There were some other types of plane but Source was not instructed on the details of these other aircraft.

(b) Practice: After being trained on theory by the company Commanders, the squad Leader took notes to further instruct and drill the subordinate soldiers. The strength and assignment of soldiers of each Air Defense Squad were as follows: 1 Squad Leader; 3 number 1 gunners (to fire); 3 number 2 gunners (to ascertain the aircraft's direction), 3 gun loaders; 3 belt loaders. All the others were ammunition carriers. The guns were set up in the training area encircled by direction poles numbered 1 (North), 2 (West), 3 (South), 4 (East), 12 (Northwest), 14 (Northeast), 32 (Southwest), and 34 (Southeast). One six centimeter plane, made of wood and painted black, was sometimes fastened to the end of a long pole and held by a person who stood 10 to 15 meters away, varying the distance and speed of the plane. The plane could also be hung on a wire stretched over the area. It was then manipulated by a string attached to it.

The practice was broken down into three stages:

1. 1st stage:

   Number 1 Gunners: They accustomed themselves to pressing the trigger skillfully. They were trained in calculating flying speed and range scale (given by squad leaders) based on the data board which they memorized, to aim at the fixed target.

   Number 2 Gunners: They were trained in ascertaining flying direction, in catching the target quickly and operating the elevation crank evenly.

   Number 4 Gunners: (belt loaders). They were trained to quickly and skillfully load ammunition in magazines.

   After the aircraft's flying direction, range scale and speed were given by squad leaders and after the number 1 gunner calculated and adjusted the gun to the flying direction, the number 2 gunners locked the firing range. Squad Leaders came to check whether it was right or not; if it was wrong Squad Leaders gave them further instruction.

2. 2nd stage:

   Same as the 1st stage but this time the wooden plane was pinned on a pole and moved slowly.
Squad 1, Platoon 2,

Squad Leader: Corporal
Assistant Squad Leader: Corporal
Members: 18 personnel

Squad 2, Platoon 2,

Squad Leader: Corporal
Assistant Squad Leader: Corporal
Members: 18 personnel

Squad 3, Platoon 2,

Squad Leader: Corporal
Assistant Squad Leader: Corporal
Members: 17 personnel

4. ACTIVITIES IN NORTH VIETNAM:

In August 1964, the air defense unit had only one platoon (composed of two squads) which was given specialized training. In October 1964, after the company was formed, the cadre and soldiers continued their training and drill.

A. Training:

(1) Location of training: The training courses were held in the barracks.

(2) Period of training: Each training course lasted for six months.

(3) Training Program: The training program consisted of theory and practice.

(a) Theory:

Structure of 12.7mm heavy machine gun; action; assembly and disassembly; Repair; use in shooting at aircraft; use in supporting infantry; maintenance. Squad leaders and number 1 gunners were instructed on the speed of the following aircraft:

Helicopters: One engine helicopters.

Transport aircraft:
F. 86
F. 100

Scout planes:
L. 19

Bombers:
B. 57
3. ORGANIZATION AND WEAPONS:

a. Company Command Section:
   Company Commander: Senior Lieutenant
   Deputy Company Commander: Aspirant
   Political Officer: Senior Lieutenant
   Deputy Political Officer: Lieutenant
   Adjutant: Sergeant
   Medic: Private first Class
   Liaison agent:

b. Subordinate units: With a complement of 127 personnel, the company was divided into two platoons which were further divided into three squads each.

   (1) Platoon 1,
   Platoon Leader: Lieutenant
   Assistant Platoon Leader: Senior Sergeant
   Strength: 59 Personnel
   Equipment: 3 12.7m/m heavy machine guns
             1 pistol; 4 AK sub machine guns;

   Squad 1, Platoon 1,
   Squad Leader: Corporal
   Assistant Squad Leader: Corporal
   Members: 17 personnel

   Squad 2, Platoon 1,
   Squad Leader: Corporal
   Assistant Squad Leader: Private First Class
   Members: 17 personnel

   Squad 3, Platoon 1,
   Squad Leader: Corporal
   Assistant Squad Leader: Corporal
   Members: 17 personnel

   (2) Platoon 2,
   Platoon Leader: Aspirant
   Assistant Platoon Leader: Aspirant
   Strength: 61 personnel
   Equipment: 3 12.7m/m heavy machine guns,
             1 pistol, 4 AK sub machine guns,
             44 CWC rifles, 118 wood handled grenades,
             59 spades
SUMMARY AND HIGHLIGHTS:

This report contains information concerning the history, organization, composition, training, and the military and political activities of Regiment 66, Division 304. Included is information concerning its infiltration into South Vietnam, the location of anti-aircraft artillery and radar sites in the area of HAM RONG Bridge, THANH HOA Province.

BASIC BIOGRAPHICAL DATA:

Source is a Vietnamese National, and a member of the Labor Youth Party. He was born in 1941 in NINH BINH Province, DRVN. He is a farmer by occupation, and his social level is middle class. His religion is Buddhist, and he has received a certificate of completion of the NVN 8th Form (US 10th Grade). Source entered military service in the spring of 1964 and began infiltrating into SVN in August 1964 with Regiment 66, Division 304. Source was captured in late 1965 by ARVN Forces as he and two companions were walking by 1A DRANG Stream in PLEIKU Province after the battle of Hill 85.

PHYSICAL CONDITION AND ATTITUDE:

Source is in normal health; however, he has contracted malaria. He has a fair education, but because he just entered military service and served in one unit, he only knew about his company which is a separate unit. Source appeared to cooperate during the interrogation.

CIRCUMSTANCES OF OBSERVATION:

Source served with his company from the date of its formation up until the time that he was captured.

1. BACKGROUND AND HISTORY:

Source's company is an air defense unit subordinate to Infantry Regiment 66, Division 304. It had formerly been located in THANH HOA Province but after infiltrating into SVN it is presently (November 1965) located in the forests of PLEIKU Province. In July 1966, this unit had only one platoon; however, in October 1964, because of the needs in the SVN battlefield, Regiment 66 enlisted more men and transferred a number of cadres and soldiers to form the company designated with a complement of approximately 127 personnel.

2. LOCATIONS:

From October 1964 to 4 August 1965, Air Defense Company Regiment 66 and the Headquarters of Division 304 in HA TRUNG District, THANH HOA Province. From August 1965 to September 1965, the company encamped in THANH HOA Province.
INTERROGATION OF A MEMBER, 66TH REGIMENT OF THE 304TH DIVISION OF THE NORTH VIETNAM ARMY. HE WAS CAPTURED IN LATE 1965 BY SOUTH VIETNAMESE FORCES AFTER THE BATTLE OF HILL 85 IN PLEIKU PROVINCE.
3. 3rd stage:

Same as the 2nd stage, but this time the plane was moved quickly from one point to another and from far away to near. At this stage, the gunners became skilled. In the 12.7m/m Air Defense Squad, the number 1 and 2 gunners were the most important persons because they always had to concentrate their attention on the work; in addition, they had to be patient, active, intelligent and observant.

Main task of the number 1 gunner: Example: the Squad leader said aloud that the enemy aircraft appeared at pole 1 (North), with speed 120 (120 meters per second), scale range 120 (1,200 meters), fire on the aircraft flying ahead. (The company used to concentrate their fire on one plane only.) After receiving orders, the number 1 gunners observed and calculated the aircraft's flying direction, and turned the gun to it. While turning the gun, the gunners calculated in their mind (looking at the Data board was not necessary because gunners learned this board by heart) and knew that they had to put their sight on the third hole (the sight has nine holes from the middle out (see attachment 1). If they saw a quarter of the plane, which was headed straight to the Air Defense position, the gunners saw the head of the plane only. With the same speed and range scale mentioned above, if the gunners saw a half of plane, which flew at an angle to the Air Defense position, the gunners saw only the head and a part of the wings of the aircraft and they had to put their sight on the fifth hole. If the gunners saw three fourths of the aircraft, they should keep their sight on the eighth hole and if they saw the whole aircraft, which flew directly over the gun, they should fix their sights on the internal edge of the sight. In any case, the number 1 gunners should aim at the head of aircraft to fire and should make their sighting through the plane aiming holes of the sight. This method was applied only to aircraft flying horizontally with a speed not over 140 meters per second, at an altitude not over 1,500 meters and a range scale not over 1,800 meters. This method was effective only with jets, bombers and transport aircraft. In case, the gunners didn't see the aircraft until it approached near them, they would not use the Data board but fire at long range; that is, the number 1 gunners should use the sixth hole of the sight to fire. Because Source was not in charge of these services he had only the above mentioned general information.

Main task of the number 2 gunner: Example: The Squad Leader said aloud that the enemy aircraft appeared at pole 1 (North) (speed and scale range were not necessary to the number 2 gunners but to the number 1 gunners only). After receiving the orders, the number 2 gunners operated the elevation crank fixed to the internal disc of the sight by turning from outside to inside. This disc could be moved
(the external disc was not moveable) by four wheels and one gear rack. When this disc turned counter clockwise, the operating lever moved and made the internal disc of the gear-rack connected the internal disc with the external disc (the same as the sight). When the number 2 gunners saw the image of aircraft laying on the crosspoint of three wires in the middle of the flight direction searching apparatus, they would stop the elevation crank for a very short time only. When the aircraft moved, the number 2 gunners operated the elevation crank again to keep the image of the aircraft always on the crosspoint of the three wires (copper wires). They had to pin point the target before the number 1 gunners finished their work in order to open fire quickly. In brief, the number 1 and 2 gunners had to be shadows of one another - their work had to be coordinated and mesh. After six months training on the 12.7mm heavy machine gun, its assembly and disassembly as well as maintenance. The unit moved to NINH BINH Province for an exercise, but they only practiced firing at tanks (fake tanks made of woven bamboo pulled along the road) but not at aircraft.

6. PROTECTION OF BRIDGE

In August 1965, they quartered on top of a hill which was near a bridge, in NINH BINH Province in order to protect the bridge. Combined with the unit were:

(1) Various anti-aircraft units: One platoon of 14.5mm anti-aircraft (3 pieces) quartered West of the foot of the hill; one company of 37mm anti-aircraft (5 pieces) quartered South of the foot of the hill. During that time, U.S. aircraft came two or three times a day to bomb the bridge, and anti-aircraft units bravely stood up against them. All the bombs hit the water, and none of them hit the bridge, however, one bridge was damaged because of blast effect. One time, the bombs hit a guard post at one end of the bridge and a store house which held about three tons of peanuts belonging to the cooperative. Both the guard post and the store house, which was one kilometer South of the bridge, were demolished. That same night, the bridge was repaired but it was not usable. During the bombing raids, Source saw two jet aircraft spread smoke and flame from the end of their fuselages. This proved that these two aircraft had been hit by anti-aircraft fire, but both of them continued to fly toward the sea. Source also saw another U.S. aircraft fly at a very high altitude and drop many pieces of tin foil of about 0.5 to 1 meter long and 1 centimeter wide. The Commander of Source's unit prohibited his soldiers from picking up these pieces of tin foil explaining that they were imbued with poison and were dropped to destroy the Radar station.
(2) Radar station at the bridge. One Radar with a red painted column, turning toward the provincial city, was set up in front of a cave which was at the foot of a hill. The Radar was round in shape, and was about 1.70 meters in diameter, about 1.70 meters high (including the platform) and turned 90 degrees. The surface of the Radar was slightly convex and perforated like a bee-hive. Source was forbidden to approach the Radar, but he could see it clearly from the top of the hill where his unit was quartered. According to Source, there were about five men taking care of the Radar, and these men used to stay in the cave.

(3) Alarm system: The Radar always detected the aircraft before they arrived, so anti-aircraft units were usually warned (by telephone) on a timely basis to be ready for action. Source did not see any other Radar station beside the above mentioned one.

C. VISIT OF CHICOM ADVISORS:

wearing black cloth clothes and overcoats (also made of black cloth), guided by the chief of THANH HOA Province unit, came to observe all anti-aircraft units, including Source's unit quartered around the bridge. These CHICOM advisors spoke fluent Vietnamese; they said that they came to check the effectiveness of the guns that they had provided. Also, on that occasion, the CHICOM advisors instructed the soldiers that to keep the 12.7 mm AAA from shaking while in use, they had to hang under it between the legs of its tripod one or two boxes of ammunition (each box weighed 28 kilos). The soldiers followed the instruction and the gun did not shake any more.

5. MATERIAL LIFE:

A. Mess: From the time Source joined the unit, the cadres as well as the soldiers enjoyed the same ration which cost 0.67 piasters a day. When the unit moved to another area, the ration was doubled to strengthen the soldiers, but since food was scarce at that time and the area was far from the market and from the people, the new ration was not better than that of 0.67 piasters.

B. Salary: According to the regulations officers received a salary. Non-commissioned officers as well as soldiers only received allowances but were not required to pay their mess expenses.

Allowances:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Allowance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2nd class private</td>
<td>5,00 piasters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st class private</td>
<td>6,00 piasters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corporal</td>
<td>8,00 piasters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sergeant</td>
<td>12,40 piasters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior Sergeant</td>
<td>13,00 piasters</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Salaries:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Salary</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aspirant</td>
<td>54,00 piasters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Lieutenant</td>
<td>65,00 piasters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Lieutenant</td>
<td>75,00 piasters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>85,00 piasters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior Captain</td>
<td>95,00 piasters</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source heard that officers and non-commissioned officers also received seniority and family allowances (officers) but he had no further knowledge on that subject. Immediately after receiving their salaries, officers had to pay 21,00 piasters for their monthly rations.

C. Health: The unit had a medical room where soldiers received medication for non-serious diseases. When the medic could not identify the disease, the patient was sent to the Regiment for the physician to diagnose. Only very serious cases were hospitalized; otherwise they were only issued medication and had to return to the unit for work. Rest was rarely allowed because the soldiers were suspected of malingering. A number of soldiers expressed their annoyance. They did not dare to express their dissatisfaction openly but only made insulting allusions.

D. Entertainment: The unit had a volley-ball court. As the unit was quartered together with Regiment 66, the soldiers sometimes went to the Regiment's canteen to read newspapers or to buy candies, beer, etc. From time to time, an Entertainment group came to the camp to give performances or movie showings.

E. Mail: Mail to families was free and was not subject to censorship. Before infiltration, all soldiers were allowed a seven-day leave, during which time they were free to go home or to write to their families telling them that they were going South to fight. Thus the correspondence was not limited and censored. Each soldier was issued two stamps a month for mail; if anyone wanted to send a lot of letters, he had to buy additional stamps with his own P.O. box, but almost all the soldiers mailed their letters through the civilian Post-Office to avoid the slowness of the unit's postal transportation.

F. Leave: Only volunteer soldiers enjoyed annual leave; the draftees did not. However, in mid August 1965, before the infiltration, all the cadres and soldiers of the unit were allowed a seven-day leave to visit their families for the last time. In special circumstances, such as the death of one of his parents, wife or children, a soldier was allowed five days leave.
G. Individual equipment: In NVN, each soldier was issued the following: two yellow uniforms; two sets of underwear; two towels; two pairs of stockings; two pairs of tennis shoes; one mosquito-net; one knapsack; one hat. Before infiltrating SVN, each soldier was issued the following additional items: one green uniform; one set of black peasant pajamas; one set of underwear; one linen hammock; one pair of BINH TRI THIEN shoes (rubber shoes); ten meters of rope used to hang the hammock, one six-meter piece of nylon; one two-meter piece of nylon.

H. Production: During one year, the soldiers only spent six months in training and the other six months were reserved for the production mission. They cleared fields that the people did not cultivate; they borrowed buffaloes from the people to plow these fields, then sowed them with rice. They also grew vegetables and bred pigs and poultry. The income from this went to the unit which held parties on festival days.

6. Labor Party Organization and the Labor Youth Group:

A. Labor Party: The unit had about thirty Party members who formed a Party-chapter headed by First Lieutenant, political officer of the unit. The Executive section consisted of five members: One Secretary, one deputy-secretary, three Chapter Committee members. All the Party members appeared to be serious and set good examples. They only met when necessary and not at any set time; however, they usually met once every week or every two weeks. Source had no knowledge of what went on in the meeting because he was not a Party member.

B. Labor Youth Group: Almost all of the personnel who were not Labor Party members were members of the Labor Youth Group. There were only about ten persons who were not members of the group. The group had a Group chapter Executive section which consisted of five members headed by an Aspirant, a cadre of the Labor Party.

Composition of the Executive section: One secretary; one deputy secretary; three committee members.

Every Wednesday afternoon, a meeting was held by the Group chapter to check all the week’s assignments, to criticize, to point out advantages and disadvantages, and to carry out directives received from higher echelons. The meetings usually lasted about one hour. Many soldiers tried to avoid the meetings because of they were dull and boring. The absentees were usually warned or criticized (the cadre called the subject alone to an unfrequented place and gave him an explanation), but in every meeting there were absentees whose comrades made excuses for them.
7. Daily political activity of the unit:

Every evening, except Saturday and Sunday, the unit Commander gathered the whole unit together for political activities. When documents were received from higher echelons, the Political Officer would study them, lecture on them and finally hold discussions. For example, if the subject one day was "The traditions of the Army", there would be a lecture, after which the unit would divide into many cells for discussion and to raise questions, if any; however, the soldiers were present just because they could not slip away. No one liked the lectures. At the worst, they availed themselves of the discussion period to talk to one another; therefore nobody had any questions, though they still might not understand the subject.

8. INFILTRATION INTO THE SOUTH:

A. Preparation:

(1) Material preparation: In preparation for the infiltration into South Vietnam, in early August 1965, the Company allowed one Squad to take leave first; then when the Company moved to a forest, this Squad stayed in the barracks to watch the weapons while the rest took leave. After a seven-day leave, the soldiers and cadres returned to their unit and were issued more clothing and equipment (see paragraph 56). Each individual was issued the following food: 1 can of fish paste; 300 grams of seasoning powder; 300 grams of sugar, 1 kilogram of salt. Each individual was also issued the following medicine: 20 quinine pills; 20 vitamin pills; 1 can of anti-leech oil (for leeches in the forest).

(2) Preparation of weapons: A number of individual weapons were issued to the soldiers who were not yet armed. Number 1 gunners were not given individual weapons, because they directly operated anti-aircraft guns and did not need individual weapons.

(3) Preparation of Morale: In the political meeting, the cadres used to tell the soldiers that they were going to South Vietnam soon for a long struggle, that during the infiltration they would meet difficulties and hardships which they would have to overcome, and that in order to prevent illness, they should not eat and drink carelessly, or get in touch with the villagers to banter etc.

B. Infiltration route: At 1900 hours on a night in August 1965, the unit with its members went to an area in THANH HOA Province, to join four other Companies of Regiment 66. Group moved on foot from QUI HUONG to National Route 1, and kept moving along this road southward to cross on the LEN and HAM RONG ferries. Around 0400 hours they arrived THANH HOA town and stopped in a village near National Route 1, about one kilometer from the town. Liaison agents had been sent out before to make the necessary arrangements for food and lodging for the infiltration group; therefore,
the residents there came to receive them at the gate with lamps in their hands. Each family received one squad. The food was issued to them by the local authorities, but they had to do their own cooking.

Probably the authorities had ordered the residents to keep strict secrecy; therefore when any soldier was curious and asked the villagers about the name of the village these people did not answer but just shook their heads.

After the meal and a short rest the Group started at 1900 hours. The crew-served weapons were taken apart for ease in carrying. Each of the five companies took turns leading the group. Around 0400 or 0500 hours they arrived at Station 2 where there was the same strict discipline as had applied at Station 1. No one was allowed to go from one house to another; after the meal they went to bed. To take a bath, they had to have permission from the cadre, and two men had to have permission from the cadre, and two men had to go at the same time. The rest could only go to take a bath when the others came back. When night came, the whole Group got on its way again. By day they rested in villages near national route 1. On the average they walked from 25 to 30 kilometers per night, and for every hour of walking they rested 10 minutes.

Since he always travelled at night he was tired from his heavy load and was not allowed to ask anything, Source did not know how far he had gone. After about a half a month, the Group came to the territory of QUANG BINH province. There they switched from route 1 to move westward along a small river. About two or three days later, they took a road in the forest to come to Station 20, which was still in QUANG BINH province. Though it was called a Station, in fact it was only a forest area with no houses, and the reason it was called Station 20 was unknown to Source. Source did not remember exactly how many stations he had passed, but estimated that he had travelled for over 20 days.

The people could realize the hardships and shortages that the soldiers had faced; therefore they welcomed them cordially helped the soldiers whenever they came. In addition to the rations received, the cadres and soldiers - two or three men - shared money with one another to buy chickens, cookies and candies to enjoy themselves. The reason they had money was that Privates Second class who received five plasters per month could spend four plasters and had to put one plaster into a savings fund. Prior to their infiltration, they drew their money from this fund. With these savings, plus the money that their families had given to them, everybody had some extra money. Many of them did not spend all this money; they either asked the youth who had volunteered to transport the rice to Station 20 to return it to their families or gave the money to these youths, because they knew that this money could not be used in South Vietnam.
At Station 20, Source saw a group of about 20 men, aged from 30 on up, whom Source did not converse with, but through their conduct and speech, he was sure that they were the "Military, Civilian, Political and Party" southern cadres who were regrouped to the North, and now were returning to South Vietnam to establish agencies.

After a two day rest at Station 20 to refresh their strength and receive rice, the Group again resumed its travel. From Station 20 the move was made by day, not at night any more, and two days later the Group reached the foot of mountain 1001. Up to that day, the Group had been moving nearly half a month already.

From Station 20 to the foot of mountain 1001, the Group had to cross two suspension bridges that were hooked to tree branches on both banks of the streams. At each end there was a ladder placed against the tree branch, where the suspension bridge was fastened for them to climb and swayed seriously and was hard for them to walk on. Source could not identify this location, nor the location of Station 20 because there was nothing significant that drew his attention. It was just a forest like many other forests.

Also along the way from Station 20 to the foot of mountain 1001, Source often saw groups of Chinese Communist made bicycles bearing the mark PHOENIX (PHUONG HOANG) moving in the same direction. Each Group of bicycles consisted of about 10 volunteer Northern youths carrying two sacks of 30 or 40 kilos of rice. From time to time, Source also saw the bicycles carrying nothing, coming from the opposite direction.

The rice was transported on bicycles to the foot of the mountain and delivered to a group of men and women who were responsible for transhipment. First, this quantity of rice was placed into khaki pouches (like the rice sacks used by the ARVN soldiers), both ends of which would be well tied and formed into a round shape about 60cm long, and weighing 30 kilos. Two pieces of bamboo would be placed along every filled pouch. When ready, each man or woman carried them to cross mountain 1001 to a storage area at the foot of the opposite side of the mountain.

After a night of rest, the Group crossed mountain 1001, received rice and kept on its way again. Source knew that three days after the Group crossed the BEN HAL river, it passed Road 9 in LAOS and came to a big river with a strong current. A rather big ferry, capable of holding from 60 to 70 men and weapons, was available there; and because they were afraid that the airplanes might spot this ferry, they did not use the motor, but it was moved by pulling the cables. The whole Group crossed the river at night. Later, Source was told that this was the SEPONE river.
After crossing the river, the Group continued moving Southward and reached a big earth road, 4 meters wide. Though they did not see any traffic, Source saw the traces of wheels cut deep in the road surface. The tracks turned into the dense jungle on both sides of the road.

Along a section of this road, Source met a group of about 10 men. After Source talked to them, he knew that they were NVN engineers who had come there in 1963 with the responsibility of repairing this road. Looking at them, Source got the impression that they were but animals with skinny builds, jaundiced faces and leaden complexions, because malaria had tortured them for a long time. Their hair hung loose to the shoulders, and their bodies too were covered with long hair which looked repulsive. Though they stated that they had come there to work, in fact they sat trembling along the road sides by their shovels and did nothing. When asked what they ate, they showed a pack of cooked manioc lying on the road side.

The road was long, occasionally the Group moved on it, but sometimes they by passed through the jungle. Two or 3 days later they reached a track about one meter wide, along which there were 3 or 4 suspension bridges spanning the streams. The shapes of these bridges all resembled one another. Each of them had two big ropes that ran parallel from one side to the other side of the stream. The space between the two ropes was about one meter wide. To keep the ropes from being displaced, pieces of bamboo or thin boards were tied underneath these ropes, upon which was laid bamboo so that one could walk. Also, two other ropes were hung at chest height for use as handrails.

Since there were no houses, villages or passers-by, Source could not tell where this Section of road was, but his comrades-in-arms who had operated in this area before told him that this was LAOTIAN territory.

After moving about 10 days in LAOTIAN territory, the Group arrived in Cambodia, and two days later came to a big river 20 or 30 meters wide, the banks of which were covered with thick trees and plants. There a boat operated by two men was available. This boat was capable of holding 15 or 16 men with weapons.

After crossing this river, the Group moved toward the South by day, and rested at night. The rice was picked up from Station along this route as needed. About 2 or 3 days later the Group came to a murky river, about 40 or 50 meters wide, where a ferry called "the people ferry" existed. This ferry could carry 7 or 8 men with weapons. After the crossing, the Group moved along the bank of this river to the east for two days till it arrived in KONTUM. Thus, the Group moved in CAMBODIAN territory for 5 or 6 days.
For unknown reasons the Group did not quarter in KONTUM, but proceeded to Central VIETNAM through a new track cleared by an Engineer Platoon. As this was a new track, wide enough for one man to get through, Source did not know what provinces he passed. The Group moved in the day time only. At night they stopped to cook meals and to sleep in hammocks hanging on the trees.

About one week later (October 1965), they arrived at a forest in QUANG NAM Province. They stayed there for one and a half days to participate in a movement which was organized in commemoration of a hero. A VC cadre said that a VC combattant was captured by the enemy (RVN) and had chosen the deadly torture rather than to reveal the secrets that he had known. There after they took another trail to go Southward. About 15 days later, they arrived at a village in PLEIKU Province which was already occupied by the Headquarters of Regiment 66 and Battalions 8 and 9.

After a 2 days' rest, Company was ordered to move on. They headed for a collecting point which was not revealed to the members. At 17.00 hours, when they had walked 5 more kilometers in the forest, they were ordered to rest and were told that they would have a fiesta on the next morning. The word fiesta was used only to encourage the soldiers; in reality, each Battalion was given one water-buffalo to compensate for the miserable days that they had undergone. Unfortunately, at 13.00 hours on the next day, a liaison-agent of Regiment 66 arrived and stated that Battalion 8 had been engaged in combat with enemy troops (ARVN) since 11.00 hours. The Regiment wanted the unit to get ready to support Battalion 8 at 15.00 hours, thus they gave up the buffalo meat and went back. When they arrived there, the fighting was still in progress.

As Source was sick from malaria, he was assigned to the evacuation of wounded soldiers with three others. At 16.00 hours, while the four of them sat in a shallow stream to wait for carrying out their assignment, a friendly evacuation unit passed by and let them know that their company had been attacked by enemy airplanes. As soon as they got up, a round of heavy artillery (origin unknown) landed nearby and hurt one companion's leg. Immediately afterward, a helicopter made a landing. Source and two others ran away and left the injured one lying there alone.

After they ran a long distance, a second round of heavy artillery exploded near them. A fragment of the round hit Source's arm and slightly wounded him.

Due to the fact that they did not know the way, they ran along the stream. At night, they hung their hammocks on a tree and slept. The next morning, they had their meal and went again. During the day they did not meet anyone,
At 15.00 hours the next day while the 3 of them walked along the stream, they were captured by ARVN troops and were taken to an outpost.

9. Activities of the Unit in SVN.

As stated above, the company had just arrived in SVN and they were attacked by the ARVN on their way to a collecting point. Source was captured in this battle therefore he knew nothing about the activities of the Company and other related units in later days.

10. Morale of the Troops.

Source stated that VC soldiers and cadre are now very demoralized because of the unvarnished truth that they had observed with their own eyes in NVN and SVN.

A. In NVN: VC political cadre used to say that: VC troops had liberated 2/3 of SVN and the Southerners had a strong belief in the PAVN. VC comrades arriving in SVN would quarter with local inhabitants. They would have priority in everything and would be fully fed. The American troops are very barbarous; they killed VC prisoners after they exploited them. The Northern Vietnamese who took refuge in SVN years ago belong to the capitalist class; if those people capture SVN soldiers, they will kill them to avenge their relatives who were brought to public trials in NVN.

Unaware of the true situation in SVN, the majority of the soldiers believed what the Political cadres said; others were dubious. However, nobody wanted to go South because their neighbors who infiltrated into SVN one or two years ago had not returned yet, and no news from them had been received. Another thing was that parents and wives of prospective infiltrators cried and tried to prevent them from going, and cadres had to pacify them.

B. On the Infiltration Route. From the departure (THANH HOA) to way-station 20 (QUANG BINH) there were 7 or 8 soldiers who objected passively by making a feint of being sick. They requested to have a rest and got it, but Source thought that they would probably be forced to go with the following Group. Furthermore, a member of Source's battalion attempted suicide with a grenade to object being forced to continue the trip while he was sick from malaria. He dared not desert because he knew that sooner or later he would be caught.

The infiltration trip was too long. It took them 2 months to arrive in SVN; so when they arrived in SVN, they were tired, starved, sick and demoralized.
C. In SVN. Arriving in SVN, they found that everything was quite contrary to what they had heard in NVN. Therefore, when Battalion 8 of Regiment 66 arrived in SIM village (PLEIKU), 10 soldiers were missing from the Battalion but Source did not know whether they went back to NVN or they surrendered to the RVN. In later days, more diseases existed. The majority of them suffered from malaria, beriberi and diarrhea. Neither drugs nor care were given to sick people. Nobody buried the dead. Those who got sick also had to go on operations because if they did not go, they would have no place to live and no foods to eat. Also, their work was hard but their foods were insufficient. They often ate rice mixed with manioc or wild edible roots and soup cooked with leaves. Therefore, the diseases multiplied very fast. In addition to the above mentioned facts, they were attacked day and night by US and RVN troops and airplanes to such a point that they could not prepare their meals; even if they could, rice was uncooked or burned. Source stated that not only soldiers but also cadres who used to threaten them with everything in NVN, now exchanged salt for bananas with montagnards, plucked leaves and dug up manioc. They also came to empty rice depots to pick up the grains dispersed on the ground. By the above mentioned facts, VC soldiers and cadres were greatly demoralized and they did not have confidence in their superiors any more.
ITEM 96

Interrogation of an officer in the 6th Regiment of the North Vietnamese Army. He was captured by South Vietnamese forces in March 1966 in Quang Tri Province.
SOURCE: NVN National and member of the LAC DONG Party since 1956, infiltrated SVN in July 1964, arriving in THUA THIEN Province. His unit moved to LAOS where he was transferred to an artillery section of northern QUANG TRI and THUA THIEN Provinces. In 1965 he was transferred to a company which became subordinate to Worksite 6, when it was formed in September 1965. He was captured in March 1966 in QUANG TRI Province.

SUMMARY

Worksites were formed in September 1965 in the Northern Sub-Region (QUANG TRI and THUA THIEN) because the Sub-Region did not have a regimental level unit to organize and conduct large scale operations. The Worksites were stationed at the KHE LAOU, BA LONG District, QUANG NGAI Province, which had been bombed many times. Worksite 6 had the responsibility to hold on to the few liberated areas in QUANG TRI Province and use them as stepping stones for attacks on scattered posts in the area. Secondly, Worksite 6 was to propagandize the local populace, in order to organize the people against the SVN government and motivate them to contribute rice to the Liberation Troops, who were experiencing food shortages. As the result Worksite 6 had to move into the lowland areas to obtain rice, and, thus, it introduced the CHIEN DICH DONG XUAN (Spring - Winter Campaign) Plan. According to the plan Worksite 6 was to conduct operations in the plains area; wipe out dispersed SVN forces; and immediately reorganize the local intra-structure after liberating areas. The lowlands people were seldom harassed by the VC. The VC plan was aimed at these people in HAI LANO and TRIEU PHONG Districts. The VC had some support in the coastal areas where there existed some underground cadres who had fought against the French.

BACKGROUND HISTORY

1. Worksite 6 was formed on 15 September 1965 in the KHE LAOU forest, BA LONG District, QUANG TRI Province, Northern Sub-Region (QUANG TRI-THUA THIEN). The VC had to establish Worksite 6, because the Northern Sub-Region did not have a regimental level unit which could collect company level main force units and an Independent Battalion (formerly subordinate to the Military Zone) for large scale operations.

CAMPSITES

2. In September 1965, the Northern Sub-Region headquarters was stationed at AM DA Area (VC name), NAM HOA District, THUA THIEN Province. Worksite 6 was stationed at KHE LAOU, BA LONG District, QUANG TRI Province. Both of these places were bombed many times.

CORRESPONDENCE

3. Source knew that all cadres and soldiers of Worksite 6 were permitted to correspond with their families in NVN through the unit P.O. box. It took three or four months to mail letters from NVN to the unit quartered in the jungle in QUANG TRI or THUA THIEN Province. On the average, Company 15 received 30 to 40 letters per month, but for lack of means, letters were sometimes delivered or mailed every second month. The cadres and soldiers
seldom wrote to their families because they were busy with operations. Writing about secret military matters was absolutely forbidden.

**PRODUCTION**

4. Before the formation of Worksite 6, units had to participate in self-sufficient production which involved clearing land for the cultivation of rice, Indian corn, sweet potatoes or for animal breeding. After September 1965 when the CONG TRUONG was formed, all units received an order to stop the production which was handed over to the local units.

**SUPPLY**

5. Food: In early 1965, Source's unit was stationed in LAOS and produced its own food. Source learned that the other unit also had to be self-sufficient in obtaining food. When they moved to QUANG TRI Province, the Company Adjutant went to the Worksite 6 Adjutant to get necessary rice for the company. Source learned from the soldiers who carried the rice that they received it from an area about a two-day walk from the billet area. The rice storage area were situated in deep jungle; each of them contained about four or five piculs (approximately 550 to 700 lbs.). For security reasons the soldiers were permitted to obtain rice from one storage area which would be immediately destroyed when the rice ran out; then they went to another one. Therefore, the soldiers could identify neither the number of storage areas nor the locations.

6. Ammunition: Source confirmed that Worksite 6 as a whole received ammunition supplies many times.

A. In late fall 1965, the unit moved from LAOS TO KHE LAOU to merge with Worksite 6. Source learned from the Corporal of the Company Armament Section that the ammunition storage area was about seven or eight meters wide was half under and half above ground and was situated on a mountain slope (possibly on the slope of the CO TIEN Mountain) in NAM HOA District, THUA THIEN Province.

B. Later after the arrival of the unit in QUANG TRI Province, the Worksite 6 Transportation Company provided more ammunition. Source learned from the Transport Team that ammunition storage area was situated at BE Village (VC name; location not identified). The ammunition rounds were 12.7 mm.

**WORKSITE 6 POLICY**

7. Just after its formation, Worksite 6 launched many activities to obtain combat achievement and glory for the Worksite to build up the morale of the soldiers, to entice the SVN forces to send reinforcements to be wiped out; to spur local authorities in the lowlands to increase propaganda activities among the masses; and to obstruct the ARVN transportation and supply system.
8. Criticism of Activities: In Mid-February 1966, all Company Commanders and Political Officers met with the Worksite Command for two days to criticize activities, to discuss and to draw up winter and spring plans. Before dealing with the Spring Winter Campaign, the Worksite 6 Command reviewed the military and political situation.

A. Military Situation: The military situation in the Northern Sub Region was not good. In QUANG TRI Province, there were only a few liberated areas, so the responsibility of the Worksite was to hold on to the people in the liberated areas and to use them as stepping stones for attacks on scattered posts in the area.

B. Political Situation: Parallel to the military policy, political propaganda among the people was increased to induce the populace to support the struggle. The Worksite was responsible for promulgating Socialism in order to promote the struggle against the SVN Government among the to motivate the people to contribute rice to supply Liberation Troops due to the food supply problem in mountainous areas poor production and SVN mopping up operations. Due to the above difficulties, Worksite 6 had the responsibility of going to the lowlands to try to gather rice at any price.

DONG XUAN Campaign. After viewing the military, political, and supply situation of the Northern Sub-Region as a whole, and QUANG TRI Province in particular, the Worksite 6 Command intended to launch a campaign to overcome the above difficulties. This campaign was named "CHIEN DICH DONG XUAN" (Spring-Winter Campaign). This Campaign was indefinite and would only be stopped when the Worksite accomplished its goal of conducting active operations in the plains from the THUAN to VIET Estuary, being aggressive in exterminating SVN local units in the areas under enemy (SVN) control in TRIEU PHONG and HAI LANG Districts. Simultaneously they would aggressively counter SVN operations at any price to stay close to the people. After liberating any area, they would immediately reorganize the infra-structures. Therefore, all cadres and soldiers of Worksite 6 had to consolidate ideology and the principal of steadfastness in combat in order to mobilize manpower and resources on the plains to meet food and labor needs. Only when the plain was liberated could propaganda activities be accelerated, the liberated areas enlarged and conditions created to launch attacks on US/SVN armed forces.

ATTITUDE OF PEOPLE IN HAI LANG AND TRIEU PHONG DISTRICTS TOWARDS WORKSITE 6.

10. The majority of the people in HAI LANG and TRIEU PHONG Districts were not deeply affected by VC influence. The people in the plains, especially those who lived near the district capitals, townships or National Routes of these two districts, were seldom harassed by the VC. Therefore, the Northern Sub-Region launched the DONG XUAN Campaign with the hope of gaining control of more people in these two districts to satisfy food and labor requirements. Source learned that the people living along the coast in HAI LANG and TRIEU PHONG Districts liked the VC because
they had previously participated in the Resistance against the French, and there were some underground cadres among them. Therefore, the VC were warmly received and supplied with sufficient food. The people in areas under mixed control did not like the VC. If they saw the VC appear, they would automatically leave their villages for secure areas.

MORALE OF CADRES AND SOLDIERS

11. In general, the morale of the cadres and soldiers of Worksite 6 was relatively high in spite of insufficient supplies. After many battles conducted by the unit, Source realized that all soldiers were high spirited and aggressive in combat. The young Northerners appeared to be very aggressive in combat to liberate 25 percent of SVN territory. They were calm and able to fire at airplanes during air-attacks.

ATTACHMENT 1.

1. DAN: Major, Field Grade Political Officer, last seen by Source in February 1966 at the UNOVAR Battle, QUANG TRI Province, native of the Central Vietnam. About 38 years of age, thin build, 1.60 meters tall, small face, pale complexion, short hair, short forehead, small eyes (seemed to suffer from trachoma), straight nose, white and regular teeth, pointed chin, quick tempered, addicted to smoking.

2. VANG: Senior Captain, Chief Political Officer, last seen by Source in February 1966 at KHE LAOU, QUANG TRI Province, Native of Central Vietnam. About 40 years of age, thin build, 1.60 meters tall, pale complexion, bony face, black short hair, 48 kilos, short forehead, medium face, straight nose, white teeth, medium mouth, pointed chin, quick tempered, addicted to smoking.

3. VAN: Aspirant, Deputy Political Officer of Company 15, last seen by Source in March 1966 at HAI LANG, QUANG TRI Province, native of NAM DINH Province, married with two children. About 34 years of age, medium build, 1.60 meters tall, long face, brown complexion, black hair, flat forehead, medium eyes, straight nose, medium mouth, white teeth, pointed chin; easy, cheerful character; addicted to smoking.
ITEM 98

Interrogation of Private First Class
in the 7th Battalion, 18B Regiment of the
325th Division of the North Vietnamese Army.
He was captured by US forces in March 1966
in Pleiku Province.
VC Occupation:

In the North: Source was a private of the 18B Regt, 325th (New) Div.

In the South: Before infiltrating, source was promoted to PFC and was still subordinate to the old unit.

Date and Place of Capture: Source was captured by US Forces in March 66 near CHU PHONG Mountain, PLEIKU Province.

Weapons and Documents Seized: Two locally manufactured grenades.

I. Biographical Data:

Date and Place of Birth: Born -- 1944 at NGHE AN Province, NVN.

Parents: father, deceased. mother (living), age 70, presently living in HA TINH Province, NVN.

Education: VC 8th grade.

Social class: Poor farmer.

Profession: Student.

Political affiliation: Member of the Labor Youth Group.

Marital status: Single.

II. Past Activities:

21. Prior to 1954:

Source was young and lived with his parents in NGHE AN Province, NVN.

22. 1954 to 1966:

1955: Source attended the initiate course of the village school in NGHE AN Province.
July 65: He was called to military service. They were led to HA TINH Province in order to be assigned to the 18B Regt, 325th Div, but the unit had moved to QUANG BINH Province. Therefore, the recruit group followed on foot. There they were attached to the 7th Bn, 18B Regt, located at QUANG LIEM Village, QUANG TRACH District, to train for infiltrating NVN.

22 Dec 65: The 18B Regt, 325th Div departed on infiltration to the south. Leaving in this order, the 7th, 8th and 9th Bns, left at intervals of an unknown number of days.

23. Circumstances of Capture:

In Mar 66 while the 7th Bn, 18B Regt, was located temporarily near CHU PHONG Mountain they were bombed by US aircraft. The soldiers, in a state of chaos, ran. Only source was wounded and he was left unconscious.

Approx at 0800 hrs source was captured by US Forces.

III. Preliminary Information Obtained:

3. The 18B Regt, 325th (New) Div, infiltrated the south.

General:

The 18B Regt's cover designation was SONG CHU (CHU River) and was established in March 65 at HUONG DO Village, HUONG KHE District, HA TINH Province, NVN. All the soldiers were recruits and reenlistees of HA TINH, TRANH HOA, NGHE AN and QUANG BINH Province, NVN.

In addition, it was known that a majority of the cadre was what was left of the 18th (Old) Regt, which had previously infiltrated RVN.

During infiltration the Regt had the following designations:

The 18B Regt: Group 303.

The 7th Bn: Group 303A.
The 8th Bn: Group 303B.
The 9th Bn: Group 303C.

When the regt arrived in the south it again changed designations.

The 7th Bn: Agricultural Site 7.
The 8th Bn: Agricultural Site 8.
The 9th Bn: Agricultural Site 9.

Cadre:

Regt Commander: MAJ THUAN
Asst Regt CO: Unknown.
Field Grade Political Officer
(A number of others were forgotten by source).

Strength: Unknown.
Weapons: Unknown.

Composition:

Three infantry bns numbered 7, 8 and 9.
One reconnaissance company.
One medical company.
One transportation company.
One signal company.
One engineer company.
One 12.7mm antiaircraft company.
(Source did not know any other elements subordinate to this Regt)

Organizational Chart of the 18B Regt.
(See figure number 1)

32. Group 303A (in the 7th Bn), 18B Regt's Preparation for Infiltrating SVN.

321. General:

In early Aug 65 source with approx 120 prior servicemen and recruits of HUNG NGUYEN District, NGHE AN Province, was assigned to the 7th Bn, 18B. Regt which was located at TRAI QUANG LIEN Village, QUANG TRACH District, QUANG BINH Province, for infiltration training.

322. Training Area:

The 7th Bn, 18B Regt was located throughout the TRAI SIM area of QUANG TRACH District.

323. Training Cadre:

The training was conducted by the company and platoon cadre.

324. Training Program:

Source was trained for a period of four months
in the following training program:

Politics:

The revolution in RVN,
RVN movement,
The policy toward the population,
The policy for prisoners,
The policy for the war dead and the wounded,
Land reform policy.

Military:

Individual combat.
Sqd, plat, and company combat,
Ambush tactics,
Raid tactics,
Attack tactics against airborne troops,
The use of individual weapons.

Moving while carrying a heavy load.

Everyday from 1500 hrs to 1700 hrs all soldiers practiced carrying heavy loads to strengthen themselves for the infiltration.

325. Schedule:

0530 hrs: Reveille and exercise.
0630 " : Breakfast.
0700 " : Training.
1100 " : Rest.
1130 " : Lunch.
1400 " : Training.
1500 " : Practice heavy load carrying.
1800 " : Rest and dinner.
1930 " : Off-duty time.
2200 " : Taps.

326. Trainee Interests:

Mess:

According to the standard, the daily food ration costs 0$67 (NVN money).

Approx one month prior to infiltration day the soldiers received a fortified diet of daily food rations costing 2$40 piastres (NVN).

Leaves:

During the training period, the trainees did not have leaves. They were allowed to write their families; however, they were not allowed to reveal the mission of the unit.
The morale of the Trainees:

During the military training period all the trainees were enthusiastic but knowing they were going south several trainees became downhearted and frightened although the political cadre always tried to lift their spirits.

The Organization of Group 303A for Infiltrating SVN:

General:

On 27 Nov 65, the 7th Bn, 18B Regt, moved to BO TRACH District, QUANG BINH Province for advanced training in politics.

Here every soldier wrote a letter of resolution, the contents of which declared their enthusiasm, before they departed for operations in the south.

On 22 Dec 65 the 7th Battalion organized an oath-taking ceremony presided over by MAJ THUAN, the Regimental Commander. After that the political officer of the battalion received the RVN liberation flag from the regimental commander and the 7th Bn, 18B Regt took an oath that "they would accomplish the RVN liberation mission" which they had received from higher echelons.

Before infiltrating RVN source learned that the 18B Regt changed its designation to Group 303 and the other battalions changed as follows:

**Former:**
The 7th Bn: The 8th Bn: The 9th Bn:

**Redesignated:**
Group 303A Group 303B Group 303C

**Cadre:**
Battalion Commander: Sr CPT. NGUYEN DINH CHIEU.
Assistant Battalion Commander: None.
Political Officer: Sr. CAPT [name unclear]
Assistant Political Officer: ""
Chief-of-Staff: CPT. QUE.
Adjutants: Sr. Sgts LUAM and HAIT
Armorer: Sr Sgt QUY.
Medic: Sr Sgt KHIEM.

**Strength:** 728 persons (?) (Source heard this announced by the CO in the oath-taking ceremony).
Weapons:

Three 82mm mortars.
Three 75mm recoilless rifles.
Four GORYUNOV machine guns.
Eighteen B.40 antitank weapons.
Nine RP 46 light machine guns.
27 RPD machineguns and a number of AK assault rifles and CKC rifles.

Composition:

Three infantry companies.
One combat support company.
One signal platoon.
One reconnaissance squad.

In addition when they departed on infiltration the group had one more reconnaissance platoon subordinate to the 18th B Regt, 325th Div, cover destination /unclear/.

Organizational Chart of Group 303A (is the 7th Bn).

18th B Regt (attached).

331. The 1st Company of Group 303A (i.e., the 7th Bn).

Cadre:

Company Commander: 1st Lt. HOARC KHARC.
Assistant Company Commander: 2nd Lt /unclear/.
Political Officer: 1st Lt. /unclear/.
Asst P.O.: 2nd Lt. /unclear/.

Platoon cadre:

Platoon Leader of the 1st Plat: 2nd Lt /unclear/.
Platoon Leader of the 1st Plat: 2nd Lt /unclear/.
Platoon Leader of the 3rd Plt: /unclear/.

Strength: Approximately 126.

Weapons:

Six B.40 antitank RR.
Three RP 46 light machineguns.
Nine RPD automatic rifles.
An unknown number of AR machineguns and CKC rifles.

**Composition:**

Three infantry platoons.
One light machinegun squad.
One B.40 antitank squad.

332. **The 2nd Co of Group 303A (i.e., the 7th Battalion):**

**Cadre:**

Company Commander: 1st LT TRUONG.
Assistant Company Commander: Unknown.
Political Officer: 1st LT TOAI.

**Strength:** Approximately 130.

**Weapons:**

Six B.40 antitank weapons.
Three RP 46 heavy machineguns.
Nine RPD automatic rifles.
An unknown number of AK Submachineguns and CKC rifles.

**Composition:**

Three infantry platoons.
One B.40 antitank squad.
One RP 46 light machinegun squad.

333. **The 3rd Co of Group 303A (i.e., the 7th Bn):**

**Cadre:**

Company Commander: 1st LT YEM (?).
Political Officer: 1st LT DUC (?).

**Strength:** Approximately 130.

**Weapons:** Same as 1st Company.

**Composition:**
Three infantry platoons.
One B.40 Antitank squad.
One RP 46 light machinegun squad.

334. The 4th Co of Group 303A (i.e., the 7th Bn).

Cadre: Unknown.
Strength: Approximately.
Weapons:
Three 82mm mortars.
(Other details, see following report).

34. RVN Infiltration Route:

22 Dec 65:

At approx 1800 hrs the entire Group 303A (i.e., the 7th Bn, 18th B Regt) started leaving the training base at TAN TRACH Village, BO TRACH District, QUANG BINH Province. They moved on foot along a trail through many bare hills. At approx 0300 hrs on 23 Dec 65 the unit stopped in a jungle near the PHU QUI Agricultural Site of QUANG DINH Province, NVN. They carried the following weapons;

Three 75mm recoilless rifles.
Four GORYUNOV machine.
An unknown number of AK assault rifles (carried by platoon and squad leaders).
An unknown number of rounds for the 82mm mortars, 75mm recoilless rifles and GORYUNOV machinegun.

Composition:
One 82mm mortar platoon.
One 75mm recoilless rifle platoon.
One GORYUNOV machinegun platoon.

23 Dec 65:

At approximately 1800 hrs, the group was still moving south on a red paved road alongside the railroad. At approx 0500 hrs the next morning the group stopped to rest in a jungle near the MY LE Ferry (PHONG LOC District). Movement was resumed the next evening and continued through the night.

25 Dec 65:

At approx 0530 hrs the unit was located in a jungle near THACH BAN Village, LE THUY District. At 1800 hrs they started moving along the red paved road in an
Easterly direction. Approx 0700 on 26 Dec 65 it arrived at LANG HO Village and stopped temporarily to rest for the night. From this station the unit moved during the day starting at 0630 hrs every morning through the following areas:

Hill 1001:

The BEN HAI River (?) (in LAOS).

On National Highway 9.

The SEPONE River.

A strategic road (sic) and through pine jungles.

30 March 66:

While Group 303A stopped temporarily near CHU TRONG Mountain, PLEIKU Province (source did not know the coordinates), it was bombed by aircraft. Source was wounded and unconscious.

According to VC captives CHU VAN KY and PHAM THANH HUNG, who were in the same unit with source, it was known that from CHU PRONG Mountain Area the bn would move nine more days before reaching the rallying point.

Details Obtained on the Commo Liaison Route:

a. VC Strategic Road:

When the unit moved to National Highway #9 (in LAOS) source saw the strategic road parallel to the pine jungle.

After he passed the pine jungle source saw the engineer groups that built the strategic road. Each group consisted of five or six persons wearing NVN uniforms. This road led to the jungle of PLEIKU Province (?) and was crossed by source on 28 Feb 66.

b. The VC Truck Convoy:

On the strategic road, from the SEPONE River to the pine jungle, source periodically saw convoys of four wheel trucks either parked in the thick jungle or carrying goods toward the South. Each convoy consisted of three or four trucks and usually moved between 0100 and 0200 hrs. Source also saw many barrels containing gasoline on both sides of the strategic road.

c. SEPONE River Ferry:

The unit crossed the SEPONE River on a ferry boat which was pulled across manually by rope.

This ferry boat could transport three four-wheel trucks carrying heavy goods (?) and one infantry company.
35. VC Information in NVN:

351. The 325th Div (new) (Cover Designation: SONG HONG).

Late in Jul 65, source with 120 reenlistees of HUNG NGUYEN District, NGHE AN Province, was sent to HUNG KHE District, HA TINH Province, for assignment to the 188 Regt of the 325th Div (new). Source learned that the division headquarters was located at HUONG MAI Village (source could not fix the coordinates), HUONG KHE District. Source did not know when the 325th Div (new) was formed.

Source heard that the 325th Div (new) consisted of three regts as follows:

18th Regt, cover designation SONG CHU.
95th Regt, cover designation SONG MA.
101st Regt, cover designation SONG LAM.

The SONG MA and SONG LAM Regiments were not known to source.

352. Airraids by SVN and USAF in HA TINH and NGHE AN Provinces:

Source only knew the general results of the airraids.

5 Aug 64:

The damaging of VINH City:

POL depot burned after two days of bombing.

The rice-milling plant and carpentry shop were greatly damaged.

Damages to HA TINH City:

One 75mm artillery gun and its crew were destroyed.

A housing area with 28 buildings was burned, and 20 persons killed.

Mar 65:

The paper and sugar factories in THANH CHUONG District, NGHE AN Province were heavily damaged.

The district party committee agency in NAM DAN,
NGHE AN Province, collapsed.

**April 65:**

The armament depot in NGHIA DAN District, NGHE AN Province, was blown up during two days of bombing.

**May 65:**

The power station in VINH City.

The BEN THUY Ferry was damaged.

**July 65, Damages were Sustained by:**

- SONG LAM Sugar Factory, VINH City.
- Cement factory, VINH City.
- VINH City Railroad Station.

All of the above heavily damaged and approximately 40 workers were killed (an unknown number of other casualties) (See report for further details).
ITEM 99

Interrogation of a member of a reconnaissance company of the Reconnaissance Battalion of the 95th Regiment of the 325th Division. He was wounded and captured by U.S. forces in mid-1966 in PLEIKU Province.
The following information was obtained from the interrogation of a Private attached to Recon Bn, 958 Regt, 325 Div. Source was captured by 1st Air Cavalry Division in June 66.

A. Biographical Data.

DOB: 45.  
POB: NGHE AN Province.  
Rank: Private.  
Position: Member 95th Inf Regt, 325th Div.

B. Circumstance of capture:

After infiltrating PLEIKU Province in June 66, the commander and one recon squad reconnoitered landing fields for helicopters and the deployment of US forces in the area (LE THANH PLEIKU).

The unit was discovered and pursued by a patrol of the 1st US Air Cavalry Division. Source was wounded and left on the battlefield. Source was captured in the area.

C. Information Obtained.

1. Circumstance and reason for activity in RVN:

11. In early 65, source joined the army and after two months of recruit training at HUONG KHE District (HA TINH), source was assigned to the 95th Inf Regt, 325th Div. In the new unit source was trained in recon subjects.

12. On 4 Dec 65, the 95th Infantry Regt moved to KY ANH District (HA TINH) for a rest before the infiltration to RVN.

In Mar 66, units of the regiment were ordered to infiltrate and started infiltrating the RVN.

After several weeks when they arrived at Station 20 (near LANG HO), the cadre and soldiers were instructed to leave all insignias and to change military uniforms. They were also issued ID Cards (source saw that the ID card was registered to Group 300A, which would arrive at BAC DANH Agency, B. 45).

13. On 10 Jun 66, the C. 20 Recon Co came to GIA LAI Province (PLEIKU). The cadre also disclosed that the 95th Infantry Regt would continue to move south.

2. The 95th Inf Regt, 325th Div.:

21. General:

211. The VC established the 95th Inf Regt in Dec 64 at HUONG KHE District (HA TINH). The main composition consisted of the skeleton cadre left by the 95th Inf Regt during the infiltration.
212. The 6th Bn, 95th Inf Regt formerly belonged to the 320th Inf. Div. This bn was newly assigned to the 95th Inf Regt.

213. All the regt cadre and soldiers were drafted recruits from NÜHE AN, THANH HO, and HA TINH Provinces. These were assigned to the unit in 1965.

22. Order of Battle:

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<th>Order No</th>
<th>Composition</th>
<th>Cadre</th>
<th>Strength</th>
<th>Equipment</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
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<td>32</td>
<td>Pistols</td>
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<td>Commander (CO): MAJ BINH</td>
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<td>Executive Officer (XO): MAJ HUU</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Chief of Recon: 1LT LUONG</td>
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<td>Chief of Engineers: 1LT THANH</td>
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<td>Cadre: 1LT VAN</td>
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<td>Rear Service Section: CPT THANH</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>C.13 75mm RR Co: ?</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>Four 75 mm RR</td>
<td></td>
<td>c. The composition of each inf bn consisted of: Three inf companies One firepower co One signal co One recon co</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>C.14 82mm Mort Co: ?</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>Six 82 mm Mortars</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>C.15 12-7mm AD Co: ?</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>?</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>C.16 Signal Co: 1LT TUA</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
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<td></td>
<td>C.17 Trans Co: ?</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>?</td>
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<td>C.18 Medical Co: ?</td>
<td>?</td>
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<td></td>
<td>C.19 Engineer Co: ?</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>?</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>C.20 Recon Co: ?</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
3. Cover name of 95th Inf Regt, 325th Div:
Regt: SONG MA.
4th Bn: XA DUNG.
5th Bn: XA DONG.
6th Bn: XA GIAP.

4. Occurrences along the infiltration route.

41. On May 66, when the unit came to Station 57 (LAOS) was ordered to stop because the cadre at the station said that the corridor (between NONTUM and GIA LAI) was blocked and no rice was available. During the stay at the station, each troop received 200 grams of rice instead of 300 grams.

During that time, there was a team of 30 civilian administrative cadre, including a number of women, who had just come to Station 57. They also stayed at the station because of the food shortage.

42. In mid May 66, the group resumed its movement. The unit crossed the BAC River (?) and moved along the Cambodian border to the south.

In late May 66, they crossed National Highway 19 (source knew that the section of road passed was in CAMBODIA).

43. In June 66, the group came to GIA LAI Province (PLEIKU). MAJ CANH, Regt Staff Chief, sent one recon squad to load the recon.

The landing field in IA DRANG. This mission was to study the deployment of the US Forces and to observe their strong and weak points.
ITEM 100

Preliminary interrogation of an officer in the North Vietnamese Army, 98th Support Regiment.
SOURCE. A Lao commissioned officer, from the preliminary interrogation of a North Vietnamese Army (NVNA) officer who defected to the Lao Armed Forces (FAR) in 1967. Source joined the NVNA in 1959, was assigned to the 98th Support Regiment, given political training at Thanh Hoa for four months, and sent to Laos with the 98th Regiment in May 1964. From then until February 1965, who speaks Lao, worked with the Pathet Lao (PL) political officer. From February 1965 until he decided to defect, he obtained the information reported here by personal observation and in conversations with people he met during his travels.

1. Summary: According to source, the Binh Tram 5, formed from the 98th and another NVNA Regiment, is the NVNA unit responsible for the transportation of supplies from Cambodia through Laos to Route 96. Its headquarters are in Cambodia. Binh Tram 5 is responsible for the area from Vietnam to Ban Bac, and Binh Tram 4 has the responsibility for the area from Ban Bac South. There is an anti-aircraft company with 18 machine guns positioned along Route 110. Fourteen battalions are on Route 110 to maintain and guard it. There is a storage area on the Ke Kong from XB 62142 to XB 713175. About 1,200 tons of supplies are shipped out of Cambodia each month. These supplies are brought up the Se Kong. Source estimated that Binh Tram 5 had 140 trucks to move supplies east on Route 110 but could not give details on the movement of supplies along the road.

2. When the 98th NVNA Support Regiment arrived at San Sempo, Laos, in May 1964, it was made up of three battalions, each with four companies. Between June 1964 and February 1965 another regiment, with three battalions was added to it and the resulting group was called Binh Tram (Jungle Military Post) 5. Initially Binh Tram 5 was charged with the construction of the road from the vicinity of XA 4997 in Cambodia to where it joined with Route 96 at YB 4828 in Laos. Two companies also worked on improving the road and repairing bridges in Cambodia. Most of the construction was completed by August 1965. Binh Tram 5 was then made responsible for the maintenance and security of the road and the movement of food from Cambodia through Laos to Route 96. At first the Cambodian Government allowed Binh Tram 5 to use the portion of the road from Siem Pang, but withdrew its permission after a month.

3. At the time of source's defection the headquarters of Binh Tram 5 were in Cambodia, a two-hour walk along the Houei (stream) Ta Ngao from where the Houei Ta Ngao empties into the Se (river) Kong. The headquarters complex consists of more than 50 straw and bamboo buildings about two and a half meters wide and four meters long. Lieutenant Colonel Don was the commander of Binh Tram 5. His deputy was Lieutenant Colonel Le Duc Phuong.
4. Road maintenance and security and movement of supplies from North Vietnam to the area of Ban Bac is the responsibility of Binh Tram 3 (71st Transportation Regiment). From Ban Bac south they are the responsibility of Binh Tram 4 (71st Transportation Regiment).

5. Approximately 40 percent of Binh Tram 5 is armed with Kalashnikov 7.62MM submachine guns and Simanov 7.62MM semi-automatic carbines. All personnel carry one or two hand grenades.

6. There is one anti-aircraft company with 18 12.7MM Goryunov machine guns positioned along Route 110. Fourteen companies responsible for road maintenance and security are stationed along Route 110. Three companies are along the Se Kong from Ban Hat Hai. Two companies are at a storage area along the east bank of the Se Kong. At Binh Tram 5 headquarters there are two companies and there are usually two companies at a rest area. Although these companies are authorized 120 men each, their average strength is about 90. The 3rd NVNA infantry battalion, a combat battalion with 480 troops, is headquartered along the Se Kong from Ban Hat Ngao to Ban Nemo, but it is not under the command of Binh Tram 5.

7. The storage area along the east bank of the Se Kong includes a munitions depot and five food depots. The munitions depot, a straw building with a metal roof painted black, is filled with M-1 and 7.62MM small-arms ammunition and B 140 rounds. No weapons are stored there. Each food depot consists of four to six straw and bamboo buildings about nine meters long and six meters wide. The food depots are between a kilometer and a half and two kilometers apart, between 100 and 200 meters from the river and under a heavy tree canopy. The food depots are always more than 60 percent filled.

8. About 1,200 tons of supplies are shipped out of Cambodia each month. They consist mainly of rice but also include medicine, sugar, condensed milk, salt, coffee, fish sauce, dried fish, and tobacco. Fuel, at the rate of 20 or 30 drums a week, is also shipped. In 1965 there was a shortage of food, but since 1966 there has been sufficient food. There has never been enough malaria or dysentery medicine, but aspirin, bandages, and injectable serums are plentiful. There has always been a shortage of clothing. There is a sufficient supply of weapons, ammunition, and demolition materials for road construction.

9. Food and other supplies are brought up the Se Kong by Cambodian boats and deposited on the river bank between Ban Hat Hai and XB 5905. The NVNA troops have about 60
motorized boats to move the supplies from the river bank to the storage area. They are between eight and ten meters long and can carry about two tons of supplies each. They are used only at night. During the day, they are camouflaged and tied up along the river bank under trees. The NVNA boats were built in 1965 and 1966. The three companies along the Se Kong from Ban Hat Hai to the storage area built the boats, maintained them, and guard the area.

10. Source estimated that Binh Tram 5 had 140 trucks to move supplies east along Route 110. The trucks, truck parts, boat motors, ammunition, weapons, and demolition materials had been brought from North Vietnam, not from Cambodia. One half of the trucks were kept between the storage area and "Hill 200" where the supplies were transferred for onward movement to the east. The other half were east of "Hill 200". Source said "Hill 200" was also known as Se Sou and could be in the vicinity of YB 1429. Source did not know how many trucks were used at any given time, but thought it was a limited number because there was only a limited supply of fuel. He had seen only four-wheeled "autobar" trucks near the storage area and never more than seven of these at one time. He had seen no bumper marking or external identification on any vehicles.

11. In the rainy season, 2,000 bicycles are used to move supplies east on Route 110. He did not know where the bicycles were stored in the dry season.

12. There is a two-building prison. One building contains six Lao armed forces prisoners. The other houses the three PL guards.

13. Nearby is the Sene Keo Hospital complex, which consists of about 30 straw and bamboo buildings with six or seven beds each. The Hospital is under the control of an NVNA doctor with the rank of Captain. In all, there are four doctors and ten field medics at the hospital.

14. There are more than 100 individual huts at the rest area. Until December 1966 there was a small North Vietnamese theatrical group there that put on stage performances and showed films there.
ITEM 101

Follow-up interrogation of
an officer of the North Vietnamese
Army, of the 98th Support Regiment.
Source: A LAO commissioned officer from the interrogation of a North Vietnamese Army (NVNA) officer who defected to the LAO Armed Forces (FAR) in 1967. Source joined the NVNA in 1959. Came to Laos with the 98th Regiment in May 1964. Worked with the Pathet Lao (PL) political officer.

1. Summary: The 98th NVNA Regiment moved into Laos between April and December 1964 bringing with it supplies to be used in the building of Route 110. It was later joined by another three-battalion regiment and in March 1965 the combined force was designated as the BINH TRAM 5. A permanent headquarters was established in Cambodia in November or December 1966. The headquarters has a CW radio. Intragroup communication is by written message.

2. The 98th NVNA support regiment started leaving THANH HOA, North Vietnam, for Laos in April 1964, and Source estimated, all three battalions of the regiment were in place along what is now Route 110 before the end of 1964. The battalion travelled in groups of about 40 men. The first group, riding in two trucks, travelled for two days to reach BAN TLENG (unlocated) on the Lao border. The group stayed there for three days before moving by truck to TCHEPONE. The trip from THANH HOA to TCHEPONE, with travelling done only during daylight hours took about two weeks. From TCHEPONE, the men continued the trip on foot passing through BA BAC and BAN VANG DIEP (unlocated) and arriving in the BAN SEMPO area in late June or early July 1964. The first group marked trees as it went along to leave a trail for succeeding groups to follow. Only about eight of the 40 men in the first group were armed. Each man in the regiment carried about 40 kilograms of cargo. The cargo included shovels, picks, crowbars, machetes, hoes, hammers, dynamite, canned milk, rice, and dried and canned fish.

3. Another regiment, made up of three construction battalions, had reinforced the 98th Regiment by February 1965. The new regiment had about 1000 men, primarily new recruits who although between the ages of 18 and 20 had engineering or road construction experience. In March 1965 the six-battalion construction group was given the name BINH TRAM (jungle military post) 5. A permanent headquarters for BINH TRAMS was established in Cambodia in November or December 1966. Previously, the headquarters had been moved from place to place in the area of Route 110 to avoid air strikes, and never kept in one place more than two weeks. Source visited the headquarters at least once a month.

4. The headquarters of BINH TRAM 5 has a CW radio about 22 inches wide, 14 inches deep and 12 inches high. Its antenna is about 10 meters high. Source did not know its operating frequencies, the type of code used or to whom...
messages are sent. Radio contacts are daily at 0700 and 1500 hours and once during the night. Source assumed the radio messages are concerned with the supply situation and probably also air strike damage. A switchboard with 15 telephones serve the headquarters complex. Communication within BIN TRAN 5 is through written messages carried by couriers assigned to each company.