When the French withdrew in 1954, they left behind the remnants of several police organizations. Civil Police agencies responsive to the National Government were the National Surete, the Saigon Municipal Police, the Gendarmerie, and the Civil Guard; in addition, there were police forces in the provinces, located mainly in the capital cities and towns, responsive to the province chiefs.

At the request of President Ngu Dinh Diem, a U.S.-financed survey was commenced in 1954 by Michigan State University (MSU). In 1959 a Public Safety Division was created in USAID to provide advisory assistance to the Civil Guard, which was the rural civil police force in Vietnam. MSU retained advisory responsibility for the National Surete. Upon the continued insistence of the Military Advisory Assistance Group (MAAG), the support of the Civil Guard was transferred from USAID to MAAG in February 1961. With the transfer of the Civil Guard to the GVN Department of Defense, where it was formed into the Regional Forces, a uniformed civil police organization ceased to exist in the rural areas. Advisory responsibility for the National Surete was transferred from MSU to USAID on June 30, 1961.

The National Police (NP) emerged by Presidential Decree on June 27, 1962 from a conglomerate of smaller internal security agencies--the National Surete, the Saigon Municipal Police, portions of the Gendarmerie, and the various provincial police organizations. President Diem used certain elements of the police as his own private army and, as a result, the people gradually came to distrust the police. Full GVN support for the NP was not forthcoming until after the coup in January 1964. By this time the Special Police Branch (SPB) of the NP has been all but disbanded due to the stigma attached to it during the Diem regime, and the police were relegated to a position of ineffectiveness.

Current Status

GVN Organization

In its necessarily rapid expansion from 16,000 in 1963 to 78,400 today, the NP, like the other GVN security forces, has undergone major transitions and encountered unavoidable problems in recruitment, training, leadership development, doctrine and overall management. Approximately 20,000 police have yet to receive formal basic police training. In general, however, NP improvement has been positive and holds considerable promise if not
unduly inhibited by internal political or interservice obstacles and if provided with continued support at needed levels.

The current structure is only nominally "national". Although centrally organized under the Ministry of Interior (MOI), the NP is operationally decentralized to 44 provinces, 250 districts and six autonomous cities where operational control is vested in the provincial and district chiefs. All of the former and most of the latter are GVN military officers at present. Internal NP support for logistics, finance, personnel and matters of policy emanates centrally from the Director, General National Police (DGNP), to four regional police directors and thence to province chiefs and mayors.

The present NP organizational structure includes an NP headquarters at the village level. Tables of Organization include village staffing patterns of 25, 40, or 60 policemen depending on village area, population, security and other factors. These tables are still tentative and not yet finalized by the DGNP.

Associated with the NP under the Ministry of Interior, are the Combined Telecommunications Directorate (CTD) and the Directorate of Corrections (DOC). The CTD provides all NP communications plus a government radio teletype/telegraph service throughout the country. It also supports the Village/Hamlet Radio System now being expanded, with MACV funding, from 15,000 to approximately 26,000 radios. The DOC maintains the GVN civil prison system and is responsible for prisoner rehabilitation and confinement.

US Support

The Overall NP effort is advised and supported by USAID. This is provided through the AID Public Safety Division of the MACV Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) with 226 of the 274 US advisors being AID or AID hired personnel and with AID providing $21 million of the $28 million for the program in FY69, and about $20 million of the $26 million for FY70. The SPB is advised by the CIA although AID is increasing support. The NPFF are supported by both AID and DOD with DOD providing approximately $5.7 million in FY69 in commodity support. DOD also provides about $1.5 million of the $4.8 million FY69 expenditure for the CTD.

Roles and Missions

At all levels the general police task is to provide a government presence and atmosphere of law, order, internal security and public tranquility through its constituted civil police authority in areas made secure by military action. It discharges these basic responsibilities by performing the following missions through its Uniform Police (UP): enforcing administrative laws; controlling traffic, immigration and narcotics; controlling human and material resources movements in specific areas; administering
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the National Identity Program; managing and controlling police detention facilities and conducting criminal investigations.

The NP occupies both a pacification support and national development role to encompass short and long-term efforts. In both roles it is directed toward aiding the creation of a stable government and society with an effective civil police force throughout urban and rural areas. In its pacification role, the NP is currently and heavily involved with military and paramilitary elements conducting priority security operations against the VC and in the national effort to aid in the extension of GVN control. Primary in these efforts are the NPFF, the SPB, and the Marine Police.

The primary role of SPB is to identify the VC/NLF covert political structure and its supporting elements. The primary role of the NPFF is to apprehend or otherwise neutralize members of this structure. Both the NPFF and UP assist military units in providing territorial security by undertaking guard activities. In national development, the NP aims at extending and improving the legal influences and services of a civil police body oriented toward constitutional processes of law enforcement in a civil administration. In this function it is most active in the relatively secure areas which are the areas of highest population density. Below the provincial level, NP operations are centered in district towns. Although districts have an indeterminate administrative status under existing decrees, district chiefs function as extensions of the provincial authority, particularly in security matters. As military security increases in rural areas, the NP expands its police operations downward from district locations into villages. The long-range role has importance since effective law enforcement has been minimal in rural areas due to a lack of security. It is here that the fostering of the institutionalization of a Rule of Law is simultaneously most significant and difficult.

Effectiveness

Local Security and Pacification

NP serve as an adjunct to security forces in the pacification program. The civil police presence is generally well established in urban areas, i.e., areas with a population of 25,000 or higher. Approximately 50% of all police operate in such areas. Here they have proven reasonably effective since they are deployed in sufficient numbers and have adequate leadership. Their effectiveness in the recent past can reasonably be judged by the successes of the police during the February and May 1968 offensives. During these actions, the NP lost 239 killed, an additional 38 missing and many more wounded while conducting defensive combat actions. This was an effective performance in the public eye which created a positive image of a central government institution and resulted in an increased flow of helpful information concerning the VC from the general public.
However, the NP have not been particularly effective in rural areas. Their presence is limited. Thus the NP have not yet had an adequate opportunity to either succeed or fail in rural areas. Basic to rural police assignments is the necessity for a level of security in village areas adequate to permit police survival, and the GVN has been slow in extending its rural security presence. Present pacification planning calls for six policemen in each of 1,650 villages under GVN control. Assignments to villages and many districts were largely halted with the Tet offensive in 1968 and reinstituted later in the year. At present 41% of all Uniform Police assigned to provinces, exclusive of SPB, NPFF and Marine Police, are assigned to the district level and below. By June 1969 this should exceed 50%. Incomplete data indicate approximately 1,500 Uniform Police in IV Corps and 655 in III Corps are assigned below the district level. The latest available information indicates NP can be inserted into 800 villages during CY69 if a force level of 90,000 is reached. Diversion of additional manpower from the NPFF and SP for an additional 850 villages will seriously impede Phung Hoang actions.

-- The NPFF, when properly employed, operates almost exclusively in a pacification role in the rural areas. They represent the initial contact between the general rural populace and the national police structure. Since later 1968, its 12,000 men have been largely employed in platoons in anti-VC actions.

-- The 1969 Pacification Program includes provisions for assigning NP at the village level. There have been significant efforts toward such assignment, including the following:

- Teams of two Uniform and one Special Police are being assigned to work in New Life Hamlets with Revolutionary Development (RD) teams in I and IV Corps. These composite teams are assigned principally to eliminate corrupt practices, provide intelligence and neutralize the VC1.

- The dimensions of these and similar efforts are currently transitional and reports are still being developed. Police functions in rural areas are geared directly to the status of security, without which police efforts at law enforcement are impossible. In most instances, the attack on the VC1 is necessarily emphasized at the expense of routine police duties.

Public Order

As discussed above, at present the NP are most effective in establishing law and order in those areas where adequate military security has been imposed. This effort is not without major difficulties. Within SVN, the NP does not always possess a common acceptance of its legal authority.
The Writ of Law has not been universally extended in fact. Accelerated by the new national constitution, penal, civil, commercial and other legal codes have not completed a re-codification initiated in 1951. There is much understandable ignorance of the law and its constitutional application. Resolution will take considerable time and practice, plus public and official education. At the present time, a variety of National Emergency Decrees are being applied by the police and military to maintain public order. These decrees are extensive and detailed and cover the majority of offenses against the government in the existing hostile environment. Overall, the police would be more effective with improved public and government acceptance.

**Resources Control**

In accordance with existing directives, resources control is an extension of law enforcement, since it is operative against specific decree or law violations. Although considerable material contraband has been seized by the police and many personnel apprehended, the resources control program has generally been conducted in the absence of a National Resources Control policy—while there is no valid way to measure its effect on the VC, it appears to have had little impact. In this program from October 1964 through January 1969, AID reports that NP have:

- Apprehended 468,459 known or suspected VC, deserters, draft evaders, illegal residents and other offenders.
- Confiscated 14,481,831 kilos of foodstuffs, 482,266 units of medicine, 7,323,937 units of equipment and 3,458 units of firearms.

The Resources Control effort suffers from a lack of clear high-level US/GVN police guidance. In general terms military commanders implementing security measures desire strong controls over material and population resources; those in the economic and development fields tend toward more relaxed controls to avoid inhibiting economic development. The NP attempt to promulgate controls in the midst of these basic conflicting views. This effort cannot achieve its full effectiveness without clear guidance and high level joint US/GVN support. In addition to the doctrinal problem, the NP do not have sufficient authority to control resources effectively. For example, they are authorized to stop and check military vehicles; however, they frequently encounter a total lack of RVNAF cooperation. At times military units have demonstrated acute animosity to police resources control activities. In the face of obvious military superiority in local influence and firepower, many police checkpoints can have only a limited effectiveness.

1/ Unit: 100 rounds of ammunition, 100 pills, or 1 firearm
This appeared relatively clear in concept but has assumed new and vastly more intricate dimensions. Today there is little doubt that full and effective implementation and execution of systematic resources control measures would hamper many vested interests at many levels of Vietnamese society, commerce and government, and otherwise disrupt burgeoning webs of patronage and obligation.

There is a necessity for clear realization that there are no simple or "popular" methods for implementing the control of population or resources against losses to VC/NVA without incurring some economic disadvantage to the commercial sector or imposing certain hardships upon innocent citizens. There is a normal US repugnance to consider controlling peaceful economic pursuits, particularly where GVN sovereignty is involved. On the other hand, the GVN appears to give overall economic controls little priority. However, in SVN, where otherwise innocent civil pursuits can give direct aid and comfort to the VC/NVA and in turn cause deaths and injuries to US and GVN personnel, effective controlling actions are sorely needed. This is true now and will gain emphasis as levels of violence decrease.

Controlling population and material resources in SVN had been an almost unilateral NP function until the introduction of large US forces. The lack of cooperation from many segments of the RVNAF and the lack of a GVN national economic warfare policy, prevented the police effort from reaching full effectiveness. At present, the conduct of joint police/military resources denial activities is contained in the MACV-GVN Joint General Staff Combined Campaign Plan, AB 144. However, these control actions form a dichotomy with civilian economic attitudes. In general terms: the police/military attitude would encourage more rigid controls to improve internal security; the civilian economic sectors tend toward a lessening of controls to further economic well-being. Overlying the entire problem is the fact that there is no clear-cut combined US/GVN economic warfare policy.

From a national viewpoint, existing implementation has produced a mutation of police/military controls with wide gaps between concept and practice. The gap is occasioned by limited GVN support and nationwide execution of a civil police program through GVN military operational control from the regional levels downward. From the standpoint of the NP structure, the largest obstacle outside limited guidance from the national level is inadequate GVN military control and support from RVNAF from the corps level downward. The GVN military edifice has negated much of the police control effort by frequently placing its personnel above police jurisdiction in many areas. To develop control momentum, clear-cut combined US/GVN civil/military economic warfare policy is needed plus accession of the RVNAF
structure to police authorities. Yet even with such a policy, the manpower resources needed to make such a program effective would be considerable. What is required is a clear delineation of policy considered in conjunction with available forces to do an adequate job. We have insufficient data to make such an examination.

National Identification

Basic to long term law enforcement is an effective system of population identification. There has never been an adequate system in SVN. Since 1960, the NP have issued over 7,800,000 identification cards. An improved system was initiated in October 1968, designed to fingerprint and photograph approximately 9,000,000 people 15 years of age and older within the next three years. This program will result in individual biographic and fingerprint information for the population in each province, as well as a central national identification repository. This program is expected to assist in establishing a suitable record system to provide a means to identify and apprehend wanted persons. National identification was adversely affected in late 1968 by the mobilization transfer of 123 trained identification personnel from the Uniform Police. The program is lagging seriously and suffers from failure of the general public and all elements of the GVN to recognize its urgency. At the present rate of progress, this program will have to accelerate considerably if it is to be completed within a reasonable number of years. The main problem is one of developing the necessary priority within the GVN.

Anti-Viet Cong Infrastructure

The NP are concerned with the following functions regarding the anti-VCI program: identification and detection, apprehension or neutralization, and prosecution.

All elements of the NP give priority to anti-VCI activity. The NPFF and Special Police are almost exclusively occupied in this pursuit. In addition, the NP have been directed to establish detention facilities to control, screen and otherwise process civil persons detained for violations of emergency decrees. A significant number of these detainees are VCI suspects apprehended by police/military cordon-and-search, checkpoint, and other activities.

The NPFF are responsible for apprehension and neutralization. They are becoming productive in anti-VCI actions, although much remains to be done in developing NP field leadership, training and effectiveness. NPFF are trained to function in rural areas and are somewhat more heavily armed than urban police. Frequently misused in the past by military-oriented province chiefs, their utilization is become more effective in most provinces. During its operations in late 1968, the
NPFF functioned largely in platoon elements in rural areas, working with many USA, USMC, Republic of Korea (ROK), RF/PF, Special Police and other friendly security and intelligence agencies. In 1968 the NPFF reported 2,697 VC killed, 3,258 captured and 15,732 VC suspects apprehended. During the year it sustained 255 KIA and 891 WIA.

Ways to Improve NP Effectiveness and Constraints

Quantitative Improvement

A significant potential for augmentation of the internal security capability lies in increases in the NP force levels.

-- Since 1962, the National Police development program has indicated an overall requirement for 163,000 police by 1973 for adequate law enforcement in South Vietnam. AID Public Safety considers that this estimate is still considered valid, but one to be reached by CY1976. The National Police has never exceeded 80,000 in total strength and has an annual attrition of approximately 4,000 from all causes. In 1968 it was unable to exceed 80,000 due to attrition, mobilization restrictions and lack of GVN funding. This has been particularly harmful to the required development of the Marine Police, the SPB and the NPFF.

-- The following tables show the planned NP force structure, functional and geographic assignments. COMUSMACV has proposed an acceleration of NP expansion to a total force of 120,000 by end of CY1970.

### TABLE BI-1 PLANNED FORCE STRUCTURE FOR CY68-70

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Current 12/31/68</th>
<th>Planned CY 68</th>
<th>Planned CY 69</th>
<th>Planned CY 70</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SPB</td>
<td>13,496</td>
<td>14,000</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>17,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPFF</td>
<td>11,599</td>
<td>14,000</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>24,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Police</td>
<td>1,410</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>3,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Police</td>
<td>51,926</td>
<td>52,000</td>
<td>57,500</td>
<td>57,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>78,431</td>
<td>82,000</td>
<td>90,000 a/</td>
<td>102,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a/ Consideration is being given to forming two additional NPFF battalions for assignment in platoon strength to 58 Saigon wards. This force of 2200 would replace to ARVN battalions.
### Table B1-2 CURRENT NP FUNCTIONAL ASSIGNMENTS (JANUARY 1, 1969)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>SPB</th>
<th>PFF</th>
<th>Marine a/</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Uniform and Patrol Police</td>
<td>13,496</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative Police</td>
<td>4,544</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field Force (NPFF and Riot Police)</td>
<td>11,599</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Police</td>
<td>1,410</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support</td>
<td>7,469</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judicial Police</td>
<td>2,739</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traffic Police</td>
<td>4,783</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training Staff</td>
<td>1,658</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scientific Police</td>
<td>1,950</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Students</td>
<td>1,847</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>78,431</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table B1-3 CURRENT NP GEOGRAPHIC ASSIGNMENT (JANUARY 1, 1969)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>SPB</th>
<th>PFF</th>
<th>Marine a/</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DGNP</td>
<td>1,957</td>
<td>1,697</td>
<td>(499)</td>
<td>7,457</td>
<td>11,111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMPD</td>
<td>1,618</td>
<td>1,129</td>
<td></td>
<td>14,494</td>
<td>17,241</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I Corps</td>
<td>2,110</td>
<td>2,207</td>
<td>(36)</td>
<td>5,773</td>
<td>10,090</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II Corps</td>
<td>2,916</td>
<td>1,771</td>
<td>(54)</td>
<td>6,598</td>
<td>11,285</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III Corps</td>
<td>2,025</td>
<td>1,818</td>
<td>(103)</td>
<td>8,689</td>
<td>12,532</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV Corps</td>
<td>2,870</td>
<td>2,977</td>
<td>(718)</td>
<td>10,325</td>
<td>16,172</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**In Training**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>(1,847) a/</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>13,496</td>
<td>11,599</td>
<td>(1,410) a/</td>
<td>53,336</td>
<td>78,431</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* a/ Included in other
Yet there are a number of constraints on NP expansion, primarily serious manpower problems, lack of NP leadership and funding limitations.

-- Overall effectiveness of the NP in both pacification and national development is adversely affected by a budget which does not provide sufficient funds for maintenance, operations, construction and logistics. A typical constraint is the inability to properly feed police recruits, trainees and imprisoned persons on the funds allocated. The existing budget consists almost completely of funds for pay and allowances, a common situation for units in many lesser developed countries. In order to reach operational effectiveness, the police budget should approach 60% for pay and allowances and an additional 40% for operations and maintenance of the overall police structure.

-- Funding requirements essential to an accelerated NP expansion to 120,000 by end CY70 would total about $34 million for FY69 and $37 million for FY 70, including $22 million in commodity support in FY69 and $15 million for FY70. $29.9 million is currently available for FY69 and $25.6 million is budgeted for FY70. In addition to dollar costs, the total plaster budget requirements of the expanded NP would be about 10.5 million plasters in CY69 and 12.9 billion plasters in CY70, as compared to the current 1969 plaster support of 9.7 billion. The increase in plaster support must come from the GVN. And the GVN may not have this capability or inclination.

-- In February 1969, 5,000 police applicants could not be processed because of plaster funding limitations. This presents only the latest obstacle to overall police strength development which has been consistently frustrated. The desired strength of 74,000 for FY67 was not achieved; this was also true of the FY68 goal of 94,000. The NPFF was scheduled to reach 18,000 in 1968, but was only able to achieve 12,000. The Marine Police planned to go to a 1968 strength of 2,000 and was able to reach only 1410. Currently the GVN has approved and funded for a total of 90,000 police for FY69. This does not necessarily indicate that the allotment of these funds will be forthcoming on a timely basis. Since military expansions are already extending the GVN national budget, it is also doubtful if realistic police budgetary requirements can be met without substantial US plaster inputs to absorb shortfalls.

Accelerated expansion of the NP would require a build-up of the training base and an increased US advisory support.

-- To accommodate the CY70 program, two additional training centers, each with a capacity for 3,000 recruits, would have to be made available preferably from existing GVN or US facilities. Additional instructors would be required and provisions for the advanced training of an estimated 17,000 supervisory personnel made. Some of the training burden of accelerated NP recruitment may be alleviated by employing existing RVNAF training facilities for the NP. The RVNAF could not, however, handle any police specialist training requirements.
NP effectiveness has been hampered greatly by internal training inadequacies. There is a lack of instructors, training facilities and training advisory personnel, both civilian and military. This training backlog, plus badly needed specialist and leadership training, will compound expansion problems in the next two years. It is reasonable to conclude that internal police facilities and available US advisory assistance cannot effectively approach the additional problem of NP expansion to 100,000 much less 120,000 without major additional advisory assistance and the availability of sizeable GVN or US training facilities until the end of 1970.

The currently approved 1969 force level of 90,000 will provide approximately 16,000 new personnel; 12,000 new inputs for increasing from 78,000 and 4,000 for attrition during the year. The 12,000 new personnel will all require 12 weeks of basic police training before achieving even fundamental police usefulness in the NPFF, SPB, Marine Police and the Uniform Police.

Raising the NPFF to approximately 15,000 in 1969 will present the major problem of training 9,600 on board and new personnel in basic and NPFF training for a total of 18 weeks. The training of these and existing NPFF already in the field will require an estimated 53 additional advisors. Accelerated expansion will require 134 advisors. Most of these would be military personnel on a temporary basis.
SECRET

ANNEX C

GVN MANAGEMENT AND OPERATIONAL TECHNIQUES

Adequate management of security resources and effective execution of programs at all levels is required if effective internal security is to be achieved. This annex examines the GVN management capability at the critical local or village-hamlet level, and the execution of the two major programs associated with internal security, pacification and the anti-VC infrastructure program (Phoenix-Phung Hoang).

Administration

**Essential to internal security is the capability to manage effectively and coordinate activities of security forces.**

-- The central government civil structure in SVN extends from Saigon to the 44 provinces and 6 autonomous cities and down to district. The latter is not a constitutional structure, but was formed to better extend government control; it is an administrative rather than a true governmental entity. Associated, there is also a military structure extending from Saigon to four corps (regions), down to sector (province) and subsector (district). In addition to these structures, there is a local self-government structure formed at village and hamlet level which is linked constitutionally directly to province, but in reality functions under district control. It is at this lowest level that the provision and management of internal security is critical.

-- The GVN historically has been weak in rural areas. The French had little strength in rural areas and administration there was left to village committees. Beginning in 1956, the GVN centralized control over village administration by appointing village and hamlet chiefs, which was a blow to the traditional autonomous position of the village in SVN. After 1963, layered military administrations fragmented control from Saigon leaving the GVN local administrative structure critically weak.

-- This trend was revised in late 1966 when the first series of village/hamlet elections were begun. Approximately 1100 villages and 5000 hamlets had elections by Feb. 1969; 1100 additional villages are
reported to have appointed administrators with about 600 villages and 2800 hamlets electing officials during March 1969. Current plans call for further strengthening and providing more autonomy and resources to village administrations during 1969; village governments are to be given control of local PF, RD Cadre, PSDF and locally assigned NP. In addition, the village council will control the expenditure of pacification self-help funds -- approving expenditures of up to VN $50,000. A basic assumption in this policy of increased village autonomy is that people will in time be mobilized to their own defense through participation in the political and economic life of their community. Viewed in this perspective, the emergence of PSDF units is a natural outcome of this process which contains both political and military dividends.

Information on the effectiveness of GVN administrations, the number of local officials and the extent of GVN administrations in rural areas is limited and conflicting.

-- Some information indicates that the GVN only has about 19% (38,000) of its 250,000 man administrative structure at local (village and hamlet) level compared with about 65% (70,000) of the VCI. There is also data that shows that there are about 36,000 trained officials in about 5100 hamlets. If one considers the 1100 villages and approximately 3000 hamlets with appointed administrations, plus the RD Cadre, the 38,000 figure is probably closer to 100,000.

-- The GVN has been increasing their structure slowly. During 1968, the percent of population under GVN administrative influence has increased by 5% to about 76.6% (A, B and C nonhamlet secure categories) compared with a 9% increase in relatively secure population. As of December 1968, a functioning GVN administration according to HES was formed in 3485 hamlets (A plus B) with another 3016 having some form of administration.

-- In contrast, using VCI indicators from HES, about 65% of the hamlets and 45% of the population was reported under some VCI influence (L/2 C, plus D, E, and VC) as of the end of December 1968. Only about 6% (A) of the total hamlets had no VCI.

-- Thus it is not surprising that the population and areas called relatively secure or under the primary influence of the GVN has grown slowly and principally under the weight of allied military forces. If C

1/ These figures do not include those who have attended short seminar courses.

C-2

SECRET
category hamlets in the HES system are viewed as being under active contention (and our assessment is that this is the case), then only about 50% of the rural population is under the primary influence of the GVN.

- Good data on attrition of GVN local officials and employees is not available, but it probably runs about 7% per year; attrition due to enemy activity is about 2% per year. Despite the low attrition by terrorism, such actions are highly selective and appear to have had a significant psychological impact. Calculation of attrition is hampered by incomplete reports and the lack of any reliable accounting system for the strengths of GVN officials.

The prognosis for improvements in local administrative capability is brighter today than in the past; yet there are a number of difficulties which must be overcome.

- The 1969 pacification plan calls for the training of nearly 42,000 village and hamlet officials during 1969. These are planned to be trained at Vung Tau. While such training is urgently required, previous experience indicates that it is unlikely that all of this ambitious program will be accomplished.

- It appears that the war in SVN is turning once again to the political arena; probable increased terrorism against local officials and possibilities of a "peaceful" settlement may increase pressures for local accommodation.

- Local administrations were in decline between 1954 and 1965; their capability to administer fairly modern programs is questionable. Many GVN officials at province and district levels are neither concerned with nor trust the village and hamlet officials, and thus may not really allow local administrations to function. Further, if village administrations are constituted by election, political loyalty rather than efficiency becomes the greatest motive; if they are appointed from existing village notables, they may be ill-suited to meet modern aspirations of the people. Even if they do become effective, the lack of adequate links to Saigon for goods and funds that plagued the RD Cadre will constrain capabilities of the local administrations -- and improved capabilities are required to win the support of the people.

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2/ Additional officials are generated through elections in March, June and December 1969.
-- More and more of the GVN manpower pool is going into the military and paramilitary forces. Local administrations have little priority in the competition for capable personnel.

-- The assumption that political and economic participation will mobilize the populace appears valid; however, participation does not necessarily build loyalty to the national government. In fact, unless the GVN can control local organizations and provide necessary resources, the opposite may be the case.

Yet, the capabilities for management at local levels must be improved if there is to be adequate internal security in SVN. There is no simple solution to the problem. Mainly, it is one of emphasis on the part of the GVN and time in which to develop effective and stronger local administrations and popular participation in these governments. Effectiveness is the first priority. Some interim measures would include the use of outside Administrators for those villages which are particularly weak. Qualified personnel can possibly be obtained from universities, the National Institute of Administration, and RVNAF. Competent RD teams can also do the job in those areas where they are operating.

In summary, the basic direction which the GVN has taken since 1966 in the area of local government has been correct; however, additional emphasis and resources must be devoted to local administration. The three main requirements at this level are: (1) to manage effectively various security force elements and other resources; (2) to build and control popular functional organizations; and (3) to tie the village in an efficient two-way communications link to district, province and Saigon. Functional organizations (self-defense, economic and social) can help in linking the community to higher echelons and adjacent communities. Thus, while the district is not a constitutional government structure, it must remain as an interim measure to manage internal security resources until village governments develop this capability. Most provinces are too large and the province capital too distant from the village to have effective management just at provincial level.

The main US-GVN response to the problems of internal security is the pacification program. All things considered, this program has
made a significant contribution to the prosecution of the war and to the political struggle. It has been most successful in expanding the presence of the GVN in the countryside; it has been less successful in establishing permanent security or stimulating genuine loyalty and commitment to the Saigon government. And it has been laggard in coping with the political threat posed by a well-organized and disciplined communist infrastructure. This has been a significant weakness, threatening and undermining other gains. 3/

The pacification concept generally is sound. Its execution has been weak; we have tried to circumvent management problems within the GVN with organizational and conceptual innovations. The program correctly has been oriented on the village-hamlet level, but without sufficient resources, management, and communication links between the operators and the central government. Many of the GVN administrators who must manage the program have never accepted fully the concept or its focus on the rural populace.

Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE) Number 14-69, 16 January 1969, The Pacification Effort in Vietnam, states, in part:

"During 1968, however, new uncertainties have arisen which are bound to have an impact on Revolutionary Development. With the beginning of negotiations and the end of the bombing of North Vietnam, there is a growing belief -- at least among informed Vietnamese -- that the war is coming to an end, sooner rather than later. Among these people, there is growing apprehension over the shape of a final settlement and the firmness of the American commitment. To the extent that this uncertainty may be reflected in the countryside, it would tend to undermine the gains of Revolutionary Development. Moreover, any weakening of the central government, whether real or imagined, would magnify the uncertainties of officials involved in Revolutionary Development programs and thus pose a growing threat to this aspect of pacification.

"Even leaving aside such general uncertainties, progress in the field of "nation building" or Revolutionary Development is likely to be painfully slow for several basic reasons. As noted, security is an indispensable prerequisite. In areas where there is a decline in security conditions, even temporarily, the resulting damage to confidence and respect for the government more than offsets gains from development

projects. Even if security conditions remain good, the administrative capability of Vietnamese officials is weak; Revolutionary Development is heavily dependent on American advice, assistance, and inspiration. Pervasive corruption is a constant threat to the entire system.

"Pacification is far too complex, covers too many individual programs, and is geographically too diverse to permit clear prognoses. ... Much will depend on the attitude of the GVN. It cannot be said that the various Saigon governments have shared the American enthusiasm or dedication to pacification. Results obtained during 1966 and 1967 were largely because of constant American pressures. The skills, funds, and motivation have been overwhelmingly American; the GVN has provided manpower and occasional high level endorsements but has been far from committed to the programs. Too often GVN officials have participated or cooperated simply to please their American counterparts, or to share in the spoils of the inevitable corruption.

"The GVN still does not have the skills and resources to assume a significantly greater role in the management and execution of an effective pacification effort in 1969. US assistance is still vital to success, but popular acceptance will depend finally on a growing effectiveness of the GVN's performance in the program."

Thus, we consider that future progress in pacification will be limited unless certain changes are made. Even if one accepts the view that pacification progress is adequate and will continue to be so, some changes in the pacification program are required. Some requirements are:

-- Continue to give priority attention to territorial and internal security forces by increasing support from regular forces. Augment these forces as required with RVNAF regular forces and U.S. maneuver battalions, if necessary, to improve the level of security in selected high priority districts. Develop more effective pacification tactics using all forces.

-- Reward unit and individual performance in providing local security and eliminating the VC infrastructure through promotions, awards and publicity.

-- Initiate motivational and educational actions to change the attitudes of RVNAF personnel towards the populace and toward pacification programs, primarily as to the worth of the populace and the necessity for their security.
-- Provide specific training to U.S. and ARVN maneuver battalion commanders and their staffs in the tactics and techniques of providing offensive security operations in direct support of pacification.

-- Continue and accelerate the turn over of funding responsibility for most pacification programs to the GVN. It should be made clear to the Vietnamese that we will continue to provide overall budgetary support but that they must fund and manage their own pacification program and that we will retain the option to withdraw funding if the programs are mismanaged or subverted through inefficiency, disinterest or corruption.

-- Reduce a significant number (perhaps as high as 50% of both tactical unit and the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) advisors over the next year. Withdrawal of advisors should be as a reward for good performance, not bad, with the growth in Vietnamese capability and efficiency being stressed.

-- Continue to stress the requirement to meet the felt needs of the people in all discussions with GVN leadership. Particularly, programs should be developed to reward officials, civil and military, for activities which assist the people and advance the GVN toward influencing the population.

The above changes could accelerate the pacification process during the forthcoming year.

In addition to the above changes, other more basic changes are required. Pacification is a state of mind -- not a social condition. Pacification's real objective is attitudinal change, both by the South Vietnamese leadership and by the South Vietnamese people. On the one hand, the leadership needs to perceive the necessity for relating to the people and for providing them with clear evidence that the GVN represents the "JUST CAUSE" and for providing a reasonable degree of local security. On the other hand, the people need to perceive that security and commitment necessarily go together simultaneously and that the GVN represents the "JUST CAUSE" to which they should pledge their allegiance.

Phoenix - Phung Hoang

Closely associated with pacification is the second major program influencing internal security -- the anti-VCI program called Phoenix-C-7.
Phung Hoang. The GVN National Phung Hoang plan is designed to direct, control and coordinate all national efforts to neutralize the VCI. This is accomplished through a country-wide system of Phung Hoang (PH) committees and permanent offices/centers at national, regional, provincial, and autonomous city levels, and District Intelligence and Operations Coordinating Centers (DIOCCs). Participation is required of all GVN elements that have an intelligence or action capability against the VCI.

The principal management elements are DIOCCs and Province/City PH centers. Each has a dual mission -- to provide timely intelligence support to both military and anti-VCI operations, and to generate and coordinate operations against the VCI and other VC or bandit elements.

The manpower for PH centers is mainly provided by existing GVN resources, primarily police and military. The total commitment, if fully met, would amount to 6,000 - 6,500 personnel in some 300 centers. In addition, 631 interpreter/translators and typists are currently employed and funded by the US. This probably will increase to 800.

The main operating agencies are: SPB, NPFF, RF, PF, PRU, Military Security Service (MSS), APT, Vietnamese Information Service (VIS), RDC, SCGC and PSDF.

The Phung Hoang force structure is basically adequate although difficulties are being experienced in manning with fully qualified personnel. Phung Hoang, with U.S. Phoenix support, has set up the basic committee/center structure, including at the operational level four Corps Intelligence and Operations Coordinating Centers (CIOCCs), 44 Provincial Intelligence and Operations Coordinating Centers (PIOCCs), and 247 rural and urban District Intelligence and Operations Coordinating Centers (DIOCC) of varying effectiveness. As security conditions permit, individual centers will shift from predominately military to police staffing and management.

The Phung Hoang organizational concept is sound. However, the GVN, at the highest levels, must emphasize more comprehensive use of the intelligence and operations coordinating centers for all security operations at all levels.

The responsibilities for U.S. management and management support, under overall COMUSMACV supervision through DEPCORDS/MACV and the National PH Committee, is being shifted from CIA to MACV. The
requisite organization and support adjustments are to be accomplished by 1 July 1969. The present MACV JTD for Phoenix calls for 450 military personnel and 23 civilians, including one CIA officer (Phoenix Director).

The current Phung Hoang program includes planning for coordination, guidance and support of security and public information elements in the new village and hamlet administrations.

The Phoenix-Phung Hoang program has improved in effectiveness but losses during 1968 have not unduly disrupted the VCI.

-- COMUSMACV reports that during 1968, 15,776 (16-20% of the total VCI estimated strength) members of the VCI were killed, captured or surrendered. Of these approximately 2,050 were cadre of higher than village level, and approximately 10% were People's Revolutionary Party members. In terms of organizational goals, progress against the VCI has been satisfactory; however, the attack on the VCI did not significantly reduce the VC's ability to carry out essential activities.

-- Operations targeted against specific VCI are still not too common. Most VCI are picked up in sweeps, cordon and search operations, or in ambushes along communication routes. Only 10-20% of those neutralized are specifically targeted through the Phung Hoang program.

-- At the current rates of attrition, the VCI can sustain his operations except in a few localities. Anti-VCI operations are, however, making inroads and should continue to disrupt VCI activities in an increasing number of hamlets. But the VCI is too large and well established to be permanently neutralized or rendered impotent, short of an extended and intensive campaign over the next several years, including much improved GVN performance.

The Phoenix-Phung Hoang program is constrained by several factors.

-- Better understanding of the program, better organization, improved tactics and techniques, better coordination, and improved personnel relations should improve the Phoenix-Phung Hoang program execution during 1969. However, increasing difficulty in identifying, locating and neutralizing VCI as easier targets are neutralized may tend to limit program effectiveness.
Problems in detention and judicial processing discussed in the following section also limit Phoenix-Phung Hoang effectiveness.

In the realities of the Vietnam war, families have close relatives on both sides of the conflict, and accommodation with the VC has been a way of life in many areas particularly at hamlet level. The GVN was reluctant to carry out a systemic program of neutralization prior to 1968 Tet activities by the VC in fear of reprisal and apparently because of this sort of unwritten agreement. As negotiations progress, or give the appearance of progressing towards a settlement, the pressures within families to reach accommodation probably will increase, and correspondingly the effectiveness of the Phoenix-Phung Hoang program could decrease.

For the immediate future, the Phoenix-Phung Hoang program should continue to be improved.

The PH Center structure, including DIOCCs, would begin to phase gradually into police-heavy Intelligence and Operations Coordinating Centers (IOCCS). While the military element and role would diminish (according to local circumstances), active military participation and support must continue, as must the support of other PH agencies.

The IOCC at each level must continue to produce a picture of total VC and major criminal organization, strength, dispositions, personalities, and area activity patterns. The task would become more complicated as the VCI resort to more extensive use of legal fronts and moves its clandestine apparatus more deeply underground. The IOCC must also support military operations of both regular and territorial security forces, as well as generating police and police-military operations.

New laws and judicial procedures should be promulgated under the Constitution to replace the present emergency laws and procedures. These would provide a firm legal basis for investigation, arrest, prosecution and disposition of VCI.

As a post hostilities situation is reached, the Phoenix-Phung Hoang program probably will require drastic revision. Much would depend upon the nature of a political settlement in SVN. For example, if the NLF were legalized (and not the PRP), then VC supporters and low level VCI who are not party members must be differentiated from...
PRP members. It also would pose problems of police surveillance, rehabilitation, etc., of released NLF detainees and prisoners. It is clear that if a political settlement in SVN is reached, the Phoenix-Phung Hoang program cannot continue in its present form.

**Prisoner Detention and Judicial Processing**

A major factor that affects the Phoenix-Phung Hoang program and internal security is the capability of the GVN to interrogate, detain, process and sentence or release people suspected of being VC or committing crimes.

The system for processing, interrogating and detaining prisoners has considerable impact on law and order and anti-VCI programs. At the end of January 1969, there was a total of 41,000 civilian confinement spaces in SVN, and the total incarcerated population was reported by the GVN officials to be 44,200. There are four national prisons, 37 provincial prisons, and 50 existing or planned detention centers. While there are only slightly less than adequate facilities on a nationwide basis, provincial detention centers are frequently overcrowded, and poor prisoner accounting procedures are the rule rather than the exception. Roughly 60% of the prisoners arrested in 1968 were released. The chief problem is improper release of suspects by the police and by district and province chiefs. Only a relatively small proportion of cases are referred to security committees or military courts. Most of these releases are due to administrative inefficiency, but some are also due to motivations of fear or favor.

Current plans call for expansion of provincial facilities to about a 12,500 capacity by the end of 1969, but this may not be sufficient. The magnitude of the facilities problem is illustrated in Table C-1.

The existing judicial laws and procedures in Vietnam are considered adequate; administration of these laws and procedures is the chief difficulty. The major problem is slowness in processing of suspects. Judicial processing is one of the weakest links in the overall attack on the VCI.

Problems in the area of detainee processing include release of apprehended VCI members by local GVN officials prior to hearings on their cases. Also, once cases are heard, lenient sentences are given VCI by Provincial Security Committees (PSC's) because of lack of sufficient evidence, corruption and accommodation at local levels, inadequate detention space, and the failure to appreciate the danger of the VCI.
### TABLE C-1. PRISONER/DETAINEE POPULATION/CAPACITY STATUS - 28 JAN 69

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FACILITY</th>
<th>POPULATION:</th>
<th>SENTENCED</th>
<th>UNSENTENCED</th>
<th>RATIO OF SENTENCED: CAPACITY</th>
<th>EXCESS POP</th>
<th>POP/CAP RATIO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National Centers</td>
<td>14,208</td>
<td>11,516</td>
<td>2,512</td>
<td>82.1%</td>
<td>8,587</td>
<td>77.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provincial Centers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region I</td>
<td>4,730</td>
<td>1,035</td>
<td>3,695</td>
<td>21.9%</td>
<td>3,900</td>
<td>121.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region II</td>
<td>4,044</td>
<td>2,034</td>
<td>2,010</td>
<td>50.3%</td>
<td>3,810</td>
<td>106.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region III</td>
<td>2,827</td>
<td>929</td>
<td>1,898</td>
<td>32.9%</td>
<td>2,150</td>
<td>131.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region IV</td>
<td>8,587</td>
<td>1,782</td>
<td>6,805</td>
<td>20.8%</td>
<td>5,340</td>
<td>160.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>20,188</td>
<td>5,780</td>
<td>14,408</td>
<td>28.6%</td>
<td>15,200</td>
<td>132.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National Police Facilities</th>
<th>10,000</th>
<th>7,650</th>
<th>130.7%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OVERALL</td>
<td>44,396</td>
<td>40,990</td>
<td>107.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1/ Report incomplete; figures estimated.
2/ Revised estimate, based on incomplete report.

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Roughly 50% of the prisoners in jail at any one time are awaiting sentence. Numbers of innocent persons, or at least persons who have been forced to perform tasks for the VC, have been arrested and held, sometimes for extended periods, without a hearing. There is no habeas corpus procedure for testing the validity of the detention. Justifiably concerned, the Office of the Prime Minister established special screening committees throughout the country to review the cases of a large number of civil detainees, and many have since been released. On the other hand, real VC1 and VC supporters are being released prior to judicial processing or receive very light sentences, usually on the ground of lack of sufficient evidence.
SECRET

-- Civilians suspected of being members of the VCI may be tried by military courts or processed administratively by PSC's. The vast bulk of cases are handled by the PSC's. These committees are primarily military in composition (chaired by the Province Chief and comprised of the Deputy Chief for Security, NP representative, the Sector S2 and RF/PF members) and consider a case in a less exacting and technical manner than a regular court. They may: (1) release a suspect; (2) refer the case to the appropriate military court; (3) or recommend detention or enforced residence for a maximum of two years.

-- Cases referred to military courts are tried by either regular or field military courts; one of each type are located in each corps. The chief differences are that the procedures for field courts are simplified and field courts travel throughout the corps area. Military courts are not restricted as to sentences they can mete out.

The prosecution of detained persons is not following established lines. In the police reorganization of the Surete in 1963, the Judicial Police (Police Judiciaire) and Special Police (Police Speciale) were separately oriented toward police investigation and counterintelligence functions respectively. The prosecution of detained persons was to be handled through normal civil Judicial Police investigation and processing for court actions. The lines of investigation/prosecution jurisdiction have since become blurred; both Special and Judicial Police are now involved in investigation and prosecution.

The main problem lies in administrative management -- adequate qualified personnel and good management practices. The first breakdown comes with the initial investigation of a case, which is done either by the SPB or by the Military Judicial Police for military courts. The SPB lacks investigative personnel -- and this has led to improper release of detainees, inability to identify and release innocent civilians, slowness of further processing, etc. The PSC's are slow in taking judicial action, normally about 60% of those cases referred to them are dismissed (it is not easy to try and convict an important member of the VCI since witnesses are often reluctant to testify). Only about 5% of the suspects are referred to military courts and, as a result, these courts are not overburdened.

The problem of civilian detention and judicial processing is of undesirable proportions now and is likely to become exacerbated in 1969 with increasing detainee inputs from anti-VCI programs. The meeting of several requirements would speed and improve the judicial process; the success of any actions in this regard are directly commensurate with the priority and emphasis given it by US and GVN officials. Among the requirements are:
-- A considerable additional number of trained investigators and other police personnel to prosecute cases are required. Some of these should be retained in a mobile pool to clear up problems in congested provinces. These investigators should attempt to get early documentation of a case so as to curb improper releases. While there are some Judicial Police that handle the prosecution function, the SPB has practically all the investigators, yet their prosecution function is given short shrift because the SPB main mission is developing intelligence on the VCI. One feasible course is to provide the uniform police with investigators for normal offenses against law and order and have the SPB investigate offenses against national security. Prosecution, and additional investigative functions in this regard would be handled by the Judicial Police. Thus, the Judicial Police element should be strengthened, provided detailed assistance from the Special Police in national security cases and substantially bolstered with qualified police advisory personnel skilled in legal and prosecution actions.

-- The performance of the PSC's needs to be improved and speeded up. They require adequate and qualified staffs and their operations must be reviewed closely by the Ministry of the Interior. Subsidiary committees at district level are required; village and hamlet administrations need a larger role in the judicial process as their capabilities are developed; and a larger role for civilians on the PSC is required. In addition to administrative/judicial efficiency, meeting the latter two requirements would work towards developing a judicial system more representative of and responsive to the rural population.

-- An agreed priority system for prosecution of offenses is required - a system where national security offenses are categorized as to degree of violation against security and offenders as to degree of offense and categories of "most wanted."

-- More cases are required to be referred to military field courts and additional courts are required in those areas where the load is heaviest such as in IV Corps.

-- The detention facilities programmed for construction in 1969 are required to be completed on a priority basis. Additional provincial detention facilities are required.
Intelligence

Effective GVN intelligence is essential to the anti-VCI program and internal security, yet GVN intelligence procedures in the past have been characterized by fragmented effort, little focus on the district or lower levels, only minor concern with the VCI, and significant concern with internal politics.

Several separate elements are concerned with intelligence: The SPB and SCGC with intelligence on the VCI, the Central Intelligence Organization (CIO) with intelligence and counterintelligence on NVN and VC intelligence services, the Military Security Service (MSS) with counterintelligence within the military forces, and the usual military combat intelligence structure targeted against VC/NVA military units. All function semi-autonomously.

During 1968, a number of actions were taken to improve intelligence activities. First, the National Intelligence Coordinating Committee (NICC) was established under the jurisdiction of the President to coordinate intelligence matters. This committee has reviewed intelligence exploitation and has begun to coordinate operations involving more than one GVN intelligence agency. However, it has not defined specific national collection objectives nor assigned operating agencies specific responsibilities. Thus, the chronic problem of coordinating information among various GVN agencies and the establishment of collection requirements/priorities/responsibilities remains. Second, the GVN effort against the VCI finally was nationalized and unified last July. However, the effectiveness of this effort is constrained by the limited intelligence capability of the GVN. Personnel in those agencies tasked with gathering intelligence of the VCI and running operations against it simply have not had the training and background for sophisticated intelligence work. This is especially true at district level where the anti-VCI program is focused -- most of the talent and intelligence information presently is found at province. Information available at province level often is not fully disseminated down to the district; moreover, most of the DIOCC's are still in the process of developing the data base needed to operate against the VCI.

For the future, as the conflict turns more from the military to the political arena and probable NLF participation in public life predicates restrictions on police powers of arrest and detention, intelligence activities must be strengthened and better coordinated. More subtle penetration

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4/ The CIO reports directly to the President and the MSS to the Joint General Staff (MOD).
techniques will be required as intelligence targets shift to NLF sponsored political, social and economic front organizations. Thus better training and other actions to improve the covert and overt intelligence capabilities of all intelligence elements will be required.

The main structural - organizational problem is to determine what the optimum intelligence organization in SVN should be. There are two extremes: (1) a centrally controlled intelligence structure either with a unified intelligence organization or with tight control over separate intelligence elements; (2) separate intelligence elements under a central coordinating body. We believe that a combination of both is the best course.

-- With respect to the NICC, it is likely that the GVN intelligence services in 1971 will not yet have reached a sufficient level of sophistication to allow the NICC to be more than a coordinating body whom conflicts between intelligence agencies are resolved. CIA considers that the NICC should probably remain in this limited role and not have command authority over intelligence agencies, although consideration of such authority may be necessary for the sake of effectiveness.

-- Covert penetration and counterintelligence functions should remain with the separate agencies. The CIO should continue to have the main role in covert penetration of the VC/PRP intelligence bodies and the MSS should continue in the military counterintelligence field. But a central clearing house of all information on the VCI gathered by these agencies is necessary. In addition, the SPB should develop similar penetration capabilities with respect to the NLF/PRP and associated front organizations.

-- Separate intelligence elements for territorial security and internal security are not required. Forces involved in both functions operate under province and district control. At these levels existing military and police intelligence elements can serve both forces. The SPB should continue to concentrate on the VCI at all levels, working with military forces when necessary.
STUDY: IMPROVING SOUTH VIETNAM'S INTERNAL SECURITY SCENE: III

Annexs D, E, F.
ANNEX D

CONSTRAINTS

This annex considers several constraints inhibiting improvement in security capabilities in SVN: geographic and political, perceptive, budgetary and manpower.

Geopolitical

As an overview of the problem we have been confronted with in South Vietnam it is useful to examine the problem from a localized geographic and political point of view. It seems clear historically that the VC/NLF that we are confronted with today had their genesis in the Viet Minh organization which fought against the French from 1945 to 1954. Thus, there is some value in comparing those areas in SVN which were hard core Viet Minh in 1954 with those areas which have the greatest VC/NLF influence at the present time. Map 1 shows the hard core areas of the Viet Minh in 1954. 1/ The coastal lowlands of central Vietnam, the central highlands, the remote jungle areas of what is today the boundaries of III Corps, the Plains of Reed and Camau Peninsula plus the southernmost points of the delta were the areas which the Viet Minh had their greatest influence. Map 2 shows the areas in which the VC/NLF have their greatest influence as of 31 January 1969. 2/ The coastal lowlands of I Corps (plus Binh Dinh), Pleiku at the central highlands, a large part of the upper delta (both III and IV Corps) and the Camau Peninsula show least GVN influence and most VC/NLF influence.

Areas of similarity between the two maps are the coastal lowlands of central Vietnam, portions of the central highlands and the Camau Peninsula. The biggest difference is the apparent growth of VC/NLF influence in the provinces of the upper delta: Hau Nghia, Long An, Dinh Tuong, Kien Hoa and Vinh Binh. These provinces represent an


2/ Cross hatched are the 13 provinces by Corps area which have the lowest % of population in the relatively secure category and the highest % in the VC category according to the Hamlet Evaluation System (HES) report of 31 Jan 1969. Double crosshatching indicates provinces in which the % of relative secure population is below 60%.
Extracted from p. 13 of
Government and The Countryside:
Political Accommodation and
South Vietnam's Communal Groups,
a Rand publication, P-3924, by
A.E. Goodman.
Cross hatched are the 13 worst provinces by Corps having lowest % of population in relatively secure and highest % VC in accordance with HES data of 31 Jan 69. Double cross hatching indicates provinces in which the % of relatively secure population is below 60%. Dotted areas indicate areas of Hoa Hao or Cao Dai influences. Shaded areas indicate Montagnard areas.
area which contains (1) the major VC/NLF lines of communication for men, money and material from IV Corps to the north and (2) the major GVN lines of communication from IV Corps north and from Saigon to IV Corps. Thus the VC/NLF penetration into these areas may have two objectives: (1) to insure the safety and stability of supply of their forces in and around Saigon; (2) to disrupt and/or cut off IV Corps from Saigon and vice versa.

This analysis tends to indicate that we are faced with a problem in some areas of South Vietnam which may not be amenable to any of the solutions we are employing presently. Further, we may not ever be able to accomplish some of the goals that we have set out for ourselves; for instance, it would seem that the chances of "rooting out" the infrastructure and replacing it with GVN infrastructure in many of the old Viet Minh areas and/or all of the provinces of the upper delta are slim. Thus, strategies, solutions and future proposals need to be examined in the light that certain areas of South Vietnam will likely remain beyond the control of the GVN in the near future.

Additionally, if the areas of Hoa Hao, Cao Dai and Montagnard influence shown on Map 2 are examined, the magnitude of the GVN internal security problem is evidenced. As long as these groups are aligned with the GVN, they tend to help the GVN maintain internal security or, at least alleviate the problem by removing certain areas from contention (An Giang for instance), but if their allegiance shifted, the possibilities of Saigon being isolated are apparent. Further Montagnard support of the VC could make the Highlands a more difficult environment for friendly operations. Therefore, a deliberate policy of accommodation would seem circumspect for the GVN with regard to the minority groups.

Perceptions

Perhaps one of the major constraints to development of internal security programs for South Vietnam since the beginning of our endeavor there has been our perceptions as to the nature of the problem and its solution.

Dotted areas indicate Hoa Hao and Cao Dai influence (IV Corps Cao Dai not considered) and the shaded areas indicate the area where Montagnard represent a majority of the population.
Our first perception was that the problem of internal security in South Vietnam was amenable to acceptable solutions. The second perception was that the US could help provide acceptable solutions. Another similarly shared American perception was that American problem solving techniques would provide the path which, if the Vietnamese followed it, would result in an acceptable outcome. Thus, the problems were identified and delineated, plans were developed to deal with problems, programs were set up to implement the plans, and organizations were structured to complement the programs. Sometimes the cycle worked in reverse, but in general it was followed one way or the other. Certain American beliefs were clearly apparent in the plans and programs and organizations that were initiated: (1) development of a democratic political system to include a legislature, an executive and a judiciary and to include free elections; (2) reorganization of the Vietnamese internal security system to achieve a full integration of the civil and military efforts but at the same time maintain the separation of civil and military functions and powers; (3) development of a more modern South Vietnamese economic system through US economic assistance which would alleviate the discontents of the dispossessed so they wouldn't be as susceptible to subversion; (4) provision of better training and equipment to the RVNAF and getting them on the offensive would defeat the threat. 4/

The difficulties of applying these generally accepted US perceptions began to appear early in the Vietnam experience.

--- One illustration of what happened when our perceptions were applied can be seen in the issue of how to integrate fully the civil and military efforts in internal security. In 1961, our perception was that our problem in Vietnam was that there was an "overemphasis on civilian control and direction of the Armed Forces" 5/ because Diem directly controlled all province, district and military commanders. We believed that this problem could be solved and should be solved by taking away control from the district and province chiefs for military counterinsurgency missions" 6/ and placing the province chiefs under the Corps Commander for military operations. Military and civilian counterinsurgency efforts

4/ Counterinsurgency Plan for South Vietnam, 1961
5/ Ibid
would be coordinated through the respective internal security committees at district, province, regional and national levels.

By 1966, our perception was that there was too much military control over the internal security effort and our solution was to try to persuade the Vietnamese to eliminate the Corps and Division Commanders from the internal security role and return to the Diemist system of direct control over the province chiefs from Saigon.

Another indication of how our perceptions affected our approach to the SVN internal security problem is seen in the history of the rural police program. When the French withdrew in 1954, they left behind only the remnants of several police organizations, among them was the Civil Guard (CG), which was and continued to be the rural civil police force in South Vietnam. In 1959 USAID (at that time US Operations Missions (USOM)) formed the Public Safety Division to provide advice and assistance to the CG. During the period 1959 through 1960, there was a three sided battle in which one group (mostly US civilians) perceived the CG as the rural police force (or constabulary) which would carry the main burden of the internal security fight; another group (mostly US military) which saw the CG as a para-military force to help provide territorial security; and a third group (Ngo Dinh Diem and his adherents) which saw the CG as a counterpoise to ARVN. In November 1960, the battle on the US side was resolved in favor of making the CG a paramilitary force; the Regional Forces (RF), a military force and part of RVNAF, with the mission of providing territorial security. While the degree to which the CG carried out their role as rural civil police is debatable, nevertheless they were charged with the responsibility and as a result of their transfer there was no force specifically charged with this responsibility until 1966 and no uniformed civil police organization in the countryside.

Another indicator that the US effort has been weighed in favor of viewing the internal security war as essentially a military problem with political overtones in the gross amounts of men and money which are engaged in our total effort. Specifically, with regard to internal security, the forces developed and strategies pursued have, explicitly or implicitly, been mostly military, although political, or at least paramilitary type, forces have been increased for this lower intensity warfare. But the bulk of the advisors within the internal security area have been and continued to be military as shown in the table below.
### Table D1. GVN INTERNAL SECURITY FORCES, US ADVISORS AND FY 1968 FUNDING LEVELS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Force</th>
<th>US Advisors Military/Civilian</th>
<th>Funding FY 68 (Millions of US $ Military/Civilian)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Regular Forces</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RF</td>
<td>6,000/--</td>
<td>533.2/--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PF</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PFF</td>
<td>--/255</td>
<td>--/28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NP(GD)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SBP</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRU</td>
<td>102/5</td>
<td>--/3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RDC/TSRF</td>
<td>53/86</td>
<td>--/60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCGC</td>
<td>--/13</td>
<td>--/5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APT/Chieu Hoi</td>
<td>--/13</td>
<td>--/2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>6,155/372</td>
<td>533.2/98</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Additionally, it has been estimated that all pacification activities (and these nearly approximate internal security activities) represent only 5% of the total annual US expenditure in South Vietnam. While this evidence is not conclusive proof, the indications are that the US basically has perceived internal security in SVN as a military problem.

US perceptions which saw the necessity for centralized control of all military forces, intelligence activities and police functions often were counteracted by another US traditional perception — the necessity for separation of political and military power and both of these perceptions together often were counteracted by the Vietnamese perception that neither was very useful toward providing solutions to their internal security problem. The conflict and the apparent unresolvability of these perceptions led to diverse organizations, both US and GVN, carrying out similar or closely related programs using their own separate resources to accomplish similar or in some cases the same, goals. The following table illustrates the point:
Table D2. GVN SECURITY FORCES -- ORGANIZATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Force</th>
<th>GVN Ministry</th>
<th>US Advisors</th>
<th>US Funding (FY69)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Regular Forces</td>
<td>MOD</td>
<td>DOD</td>
<td>DOD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RF</td>
<td>MOD</td>
<td>DOD</td>
<td>DOD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PF</td>
<td>MOD</td>
<td>DOD</td>
<td>DOD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PFF</td>
<td>MOI</td>
<td>AID</td>
<td>AID/DOD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NP(GD)</td>
<td>MOI</td>
<td>AID</td>
<td>AID</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SBP</td>
<td>MOI</td>
<td>CIA</td>
<td>CIA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRU</td>
<td>MOI(In Process)</td>
<td>CIA</td>
<td>CIA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RDC/TSRD</td>
<td>MORD</td>
<td>CIA/DOD</td>
<td>DOD/CIA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCGC</td>
<td>MORD</td>
<td>CIA</td>
<td>DOD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APT/Chieu Hoi</td>
<td>MOCH</td>
<td>AID/DOD</td>
<td>DOD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSDF</td>
<td>MOI/MOD</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

--- Periodically, the US mission in Saigon or the US agencies in Washington or both have made efforts to re-examine either the priorities for programs in SVN or the roles and missions of the various forces. In no case has any study or report of the nature been officially accepted, and, in most cases, the perceptual conflicts have not been resolved.

The suggestion is that our perception of the military command problem as it relates to the question of the internal security problem in South Vietnam was too much colored by our own experiences and traditional approaches without due consideration of the uniqueness and differences of Vietnamese experiences and their traditional approaches.

Thus, in considering the overall effect our perceptions have had upon our attempts to define the nature of the internal security problem and the solutions to it, our past and present conceptions will probably continue to constrain us in certain ways.
1. It is and will be difficult, if not impossible, to get agreement among the USG agencies as to the nature and solution of the problem--thus we are likely to continue to have duplication of effort and resources.

2. It is most likely that US agencies will continue to perceive the SVN internal security situation as amenable to basically US-conceived plans, programs and policies--thus, while we have and will continue to talk of how internal security is a SVN problem, at the same time, we have and will continue to impose US solutions upon the South Vietnamese.

3. The basic perception that the internal security war is a military war with some political overtones has been and will continue to be the prevailing perception (or, stated another way, the perception is that no real political progress can be made until some level of security is achieved; this level of security won't be achieved until military forces, tactics and strategy are employed to provide it). Thus, it is unlikely that programs, forces and organizations designed to counter the political warfare practiced by the VC/NLF will receive priority attention.

**Political**

The South Vietnamese political scene has several salient features which have an affect on what happens vis-a-vis the internal security situation.

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South Vietnam does not have a long term, stable and established political structure resting upon a solid rock of political tradition and popular support. We are dealing with a nascent constitutional system in which the elective process has yet to take hold and elections are often viewed merely as a manipulatory process whereby present leaders are confirmed in their power positions. The non-communist elements of the SVN body politic generally have rallied in times of apparent danger but otherwise normally engage in a competitive struggle to gain status and dominance. The existing government structure and processes are fragile. Thus changes in internal security organization and procedures should not increase the instability of this structure.

In the past, there has been a constant balancing off of political and military forces by the various incumbent political powers in attempts to ensure the continuance in power. Previous American attempts to centralize control over various internal security forces in accordance with our organizational principles often have gone astray because they ran counter to the realities of SVN political life.

---
In the present situation, there are some factors which may operate against this heretofore solid reality. As best can be surmised, President Thieu is establishing a modified Diemist structure in SVN—placing the Province Chiefs under the control of the Minister of Interior (MOI), etc. In some ways, General Khiem has been cast by Thieu in the role of Ngo Diem Nhu—i.e., his recent appointment as Deputy Prime Minister of Pacification while concurrently serving as MOI. Therefore, many of the internal security forces (the major exception being the RF/PF) now come under a single individual's control. It is unknown whether this will continue and the RF or PF or both will be placed under Khiem (as predicted by some) or whether the old fears of placing too many forces under a single individual will be paramount and thus no further centralization of internal security forces will be possible.

Basically, and most important, the internal security situation can only be dealt with effectively through actions which: (1) do not upset the delicate structure which we and the SVN have built together over the last three or so years and which gives some promise for the future; and (2) are in consonance with the realities of internal SVN politics.

The internal security situation is also influenced by the US organization both in Washington and Saigon.

In Washington, due to a variety of reasons, there has not been an effective focal point for pacification/internal security programs. Since 1961, there have been attempts to set up such a focal point with the zenith of such attempts being the establishment of Mr. Komer's office on the White House staff during 1966. This office was given the responsibility for the direction, coordination and supervision in Washington of US non-military programs in SVN. With Mr. Komer's departure for South Vietnam to become Deputy to COMUSMACV in 1967, these responsibilities lapsed and, at the present time, there is no single Washington focal point for US pacification/internal security programs in SVN. Whether this adversely affects the situation is arguable but, at a minimum, it does create cumbersome problems. For instance, in last year's hearings before Congress on the AID program for SVN, representatives from State, AID and DOD appeared simultaneously in defense of the programs. Each of the agencies is autonomous, with no authority over the other; thus, little or no real program trade-offs are made and each agency's programs are defended and presented as entities unto themselves. Nowhere in Washington, under present arrangements,
can one agency's program be reduced and the funds supporting it be shifted to another agency's program which might be thought to have a higher priority or be more capable of accomplishing the same objective. In general, interagency program trade offs are not made and each agency, in many ways, runs an autonomous operation with regard to its internal security programs in SVN.

-- In Saigon, the same lack of focal point existed until May 1967 when all US pacification programs were placed under the aegis of COMUSMACV. The general opinion is that this organizational change has done much to enhance coordination, cooperation and integration of both US civil and military programs. However, some differences between US agencies remain as to the nature of the internal security war and as to the solutions of the problem--these differences are less visible than before and perhaps less significant in terms of seriously affecting the situation.

-- Possibly a more significant problem in Saigon among US agencies is the problem of the US seriously and effectively intervening in the SVN political scene. The record of American experience in South Vietnam indicates our difficulties in directing the evolution of Vietnamese political life into the desired channels. Generally, the US has had to adjust its policy because of changes in the SVN political scene which have come about because of Vietnamese imperatives rather than the other way around. Essentially, our role seems to have been one in which we have tried to support and stabilize whomever emerged as the SVN power holders of the day. Partially this has been true because of our lack of detailed knowledge of the internal political dynamics of Vietnam and partially because of the political constraints under which we operate. Our history and tradition, and the pressure of both domestic, international and South Vietnamese politics have dictated that US political intervention into the SVN internal political scene remain at a low level, both in terms of visibility and activity. Thus, a major political constraint upon US activity in SVN has been, and is likely to remain, our inability or unwillingness (or both) to intervene in SVN political life to the extent of effectively influencing desired outcomes for civilian or military programs we are supporting.

Budget

The South Vietnamese budget for CY69 is about $1.1 billion; the Defense portion is about $806 million or 73.2 percent. At present, the SVN GNP is about $3.2 billion -- of which the Defense budget represents about

7/ GVN fiscal year is the same as the calendar year.
34%. In most countries of the world the Defense budget, at a maximum, represents about 10% of the GNP—thus the GVN is faced already with a serious handicap in developing a viable economy by the present defense budget.

Various force elements have different costs. Spending per capita for RVNAF soldiers over the last four years (FY65-68) has averaged $2041 per ARVN soldier, $796 per RF and $465 per PF. If VNN, VNAF and VNN per capita costs are assumed to be the same as the ARVN the yearly costs for the existing RVNAF force level of 842,500, will be about $1.2 billion for CY 69. These costs are estimates only, but indicate how trade-offs could be made. For example, a combination of PF and NP, if adequate for internal security, are cheaper than RF. We have no costs for PSDF, but such forces are probably the cheapest of all. Thus it may be possible to reduce costs and yet provide better security, and cost reduction is required.

**Table D3. NP AND RDC/TSCD COSTS**

(Personnel in parenthesis in thousands; costs in $millions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FY 69</th>
<th>FY 70</th>
<th>FY 71</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NP a/</td>
<td>58.7 (78,431)</td>
<td>67.4 (90,000)</td>
<td>76.4 (102,000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RDC/TSCD b/</td>
<td>53.5 (53,552)</td>
<td>54.8 (54,760)</td>
<td>54.8 (54,760)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>112.3</td>
<td>122.2</td>
<td>131.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a/ NP per capita costs average $749.15 yearly, AID input March 1969; strengths from Annex B this study.
b/ RDC/TSCD per capita costs figured at $1,000 per CIA 20 March 1969; strengths from Annex B this study.

If the present proposed force increases are considered, the pressure on the GVN financial situation will increase. The accelerated Phase II

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8/ By comparison, the US in WWII devoted 32% in 1942, 42% in 1943 and 1944, and 35% in 1945 to the war effort. Considering paramilitary spending the GVN is at these levels now.

9/ RAC study on resource allocation in support of RVNAF, FY 68.

10/ This assumption most probably reflects a lower than average cost.
RVNAF structure, which has been approved by the Secretary of Defense, calls for a force level of about 876,000; the operating costs for this force structure would be about $100 million more than the existing force structure. The MACV proposed post-hostilities force level is about 804,000 which would cost about $100 million less than the existing structure. Table D4 indicates the magnitude of total operating costs for military and selected paramilitary forces in SVN:

Table D4. TOTAL COSTS OF MILITARY AND SELECTED PARAMILITARY FORCES ($ million US)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Force Type</th>
<th>Cost</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Current Force</td>
<td>1,269.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase II plus FY 70 Forces</td>
<td>1,319.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase III plus FY 71 Forces</td>
<td>1,087.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These figures indicate that the expenditures required to sustain any of these force levels will create unacceptable economic problems, unless such spending is accompanied by significant decrease in other expenditures, offsetting additions to GVN revenue, or a devaluation of the piaster.

At present DOD on an annual basis through service funding provides about $1.2 billion directly for the GVN military forces. The GVN also earns about $345 million in foreign exchange from the USG and from US personnels' purchases of piasters. Additionally, another $100 million is earned from exports, services provided ships, travelers, etc., much of which is attributable to the US presence. The foreign exchange provided by the US Commercial Import Program (CIP) and PL 480 currently totals about $320 million yearly. At present, continued pressure on prices is expected with prices to rise between 35 to 50 percent during 1969 (the lower figure only if we can persuade the GVN to take appropriate tax measures). The additional costs projected in this paper tend to indicate that the price raise may go even higher, perhaps up to 55-60 percent. Further force level increases will have a greater effect. Attempts to redress the balance through the Commercial Import Program can only be partially effective. Other effective anti-inflationary actions can only be accomplished by the GVN. Thus, inflation is apt to continue apace or increase during CY 69 -- even with no further increase in expenditures. Further inflation places an increasing squeeze upon both the civil and military servants of the GVN and others who have a relatively fixed income. Problems in loyalty of these people can be expected. More particularly, a situation of increasing prices without corresponding wage increases does not bode well for a decrease in desertion rates nor overall support for the GVN.
Another problem which might be considered is the affect of US troop reductions upon the SVN economy. If, as US troops are reduced, there is a proportionate drop in spending and piaster purchases, the GVN could lose somewhere between $32 million and $44 million in foreign exchange per 20,000 men withdrawn; however, some of this loss (at best 50%) may be recovered through various re-employsments of thus released SVN resources. Such losses will probably not be reflected until the year following the completion of the redeployment, thus, the impact on the SVN economy would not be immediate. For projection purposes, it could be considered that SVN will lose from 16 to 22 million dollars per 20,000 US troops withdrawn from SVN. Additionally, as young men with specific skills providing essential services to the private sector and civil government become more scarce because of the general mobilization additional pressure is placed on prices. These young men provide services that cannot be supplied through imports financed with US dollars.

In summary, there appears to be some serious budgetary constraints which must be considered when dealing with the internal security situation:

-- The SVN Defense expenditures are apparently at a level which prevents development of a viable economy.

-- Inflation is and will remain a serious problem.

-- The present general mobilization is increasing costs for scarce skill resources thus increasing pressure on prices.

-- Increases in GVN spending over CY 1968 will create even greater inflationary pressures which would be extremely dangerous. Thus expansion of existing force levels without mitigating actions is not feasible.

-- There are force level trade-offs that can be made within existing spending, i.e. more PF or NP instead of RF or ARVN.

-- SVN must rely on US support to operate its armed forces as well as equip them.

-- GVN foreign exchange earnings will be constrained seriously within a year after any major US force reductions.

-- From the viewpoint of SVN economy, further expansion of the SVN military and paramilitary seems not feasible.
Manpower

Beyond the present probable questionable ratio of friendly to enemy forces within the realm of internal security is the entire question of manpower availability to sustain not only the force levels for internal security forces, but also the force levels for the regular forces and other GVN agencies.

-- MACV has estimated that the additional manpower available to fill only the military and paramilitary requirements and also has estimated the requirements themselves as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Available</th>
<th>Required</th>
<th>Shortfall</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>324</td>
<td>311</td>
<td>+13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>197</td>
<td>-22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>221</td>
<td>-107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>-135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>-128</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table D5. MANPOWER ESTIMATES (000)

a/ According to MACV, based on conservative estimates of the manpower pool.
b/ Based on current loss rates and Phase II Accelerated Force Structure.

-- About 70% of the projected loss rate is represented by desertions; thus dramatic improvement in the desertion rate could alleviate the seriousness of the manpower shortfall considerably. However, even if the desertion rate is halved, manpower required would be more than that available by 1971:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Available</th>
<th>Required</th>
<th>Shortfall</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>324</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>+123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>+46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>-29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>-56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>-51</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table D6. MANPOWER ESTIMATES - REDUCED DESERTION RATE (000)
Thus, present force expansion plans apparently require more manpower assets than will be available two years from now and, therefore, any future proposed increase in a given force in SVN would seem to require a corresponding decrease in some other force.

Summary

In analyzing the above, the following major constraints could have an affect upon the internal security situation and any solutions proposed herein:

- Certain areas of South Vietnam have been, are, and likely to remain, beyond the control of the GVN. Internal security plans and programs probably should be designed to constrain or "quarantine" these areas.

- The armed strength and internal cohesion of the Cao Dai, Hoa Hao and the Montagnards are sufficient to require the GVN to be circumspect in handling internal security problems in those areas where the minorities are strong.

- Continual duplication of effort and resources in the internal security field may be expected as it is unlikely there will be insufficient interagency agreement as the nature of the solutions to the problem.

- For a variety of reasons, perceptual and parochial, it is unlikely that programs and forces designed to counter the VC/NLF/PRP political warfare will be developed in the near time frame.

- Internal security plans, programs and organization should:
  - not upset the balance of the democratic structure which has been developed in SVN during the past few years; and
  - be in consonance with the realities of internal SVN politics if they are to be effective.

- With the lack of a single focal point for US support of SVN internal security programs in Washington, it is unlikely appropriate inter-agency trade-offs will be made; thus, each agency will continue to operate its own semi-autonomous programs.
-- It is likely the USG representatives in Saigon will remain unable or unwilling to intervene in SVN political life to the extent of influencing effectively desired outcomes for the SVN internal security programs we are supporting.

--- Serious budgetary problems affect the internal security situation:

- Inflation is and will remain a serious problem.

- The present general mobilization is placing increasing upward pressure on price levels by removing personnel with scarce skills from the general manpower pool.

- GVN defense expenditures are apparently at a level which prevents development of a viable economy; further, from the point of view of the SVN economy, more expansion of the SVN military and paramilitary does not seem feasible.

- GVN foreign exchange earnings will be constrained seriously within a year after any major US force reductions.

-- It appears that the present force levels cannot be maintained beyond this year if present desertion rates continued or beyond CY 70 if the deseration rate is reduced by half.