Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, on February 16, 1971, the CBS television network presented a new special entitled "The Changing War in Indochina: The Widening War in Laos and Cambodia." This program was one of the most comprehensive and objective accounts of the war in Indochina that the media has produced.

I ask unanimous consent that the transcript of the program be printed in the Record.

There being no objection, the transcript was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

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Charles Collingwood. This scene is as familiar as the story of America's involvement in Vietnam: Massed U.S. units on the move. But this may be the final big-scale American action in South Vietnam—and on the ground, it is strictly limited. The orders are to go up to the border with Laos and no farther. It is the South Vietnamese who are going across.

The war in Indochina is changing, radically and rapidly. The American combat role on the ground is diminishing. The South Vietnamese are taking over. But in the air the American combat role continues. There are as yet no boundaries to the exercise of American air power and as the geography of the war expands, the great weight of our air strikes has switched from South Vietnam to Laos and Cambodia.

There is a paradox about this busy war on new battlefields at the very moment the United States is winding down its participation in Vietnam. Administration officials deny that the invasion of Laos represents an extension of the war. Secretary of Defense Laird. No, the area of the war is being narrowed because the war has moved out of South Vietnam to a large extent, it's moved out of North Vietnam and now the war has narrowed into the area of the occupied territory of Cambodia—northeastern Cambodia and in southern Laos. So, by any measurement, the war is being narrowed as far as its scope is concerned.

Collingwood: Critics insist that by any measurement the war is obviously being widened.

Marvin Kalb. Senator, the Administration claims that its actions in Cambodia and Laos have really not widened the war, and, in fact, have hastened the timetable for the U.S. withdrawal.

Senator Frank Church. Haven't widened the war?

Kalb. Have not widened the war.

Church. Opening a front in Laos? It doesn't widen the war?

Kalb. Well, that's what they claim. Now what is your own feeling?

Church. Black is white? Night is day? Up is down? Doesn't the language mean anything any more? Of course the war has been widened, in the sense that the fighting is going on in Laos, and it's going on in Cambodia, and American forces are participating on fronts that didn't exist before.

Collingwood. The U.S. and more particularly the South Vietnamese, are now participating on fronts that did not exist before. To a degree, the fate of South Vietnam is now being decided in the jungles of Laos and Cambodia. Yet Secretary Laird is also right. The war is narrowing—at least in the American commitment of lives, of money, of troops on station.

These contradictory changes, these transformations of the last year in Indochina, and their implications are the subjects of our broadcast tonight. I'm Charles Collingwood.

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Announcer. This is a CBS News Special Report, the first of two broadcasts on "The Changing War in Indochina." Tonight: "The Widening War in Laos and Cambodia." With CBS News Chief Foreign Correspondent Charles Collingwood.

Announcer. South Vietnamese troops are now well into their second week in Laos, with American planes supporting them overhead and 5,000 American troops backing them.
up across the border in South Vietnam, but no American soldiers fighting with them. The operation author for a new embargo is the same as before, has been something that has been canceled on information ever since, but the South Vietnamese Command says that it has already been rescheduled on the axis of Route 9 to a point about halfway between the border and the town of Véronique, a key point on the Ho Chi Minh Trail complex. All of these Red Chinese troops are said to have reached the border itself.

According to Saigon, about one-half of the Ho Chi Minh Trail complex in this area has already been blocked. This, of course, is the purpose of the operation, to cut the supply lines of the North Vietnamese army. The efforts are being made by American forces from the air, for transport of Vietnamese troops into Laos and the use of where else. But with American offensive efforts having been made a special effort this year to push his men and supplies down the Trail, but because of bad weather at the beginning of dry season, the progress seems to have been delayed and supplies are said to have piled up in the northern part of the Trail. Therefore, if the Trail is cut now, North Vietnamese offensive operations, which have delayed the operation, may be ended.

This is the rationale of the present attack in Laos, but expectations in Indochina that it may be beneficial in the future. The name of this operation is Lam Son 719, the 719th in a series of South Vietnamese Army operations. There is no reason to believe that there will not be a 720th or 30th or—that is to say, there is no reason to believe that the South Vietnamese will not fight this battle.

At most it is a way station on the road toward American departure and South Vietnamese self-sufficiency.

Although the Army of South Vietnam is bearing the brunt of the fighting in Laos, the way that the operation was prepared by American elements is Webber reports.

Wessner. When the offensive began January 30th, the first vehicles to move were American. On the other day, was well aware of this.

Wessner: Will you be glad to get back? G.I. Yes. I'd be glad to get back where I came from.

Wessner: Besides all the logistical help and the three CAS role, the U.S. role has been in the air, for transport of Vietnamese troops into Laos and the use of where else. But with American offensive efforts having been made a special effort this year to push his men and supplies down the Trail, but because of bad weather at the beginning of dry season, the progress seems to have been delayed and supplies are said to have piled up in the northern part of the Trail. Therefore, if the Trail is cut now, North Vietnamese offensive operations, which have delayed the operation, may be ended.

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I believe it is important to America that the decline in this movement be reversed. I further believe this can only be done by basic changes in governmental policies that will reinvigorate the desire of our people to serve as representatives of American overseas or here at home. Without such rejuvenation of the desire to serve, the mere amalgamation of volunteer programs, which the President has suggested, will probably be of little consequence.

With respect to the Peace Corps, this rejuvenation requires a foreign policy which ceases to be established primarily on cold war concepts and its replacement by a foreign policy that places our ideals above our fears, that seeks long-term peace rather than short-term tactical advantage, and that emphasizes what we as Americans stand for as well as what we stand against. On the domestic side, this rejuvenation needs a recommitment to a meaningful attack on poverty in the United States, to the saving of our environment, and to the overcoming of the morass of problems that consume our urban areas. Only with basic changes such as these, can we decide in which the people of this country truly want to serve.

Thus, on this the 10th anniversary of the Peace Corps, I congratulate all those who have answered the call to serve in the Peace Corps and in the host of other private and public volunteer organizations; and I urge that we as a nation commit ourselves to reclaim the Peace Corps spirit, so that Americans will continue to have not only the vehicles through which to serve their fellow men but also the desire to do so.

CAPTIVE NATIONS

Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, I know that my colleagues share with me the deep concern for those in Central and Eastern Europe who live under regimes which do not represent their ideals or their aspirations. It is one of the tragedies of our time that such situations exist year after year without hope of immediate change. It is very sad that the United Nations is not a protagonist for change.

On the occasion of the 25th anniversary of the United Nations, Vasil Germanelli, chairman of the Assembly of Captive European Nations, sent the following telegram to Dr. Edward I. Hambro, president of the United Nations General Assembly:

The Assembly of Captive European Nations, composed of democratic representatives of the silenced people of Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, and Yugoslavia, extends to Your Excellency and the General Assembly its sincere congratulations on the twenty-fifth anniversary of the United Nations.

The United Nations, founded amid great hopes for a just and lasting peace, is entering a crucial stage of its existence. In the face of many notable accomplishments, the U.S. has unfortunately failed to address itself to a number of human and national questions of primary importance to mankind. Our Assembly respectfully draws the attention of Your Excellency and that of the General Assembly to the following:

1. Not one of the nine countries listed above is represented in the United Nations by delegates designated by a freely elected government. These delegates have no right to speak on behalf of their countries, and which have been maintained their stranglehold over East and Central Europe by force, intimidation and threats of reprisals. Advocates of the right to self-determination, this continued misrepresentation of 100 million East and Central Europeans in violation of the Charter of the United Nations should be condemned, and corrective measures instituted.

2. Since the nine nations enjoy no genuine representation in the U.N., their citizens have no recourse for airing their grievances concerning violations of human rights and political freedoms and seeking redress. It is submitted that the U.N. should devise, and make operative, a machinery that would allow nationals of these countries to take specific steps to bring their case to the attention of the world forum.

3. The invocation of the Brezhnev Doctrine of Limited Sovereignty formulated after the invasion of Czechoslovakia—are in direct contravention of clauses of the U.N. Charter, which postulates that each member state is to enjoy full sovereignty. It is inadmissible how the Soviet Union—can enunciate a Doctrine so fundamentally opposed to the Charter and spirit of the U.N. Charter and spirit of the U.N. Charter. Thus, such situations deny that the invasion of Laos represents an extension of the war.

MARTIN KALS. Senator, the Administration claims that its actions in Cambodia and Laos have really not widened the war, and, in fact, have hastened the timetable for the U.S. withdrawal.

Senator FRANK CHURCH. Have not widened the war?

KALS. Have not widened the war.

ChurcH. Opening a front in Laos? It doesn't widen the war?

KALS. No, that's what they claim. Now what is your own feeling?

ChurcH. Black is white? Night is day? Up is down? Doesn't the language mean anything more? Of course it has been widened, in the sense that the fighting now is going on in Laos, and it's going on in Cambodia. As American forces are participating on fronts that didn't exist before.

CHARLES COLLINGWOOD. South Vietnamese troops are with American planes supporting them over­

KALS. Well, that's what they claim. Now what is your own feeling?

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Collingwood. The U.S., and more particularly the South Vietnamese, are now participating on fronts that did not exist before. To a degree, the fate of South Vietnam is now being decided in the jungles of Laos and Cambodia. Yet Secretary Laird is also right. The war is narrowing—at least in the American commitment of lives, of money, of troops on station.

These contradictory changes, these transformations of the last few months, and their implications are the subjects of tonight's broadcast. I'm Charles Collingwood.

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March 1, 1971

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE

entire number of B-52 missions the Air Force is permitted in South East Asia each month. The number has been restricted by bombing over Laos since we started bombing there, more than fifty in the last ten months, not counting sorties. The bombing in operations there. American pilots say the ground fire is heavy, accurate and increasing. Jef Devall, Sp [][] pilots just returned from a tour over Laos.

Captain Easr. Have you been over here for a year now and it seems like recently there have been a lot of bombing. They've got more guns in the air, of course they have a lot of ammo to spare, and every target we've tried to hit is coming at us hot and heavy.

Devall. What do you mean, big stuff?

Captain Easr. It's just big stuff, it comes up as big red traces at us and explodes just like it does in the movies, World War II, you know. If you see the guns come up and the fire start, that's all, just, just like they had in World War II and the Korean War.

It's bad stuff.

Lieutenant Groves. Most of the time the guns that fire, the closer you get to the target, the more the guns will fly. If you're too close and it's firing a lot, the closer you get to the vehicles, but the closer you get to the trucks, they really open up.

Devall. What are your targets on the Trail, what are you trying to hit?

Captain Lemon. Well, the targets, mainly consist of roadways, bridges, vehicles and trucks. And IDPs, or intersection points, choke points where the roads will come together at one point and we try to clear these roads, to inhibit the flow of the traffic. And oftentimes, the forward air controllers in the area will find trucks that are actually moving on the Trail and we will try to hit these. These are basically the two prime targets that we have on the Trail.

Devall. One idea that you're stopping some of the traffic or most of the traffic or what?

Captain Easr. We're stopping some of it. We're stopping some with our bombs, and we're stopping some with the threat of our bombs. The traffic doesn't move much in the daytime, very, very little. At night they do most of their moving and we stop a lot of it, but most of our efforts are on the forward air controllers. We're helping them keep the roads open.

Devall. What does that Trail look like? Is it one straight road?

Lieutenant Groves. Largely it's a honeycomb. There are places where the road is not much longer than those places are pretty scarce. It runs a lot of times pretty close to a river, almost paralleling at times, but most of the rivers here are so crooked they can't do that very well. The triple-layered canopy is pretty bad. You can't see it in a lot of places, you have to have —

Devall. By triple-layered canopy, you mean heavy jungle?

Lieutenant Groves. Yes, there are three different layers of jungle above it, different heights of trees and it grows in three layers. And you look up, you know, it grows in three layers. And you see the —

Captain Easr. There's one thing I'd like to add. I don't think people realize about the Trail, in the fact that it is so large. Now everyone thinks of it as maybe four or five roads coming right in to South Vietnam and that's not true at all. That thing is fifty miles wide and it has been hundreds and miles long. And the whole thing is nothing but a network of roads, just everywhere. Now they're not always there in the same place, they're there in the same place constantly. Every road it seems is travelled. If we should hit the road, which we try to do, with a bomb, there's a trail within a period of just a matter of hours.

They have big bulldozers in and clear the road and the traffic starts again.

General Collingwood. We've been clearing these B-52s and helicopter gunships also fly strikes against targets in Cambodia, and in recent months, because there has been some deterioration, the number of fighter-bomber sorties has increased, about 1500 a month. A month earlier in 1970. It has been obvious to newsmen on the ground that some of these missions have been directed at key road, from Phnom Penh to Kompong Som. Cambodian and South Vietnamese troops were getting American helicopter support, and from a helicopter base at Phu Quoc Island, just off Cambodia's southern coast. We spoke to General Lucius D. Clay, Jr., commander of the 7th Air Force in Southeast Asia, about the changing air war in Indochina.

General Clay. In the last several months that I've been here, we've seen a decided decline in the HVC (Ho Chi Minh) Trail. The missions up the Trail are just as busy as ever. I see in substance then, the answer is that that in terms of the air support and direct support of the U.S. Army in the Republic of Vietnam, there has been a decline. But in terms of our other activities through the South, we're still fighting a pretty busy war.

Devall. General Clay, how effective has bombing been on the South of the Ho Chi Minh Trail?

General Clay. Well, I'd like to give you a good firm answer to that question, but unfortunately, there is no firm answer. I am to think that so far this year we've been more effective than ever. We've introduced some new equipment, particularly the H-50 gunships, which have been highly effective. However, I think the full story of the operation is still too early to tell, and we work over there with the various units that we work over there most effectively during the dry season. This, of course, is the dry season now and the other one is sometime around the last quarter of May, the latter part of May 1971.

Devall. At the time, we'll have a story to put together as to how they've been.

Devall. Do we contemplate training and equipping the South Vietnamese eventually to launch the operation in areas that we are now flying in Laos and Cambodia?

General Clay. No, sir, we're not. Basically, the Vietnamese Air Force is being trained to handle the insurgency problem within the country, within the Republic of Vietnam. As regards the B-52s, yes, we are leaving with the Vietnamese Air Force are basically A-1s and A-37s, both basically short range, close air support. So we're not leaving heavy carriers of ordnance, long range type airplanes, which are the kind that fire, the closer you get to the road, which we try to do, with a bomb, there's a trail within a period of just a matter of hours.

They have shown that they are not only vastly superior to the amateur armies of Cambodia and Laos, but that in conventional warfare they are often more than a match for the North Vietnamese themselves. This has given the warring forces a psychological hold on their opponents, who are often more than a match for the North Vietnamese themselves. This has given the warring forces a psychological hold on their opponents, who are often more than a match for the North Vietnamese themselves. This has given the warring forces a psychological hold on their opponents, who are often more than a match for the North Vietnamese themselves. This has given the warring forces a psychological hold on their opponents, who are often more than a match for the North Vietnamese themselves.
Southeast Asia's capitals now bear all the familiar signs of a city under siege. Cambodians, South Vietnamese, and others are familiar with the sight—occasionally to catch the eye and charge for civilians as well as to whom even a quasi-familiar sign of a city under siege. It is not only for those actually in the Army, but for civilians, too. They look the Communists showed howpressive, and that is that this country really is in a state of civil war. The urban population is learning more about Vietnam than just a country's help. Right now it is militarily dependent upon South Vietnam. There are millions of dollars going over the old sanctuary road.

These, and similar acts of terrorism are reminiscent of the way the Viet Cong was operating in Vietnam in the late 1960s. I asked the U.S. Ambassador to Cambodia, Mr. Collingwood, about that.

**SWANK.** I'm not familiar with all of the situation in Vietnam in the early '60s, but I can give you a rough idea of the different atmosphere, and that is that this country really is not in a state of civil war. This is outside Cambodia, somewhat, from North Vietnam and from the Viet Cong.

**COLLINGWOOD.** Are the people of Cambodia behind the present government?

**SWANK.** The present government, certainly, from the time that I've been here, since last September, is that the government enjoys the support of the important element of the population. Quite frankly, concerning the countryside, the returns are inconclusive, but we have no information to make a valid judgment.

**COLLINGWOOD.** How do you foresee the enemy's intentions toward Cambodia? Do they want to take over the country?

**SWANK.** This is, of course, a very interesting and difficult question to answer, because we can't prove the enemy's thinking completely. But my own personal judgment is that the enemy's principal object of interest remains South Vietnam, and that Laos and Cambodia are both way stations along that road.

**COLLINGWOOD.** Were the present government in Cambodia to be seriously threatened, could the United States really just stand by and watch?

**SWANK.** This is a bridge that I would rather not cross right now, Mr. Collingwood.

One of the ways in which the enemy can easily produce a critical situation in Cambodia is to cut the main arteries linking Phnom Penh with the rest of the country. A regular object of his attention is Route 4, which connects Phnom Penh with its seaport of Kompong Som. Last month the enemy closed the highway and it took the Cambodians, plus a large South Vietnamese task force, plus powerful U.S. air support, to open it again.

The Cambodians aren't cowards. They fight and suffer casualties, but compared to the South Vietnamese, let alone the veterans from North Vietnam, they are not impressive soldiers and they are having to learn the hard way. While they are learning, Cambodia is clearly vulnerable to a major North Vietnamese attack with all the repercussions that would seem certain to follow. Whether a similar situation in South Vietnam. I asked Fred Ladd, the U.S. official charged with guiding the Cambodian Army, how much more important a buffer force of U.S. and South Vietnamese troops could be? One expert on the country's struggle to maintain peace and security.

**LANE.** I really don't know, because I assume, and I have—Dr. Lanke, I have received a file of a lot of correspondence, and that is that this country really is not in a state of civil war. This is outside Cambodia, somewhat, from North Vietnam and from the Viet Cong.

**COLLINGWOOD.** If the enemy did mount a major attack against Cambodia, would the United States, in its own interest, be able to just let it happen?

**LANE.** I don't think we have enough in—

**SWANK.** ...the preparations for the coming—

**COLLINGWOOD.** Are the people of Cambodia and by clearing up all the area. The Cambodians wish to take over the country? They have their own personal judgment is that the enemy's principal object of interest remains South Vietnam, and that Laos and Cambodia are both way stations along that road.

**LANE.** The goal is for Cambodia eventually to be able to defend itself by itself, a Cambodianization program, if you will. The United States is just the enabler. The ground troops from the United States to help in fighting this war. I'm positively sure.

**SWANK.** Of course, I do hope that the South Vietnamese military operations in Cambodia would be able to be decreased in the future rapidly.

**LANE.** The program began last July, if not secretly, at least very quietly. It's estimated 19,000 Cambodians will be trained here this year. In the midst of a war which is winding down, this program is escalating rapidly. The Co-Op-Church amendment prohibits any American ground troops or advisers in Cambodia. We can prevent Americans from advising the Cambodians by bringing them across the border. However, the American strategy's happened. They say they are merely advising the Vietnamese, who in turn are instructing the Cambodians.

**SWANK.** Vietnamese instructors here work through interpreters to get their points across. Some of the Cambodian pupils are just 15 years old. Presumably, the young Cambodians are learning more about Vietnam than just a few words... "not hal... sat sat"... "one, two, kill, kill."

There's plenty of discussion whether the Vietnamese Army is ready to fight alone, but there seems general agreement the Cambodian Army is not ready.

**SWANK.** How much longer do you think Cambodian troops will be of use in Vietnam? Major Salas. I think it will be one or two years more.

**LANE.** How much longer do you think it will take the Cambodian Army to become as good as the South Vietnamese is now?

**SWANK.** Colonel Lac, in a comparison with the Vietnamese Army, I would say in the neighborhood of eight to ten years.

**COLLINGWOOD.** Despite all the multinational efforts to equip the Cambodian forces, one thing is perfectly clear—Cambodia cannot yet survive without somebody's help. It is still dependent upon South Vietnam. There are more South Vietnamese troops fighting in Cambodia than there are other South Vietnamese troops fighting in Vietnam, 16,000 going over the old sanctuary road of the Parrot's Beak and the Fishhook.

The South Vietnamese Economic Minister is budgeting for a constant level of 20,000 troops in the central border in Cambodia. The Cambodians with few allies elsewhere. They have an ancient antipathy for the Vietnamese, North and South alike, but they are willing to take as much as they can get it now and are surprisingly confident that they will be able to hold off the North Vietnamese and retain their independence and identity.

I asked Um Sim, Cambodia's Minister of Commerce and Supply, if they foresaw any success recruiting the people to their side.

**UM SIM.** It all depends upon the definition of success. They are there to do their duty, to do the nation's business. They can get it now and are surprisingly confident that they will be able to hold on to the South Vietnamese and still retain their independence and identity.
March 1, 1971

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE

S 2171

He—even the young—have become so numb about Indochina they won't get exercised unless American ground troops are engaged. We have stayed in school this time and the protests have been muted. Nevertheless, what is happening in Laos is, in a real sense, a war for the first time in our country—when he's going to have to turn back the risk of the war, and the eventual outcome.

SCHEFFER. When the United States moved into Cambodia, there was a great public outcry. And yet when the Cambodian operation into Laos began, it was not a very much public criticism. Why do you suppose so?

LAIRD. Because the South Vietnamese are handling this operation themselves as far as the ground combat is concerned, not only in the Cambodian situation but also in Laos. If there's been any escalation in this war, it's been the escalation in South Vietnam, giving South Vietnam a capability to defend itself and to carry on these combat responsibilities.

SCHEFFER. But the fact is U.S. helicopters are going in there, ferrying the troops directly into battle, as it were. They're handing, they're on the ground, are not cutting a line little by little by using this air power for this close troop-lift as it's being used.

LAIRD. Air support has not been prohibited by the Congress. This was discussed at some length, but air support is perfectly within the letter of the law as well as the intent of Congress.

SCHEFFER. The question I think that many critics are asking is how do you shorten the war by widening it? Is that a fair question?

LAIRD. Well, the important thing here is to disrupt the supply routes that are going to Cambodia and into South Vietnam from theextérieur. If you have a set of criteria you want to use on the success of this operation, even if we were to withdraw air support and the South Vietnamese were to leave Laos at the present time, this operation is to disrupt the logistic supply route so that we can reduce American casualties and that's what the President has been going to do.

SCHEFFER. Mr. Secretary, there will be another dry season next year. Just like there's been another dry season in the second part of our report. Next Sunday at the second part of our report. Next Sunday at this same time I'll report on the situation in South Vietnam today—military, economic, political.

This is Charles Collingwood. Good night. (Announcement)

ANNOUNCER. This has been a CBS News Special Report, "The Widening War in Laos and Cambodia," the first of two broadcasts of "The Changing War in Indochina."

PROPOSED CUTS—ADMINISTRATION ON AGING FUNDS

MR. PROUTY. Mr. President, it is with considerable regret that I take note of proposed reductions of more than $7 million in the Administration on Aging in the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare.

It is my understanding that cuts in funding for community grant programs under Title III of the Older Americans Act and Foster Grandparents program by the Bureau of the Budget were contrary to recommendations from HEW Secretary Elliot Richardson.

The needs of older Americans, and hopes created by unanimous enactment of the Older Americans Act in 1965, are such that the Administration on Aging and Foster Grandparents program by the Bureau of the Budget were contrary to recommendations from HEW Secretary Elliot Richardson.

I am especially disturbed by proposed reductions in activities directly involving older individuals. Important among these are the Older Americans Act, the Foster Grandparents program and the Elderly USA program.

I am also deeply disturbed, however, about the persistent downwarding of the Administration on Aging within the Department of Health, Education, and Wel-
they are not a symptom of a far more serious problem within the Federal Government’s executive branch regarding older persons.

I do not propose to give a complete review of the history of HEW’s attitude. Certain facts on the record suffice to indicate the problem and its persistence.

In 1962, the year after the White House Conference on Aging called by President Eisenhower had emphasized the importance of a strong focal point for needs of older persons in the Federal Government, the Office of Aging was downgraded and made a subsidiary part of the Welfare Administration in HEW. This action was probably a factor in heightened interest on the part of Congress in an independent unit on aging, an interest which ultimately produced the Older Americans Act of 1965.

Resistance from HEW continued. This is documented by repeated testimony between 1962 and 1964 before the Secretaries of Health, Education, and Welfare against proposals similar to that finally enacted. That the Congress did not share such reluctance on behalf of older persons is shown by its action in passing the Older Americans Act, which was signed into law by President John-

In August 1967 a reorganization plan was announced placing the Administration on Aging under a new Social and Rehabilitation Service within HEW. So far this action, recommended by then Secretary of HEW Wilbur Cohen and regarded by many as violating Congressional intent, remains unchanged.

That the persistent pattern of submerging programs for the elderly has generated much dissatisfaction among older Americans is obvious. That it is contrary to the intent of Congress in its passage of the Older Americans Act of 1965 and subsequent amendments is clear.

It seems to me that corrective action, either by Congress or by the Administration or by both, deserves serious consideration. A first step, but only a first step, will be early action on the proposed budget cuts for the Administration on Aging. The entire HEW Administration on Aging strongly suggests, however, that a thorough review of its relationship to other Federal agencies should be undertaken.

CEYLONSE INDEPENDENCE

Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, on February 4, 1971, Ceylon commemorated the 23rd anniversary of its independence. Ceylon has remained a stable democracy throughout the last two decades of our history, a stability no longer often taken for granted in the democratic traditions in its observance of government officials, and in the other functions of its government.

I should like to express my admiration for the people of Ceylon and my hopes that their example will serve as an inspiration to other countries of the world.

THE SEV AND THE ARCTIC

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, in a time when many persons have expressed concern about damage that could be done to the tundra by surface vehicles, we should consider all alternatives. One method of transportation we should consider is the Surface Effect Vehicle—SEV—which rides on an air cushion. An article dealing with the development of this vehicle and its potential for the Arctic was published recently in "Researcher," the public relations department magazine of Bell Aerospace. The article, based on a technical paper by A. W. Courial, technical director for SEV development at Bell Aerospace, is as follows:

Awesome, icebound and ruler of one of the Free World’s last potentially great oil and mineral deposits, the Arctic region of Alaska and Canada lies waiting... majestically isolated by severe winds, ice, and snow and by the wall of tundra. Exploration to date has surfaced the prospect of vast resources in Arctic Alaska and Canada. The southern boundary of Alaska’s Brooks Range promising huge stores of metallic ores. Below the northern slopes are huge coalfields and oil deposits. Recent evidence of submerged gold fields is discovered on the northern continental shelf in Norton Sound, Alaska.

Although the Prudhoe Bay oil strikes are now history, additional millions are being spent each year in attempts to speed development of the oil-rich Alaska North Slope. However, as it is with practically every other polar project, significant progress here has been limited by the inherent and obvious difficulties that have been faced by the lack of an effective, flexible and economically feasible off-road transportation system.

The National Petroleum Board Pipeline System also has yet been granted the necessary right of way to carry its pipe; for it remains stored at Valdez, Prudhoe Bay and strategic points on the north to the proposed pipeline route. The mammoth tanker Manhattan, which attempted to establish the feasibility of yearround operations between Southwest Passage, proved only that the transport of crude oil from the Arctic continental land mass by tanker would be economically unfeasible.

Scientific research in the Arctic Basin and surrounding land mass is still looking for a transportation system that will return more for the budget dollar. Aerial and high-value cargo transportation in the Arctic future may be by air, via the North Atlantic and by sea. Such air transports as the C130, DC-3, 727 and 737 are serving remote airstrips, many of which are makeshift, and accessible only during certain months of the year.

And, once on the ground, most air-lifted cargoes still face the ever-present deterrent to delivery of cargo from the leading strips to the final point of delivery.

For example, railroads are almost nonexistent. Roads are almost prohibitively expensive and normally unusable during the winter months, therefore are few in number and not often long enough. Rivers are shallow, winding, boulder-strewn, ice-clogged and generally unavailable by conventional craft. And, transportation by ship or barge where possible, is limited to slow types. Even when the Arctic ice is melted or penetrable, limited to the ships because of constrained by range, weather and restricted pay-cargo possibilities. Cargo transport by snowmobile or dog sled is slow, limited and economically impractical.

Then there’s the vast, flat and barren Arctic tundra. Criss-crossed with thousands of tundra bogs, tundra and other obstacles in the sub-zero winter, the tundra is interspersed with thousands of small lakes...