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THE CHANGING WAR IN INDOCHINA: THE
WIDENING WAR IN LAOS AND CAMBODIA
AS BROADCAST OVER THE CBS TELEVISION NET-
WORK, FEB. 16, 1971, WITH CBS NEWS CHIEF
FOREIGN CORRESPONDENT CHARLES COLLING-
WOOD
Produced by CBS News

CHARLES COLLINGWOOD. This scene is as familiar as the story of America's involvement in Vietnam: Massed U.S. units on the move. But this may be the final big-scale American action in South Vietnam—and on the ground, it is strictly limited. The orders are to go up to the border with Laos and no farther. It is the South Vietnamese who are going across.

The war in Indochina is changing, radically and rapidly. The American combat role on the ground is diminishing. The South Vietnamese are taking over. But in the air the American combat role continues. There are as yet no boundaries to the exercise of American air power and as the geography of the war expands, the great weight of our air strikes has switched from South Vietnam to Laos and Cambodia.

There is a paradox about this busy war on new battlefields at the very moment the United States is winding down its participation in Vietnam. Administration officials deny that the invasion of Laos represents an extension of the war.

Secretary of Defense Laird. No, the area of the war is being narrowed because the war has moved out of South Vietnam to a large extent, it's moved out of North Vietnam and now the war has narrowed into the area of the occupied territory of Cambodia—north-eastern Cambodia and in southern Laos. So, by any measurement, the war is being narrowed as far as its scope is concerned.

COLLINGWOOD. Critics insist that by any measurement the war is obviously being widened.

MARVIN KALB. Senator, the Administration claims that its actions in Cambodia and Laos have really not widened the war, and, in fact, have hastened the timetable for the U.S. withdrawal.

Senator FRANK CHURCH. Haven't widened the war?

KALB. Have not widened the war.

CHURCH. Opening a front in Laos? It doesn't widen the war?

KALB. Well, that's what they claim. Now what is your own feeling?

CHURCH. Black is white? Night is day? Up is down? Doesn't the language mean anything any more? Of course the war has been widened, in the sense that the fighting now is going on in Laos, and it's going on in Cambodia, and American forces are participating on fronts that didn't exist before.

COLLINGWOOD. The U.S., and more particularly the South Vietnamese, are now participating on fronts that did not exist before. To a degree, the fate of South Vietnam is now being decided in the jungles of Laos and Cambodia. Yet Secretary Laird is also right. The war is narrowing—at least in the American commitment of lives, of money, of troops on station.

These contradictory changes, these transformations of the last year in Indochina, and their implications are the subjects of our broadcast tonight. I'm Charles Collingwood.

ANNOUNCER. This is a CBS News Special Report, the first of two broadcasts on "The Changing War in Indochina." Tonight: "The Widening War in Laos and Cambodia." With CBS News Chief Foreign Correspondent Charles Collingwood.
(Announcement.)

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THE WIDENING WAR IN LAOS
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Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, on February 16, 1971, the CBS television network presented a new special entitled "The Changing War in Indochina: The Widening War in Laos and Cambodia." This program was one of the most comprehensive and objective accounts of the war in Indochina that the media has produced.

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up across the border in South Vietnam, but no American soldiers fighting with them. The operation was born under a news embargo and has been scant on information ever since, but the South Vietnamese Command says the advance has already been consolidated along the axis of Route 9 to a point about halfway between the border and the town of Tchepone, a key point on the Ho Chi Minh Trail. Reconnaissance troops are said to have reached Tchepone itself.

According to Saigon, about one-half of the Ho Chi Minh Trail complex in this area has already been blocked. This, of course, is the purpose of the operation, to cut the supply line from North Vietnam down into South Vietnam and into Cambodia. The enemy is believed to have been making a special effort this year to push his men and supplies down the Trail, but because of bad weather at the beginning of dry season, the progress is thought to have been delayed and supplies piled up in the northern part of the Trail. Therefore, it is reasoned, if the Trail is cut now, North Vietnamese offensive operations would be prevented this dry season and possibly next. That is the rationale of the present attack in Laos, but expectations in Indochina have a habit of being denied. The name of this operation is Lam Son 719, the 719th in a series of South Vietnamese Army operations. There is no reason as yet to think there will not be a 720th or 30th or—that is to say, there is no reason to believe that the invasion of Laos will in itself end the war. At most it is a way station on the road toward American departure and South Vietnamese self-sufficiency.

Although the Army of South Vietnam is bearing the brunt of the fighting in Laos, the way for the offensive was prepared by Americans, Don Webster reports.

WEBSTER. When the offensive began January 30th, the first vehicles to move were American. They pushed westward down Highway 9, a road which runs all the way from the South China Sea across Vietnam and then across Laos.

The decision to reopen Highway 9 and the bases which are strung out along it created a virtual traffic jam of vehicles. In the air, helicopters of all varieties were used to ferry troops and supplies to key locations. This tremendous activity in an area which had been deserted couldn't be concealed. In this important way it differed from the Cambodian operations of last summer, which took place with little visible evidence of advance preparations. Despite attempts by the military to place a news embargo on the preparations for Laos, there was worldwide speculation about it ten days before it even began.

One by one, American troops reopened their old bases, Camp Carroll, Vandergriff, Khesanh, Lang Vei—and many small bases which don't even have names. This one at Lang Vei had a special significance: it is the only outpost in this war which Americans have had to abandon, on the run, under enemy fire. Three years ago Communist troops overran it, using tanks, in a middle-of-the-night attack.

As to the G.I.'s, at a glance they appear much the same as before, loaded with goods they will need in the field. But the tactics being used by American troops are different. Basically, they went to their locations and stayed there. They are not holding night ambushes. They are not holding combat assaults. There are not very many reconnaissance patrols. That is now the job of the ARVN.

KONYHA. Really, we're simply mainly for forming a blocking force function. Road clearing and things like this in support of the Vietnamese operation.

WEBSTER. Would you like to go with them into Laos?

G.I. Definitely not! From what—we don't

know anything about it, but from what everybody says, it's—you know—it's pretty hairy over there. So, I don't think so. I think, as I just said, I imagine I'm just like the rest of the guys and want to go home.

WEBSTER. How long do you think you'll be out here?

G.I. Well, when we left our area, why, they told us that we'd be up here about thirty days. And I don't know if that's for sure or not.

WEBSTER. Will you be glad to get back? G.I. Yeah. I'd be glad to get back where I came from.

WEBSTER. Besides all the logistical help and the artillery, the other major U.S. role has been in the air, for transport of Vietnamese troops into Laos and the use of American helicopters and gunships in Laos. It is in this area the Vietnamese need the most help. President Thieu, when he visited the Laos Command Center in Vietnam the other day, was well aware of this.

Do you think in the future you could continue to conduct operations in Laos like this without American air support?

THIEU. I think that we still need American air support, as a very frank . . .

WEBSTER. For years to come?

THIEU. It depends upon how our aviation will be developed. That's a very important factor.

WEBSTER. Do you think that in the future, in years to come, South Vietnamese troops are going to have to continue to go back into Laos again and again as you are in Cambodia?

THIEU. We cannot say what we will do one year ahead. Now, we can say only what I have said, it's a very limited operation—limited in time, in space and the duration and every year. Now it depends upon how the war is going on and we will decide later on.

WEBSTER. It's been a good many years since the U.S. sat back and let someone else do the bulk of the fighting, in Vietnam or anywhere else. But with American offensive operations due to end in Vietnam by May First, this may be a preview of the way the U.S. will operate here in the future. Don Webster, CBS News, in Quang Tri, South Vietnam.

COLLINGWOOD. Although the ground operations in Laos are South Vietnamese, the Americans in their secondary role have taken substantial casualties. The Pentagon reports 19 Americans have been killed in "air operations." Earlier, ten Americans had been reported killed in "Operations Dewey Canyon." Fifteen U.S. helicopters have officially been listed as destroyed, and many more are believed to have been shot down but later recovered.

Casualties among the South Vietnamese are higher—71 reported killed. And they claim to have killed nearly five hundred of the enemy. Nevertheless, North Vietnamese resistance so far has been less vigorous than expected, as the South Vietnamese move ahead slowly and cautiously. Jeff Williams reports from Laos.

WILLIAMS. The South Vietnamese thrust into Laos is proceeding at a snail's pace, and these airborne forces appear to be in no real hurry. They know they will be in Laos for a long time.

While one thrust toward the Ho Chi Minh Trail was made on the ground, Ranger and airborne units were helicoptered directly into the conflict, in U.S. Army choppers. Although the United States Government says it is not sending Americans on the ground into Laos, U.S. troops are playing a major air support role. The overwhelming majority of all Vietnamese troops carried into combat go on U.S. helicopters, as do the tons of supplies they need.

Troops pushing across the dry Laotian hills are slowly but steadily uncovering enemy supply caches, like here right in the Ho Chi Minh Trail complex. The goods are stored in these hunkers for short periods, then carried

on south into Cambodia or east into South Vietnam.

What type of supplies did you find?

South Vietnamese Officer. Every kind. Ammo, rice . . . medical—every kind. And many—many (indistinct) material.

WILLIAMS. This part of the Trail is quite elaborate. It includes bamboo trellises over exposed parts of the road to hide it from planes. Gasoline drums were left behind as the Hanoi regulars fled the base camp. The Vietnamese troops hope to find many such dumps, but they may be disappointed.

The Ho Chi Minh Trail is a pipeline for supplies, and as such, the goods are kept moving and are not stored in large amounts. The North Vietnamese, with more than a full combat division in the area, are fighting back from an elaborate network of bunkers along the Trail. And as the South Vietnamese push forward, the enemy resists more stubbornly. Casualties are increasing. Wounded men are flown out of combat areas by both American and Vietnamese choppers. But medical attention for the Vietnamese in the field is poor. Not a few soldiers bleed to death because the average soldier is not skilled in basic first aid.

Some causes for the slow progress of the incursion are the elaborate preparations by the Vietnamese, including a series of artillery bases like this. The Saigon troops are going in to stay, and they're using bulldozers to build lasting defensive positions. Here again, it's the U.S. bringing in the supplies. Technically, the South Vietnamese invasion into Laos is a limited operation. The purpose of this drive is to cut the Ho Chi Minh Trail, but until that is completed, the South Vietnamese are not likely to leave. Jeff Williams, CBS News, on a firebase inside Laos.

COLLINGWOOD. If the South Vietnamese do contemplate staying indefinitely astride the Ho Chi Minh Trail in Laos, they will face heavy risks from the weather and the enemy. When the rainy season begins in May, what is now dust along Route 9 will turn into mud, hampering ground movement; and in the air the sodden skies will limit American air support. Like the rains, the North Vietnamese are bound to come sometime, too. As they push farther into Laos, the South Vietnamese are bracing for enemy counterattacks. Already the North Vietnamese have intensified their pressure in the northern part of Laos, tightening their encirclement of the CIA-based camp at Long Cheng, less than 100 miles from the capital of Vientiane.

In Vientiane, the neutralist government of Souvanna Phouma issued only a token protest against the South Vietnamese entry, put the main blame on the North Vietnamese for being there in the first place. Souvanna told our correspondent, Ed Rabel, he did not feel that the U.S. has escalated the war and said he doubts that China will be drawn in.

(Announcement.)

COLLINGWOOD. If the current South Vietnamese ground operations in Laos are new, U.S. air operations over Laos are not. We have been bombing Pathet Lao forces in the North and the Ho Chi Minh Trail for at least five years, although President Nixon announced it officially only last March. In recent months the bulk of the missions have been against the movement of supplies.

From US airbases in South Vietnam and Thailand, and from aircraft carriers in the Tonkin Gulf, American fighter bombers flew almost 100,000 sorties against targets in Laos during 1970. They are going after crossroads, supply dumps, truck parks, and moving vehicles along the Ho Chi Minh Trail. Some of the missions are flown by C-119 gunships, equipped with infra red and other devices to enable them to spot and strafe moving vehicles at night. From U Tapao, Thailand, B-52 bombers fly missions against the trail, averaging about 900 a month, almost the

I believe it is important to America that the decline in this movement be reversed. I further believe this can only be done by basic changes in governmental policies that will restimulate the desire of our people to serve as representatives of American overseas or here at home. Without such rejuvenation of the desire to serve, the mere amalgamation of volunteer programs, which the President suggested in January, will probably be of little consequence.

With respect to the Peace Corps, this rejuvenation requires a foreign policy which ceases to be established primarily on cold war concepts and its replacement by a foreign policy that places our ideals above our fears, that seeks long-term peace rather than short-term tactical advantage, and that emphasizes what we as Americans stand for as well as what we stand against. On the domestic side, this rejuvenation needs a recommitment to a meaningful attack on poverty in the United States, to the saving of our environment, and to the overcoming of the morass of problems that consume our urban areas. Only with basic changes such as these can a climate be restored in which the people of this country truly want to serve.

Thus, on this the 10th anniversary of the Peace Corps, I congratulate all those who have answered the call to service—in the Peace Corps and in the host of other private and public volunteer organizations; and I urge that we as a nation commit ourselves to rekindle the Peace Corps spirit, so that Americans will continue to have not only the vehicles through which to serve their fellow men but also the desire to do so.

CAPTIVE NATIONS

Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, I know that my colleagues share with me the deep concern for those in central and Eastern Europe who live under regimes which do not represent their ideals or their aspirations. It is one of the tragedies of our time that such situations exist year after year without hope of immediate change. It is very sad that the United Nations is not a protagonist for change.

On the occasion of the 25th anniversary of the United Nations, Vasil Germenji, chairman of the Assembly of Captive European Nations, sent the following telegram to Dr. Edward I. Hambro, president of the United Nations General Assembly:

The Assembly of Captive European Nations, composed of democratic representatives of the silenced people of Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Rumania, extends to Your Excellency and the General Assembly its sincere congratulations on the twenty-fifth anniversary of the United Nations.

The United Nations, founded amid great hopes for a just and lasting peace, is entering a crucial stage of its existence. In spite of many notable accomplishments, the U.S. has unfortunately failed to address itself to a number of deep-seated problems plaguing mankind. Our Assembly respectfully draws

the attention of Your Excellency and that of the General Assembly to the following:

1. Not one of the nine countries listed above is represented in the United Nations by delegates designated by a freely elected government. These delegates have no right to speak on behalf of our nations. They speak in behalf of regimes which have been imposed on these countries by, or with direct assistance of, a foreign power, and which have maintained their stranglehold over East and Central Europe by force, intimidation and threats. In an age of world wide advocacy of the right to self-determination, this continued misrepresentation of 100 million East and Central Europeans in violation of the Charter of the United Nations should be condemned, and corrective measures instituted.

2. Since the nine nations enjoy no genuine representation in the U.N., their citizens have no recourse for airing their grievances concerning violation of human rights and political freedoms and seeking redress. It is submitted that the U.N. should devise, and make operative, a machinery that would allow nationals of these countries to take specific steps to bring their case to the attention of the world forum.

3. The implications of the Brezhnev Doctrine of Limited Sovereignty—formulated after the invasion of Czechoslovakia—are in direct contravention to the principles of the U.N. Charter, which postulates that each member state is to enjoy full sovereignty. It is inconceivable how a member state—the Soviet Union—can enunciate a Doctrine so fundamentally opposed to the letter and spirit of the U.N. Charter, without being brought to account by the members of the United Nations.

The U.N.'s prestige can be enhanced only if the organization consistently and without exception defends and adheres to the provision of its Charter and the Universal Declaration of the Rights of Man.

A case in point is the situation in the Captive European Nations and specifically the unresolved question of Hungary.

The Assembly of Captive European Nations respectfully submits to Your Excellency and to the General Assembly that the time to act on pressing issues including those outlined above so essential to international peace and security, is now—on this solemn occasion when the U.N. observes twenty-five years of its existence.

The sentiments expressed in Mr. Germenji's telegram are in keeping with the feelings of a great majority of Americans who want freedom and autonomy for the peoples of central and Eastern Europe. His comments about the so-called Brezhnev doctrine are especially compelling and deserve the attention of all in this body. I commend them to you.

THE WIDENING WAR IN LAOS AND CAMBODIA

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CHARLES COLLINGWOOD. This scene is as familiar as the story of America's involvement in Vietnam: Massed U.S. units on the move. But this may be the final big-scale American action in South Vietnam—and on the ground, it is strictly limited. The orders are to go up to the border with Laos and no farther. It is the South Vietnamese who are going across.

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There is a paradox about this busy war on new battlefields at the very moment the United States is winding down its participation in Vietnam. Administration officials deny that the invasion of Laos represents an extension of the war.

Secretary of Defense LAIRD. No, the area of the war is being narrowed because the war has moved out of South Vietnam to a large extent, it's moved out of North Vietnam and now the war has narrowed into the area of the occupied territory of Cambodia—north-eastern Cambodia and in southern Laos. So, by any measurement, the war is being narrowed as far as its scope is concerned.

COLLINGWOOD. Critics insist that by any measurement the war is obviously being widened.

MARVIN KALB. Senator, the Administration claims that its actions in Cambodia and Laos have really not widened the war, and, in fact, have hastened the timetable for the U.S. withdrawal.

Senator FRANK CHURCH. Haven't widened the war?

KALB. Have not widened the war. CHURCH. Opening a front in Laos? It doesn't widen the war?

KALB. Well, that's what they claim. Now what is your own feeling?

CHURCH. Black is white? Night is day? Up is down? Doesn't the language mean anything any more? Of course the war has been widened, in the sense that the fighting now is going on in Laos, and it's going on in Cambodia, and American forces are participating on fronts that didn't exist before.

COLLINGWOOD. The U.S., and more particularly the South Vietnamese, are now participating on fronts that did not exist before. To a degree, the fate of South Vietnam is now being decided in the jungles of Laos and Cambodia. Yet Secretary Laird is also right. The war is narrowing—at least in the American commitment of lives, of money, of troops on station.

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entire number of B-52 missions the Air Force is permitted in South East Asia each month.

More than 400 planes have been shot down over Laos since we started bombing there, more than fifty in the last ten months, not counting the current ground combat support operations there. American pilots say the ground fire is heavy, accurate and increasing. Jed Duvall spoke with pilots just returned from a mission over Laos.

Captain EAST. I've been over here for a year now and it seems like recently they've been shooting at us more than ever before. They've gotten more guns in, of course they have a lot of ammo it seems, and every target we go in on, they're hammering away at us. And it's big stuff.

Duvall. What do you mean, big stuff?
Captain EAST. It's just big stuff, it comes up as big red tracers at us and explodes just like it does in the movies, World War II, you know, you see the guns come up and the flak start, that's all it is, just flak, just like they had in World War II and the Korean War. It's bad stuff.

Lieutenant GROVES. Most of the time the guns that fire, the closer you get to the target, the more the guns will fire. If you're not closed they're not going to fire very much, but the closer you get to the trucks, they really open up.

Duvall. Captain, what are your targets on the Trail, what are you trying to hit?

Captain LEMON. Well, the targets, mainly consist of movers, in other words, loaded trucks. And IDPs, or interdiction points, choke points where the roads will come together at one point and we try to crater these roads, to inhibit the flow of the traffic. And oftentimes, the forward air controllers in the area will find trucks that are actually moving on the Trail and we will also try to hit these. These are basically the two prime targets that we have on the Trail.

Duvall. Do you get the idea that you're stopping some of the traffic or most of the traffic or what?

Captain EAST. We're stopping some of it. We're stopping some with our bombs, and we're stopping some with the threat of our bombs. The traffic doesn't move much in the daytime, very, very little. At night they do most of their moving and we stop a lot of it, but of course, not all of it. We're helping a great deal, in my opinion, but we're not stopping the flow completely.

Duvall. Lieutenant, what does the Trail look like? Is it one straight road?

Lieutenant GROVES. Largely it's a honeycomb. There are places where there's not much jungle around it, but those places are pretty scarce. It runs a lot of times pretty close to a river, almost paralleling at times, but most of the rivers here are so crooked they can't do that very well. The triple-layered canopy is pretty bad. You can't see it in a lot of places, you have to have—

Duvall. By triple-layered canopy, you mean heavy jungle?

Lieutenant GROVES. Yes, three different layers of jungle above it, different heights of trees and it grows in three layers. And you can see the trail in spots from the lighter color dirt road with the green background all around it, but to really get a good look at it you have to be a little slower than we are and a little lower.

Captain EAST. There's one thing I'd like to add. I don't think people realize about the Trail, is the fact that it is so large. Now, everybody thinks of it as maybe four or five roads coming right in to South Vietnam and that's not true at all. That thing is about fifty miles wide and two-three hundred miles long. And the whole thing is nothing but a network of roads, just everywhere. Now they're well travelled. There is traffic on them constantly. Every road it seems is travelled. If we should hit the road, which we try to do, with a bomb to stop the traffic, it's fixed within a period of just a matter of hours.

They have big bulldozers come in and clear the road and the traffic starts again.

COLLINGWOOD. American fighter-bombers, B-52s and helicopter gunships also fly strikes against targets in Cambodia, and in recent months, as the ground situation there has deteriorated, the number of fighter-bomber sorties has increased, about 1500 a month for the last few months compared with 500 a month earlier in 1970. It has been obvious to newsmen on the ground that some of them, at least, especially in the Route 4 operations, have been close air support for Cambodian and Vietnamese troops. During the heavy fighting last month to reopen that key road from Phnom Penh to the port of Kompong Som, Cambodian and South Vietnamese troops were getting American helicopter support from two carriers in the Gulf of Siam and from a helicopter base at Phu Quoc Island, just off Cambodia's southern coast.

We spoke to General Lucius D. Clay, Jr., commander of the 7th Air Force in Southeast Asia, about the changing air war in Indochina.

General CLAY. In the last several months that I've been here, we've seen a decided decline in the air operations in the Republic of Vietnam, as compared to what it might have been a year ago or the last time you made a survey of this nature.

On the other hand, with the importance of the logistic activities of the Viet Cong, particularly as they relate to the Ho Chi Minh Trail, we find our activities up there are just as busy as ever. So I guess in substance then, the answer is that in terms of close air support and direct support of the U.S. Army in the Republic of Vietnam, there has been a decline. But in terms of our other activities throughout Southeast Asia, we're still fighting a pretty busy war.

COLLINGWOOD. General Clay, how effective has been our bombing of the South—of the Ho Chi Minh Trail?

General CLAY. Well, I'd like to give you a good firm answer to that, Mr. Collingwood, but unfortunately, there is no firm answer. I happen to think that so far this year we've been more effective than ever. We've introduced some new equipment, particularly in the form of gunships, which have been highly effective. However, I think the full story remains to be told because as you well know we work over there most effectively during the dry season. This, of course, is the dry season now, and it will come to a close some time around May, the latter part of May 1971. And at that time, we'll have a story to put together as to just how effective it's been.

COLLINGWOOD. Do we contemplate training and equipping the South Vietnamese eventually to undertake the interdiction missions that we are now flying in Laos and Cambodia?

General CLAY. No, sir, we're not. Basically, the Vietnamese Air Force is being trained to handle the insurgency problem within the country, within the Republic of Vietnam. As you may know, the fighter aircraft we are leaving with the Vietnamese Air Force are basically A-1s and A-37s, basically short-range, close-support type airplanes. So we're not leaving heavy carriers of ordnance, long-range type airplanes, which are the kind necessary if you're going to be operating in trails of Laos and outside the Republic of Vietnam.

COLLINGWOOD. General Clay makes a point and poses a question. His point: The Vietnamese Air Force is being trained and left with strength to operate only within South Vietnam's boundaries. The question: If air operations outside continue to be necessary, who will conduct them, and how?

(Announcement.)

COLLINGWOOD. Whatever the South Vietnamese operations across the border may ultimately accomplish in Laos and Cambodia, they have certainly given Saigon's armed forces a psychological shot in the arm. They

have shown that they are not only vastly superior to the amateur armies of Cambodia and Laos but that in conventional warfare they are often more than a match for the North Vietnamese themselves. This has given them a new and heady self-confidence. I asked General Do Cao Tri, who commands the Vietnamese now in Cambodia, whether his operations were a strain on his troops and his resources.

General TRI. Not at all. On the contrary, it gives more opportunity to our regular army to be able to continue to impose our pressure to our enemy. Last year we strike them in their sanctuary and we forced them to withdraw far away from our border. And we continue to have our initiative of action in Cambodian territory and to keep such pressure on the enemy regular forces as long as we intend to stay in Cambodia.

COLLINGWOOD. Well, do you foresee that you'll be making a greater effort in Cambodia than in the future?

General TRI. I think so. And I'm quite optimistic about our military potential in Cambodia because the dry season comes now, and it's the most favorite time for our military operations. The terrain in Cambodia is favorable for the use of combined arms and we plan to employ our full firepower to destroy the enemy where they are.

COLLINGWOOD. The war in Indochina is changing; what are the principal changes that you have seen?

General TRI. From outside, the big change is that it's become, really, a Vietnamese war, in which South Vietnamese Army and the people are fighting against Communist aggression. There will be no more U.S. combat troops commitment in our fighting.

COLLINGWOOD. General Tri, do you think that you'll ever see in your military region a resumption of the big war, main force elements making another threat to Saigon?

General TRI. Never it will happen, because I keep the enemy main forces far away now from our border. How can they come back again once they have to fight against us where they are?

COLLINGWOOD. You mean you keep them in Cambodia?

General TRI. Quite sure.

COLLINGWOOD. In any discussion of the widening war in Indochina, Laos and Cambodia are now run together almost as one word. They're very different countries with different problems, but it was a similar military logic which converted them into battlefields.

At the beginning, the Cambodian operation was oversold as a brief surgical stroke which would solve the problem of the sanctuaries once and for all. Well, nine months later it's still going on. The South Vietnamese are back in Cambodia, scouring the sanctuaries and keeping roads open. They are actually more deeply involved in Cambodia today than they are in Laos. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that the Cambodian incursion did greatly relieve the military pressure on the southern part of South Vietnam, permitting dramatic progress in extending government control. It is hoped that Laos operation will do the same thing for the central and northern provinces. But whatever its salutary effects in South Vietnam, the widening of the war has made a shambles of Cambodia.

The most important thing about Cambodia is that it has survived. It is 11 months now since the overthrow of Sihanouk brought the war to what was surely one of the most unprepared countries on earth. But with American and South Vietnamese help, the Government of Lon Nol, however precariously, stayed in power under increasing enemy pressure. And there is no reason to think, even in the light of his illness and replacement by Sirik Matak, that his government will fall now. But the price of survival has been heavy.

Phnom Penh, once the most agreeable of

Southeast Asia capitals, now bears all the familiar signs of a city under siege. Sandbags and barbed wire abound. Patriotic slogans are flaunted to catch the eye and charge the spirit. There is a prevalence of uniforms, not only for those actually in the Army, but for civilians as well, to whom even a quasi-uniform is worn as a sign of solidarity in the struggle against the enemy.

If the fate of a peaceful people were not at stake, some of the preparations for the defense of the fatherland would be touchingly funny. As it is, there is a certain air of hasty improvisation about Cambodia's defense preparations. The roadblocks that ring the capital are even less effective than they look. The Communists showed how easily they could penetrate Phnom Penh's defense perimeter by their devastating raid on the capital's airport in which they blew up most of Cambodia's fledgling air force and got away scot free. They also hit brutally at a barracks compound.

These, and similar acts of terrorism are reminiscent of the way the Viet Cong was operating in Vietnam in the early 1960's. I asked the U.S. Ambassador to Cambodia, Emory Swank, about that.

SWANK. I'm not familiar with all of the situation in Vietnam in the early '60's, but I can think off-hand of a very important difference, and that is that this country really is not in a state of civil war. This is outside aggression, unmistakably, from North Vietnam and from the Viet Cong.

COLLINGWOOD. Are the people of Cambodia behind the present government?

SWANK. My impression, certainly, from the time that I've been here, since last September, is that the government enjoys the support of most of the important element of the urban population. Quite frankly, concerning the countryside, the returns are inconclusive, and I don't think we have enough information to make a valid judgment.

COLLINGWOOD. How do you foresee the enemy's intentions toward Cambodia? Do they want to take over the country?

SWANK. This is, of course, a very interesting and difficult question to answer, because we can't probe the enemy's thinking, completely. But my own personal judgment is that the enemy's principal object of interest remains South Vietnam, and that Laos and Cambodia are both way stations along that road.

COLLINGWOOD. Were the present government in Cambodia to be seriously threatened, could the United States really just stand idly by?

SWANK. This is a bridge that I would rather not cross right now, Mr. Collingwood.

COLLINGWOOD. One of the ways in which the enemy can easily produce a critical situation in Cambodia is to cut the main arteries linking Phnom Penh with the rest of the country. A regular object of his attention is Route 4, which connects Phnom Penh with its seaport of Kompong Som. Last month the enemy closed the highway and it took the Cambodians, plus a large South Vietnamese task force, plus powerful U.S. air support, to open it again.

The Cambodians aren't cowards. They fight and they take casualties, but compared to the South Vietnamese, let alone the veterans from North Vietnam, they are not impressive soldiers and they are having to learn the hard way. While they are learning, Cambodia is clearly vulnerable to a major North Vietnamese attack with all the repercussions that would have on the situation in South Vietnam. I asked Fred Ladd, the U.S. official charged with guiding the Cambodian Army, how the enemy with only 6,000 effective fighting troops could blow up the airfield, close the roads and rivers, and what would happen if he poured more troops in?

LADD. Well, I think if he were to commit more troops at that kind of an objective, the airfield, or a road, or the river, it would be

easier for the Cambodians and their Vietnamese allies to deal him rather severe blows. And I feel that his strategy is to do these attacks rather spectacularly, but do them with very few people, and cause a sensational environment, when really the military situation as such is not that critical.

COLLINGWOOD. To what degree has the Cambodian Army improved?

LADD. Well, I think it's—I'm glad you asked. It's one of those points that isn't brought forward very often. They started in June or July with about 30,000-40,000 men in the army. This army was a rather makeshift affair, poorly led. It wasn't a very inspired group of people. And in the eight to nine months that have passed since then, the army has grown to about the strength of 200,000. So I think that, although it's still an amateur army, it gets better every day, and it isn't evident unless you sit and watch it over a period of months. But I do think they're much more effective today than they were in May.

COLLINGWOOD. If the enemy did mount a major attack against Cambodia, would the United States, in its own interest, be able to just let it collapse?

LADD. I really don't know, because I assume, and I have—the guidance I have received is that we would like a non-Communist government maintained in Cambodia. And it would depend on when it would be, I think. If it were right now, no. They want the Vietnamization program and the troop withdrawal—the United States does, in its interests, to continue. And if Cambodia were to fall today, I think that this would seriously jeopardize both the troop withdrawals and the Vietnamization program.

COLLINGWOOD. The goal is for Cambodia eventually to be able to defend itself by itself, a Cambodianization program, if you will. To that end, thousands of Cambodians are being trained in South Vietnam. Don Webster reports.

WEBSTER. The program began last July, if not secretly, at least very quietly. It's estimated 16,000 Cambodians will be trained here this year. In the midst of a war which is winding down, this program is escalating rapidly. The Cooper-Church amendment prohibits any American ground troops or advisers in Cambodia, but it doesn't prevent Americans from advising the Cambodians by bringing them across the border. However, the Americans here deny that's happening. They say they are merely advising the Vietnamese, who in turn are instructing the Cambodians.

Vietnamese instructors here work through interpreters to get their points across. Some of the Cambodian pupils are just 15 years old. Presumably, the young Cambodians are learning more about Vietnam than just a few words . . . "mot hai, sat sat" . . . "one, two; kill, kill."

There's plenty of discussion whether the Vietnamese Army is ready to fight alone, but there seems general agreement the Cambodian Army is not ready.

How much longer do you think Cambodian troops will come to Vietnam for training?

Major SALAT. I think it will be one or two years more, sir.

WEBSTER. How long do you think it will take the Cambodian Army to become as good as the South Vietnamese is now?

Colonel BERRIS. Well, by making a comparison with the Vietnamese Army, I would say in the neighborhood of eight to ten years.

COLLINGWOOD. Despite all the multinational efforts to train and equip the Cambodian forces, one thing is perfectly clear—Cambodia cannot yet survive without somebody's help. Right now it is militarily dependent upon South Vietnam. There are more South Vietnamese troops fighting in Cambodia now than there are in Laos—16,000 going over the old sanctuary areas of the Parrot's Beak and the Fishhook. The

South Vietnamese Economic Minister is budgeting for a constant level of 20,000 troops operating across the border in Cambodia. The Cambodians wish it were otherwise. They have an ancient antipathy for the Vietnamese, North and South alike, but they are willing to take help where they can get it now and are surprisingly confident that they will be able to hold off the North Vietnamese and still retain their independence and identity.

I asked Um Sim, Cambodia's Minister of Communications, if the enemy had any success recruiting the people to their side.

UM SIM. It all depends upon the definition of the word "success." I think to a certain extent they succeed in recruiting some of the Cambodian people. But this most mainly is done by force, not by persuasion or any other peaceful means.

COLLINGWOOD. Mr. Minister, is Cambodia receiving the amount and degree of assistance from the United States that is necessary to permit it to continue the fight on its own?

UM SIM. I think the American government has helped Cambodia to survive by moving into the sanctuary of the Viet Cong, North Vietnamese and by clearing up all the area. And later we have got some aid, but usually the aid has not come as fast as the situation was getting—you know, worse.

COLLINGWOOD. Mr. Minister, do you foresee any circumstances in which Cambodia might ask the United States once again to introduce ground forces into the war here?

UM SIM. This I am positively sure that the Cambodian government never asked for, the ground troops from the United States to help in fighting this war. I'm positively sure.

COLLINGWOOD. Do you hope that the South Vietnamese military operations in Cambodia would be able to be decreased in the future rather than increased?

UM SIM. I do hope so, because as the number of our well-trained troops is increasing, we will do our best in order to replace the South Vietnamese troops in here. And both parties agree to do so, because the presence of South Vietnamese troops in Cambodia is not doing any good to our policy.

COLLINGWOOD. Before illness struck him down last week, Cambodia's Prime Minister, General Lon Nol, was supremely optimistic, many Americans thought too much so. He even dismissed the blow at Phnom Penh's airport as a mere incident and a sign of the enemy's desperation. What he wanted most was more American aid and equipment before his countrymen face the full brunt of a North Vietnamese attack.

Lon Nol (through interpreter). I have requested that delivery should be speeded up in the program. As for the aid covered by the program, we are holding meetings with our American friends in order to formulate an effective program with regard to both planning and execution. We hope that this will be done quickly.

COLLINGWOOD. What do you think of the enemy's intentions?

Lon Nol. I think the intention for the long run is as follows: The enemy, being unable to go straight into South Vietnam and also because they now lack bases and sanctuaries, is directing the whole effort against us—the whole effort.

COLLINGWOOD. General, is there anything that you would like to say to the American people?

Lon Nol. It gives us great moral encouragement to know that in the United States of America the people are learning to understand our problems more and more.

(Announcement).

COLLINGWOOD. It must have come as a relief to the Administration, if not a surprise, that the invasion of Laos did not provoke the same public outcries and disturbances which followed last year's entry into Cambodia. The cynical say it's because the pub-

llc—even the young—have become so numb about Indochina they won't get exercised unless American ground troops are directly engaged. Anyway, the kids stayed in school this time and the protests have been muted.

Nevertheless, what is happening in Laos is, in a real sense, only an extension of what already happened in Cambodia—minus Americans on the ground. The same basic arguments pertain, for and against, and the same arguments are being made. In Washington, Bob Schieffer spoke to Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird, and Marvin Kalb talked with Senator Frank Church, still a strong Administration critic.

KALB. Senator, its claimed by the Administration that the war has been fought in this part of Laos for five years now, so it really hasn't been widened, and that's what they're saying.

CHURCH. It hasn't been fought with American helicopters in close tactical support, hovering above the tree-tops and firing into any enemy target of opportunity. It hasn't been fought in the middle of Cambodia and the western reaches of Cambodia. No, of course the war has been widened. Why fool the people?

KALB. Senator, why do you feel that there has been so little public outcry? There was public outrage last year at the time of Cambodia.

CHURCH. Because now we don't have an American army on the ground. We don't have thousands of American troops moving in on the ground to engage the enemy in hand-to-hand combat. And I'm glad that we were able to enact the Cooper-Church Amendment, which restricts the introduction of American ground forces in Laos and Cambodia. Otherwise, I think we'd have an American army in there, just as we had an American army in Cambodia eight or nine months ago.

KALB. Is the difference in climate, in your judgment, limited solely to that one reason, that there is not an American army in Laos?

CHURCH. No. The difference in climate is partly due to the fact that this is just more bombing. And the country has long since become accustomed to the bombing. Its been one of the brutalizing effects of this war.

But there's another reason for the change of climate. The President seems to be saying that he's winding down the war and he has withdrawn substantial numbers of American troops. I give him credit for that. I don't think that in that sense, his Vietnamization program is a token program. If he continues his present pace, if this is all the faster he feels he can go, I'd be willing to settle for that, as long as I knew that we're going to continue to come out . . . That we're not going to stop in May or August or in December of this year, and leave a large American military force in Vietnam indefinitely.

KALB. Come out lock, stock and barrel?

CHURCH. Come out. The time has come. We've equipped the Vietnamese, they have the capability. After all, we didn't promise to make that country the 51st American state, or use American men indefinitely to defend a government that South Vietnamese men should be willing to defend. And now that they have the capability the overriding objective in American policy should be to come out.

KALB. Senator, have you heard about any time limit on the use of American air power in support of South Vietnamese units in Cambodia or Laos?

CHURCH. No. No time limit at all. This is part of the reason why long-time critics of the war grow cynical when they hear about Vietnamization. They're fearful that rather than bringing us out of the war, it's just a method for changing our method of warfare, for converting our participation from ground warfare to air warfare, logistical support and artillery support, and that this is just going to go on endlessly.

There's going to come a time at the end of the summer, or the fall of this year, when the President will have to face his moment of truth on Vietnamization, when he's going to have to take his chances with the Vietnamese being able to do their job in their country . . . when he's going to have to turn back the risk of the war, and the eventual outcome of the war, to them.

SCHIEFFER. When the United States moved into Cambodia, there was a great public outcry. And yet when the details of this operation into Laos became known there was not really very much public criticism. Why do you suppose that is?

LAIRD. Because the South Vietnamese are handling this operation themselves as far as the ground combat is concerned, not only in the Cambodian situation but also in Laos. If there's been any escalation in this war, it's been the escalation in South Vietnam, giving South Vietnam a capability to defend itself and to carry on these combat responsibilities.

SCHIEFFER. But the fact is that U.S. helicopters are going in there, ferrying the troops directly into battle, as it were. They're landing, they're on the ground. Is that cutting the line a little bit thin, by using this air power for this close troop-lift as it's being used?

LAIRD. Air support has not been prohibited by the Congress. This was discussed at some length, but air support is perfectly within the letter of the law as well as the intent of Congress.

SCHIEFFER. The question I think that many critics are asking is this: How do you shorten the war by widening it? Is that a fair question?

LAIRD. Well, the important thing here is to disrupt the supply routes that are going to Cambodia and into South Vietnam from the Cambodian sanctuaries. By any kind of criteria you want to use on the success of this operation, even if we were to withdraw air support and the South Vietnamese were to leave Laos at the present time, this operation is to disrupt the logistic supply route so that we can reduce American casualties as we withdraw American troops. We will be withdrawing additional thousands of Americans, as a matter of fact while these operations are going on.

SCHIEFFER. Mr. Secretary, there will be another dry season next year, just like there's one this year. Will that require another South Vietnamese operation into Laos to interdict supplies?

LAIRD. Well, that would be a matter that would certainly be up to the South Vietnamese. I would—to be very frank with you they will even have a greater capability to carry on those kind of operations next year than they have this year.

SCHIEFFER. As I understand it there's no plan now to train or equip the South Vietnamese to handle this bombing of the Ho Chi Minh Trail in Laos once the United States stops that. What do you do about that? Does the United States just stay there? Will we be required to stay there and bomb as long as the North Vietnamese send supplies—

LAIRD. I don't know whose plans you're looking at. Our plans do give them very important gunship capability which is needed and necessary to interdict supplies and logistics on the Ho Chi Minh Trail. I don't know where you got your information that they weren't being prepared in this area, but we are turning over the gunships, we also are using the A-1s and other types of aircraft that can carry on a very effective interdiction campaign as far as the South Vietnamese are concerned.

SCHIEFFER. You're telling me that that plan is already underway?

LAIRD. The plan is underway to give the South Vietnamese Air Force an interdiction capability.

(Announcement).

COLLINGWOOD. Today Secretary Laird told the President the Laos operation is "going well." But even if it is a military success this time, it may have started something we are not prepared to finish. A precedent has now been established which would allow the South Vietnamese to push beyond their borders whenever necessary to keep the enemy off balance. But will they be capable of doing so, even if it were desirable?

This time, the massive operation was heavily dependent on U.S. air. Secretary Laird indicates that, in the future, South Vietnam will be able to furnish its own air support. But his air commander for Indochina, General Clay, indicated we are not leaving them that kind of force.

Three hundred U.S. helicopters, just for starters, are being used for the Laos attack. The entire projected South Vietnamese helicopter fleet is five hundred. And they will have little, if any, long-range fighter or bomber capability.

So, we may have solved a problem for this dry season—but what about the next, and the ones after that, as long as the North Vietnamese keep coming down the Ho Chi Minh Trail?

To fly cover for future adventures across the border, will we have to leave the South Vietnamese a far bigger and costlier air force, and one which will take us far longer to train? Or will we keep the U.S. air strength there longer, and will the rate of its withdrawal be slower rather than faster from now on? And, if so, will the muted reaction of the American public to this geographical extension of the war remain that way?

Like all operations designed to buy time, the success of the ones in Laos and Cambodia will ultimately depend on how the time bought is used. And that means within South Vietnam. What is happening there is the second part of our report. Next Sunday at this same time I'll report on the situation in South Vietnam today—military, economic, political.

This is Charles Collingwood. Good night. (Announcement).

ANNOUNCER. This has been a CBS NEWS SPECIAL REPORT, "The Widening War in Laos and Cambodia," the first of two broadcasts on "The Changing War in Indochina."

PROPOSED CUTS—ADMINISTRATION ON AGING FUNDS

Mr. PROUTY. Mr. President, it is with considerable regret that I take note of proposed reductions of more than \$7 million in the 1971-72 budget for the Administration on Aging in the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare.

It is my understanding that cuts in funding for community grants under title III of the Older Americans Act and Foster Grandparents program by the Bureau of the Budget were contrary to recommendations from HEW Secretary Elliott Richardson.

The needs of older Americans, and hopes created by unanimous enactment of the Older Americans Act in 1965, are such that there should be an immediate reconsideration of these funding cuts.

I am especially disturbed by proposed reductions in activities directly involving older individuals. Important among these are the community programs—senior citizens centers, homemakers services, meals on wheels, and so forth—funded through State grants under title III of the Older Americans Act and the Foster Grandparents program.

I am also deeply disturbed, however, about the persistent downgrading of the Administration on Aging within the Department of Health, Education, and Wel-

fare. This process began almost immediately after the passage of the Older Americans Act of 1965 and has continued under both the Johnson and Nixon administrations.

Even before the Older Americans Act, action taken during the Kennedy administration suggested a bias within HEW against the needs of the elderly that has continued unabated ever since. Indeed, passage of the Older Americans Act of 1965 without a dissenting vote in either the House of Representatives or the Senate could, in itself, be interpreted as a congressional protest against current and previous discrimination against the elderly within HEW.

It may again be time for Congress to take a serious look at what appears to be a basic long-term departmental policy within HEW contrary to congressional intent. President Nixon's action in naming the Commissioner on Aging to a second post as Presidential Assistant on Aging strongly suggests that he, too, is personally concerned about the elderly and recognizes their need for a highly visible focal point within the executive branch of the Federal Government.

Proposed cuts in the Administration on Aging budget would seriously impair realization of this objective and work of the AOA. The total AOA budget does include some improvements. Among these, the increase of \$4,500,000 in funding for the recently authorized retired senior volunteers program, RSVP, is worthy of special commendation. It provides money for out-of-pocket expenses incurred by retirees doing voluntary community service. Its approval and implementation will do much to expand opportunities for involvement by older Americans in projects useful to themselves and others. There is also a proposal to increase funds for areawide projects by \$1,800,000.

This step forward with RSVP, however, and area-wide projects, does not justify the backward steps on existing, highly successful programs, particularly at the community level. The \$3,650,000 reduction in funds for community program grants under title III of the Older Americans Act and the \$3 million reduction for the Foster Grandparents program will work serious hardship in almost every State. Many persons and organizations in my own State of Vermont are seriously disturbed by this possibility. Also deserving review is the \$2,150,000 cut in funds proposed for research and training.

While the proposed reductions are a substantial percentage of the total Administration on Aging budget, it should be remembered that the savings they would involve would be almost insignificant in comparison to other Federal expenditures and would have little impact on the total Federal budget. Certainly the amount is small when related to the needs of over 20 million older Americans and all out of proportion to damage the cuts would do to the State Offices on Aging.

Serious as the immediate problem would be if the proposed reductions are allowed to stand, my work as a member of the Senate Special Committee on Aging since 1962 makes me wonder if

they are not a symptom of a far more serious problem within the Federal Government's executive branch regarding older persons.

I do not propose to give a complete review of the history of HEW's attitude. Certain facts on the record suffice to indicate the problem and its persistence.

In 1962, the very year after the White House Conference on Aging called by President Eisenhower had emphasized the importance of a strong focal point for needs of older persons in the Federal Government, the Office of Aging was downgraded and made a subsidiary part of the Welfare Administration in HEW. This action was probably a factor in heightened interest on the part of Congress in an independent unit on aging, an interest which ultimately produced the Older Americans Act of 1965.

Resistance from HEW continued. This is documented by repeated testimony between 1962 and 1965 by the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare against proposals similar to that finally enacted. That the Congress did not share such reluctance to move on behalf of older persons is shown by its action in passing the Older Americans Act, which was signed into law by President Johnson, July 14, 1965.

In August 1967 a reorganization plan was announced placing the Administration on Aging under a new Social and Rehabilitation Service within HEW. So far this action, recommended by then Secretary of HEW Wilbur Cohen and regarded by many as violating Congressional intent, remains unchanged.

That this persistent pattern of submerging programs for the elderly has generated much dissatisfaction among older Americans is obvious. That it is contrary to the intent of Congress in its passage of the Older Americans Act of 1965 and subsequent amendments is clear.

It seems to me that corrective action, either by the administration or by the Congress, deserves serious consideration. A first step, but only a first step, will be early action on the proposed budget cuts for the Administration on Aging. The entire history of the Administration on Aging strongly suggests, however, that a thorough review of its relationship to other Federal agencies should be undertaken.

CEYLONESE INDEPENDENCE

Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, on February 4, 1971, Ceylon commemorated the 23d anniversary of its independence. Ceylon has remained a stable democracy throughout the last two decades of our history and has carried on the finest democratic traditions in its election of government officials, and in the other functions of its government.

I should like to express my admiration for the people of Ceylon and my hopes that their example will serve as an inspiration to other countries of the world.

THE SEV AND THE ARCTIC

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, in a time when many persons have expressed concern about damage that could be

done to the tundra by surface vehicles, we should consider all alternatives. One method of transport which may hold the answer to the problem is the Surface Effect Vehicle—SEV—which rides on an air cushion. An article dealing with the SEV and its potential in the Arctic was published recently in "Rendezvous," the public relations department magazine of Bell Aerospace. The article, is based in part on a technical paper by A. W. Courtial, technical director for SEV development at Bell Aerospace.

I ask unanimous consent that the article be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

Awesome, icebound and ruler of one of the Free World's last potentially great oil and mineral deposits, the Arctic region of Alaska and Canada lies waiting . . . majestically influencing world weather conditions and challenging man's every move along its frontiers.

Exploration to date has surfaced the prospect of vast resources in Arctic Alaska and Canada. The southern slopes of Alaska's Brooks Range promise huge stores of metallic ores. Below the northern slopes are huge reservoirs of low-sulphur coals. Recent evidence of submerged gold is being pursued on the northern continental shelf in Norton Sound off the coast of Nome.

Although the Prudhoe Bay oil strikes are now history, additional millions are being invested each year in attempts to speed development of the oil-rich Alaskan North Slope. However, as it is with practically every other polar project, significant progress here has been limited to a large extent by the lack of an effective, flexible and economically feasible off-road transportation system.

Approval for the Trans-Alaska Pipeline System also has not yet been granted. The pipe for it remains stored at Valdez, Prudhoe Bay and strategic points to the north along the proposed pipeline route.

The mammoth tanker Manhattan, which attempted to establish the feasibility of year-around operations through the Northwest Passage, proved only that the transport of crude oil from the Arctic continental land mass by tanker would be economically unfeasible.

Scientific research in the Arctic Basin and surrounding land masses is still looking for a transportation system that will return more for the budget dollar.

Personnel and high-value cargo transportation in the Arctic today is primarily by air. Such air transports as the C130, DC-3, 727 and 737 are serving remote airstrips, many of which are makeshift, and accessible only during certain months of the year.

And, once on the ground, most air-lifted cargoes still face the ever-present deterrents to delivery of cargo from the landing strips to the final point of delivery.

For example, railroads are almost nonexistent. Roads are generally prohibitively expensive and normally useable only during winter months, therefore are few in number and most often local only. Rivers are shallow, winding, boulder-strewn and generally unnavigable by conventional craft. And, transportation by ship or barge where possible, is limited to the short summer when the Arctic ice is melted or penetrable. Helicopters are constrained by range, weather and restricted pay-load carrying capacities. Cargo transport by snowmobile or dog sled is slow, limited and economically impractical.

Then there's the vast, flat and barren Arctic tundra. Criss-crossed with thousands of frozen ditches, troughs and other obstacles in the sub-zero winter months, the tundra is interspersed with thousands of small lakes