Peacetime

The assumptions regarding this peacetime situation are:

-- The NVN will maintain their capability to invade (overtly or covertly) SVN through Laos or across the DMZ.

-- In SVN, the NLF will have achieved legal political status, probably under a different name, and the PRP members of the NLF theoretically will have been purged. In actual fact, the PRP will remain covertly in control of the "new" NLF.

-- The NLF objective will remain the same: the establishment of a Communist government in Saigon. They will continue to employ all weapons of subversion to include a highly efficient organization, conspiracy, corruption, a secret army, agitation and propaganda, and economic sabotage.

-- The VC armed units will be mostly disbanded although the NLF will retain the capability to reconstitute their guerrilla units in fairly rapid fashion.

-- The level of violence will be just slightly above normal for a peacetime South Vietnam. Incidents of sabotage, terrorism and harassment will be very low. Selective assassinations and/or abductions will be at a low level. It is assumed further that the GVN will have accommodated the minorities satisfactorily and thus alleviated any threat they pose to SVN internal security.

To combat the NLF in this pose requires the GVN to have:

-- An effective political system which can prevent NLF/PRP takeover through subversion or by default.

-- An effective body of laws aimed at illegal and extralegal activities the NLF/PRP will engage in, backed up by a judicial system affording quick and equitable justice and providing appropriate penalties.

-- A highly effective law enforcement and semi-territorial security force.

-- Military armed forces capable of deterring external aggression.
We consider border security would be the function of the regular military forces augmented by some NP as required. 4/

The considerably decreased levels of violence will allow the disbanding of much of the forces as necessary during the transition period.

We consider, as do State and AID, that responsibilities for internal and territorial security (less border security) would be under the MOI; there would be one NP structure, with a territorial force (similar to the TSF) responsible for law and order in areas outside villages/hamlets and urban areas. This force would be of a paramilitary nature designed to cope also with limited guerrilla activity. There would also be municipal police in all municipalities down to and including hamlets. The territorial force would operate under province control and the municipal force under local control. Administration and support of these elements would be from Saigon, although municipalities might pay local police.

Regular military forces would provide backup support to these forces as required; local defense (PSDF) elements would continue to provide village hamlet defense; RD Cadre would be phased into local government structures or other elements.

The Territorial Police would, in all non-urban areas, have all the functions of security and civil law enforcement to include: intelligence and investigation, patrol and reconnaissance combat, riot control, population control, apprehension, judicial processing, protection of lines of communications between municipalities and civil crime detection and prevention.

This force would be further characterized as follows:

-- Its territorial scope would include South Vietnam's coasts, rivers, air space, and all non-urban areas.

-- Its assets would include ground, sea and air facilities and capabilities.

4/ AID considers that border control should be vested in an element of the NP, similar to the Thai border police. They believe such an element can logically be developed from the NPFF, if manpower trade-offs from the RF become a reality. Additionally, no new territorial police should be developed since the role, training and functions are approximately those for the NPFF.
Police intelligence would continue to be provided by one NP intelligence organization similar to the SPB which would be responsible for all internal security intelligence functions. Its staff personnel would be stationed in municipalities (including villages) and would work in close cooperation with all police.

The municipal police would have all the usual security and law enforcement functions in municipalities down to the hamlet, including a strictly local security intelligence function. Assets of Territorial police such as sea and air lift, would be made available to meet local functional requirements.

The Phoenix-Phung Hoàng structure would be abolished and its facilities and functions taken over by either the Territorial police or Civil Police as appropriate.

The approximate force level for both types of police forces would be somewhere between 150-200,000 men. At the same time, the Regular Forces would continue at a level of approximately 316,000 for a total military and paramilitary/police force level of between 466-516,000. These forces would continue to receive US equipment and advice and be provided with US advisors. The paramilitary/police advisors would be mostly civilian and the regular force advisors US military. It is likely that the bulk of the equipment provided will be US military equipment provided through the MAP or its successor program.

Most US Agencies agree with the general concepts postulated above, but there are some variances.

--- AID considers that "all police should remain in the NP structure without segmenting into 'municipal' divisions except for operational control by administrative entities involved. Additionally, it is doubtful that municipalities can generate sufficient revenue to pay the required levels of police services. Experience with this type of approach in the Philippines has resulted in a completely inadequate system with violent local political orientations and police abuses. The NP should have all the usual civil security and law enforcement functions throughout the entire country, including not only the cities, the villages and hamlets, but also the rural areas, the waterways and roadways and the borders."

--- State believes that the Civil Police should be confined to the cities and towns, down to the district level, and should not be extended to the villages and hamlets. This is where the Territorial Police, or rural constabulary would operate.
SECRET

-- The JCS and COMUSMACV consider that the RF would remain separate from the NP.

-- CIA considers that the territorial force would have a military orientation and remain under the MOD.

In summary, we consider that peacetime security forces must be reduced in size and further amalgamated in comparison to the present force structures and levels.
CONCLUSIONS

Adequate internal security requires successful concurrent accomplishment of balanced political and military tasks.

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The VC/NLF method of operation is through a sophisticated political-military control system which balances political and military effects. Political objectives govern military operations and sometimes vice-versa. The mesh between both is close. The VC have concentrated on building a political organization and on destroying or subverting the GVN's political and administrative structure.

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The GVN system of establishing security is made up of several political-military tasks all of which must be carried out if the objective is to be attained. Yet, the separation between the political and military both in the organizational structure that must accomplish these tasks and in task execution is considerable. Successful accomplishment of these tasks hinges upon close coordination among forces carrying out these tasks; this has not occurred. Forces which are to establish internal-territorial security are controlled by separate and independent GVN agencies which have not worked together closely. GVN operational methods are adequate but have failed largely in execution.

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In addition, until recently allied emphasis has been on accomplishing the military tasks but not the political ones. Thus, despite some significant gains during 1968, internal-territorial security in the rural areas is still inadequate.

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Progress has been limited by:

- increased infiltration from the north and incursion of NVA forces;
- use of the majority of available allied resources to counter the military threat;
- inability to utilize effectively the operational and structural system to counter VC political-military activities; and
- lack of GVN competence, interest, resolve and motivation in regards to internal security.

While sufficient data upon which to draw a firm conclusion is not available, it appears from an examination of opposing forces and strategies that:
there are probably sufficient allied military forces overall to provide a more adequate level of internal and territorial security;

there may not be adequate forces devoted to providing this level of security now; and

there are inadequate resources devoted to internal security at the village-hamlet level.

The approach generally taken in past attempts to improve internal-territorial security was either to develop new programs and forces, or to expand existing forces and provide them with more funds. However, manpower and budgetary constraints, in addition to problems of task execution, limit the feasibility of this approach now. It appears the GVN cannot maintain currently programmed force levels with existing manpower resources; economic constraints limit any increase in GVN current expenditures unless this is accompanied by offsetting additions to GVN revenues or a currency devaluation. These constraints become more important in a post-hostilities period when large force levels will limit needed economic and social development.

We consider that if security is to improve except under the sheer weight of US military force, separate force expansion is not the best way to proceed. What is required are GVN forces of maximum quality and minimum quantity necessary for adequate levels of security -- thus improved GVN management, a more rational use of forces, and better integration of resources. This requires force amalgamation and consolidation, clarification of roles and missions, alignment of GVN ministerial responsibilities and significant leadership and attitudinal improvements in GVN forces.

Such amalgamation is necessary to obtain the largest increase in potential security improvement within the present manpower and funding levels. For example, PF cost less than RF, yet also appear to provide local defense more effectively than RF.

In addition, particularly in view of the fact that the conflict now appears to be shifting to the political arena, emphasis should continue to be shifted on a priority basis to this area at the village-hamlet level, and priority given to those forces operating there.
SECRET

Necessary changes in force structure, force levels and emphasis should be made now. Such action would be less disruptive now than it might be in a post-hostilities situation when US forces may be withdrawing rapidly, and it would better prepare the GVN for future political confrontation with the VC/NLF. The JCS and COMUSMACV do not concur in this view; they consider that force amalgamation would be too disruptive now; major changes should not be made until the post-hostilities period.

-- Change and development of an optimum structure are constrained by:

- political realities in SVN;

- lack of data on force effectiveness, particularly when different elements operate together; and

- lack of agreement within the USG as to the details of force structure, force levels required, what forces would be utilized as a nucleus for any revised structure, and GVN ministerial responsibilities.

-- There are several feasible alternative force structures ranging from a rather complete force amalgamation now, to a minimal amalgamation in the future. Washington agencies, less the JCS, generally support some form of the first; the JCS and COMUSMACV support the latter. Regardless of the alternative, a USG-GVN agreed on force structure that maximizes security in SVN is required. The current GVN force structure does not do this.

-- Distinct from structural alternatives, several separate GVN forces should be consolidated now;

- The PRU should be eliminated as a separate force and selected personnel integrated into the NPFF or SPB.

- Selected members of the SCGC should be integrated into the SBP.

-- Currently programmed force levels of those GVN elements included in internal security should be reassessed by the US Mission in Saigon and the NSC. Our information indicates that currently programmed force levels cannot be sustained beyond CY 1971 even if today's attrition rates are reduced. For general planning, the force level alternative shown in the following table for CY 1970 should be used as a guide. Actual levels should be developed by the US Mission together with the GVN based on a
detailed analysis of separate requirements, attrition, and manpower availability. No significant increases should be supported until this action has been accomplished.

**Territorial Security Forces (TSF)**

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RF</td>
<td>262.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>NPFF</td>
<td>19.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>APT</td>
<td>4.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Subtotal</td>
<td>286.7</td>
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**Internal Security Forces (ISF)**

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<tr>
<td>PF</td>
<td>180.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>NP (UB)</td>
<td>70.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>RD/TS Cadre</td>
<td>54.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSDF (Full Time)</td>
<td>18.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Subtotal</td>
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<tr>
<td>SBP</td>
<td>18.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>GRAND TOTAL</td>
<td>628.0</td>
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No change in the US organizational structure in Saigon is required in the near time frame. However, a single focal point should be established in Washington to monitor and adjust programs and policies supporting the internal security programs in SVN. We consider that this focal point should be empowered to authorize interagency transfer of resources. As an alternative, State and the JCS consider that it should have coordination responsibility only and be authorized to act where there is unanimity; where this cannot be achieved disputes would be resolved at the NSC or White House level.

The effectiveness of all GVN forces involved in internal and territorial security requires improvement.

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In general, all elements have significant leadership and attitudinal problems now that must be corrected if they are to become more effective. We should help the GVN to overlay their system with an effectiveness criterion and instill professionalism in the operating forces. The leadership must perceive the necessity to relate to the people and provide local security.
NP effectiveness has improved but the NP are constrained in improvement by significant leadership limitations, poor national status in relation to RVNAF, military influence on police employment, lack of a career status, inadequate funding, lack of management expertise, inadequate training, and limited rural capability.

RF and RF units vary considerably in effectiveness. They are faced with leadership and motivational problems; many PF units lack adequate training and communications equipment.

The SPB effectiveness is constrained by the same problems that affect the NP aggravated by inadequate technical capabilities.

The RD Cadre have performed some tasks effectively, but have been inadequate in performing their political and organizational functions.

The US Mission in SVN and the GVN have a considerable number of programs under way to improve the quality of forces involved in internal and territorial security, and to improve major programs related to security. These programs are improving the various forces, yet other programs and actions are necessary.

Two main actions are paramount: (1) upgrading of the effectiveness of the NP; (2) improvement in GVN management capabilities at all levels, but particularly at the village-hamlet level. Specifically, action programs to meet requirements for various forces and programs listed in Annex B and C should be developed by the US Mission and the GVN, and supported by USG agencies in Washington. For example: an NP improvement and modernization program similar to that for RVNAF should be instituted; selected RVNAF NCO's or junior officers should be assigned to the village level to help manage security elements.

In addition, the following actions, if taken, should materially effect leadership and attitudinal changes:

(1) Institution of strong and energetic leadership at the top levels of the GVN which is concerned with people;

(2) systematic promotion based on merit and effectiveness; and

(3) systematic punishment of those who mistreat the people.
Direct US involvement in Vietnamese programs should be reduced. Conversely, the US should assist the GVN in carrying out necessary changes and taking actions to satisfy the above requirements. We should make it clear to the GVN at the highest levels that:

- while we will continue support of the GVN, we intend to reduce our direct efforts;
- the basic political and military steps necessary to improve internal security is a GVN responsibility which assumes particular urgency in view of the above and "politicizing" of the conflict.
- we will assist the GVN in actions in this regard;
- despite past improvement, the GVN must put greater emphasis and high level pressure on solving leadership problems at all levels;
- without such emphasis and improvements in internal security the GVN's political life may be short;
- and we retain the option to withdraw particular program support if programs are mismanaged.

A standard data base and reporting system on the effectiveness of those GVN forces involved in internal and territorial security is required. Additional study is also required concerning:

- the level of security in major urban areas and VC/NLF inroads in these areas;
- methods to achieve an adequate degree of border security;
- development of a feasible economic warfare-resources control policy; and
- effectiveness of various security elements operating in combination.

Pressures for improvement in SVN's internal security capability and thus the process of consolidation and amalgamation of GVN forces and their supporting structures and command lines become more urgent in the immediate post-hostilities time frame.

As level of violence subsides and the VC/NLF/PRP shift their tactics and techniques to concentrate on the political arena, the total GVN force levels should decrease accordingly.
In the ultimate peacetime situation, all internal and territorial security forces (with the possible exception of a border security force) should be consolidated under the control of the MOI as paramilitary/police forces; force levels should be reduced significantly by this time period. If the force levels decrease to something approximating the levels projected in this study (total force level of 466-516,000 including regular forces), budgetary and manpower difficulties should be manageable.

During both the post-hostilities and peacetime situations, the VC/NLF/PRP will maintain their primary goal -- overthrow of the GVN and substitution of an NLF/PRP government, requiring the GVN to maintain a high degree of competence in political warfare. Some type of accommodation between the GVN and VC/PRP will probably be reached requiring that GVN pacification and other programs to extend GVN control be revised significantly.

Perhaps the most paramount and over-riding consideration is that improvements in the South Vietnamese internal security capabilities can only come about if the SVN leadership clearly understands and strongly backs programs for improvement.
RECOMMENDATIONS

We recommend that:

1. The quantitative and qualitative methods for improving SVN's internal security capability as proposed in this study be approved by the NSC for use in planning and developing programs by elements of the USG.

2. This study be forwarded to the US Mission in SVN for review and development of coordinated US Mission and GVN actions as required in the following paragraphs.

3. The US Mission in SVN in coordination with the GVN develop action programs to reduce US involvement in Vietnamese programs. Actions in this regard should be reported to the NSC within two months after receipt of this study.

4. The US Mission in SVN in coordination with the GVN develop action programs, within overall existing force levels and spending levels, to devote more US and GVN resources at the village-hamlet level and to develop political-action programs. Actions in this regard should be reported to the NSC within four months after receipt of this study.

5. The US Mission in SVN in coordination with the GVN develop recommendations for an optimum GVN internal-territorial security force level and structure based on wartime conditions. These recommendations should be forwarded to the NSC within five months after receipt of this study.

6. The US Mission in SVN in coordination with the GVN develop plans for an optimum GVN internal-territorial security force level and structure based on peacetime conditions. These plans should be forwarded to the NSC within six months after receipt of this study.

7. Associated, on a continuing basis, the US Mission in SVN in coordination with the GVN review overall GVN force levels and structures semianually and forward results of this review along with any recommended changes to the NSC.
9. Significant increases in GVN force levels (less regular forces) and GVN spending levels not be undertaken until force levels and structures to be supported by the US have been approved by the NSC.

10. GVN forces supported by the US not be expanded beyond the NSC approved levels unless corresponding trade-offs are proposed.

11. A single US focal point be established in Washington to monitor and adjust agency programs and resources (alternative 1), or recommend adjustment to the NSC (Alternative 2).

12. The Department of Defense, with support of other US agencies, assist the US Mission in SVN to develop on a priority basis a standard data base, and a reporting and evaluating system with regard to the effectiveness of GVN forces involved in internal-territorial security. In particular, effectiveness information concerning various security forces acting in combination with each other be developed and used in preparing US Mission and Agency recommendations pertaining to optimum GVN internal-territorial security force levels and structures.
STUDY: IMPROVING SOUTH VIETNAM'S INTERNAL SECURITY SCENE - II

May 1970

annexes: A, B, C.
ANNEX A
VC/NLF METHOD OF OPERATION

The VC/NLF method of operation has been described well in a recent RAND study of D. W. P. Elliot and W. A. Stewart 1/ appropriate portions of which are quoted below (emphasis added). While this study is on only one province, it is considered to be generally representative of operations in most parts of South Vietnam.

* * *

"Despite its strengths and its successes, the Viet Cong system is bureaucratic and cumbersome. In that it relies on intensive communications and delicate balancing of forces, military and political, to maintain system momentum, it is sensitive to interventions that disrupt communications and balance.

"The system is face-to-face communications intensive. Maintenance of the Viet Cong control system demands that its operatives be heavily involved in indoctrination sessions, planning groups, visits to subordinates to monitor and give instructions and to superiors to receive them, and in a variety of agitational activities that seem necessary to sustain adherence to system objectives. Intervention in this process, whether by broad geographical denial, interception of essential cadres, or cutting off local lines of communications isolates the activists from those whose adherence to the movement is marginal at best or who remain in the system because of their personal risk-benefit calculations.

"Those cadres who provide the link between district and village operations play an essential role in maintaining the effectiveness of the Viet Cong system. These are the organizers, activists, and operatives whose activities are shielded by the general military threat posed by the Viet Cong military arm. Anything that erodes their feelings of personal security -- military action that drives major VC units from an area, random small unit patrols by government forces, ambushes set by commando units, suspicion engendered by arrests, detention, and subsequent release of persons with whom these key cadres may be in contact -- may inhibit these cadres in the performance of functions essential to system effectiveness. The response of the Viet Cong to the pacification program of 1966-1967, which was both to reorganize in ways that delegated decision making authority to this level of officials and, perhaps more importantly, to draw upon higher level cadres and send down to this level persons of particular skill, training, and experience, suggests the importance attached by the Viet Cong leadership to maintaining a high level of performance in these functions.

1/ RAND Memorandum RM 5788 ISA/ARPA, January 1969, Pacification and the Viet Cong System in Dinh Tuong.
"In contrast, the marginal adherent or participant in the activities of the Viet Cong system is individually unimportant, although collectively he furnishes the connective tissue of the movement. The marginal adherent is both expendable and replaceable... The essential point is that it is counterproductive to punish such persons during pacification. In fact, punitive action against these marginal participants may imbed them in the Viet Cong system, as it may appear to them as the only possible course.

"In general, the function of the Viet Cong military force is to assure the greater freedom of the political arm. In Viet Cong controlled areas, the presence, or the threat of presence, of sizeable Local or Main Force units posits a threshold of force needed for pacification or even "search and destroy" units to enter the area. Tactically always defensive in their own areas, Viet Cong military units normally sally into contested or government controlled areas for the political objective of asserting a "Viet Cong presence." Part of this political purpose is the demoralization and disintegration of the GVN, which the Viet Cong expect to flow from continued military pressures. This establishes a point of entry for political organizers and activists. Reciprocally, the political organizers and activists create the control system that nourishes and sustains further military activity.

"Viet Cong military capability depends upon a careful balance among its three types of units. Guerrilla units, to operate freely, need to feel that Viet Cong Local Force or Main Force units shield them from inadvertent encounter with regular government forces. Local Force in turn relies upon the potential presence of Main Forces to ensure that government units must be of such size to enter their area of operations as to give warning of their approach. And without Local Forces and guerrilla forces active in an area to check the structure of fortified resting places, stored supplies, and logistical support, not to mention intelligence and security, Main Force units are disinclined to enter the area. To upset the 'infrastructure' of fortified resting places increases both the risk to Local Force units when they do concentrate and the need for them to concentrate for want of alternative safehavens. Thus, to drive the Local Force from an area is to upset the balance of force relationship, leaving the guerrillas vulnerable because of their small unit size and the Main Force unable to enter the contest because, without Local Force cover, Main Force units become highly visible."

More specifically, VC provincial operations have been conducted generally in accordance with the following strategic and tactical precepts:

"The relationship between armed force and territorial control is complex. Initially, armed force is used to break the control of the opposition. Guerrillas or Local Force elements act in an armed propaganda role. They accompany political cadres both to protect them and as a show of force. Usually they succeed in giving the impression of a much larger force than is actually the case. When political organization begins to take root, it provides a jumping.
off point for military operations into adjacent areas for the armed units. The armed units, in turn, protect the political apparatus, and enable it to consolidate and further expand its control. The two elements of this mutually supporting relationship might be termed the "springboard" and the "threshold" concepts.

"The 'springboard' concept derives from the insistence of Viet Cong strategists on operating 'with two legs.' One leg is planted in the base area, while the other walks tentatively through the contested and weak areas. Much attention is paid to the use of base areas as 'springboards' or as stepping stones giving entry into a zone of lesser Viet Cong control. Viet Cong documents also show great sensitivity toward 'enemy encroachments' into their areas, for these encroachments expand the 'enemy's' base of operations and provide jump-off points closer to areas of strong VC control that menace the very base areas that serve as the foundation for VC political-military operations. The 'springboard' is a two-edged sword. Used by one's own forces, it is an indispensible prerequisite for further expansion. Used by the opposition, it threatens the very foundations of one's own position.

"Consolidation and expansion are the two major elements of the Viet Cong strategy for territorial control. Without a consolidated base area, further territorial expansion is difficult. Without territorial expansion, the existing base areas are endangered. The patterns of Viet Cong expansion of military base areas and the areas selected for military operations reflect the springboard concept at work.

"The 'three types of forces' concept of territorial expansion is like a wedge with the village guerrillas backed by Local Force units detailed by the Province Party Committee moving into prospective base areas and clearing the way for larger units. When the base area has been properly prepared, and a 'springboard' established, the heavy regional units (Main Force) move in to add authority to the threat of strong Viet Cong retaliation to GVN encroachments on the base area, and to pose a stronger threat to the GVN areas surrounding the base complex. Then the advance edge of the wedge moves forward again and repeats the same process. Large units cannot operate in the open Delta terrain until the problems of access and withdrawal, as well as the preparation of fortified defenses against ARVN attacks have been attended to. Once moved in, the area threatened by their presence expands, and the GVN troops available to counter the cutting edge of the Local Force are 'pinned down' by the increase in area coverage required of them.

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"The Points at which military activity was employed to support political population control operations seem to have been selected as much on the basis of their strategic location as for the ripeness of the internal situation of these villages for such action. The counterinsurgency maxim that the insurgents are after people and not territory seems considerably to overstate the case.
"The development of friendly and enemy forces in guerrilla warfare, as practiced in Vietnam, has given rise to the rubric 'war without a front.' The Viet Cong characterize this development metaphorically as the 'interlocking comb teeth position.' An interesting description of this is offered by General Vo Nguyen Giap:

With the forms of guerrilla fighting and mobile fighting, and owing to the enemy's conditions and ours in strength, shaping up of force and topography, etc., there appeared on the battlefronts the situation of free zones interlacing with enemy-controlled areas, intersecting and encircling one another....The strategy of long-term war and the guiding principle of fighting from guerrilla war gradually moving to regular war with forms of guerrilla warfare, mobile warfare, including entrenched camp warfare, were very successful experiences of our national liberation war.

"This statement is noteworthy in that it mentions two elements of guerrilla warfare that deserve special attention. The first is the interlaced deployment of friendly and enemy forces and the second is the reference to entrenched camp warfare.

"The 'interlocking comb teeth' metaphor is used by the Viet Cong to describe interlacing friendly and enemy positions. It is characteristic of the stage of mobile warfare, which is, by Viet Cong definition, a stage of equilibrium or balance of forces in which both sides confront each other from positions of relative equality, with territorial boundaries tacitly understood by both sides. By 1965, the Viet Cong had advanced from the stage of guerrilla warfare to a combination of guerrilla and mobile warfare involving concentrated forces of up to regimental strength. A general although unwritten, consensus seemed to operate on the rules of engagement, stemming from an admixture of habit, convenience, and limitations on the capabilities of both sides. The game of chess offers an analogy. A pawn can only move one square: the GVN Popular Force goes out of its post only during the day. The bishop must only move diagonally: Viet Cong units are confined to lines of march that keep careful distance from GVN posts.

"General Giap's term, 'entrenched camp warfare,' which he uses to describe attacks on fortified government positions, is almost equally applicable to Viet Cong military units. The GVN fortifies its areas of control with military posts. The Viet Cong fortify theirs with defensively prepared positions. Viet Cong units require rest points where they can sleep and recover from their fatiguing night marches and a prepared fortified position in these areas where they can defend themselves if attacked. Both sides share similarities in their security requirements and both sides come to essentially the
same solution -- construction of a prepared fortified position. The primary difference is that the ARVN man their posts on a continuous basis, while the Viet Cong units move from one fortified position to another.

"Given the precarious nature of military security arising from the 'interlocking comb teeth' position of both sides, the selection of base areas for Viet Cong units must be done with great care. This relationship is not quite a war without a front; it is a war with many fronts, as well as a war with definite rear base areas (despite the logical implication that a war without a front must also be a war without a rear). The Viet Cong base areas are interspersed between GVN controlled areas and communication routes. The preservation of Viet Cong units is related to their success in concealing their location from the opposition and, if discovered, ensuring that they are in a favorable position to resist attack.

"Preservation of secrecy," as the Viet Cong term their efforts to conceal information on the location and disposition of their military units, is a paramount objective since, as noted above, it multiplies the effect of the threat of the presence of these units, and is necessary for the preservation of the strength of these units. For this reason, the security organization of the population surrounding the base areas must be thoroughly done. The minimum support required by Viet Cong units moving through populated areas is the passive cooperation of the villagers in maintaining the secrecy of their movements.

"A second necessity is that the work of logistical support which a large unit requires must not create ripples that reach the areas of GVN surveillance. To do this, active cooperation of villagers on a wide scale is required both to split the purchase of large quantity of food into many small purchases by village sympathizers and to have villagers keep sufficient rice on hand to sell to the troops when they arrive in the village, so that a sudden tell-tale increase in the volume of sales in GVN market areas can be avoided.

"Other village services, directed toward supporting a unit engaged in actual combat, are the organization of civilian teams for transporting wounded troops and ammunition, and evacuating the dead from the battlefield. Organizing the civilian population to meet these requirements is the task of the local Village Party Chapter, with occasional assistance from specialized cadres higher up in the system. One such cadre, a province security cadre, tells of his role in searching out potential campsite base areas in the 20/7 Zone:

In 1962, ... Chin Duc of the province Security Section leadership attached me to the province unit to see which villages had terrain favorable for stationing troops....
First, when I got to the village, I contacted the local organization to see whether or not the people’s attitude was favorable or hostile, and how many families had contacts in both (VC and GVN) zones, how many local inns there were, and how many "complicate" (e.g. untrustworthy) people go back and forth to trade, and put them under surveillance. Militarily, I had to discover the patterns of GVN activity; how the small units were, how many pinpoint small operations they conducted, and how often they hit the right targets.

After having completed these two tasks, I proposed to the village cadres that they call the villagers together and have them engage in civic tasks like digging fortification trenches and fixing up bridges and roads, so that in the future it would provide a (favorable) battlefield. While this was being done, I could see immediately what the people’s reaction was and could assign people to keep an eye on those who reacted unfavorably....

In summary, it is not only a question of stationing troops anywhere the terrain permits. If there is a military action planned somewhere, the security cadres have to come in first and probe the GVN police and spy machinery in the countryside to see whether it is strong or weak.

"The emphasis on continuity in the expansion of the political structure is paralleled by the emphasis on continuity in the expansion of military activities. The strategy of military development is that:

Concentration will be made step-by-step, from three-man cells in (a) squad, and then from squads into (a) platoon. Development of local guerrillas must follow the same (method). Concentration must be undertaken at the proper time.

* * *

"The role of the battalion-sized units in Dinh Tuong, region units as well as the province 51st Local Force Battalion, has been essentially a passive one. It is the potential that they represent, and the threat that they pose, that keeps GVN units tied down in static security roles. More importantly, it posits a threshold of force necessary to enter any area that they are known to frequent.

* * *

"The foregoing pattern of military activities, balanced carefully against political capabilities and objectives, is a blueprint for cautious expansion. Assured control of territory and of people is basic to continued advance. The Viet Cong ‘springboard’ metaphor
usefully characterizes the conservation of the approach and the need for elaborate preparation before an extension of their control. The 'interlocking comb teeth' metaphor similarly characterizes their style of operation in contested areas. Emphasis upon the creation of fortified camps and other infrastructure activity, upon the preservation of secrecy in connection with military movements, and the defensive character of Viet Cong military activity -- except for politically directed offensive sallies from base areas, all suggest elements of vulnerability to which the Viet Cong are sensitive.

"Two main elements of weakness can be perceived in the carefully conceived pattern of mutual support between the concentrated Main and Local Force units, and the political organization in the villages. The first is a decline in the credibility of the threat posed by Main and Local Force units, which would reduce the threshold of force required to penetrate Viet Cong controlled ground. Put differently, it is an erosion of the belief that they may run into sizable Viet Cong units, a belief that inhibits small government units from entering Viet Cong territory in operations directed against the system of political control. The second weak element is the ability of the local population to support Viet Cong forces coming into their area. Inability to furnish food, shelter, information, and the like could stem either from a dwindling of population and resources in an area or from loss of cadre control over the population, or both.

* * *

"Finally, the view of the Viet Cong as a system implies a need to deal with it systematically. It is useful, of course, to apply pressure at particular points of the enemy's system, to break down where possible his face-to-face and other communications, to apprehend or drive to cover those cadres who provide the district-village links, to surprise or destroy or force out of operation His military forces or even to upset the balance among Guerrilla, Local Force, and Main Force activity that is prized by Viet Cong doctrine, and to bring selected areas under government control. Given the capacity of the Viet Cong structure to adapt, however, simultaneous pressure on the system at a number of points may be required. This should include explicit recognition of the need to take the local requirements and operations of the enemy system into consideration when planning counter-operations....

"...Viet Cong fears of the mobility that U.S. forces bring to military operations, their preoccupation with maintaining communications and providing leadership, and their concern over loss of control in areas that they regard as strategically important could be systemically exploited."
ANNEX B

GVN FORCES ENGAGED IN INTERNAL SECURITY OPERATIONS

This annex contains a detailed discussion of the various GVN forces engaged in internal security operations. Each force is examined as to organization, roles and mission, responsibility for US advice and support, effectiveness, adequacy, and requirements for improvement. However, the effectiveness analysis is limited by the availability of factual data on some of the forces and the lack of a standard base against which to measure force effectiveness.

Regional and Popular Forces

Regional (RF) and Popular (PF) Forces are the primary military forces engaged in territorial and internal security operations. The main role of the RF now is to clear areas selected for pacification of enemy local force units, maintain security in these areas, augment PF, and protect key installations and vital lines of communications. PF provide local security for villages and hamlets under GVN control (until relieved by National Police), conduct operations against VC guerrillas. Current planning in SVN calls for RF to assume the role of regular forces now engaged in pacification operations as the RF become more capable. The PF and police would then take on more of the defensive missions for both internal and territorial security.

Both RF and PF are part of the GVN military structure, operating under operational control of province and district chiefs, but supported administratively and logistically by the regular Army structure. Since the province and district chiefs are practically all military, operational employment of RF/PF has been satisfactory. RF are organized in companies and PF in platoons; RF control headquarters (groups) are being organized as part of the RVNAF improvement program. During 1969, there are plans to place PF units under the control of village administrative committees where there is efficient village administration. The effect this will have on PF performance is unknown but it may be generally detrimental unless there is some centralized training and supervision. However, we do favor the attempt to place the PF under village control though we recognize that most district chiefs will continue to be actively involved in PF operations for some time to come.
US advice and support for RF and PF is through the MACV Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) structure. US Mobile Advisory Teams (MATS) (small 5 man teams) have added backbone to the RF and PF, improved their training, and helped make increased air and artillery support available. Other similar programs such as the Marine Combined Action Platoons, training courses conducted by US combat units, and numerous combined operations, have enhanced the capability of the RF and PF.

RF and PF provide both territorial and internal security, yet there are significant differences in recruitment, employment and contribution to internal security.

-- About 80% of PF units are recruited primarily from their own or adjacent villages, while only about 25% of PF units serve close to their homes. Thus PF, under district control, are really local military forces, while the RF is a provincial force.

-- RF are utilized as a flexible, mobile force which can take part in large unit operations with regular forces, replace ARVN battalions currently in a pacification and territorial security role, and provide a security umbrella for RD cadre and Peoples Self Defense Forces (PSDF). PF, on the other hand, are stationed in or just outside hamlets to provide the primary local defense against overt enemy actions.

-- The actual number of RF/PF units participating in offensive operations is not known but about 21% of RF are assigned to offensive or reaction forces, versus 40% of the PF.

-- Both elements have undergone significant expansion during 1968. The RF have grown from 151,000 at the end of 1967 to 228,000 by the end of February 1969 while the PF have expanded from 149,000 to 175,000 during the same period. By the end of FY1969, according to expansion plans, the RF will level off at a strength of about 253,000 organized in 1479 companies (although about 38% of the overall RF strength is in non-combat overhead), and PF at a strength of about 178,000 organized in 4861 platoons (PF overhead is about 10%).

-- With respect to employment, as of the end of January 1969 about 48% of RF units and about 79% of PF units were assigned an internal
security mission; 53% of RF units and 17% of the PF units were assigned a territorial security mission - specific assignments are shown in the following table.

**TABLE B1. RF AND PF EMPLOYMENT (% OF UNITS)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission</th>
<th>RF Co's</th>
<th>PF Platoons</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Security of Hamlets/Villages</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security of Province/District Towns</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security of LOC's or Key Installations</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Offensive, Reserve and Reaction Missions</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- From MACV TFES, 31 Jan 1969

Compared with enemy military forces, the current ratio of RF/PF forces is barely adequate. With reasonable effort and good intelligence, RF/PF units should be able to contain the level of enemy activity. However, if US force levels decline and those ARVN forces now engaged in pacification must cope with enemy main forces, then the ratio becomes less favorable. Further, RF and PF now are limited in their capability to concentrate against the enemy because of limited mobility and because of their defensive missions.

Concerning effectiveness, there is little doubt that RF and PF have improved in combat potential. RF and PF units have received priority US and GVN attention in 1968.

Modernization has added about 100,000 M-16 rifles to RF and PF with another 150,000 to be issued in CY 1969. As of December, 1968, US advisor rated 27% of RF units superior in firepower to the VC and 44% equivalent; 19% PF units were rated superior, 44% equivalent and 26% inferior to the VC.

Both RF and PF are now conducting slightly less than twice the number of operations than they conducted during the first quarter of 1968. About 75% of these are conducted at night with 45% of RF and 60% of PF
contacts occurring at night. However, results of operation per RF and PF unit, per operation, and per contact show only marginal improvement.

RF and PF units probably have assisted in the significant expansion of GVN population control in rural areas from 53% in January 1968 to 64.9% in December.

Despite improvements, RF and PF effectiveness is still not yet adequate.

COMUSMACV reports that the pace of RF/PF improvement is still not rapid enough. The first year's improvement program in 1968 was moderately successful, and with continued high level GVN interest, improvement should continue in 1969. But degree of improvement varies from unit to unit and area to area.

Despite considerable efforts in 1968, there are still serious shortcomings in leadership, training and firepower.

The RF has about 3.5 present for duty officers per company of the authorized 6; in spite of a 70% increase during the last six months of 1968, only 34% of the authorized captains through colonel were assigned on 31 December 1968. About 71% of the authorized senior non-commissioned are assigned. In the PF, leader strength increased 39% in the last six months of 1968, filling all authorized positions.

As of the end of January 1969 about 67% of RF units have sufficient radios (6) to conduct their mission; in contrast, 58% of the PF units are hampered because they only have one operational radio.

About 57% of PF units and 40% of RF units (as of January 1968) were receiving less than adequate training.

Analysis of Territorial Forces Evaluation System (TFES) and Hamlet Evaluation System (HES) data, indicates that the population unprotected by RF or PF improved during 1968 (through September) almost as rapidly as those protected by RF or PF; further, security improvement existed only when PF were present. RF, however, outperform PF in an offensive role, although the PF has improved its kill ratio relative to RF during 1968 - from 41% in 1967 to 55% in 1968.
The actual effect of RF/PF operations on local security is not known completely. Tentative analysis indicates that RF/PF operating together have the best effect on HES scores, followed by PF operating alone; RF operating alone tend to be associated with HES regressions, except in IV Corps.

With respect to VCI neutralizations, limited data indicates that about 7.5% of the total neutralization are by RF and PF.

A number of internal improvements and changes are required to develop the RF and PF into an effective political and military force to counter the VC. While some actions to accomplish this goal are underway, others are not.

Top echelon US and GVN political action is required to emphasize and reward professionalism in the RF and PF by making competence the basis of promotion. The promotion system should be overlayed with effectiveness criteria and RF and PF soldiers should have equal opportunity for advancement as regular forces.

RF and PF require continued priority attention by increasing support from regular forces, by providing more and better functioning communications equipment, and by detailing more regular force officers and NCO's to fill leadership shortages.

Reward of unit and individual performance in providing internal security is required through promotion, awards and publicity.

Continued revitalization of the RF is required by redistribution of leaders from combat elements, cross assignment of ARVN officers, and improved training and motivation.

High quality leadership, espirit and good training are more important to RF/PF combat performance than personnel and equipment increases. Moreover, RF/PF operate best in I Corps where there are good ARVN divisions and worst in III Corps where the ARVN divisions have poor records. Thus, leadership improvements and improving ARVN performance may be the best keys to improving RF/PF performance.

In summary, RF and PF forces, with continued high level US and GVN attention, with some expansion, with equipment modernization and with leadership improvements, should show increased effectiveness and be capable of fulfilling their role in the overall security system.
The National Police organization emerged by National Decree in June of 1962 from a conglomerate of smaller internal security agencies; thus, long-term police expertise and experience is limited. From a force of about 19,000 in 1963, the NP has expanded to about 78,000 by January 1969. Approved plans call for the NP to expand to 102,000 by end CY 1970; revised planning in SVN calls for the NP to expand to 120,000 by end CY 1970. Integral to the NP are the Police Field Forces (PFF) and the Special Police Branch (SPB), in addition to the major component, the Uniformed Police (UP). Additional details concerning development of the NP are contained in Appendix 1.

The SPB is one of the two civilian intelligence organizations within the GVN and is responsible "for investigation and research of any crimes against national politics or security." In general, their operations are focussed upon penetration into and identification of the VCI. The PFF were designed for rural policing as a replacement for the civil guard which was transferred from MOI to MOD and redesigned into the RF. The PFF was given the primary mission of anti-VCI action in 1967. They are organized and equipped along military lines (in companies and platoons). In general, they frequently have been malemployed in military operations and as static guards. However, since late 1968, this malemployment has been reduced.

The NP, particularly those in Saigon, have been involved, one way or another, with internal GVN political struggles since their inception. When GVN administrations changed, so did the police leadership (frequently by arrests), often resulting in complete paralysis of entire directorates of NP. Senior positions have been political appointments primarily of military officers, and advancement is by political loyalty or opportunity for corruption.

As a result of political influences, and failure of the GVN to grant the NP recruitment and budgetary priorities, NP effectiveness in traditional and prescribed police functions has been limited. Additionally, the NP has had a military orientation due to poor security conditions and because military personnel, untrained in civil police supervision have been in command positions.
Since the 1960 transfer of the Civil Guard, the NP have been largely an urban-located law and order force with few NP operating in rural areas. In urban areas, where approximately 50% of the police operate, they have proven reasonably effective since they are deployed in sufficient numbers and have adequate leadership. At present, incomplete records from III and IV Corps indicate the NP have only about 2,500 Uniformed Police assigned to the village and hamlet level. In the rural areas, where law and order has been traditionally a function of the village notables and not an adjunct of the central government, the NP have not been particularly effective. This has been due in part to poor leadership, absence of effective territorial security, and traditional attitudes. Police activities have focused on the VCI rather than provision of law and order. In this latter mission, evidence of effectiveness is conflicting -- PFF reports for 1968 indicated they killed and captured about 6,000 VCI, about 60% of the total VCI neutralized; however, limited VCI data indicates that the NP overall only account for about 10% of VCI neutralizations.

GVN Organization

Although centrally organized under the Ministry of the Interior, the police structure is only nominally national. Operational control is decentralized to province, district, and autonomous city. Support and policy guidance emanates centrally from the Director General of National Police (DGNP) to four regional police directors and thence to province chiefs and mayors. The several major components (NPFF and SPB) at times have operated semi-independently, resulting in fragmented effort. The structure is organizationally adequate but suffers from political fragmentation, and a military orientation, resulting in low priorities to police efforts. All DGNPs have been Vietnamese Army officers and most province chiefs since 1964 have been military officers. Expansion and improvements in effectiveness of the police has frequently been limited by inadequate funds.

US Support

The overall NP effort is advised and supported by AID with 226 of the 274 US advisors being AID or AID hired and with AID providing $21 million of the $28 million for the program in FY 1969 and about $20 million of the $26 in FY 1970. The SPB is advised by the CIA, although AID is increasing support. The PFF are supported by both AID and DOD. AID advisors function under the jurisdiction of the MACV Civil Operation and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) apparatus. Qualitatively, COMUSMACV considers that US advice is effective but that more advisors are needed as the NP expand, particularly mobile training teams.
Effectiveness and Constraints

In general the NP have demonstrated improved effectiveness in urban areas but have been ineffective in providing internal security in the rural areas of SVN. Population and resources control operations have not materially affected VC activities. Police ineffectiveness, inadequacies in detention facilities and the judicial system, poor leadership, and corruption all have combined to give the police a bad image. While this has been mitigated somewhat by effective police performance during the 1968 Tet offensive, and by fairly effective performance in urban areas, the NP require significant improvement.

- As indicated previously, the people of South Vietnam, especially those in the rural areas, traditionally have not looked to the police for protection nor for maintenance of law and order. Thus, efforts to make the National Police more efficient and effective and to expand their size and their area of operations necessarily face a long arduous struggle to gain the acceptance of the SVN populace. Hints and rumors of corruption, nepotism and malfeasance plague the NP as well as RVNAF, and tend to have more importance with regard to the NP than perhaps any other force in SVN.

- More specifically, the National Police have suffered over the years from low priority within the GVN. This is not only their priority with regard to manpower but money as well. An example of the problem is that the National Police had 5,000 personnel recruited during the last quarter of 1968, but was unable to induct them and begin to train them due to lack of funds. Further, in general, the National Police pay runs less than the ARVN equivalent and we are concerned in DOD over the low pay of ARVN.

- Other systematic problems which have existed are that only 13,000 personnel out of the 80,000 now a part of the National Police have career status. Coupled with this, is a promotion system in which merit promotions are virtually nonexistent and which is archaic at best and criminally unjust at worst. The low percentage of career personnel (16.3%) increases the

1/ We have very little factual data on police effectiveness anywhere.
lack of incentive and low morale within the ranks and moves to reinforce a low level of professionalism. The whole promotion system requires drastic overhaul and should be a matter of priority attention.

-- Additionally, the training program, at present, cannot provide sufficient numbers of civilian personnel to fill the leadership positions within the NP significantly. Despite continuing US commodity and advisory support, significant professionalism of the NP will not develop until the GVN promulgates a National Police Career Service and provides sustaining budgetary and personnel support.

-- Improvement of the police effectiveness in rural areas is also constrained by the limited GVN administrative capability below district level. Despite GVN plans to assign more police to the village level in 1969, many village administrations are not considered competent, and many probably have reached some accommodation with the VC. SVN also suffers from the lack of an effective system of population control and identification. While there is a program in progress to establish such a system, it must be accelerated considerably if it is to be completed within a reasonable number of years.

Table B2 compares NPFF, RF and PF effectiveness in killing VC during 1968. NPFF were twice as productive as RF/PF; each 1,000 NPFF killed 254 VC versus 128 for RF and 101 for PF. Similarly, NPFF were 3-4 times as efficient as RF/PF; the NPFF enemy-friendly kill ratio was 13.2 versus 4.6 for RF and 2.7 for PF. In addition, the NPFF captured and apprehended another 7.3 VC for every one they killed (18,541 VC captured and apprehended in 1968, versus 2535 VC killed). However, it should be noted that these comparisons are based on casualties reported by each force -- essentially evaluating their own effectiveness -- and are thus somewhat suspect.

TABLE B2. COMPARISON OF FORCE EFFECTIVENESS - 1968

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>VC Captured</th>
<th>Friendly KIA</th>
<th>Average Strength (000's)</th>
<th>Average Operations Per Month</th>
<th>Kill Ratio VC/ Friendly</th>
<th>VC KIA Per 1,000 Friendly</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NPFF</td>
<td>18,541</td>
<td>2535</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>23.6</td>
<td>13.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RF</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>24,524</td>
<td>5359</td>
<td>192.2</td>
<td>55.8</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PF</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>16,494</td>
<td>6162</td>
<td>164.1</td>
<td>64.4</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2/ See Annex C, p C-1
However, based on limited data, we estimate that only 1-2% of the VC the NPFF neutralize are members of the VCI, even though the prime mission of the NPFF is to neutralize VCI targeted by the Phoenix program. Better targeting would have a higher payoff.

Despite the limited NP performance in the past, the current Director of the NP and the Chief of the SPB both are considered competent and dedicated individuals. Their leadership should have positive influence on police performance.

**Improvement in Effectiveness**

There is little doubt that quantitative expansion of law and order forces is required. However, major expansion is constrained by availability of qualified manpower. AID considers that the currently planned annual expansion of 10,000 personnel for all police elements is the optimum desirable so that quality will be maintained. Of this only 3,000 in CY69 and 2,000 in CY70 are for the uniformed police. COMUSMACV considers that the NP should be expanded to a 120,000 level within a two-year time-frame instead of the currently planned four years; 12,000 added by end CY 1969 and 30,000 by end CY 1970. In support of this view, the Joint Staff considers that in view of the possibility that the Paris talks will lead to a reduction in military activity in SVN within the next two years, police expansion to
120,000 should take place by end CY 70 rather than at the slower four year pace: "It is recognized that this accelerated expansion will produce problems in securing qualified manpower, leaders and advisors for the program. However, with the RVNAF expansion completed in mid-1969, these problems are capable of solution. Any plan for expansion within two years would have to be flexible to permit reallocation of manpower to other areas if the situation should so dictate."

AID considers that, if accelerated expansion is undertaken, the most productive course would be to use members of the RF, rather than untrained or inexperienced recruits.

Because of the planned expansion of RVNAF and the limited availability of qualified manpower and existing leadership limitations of the NP, it appears that expansion at the 10,000 rate probably will be difficult, since to get back on track, about 15,000 additional police are required to be recruited and trained in 1969. Of this amount, 9,600 are to go to the PFF -- which will require a substantial short-term paramilitary advisory effort.

Existing GVN mobilization directives pose a clear stricture to NP development. It must secure half its new personnel from the 24-33 age group and the remainder must be over 34 years of age. Approximately 35,000 policemen are eligible for the draft. Without sufficient recruitment priority, further numerical development and improved national internal security stature of the NP appears dubious when juxtaposed to force levels of over 870,000 in RVNAF plus some 1,000,000 in Popular Self Defense Force (PSDF) units.

We consider their the best course for extension of law and order forces is to integrate qualified members of the PF into the NP(UB) in the more secure areas. In addition, some qualified RF with police backgrounds could also be integrated. The rate of integration would depend on PF availability and capability and training replacements; the rate of expansion of the NP would have to be reassessed but should be at the maximum consistent with quality, manpower availability and other internal security programs.

This course will provide adequate flexibility, and assist deployment of police to village-hamlet level since the majority of the PF are recruited and deployed at village/hamlet level and could integrate in
the NP as the situation warrants. Such integration should begin in the most secure areas where PF are available. The PF are considered a better choice than the RF, since the latter are employed in military clearing and securing operations against VC/local forces and guerrillas, while the PF have been and will continue to be more defensively oriented. Further, PF are recruited locally and thus generally relate better to the local population and probably will remain in the local areas.

AID has serious reservations about integration of PF. They consider that the best course for police expansion is through allocation of qualified RF/PF manpower if new recruits are not available. These inputs would be made available for assignment to the NP without restriction, dependent on development needs. "Although the PF is said to be oriented to the local level, it does not provide the caliber of personnel required for police education without a high degree of selectivity. Additionally, the RF, when constituted as the Civil Guard, received training for 20,000 of its membership by AID in police operations. It is patently pointless to encourage the development of a law enforcement agency, of which many demands are made by the civilian populace, by integrating low caliber PF personnel, thereby compounding already obvious difficulties within the police structure."

With respect to the PFF, we consider their improvements would result in internal security by having the PFF become integrated closely with the RF in both operations and training. Their functioning closely approximates that of RF since they act as a mobile force at district level; and it would strengthen RF operations by providing an anti-VCI capability during clearing and security operations in contested areas. In addition, better targeting of VCI would result in increased VCI eliminations.

Associated with NP expansion, we should develop US/GVN action to provide suitable utilization of US or GVN training facilities and personnel to reduce NP training backlog and expansion training requirements until the end of 1970.

Qualitative Improvements

Major improvements are required in police leadership. While the police probably cannot be depoliticized, an effectiveness criterion can be overlayed on the existing system. Associated, career service status for the NP is required to provide opportunities for adequate internal training and advancement prior to major expansion.
NP effectiveness has been hampered by internal training inadequacies. Additional advisory assistance, more training facilities, and more GVN instructors are required both to reduce the training backlog and train new recruits. As RVNAF expansion goals are reached, combined utilization of RVNAF facilities, both national and provincial can be considered.

The NP require training and motivational indoctrination concerning respect for law and order and for the populace. In addition they must be trained and motivated for operations in rural areas.

High priority NP improvement and modernization program, similar to the on-going RVNAF program, is required to upgrade NP capabilities and effectiveness -- to include provision of more modernized arms and equipment through DOD funding to allow the NP to compete with the VC in rural areas.

Associated with the above training requirement, Mobile Advisory Teams (MAT's), augmented with qualified US and Vietnamese police instructors, are required to provide such training to NP deployed in rural areas without detriment to current GVN internal security capabilities.

An increased GVN budget for the Police is required to provide adequate funds for police expansion and qualitative improvement.

The improvements in national police have been constrained by inadequate GVN funding and emphasis. If the GVN cannot do this and in fact takes action to fulfill the preceeding requirement, then US funds are required for this purpose to supplement GVN funds. The following are minimum requirements:

1. Secure GVN budgetary priority for NP sufficient to ensure recruit inputs adequate to achieve the programmed NP force levels.

2. Ensure that any 1969 and 1970 shortfalls in piaster budget for these force levels are absorbed by US Special Fund or American AID Chapter if GVN budget support cannot be generated sufficient to satisfy effective operations and maintenance, e.g., feed trainees, recruits and prisoners, provide uniforms, maintain facilities, etc.
Operational Improvements

The police must expand their presence into the rural area as a counter to the VC and to provide law and order. Major portions of the NP must go to the village and hamlet level. Integration of selected PF in secure areas will assist in expanding police capabilities in these areas. Associated, province and district chiefs and village administrators must be adequately trained so that they can effectively manage and employ NP.

In addition to bringing effective police functions to the rural areas, the National Identification Program requires expansion and acceleration if population control is to be effective. The identification card phase must be completed as soon as feasible.

US Support

Increased US advisory support to the NP is required. Specifically:

-- The number of advisors in the CORDS Public Safety Division are required to be raised to properly address CY69-70 NP development.

-- Additional qualified military and police personnel are required for MACV CORDS to improve effectiveness and assist in rural deployment of the NP.

-- A more effective preparatory police advisory training program is required with emphasis on police operations in rural Vietnam.

Special Police Branch (SPB)

As an integral part of the NP, the SPB is one of the two civilian intelligence organizations. Its principal current missions are (1) to neutralize VCI in accordance with a presidential decree charging SPB with executive responsibilities for Phung Hoang and (2) to conduct operations for the collection and dissemination of intelligence on the VCI. Associated, the SPB also must do the investigative work necessary for prosecution of VCI suspects.

The SPB is part of the NP structure under the GVN Ministry of Interior; however, on the US side, CIA has the responsibility for advisory and liaison.
roles for the SPB. About 60 CIA advisors are involved in the SPB program. The normal requirements for SPB support from CIA were anticipated in a budget forecast for FY69 ($2.6 million) and FY70 ($3.3 million). However, as the tempo of training picks up, this crucial part of the CIA program may require added advisory assistance.

As of the end of January 1969, there were 13,496 SPB with expansion planned to 17,500 by the end CY 1970. Under MACV plans to expand the NP to 120,000 by end CY 1970, the SPB would expand to 18,000 at this time. Currently about 50% of the SPB is assigned at District level; CIA estimates that the pace of the program to expand presence at this vital level should quicken because of lessons learned during the past year and better coordination among participating US agencies. 3 /

Information of the effectiveness of the SPB is sparse, but their effectiveness has been limited in the past. SPB effectiveness has been constrained by the same difficulties that affect the entire NP structure, and perhaps to a greater degree because of their more technical functions. And SPB effectiveness is one of the chief factors in the anti-VC program.

SPB has been handicapped by a low administrative and budgetary priority, a shortage of skilled manpower, inexperience, deficient training, inefficient organization, and the absence of a career concept and service esprit. CIA considers that some recent accomplishments should have long-term, service-wide effect such as a new decree that reinforces the reorganization in progress for the past year, provides the basis for autonomy within the NP and the formation of a career service, and reasserts SPB control over its own training.

Incomplete data indicates that the SPB account for only a small percentage of the VCI neutralizations (for example, only about 3% of the total VCI neutralized during October 1968).

Lack of training has hampered the SPB. Only about 2200 SPB have received basic intelligence training. However, CIA estimated that the basic training of 8,000 SPB officers is an attainable target in FY70 if the current expansion of training facilities (especially regional schools) proceeds smoothly. Of those 8,000, as many as 3,500 could be given some advanced or specialized training.

The SPB concentration on developing intelligence for VCI neutralizations has handicapped other investigative work of the NP overall.

3/ Assignment figure based on CIA estimates; we believe actual figure may be considerably lower.
The SPB intelligence product has multiplied and improved, but has consisted almost entirely of perishable tactical information that has served Phung Hoang with rather sporadic success and has had little lasting value for dissemination to the national-level intelligence community.

Concerning improvements in performance, CIA, during the remainder of FY69, plans to emphasize SPB organization improvement, penetration operations, the assignment of additional advisors, the improvement of training schools, commencement of the final phase of district construction and the phase-out of PHOENIX management. FY70 plans call for continued emphasis on SP organizational refinement, penetration operations and training, and completion of district expansion and the improvement of province and region-level facilities.

CIA considers that sound planning and groundwork, especially during the past year, have helped advance SPB to the verge of an organization leap forward. Time is not on our side, however, in the preparation for the post-hostilities period. Collective SPB case officer performance will depend largely on sustained US training support and advisory assistance in field operations. Lastly, a growing GVN awareness of the need for an effective SPB is translated into positive support too slowly and will require steady pressure and education effort at the highest levels.

In this regard, both qualitative and quantitative improvements in the SPB are required similar to those proposed for the NP in a previous section. More SPB are needed at district and village level but this deficiency cannot be solved by organizational changes—quality personnel must be recruited and trained.

In addition, SPB effectiveness in investigative and prosecution work requires major improvement. In this regard, trained US advisors with this type background are required.

We also question the movement towards increased autonomy for the SPB. While such a movement might have improved SPB effectiveness in the short term, we do not consider that continuation is desirable.

**Revolutionary Development and Truong Son Cadre**

**Organization and Employment**

RD and Truong Son Cadre were organized in 1966 under the GVN Ministry of Revolutionary Development (MORD) to provide a capability to
carry out the civil aspects of pacification programs in rural areas. RD Cadre were organized in 59-man groups with a command and control element, a reconstruction team for psychological, economic and social projects, and a militia element (34 personnel) for team security. The role of the RD Cadre is to initiate political, economic and social activities in hamlets and villages; to establish firm government control; and to involve the people in these activities -- all designed to motivate the people to oppose the VC and support the GVN. The RD Cadre have four main tasks: (1) identify the VC; (2) organize Popular Self-Defense Forces (PSDF); (3) organize local elections; and (4) implement self-help programs.

The initial concept called for teams to move into contested and VC hamlets where there was no government presence, to establish such a presence, and to move on to other hamlets as soon as a hamlet administration was functioning. However, several problems soon developed; there either was no follow-on government presence to continue the RD work, or there was an existing administrative structure in the hamlet/village which resented RD Cadre interference and, further, which was often ignored by the cadre thus exacerbating the differences between the cadre and the existing structure. These necessitated a revision in employment. During 1969, RD Cadre will be reorganized into 30-man groups (a 6-man control element and 3-8 man teams having a 3-man militia cell and a 4-man reconstruction cell) to work as a whole or in part under the control of Village Administrative Committees; they will move into densely populated VC controlled and contested areas and remain permanently in villages in these areas. According to the 1969 Pacification plan, RD Cadre groups will be assigned only to a village when supported permanently by at least a PF platoon.

As of the end of February 1969, there were 46,218 RD Cadre and 7,334 Truong Son (Montagnard) Cadre against an end FY 69 goal of 47,200 and 7,560 respectively. There is no planned expansion beyond these levels.

US Support

US Agency responsibility for both cadre programs is in process of shifting from CIA to DOD with MACV CORDS responsible for support in SVN. COMUSMACV has proposed that this transfer be completed by the end of FY 69. Currently, 86 CIA and 53 military personnel are involved in the program in SVN; under the MACV proposal, all except a few CIA personnel would be replaced or rehired by DOD.
The RD Cadre have been funded almost entirely since their inception directly with US money; thus many South Vietnamese believe the RD Cadre are an American rather than a Vietnamese effort. Since their mission is primarily to attain the willing support of the people for the GVN, the program should be mainly GVN funded. As a partial measure, GVN funding has been increased to 6.7% of total program funding for FY 69 and 35% for FY 70. We consider that US direct funding of the cadre and other pacification programs should be further reduced.

Effectiveness

We have little good information upon which to base an evaluation of RD Cadre effectiveness. Performance ratings by advisors has varied from excellent to unsatisfactory. There is no system to measure popular support. Much depends on leadership in individual cadre groups, where cadre are employed, local security conditions, and management capabilities and interest of province and district chiefs.

-- RD Cadre are one of the main elements in the pacification program and undoubtedly have contributed to HES reported increases in the relatively secure population from 62.1% in January 1967 to 79.2% at the end of January 1969.

-- The 3 months of training the cadre receive is probably inadequate in most cases to develop the administrative, political and psychological skills required so that the cadre may effectively carry out their missions. The cadre must work in rural areas, yet many come from urban areas. While the cadre becomes highly motivated during training, observers report their motivation rapidly declines after they are deployed. This appears to be due mainly to frustrations they encounter when coping with actual situations.

-- Practically all the cadre functions must be augmented by the normal GVN administrative structure. While the cadre provide the initial GVN presence, continuation of their work requires funds, materials and support from the GVN. Frequently this support is not forthcoming because of administrative weakness or an attitude of disdain for pacification on the part of local officials. Cadre are frequently mal-employed as a security force. They were formed because of the failure of the GVN administrative apparatus, yet they must be supported by an efficient structure to be effective themselves.
SECRET

--- Total RD Cadre attrition is about 26% annually. Cadre are deserting at a rate of 16% per year, about the same as RVNAF overall, but at 1/2 the rate of RVNAF combat forces. The monthly KIA rate during the first six months of 1968 is 2.5 per thousand, 79% above the PF rate, but 16% below the regular forces rate.

--- The cadre generally appear to do the physical things (i.e., construction of self-help projects, cleaning up hamlets, etc.) well, but their effectiveness in the organizational and political tasks is limited. Observers report that the cadre have developed few if any functional organizations or self-defense forces.

--- In addition to management problems, RD Cadre tend to be resented by the village notables and in many cases by the populace. This is particularly true if the cadre are from outside the district where they operate.

There are several major difficulties with the RD Cadre concept.

--- The cadre tend to exacerbate local administrative deficiencies and further factionalize the already limited GVN capability in rural areas. In addition, they tend to detract from rather than reinforce loyalty to the national government. To mitigate this, employment of the cadre under village administrations as planned is a step in the right direction, but it may be difficult to train the administrations to properly manage the cadre, and it may be even more difficult to reconcile the somewhat idealistic views imparted the Cadre at Vung Tau with the "real world" of the village notables.

--- The cadre require a fairly high level of security to operate successfully. The level is difficult to achieve and maintain. The level of security is the greatest single factor in providing a climate in which popular support may be elicited, and the greatest single factor in determining that level is the perception of the threat by an individual. A single VC terrorist act, a demonstration by a VC unit, or VC/NVA military activity easily can disrupt cadre effort.

--- Organizationally, the MORD reflects a failure of the GVN to carry its administration to the rural area, and probably a disinterest in doing this on the part of the other ministries. The tasks performed by the MORD and its major operating element, the RD Cadre, are really the
responsibility of other GVN ministries. Thus, the MORD is a makeshift structure, and as such is resented by other ministries; this resentment is carried to the RD Cadre:

Despite these problems and difficulties, the RD Cadre are necessary at present, primarily because there is no other civil element that can carry out their functions in rural contested areas. There are, however, several actions that are required to improve the RD Cadre.

-- The GVN must continue to assume a greater share of the RD Cadre funding and take over 100% of cadre funding by beginning CY 71.

-- DOD should have full advisory and support responsibility for the RD Cadre program.

-- A system similar to TFES to adequately measure the effectiveness of RD Cadre, particularly in the organizational, political and psychological areas, is required.

-- The cadre training program requires reorientation to emphasize development of political, psychological, administrative and organizational skills. Further, the cadre should be trained and motivated to work with and relate to the local village officials and the national government. The mobile training team concept should be utilized in periodic retraining of cadre groups and in the training of village administrations in cadre management.

-- Operationally, the cadre should concentrate on the building of effective local administrations and functional organizations, to include self-defense forces but also economic and social structures.

-- RD cadre should be transferred from the MORD to the appropriate GVN Ministry as the villages they are working become secure (category A or B of HES).

-- Associated, overall qualitative improvements in the cadre program are required, such as weeding out ineffectiveness and trouble makers, providing some career status, etc.
Static Census Grievance (SCG)

The SCG program has the multiple mission of pacification and intelligence collection targeted against the VCI. It also contributes to the overall effort to maintain law and order by providing information, hamlet books, dossiers, and residence cards to GVN authorities for population control. Black lists of VCI suspects and sympathizers are furnished to Phung Hoang centers for use in neutralizing operations.

This program is sponsored by the GVN Ministry of Revolutionary Development, advised by the CIA and funded by DOD. The program has an approved force level of 9,500. In January 1969, there were 6,269 SCG Cadre with 4,709 deployed in 4,013 villages and hamlets throughout SVN. The main thrust of the SCGC program is in relatively pacified rural areas, with cadre serving in areas where there is very little, if any, VC presence.

Effectiveness of the SCG program is limited.

-- The program produced about 10,000 low-level, perishable and tactically-oriented intelligence reports per month during the past year. These were passed laterally to Phung Hoang centers and local military forces for immediate exploitation. The program also contributes by inducing Hoi Chanhs to rally the Chieu Hoi Program. In the recent three-month period, almost 700 Hoi Chanhs were brought in.

-- The draft has cut into the total personnel available for SCG work in hamlets and villages. The lack of sufficient full-time CIA advisors has resulted in secondary-to-incidental management in many provinces.

-- As a measure of effectiveness of the SCG and the RD cadre in the census grievance area, as of November 1968, HES reflects that there was substantial evidence of GVN effort to meet popular aspirations in only 10% of those hamlets having some GVN presence.

It appears that since the SCGC program is related primarily to intelligence and law and order in secure areas, sponsorship of the program is more logically under the Ministry of Interior, in particular the NP SPB.
The Popular Self-Defense Force (PSDF) is an organization for all 16 and 17-year-old males and those between 39-50 years of age for the defense of hamlets, villages, public buildings, and other installations. The objectives of the PSDF are: to increase the number of Vietnamese citizens committed to the GVN cause, and to increase security from enemy attack and to assist in uprooting VC infrastructure. PSDF volunteers are trained by NP, RD Cadre and sometimes by RF. Logistics support is provided by the Army. In addition to persons trained to use weapons and who are armed, members are trained in first aid, fire fighting, and village defense. We have little information on quality of this training, but suspect it is minimal. The relatively rapid growth of Popular Self-Defense Force is indicated below:

**TABLE B3. PEOPLE'S SELF-DEFENSE FORCE STRENGTHS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>August 1968</th>
<th>January 1969</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Organized</td>
<td>267,478</td>
<td>1,134,264</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trained</td>
<td>130,062</td>
<td>625,399</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armed</td>
<td>28,146</td>
<td>170,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The 1969 goal is two million members, 1,600,000 trained and 400,000 with weapons. The primary problem has been caused by the reluctance of lower government officials to arm the people; to date, only about 170,000 weapons have been distributed. The PSDF concept is good. The PSDF is the first mass organization in rural Vietnam since demise of Ngo Dinh Nhu's National Revolutionary Movement. While local organizations do not pose a threat to the VC, they do make it harder for the VC to operate because they are organized and the VC have difficulty operating in such a milieu.

We have little accurate information on the implementation of the PSDF program nor on its effectiveness. However, there are sporadic reports that PSDF units have beaten off VC attacks. There is also increasing intelligence that the VC are beginning to target PSDF units and leadership.

The PSDF forms the nucleus of an effective defensive internal security organization in all relatively secure hamlets. More of these forces are required to be armed where there is adequate qualified leadership. In those areas where security is good, PF that are not integrated into the NP could be phased into the PSDF to provide leadership and to "stiffen" the PSDF. One system would be to use a similar structure as that in North Vietnam.
a small full-time armed PSDF in each hamlet and village made up of the more qualified and physically able people; and a larger, less well trained and armed force made up of the majority of the remainder of the populace.

**Provincial Reconnaissance Units (PRU)**

The PRU program is a covert type targeted against the VCI. The PRU is organized under joint MACV/GVN (RVNAF Joint General Staff) sponsorship and functions under the direct full-time management of five CIA, 102 US military, and five Australian personnel. CIA province officers direct and supervise the targeting of the PRU. There is normally one US military NCO with each PRU element at province level, and a small control detachment at each Corps.

The PRU force totals 5,170 indigenous personnel. It is anticipated that during FY70 a weeding out process will be undertaken to eliminate ineffective or undesirable PRU. Following this, the force level will be expanded through selective recruiting, to a strength of 6,000 personnel.

Administratively, PRU's are organized in companies and platoons, but they operate normally in two to 20 man units organized for a particular task. Their primary function is to collect intelligence on the VCI, but they function mainly as a quick reaction agency to eliminate (by killing or capturing) specifically targeted VCI.

The PRU's have been effective in eliminating VCI. As an example of their effectiveness, during a recent four-month period, CIA reports that PRU operations resulted in the capture of 5,646 VC/VCI and the killing of 2,177 VC/VCI. In addition, 8,508 low-level tactical intelligence reports were passed laterally to Phung Hoang centers and military units for quick exploitation. During October 1968, the PRU accounted for about 13% of all VCI neutralizations.

However, when considering the PRU program in the overall context of internal security, it may be counterproductive in the long run. While there is little evidence, PRU operations may alienate the non-committed population. Its concept and operations are copied after the VC, and by copying their extra legal methods we lose any claim to the "just cause" of the GVN. (It appears that the majority of those supporters of the GVN are nationalistic in the sense of being proud of their nation and being Vietnamese, and are willing to die in the service of the GVN not so much because they respect their government and its image, but because they think they are fighting for the "just cause".)
Further, the PRU program is clearly identified as an American program despite the cover arrangement and their operating under the control of the province chief. They have been trained, paid and basically led by the US. Thus, the issue of national sovereignty is a real issue with regard to Vietnamese attitudes. How much anti-Americanism is caused by this program is unknown, but the suspicion is that it is enough so that it must be taken into account when assessing the program. In this regard negotiations are currently in progress to effect the transfer of the PRU to civilian control and solid cover within the Ministry of Interior, where the PRU will become the executive-action arm of the SPB or be merged with the NPFF.

Enclosures:
Appendix 1 - National Police