ANNEX E

FORCE STRUCTURE AND FORCE LEVEL ALTERNATIVES

This annex considers several GVN force structure and force level alternatives. Concepts of the various USG agencies and elements are advanced.

Office of the Secretary of Defense Alternatives

There basically would be two major types of internal-territorial security forces -- a Territorial Security Force (TSF) and an Internal Security Force (ISF) -- both would be administered and supported by GVN Ministries.

- The RF would remain the main element of the Territorial Security Forces (TSF), but would be augmented by a police element (NPFF) to give this force police power necessary for resources control and anti-VC operations. In general the TSF would be national force operating primarily under district control with some forces retained at province level. It would perform the tasks previously outlined in nonsecure areas and those areas between villages and urban areas. Also incorporated in this force are the PRU and APT, of which qualified members would become part of the PFF and Vietnamese Information Service respectively. The TSF would remain relatively stable in structure over time, but gradually shift to more of a police role.

- The Internal Security Force (ISF) would have the PF, NP (UB), RD Cadre, SCGC and PSDF as its main elements. It would operate primarily under village, city or municipality control and perform internal security tasks in villages and other populated areas and in their close environs. The ISF structure would vary overtime depending on the security status in the local areas.

- In the most secure areas, the PF would be nonexistent, selected personnel being phased into the NP and the PSDF. The PSDF would continue to be primarily a lightly armed part time force, but augmented
with some better armed full time personnel. Local defense would be the responsibility of the NP and PSDF. The RD Cadre would be phased into the local administrative structure and PSDF. The SCGC would also become part of the local police structure; the village-hamlet arm of the SPB.

- In less secure areas, the situation would be essentially as it is now. The PF would continue to provide local security augmented by the NP (UB). RD Cadre would comprise the administrative structure until they can develop a local government.

This proposed structure would facilitate the transition to the future post-hostilities/peace time structure (See Part II) in which:

-- The TSF would continue to be comprised of RF and PFF, being phased into a national police type paramilitary organization.

-- The ISF would function as a local or municipal type police and self-defense forces.

-- Both forces would be managed and supported by an administrative structure under the Ministry of Interior. Intelligence support would be divided into military and civil intelligence, but coordinated at province, district and village level through the Intelligence Operations Coordination Centers (I OCC's) as discussed in Annex C. The SPB would continue to be the main civil intelligence arm at province, district and village level, being a part of the management structure rather than integral to either the TSF or ISF. This would make the best use of available resources.

With respect to ministerial responsibility, we envision a phased shifting of responsibilities.

-- For the near time frame, the TSF would remain the responsibility of MOD with the support for the NPFF shifting from MOI to MOD. While ideally the MOI should be responsible for this force, we consider that political realities in SVN, limited MOI management and logistics capabilities and the security situation would preclude shifting the RF to MOI at this time. If, however, these difficulties could be overcome, the TSF would go to MOI. Under MOD sponsorship, portions of the NP central structure associated with the NPFF must be closely associated with MOD.
One solution would be to appoint a qualified civilian police official as an assistant to the Deputy for Territorial Security on the Joint General Staff. 1/

-- For the future post hostilities situation, the TSF would come under the MOI and function as a paramilitary, mobile National Police force.

-- Responsibility for the ISF would be shifted now to the MOI. This shift would be phased beginning with those forces in most secure areas, but to be completed by end CY 70. However, logistic support for military items would continue through the MOD chain. The future ISF would remain under the MOI for support, but function primarily under local control. The present Ministry of Revolutionary Development (MORD) would be subsumed under the MOI also by the end of FY 70. 2/

US advice and support for the TSF and ISF would continue through MACV for the near time frame. DOD would be primarily responsible for Washington backup of the TSF; with DOD and AID continuing to share responsibility.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff

The Joint Chiefs of Staff do not concur with the major concept advanced in the study involving the consolidation of all Vietnamese non-regular and paramilitary forces into an offensive Territorial Security Force (TSF) and a defensive Internal Security Force (ISF).

Since 25 June 1968, COMUSMACV has developed four plans dealing with force levels and an organizational structure for the RVNAF and GVN paramilitary forces. These plans set forth a progressive series of changes as full scale mobilization is instituted, the forces gain self-sufficiency, US and NVA forces withdraw, and the external and internal threat diminishes. Each of these plans was based on a specific assumed threat, each is tied closely to post hostilities planning for US forces, and each reflects a realistic estimate as to what can be accomplished by the GVN with adequate US assistance. In preparation for the study required by NSSM #19, COMUSMACV has reexamined the elements of these plans which are specifically concerned with internal security forces.

1/ State considers that the TSF should be placed under the MOI. If this is not possible, the second recourse should be MOD.

2/ State does not believe that the MORD need be abandoned. It could still perform some limited but useful functions in the future.
and has submitted additional recommendations. In some cases, these recommendations involve changes in previous concepts concerning strength and employment of certain GVN forces.

COMUSMACV plans provide for evolutionary changes among the various GVN forces. They do not maintain the status quo, as would be gathered from the comments on page 25 of the OSD study. They do involve some expansion, consolidation and elimination of forces as the nature of the threat changes and in anticipation of new requirements. These changes are generally outlined on page 29 of the study and include the following:

-- Retention of the Regional Forces (RF) to be employed as the primary mobile internal security force for offensive operations against local forces and guerrillas and for extended mobile patrolling.

-- Expansion of the National Police (NP) to 120,000 by the end of CY 70 to be employed as follows:

- The Police Field Forces (PFF) as the primary agency against the Viet Cong infrastructure, bandits and other unlawful elements in rural areas, and as augmentation for local law enforcement personnel where needed.

- The Uniformed Branch (UB) police as the local law enforcement agency in urban areas, extending into rural towns, villages and hamlets as the level of security increases.

- The Special Branch Police (SBP) as the police intelligence organization.

-- The gradual elimination of the Popular Forces (PF) as the level of security rises in the post hostilities environment. The Popular Self Defense Forces (PSDF) or police would assume responsibility for all local security and civil defense as the PF is phased out.

-- The absorption of the Revolutionary Development Cadre (RDC), Truong Son Cadre (TSC) and Static Census Grievance Cadre (SCGC) into the GVN infrastructure at village and hamlet level as security improves and the need for such special agencies subsides.
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The gradual elimination or reduction of the Civilian Irregular Defense Groups (CIDG) through attrition and absorption into the RF or other agencies.

The absorption of the Provincial Reconnaissance Units (PRU) into the SPB.

The elimination of the Armed Propaganda Teams (APT) and their absorption into the Vietnam Information Service (VIS) or other local information services.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff generally concur with the MACV approach and consider that this evolutionary program, developed in recognition of manpower and budgetary constraints and in extension of currently approved plans, should be continued.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff do not agree with the concept of consolidating these forces into a TSF and an ISF. The following are some of the shortcomings of the OSD proposed reorganization.

The basic concept of dividing internal security into offensive and defensive missions and the subsequent organizing, equipping and training of forces for such missions would be too inflexible.

The OSD proposed reorganization would create three armies -- ARVN, TSF and ISF -- which would compete for resources but would not have clearly delineated functional differences.

The police would be split three ways in the proposed organization -- the PFF to the TSF, the UB police to the ISF, and the S3P maintained under MOI. As a result, functional expertise would be seriously fractionalized. For example, both MOI and MOD would require police expertise. To achieve this, a part of the NP overhead would have to be transferred to MOD. Responsibility for development of police doctrine and control of career patterns for the professional forces could pose serious problems.

The PF under the MOI, would still be supported logistically by MOD.

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Responsibility for advising the ISF would fall on AID. It is doubtful that AID could provide the quantity of advisors required for the PF elements of the ISF without DOD assistance.

The assignment of full-time PSDF elements to the ISF would destroy the political purpose of the PSDF program without adding appreciably to internal security.

The OSD proposal would result in a major realignment of responsibilities from Saigon down to each village and hamlet. The reorganization would disrupt existing command, administrative and logistical channels and divide forces which have been trained to function in tandem. A reorganization of this magnitude would waste time and divert GVN leadership to reorganization problems at the very time when they should be giving their full attention to on-going problems. Additional comments by COMUSMACV concerning the disruptive effects which such a proposal would have on the GVN are in Annex F.

Central Intelligence Agency

The CIA post-hostilities structure is based on two major elements: National Police and Municipal Police.

The forces would be a constabulary type force under MOD comprised of RF, PF, SPB and volunteers from the present NP and NPFF. Functions would be similar to the TSF. Appropriate personnel would be trained in law, paramilitary tactics and police methods. The Municipal Police would be similar to the ISF, constituted from the present NP, NPFF, some RF/PF and possibly RDC, and supported by the MCI.

In addition, the RDC and SCGC would be retained under the MORD but with a covert link between them and the Municipal Police for intelligence purposes. The intelligence arm of the National Police would be constituted from the SPB and be responsible for all internal security intelligence functions. The PRU, beginning in FY 71, would be built into a separate highly mobile Police Special Reaction Force, expanded with about 3,000 NPFF, working under the operational control of the SPB to "wipe out" VC/VCI remnants in rural and some urban areas. It would operate at province and district levels and have its own intelligence arm.
State

State concurs with the TSF-ISF concept, considers that a constabulary-type force is required, and believes that certain modest steps should be taken now to constitute such a force. As a beginning, the RF and NPFF would be the basis for such a force, and that this force should be under the MOI, though at what point in time this would occur would depend upon internal GVN political considerations. Fully integrated TSF companies and platoons would perform both police and military functions rather than a separate element of the TSF performing police functions. Further, State recommends that the PRU be phased out, possibly by consolidation with the TSF.

Territorial Security Forces should be clearly labeled as the rural constabulary and should be under the Ministry of Interior. The constabulary would have both military and police responsibilities, though the relative emphasis would depend on the level of violence within the locality in which they were operating. They would in any event be one of the primary instruments in attacking the Viet Cong infrastructure. In line with this approach, State believes that the National Police should be based in the cities and towns, down to the district level only, and further expansion of the National Police Field Forces should not be undertaken.

Agency for International Development

AID considers that no new force entities should be formed or inter-ministerial transfers effected unless it conforms with Mission Council determination. Rural security progress should be developed from increasing the effectiveness of existing forces while eliminating or down-phasing unproductive organizations or those outside a "standard" military, paramilitary or police structure. The RF should continue its development under the MOD. If future manpower trade-offs are necessary, selected and qualified RF/PF personnel should be made available to the police structure. To meet significant political or other contingencies, major portions of the RF should be considered for transfer into the NP. NP development should continue to 90,000 in CY 69 and 102,000 in CY 1970 unless such a contingency intervenes, when expansion to 120,000 or over should be considered on an emergency basis. The NP should continue to be developed as a unitary national law enforcement agency with all its organic divisions of UP, SPB, NPFF, and Marine Police. Its overall development should continue under the aegis of the MOI, where its elements should continue to coordinate activities with all GVN and Free World agencies involved in rural and urban security efforts.
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Any proposal for shifting elements between ministries, or developing an organization in MOD for later transfer to MOI, does not realistically confront SVN power/political realities. It is manifestly unwise to contemplate a security force development of 250,000 RF in MOD and place reliance on a future simple transfer to MOI in the changing political climate of SVN. Necessity and prudence dictate development of the law enforcement structure within the MOI, phasing RF/PF manpower into the NP structure as rapidly as possible.

The proposed "realignment and amalgamation" calling for a transfer of the small NPFF force of 12,000 to constitute a "Territorial Security Force" in combination with over 250,000 RF would be a largely futile exercise, resulting most probably in a permanent loss of the NPFF to the desired unitary NP structure. It is erroneous to consider such transfer an "amalgamation" if it removes from the NP structure an integral portion of its rural law enforcement capability. The gain to the TSF would be minimal and unknown, while the comparative loss of 12,000 men to the 78,000 man NP force would be a very real and major blow. Transfers of this nature tend to be irreversible. The transfer of the 54,000 man Civil Guard police under MOI into the RF under MOD in 1961 effectively eliminated civil police rural efforts in SVN for several years until the NPFF emerged to fill the law enforcement vacuum created by this transfer. This earlier transfer was strongly resisted by USAID/PSD. This latest proposal would again negate several years of PSD effort to rebuild its rural police activity and should not be considered. Its cost in divisive effect will far outweigh possible benefits. To be considered are the following:

--- The NPFF can and do work effectively with any GVN or Free World forces in rural security efforts against the VC and VCI. They can be expanded and continue these efforts with appropriate concentration on RF activities.

--- The significant tasks outlined for the TSF: area security, extending control into VC areas, external protection for cities and villages and LOC security are predominately military in nature. The functions and responses to these requirements are suitable to the paramilitary RF with its military orientation, with police acting as a law enforcement adjunct where required. A law enforcement capability is only intermittently applied by RF forces in cordon-and-search, intelligence, resources control, identification, etc.
COMUSMACV indicates that both the NP and RF will be required for the foreseeable future. He sees no incompatibility in parallel RF and NPFF development.

In the initial time frame of this report, i.e., by the end of CY 1970, it is more than doubtful if the inter-ministerial transfer can be effected and individual and unit re-orientation accomplished to profitable magnitudes in view of existing leadership, training and administrative problems already extant in the NPFF and RF.

Based on past history, there is no reliable precedent to ensure that the future GVN power/political structure will be amenable to retransferring the NPFF, or the TSF, to the jurisdiction of the MOI. The national level of violence may also militate against consideration of a re-transfer.

Such a transfer would disrupt on-going advisory continuity for the NPFF, adversely affect its training, logistics, command/control advisory support and general administration. In view of its existing limitations and deficiencies, the action would be a severe trauma-requiring many months to dissipate its adverse effect's and regain profitable momentum.

A "quick-fix" or short-term solution is inappropriate to the current SVN environment. It will create identification and functional discontinuities until the forces involved and the general public can undergo a necessary re-orientation. From a security viewpoint, it will have an adverse effect on the national stability.

It is axiomatic that no government efforts can achieve permanent success in the rural areas without promulgation of some system of law enforced by a legally constituted enforcement agency. The RF is not such an agency and cannot realistically be so constituted in any brief period outside the NP structure.

The series of transitions outlined would result in the development of a separate structure under MOD with police powers. By the end of hostilities this force would have considerable autonomy within MOD and might well resist inclusion back into the basic national police structure. Normal inter-service jealousies would likely continue.

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between this organization and those already in the NP organization, creating jurisdictional, morale and command/control problems of unknown but troublesome magnitude.

The GVN problems of leadership, political in-fighting, maladministration and power orientation will affect any application of external solutions to internal problems. Massive internal power transfers at this and future points do not appear to conform to GVN political realities. They bring with them undesirable identity as an "American" solution to Vietnamese problems.

The rural security problem in SVN is not uniform. Security situations can demand either police or military reactions, or any combination of both. Flexibility can be achieved best by developing the paramilitary NPFF with a law enforcement orientation and the paramilitary RF with a military orientation. There is no incompatibility in these parallel developments, particularly if the former phases up and the latter down.

Every effort should be made to support and expand the development of the civil elements of this predominately military-oriented government. This report itself indicates that the overall effort in SVN has arrived at a point where military force is predominant and that law enforcement is badly in need of significant additional development.

Regarding the shifting of NPFF assignment from MOI to MOD, specific exception is taken to any necessity for such shifting in force assignment. At present the NPFF and all other NP elements come under the operational control of regional, provincial and district commanders. At the village level they are under the operational control of the elected village chiefs. In this configuration the NPFF and other NP elements have worked with and for GVN commanders and administrative heads of any ministry and all elements of Free World military forces. Transferring the NPFF from MOI will negate efforts toward establishing a career police service and eliminate what effectiveness has been achieved in training, logistical support, promotions, advisory support, etc., all of which are contained within the National Police command/administrative structure. The National Police has had a major difficulty in developing its initial rural police entity through NPFF; it would be tragic to obliterate past efforts in an unnecessary shifting between ministries.
Also to be considered as the fact that ultimately the entire TSF must be shifted back to MOI at an unknown point in time and in an unpredictable political/power environment. The NPFF can be made to work effectively with personnel from any ministry while assigned to MOI. If the NPFF remains under MOI, there will be no necessity to appoint a civilian police official as an assistant to the Deputy for Territorial Security on the Joint General Staff.

The ultimate form of the civil police structure in South Vietnam should be a unitary civil law enforcement body which would incorporate a uniform branch for all areas, to include villages. It also requires a Marine Police element for water LOCs, a Special Police Branch for police intelligence and an NPFF rural police element to handle those rural areas not covered by the Uniform Branch, plus expansion into necessary police border control activities. The proposal for establishment of still another "highly mobile Police Special Reaction Force" as the action arm of the SPB to replace the PFF which now has the responsibility, is considered a retrogression towards additional proliferation. Efforts to develop an organization on a national scale which can accomplish both civil police and military activities would tend to run afool of the RVNAF structure which will exist in a post war environment.

Civil police actions should be geared to law enforcement concepts and possess limited fire power. If additional fire power is needed, this should be a function of the military. If this clear division is not realized, the lines of police and military jurisdiction will be constantly confused and inevitably lead to political/power problems.

The major consideration in developing forces at this stage must consider the following Vietnam realities: (a) The police/military structure has been subjected to drastic and continual changes since 1954. It has now generally achieved a recognizable structure of military, paramilitary and police elements. Future changes should be made in the context of existing organizations without creating new force structures or major shifts of force elements. Major changes to forces which are acknowledged to be inadequate in some respects will only serve to compound existing inadequacies while solving little. (b) Changes tend toward instability. At this point in time, major changes which tend toward creating new misunderstandings in security roles and missions will detract from improving stability.
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FORCE LEVELS

Current Situation, OSD Alternatives (Table 9)

The TSF would continue at present or slightly expanded levels, with trade-offs being made within elements of the TSP. For example, in the more secure hamlets (A and B of HES) the PF could be phased out and selected members placed (voluntarily) into the NP(UB) or the full time element of the PSDF. RD Cadre could also be phased into the local government, NP or PSDF as those villages they are working in become secure.

The TSF levels essentially are reduced slightly from current plans except PRU personnel have been amalgamated into the NPFF. The NPFF levels are based on one platoon per district and one company per province. Logistic support, management and administration of the NPFF would be through the existing RF, NP and sector/subsector structures. RF requirements are postulated on the supposition that the current RF level is barely adequate now. This view is supported by information from the field and by our analysis of opposing forces. For example, a minimum of roughly 141,000 men are required just to protect essential lines of communications, (estimated at 35 men per mile for 4041 miles of essential LOC). Further, some of the territorial tasks likely would be taken over from the PF but we do not know exactly how many personnel are involved; assuming a requirement for 13,500 personnel (1/2 the PF involved), RF requirements would increase. However, we consider this may be offset by reduction of the 38% RF overhead or utilization of regular forces in a territorial security role as an interim measure.

Within the ISF, there would be some changes in planned force levels. In regard to the PF, about 112,000 are now providing security for villages and hamlets with about 19,000 securing province and district towns. The PF would continue to be required for these functions. Based on the current rate of pacification progress, approximately 6,600 hamlets will require PF by the end of CY 70 compared with 6,200 today estimating roughly one squad per hamlet and one platoon per village, about 150,000 will be required for village-hamlet security. 3/ Assuming the requirement to secure province and district towns remains the same, 3/

Based on progress at the 1968 rate using HES data, about 6,600 hamlets will be in C, D, or E category at the end of CY 70 and 3600 in A or B category. Also assumes about 1200 villages will have some C, D or E category hamlets and that the remaining villages require a reaction force. If the reaction force was not required, the force level could be reduced to 108,000.
that PSDF elements can defend category A & B hamlets and that other utilization requirements for PF do not change (such as securing LOC's and key economic installations in populated areas), approximately 194,000 PF are required. However, since about 25-29,000 PF are performing TSF tasks now, approximately one-half of this requirement might be taken over by the TSF. Thus the final force level would be 180,500; very close to the MACV planned 178,100.

Post Hostilities. OSD Alternative

In order to estimate the force requirements for a post-hostilities environment in which the GVN and NLF are still competing militarily and politically and with reduced levels of combat and violence. We used the following rationale.

-- Using the HES data for end-January 1969, it was assumed the present A & B & C hamlets would be secure during this time frame; thus, about 7,700 hamlets would be secure. With a nation-wide average of 5 hamlets per village, about 1,540 villages will be secure. In the secure areas during this time, there should be about 10 ISF soldiers per hamlet and 15 per village for a total ISF in secure areas of 100,000.

-- The 13 "worst" provinces shown in MAP II, page D were considered to be areas in which maximum ISF and TSF would be required during this time period to prevent VC incursion into the GVN areas in these provinces and to keep the VC relatively isolated within their areas. In these areas are 2,500 hamlets and 500 villages. The assumption is that it will require 25 ISF soldiers per hamlet and 50 per village for a total of 82,500 ISF in the 13 "worst" provinces.

-- Against the VC areas and forces, the TSF is assumed to be at a ratio of about 3:1, as a minimum ratio required for offensive operations. The postulated VC force level is 60-65,000; thus, the TSF force level would be about 190,000.

-- Overhead, National, province, district headquarters and logistic support forces for the ISF will be about 57,000. Thus the overall force levels postulated are about 255,000 for the ISF and 190,000 for the TSF.
ANNEX F

US AGENCY GENERAL COMMENTS

This annex contains US Agency general comments on this study that have been specifically incorporated in the body of the study.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff

The Joint Chiefs of Staff do not concur with the major concept advanced in the study involving the consolidation of all Vietnamese non-regular and paramilitary forces into an offensive Territorial Security Force (TSF) and a defensive Internal Security Force (ISF).

Since 25 June 1968, COMUSMACV has developed four plans dealing with force levels and an organizational structure for the RVNAF and GVN paramilitary forces. These plans set forth a progressive series of changes as full scale mobilization is instituted, the forces gain self-sufficiency, US and NVA forces withdraw, and the external and internal threat diminishes. Each of these plans was based on a specific assumed threat, each is tied closely to post-hostilities planning for US forces, and each reflects a realistic estimate as to what can be accomplished by the GVN with adequate US assistance. In preparation for the study required by NSSM #19, COMUSMACV has reexamined the elements of these plans which are specifically concerned with internal security forces and has submitted additional recommendations. In some cases, these recommendations involve changes in previous concepts concerning strength and employment of certain GVN forces.

COMUSMACV plans provide for evolutionary changes among the various GVN forces. They do not maintain the status quo as would be gathered from the comments on page 25 of the OSD study. They do involve some expansion, consolidation and elimination of forces as the nature of the threat changes and in anticipation of new requirements. These changes are generally outlined on page 29 of the study and in Annex E.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff generally concur with the MACV approach and consider that this evolutionary program, developed in recognition of manpower and budgetary constraints and in extension of currently approved plans, should be continued.

The OSD proposal would result in a major realignment of responsibilities from Saigon down to each village and hamlet. The reorganization would disrupt existing command, administrative and logistical channels and divide forces which have been trained to function in tandem. A reorganization of this magnitude would waste time and divert GVN leadership to reorganization problems at the very time when they should be
giving their full attention to on-going problems. Additional comments by COMUSMACV concerning the disruptive effects which such a proposal would have on the GVN are contained in the next section.

The OSD study attempts to exert detailed control over the US effort in SVN by recommending the establishment of a Washington level agency to oversee and coordinate non-military programs in Vietnam. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that this is unnecessary. The existing machinery is adequate, and any new agency would only produce bureaucratic problems with no comparable advantages. The initial draft of the OSD study further prescribes a somewhat detailed GVN organizational structure for internal defense in SVN, and recommends that the US mission in Saigon develop plans within three months to implement the proposal. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that such detailed directions would seriously interfere with the responsibilities of the US Ambassador and the field commanders.

In summary, the Joint Chiefs of Staff generally concur with the evolutionary programs devised by MACV and approved by CINCPAC for the development of internal security forces and for their transition to meet a peacetime situation. They consider that the proposals presented by OSD represent an unnecessary reorganization which will seriously disrupt current progress in internal security. Finally, they feel that the study is far too detailed for an NSC paper.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the present draft OSD study be withdrawn and redrafted, taking the foregoing views into account. It is further recommended that the new paper be developed in more concise form in order to improve its utility to the National Security Council. Additional JCS comments are contained in Appendix 1.

OSD Comment: JCS views have been taken into account and portions of the study revised. The above JCS comments were based upon an earlier draft of this study. Our main difference with the JCS is over timing and extent of amalgamation.

Additional Comments by COMUSMACV

Reorganization of the magnitude proposed by the ISA study, if undertaken at this time, would be detrimental to progress toward important US/GVN objectives in South Vietnam.

-- In proposing such a reorganization, the study does not take into account the realities of the GVN power structure. The power struggle that would result from reorganization would be disruptive and debilitating. Personal power relationships and the institutional balance upon which
present constitutional government is based would be affected. The proposal would disrupt existing command, administrative, and logistical channels; divide forces which have been trained to function in tandem; upset civil and military training programs; and split authority at all levels of government.

The study enumerates no cogent reasons why the proposed reorganization, whatever its timing, would be any more effective than the existing structure.

Weaknesses noted in leadership and training of territorial forces would only be repeated and aggravated under the proposed structure. Moreover, reorganization, by its very nature, diverts executive attention, placing additional strains on the already limited pool of administrative and management resources at the disposal of GVN. US/GVN energies should be devoted to improving the functioning of present structures.

Reorganization would be especially harmful now. The success of Accelerated Pacification Campaign (APC), the broadened effort and aggressive approach for 1969 and the new organization for pacification, which includes territorial security forces, have achieved momentum and inspired confidence within the government. However, the momentum and confidence are still fragile. Confusion resulting from reorganization could endanger this growth in self-confidence and would result in uncertain direction along several command lines. Reorganization now would cause loss of momentum, require replanning and conceptual changes, and interrupt political and administrative growth of GVN along lines upon which we have only recently embarked. A case in point is the Central Pacification and Development Council (CPDC). Although CPDC was organized in November 1968, it should become increasingly effective with the appointment of General Khiem as Deputy Prime Minister for Pacification and Development, concurrently Minister of Interior. His Chief of Staff for Pacification and Development, a major general, will have a strong staff including nine colonels working for him.

State concurs with most of the paper with several important exceptions. The most significant is overemphasis on the linking together of the improvement of internal security capabilities to political action both by the USG and the GVN. This linkage undoubtedly exists, but the implication is that the GVN must take drastic action in improving the quality of its leadership and management at all levels if it is to succeed and the
United States must intervene more heavily in this process, - the internal political process. State recognizes the improvement in GVN leadership over the past year, particularly at the province and district levels, but also believes with OSD that even more significant improvement must be registered if the GVN is to effectively counter the NLF politically. However, we do not believe that the USG should become more heavily involved than in the past in the internal political scene. This is and must be a GVN responsibility, - their sovereign responsibilities, - in which we can assist but in limited ways. Basically, if the GVN cannot run with the ball now, we believe that past experience has clearly demonstrated that we cannot do it for them; further, we risk suffocating GVN initiative and responsibility through our greater involvement. This, of course, becomes particularly pertinent when one talks of political involvement, which can easily become a quagmire.

Agency for International Development

Current programs and plans for improvement of internal security in SVN call for major personnel increases to cope with growing responsibilities. Each organization concerned with internal security considers its specific sphere of responsibilities vital and its manpower increase essential to accomplish overall internal security function. This quantitative approach amplifies existing severe manpower and budgetary problems and further complicates management difficulties stemming from the diverse number of security and other GVN organizations already in existence. While there are numerous programs currently underway in SVN to improve the operational efficiency of the security forces, it is apparent that in order to provide for the present and a post hostilities period, additional major changes of force level, organization, and material support are probably necessary to establish a stronger and more stable internal security structure overall.

AID considers that while the Washington agencies supporting internal security in Vietnam may provide valid commentary and judgment on a possible restructuring and orientation of the internal security forces, in the final analysis only the Mission Council and the GVN are sufficiently qualified and intimate to the situation to determine the practicable courses of action to achieve this goal. AID considers the internal security problem as one of the most important confronting Vietnam's political and economic development and accordingly believe the Mission Council in Saigon should be directed to review this matter on a priority basis. In the meantime, in order to sustain momentum AID will use existing planning as a basis for programming.
In recommending referral to this matter to the Mission Council, AID considers it pertinent to caution on the approaching limitations of monetary and manpower resources to support the growing demands in internal security forces in addition to other GVN developments. The present general mobilization, inflation, and overextension of the CY69 GVN budget to support existing force levels and other programs indicates that whatever determination is made by the Mission Council it must carefully balance these factors to avoid disrupting the fundamental economic base supporting the overall GVN structure. In addition, it should be noted that the manpower pool is rapidly diminishing and by 1972 may reach critical levels. Force increases are costly -- e.g. 10,000 internal security force increase results in approximately a billion piaster increase in supporting cost. AID does not presume to make preliminary judgments on the new requirements and resources to support those requirements; however, AID will continue its efforts to develop Vietnamese economic capability to support the increases that the GVN and Mission Council decide.

AID recognizes that internal security generally comprises two basic spheres of activity: (1) civil law enforcement; and (2) paramilitary. The proper mix of these, including how present security forces may be reorganized within these spheres, again is considered something that the Mission Council and the GVN must address directly in relation to the assessed security threat and internal Vietnamese political realities.
The OSD study illustrates the excellent coordination and integration of the VC civil/military effort at the grass roots level. However, this integration is accomplished through exceptional decentralization which allows the tailoring of actions to the local situation. Above the village level, the enemy begins to experience difficulties defining relationships between district and province committees and subregion commanders, and coordination can be accomplished only through detailed and time consuming planning. OSD Comment: While the enemy concept allows tailoring of actions to the local situation, the VC/NLF/PRP structure is a centrally controlled disciplined structure. Results are achieved through centralized planning and coordination at all levels.

The GVN, on the other hand, is strongest at the higher levels. Within the past year, increasing staff expertise and capacity of flexible response have been illustrated by GVN response to the Tet offensive and the prosecution of the Accelerated Pacification Campaign (APC). The handling of the massive recovery tasks in the wake of Tet reflects a real governmental capability. The APC was planned and executed as a coordinated inter-governmental effort throughout the country in a remarkably short period of time. Further, the 1969 pacification plan is the best integrated civil/military plan yet developed.

The OSD study holds that there is a lack of awareness throughout the GVN and MACV of the political/military nature of the war. On the contrary, President Thieu has repeatedly emphasized political objectives to his senior military commanders and to his province chiefs. The assignment of Province Chiefs as Sector Commanders and District Chiefs as Subsector Commanders represents a serious effort to integrate GVN civil/military functions at these levels. Since September 1968, General Abrams has impressed US commanders with the supreme importance of the political struggle. The APC is an outstanding example of the emphasis being placed on a combined US/GVN political/military effort. As enemy main force units withdrew to sanctuaries, a major portion of both US and GVN forces was retargeted into areas in support of pacification. Throughout the APC, it is estimated that at least 50% of US and ARVN combat force effort actively supported the achievement of the pacification goals. The 1969 pacification program continues an inherently political focus, seeking to involve the population in the struggle against the VC.
Some personnel in the RVNAF and in the US forces still look on the war as primarily military and make little effort to support the political objectives. However, the leaders -- President Thieu, Ambassador Bunker and General Abrams are fully committed to a civil/military approach and are insisting that this approach be understood and followed by all of their subordinates.

In spite of increasing functional competence and understanding of the problem at the higher levels, the GVN structure is still critically weak at the hamlet and village level.

Many current programs are designed to strengthen lower level government, particularly at the village level. Village administrative personnel are being trained, RDC and PF units are being assigned under the control of village chiefs, and village councils are being provided funds for self-help projects. These programs will not provide quick results, but the enemy cannot be contested effectively at the grass roots level without such efforts.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that current COMUSMACV programs for internal security will strengthen the civil chain of government. Under these programs, the central ministries of the GVN will have responsibility for organizing and training the internal security forces, for the development of doctrine for their employment and for the execution of career development programs. The execution of internal security missions is the responsibility of the civil governmental officials, who will be provided the assets which they require. These assets will be delegated as far down as they profitably can be employed.

In Vietnam, as in any underdeveloped country, there is a shortage of good leaders. The GVN is probably not making the best use of the talent available to it. Qualitative and attitudinal changes are needed, but such changes require time. The United States should encourage the raising of able individuals to positions of authority and the elimination of the incapable. A great deal of leverage is available at the national level to achieve change, but its overaggressive use would be counterproductive to US objectives in South Vietnam.
MEMORANDUM AND FACT SHEET FOR: AMBASSADOR COLBY

SUBJECT: PAAS (November) Results: Phung Hoang

1. Percentage of Respondents Aware of Phung Hoang (Tab 41-1).
   a. The upper graph indicates the awareness of Phung Hoang as a percentage from January through November.
   b. The lower graph is an index created by subtracting the percentage of respondents not aware of the program from the percentage of those who are aware. The trend is substantial improvement.

2. Effectiveness Index for Phung Hoang (Tab 41-2).
   a. The upper left bar graph shows the comparison (for those who are aware of Phung Hoang) between those who rate it as having some success, as opposed to those who rate it as having little or no success.
   b. The lower left graph indicates the percentage of respondents aware of Phung Hoang who have no opinion as to its effectiveness.
   c. The line graph to the right is an index created by subtracting the percentage of respondents rating Phung Hoang as ineffective from the percentage rating it as effective.

3. November PAAS Data: A total of 1,134 respondents in 234 hamlets (rated A through D) were asked if they were aware of the Phung Hoang Program.
   a. 50.7 percent were unaware (or so stated).
MACJO1R
SUBJECT: PAAS (November) Results: Phung Hoang

b. 48.9 percent (broken down as follows) were aware of the program.
   - 30.3 percent, a program to eliminate enemy infra-structure.
   - 13.0 percent, an anti-Viet Cong program.
   - 5.6 percent, a program for fighting Viet Cong.

Of those aware of Phung Hoang, 497 respondents were asked for opinions as to program effectiveness.

a. 85.5 percent (broken down as follows) indicated effectiveness of Phung Hoang.
   - 31.7 percent, successfully eliminating Viet Cong infra-structure.
   - 15.4 percent, successfully eliminating the Viet Cong forces.
   - 38.4 percent, some success.
   - 11.4 percent indicated little or no success.

FRANK W. SCOTTON
Executive Assistant
AWARENESS OF PHUNG HOANG
PERCENTAGE OF RESPONDENTS
WHO HAVE AT LEAST SOME AWARENESS OF PHUNG HOANG PROGRAM

PHUNG HOANG AWARENESS INDEX
(PERCENTAGE OF RESPONDENTS INDICATING AWARENESS TO AT LEAST SOME EXTENT LESS PERCENTAGE OF RESPONDENTS INDICATING NOT AWARE)
EFFECTIVENESS OF PHUNG HOANG

EFFECTIVENESS INDEX

% of respondents indicating Phung Hoang program is having at least some success less

% of respondents indicating Phung Hoang is having little or no success.
MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: PHUNG HOANG Training for ARVN Officers Being Transferred to NP (U)

1.(C) Mr. Harry Hambleton, Training Division, PSD, visited this office, this date to inform us of proposed PHUNG HOANG training for 1,800 - 2,000 ARVN officers who will be transferred to the National Police in early 1971. These officers are in addition to the 25,000 ARVN soldiers who will be transferred to the NP as part of the same program. Training information contained herein only deals with the ARVN officers being transferred.

2.(U) Training will be conducted at the NP Academy at Thu Duc and plans now call for two cycles of four weeks each, one beginning 20 January and one beginning 25 February. Each cycle will consist of about 1,000 trainees. Total training will be 176 hours:

PHUNG HOANG 30
Special Police 40
Police Operations 30
Personnel Mgmt 16
Other 60
TOTAL 176

3.(C) Expected assignment of these ARVN officers is:

Aspirant-2LT

| 1000 | Village Police Chiefs |
| 130  | Patrol supervisors (Can Tho, My Tho, An Giang, Go Cong plus 8 provinces) |

1LT - CAPT

| 550  | NPFF Company & Platoon officers |

GROUP III

DOWNGRADED AT 4 YEAR INTERVALS;
NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL
MACCORDS-PHX

SUBJECT: PHUNG HOANG Training for ARVN Officers Being Transferred to NP (u)

CAPT-MAJ

75 District Police Chiefs to replace 75 lower-quality chiefs
18 NPFF Battalion Staff Officers

MAJ.-LTC

2 Battalion Commanders (SMPD)
15 Province Police Chiefs to replace 15 of lower quality

Naval (LTJG-LT)

10 Marine police officers

1,800 TOTAL

4.(U) I thanked Mr. Hambleton for the information and advised him to be sure that the National Police Training people coordinate with LTC Tiep for support of the required PHUNG HOANG training. We also will discuss this with LTC Tiep.

JAMES W. HUNT
LTC, USA
Chief, Training Division
NUMBER OF INSPECTIONS NATIONWIDE
BY THE NATIONAL POLICE
CENTRAL INSPECTION CORPS

YEARLY TOTALS

INCLUDES NP COMMANDS AT
REGION, PROVINCE, AND
PRECINCT LEVEL.

1968 1969 1970
49* 110 156**

COMPLAINTS POLICE PERSONNEL

1968 1969 1970
6,592 6,484 7,181

- # INVESTIGATION AGAINST POLICE PERSONNEL
- # INVESTIGATIONS FOR CORRUPTION
- # CORRUPTION ALLEGATIONS SUBSTANTIATED

* CENTRAL INSPECTION CORPS REVITALIZED IN LATE
1968—ONLY THREE MONTHS OF INSPECTIONS SHOWN.
** DGNP INSPECTED FOR FIRST TIME IN 1970.

NOTE: INSPECTION TEAMS ESTABLISHED IN EACH REGIONAL NP DIRECTORATE ON 1-1-70 TO
INVESTIGATE DISTRICT AND VILLAGE LEVEL NUMBER OF INSPECTIONS NOT AVAILABLE.