KIM SON village (BINH DINH). On 16 January 1966, the Battalion arrived in KIM SON. That night, they were ordered to launch an attack on PHU CU post with the intention of returning quickly to rear to celebrate "TET" (Lunar New Year) with the people. After the night attack on PHU CU post Source was wounded, lost contact with his unit and was captured.
ITEM 90

Interrogation of a member of the 20th Transportation Battalion, 325th NVA Division. He deserted his unit and turned himself in to ARVN forces in the fall of 1965 in Pleiku Province.
SUMMARY AND HIGHLIGHTS:

Source gave details on the 2nd Infiltration Group (Source was a member of this group), on its pre-infiltration preparations, organization of the group, equipment issue, rations, medicine, route, activities of the group in the RVN, and the morale of the VC in the RVN.

BASIC BIOGRAPHICAL DATA:

Source was born in 1944 in NGHE AN Province, DRVN. He is single and believes in ancestor worship. He has a DRVN 8th Form education (US 10th Grade) and is a farmer by occupation. Socially, he claimed to be a proletariat. He joined the Labor Party Youth Group in July 1963. Source was drafted into the Peoples Army of Vietnam (PAVN) in April 1962 and was assigned to the 38th Chemical (Phong Hoa) Battalion of Military Region IV Headquarters. In October 1964, when he completed his military obligations, he was urged to join a group infiltrating the RVN. Subsequently, he was assigned to 20th Transportation Battalion, 325th Division.

Infiltration Bloc III departed the DRVN in March 1965. At CHU DJU, the 20th Transportation Battalion transported rice for the 2nd Regiment, 325th Division, which was attacking THUAN MAU District, PHU BON Province. After the attack on THUAN MAU District ended in July 1965, the 20th Transportation Battalion moved to PL BOITTE HA Village, MY THACH Area, PLEIKU Province, where the battalion was responsible for the transportation of weapons. Source rallied to the RVN authorities in the fall of 1965 at the Provincial office in PLEIKU.

PHYSICAL CONDITION AND ATTITUDE:

Source appears to be in good health; he has an average education and intelligence. Source is cooperative with his interrogators.

CIRCUMSTANCES OBSERVATION:

1. Source was transferred to the 20th Transportation Battalion, 325th Division, in October 1964. At that time, the whole Division quartered in TUYEN HOA District, QUANG BINH Province (DRVN). Source infiltrated into the RVN with his unit and with other technical companies of Division Headquarters in March 1965.
INfiltration Preparations:

2. After five months of training from October 1964 to March 1965, the Battalion was ready to begin its infiltration of the RVN. The 20th Transportation Battalion was first divided into three groups:

a. The 1st Group was composed of the 2nd Company with other units of the Division (Source doesn't know that unit). This group probably started in November 1964.

b. The 2nd Group was composed of the 1st Company combined with the Technical Companies of the Division: Medical Company, Engineer Company, Guards Company and Information Company. This group numbered about 300 men and departed on 16 March 1965. It was headed by Senior Captain TOAN, a 20th Division cadre and Senior Captain CUN, Political Officer of the group.

c. The 3rd Group was composed of one Infantry Battalion and the 3rd Company. These were combined with a number of other units of the Division (Source does not know what unit).

This group departed on 18 March 1964 and had as commander, Senior Captain PHONG, Chief of the 20th Transportation Battalion, and as Political Officer, Senior Captain CUN, Political Officer of the 20th Battalion. During the training period, cadre of Battalion and Company level carried pistols, this is of platoon level carried G.A.G. rifles. Each Squad Leader and Squad had one local weapon. The date of departure was proceeded in secrecy until the last minute. The company which was going to depart was sent to an isolated area two days before its departure (it was forbidden to come in contact with anybody) 2 or 3 kilometers from the battalion cantonment. These two days were used to check their luggage for clothes, letters, papers, money— they had to return all items bearing a DIV mark and at the same time received equipment, provisions and individual medicine. Cadre kept the weapons they received during the training period.

In addition they received: 1 rucksack, 2 blue uniforms made of NAV KHAKI, 1 set of pajama made of NAV KHAKI popeline (dyed black), 2 sets of underwear, 1 intercoat made of NAV KHAKI Cotton, 1 pair of rubber (tire) sandals, 2 belts (one large and one small) 1 pair of cotton socks, a double blanket made of blue linen, 1 mosquito-net made of rough gauze, 1 hammock made of rough khaki, 1 water bottle, 1 iron bowl, 1 spoon, 1 belt for containing rice (about 8 kilo), 1 sheet of nylon for use as a raincoat (2.60 x 1.40 meters), and 1 pouch with needle and thread.

3. Food Provisions. 1 can of meat and salted fish (about 1 kilo),.1 can of milk, 1 parcel of condensed salted fish, 1 kilo of grilled salt, 1 kilo of Cuban sugar, 1 parcel of dried food (a mixture of rice flour, Indian corn flour and sugar, and rice for 10 days (20 mill-cups). These provisions had to be consumed during a period of three months. However, they were supplied with rice along the infiltration route.
4. Medicine. Each cadre and soldier received an individual medicine box for use over a six months period: 26 aspirin tablets, 10 aspirin tablets, 1 parcel of anti-diarrhoea medicine, 3 filterion tablets, 7 tiger balm flash, and 2 rolls of first-aid bandages. Moreover, every cadre of squad two and lower had to carry for the 325th Division a case of western medicine weighing about 10 kilos.

5. Discretion was recommended along the infiltration route in Laos to cadre of all units as well as Comms-Liaison members of all stations. Source did not know the exact name of the different places he passed by. However, by observing and by paying attention to what his commanders said, Source knew some important points.

6. In RVN Territory. On 16 March 1965, the 3rd Infiltration Group had to walk from the regrouping area (near the area. There, cadre and soldiers boarded canopy covered trucks and started out at 1900 hours. On 17 March 1965, they hid their trucks in a woods at 0500 to rest and avoid RVN and US aircraft. They resumed their journey at 1800 by following a National Route No. 1 and on 18 March arrived at the 1st station at 0600, about 3 or 4 kilometers from HD Village. They stayed in this station for two days to check for the last time and to return to the station all items bearing a RVN mark. On 20 March 1965, they crossed Mountain 1001 on foot and spent one night and one day (24 March 1965) beyond the mountain.

7. In Laos. On 22 March 1965, they walked for 5 or 6 days before crossing the Binh Hai River (Source: can't determine the spot and the coordinates) and after some more hours walk, they arrived at a station where they rested. There, cadre let them know they were in Laos territory for a month. On their way, they passed from time to time some Laotian villages where the climate was hot, and the ground was not as wet as in Vietnam. About the last day of April 1965, the group arrived at a stream (20 meters width), having a suspension bridge. On the Laos bank, there were many Laotian huts. Beyond the bridge was the "holy ground" (Dat Than: VC called the RVN battlefield the "holy ground"). After crossing the bridge, the group had to cross a high mountain at the top of which was a Highland village. The group spent the night there.

8. In the RVN. The next day, they resumed their walk and arrived in KCMVN at 1500 on the same day. Source was told that the base of VC Military Region V was there. After the days' rest, the 1st Engineer Platoon and the 1st Transportation Platoon were designated to stay at the base. The rest of the group continued to go towards GIA LAT and halted at the 41st Station (Source: could not determine its location). After a one day rest at the 41st Station, the technical units of the Division continued on their way but Source didn't know where they went to. The 1st Company stayed at the 41st Station for two more days, then the Infantry Battalion and the 3rd Company caught up with them. They regrouped into one Battalion at the end of May 1965. By that time, the 2nd Company did not
group to the Battalion, which was composed of only two companies.

(In SIC Report 277/65, entitled 'The activities of the 325th Division in the RVN', Source made an error in his statement by saying that the 20th Transportation Battalion regrouped in MAZU, approx., now Source refutes that statement). The 20th Transportation Battalion (without the 2nd Company) carried rice three times from the 41st to the 42nd station, crossed the National Route No. 7, the BA River, arrived at the 44th station in PHU BON Province and at last reached the 48th station in MAZU in PHU BON Province at the end of June 1965. There, the Battalion went on carrying rice for the Division.

THE BATTALION 110 FORMER 20th TRANSPORTATION BATTALION AKA BACH DANG BATTALION.

9. In August 1965, when the Battalion moved from MAZU to PL BOITTE HA it was reinforced with one company of newly enlisted regional men (Source was told they were from PHU YEN and BINH DINH Provinces) to replace those of the 2nd Company. At the same time, the Battalion was ordered to change its designation to Battalion 110, the 1st Company to K.1, the 2nd Company to K.2 and the 3rd one to K.3.

ORGANIZATION OF BATTALION 110

10. After having changed its designation name and being reinforced with one Company of newly enlisted men (K.2), it assigned cadre of Company K.1 and K.3 to command K.2. It also received more weapons, which occasioned a reorganization of the different companies and a modification of the quantity of weapons.

a. Command Committee

| Cadre: | No change |
| Strength: | about 300 men (no change) |
| Weapons: | about 15 K.51 pistols, about 15 carbines, about 50 CKC rifles and about 600 local one (two for each man) |
| Equipment: | About 300 pickaxes and spades. |
| Means of Transportation: | Only human force was used to carry rice and ammunition. |

b. Company K.1

| Commander: | Senior Lieutenant TRUONG |
| Political Officer: | Senior Lieutenant THAO |
| Adjutant: | Corporal SEN |
| Medical: | Corporal THUNG |
| Liaison: | Private 1st Class TRU |
| Strength: | About 90 men |
| Weapons: | 2 pistols (Company carbines (Platoon cadre), 16 CKC rifles and 2 grenades for each man |

(1) Platoon 1

| Leader: | Aspirant TIEP |
| Assistant: | Sergeant THIEN |
| Strength: | About 21 men |

(a) 1st Squad

| Leader: | Corporal DE |
| Assistant: | Private 1st Class NIEN |
| Members: | DIEN, CU, HUYNH, THUOC |
(b) 2nd Squad

Leader: Corporal TRONG
Assistant: Private 1st Class ND
Members: Privates TX, DUYEN, HUNG, XU, PHUNG.

(c) 3rd Squad

Leader: Corporal NGUYEN
Assistant: Private 1st Class TRONG
Members: KHONG, TAU, XI and PEAT; and
Private 2nd Class NA.

(2) 2nd Platoon

Leader: Sergeant TV
Assistant: None
Strength: About 21 men

(e) 4th Squad

Leader: Corporal TUY
Members: Private 2nd class CHUNG and MAN. (Source didn't know the
name of others).

(b) 5th Squad

Leader: Corporal TRONG
Members: DUYEN, GOI, KHONG. (Source
didn't know the name of others).

(c) 6th Squad

Leader: Corporal DAY
Members: Names were unknown to Source.

(3) 3rd Platoon

Leader: Aspirant TUY (22)
Assistant: Sergeant CHUNG (23)
Strength: About 22 men

(e) 7th Squad

Leader: Corporal DAE
Members: Unknown

(b) 8th Squad

Leader: Corporal VIEN
Members: Unknown

(a) 9th Squad

Leader: Corporal TRONG
Members: Unknown

(4) 4th Platoon

Leader: Aspirant TUY (26)
Assistant: Unknown
Strength: About 22 men
(a) 10th Squad
   Leader: Corporal BAO
   Members: Unknown

(b) 11th Squad
   Leader: Corporal BAO
   Members: Unknown

(c) 12th Squad
   Leader: Corporal SAU
   Members: Unknown

6. Company K.2
   Leader: Lieutenant PHX THIN GON
   Assistant: Lieutenant THU
   Political Officer: Unknown
   Adjutant: Private 1st Class NHU
   Medical: Unknown
   Strength: About 100 men
   Weapons: Similar to Company K.2

NOTE: Because this Company was just sent there to replace the old one, Source only knows the name of two Company cadre and a number of Squad cadres:

   Aspirant CHT (25)  Platoon Leader:
   Sergeant BIA (85)  Platoon Leader:
   Corporal BK  Squad Leader
   Corporal TRHU  Squad Leader
   Corporal NUX  Squad Leader

6. Company K.3
   Leader: Senior Lieutenant TRANG
   Assistant: None
   Political Officer: Senior Lieutenant LOI
   Adjutant: Unknown
   Medical: Unknown
   Strength: About 90 men
   Weapons: Similar to Company K.2 and K.2

NOTE: Company K.3 had also four platoons but Source only knew the name of a number of Squad cadres:

   Sergeant XIA  Squad Leader
   Sergeant THIN  Squad Leader
   Sergeant NY  Squad Leader
   Sergeant LAN  Squad Leader
   Sergeant KHOA  Squad Leader
ACTIVITIES OF BATTALION 11C IN THE RVN

11. When this Battalion arrived at the 41st station in the last part of May 1965, it received immediately the order to carry rice to supply different battlefields or to store it in designated stocks and stations.

12. The Transport of Rice. From the last part of May to July 1965, this Battalion executed five rice transport trips:

a. Two from the 41st station (PHU YEN Province) to the 44th station (Source can't determine their exact locations)

b. One from the 41st station to MAZU (approximately BQ 240 640)

c. Two from Montagnard Hamlets (in the surroundings of MAZU) to the main station in the MAZU area-the 48th station.

d. In the five above-mentioned trips the Battalion carried more than 7-tons of rice to supply the "1st Worksite" which was fighting in THUAN MAN, PHU BON Province. Source carried rice from MAZU to THUAN MAN to supply soldiers working at the "1st Worksite". The Battalion had no means of transportation. It relied completely on human manpower by making each soldier carry about 20 kilos of rice with the aid of a blanket.

13. Transport of Ammunition. In late July 1965, the Battalion was assigned to transfer 500 kilos of ammunition from MAZU to the DEPERIT area to enrich the stocks of the Worksite. In early August 1965, the Battalion had to transfer 25-tons of ammunition in a period of two months, from the area (?) close to the hamlet PL MOUILLE to DEPERIT. But when it transferred 5-tons (from early August 1965 to 10th September 1965) it received another order from the 10th Inter-Province (325th Division) to transfer 5 more tons. It had to transport a total amount of 30 tons in an indefinite period. During this period, Transportation Battalion 11C installed its base in PL HA, MY Tra area. When Source rallied in PLEIKU on 13 September 1965, his unit was still there.

a. Type of Ammunition. The quantity of ammunition transferred was composed of projectiles for CKC rifles and for light machineguns (These two types were kept in tin-cases and constituted the greatest quantity of the entire quantity of ammunition); plosive charges, detonators and slow fuses (These types were in great quantity also); 82 mm mortar rounds (These were kept in tin-cases; two in each case); KZ rounds (Stored singly in an iron tube); and projectiles for B.40 grenade launcher (which were also kept in an iron tube).

b. Origin. Source did not know whether it was the DRVN or COMMUNIST CHINA which supplied the 325th Division with ammunition but he was sure that it was stored in CAMBODIA and was then transferred to the RVN. In August 1965, the 3rd Company (aka K.3), went to ZA 050 290 to obtain ammunition, but when it arrived at this place, there was no ammunition left so it had to go and get it in CAMBODIA. Many cadre and soldiers of K.3 told the Source that they had gone to CAMBODIA to get ammunition and on their way back, they had brought with them CAMBODIAN rice. (this type of rice is small,
white and are not good to eat, different from other kinds of rice produced in the RVN Western Highlands, which Source had carried to supply the 1st Worksite in PHU BON Province.) In August and September 1965, Source saw the soldiers of the VC "DIEN BIEN PHU" Battalion, who were operating in the DUC CO area (PLEIKU Province), using this kind of rice.

(1) From CAMBODIA (Source was told these transfers were executed by Montagnard coolies) is a two day walk.

(2) To PL BOITTE HA is a two day walk.

(3) From PL BOITTE HA to DE DI LAM is a one day walk. Transporter spend the night there.

(4) From DE DI LAM to DEFERIT is a 6 or 7 hour walk. Source could not determine the name on the map because DEFERIT is probably a regional name used by Montagnards.

**POLITICAL ORGANIZATION IN THE RVN**

14. The organization of the Labor Party, the Labor Youth Group and the Military Council was the same as it was in the DRVN except that the Labor Youth Group chapter of K.1 was increased with 6 members during two stages of development. Although the Battalion was very busy with its successive trips, but with the slogan "Politics goes together with combat", the

**LOCAL PEOPLE'S FEELINGS TOWARDS THE VC**

21. Since its arrival in the RVN, Source's unit only came in contact with Montagnards. At the beginning, cadre and soldiers kept a correct attitude, then the Montagnards were very happy in helping the revolutionary troop. They brought products, such as gourds, pumpkins, Indian corn, potatoes, peanuts, bananas, manioc to supply the unit. Sometimes the soldiers wanted to buy their products but they gave them without accepting money. Sometime after, the unit misused the kind heartedness of the Montagnards by pretending to buy their products but actually took them for nothing. Moreover, they were insufficiently fed, so they robbed the local people of their pumpkins, gourds, Indian corn and other vegetables at this point, the cadre and soldiers ceased to be well-condidered by the Montagnards. Probably because there had been too many stolen, a representative of a hamlet in the MY TRACH area went to a cadre of Battalion 11C to ask him for permission to emplace spikes in his gardens to preserve his produce. Source does not know what was the reaction of the Squad Leader; but later, Source did not see the Montagnards making spike traps. Because of above mentioned facts and also because the Montagnards are afraid of suffering the same fate as VC cadre, which is to be killed by RVN and US bombardments, the Montagnards no longer have a good feeling towards the VC.
22. NGUYEN VAN HUY: Aspirant, Leader of the 3rd Platoon, 1st Company, 20th Transportation Battalion (3/311/B), 325th Division. Source—was in last contact with him at the PS BOTTE HA Village, MY TRACH area, Pleiku Province in early September 1965. He is a Vietnamese by nationality, about 33 years old, native of HA TIENG Province, married, completed 4th Grade. About 1.62 meters tall, short cut black hair, dark complexion, medium build, about 60 kilos, black weak eyes, skinny face, long head, high cheeks. Simple, unhearty (quiet), gentle, average spiritued, weak, qualified in mechanics. Member of the Labor Party and Chief of the 3rd Party Cell (3/1/110) at the present time. Inexperienced in military affairs.

23. NGUYEN VAN CHUC: Sergeant, Deputy Chief of the 3rd Platoon, 1st Company, 20th Transportation Battalion (3/311/B), VC 325th Division. Last seen in early September 1965 at PS BOTTE HA Hamlet, MY TRACH area, Pleiku Province. Vietnamese nationality, about 25 years old, native of NGHE THO Province, bachelor, completed DIVN 7th Form (US 9th Grade). About 1.62 meters tall, short cut black hair, dark complexion, small build, about 45 kilos, black eyes, round face, flat head. Ordinary some of servitude. Irregular (gets angry easily), lacks self-control.

24. TU: Aspirant, Chief of the 4th Platoon, 1st Company, 20th Transportation Battalion (presently the 4th/311/B), VC 325th Division. Last seen in early September 1965 at PS BOTTE HA Hamlet, MY TRACH area, Pleiku Province. Vietnamese nationality, about 26 years old, native of THANG HA Province, married, has children, completed DIVN 7th Form (US 9th Grade). About 1.62 meters tall, long black hair combed straight back, light complexion, medium build, about 52 kilos, sparkling black eyes, square face, round head. Liken dark foo, correct attitude, but likes to boss. High sense of servitude. Open hearted but gets angry when unsatisfied, energetic. Qualified in military affairs. He formerly worked at the construction Worker Unit of the military Ministry. Chief of the 4th Party Cell (4/6/10).

25. GAP: Aspirant, former Chief of the 2nd Platoon, was sent (as Chief) to the (?) Platoon, Company 62, Battalion 115, VC 325th Division. Last seen in early September 1965 at PS BOTTE HA Hamlet, MY TRACH area, Pleiku Province. Vietnamese nationality, about 32 years old, Northerner, completed DIVN 7th Form (7th Grade). About 1.62 meters tall, short black hair combed straight back, dark complexion, small build, about 40 kilos, black eyes, small face and head. Simple, correct. Ordinary some of servitude. Strong, cautious, has self-control. Qualified in driving and in arming mortars. Member of the Labor Party. Lacks experience in military affairs.

26. PANG: Sergeant, Platoon Chief, 2nd Company, 20th Transportation Battalion (32/110), VC 325th Division. Last seen in early September 1965 at PS SOUTH HA Hamlet, MY TRACH area, Pleiku Province. Vietnamese nationality, about 27 years old, native of Central Vietnam, completed DIVN 5th Form (US 7th Grade). About 1.60 meters tall, short cut black hair, dark complexion, long build, about 62 kilos, ordinary eyes, square large face, large head. Strong and lacks docility, while talking, has a barking, simple, noncooperating, very high sense of self. Frail (due to heavy taxation). Member of the Labor Party, has motorcycling/hunting, lacks experience in military affairs.
ITEM 91

Interrogation of a member of the 334th Battalion, 32nd Regiment of the North Vietnamese Army. He was captured by South Vietnamese forces in November 1965 in Pleiku Province.
SUMMARY AND HIGHLIGHTS:

This report covers the camp locations and course curriculum of the political and military training received by Battalion 334, Regiment 32 in preparation for infiltrating SVN.

BASIC BIOGRAPHICAL DATA:

Source is a North Vietnamese and a member of the Labor Youth Group. Source was born in 1942 in NAM DINH Province, NVN. His religion is Ancestor Worship; he is farmer by occupation; belongs to the middle class, and is single. Source has a NVN 7th Form (US 9th Grade) education; he was drafted in the summer of 1962 and assigned to Regiment 38, Division 308 in HA DONG Province, NVN for training. From late 1962 to late 1963 he attended a Signal Course at the camp of Regiment 38. In April 1964 Source was assigned to Battalion 334, Regiment 32, and in September 1964 his company departed from XUAN MAI to infiltrate SVN, arriving in PLEIKU Province, SVN in January 1965. Source was captured by SVN forces in November 1965 in the PLEIKU forest area.

PHYSICAL CONDITION AND ATTITUDE:

Source is in normal health and has an average memory, fair intelligence and fair powers of observation. He appeared to be sincere and cooperative during interrogation.

CIRCUMSTANCES OF OBSERVATION:

In April 1964, Source and about 500 cadres and soldiers subordinate to Division 308, were selected to establish Battalion 334, Regiment 32. The strength of this Battalion consisted of cadres and soldiers extracted from Division 308 as mentioned above. He and his Battalion attended a political and military training course lasting five months to prepare to infiltrate SVN.

ORGANIZATION OF THE TRAINING COURSE:

The training program consisted of two parts: political and military. Politics was taught at MIEU NON school and military subjects at XUAN MAI school. These two schools were located in HA DONG Province, NVN.

a. POLITICAL TRAINING.

(1) Location and cantonment: The MIEU NON political military school was located in CIEONG NY District, HA DONG Province, NVN about four kilometers Southeast of the XUAN MAI training school. The school faced Route 21 and was surrounded by rice-fields; more than one kilometer from the back of the school was the chain of BOE CUA mountains.

The school was constructed on a polygonal piece of land; it faced South and inter-province route 21. This site was about 700 meters long and 500 meters wide; its front, adjacent to Route 21, was fenced with barbed-wire, but its other sides were left open. In the middle of the site, there were five rows of thatched-houses; four rows were of the same construction, and each row consisted of six thatched-houses, which were 20 meters long and five meters wide. The last row contained three houses, each of which was 12 meters long and seven meters wide.
(2) Instructors: The Battalion cadres lectured on all the subjects studied; then cadres of each company were responsible for further discussions and going into details.

(3) Training subjects: The political subjects which were brought up for discussion were the following:

**History of Vietnam.** This subject mentioned the ups and downs of the country and emphasized the brave and hardworking nature of the nation.

**Revolution in Vietnam.** This involved a comparison between the situations of South Vietnam and North Vietnam. The VC said that NVN was proceeding in the establishment of socialism and SVN was living under imperialism and feudalism.

**60 years of French colonization.** The French said that they had merits in developing and civilizing Vietnam, but actually they plundered and took the country's property to obtain wealth for their own country.

**Aggressive policy of the US Imperialists.** The Americans came to SVN not to help it but with aggressive intentions and to wait for the opportunity to invade NVN as well.

**Policy towards prisoners of war and surrenderers.** Prisoners of war should not be struck, nor insulted. The policy and line of the revolution should always be propagated with them.

**Civilian proselytising policy.** Propaganda of the revolutionary line must be spread throughout the population. The population should be taught that each time SVN troops came, they must be persuaded to bring their guns and join the Liberation Front.

**Military proselytising policy.** Propaganda should be spread to the families whose children and brothers were SVN soldiers; they should be asked to persuade their children to return to the Liberation Troops. Before attacking any outpost, loudspeakers should be used to speak to the soldiers in the outpost, providing there were favorable conditions to do this.

**Policy towards wounded soldiers and war dead.** Wounded soldiers and war dead must not be left in the hands of the SVN armed forces.

(4) Activities and conditions of living.

(a) Daily time-table

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Activity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0500 AM</td>
<td>Reveille</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0500 - 0530</td>
<td>Physical exercises</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0530 - 0600</td>
<td>Toilet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0600 - 0630</td>
<td>Breakfast</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0630 - 1100</td>
<td>Training time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1100 - 1130</td>
<td>Resting, bathing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1130 - 1200</td>
<td>Lunch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1200 - 1330</td>
<td>Afternoon nap</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1300 - 1500</td>
<td>Toilet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1400 - 1700</td>
<td>Training time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1700 - 1730</td>
<td>Resting, bathing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1730 - 1800</td>
<td>Dinner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1800 - 1830</td>
<td>Resting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1820 - 2130</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
(b) Salary and mess. Messing was fairly sufficient. Every day each trainee was given a food ration of 1.70 piasters ($0.70 deducted from the salary plus 1.00 given by the government); they were served three meals a day. At breakfast they had one dish, at lunch and dinner they were served three dishes, and the standing dishes were often changed. Each cadre and soldier was also given 7.00 piasters every month.

(c) Entertainment. Every week trainees had Sunday off. On the day off, trainees were permitted to enjoy entertainment such as playing chess, reading books or going out of the cantonment (only one-third of the strength were permitted to go), but entertainment which could cause injuries to trainees (such as football, etc.) were absolutely prohibited, because if by misfortune, trainees were injured and had to be treated, this would cause problems prior to infiltration of SVN.

b. ADVANCED MILITARY TRAINING:

After two months of political training, trainees began attending advanced military training for three months. This period was divided into three phases:

In June 1964, training on "counter-operations" at XUAN MAI School (HA DONG Province).

In July 1964, training on "Ambushes" at DENH Hamlet, HOA BINH Province, NVN.

In August 1964, practice on attacking "Strongholds", at HOA LAC, SON TAY Province, NVN.

Time-table, mess and entertainment, were like those of the period for political training, but the training hours were spent outside instead of studying in the classroom.

(1) "Counter-Operations" training. The period of training for "counter-operations" lasted one month at zone A, XUAN MAI School, HA DONG Province, NVN.

(a) Location and cantonment. XUAN MAI training school was located at XUAN MAI Village, CHUONG MY District, HA DONG Province, NVN; it was located at the left side of National Route 6 (going from HA DONG toward HOA BINH) and was about 22 kilometers from HA DONG (approximately MI 610 094). The training-center was divided into two zones: Zone A and Zone B.

Zone B stood close to National Route 6 and at the right of inter-province route 21 (in the direction of HOA BINH). Source did not live in this area, so he did not know it exactly.

Zone A was located at the left side of inter-province route 21 (in the direction of HOA BINH). From National Route 6, one turned to route 21, went through zone B, crossed the DAY River and arrived at zone A. This zone was fenced with bamboo-sticks. There were 50 rows of thatched-houses in this zone. Source's Battalion was quartered in zone A. Because of the policy of maintaining secrecy, trainees were not permitted to frequent places other than the zone where their unit was quartered; therefore Source could not describe the cantonment of zone A.

(b) Training program. The training program consisted of two parts: theory and practice.
Theory:

Soldiers were instructed in:

- Various methods of negating enemy operations.
- Digging tunnels and constructing strongholds at the cantonments as protection against operations, bombings and shellings.
- For the defense of sites, military cadres were also instructed in the organization of two cells, "Patrol" and "Perimeter Guard", in addition to the regular watch. The "Patrol" cell was responsible for control of the soldiers' guard, and it checked all the activities of the local people. The "Perimeter Guard" cell was usually placed about one kilometer from the quartering site at places where the enemy was likely to come. If there were signs of the enemy's appearance this cell had to give the alarm by shooting and had to hinder the enemy's advance.
- During engagements, soldiers must always be calm and economical in using ammunition.
- If the enemy strength was smaller than that of the VC, the VC would rush out and engage the enemy outside the quartering site so that they could destroy the enemy more quickly.
- If the enemy strength was greater than that of the VC, and their fire-power was very strong, soldiers were to fight a delaying action and only sustain a withdrawal by night in which the wounded and dead were carried away.
- If the enemy broke their lines with tanks, the DKZ or Bazooka unit would be responsible for destroying the enemy force, but if the enemy tanks came very close, military-cadres would combat them with hand-grenades (these were as large as a grenade and destroyed tanks by gas pressure) (SIC Note: This is information only heard by Source.)

Practice:

- Cadres and soldiers were divided into two groups: one group playing the enemy role, another holding its location. The practice part was carried out 2 or 3 times a week. When the "Perimeter Guard" team gave the alarm by firing, cadres and soldiers deployed to their fixed places. The ammunition supplying team and the first-aid team also prepared their equipment, medicines, etc... In short, the practice part consisted of only the deployment of troops but not organized engagements.

(2) Ambush training. In July 1964 the Battalion moved to DENH Hamlet, HOA BINH Province to practice ambushes; DENH Hamlet was located at the left side of National Route 6 (going from HA DONG to HOA BINH), about 20 kilometers from the XUAN MAI school. At this place there were 50 huts of the THAI peoples. There were 2 kinds of ambushes: underground and hit-and-run. The whole Battalion was instructed in the theory of these kinds of ambushes as follows:

(a) Underground ambushes. This tactic was applied to ambush a walking group of soldiers. Ambushing cadres and soldiers usually used bayonets and the ambush place was bare of bushy trees. Each soldier had to dig an individual underground trench close to the road. Trenches were dug on the roadsides and each one was about 1 meter deep. The trench exit was rectangular, 0.80m x 0.60m in size, and was camouflaged with a bamboo-wattle which was covered with leaves or grass depending on
the earth color. The earth taken from the trench must be thrown down the river, lake, pond or be spread on the ground skillfully and carefully. When the first cadre or soldier had gone down into the trench, the second had to put the lid on the trench, and the third did this action for the second, etc. When they heard the alarm they jumped out of the trenches. There might be 3 pistol shots given by the commander who stood at a distance. In addition to the underground ambush group there was another team which deployed about 500 or 600 meters from the ambush location with the mission of intercepting and blocking relief troops.

(b) Hit-and-run ambushes. Cadres and soldiers were camouflaged and near to or far from the ambush places depending on the terrain. If the roadsides were forested, the deployment was close to the road; if they were rice-fields or meadows the deployment was placed about 500 or 600 meters from the road. When hearing the alarm, cadres and soldiers ran straight to the target. This tactic was usually used to attack groups of military motor vehicles and only one side of the road was ambushed.

(c) Tactics. In combat, these 2 kinds of ambushes could apply the following tactics:

- One head-off Company (Dai doi chan dau)
- One main-attack Company (Dai doi danh chinh dien)
- One tail-lock Company (Dai doi khoa duoi)
- One Platoon deployed opposite to the main-attack Company (hit-and-run ambush)
- One Platoon to intercept and block relief troops (underground ambush).

In combat, the head-off company fired first to block the advance of the enemy troops. Immediately after, the tail-lock company also fired to stop the enemy withdrawal, then the main-attack company fought to disperse the enemy's forces. The team opposite to the main-attack company, which was hidden in trenches in back of the enemy, far from the underground ambush, only began to fight when the battle was won, that is when the main-attack element had driven the enemy in the direction of this team which was waiting for them. After studying theory the soldiers had to practice digging individual trenches and camouflaging these trenches (for underground ambush). In addition, the soldiers also practiced the hit-and-run ambush by lying down in the forest, after having camouflaged themselves carefully with leaves, to wait for the alarm to rush out.

(d) Good and bad points of the underground and hit-and-run ambushes: The underground ambush, if it was not discovered, would gain favourable results, on the other hand, this ambush could be destroyed. As for the hit-and-run ambush, if troops were deployed close to the road, it usually gained victories. If troops were deployed far from the road, this ambush would not succeed, because cadres and soldiers had to cover a long distance and when they arrived at the target they were exhausted and sometimes could not take up their guns; therefore, the VC usually chose the places lying along the forest to organize a hit-and-run ambush.

(3) Training for attacking of "Strongholds".

- In August 1964 the Battalion moved to HOA LAC, SON TAY Province to practice attacking "Strongholds". HOA LAC Village was situated in SON TAY Province, on the right side of inter-province route 21 (going from HA DONG to SON TAY), 17 kilometers (about WJ 546 248) from XUAN MAI school. At this place there was an old French outpost very suitable for the training of attacking "Strongholds."
The training program had 2 parts: theory and practice.

Theory:

To attack a stronghold, first the Reconnaissance Squad had to find out all the information related to this stronghold such as: strength, weapons, ammunition, trenches, underground caches, underground tunnels, guard posts, defenses, transportation, reinforcements, etc... After having sufficient information, the Reconnaissance Squad constructed a sand-table and presented it to the Battalion cadre. After having observed the sand-table, the Battalion Commander and Companies Commanders had to go themselves to examine the target then returned to prepare a plan of attack against the strongholds. This plan was brought up to get agreement from all cadres and soldiers and missions were assigned to each company. After the assignment of missions, the sand-table was reconstructed bigger so that the companies could plan the attack the outpost 20 days before carrying out the real attack. The attacks of "Strongholds" were usually carried out on dark nights, without moonlight and, to avoid confusing the VC for the national soldiers, the VC soldiers carried a piece of white cloth on their head, neck or arm. Before the engagement, the mortar unit had to fire into the stronghold to shock the enemy, destroy trenches, caches and tunnels; then the troops fired to support the explosive-attack unit so that it could rush into the outpost to lay explosive-charges. After the explosives had cleared the way, cadres and soldiers would follow immediately into the outpost. Wherever cadres and soldiers advanced, there would be pyrotechnic signals shot to make signs to the mortar unit so that it would not shell the occupied places. Following these moves and, after having occupied the stronghold, a team would carry away the wounded and dead soldiers, another team would gather war trophies, and another team would deploy along the roads by which the enemy could receive support and this team would withdraw last. The strongholds most difficult to attack were those located in a populated area and which had many underground trenches, tunnels and large and deep communication trenches outside of them. The slogan used in carrying out attacks of "strongholds" was: "Quick fight, quick withdrawal!".

Practice:

There was an old French post at HOA LAC Village, so the VC used it to practice attacking "Strongholds". The practice was usually done at night. False fences were constructed around the stronghold. In the exercise, the Battalion was divided into two groups: one group defended the stronghold and another attacked it. The stronghold attacking group consisted of: explosive-attack platoon, mortar unit and infantry unit. Successively, Platoons by turns assaulted with explosives. In the disposition of troops, the explosive-attack platoon usually deployed the closest to the stronghold. In the assault, soldiers rushed up to pull out portions of the false fences and their followers went on destroying the remaining fences. After having opened ways to enter the stronghold, infantry troops rushed in by these ways.
ITEM 62

Interrogation of a member of the 22nd Regiment, and the interrogation of an officer of the 22nd Regiment. Both men were captured in South Vietnam in February and December 1966, respectively.
SUMMARY AND HIGHLIGHTS:

This report covers information on Battalion 3, QUIET TAM Regiment, SÀO VÀNG Division.

BASIC BIOGRAPHICAL DATA:

Source is a Vietnamese National who has been a member of the Labor Youth Group since 1957. He was born in 1936 in HA NAM Province, NVN. He has a NVN 1st Form (9th 1st Grade) education, is a farmer by occupation and his social level is of the poor farmer class. From 1936 to 1942 Source lived with his parents in his native village. In 1942 he herded buffalo. In 1947 he joined the Labor Youth Group. In 1952, he was drafted into the Army and assigned to Battalion 4, Regiment 64; which was subordinate to the Red River's Right Bank Military Region and encamped in SÀO QUAN District, SÀO BÌNH Province, NVN. In mid-year he was discharged from the service and sent back to his native village as a reservist where he continued to work as a farmer. In 1964, Source was recalled to active duty and assigned to Battalion 3, Regiment 64, subordinate to the Red River's Right Bank Military Region, encamped in THAC THAT District, SÀO TAY Province, NVN. Source attended a military and political refresher course. On 1 June 1965, Source, with Battalion 3, began the infiltration trip to SÀO, walking from SÀO TAY Province, through lower Laos, to BÌNH DÌNH Province, NVN. Along the way, Source contracted a serious case of malaria and was left at a station in KÔN TRI Province, NVN. Later, he was led by a commissar agent to BÌNH DÌNH Province, where the malaria recurred, and he had to rest in the house of a local resident. Source was captured in early 1966.

CIRCUMSTANCES OF CAPTURE:

At 12:00 hours, while convalescing in a private house, BÌNH DÌNH Province, Source was captured by 30 troops. He had with his two stick grenades, one knapsack full of equipment, one canteen and one certificate issued by the Battalion to go to SÀO EM Station.

INFORMATION ON BATTALION 3, QUIET TAM REGIMENT, VC SÀO VÀNG DIVISION:

1. Battalion 3, a subordinate unit of QUIET TAM Regiment, SÀO VÀNG Division was formed by the Red River’s Right Bank Military Region on 11 April 1965 at THAC THAT District, SÀO TAY Province, NVN, in order to receive training before infiltrating into SÀO. Battalion 3 had 400 effectives consisting of the following elements:

a. The backbone cadres of the Battalion were all the regrouped cadres.

b. 50 percent of the effectives were recalled soldiers, the other 50 percent were draftees from HA NAM, RAM BÌNH and THÀNH HÀM Provinces.

2. Battalion Headquarters:

Battalion Commander: SON
Battalion Executive Officer: Unknown
Political Officer: DTEN
Medical Officer: CHAP
Strength: About 400 effectives
Weapons: Two 75mm FDLs, eight 82mm mortars, eight light machineguns, eight automatic rifles, 12 AK sub-machineguns, a number of CKG rifles (quantity unknown).
3. Subordinate Units:

Battalion 3 had three companies: Company 1, Company 2, and Company 3.

ENCAMPMENT SITE AND OPERATIONAL AREA:

4. Source stated that the encampment site and the operational area of Battalion 3 were unknown to him because he got malaria and was hospitalized for two months, so during that time, he had no knowledge about the movement of his Battalion.

5. Activities:
   a. Material Life: Unknown
   b. Morale: Before infiltrating SVN, most of the effectives appeared to be in very high spirits because they were members of the Party and the Youth Group. Nevertheless, some of the draftees appeared to be cowards and usually complained about the hardships.

SUMMARY: The following report contains information on VC withdrawal tactics obtained from captive officer, 22nd Regt, 300 VANG Div.

1. Routes of advance were never used as routes of withdrawal since no route was considered safe, after having been traversed in a tactical situation. There was always an alternate route of withdrawal, generally leading in the opposite direction of the primary route, to be used in emergencies. An element of the reserve force or recon element was posted to act as guards along all withdrawal routes.

2. The withdrawal sequence was as follows:
   a. Wounded and dead.
   b. Heavy weapons.
   c. Infantry attack forces.
   d. Reserve element.
   e. Security force.

   This order of withdrawal never varied.

3. The transportation unit of the attack forces was responsible for the evacuation of dead and wounded personnel and spoils. In small unit actions, riflemen fulfilled this function.

4. The withdrawal was conducted by elements in the sequence given above. The elements could be subdivided by the tactical commander at his discretion dependent upon the circumstances.

5. Withdrawing units would move in a column formation with point and flank security elements.

6. The senior tactical commander at the scene determined the time of withdrawal. In large scale operations where a rear headquarters directed the attack forces, the rear headquarters would make the determination. Subordinate commanders were never allowed to withdraw without orders.
7. The route of withdrawal in the immediate vicinity of the target was disseminated to all personnel. The march point, to the rally point, was disseminated to company cadre or, if deemed necessary by the tactical commander, to platoon cadre. Under no circumstances was it made known to lower levels.

8. The assembly point was chosen for its remoteness from civilian and enemy troop activity. It was invariably located approximately 12 hours marching time from the objective. The actual distance varied according to the terrain. No defensive positions, booby traps or other fortifications were placed at the assembly area or at any location on the withdrawal route.

9. No obstacles of any type were placed on the withdrawal route.

10. Only individual small arms carried by the route security element were used to cover withdrawing units. If a withdrawal element made contact with enemy forces, action taken would be decided by the unit commander.

11. Radio communication would normally be used to initiate the withdrawal. Subsequent liaison would be by runners.

12. Ambush of pursuing enemy forces was not a normal tactic. It could, however, be employed at the discretion of the unit commander.

13. The reserve elements had no mission other than withdrawing.

14. When withdrawing through their own elements, the NVA used runners of the personal liaison with the in-place units. Individual recognition were determined by the operation commander.

15. The withdrawal distance was invariably 12 hours marching time from the objective. The time of day was immaterial.

16. No special preparations were made to facilitate withdrawal from positions. All fortifications would be purely for the purpose of effective defense of the location.

17. All unit commanders made withdrawal plans anytime their units were in a static position.

18. The NVA normally employed a concentrated night attack at one point to break free of encirclement. Exfiltration as such, was only used by units which had been rendered combat ineffective in the engagement and were not capable of staging a concentrated attack.

19. No special technical courses were given to NVA personnel to facilitate withdrawal movements. Officers and NCOs studied the methodology and planning of withdrawal actions.

20. All information contained in the report applies only to the NVA.
ITEM 93

Interrogation of a member of the DUC
Long 2 Battalion, 250th Regiment of the North
Vietnamese Army. He deserted and turned him-
self in to South Vietnamese forces in Phuoc
Long Province in the spring of 1966.
332.- UNIT 840
It was unknown to which Hqs UNIT 840 belonged. However, when Source was at SUOI KAT (PHUOC BINH District, PHUOC LONG Province) he was informed by the 603rd Battalion’s soldiers that this unit belonged to the District Force. (Which District was unknown).
UNIT 840 was composed of local people who were familiar with all geographical features, and would guide the way for the Main Force unit. (details unknown).

34.- Information on North Vietnam.

341.- VC units in North Vietnam

341.1.- City Security Guard Division
HANOI City had a Security Guard Division commanded by Senior Colonel LE HIEU. Early in 1965, this Division was called the City Headquarters. (details unknown).

342.- Damages Caused by Bombardment in NVN
Before July 1965, when Source was still in NVN, he was informed as follows concerning damages caused in NVN by US and RVNAF bombings:
- Phosphate factory at PHU THO Province, completely destroyed.

343.- RA Gun positions:
On the outskirts of HANOI City there were 2 RA gun positions. They were medium sized RA and heavy RA weapons. (Source had not come close to the emplacements and cannot give a detailed description)
- 1st location: On both sides of the road between HANOI and THAI NGUYEN, at WJ.860370, there were a total of 12 RA guns.
- 2nd location: at CHAU TUY (VC name), WJ.970250 there were 4 light and medium gun emplacements.

NOTE: - Light RA gun had a barrel 3m long.
- Medium RA gun had a barrel 4m long.
- Heavy RA gun had a barrel 5m long.
I - Biographical data:

- Date and Place of Birth: 1940 at HANOI.
- Education: VC 6th grade.
- Political affiliation: None
- Ethnic: Vietnamese
- Combat achievements: None
- Marital status: SINGLE
- Brothers & sisters: 3 persons.

II - Past activities:
21.- 1940 - 1954
1948: Spent childhood with parents at HANOI and attended school.

22.- 1955 - 1966
1956: Worked
Early in 1958: Employed by a company at HANOI.
In July 1960:
Later in 1960:
In July 1960: Drafted into military service for the purpose of liberating South Vietnam (1)
Later they moved to HANG CO railroad station where a train took them to the 312th Division's cantonment area. Here everyone was issued: pack, mosquito net, blanket, cup, mat and hat. These draftees later moved by foot to TAN TIE Hamlet, CAP TIENT Village, PHU BINH District (THAI NGUYEN) where they lived with the local people and received training on infiltration tactics.

Note: After their arrival at DAI SINH Hamlet (called by VC TAN TLEN Hamlet) Senior Capt CHUC announced the activation of the 602nd Battalion.

On 9 July 1965:

23.- Reason and Circumstance for returning

(1) Source stated that in addition to the normal military draft, North Vietnam had also enforced the enrollment for SVN liberation and the International enrollment.
In truth during 5-months of travelling, he had not seen any South Vietnamese. Source lived under hardships and difficulties in the forest, not having enough rice to eat or even corn or manioc. Because of these hardships decided to leave the VC ranks.

232.- Circumstances for Returning:
During a trip made to purchase food, Source took advantage of the absence of a guerrilla security guard cell to sneak away. When he reached the road he encountered a Special Forces convoy. He laid down his weapon and raised his hands signaling the convoy to stop. He was then brought to HO BON (PHUC LONG) at 1000 hrs, where he requested to return to the Government.

24.- Source's desire
Source wished to be employed by the Government in some factory or in a Communist counter-propaganda mission. He promised to actively carry out any mission assigned.

III - INFORMATION OBTAINED

31.- The Infiltration Group 250A

311.- Group 250A

General:
Source heard the designation Group 250A late in June 1965 when he filled out a biographical card before leaving for South Vietnam. At that time the Company cadre instructed that Group 250A be put on the card as the unit's identification.

"602nd Battalion/Group 250A/VIET BAC Military Region."
Source had no information concerning Group 250A except that the Political Officer was Major BINH TRONG (1).

In April 1965, a number of military men living in HANOI, and a few young men, were called to join the military service for the purpose of liberating SVN. The above people, totalling about 500 persons gathered at the NHAN DAN theater. Later they moved to HANG CO railroad station where a train took them to the 312th Division's cantonment area at THAI NGUYEN Province. They received necessary military equipment before moving by foot to TAN TIEN Hamlet, CAP TIEN Village, PHU BINH District (THAI NGUYEN). Here Senior Captain CHUC, the Battalion Commander, announced the activation of the 602nd Battalion, and that a training course was to be given in infiltrating SVN.

(1) A check with interrogation report of another member of Group 250A who returned in Oct 1965 at DUC LAP District revealed that Major NGUYEN DUC LAU alias TRONG was the Assistant Leader to Group 250A. Source (NGUYEN VAN NHU) stated that Major BINH TRONG infiltrated South with the 602nd Battalion. Major TRONG is a North Vietnamese, 40 years old, 1.62m tall, handsome, fair complexion, he had a slow speaking manner.
Cadre: (2)
- Battalion Commander: Senior Captain CHUC
- Battalion Executive Officer: Captain DOA
- Political Officer: VU THI LOAN (3)
- Assistant to Military Staff: Lt. HONG
- Adjutant: Sergeant LIU (4)

Troop strength: 500 men

Weapons:
- 3 75mm RRs
- 3 81mm mortars
- 3 60mm mortars
- 12.7mm NFs (quantity unknown)
- A quantity of RPD AR's, AK SMG'S and CKC rifles

Composition:
- Infantry Company
- 1 Combat Support Company
- 1 Battalion Headquarters composed of specialized elements, such as: 1 Signal Platoon and 2 Recon. Squads.

3121.- 1st Co. /602 Letter box number 6622BK

Cadre:
- Company commander: Captain HUNG alias HAI
- Company Political Officer: Captain LUNG alias LEO

Troop strength: 100 men

Weapons:
- 1 81mm mortar
- 1 60mm mortar
- 4 B.40
- 3 RFD AR's
- unknown number of AK SMG's and CKC rifles

Composition: 3 Platoons

NOTE: All heavy guns such as mortars and B.40's are assigned to the 1st Platoon

3122.- Signal Platoon/An Hug

Platoon Leader: CHAU (rank unknown)

Equipment: 1 15watt radio
(details unknown)

(2) The cadre names corroborate with what was stated by Returnee LE VAN TAN, PPC, member of the 2nd Squad/1 Platoon/3 Company/ D.1 Bn/Group .250A.

(3) This man replaced GIANG in Dec 1965. GIANG was believed to be the Chief of Rear Service Staff, M1, Region VI.

(4) This man replaced Lt. HONG who joined with 400 men of the 602nd Bn to carry out combat activities in Region VI (?)

313.- Training period and duration

The training period lasted more than 2 months (from 20 April to 7 July 1965) with a program consisting of the following subjects:

Weapons: Training was given on the weapon to be used by a soldier.

Tactics: Attack - Ambush and counter operation. Source was of the opinion that none of the above training subjects were of particular importance. Normally the training was conducted at company level and sometimes at Battalion level.
Political training:
- Situation in SVN
- Balance of forces
  (details in following report)

3124.- Training Location
During infiltration training the 602nd Bn
was quartered in local houses at DAI DINH
Hamlet (called TAN Tien Hamlet by VC) in
PHU DINH District (THAI NGUYEN Province).
The Battalion usually conducted the train-
ing near a pine hill.

3125.- Description of DAU DINH Hamlet
Most of the houses in DAU DINH Hamlet were
of a thatch roofed construction, 15m apart.
The size of the house was the determining
factor in billeting the Battalion but no house
held more than one squad.

3131.- Instructors
The 602nd Battalion was given infiltration
training by the personnel of the Army Officer's
School.
Cadets of personnel being trained were also
given the opportunity to assist in training
their units.

3136.- It was recommended that it should be designated after
the BAC SON triumph during the Resistance. It was agreed that
Group 250A be called BAC SON Group.
Due to the fact that the 602nd Bn was composed of individuals
living in HANOI city, this unit was also designated after
HA DINH, therefore the 602nd Battalion was called the HA DINH
Battalion.

Before leaving, Senior Colonel TRUNG wished all members
good health and successful completion of the assigned mission.

315.- Route of Infiltration
On 9 July 1965: at 1300 hours, the 602nd Bn alias HA DINH
Battalion/Group 250A composed of 500 men headed by Senior
Captain GHOI, departed from the Military Political School/
VIET BAC Military Region. They boarded a special train
and headed South, passing HANOI, HA NAM Station, NAM DINH and
Station. At this point the bridge had collapsed and the instructors
crossed the river by lorryboat, before taking another
train. They arrived at CAU CU station (THANH HO Province).
Here they travelled by foot through
and arrived at Station #20. They stopped at this station
for 2 days and left all equipment of NVN Origin.
The Battalion continued to move South, passing over
mountain 1001, route 89, through Lao territory and
the VC region in KONTUH Province.

In mid-Oct 1965: The Battalion arrived in SVN and set
up its command near BUI GLA NAF forest, at YU.280430,
in PHUOC LONG Province, 3 Kms from the CAMBODIAN-VIETNAMESE
border.
Source developed malaria and stomach trouble. He stayed
behind for treatment until Dec 1965 then rejoined his
unit.

3151.- Results of US and RVNAF bombings on the route
On 20 Aug 1965 while Source's 602nd Bn was moving
on a strategic road in LAOS, US and RVNAF aircraft
conducted a bombing (location unknown). The Battalion
was camouflaged well enough to pass through a clearing,
longer than 1 kilometer, when the bombing suddenly occurred.
Results Known:
- 7 men killed (4 soldiers of the 1st Company/602nd Bn and 3 engineer soldiers working on a bridge)
- 3 men wounded (members of the 1st Company/602nd)
These soldiers were returned to NVN.

316. - Activities of the 602nd Bn
The Battalion stayed for 2 months at YU.280430, near BUI GLA MAP forest for recuperation, awaiting the sick members to catch up.
On 15 Jan 1966, about 200 healthy cadre and soldiers commanded by Senior Captain CHUC moved to another location, reported by Source's companies as Region 7 (?)
Late in Jan 1966, another group (strength unknown) left for an unknown destination, under the direction of LUNG cover name LEO, the Company Political Officer.

NOTE: Any changes to the Battalion during this period was unknown to Source because he busied himself with the purchase of vegetables and seldom stayed in the unit.

317. - Plan of Operation of the 602nd Battalion
While in North Vietnam, this Battalion formulated the plan of liberating the remaining territories and population of Vietnam. Its main intention consisted of carrying out combat actions in SVN; however, the Battalion had not participated in any battles.
As yet no information was obtained concerning the 602nd Bn's healthy soldiers assigned to other units (destination unknown).

318. - Supply of weapons and provisions
3181. - Weapons
The quantity of weapons brought from NVN was not expended and so the Battalion had not been resupplied.

3182. - Provisions
- Along the route of infiltration rice was furnished by the Comm-liaison stations, sometimes after having passed 3 stations and at times 7 stations. It seemed that the supply element was calculated in advance and an additional quantity was given before the rice supply became exhausted.

NOTE: On one section of the infiltration route located within QUANG DUC Province, the 602nd Battalion was not given rice, corn, or manioc and as a result many soldiers died of starvation.
- In South Vietnam, when the cantonment was constructed at BUI GLA MAP forest, in BO DUC District (PHUOC LONG) and again when it was at SUOI KAT, in PHUOC BINH District (PHUOC LONG) the 602nd Battalion had its men purchase food at the Montagnard villages near the cantonment area.

NOTE: As a result of Source's illness, he could only rejoin his unit in Dec '65 at BUI GLA MAP forest. His mission was to purchase vegetables. He did not know where the rice was purchased. However, Source was informed that the rice was procured at the nearby Montagnard villages and also near the Cambodian border, 3 Kms from the unit's cantonment area.
When the unit was located at SUOI KAT, near THUAN KHE land development area (PHUOC BINH - PHUOC LONG) Source had to purchase salt, fish sauce and dry fish from a commercial bus coming to BUDOP from PHUOC BINH District. Whenever he stopped a bus, 3 local guerrillas assumed protection.
Another man of the 607th Bn, named PHEP was in charge of buying pork from THUAN KIEM land development area.

32. - Other infiltration groups

321. - 603rd Battalion

When Source attended the Infiltration training course at PHU BINH District (THAI NGUYEN) he met some soldiers of the 603rd Battalion during the mail runs made to the District. Because many members of the 602nd Battalion became sick, the Battalion arrived late at QUANG DUC and the 603rd Battalion had overtaken his unit during the infiltration trip.

(Other details unknown)

322. - 605th Battalion

In January 1966, some sick companions left on the route had rejoined the unit and reported that the 605th Battalion was in KONTUM Province.

(Other details unknown)

323. - The 607th and 609th Battalions

When Source's unit was located at SUOI KAI in PHUOC BINH District, he had met about 100 men and they said they were the sick members of the 607th and 609th Bns on recuperation. They also disclosed that they would return to QUANG DUC upon recovery.

During the distribution of food, Source often heard LONG (2) mentioning the designations of DUC LONG 7 and DUC LONG 9.

Therefore Source thought that DUC LONG 7 was the cover designation of the 607th Bn and DUC LONG 9 was the cover designation of the 609th Bn.

33. - VC units in South Vietnam

331. - LIEN DAI 10 (?)

During infiltration, when Source arrived at KONTUM, QUANG DUC he came across a VC unit (company size) which was reportedly subordinate to LIEN DAI 10. About 2 Battalions of this unit were in QUANG DUC to carry out combat actions, coordinated with the 603rd Battalion. Source had himself seen the above unit twice near the edge of BUI GIA MAP in Dec. 1965, at YU 300 450.

(1) DAO NG TRUNG, leader of the 6th Squad/2 Platoon/3 Company/607th Bn returned on 24 Sept. 65 to KIEN DUC Sub Sector (QUANG DUC), stated that the 607th Battalion cover designation NGO QUYEN Group infiltrated on 20 June 1965.

(2) This man was the Chief of the Receiving Station located BUIGIA MAP forest. He was responsible for issuing money and distributing provisions to various groups on recuperation.

(?) Source recollected having heard the LIEN DAI 10's soldiers say that their unit was the NVN 555th Division infiltrated at the end of Dec 1964 to KONTUM.

The 08 records do not have the 555th Division but only the 325th Division, NGUYEN VAN DONG cover name THOY, member of the 4th Squad/2 Platoon/23rd Transport Co./95th Regt/325th Div. He returned to LUON HC (?) on July 65, made a statement showing the same period of infiltration and area of activity in SVN: from that we may deduce Source's mistake in hearing 325th and 555th. However as said, returned DUNG from the 95th Regt/322 knew only the cover designation LIEN TINH 10 in June 1965 but there was no LIEN DAI 10.
ITEM 24

Interrogations of two deserters, both of whom were members of the 2nd Battalion of the 33rd Regiment of the 326th Division of the North Vietnamese Army. They both deserted their unit and turned themselves in to South Vietnamese authorities in early 1966.
SUMMARY AND HIGHLIGHTS

The information contained in this report was obtained from two sources.

Both sources served in Battalion 2, Regiment 33, since the day it was formed in April 1965 in TUYN HOA District, QUANG BINH Province, NVN. They accompanied this unit when it infiltrated SVN, and the information in this report is based on their observations and contacts while serving with the battalion.

**Biographic data on cadre of Battalion 2, Regiment 33 (or H/L2/Work Site 33):**

1. **RUC**

   **Biographic data:** Senior Captain RUC, Battalion Commander, Battalion 2. The last contact with him was in the middle of December 1965 at CHU PONG (Pleiku). He was of Vietnamese nationality, about 36 years old, native of HA TINH Province, had a NVN 7th Form education.

   **Identification:** He was about 1.60 meters tall, black hair cut short, pink complexion, medium build, about 52 kilos, small black eyes, oval face, round small head, big mole on the left side of the bridge of his nose.

   **Character:** He liked cigarettes, strong tea, reading. He had high spirits, was slightly nervous and was cheerful with the soldiers.

   **Past Activities:**

   - **Political:** He was a member of the Labor Party (15 years).
   - **Military:** Experienced in leadership; good instructor.

2. **THU**

   **Biographic data:** Senior Captain THU, Battalion Executive Officer, concurrently Chief of Staff of Battalion 2, Regiment 33. The last contact with him was in December 1965 at CHU PONG (Pleiku). He was of Vietnamese nationality, about 34 years old, native of NGHE AN Province (his wife and children probably lived at his native place). Education: NVN 7th Form.

   **Identification:** He was about 1.65 meters tall, grizzled hair, dark complexion, thin build, about 54 kilos, black eyes, long thin face, head flat at the back, particularly prominent cheekbones.
Character: He liked cigarettes, tea and the theater. He had high spirit. He was a little fastidious with correct manners, simple, independent mind.

Past Activities:

Political: He was a member of the Labor Party (about 30 years).

Military: Experienced in combat. Talented instructor in tactics.

3. DMT

Biographical data: Senior Captain DMT. Political officer, Battalion 2, Regiment 33. The last time source met him was in December ‘95 at CHU PONG (Pleiku). He was a highland northerner, about 45 years old, NVN 8th Form education.

Identification: He was about 1.67 meters tall, black hair, light complexion, medium build, about 53 kilos, black eyes, big round face, round head, two prominent buck teeth.

Character: He liked reading, had a mild character and had many schemes. He had a strong sense of service and was loquacious.

Past Activities:

Politics: He was a member of the Labor Party (over 15 years), and was Party Committee Secretary of the Battalion.

4. KHANH

Biographical data: Senior Lieutenant KHANH. Assistant political officer, Battalion 2, Regiment 33. The last time source met him was in mid-December ‘95 at CHU PONG (Pleiku). He was of Vietnamese nationality, about 32 years old, a native of THUA TIEN Province; NVN 6th Form education.

Identification: He was about 1.57 meters tall, black hair, brown complexion, small build, about 49 kilos, small long face, medium-size head.

Character: He was cheerful, open-hearted, high sense of service, independent mind, qualified in speech.
Past Activities:

Politics: He was a member of the Labor Party (for seven years).

Military: He was experienced in combat (he had been Company Commander).

5. HUU

Biographic data: Senior Sergeant HUU, Adjutant of Battalion 2. The last time source met him was in December 1965 at CHU PONG (Pleiku). He was of Vietnamese nationality, 25 years old, native of HA NOI Province, bachelor: NVN 7th Form education.

Identification: He was 1.52 meters tall, black hair, light complexion, thin build, about 43 kilos, round black eyes, round face.

Character: He was quiet, liked to be alone in a quiet place; however, he worked enthusiastically, had good memory and was talented in bookkeeping.

Past Activities:

Political: He was a member of the Labor Party (for four years).

Military: No special details.

6. CHINH

Biographic Data: Sergeant CHINH, in charge of armament of Battalion 2, Regiment 33. The last time source met him was at the end of December 1965 at CHU PONG. He was of Vietnamese nationality, 27 years old, a bachelor, NVN 6th Form education, poor farmer class.

Identification: He was about 1.57 meters tall, black hair cut short, dark complexion, medium build, about 49 kilos, black eyes, long face, medium head, prominent buck-teeth.

Character: He was capricious, quiet, fair sense of service.

Past Activities:

Political: He was a member of the Labor Youth Group.

Military: Very experienced in weapons.
7. DO

Biographic data: Senior Lieutenant DO, Commander of Company 1, Battalion 2, Regiment 33. The last time source met him was at the end of December 1965 at CHU PONG (Pleiku). He was of Vietnamese nationality, about 32 years old, native of THAI BINH Province, married, with a NVN 7th Form education.

Identification: He was about 1.55 meters tall, black hair, dark complexion, about 47 kilos, black eyes, long face, medium build, face marked with white spots.

Character: He was addicted to cigarettes, and tea, liked drama entertainment, had a fair spirit of service. He was nervous, not liberalized, often scolding with his subordinates.

Past Activities:
    Political: He was a member of the Labor Party (7 years).
    Military: He was a fairly good infantry tactics instructor.

8. MAU

Biographic data: Lieutenant MAU, Former Executive Officer of Company 1, Battalion 2, Regiment 33, about 32 years old, died in the battle at the battalion base, at Nuer Stream when the Vietnamese-American troops attacked this location (early in 1965).

9. HAU

Biographical Data: Senior-Lieutenant HAU, political officer of Company 1, Battalion 2, Regiment 33. The last time source met him was in December 1965 at CHU PONG (Pleiku). He was of Vietnamese nationality, about 34 years old, native of NHIE-AN Province, completed the NVN 5th Form.

Identification: He was about 1.58 meters tall, black hair, dark complexion, big and fat build, about 52 kilos, opaque (sic) eyes, big face, head of medium size.

Character: He was cheerful, polite, of average dedicated duty, fluent and a charming speaker.
Past Activities:

Political: He was a member of the Communist Party (7 years).

Military: Unknown.

10. SUU

Biographic Data: Senior Lieutenant SUU, Commander of Company, Battalion 2, Regiment 33. The last time source met him was at the end of December 1965 at CHU PONG (Pleiku). He was of Vietnamese nationality, about 29 years old, native of NGHE AN Province, married and had 1 child; he completed the NVN 7th Form of education.

Identification: He was about 1.52 meters tall, brown complexion, black hair, short build, about 41 kilos, black eyes, round face, head of medium size.

Character: He was addicted to tobacco, strong tea, and liked sports, normally dedicated to duty, nervous, authoritative with his subordinates; no independent mind.

Past Activities:

Political: He was a member of the Communist Party (over 5 years).

Military: Experienced in combat.

11. CHINH

Biographical Data: Lieutenant CHINH, Executive Officer of Company 2, Battalion 2, Regiment 33. He left Company 2 and held the function of Commander of Company 3, Battalion 2, Regiment 33 when his unit arrived in SVN. The last time source met him was at the end of December 1965 at CHU PONG (Pleiku). He was of Vietnamese nationality, about 26 years old, native of THAI HINH Province, completed the NVN 7th Form of education.

Identification: He was about 1.60 meters tall, black hair, brown complexion, medium build, about 50 kilos, black eyes, rather long face, head of medium size.

Character: He was calm, taciturn, easy with his subordinates, and dedicated.
Past Activities:

Political: He was a member of the Communist Party (4 years).

Military: Qualified in leading soldiers. Talented military instructor.

12. HIEU

Biographic Data: Senior Lieutenant HIEU, Political Officer of Company 2, Battalion 2, Regiment 33. The last time source met him was at the end of December 1965 at CHU PONG, (Pleiku). He was of Vietnamese nationality, about 27 years old, native of HA DUONG Province, married, and completed the NVN 6th Form.

Identification: He was about 1.53 meters tall, black hair, brown complexion, short build, about 50 kilos, black eyes, oval face, small head, very handsome.

Character: He was often scowling and bad-tempered, medium service spirit.

13. GANH

Lieutenant GANH, Assistant Political Officer of Company 2, Battalion 2, Regiment 33. He is about 36 years old, native of HA TINH. On infiltrating into SVN, he deserted when the unit arrived at Mountain 1001. He was considered a deserter since.

14. BIEN

Corporal, Adjutant of Company 2, Battalion 2, Regiment 33. Source met him the last time in late December 1965 in CHU PONG (Pleiku). He is about 26 years old, Vietnamese nationality, native of NGHE AN; education: NVN 4th Form (US 4th Grade)

He is about 1.60 meters tall, has black hair, suntanned complexion, medium build, about 50 kilos, black eyes, long and brown face; the back side of his head is depressed. He is a silent, difficult man who has a poor sense of service. He was a member of the Communist Party (3 years).

15. TU

Corporal, medic of Company 2, Battalion 2, Regiment 33. Source met him the last time in December 1965 in CHU PONG (Pleiku). He is about 20 years old, Vietnamese nationality; education: NVN 5th Form (US 7th grade).

He is about 1.57 meters tall, has black hair, light complexion, medium build, about 55 kilos, black eyes, oval face, round head. He is a gay man who was always devoted to his patients. He was a member of the Youth Labor Party.
16. SAN. Aspirant, Platoon Leader of Platoon 1, Company 2, Battalion 2. Source met him the last time in late December 1965 in CHU PONG (Pleiku). He is about 25 years old, Vietnamese nationality, native of HA TI NH; education: NVN 6th Form (US 8th grade). About 1.56 meters tall, black hair, suntanned complexion, medium build, about 57 kilograms, black eyes, round face and round head. He is an open hearted man who is very fond of opera; had a high spirit of service.

He was a Communist Party member (4 years). He was good in military subjects. He was a good military instructor.

17. DINH. Senior Sergeant, Assistant Platoon Leader of Platoon 1, Company 2, Battalion 2. Source met him the last time in December 1965 in CHU PONG (Pleiku). He is 25 years old, Vietnamese Nationality; native of HA DONG Province, single, education: NVN 7th Form (US 9th grade). About 1.55 meters tall, black hair, suntanned complexion, medium build, about 50 kilos, black hair, round face, round head. He is a gay man who was very fond of music but he lacked the spirit of service. He was a member of the Youth Labor Party.

18. TUyen: Sergeant, squad leader of Squad 1, Platoon 1, Company 2, Battalion 2; source met him the last time in early December 1965 in CHU PONG (Pleiku).

He is about 22 years old, of Vietnamese nationality, native of THAI DINH Province, married, no children, education: NVN 5th Form (US 7th grade).

About 1.57 meters tall, black hair, light complexion, medium build, about 45 kilograms, black eyes, oval face, round head. He is a gay man who is very fond of art and sports; he had an average spirit of service. He was a member of the Youth Labor Party.

19. CAI: Sergeant, former squad leader of Squad 2, Platoon 1, Company 2, Battalion 2. He was about 23 years old, native of HA DUONG Province. He was wounded during CHU PONG Battle (18 Nov 65); his wound was bandaged right at the battlefield by his comrades but he was not seen to return to his unit. Source was told that CAI was killed and was buried on the spot.

20. TRAM: Corporal, squad leader of Squad 3, Platoon 1, Company 2, Battalion 2. Source met him the last time in late December 1965 in CHU PONG (Pleiku). He is about 26 years old, of Vietnamese nationality, native of HA LUONG Province. He was married with 1 child, education: NVN 3rd Form (US 3rd Grade). About 1.60 meters tall, black hair, sun-tanned complexion, medium build, 56 kilos, black eyes, oval face, round and medium size head. He is a quiet man who had
medium spirit of service. He was member of the Youth Labor Party. He was a good gunner who gained two golden medals for marksmanship during the 1964 competition.

21. CAC: Aspirant, Platoon Leader of Platoon 2, Company 2, Battalion 2. Source met him the last time in late December 1965 in CHU PONG (Pleiku). He is about 25 years old, Vietnamese Nationality, Single; education: DRVN 6th Form (US 8th grade). About 1.62 meters tall, black hair, sun-tanned complexion, medium build, about 50 kilos, black eyes, long face, long head. He was addicted to cigarettes and was very fond of sports, has a medium spirit of service. He was a quick-tempered and quiet man who was very courageous but lacking in self-control. He was a member of the Youth Labor Party who had tendency of socialism.

22. HOP: Senior Sergeant, Assistant Platoon Leader of Platoon 2, Company 2, Battalion 2. Source met him the last time in late December 1965 in CHU PONG (Pleiku). He is about 24 years old, Vietnamese nationality, married with 2 children, native of HA DONG Province, education DRVN 8th Form (US 10th Grade). About 1.60 meters tall, black eyes, oval face, round head. He looks handsome. He is a quiet man who had low spirit of service. He was member of the Youth Labor Party (4 years).

23. HAI: Corporal, squad leader of Squad 4, Platoon 2, Company 2. Source met him the last time in late December 1965 in CHU PONG (Pleiku). He is about 24 years old, Vietnamese nationality, native of HA THIN, education: DRVN 5th Form (US 7th Grade). About 1.62 meters tall, black hair, sun-tanned complexion, medium build, about 52 kilos, brown and small eyes, sunken nose, the back side of the head is depressed.

He was not an open-hearted man; he often quarreled with his comrades. His spirit of service was low. He was a member of the Youth Labor Party. He was very fond of fighting.

24. LAM: Corporal, squad leader of Squad 5, Platoon 2, Company 2. Source last saw him in early January 1966 (Pleiku). He is about 26 years old, Vietnamese nationality, native of HA DONG Province, NVN 4th Form (U.S. 4th grade); educational level, single, poor farmer social class. He is about 1.60 meters tall, short black hair, dark complexion, medium build, about 52 kilograms in weight, black eyes, long face, and irregular teeth. He was a talkative man who often quarreled and fought with his comrades. His sense of service was average. He was a member of the Youth Labor Party and had experience in fighting.
25. CU: Corporal, squad leader of squad 6, Platoon 2, Company 2. Source saw him the last time in early November 1965 in PLEIME (Pleiku). He is about 22 years old, Vietnamese nationality, native of NVN, single, poor farmer social class, NVN 5th form (U.S. 7th grade) educational level. He was about 1.55 meters tall with short black hair, dark complexion, medium build, 54 kilograms in weight, small black eyes, oval face. He was very fond of art and sports. He is a cheerful, but not talkative man. He had an average sense of service. He was a member of the Youth Labor Party and had socialist tendencies.

26. CU: Aspirant LAI VAN CU, platoon leader of platoon 3, Company 2, Battalion 2. Source saw him the last time in early November 1965 in PLEIME (Pleiku). He is 25 years old, Vietnamese nationality, native of NVN, married (?), poor farmer social level, NVN 7th Form (U.S. 9th grade) educational level. He was about 1.55 meters tall, black hair, light complexion, medium build, 55 kilograms in weight, black long eyes, oval face. He is very fond of sports. He was a member of the Labor Party (four years) and had experience in fighting.

27. LUU: Senior Sergeant, assistant platoon leader of platoon 3, Company 2, Battalion 2. Source saw him the last time in PLEIME (Pleiku). He was about 35 years old, a native of HA TINH, married with two children. His wife and children lived in HA TINH. He died of malaria on the way to reinforce the troops in the PLEIME battle.

28. NGU: Corporal, squad leader of squad 7, platoon 3, company 2. Source saw him the last time in early January 1966 (Pleiku). He is 23 years old, a Vietnamese national, a native of HA TINH, single, NVN 5th Form (U.S. 7th grade) education. He is about 1.55 meters tall, black hair, light complexion, medium build, 55 kilograms in weight, round black eyes, round face. He was a quiet man but very active. He was a member of the Youth Labor Party.

29. THIEN: Corporal, squad leader of squad 8, platoon 3, company 2. Source saw him the last time in December 1965 (Pleiku). He is 23 years old, a Vietnamese national, single, NVN 4th Form (U.S. 4th grade) educational level. About 1.56 meters tall, black hair, sun tanned complexion, thin build, 46 kilograms in weight, long black eyes, long square face. He is a quiet man who is very fond of solitude. He did not work actively for the Party. He was a member of the Youth Labor Party.
30. DIEN: Corporal, squad leader of squad 9, platoon 3, company 2. Source met him the last time in early January 1966 (in Pleiku). He is 21 years old, a Vietnamese national, single, poor farmer social class, NVN 4th form (U.S. 4th grade) education. He is about 1.54 meters tall, sun tanned complexion, medium build, 50 kilograms in weight, black hair, long black eyes, long face. He is a talkative man and very fond of singing. He was very active. He was a member of the Youth Labor Party.

31. DUU: Sergeant, a former squad leader of squad 10 (light machine gun squad) of Company 2 Headquarters, Battalion 2. He was about 22 years old, a Vietnamese national, a native of HA DUONG Province, single, NVN 3rd form (U.S. 3rd grade). He was killed in action during CHU PONG battle (probably on 18 December 1965), while he was handling a light machine gun. He was buried on the spot, without a coffin.

32. LA: Corporal, former squad leader of Squad 11 (B40 Squad) of Company 2, Headquarters, Battalion 2. He violated discipline during the PLEIME battle, and he was denoted to Assistant Squad Leader vice Corporal CHU (who also defected to the SVN government at the same time as source), who had been promoted to Squad Leader rank. Source met him for the last time in January 1966 in CHU PONG (Pleiku). He is about 24 years old, of Vietnamese nationality, single, a native of HA NAM Province; education: NVN 2nd Form (U.S. 2nd grade). He is about 1.55 meters tall, with black hair, light complexion, medium build, about 47 kilos, black eyes, square face.

He is not an open-hearted man and has a bad conduct; he often quarreled with his comrades. His spirit of service was low and he always lost his temper. He was a member of the Youth Labor Party. He was very cowardly while carrying out his military obligations.

33. CHU: Corporal, squad leader of Squad II (B.40) of Company 2, Battalion 2. A former Assistant Squad Leader, he was promoted to Squad Leader in order to replace Corporal LO after the PLEIME Battle. Subject also rallied to the SVN government in January 1966.
34. MAC: Senior Lieutenant, Company Commander of Company 3, Battalion 2, Regiment 33. Source met him the last time in December 1965 in CHU PONG (Pleiku). He is about 40 years old, a Vietnamese national; education: NVN 6th Form (US 8th grade). He is about 1.57 meters tall, tan skin, robust, 56 kilos, black eyes, big long face. Cheerful and popular personality; (several words illegible) dedicated, calm and self confident. He is a Communist Party member and enjoys a good reputation in the Party. As far as military activity was concerned, he was good in tactical fighting and good in military instruction.

35. MAI: Senior Lieutenant, Political Officer of Company 3, Battalion 2. Source last saw him at the end of December 1965 at CHU PONG (Pleiku). He is approximately 27 years old. A Vietnamese national, (several words missing) education. He was about 1.56 meters tall, short black hair, rosy complexion, medium build, about 48 kilograms, black eyes, oval face, round head. Source knew nothing about his character. He was a Communist Party member and Secretary of the 3rd Party Chapter (3rd Company).

36. SU: Senior Lieutenant, Company Commander of the 4th Company (combat support), 2nd Battalion, 33rd Regiment. Source saw him last at the end of December 1965 at CHU PONG (Pleiku). He is approximately 30 years old, is a Vietnamese and has a NVN 7th form education. He is about 1.60 meters tall with black hair, dark skin, medium build, black eyes, long face, round head and about 50 kilos in weight. He was good at tactical fighting.