Subsequently, Canadian ICC Representative, Seaborn, visited Hanoi commencing May 31. He himself raised same questions with DRV Foreign Minister and response indicated DRV evasive, and in effect negative, apparently taking position recognition four points, plus some element US withdrawal, were preconditions to any talks.
XIII. DEBATE OVER BOMBING STRATEGY AND EFFECTIVENESS CONTINUES

A. The Rostow "Victory" Thesis

With the resumption of the bombing at 0600 on 18 May (Saigon time), the arguments over the usefulness and intensity of the U.S. air attacks against the North were taken up again with full energy.

ROLLING THUNDER XV (week of 18-24 May) was designed to attack principally fixed military installations, while continuing the interdiction of LOC's south of the 20th parallel. The attacks were carried out with a weight of effort similar to the pre-pause level, i.e., 40 sorties per day, with a maximum of 200 sorties for the entire week. 147/

It was at this time that Walt W. Rostow, then State Department Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council, floated a memorandum entitled "Victory and Defeat in Guerrilla Wars: The Case of South Vietnam," 148/ in which he argued that a clear-cut victory for the U.S. in Vietnam was a possibility and that what it required mainly was more pressure on the North and effective conduct of the battle in the South. Rostow's memo follows:

In the press, at least, there is a certain fuzziness about the possibility of clear-cut victory in South Viet-Nam; and the President's statement that a military victory is impossible is open to misinterpretation.

1. Historically, guerrilla wars have generally been lost or won cleanly: Greece, China mainland, North Viet-Nam, Malaya, Philippines. Laos in 1954 was an exception, with two provinces granted the Communists and a de facto split imposed on the country.

2. In all the cases won by Free World forces, there was a phase when the guerrillas commanded a good part of the countryside and, indeed, placed Athens, Kuala Lumpur, and Manila under something close to siege. They failed to win because all the possible routes to guerrilla victory were closed and, in failing to win, they lost. They finally gave up in discouragement. The routes to victory are:

   a) Mao Stage Three: going to all-out conventional war and winning as in China in 1947-49;

   b) Political collapse and takeover: North Viet-Nam;

   c) Political collapse and a coalition government in which the Communists get control over the security machinery; that is, army and/or police. This has been an evident Viet Cong objective in this
war; but the nearest precedents are Eastern European takeovers after 1945, rather than guerrilla war cases.

d) Converting the bargaining pressure generated by the guerrilla forces into a partial victory by splitting the country: Laos. Also, in a sense, North Viet-Nam in 1954 and the Irish Rebellion after the First World War.

3. If we succeed in blocking these four routes to victory, discouraging the Communist force in the South, and making the continuance of the war sufficiently costly to the North there is no reason we cannot win as clear a victory in South Viet-Nam as in Greece, Malaya, and the Philippines. Unless political morale in Saigon collapses and the ARVN tends to break up, case c), the most realistic hope of the VC, should be avoidable. This danger argues for more rather than less pressure on the North, while conducting the battle in the South in such a way as to make VC hopes of military and political progress wane.

4. The objective of the exercise is to convince Hanoi that its bargaining position is being reduced with the passage of time; for, even in the worst case for Hanoi, it wants some bargaining position (rather than simply dropping the war) to get U.S. forces radically reduced in South Viet-Nam and to get some minimum face-saving formula for the VC.

5. I believe Hanoi understands its dilemma well. As of early February it saw a good chance of a quite clean victory via route c). It now is staring at quite clear-cut defeat, with the rising U.S. strength and ARVN morale in the South and rising costs in the North. That readjustment in prospects is painful; and they won't, in my view, accept its consequences unless they are convinced time has ceased to be their friend, despite the full use of their assets on the ground in South Viet-Nam, in political warfare around the world, and in diplomacy.

6. Their last and best hope will be, of course, that if they end the war and get us out, the political, social, and economic situation in South Viet-Nam will deteriorate in such a way as to permit Communist political takeover, with or without a revival of guerrilla warfare. It is in this phase that we will have to consolidate, with the South Vietnamese, a victory that is nearer our grasp than we (but not Hanoi) may think.

Rostow had long been a strong bombing advocate, and an outspoken proponent of air attack on elements of the North Vietnamese industrial target system. As early as April 1, 1969, he had expressed a conviction that Hanoi attaches a high premium to the maintenance of its industrial establishment and that the optimum U.S. bombing objective should be not the
destruction, but the paralysis of the DRV's industrial and urban life. By taking out all the major electric power stations, he believed, Hanoi would be presented "with an immediate desperate economic, social, and political problem which could not be evaded."

In the May memorandum, however, he was not confining his confident expertise to the sphere of targeting strategy, but extending it to the much larger sweep of the U.S. policy objectives in Vietnam. Rostow's grand historic perspective of the road to victory, unfortunately, never focused down upon the nagging practical problem of how the U.S. might "make VC hopes of military and political progress wane" when compelled to fight in behalf of a long-besieged, teetering GVN that was, by this time, hopelessly incapable of coping with the military and political tasks required of it. The critical problem of how to preserve and restore political effectiveness in the GVN never engaged Rostow's serious attention nor, for that matter, that of his contemporaries in the administration.

B. "ARC LIGHT" Comes to South Vietnam -- Attacks on the North Edge

In line with the April decision to give priority to South Vietnam over North Vietnam in the employment of U.S. air power, a major administration decision was taken after the bombing pause to assign saturation bombing missions in the South to SAC B-52 bombers which had long been alerted, but never used, to attack North Vietnam. General Westmoreland, with Ambassador Taylor's political endorsement, presented his case to CINCPAC in the following terms: 150/

1. During recent months firm intelligence has been collected using all possible sources which confirms existence of various VC headquarters complexes and troop concentrations in RVN. Each of these targets (COSVN, NAMBO, Military Region Hqs, VC battalions in jungle assembly areas, etc.) is spread over a relatively large area and consists of groups of buildings or huts, foxholes, trenches, tunnels, etc., connected by trails. General topography is more suitable for area carpet bombing than for pinpoint tactical fighter weapon delivery. In most areas two and three canopy jungle growth hides surface target. Even if accurate coordinates fixed on maps (with inherent map inaccuracies) or photos, solid jungle canopy provides few reasonable aiming points for delivery aircraft.

2. Operation Black Virgin 1 on 15 April 1965 was an attack on the military component of the Central Office South Vietnam (COSVN), (the main VC military headquarters). 443 sorties were applied against an area of approximately 12 square kilometers, dropping approximately 900 tons of ordnance. As a result of this effort, the existence of the target complex was confirmed by the uncovering of over 100 buildings.
and the occurrence of several large secondary explosions. We have determined that the attack created a drastic effect within the VC military headquarters. Individual components were disrupted for several days, and even though these components now appear to be functioning again, they have not re-assembled into an integrated headquarters complex as they were before the attack. In spite of the apparent success of the attack we still have no information concerning the number of casualties caused and have only fragmentary information concerning other damage accomplished.

3. During the attack the target area became completely covered by smoke and resulting bomb pattern was spotty. BDA photography shows that as a result, the distribution of bombs throughout the target was poor. Some areas received a heavy concentration of bomb impacts while other parts of the target area received no hits. If an attack could have been launched in which the bombs were evenly distributed, results would have been far more effective. An attack compressed into a shorter period of time would also have been much more likely to kill VC before they could evacuate the area and would have allowed ground troops to enter the area the same day.

4. It is essential that we keep these selected VC headquarters and units under attack. We are developing target information on the headquarters of the 325th PAWN Division, Headquarters Military Region V and Headquarters Military Region VII where current reports indicated a large VC troop build-up. We know from interrogation of VC captives and from agent reports that VC fear air attacks. We also know that their plans can be upset by unexpected events. The best way for us to keep them off balance and prevent large-scale VC attacks is to keep them under constant pressure in their base areas.

5. Continued use of tactical fighters for pattern bombing does not get the job done properly; it diverts them from other important work for which they are better suited; it creates an unacceptable drain on ordnance assets; and it disrupts all SEA air programs in and out of country. We will, of course, continue to use tactical fighters as the major punch against tactical targets which constitute the vast majority of the in-country air requirements, but for attacks on VC base areas, we must provide a capability which will permit us to deliver a well planned pattern of bombs over large areas and preferably within a short period of time.

6. The problem has been discussed with representatives of the Strategic Air Command and believe that their conventional bombing tactics based on pattern bombing techniques are ideally suited to meet this requirement. I strongly recommend, therefore, that as a matter of urgency, we be authorized to employ SAC B-52 aircraft against selected area targets in RVN...
Washington first authorized the use of ARC LIGHT B-52 forces for radar photography over target areas in the Kontum and War Zone D regions on May 17. A month later, despite the misgivings of the Air Staff and the SAC commander, the first B-52 bombing raid was authorized (ARC LIGHT I; June 18, 1965) attacking the War Zone D VC stronghold near Saigon. On July 4 and 7, further attacks were undertaken, and ARC LIGHT became a regular bombing program in South Vietnam.

As the weight of air attacks increased significantly in South Vietnam, there was also some rise in the level of air strikes in the North. Combined U.S.-VNAF combat sorties totaled about 3,600 in April, 4,000 in May, and 4,800 in June. USAF aircraft flew less than half the mission. But an analysis by JCS Chairman Wheeler on 4 April and another by the CIA and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) early in July showed that the strikes had not reduced appreciably North Vietnam's ability to defend its homeland, train its forces, and infiltrate men and supplies into South Vietnam and Laos.

But this rising level of attacks did not satisfy the Air Staff. At the end of June, General McConnell continued to stress the need for more air pressure on Hanoi, saying he was more convinced than ever that these operations cannot be divorced from and are the essential key to the eventual defeat of the Viet Cong. In November 1964, the JCS unanimously agreed that direct, decisive action against the DRV was needed immediately. This course of action was not adopted and intelligence reports indicate that the current air strike program, while inconveniencing the DRV had done little to curtail or destroy their will and capability to support the insurgency, largely due to the restraints on the air strike program. In fact, the restraints have provided the DRV with the incentive and opportunity to strengthen both their offensive and defensive capabilities.

So C/S USAF considers an intensified application of air power against key industrial and military targets in North Vietnam essential to the result desired. During the period of time required to introduce more forces, any build-up of and support for the Viet Cong offensive should be denied...Failing this, more serious difficulties and casualties for U.S. and allied troops can be expected.

McConnell urged again that the Air Force be allowed to strike targets in the 94 target list, as well as others.

C. McNamara Reviews the Program

At the end of July, in response to a Presidential request, Secretary McNamara undertook a review and evaluation of the bombing program.
against North Vietnam. The results of this review were forwarded to the President in a memorandum, dated July 30, 1965. Since it represents an effective wrap-up, the memorandum is reproduced in full.

1. Rationale for bombing the North. The program of bombing RVN began in an atmosphere of reprisal. We had had the August Tonkin Gulf episode; we had absorbed the November 1 attack on Bien Hoa Airfield and the Christmas Eve bombing of the Brinks Hotel in Saigon. The attacks at U.S. installations at Pleiku on February 7 and Qui Nhon on February 10 were the immediate causes of the first strikes against North Vietnam. The strike following Pleiku was announced as a 'response' -- a 'reprisal'; our strike following Qui Nhon was called a response to more generalized VC terrorism. The major purposes of the bombing program, however, were:

a. To promote a settlement. The program was designed (1) to influence the DRV to negotiate (explicitly or otherwise), and (2) to provide us with a bargaining counter within negotiations.

b. To interdict infiltration. The program was calculated to reduce the flow of men and supplies from the North to the South -- at the least, to put a ceiling on the size of war that the enemy could wage in the South. [Author's Note: This is not entirely accurate; interdiction did not become a program rationale within the Administration until late March, and publicly not until late April (see Sections VIII and XI.B.)] Supplemental purposes of the program were (c) to demonstrate to South Vietnam, North Vietnam and the world the U.S. commitment to see this thing through, (d) to raise morale in South Vietnam by punishing North Vietnam, the source of the suffering in the South, and (e) to reduce criticism of the Administration from advocates of a bombing program.

2. Achievement of major purposes. The potential targets, targets struck and per cent of destruction are shown at Tab A. In terms of the purposes of the program, its results have been as follows:

a. To promote a settlement. Obviously, this objective has not yet been attained. We recognized at the start of the program, as we do now, that the influence of the bombing on a settlement would not be great until the North Vietnamese had been disappointed in their hopes for a quick military success in the South. There is no doubt that the bombing program has become an important counter in the current tacit and explicit bargaining process and will be an important counter in any future bargaining.

b. To interdict infiltration. It is believed that regular North Vietnamese units now in South Vietnam (estimated to be one
division) require about 4 tons of supplies daily for the 'current' level of combat but would require 67 tons of supplies daily for 'light' combat. ('Current' levels are operations conducted largely in small units; 'light' combat would involve larger elements in action on the average of every third day, with expenditures of one-third of each unit's basic load of ammunition on each action.) It is believed that regular North Vietnamese units and Pathet Lao forces in the Laos Panhandle require about 21 and 51 tons daily respectively for the two levels of combat. Viet Cong arms, ammunition and other supply requirements are estimated at 8 tons daily for 'current' combat and 115 tons for 'light' combat. The effect of the interdiction program on the movement of supplies is summarized below:

The 440-ton per day rail traffic from Hanoi south to Vinh has been cut off at Ninh Binh (40 miles south of Hanoi). Supplies still move by sea and over the parallel highway system. The latter has been badly damaged and is subject to armed reconnaissance; sea traffic into SVN is under surveillance. At a minimum, supply is slower and less regular and delivered at increased cost in resources and energy expended. Roads into Laos have been subjected to similar interdiction and armed reception. Only limited interdiction has been imposed on the key rail and road net northwest of Hanoi, and none on the railway net northeast of Hanoi; and port destruction has been minimal. Thus, substantially uninterrupted supply continues from China by rail into Hanoi and by sea into Haiphong to meet major North Vietnamese military, industrial and civilian needs.

The effect of the bombing on military operations is estimated to have been as follows:

(1) For regular North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao forces.
The interdiction program has caused North Vietnam increasing difficulty in supplying their units in Laos and South Vietnam. How severe this difficulty is or how stretched North Vietnam's supply capabilities are cannot be estimated precisely. Our interdiction efforts may have either prevented or deterred the North from sending more troops than they already have. The interdiction programs in North Vietnam and Laos also may have influenced a Communist decision to forego a 1965 offensive in Laos.

(2) For Viet Cong forces. Because the VC require significantly less infiltrated arms and ammunition and other supplies than do the North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao forces, the interdiction program probably has had less of an adverse effect on their operations. By raising VC fears concerning adequacy of supplies, however, the program may have caused the VC summer offensive to be less intense, aggressive and unrelenting than it would otherwise have been.
It should be noted that the program has not been a 'strategic' bombing program; it has been limited to selected targets of fairly direct military relevance. Populations and targets such as dikes and basic industries have not been struck. Furthermore, the immediate vicinities of Hanoi and Haiphong have been avoided, partly because the targets there are primarily of the 'strategic' type and partly because strikes there would involve even more serious risks of confrontations with the Soviet Union and China.

3. Other effects of the program.

a. Deterrence of VC terrorism. There is no evidence that strikes against North Vietnam have affected one way or another the level or kind of VC incidents of terror in South Vietnam.

b. Morale in South Vietnam. Morale in South Vietnam was raised by the initiation of the bombing program (as, later, by the deployment of additional troops). Now -- with the bombing programs having become commonplace and with the failure of the situation to improve -- morale in South Vietnam is not discernibly better than it was before the bombing program began. In a sense, South Vietnam is now 'addicted' to the program; a permanent abandonment of the program would have a distinct depressing effect on morale in South Vietnam.

c. Reduction of criticism of the Administration. Some critics, who advocated bombing, were silenced; others are now as vocal or more vocal because the program has been too limited for their taste. The program has generated a new school of criticism among liberals and 'peace' groups, whose activities have been reflected especially in teach-ins and newspaper criticisms.

d. Damage to peaceful image of the US. The price paid for improving our image as a guarantor has been damage to our image as a country which eschews armed attacks on other nations. The hue and cry correlates with the kind of weapons (e.g., bombs vs. napalm), the kind of targets (e.g., bridges vs. people), the location of targets (e.g., south vs. north), and not least the extent to which the critic feels threatened by Asian communism (e.g., Thailand vs. the UK). Furthermore, for a given level of bombing, the hue and cry is less now than it was earlier, perhaps to some extent helped by Communist intransigence toward discussions. The objection to our 'warlike' image and the approval of our fulfilling our commitments competes in the minds of many nations (and individuals) in the world, producing a schizophrenia. Within such allied countries as UK and Japan, popular antagonism to the bombings per se, fear of escalation and belief that the bombings are the main obstacle to negotiation, have created political problems for the governments in their support of US policy.
e. Pressures to settle. More countries are now, as a consequence of the bombing program, more interested in taking steps to help bring the war to an end.

f. Impact on US-Soviet detente. The bombing program -- because it appears to reject the policy of 'peaceful co-existence,' because it involves an attack on a 'fellow socialist country,' because the Soviet people have vivid horrible memories of air bombing, because it challenges the USSR as she competes with China for leadership of the Communist world, and because US and Soviet arms are now striking each other in North Vietnam -- has strained the US-Soviet detente, making constructive arms-control and other cooperative programs more difficult. How serious this effect will be and whether the detente can be revived depend on how far we carry our military actions against the North and how long the campaign continues. At the same time, the bombing program offers the Soviet Union an opportunity to play a role in bringing peace to Vietnam, by gaining credit for persuading us to terminate the program. There is a chance that the scenario could spin out this way; if so, the effect of the entire experience on the US-Soviet detente could be a net plus.

g. Risk of escalation. The bombing program -- especially as strikes move toward Hanoi and toward China and as encounters with Soviet/Chinese SAMs/MIGs occur -- may increase the risk of escalation into a broader war.

4. The future of the program. Even with hindsight, I believe the decision to bomb the DRV was wise and I believe the program should be continued. The future program should:

a. Emphasize the threat. It should be structured to capitalize on fear of future attacks. At any time, 'pressure' on the DRV depends not upon the current level of bombing but rather upon the credible threat of future destruction which can be avoided by agreeing to negotiate or agreeing to some settlement in negotiations.

b. Minimize the loss of DRV 'face.' The program should be designed to make it politically easy for the DRV to enter negotiations and to make concessions during negotiations. It may be politically easier for North Vietnam to accept negotiations and/or to make concessions at a time when bombing of their territory is not currently taking place.

c. Optimize interdiction vs. political costs. Interdiction should be carried out so as to maximize effectiveness and to minimize the political repercussions from the methods used. Physically, it makes no difference whether a rifle is interdicted on its way
into North Vietnam, on its way out of North Vietnam, in Laos or in South Vietnam. But different amounts of effort and different political prices may be paid depending on how and where it is done. The critical variables in this regard are (1) the type of targets struck (e.g., port facilities involving civilian casualties vs. isolated bridges), (2) type of aircraft (e.g., B-52s vs. F-105s), (3) kind of weapons (e.g., napalm vs. ordinary bombs), (4) location of target (e.g., in Hanoi vs. Laotian border area), and (5) the accompanying declaratory policy (e.g., unlimited vs. a defined interdiction zone).

d. Coordinate with other influences on the DRV. So long as full victory in the South appears likely, the effect of the bombing program in promoting negotiations or a settlement will probably be small. The bombing program now and later should be designed for its influence on the DRV at that unknown time when the DRV becomes more optimistic about what they can achieve in a settlement acceptable to us than about what they can achieve by continuation of the war.

e. Avoid undue risks and costs. The program should avoid bombing which runs a high risk of escalation into war with the Soviets or China and which is likely to appall allies and friends.
FOOTNOTES

1. JCSM 460-64, 30 May 1964, TOP SECRET; JCS 2343/383-2, 24 August 1964, TOP SECRET. (Subsequently, of course, the list grew to comprise many hundreds of targets.)

2. JCSM 716-64, 26 August 1965, TOP SECRET; CM 124-64, 9 September 1964, TOP SECRET.

3. These recommendations were made orally to the SecDef on 1 November, and subsequently formalized in JCSM 933-64, 4 November 1964, TOP SECRET.

4. Draft NSAM on Southeast Asia, 29 November 1964, TOP SECRET.

5. JCSM 955-64, 14 November 1964, TOP SECRET; and JCSM 982-64, 23 November 1964, TOP SECRET.

6. See JCS 2339/164, 12 December 1964, TOP SECRET.

7. In this connection, it may be noted that the small expansion of the U.S. military contingent in South Vietnam that occurred during 1964, from 16,000 to 23,000 men, did not take place until after the election.

8. A U.S. officer's billet in the heart of Saigon which was bombed by the VC with the loss of two Americans killed and 63 injured. It was precisely the type of incident which seemed to fall within the Phase I guidelines as to what would justify a reprisal. The JCC recommended such a reprisal (JCSM 1076-64, 24 December 1964, TOP SECRET), but the timing was unpropitious—with Saigon in the throes of a political crisis and Washington disinclined to launch a reprisal strike on a Christmas day.

9. JCSM 1074-64, 24 December 1964, TOP SECRET.


13. 1 October 1964 SNIE 53-2-64, The Situation in South Vietnam, TOP SECRET.

14. 4 February 1965 SNIE 53-65, Short Term Prospects in SVN, TOP SECRET.

15. Memorandum to the President from McGeorge Bundy re The Situation in Vietnam, dated February 7, 1965 (TOP SECRET).
16. 9 October 1964 SNIE 10-3-64, Probable Communist Reactions... (TOP SECRET).

17. 18 February 1965 SNIE 10-3/1-65, Communist Reactions to Possible U.S. Courses of Action Against North Vietnam, (TOP SECRET).

18. 2 June 1965, SNIE 10-6-65, Probable Communist Reactions... (TOP SECRET, SENSITIVE).


20. Memorandum for the Secretary, "Notes on the South Vietnamese Situation and Alternatives, 6 January 1965 (TOP SECRET).


22. Saigon 2086, 8 January 1965 (TOP SECRET).


24. Deputy SecDef Cyrus Vance assured the CJCS, in a Memorandum dated 4 February 1965, that their views "will be given the fullest consideration in determining future courses of action."

25. CINCPAC Frag Order Mr. 2 18 Sept. 1964 TOP SECRET.

CINCPAC Frag Order Mr. 3 28 Oct. 1964 TOP SECRET.

26. Appendix B to JCSM-70-65, 29 Jan 65 TOP SECRET.

27. JCS 1287 to CINCPAC (J-3 sends) 14 Nov 64 TOP SECRET.

28. JCS 4244 to CINCPAC 28 Jan 65 TOP SECRET LIMITS.

29. JCS 4434 to CINCPAC 3 Feb 65 TOP SECRET.

30. JCS 4484 to CINCPAC 3 Feb 65 TOP SECRET.

31. CINCPAC to CINCPACFLT, CINCPACAF and COMUSMACV 4 Feb 65 TOP SECRET LIMITS.

32. JCSM 70-65, 29 Jan 65, Appendix B TOP SECRET.

33. CINCPAC 4312 to CINCPAC 4 Feb 65 SECRET.

34. Saigon 2762 (7) March 1965 TOP SECRET EXDIS.

36. CINCPAC to CINCPACFLT 5 Feb 65 SECRET LMDIS; J-3M 181-65 from Director of Ops, Joint Staff to Military Assistant SecDef, dated 9 Feb 65. SECRET

37. Jacob Von Staaveren, USAF Plans and Operations in Southeast Asia, 1965, p. 7 (TOP SECRET). To the consternation of careful U.S. target planners, Air Vice Marshal Nguyen Cao Ky who led the VNAF attack, in a last-second switch, dumped his flight's bomb loads on an unassigned target in the Vinh Linh area, in order, as he later explained, to avoid colliding with USAF aircraft which, he claimed, were striking his originally assigned target when his flight arrived over the target area. CINCPAC 100100 February to JCS, TOP SECRET.


39. See p. 30 below.


41. Ibid., p. 239.

42. Ibid., p. 239.


48. CIA-IM "Free World Reaction to the Vietnamese Air Strikes" 9 Feb 1965 CONFIDENTIAL.

49. SNIE 10-3-64, 9 Oct 1964 TOP SECRET

50. Foreign Broadcast Information Division, Special Memorandum, 10 Feb 1965, p. 3, CONFIDENTIAL.

51. Ibid., p. 1.

52. Ibid., p. 4.

53. Memorandum to the President from McGeorge Bundy, Re: The Situation in Vietnam, February 7, 1965 TOP SECRET

54. Saigon 2445, February 9, 1965, TOP SECRET EXDIS

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55. Saigon 2445, February 9, 1965. TOP SECRET EXDIS

56. Saigon 2536, February 12, 1965 TOP SECRET EXDIS

57. Saigon 2495, February 11, 1965 TOP SECRET EXDIS

58. CINCPAC 170217 Feb to JCS TOP SECRET

59. Memorandum to the SecDef JCSM-100-65, February 11, 1965, TOP SECRET SENSITIVE

60. Van Staaveren, op.cit., p. 10.


62. Deptel 1718 to Saigon, Feb 13, 1965 TOP SECRET NODIS

63. Made at the close of an address before the National Industrial Conference Board at Washington, D. C., on Feb 17 (White House press release).


64. Saigon 2583, Feb 14, 1965 TOP SECRET NODIS

65. Deptel 1268 to Bangkok Feb 18, 1965 TOP SECRET NODIS (also sent to Vientiane, Canberra, Wellington, Tokyo, Seoul, Taipei, Manila; Info CINCPAC, Saigon, London)

66. Saigon 2665, Feb 19, 1965 TOP SECRET

67. Deptel Bangkok 1270, Feb 19, 1965 TOP SECRET

68. Deptel 1744 for Ambassador from Secretary, Feb 17, 1965 TOP SECRET NODIS

69. Memocon "Conversation with Lord Harlech, British Ambassador", Feb 19, 1965 TOP SECRET

70. Moscow 2430 to SecState, Feb 19, 1965 TOP SECRET

71. Deptel 2268 to Moscow, Feb 20, 1968 TOP SECRET NODIS

72. Deptel 1783 to Saigon, Feb 20, 1965 TOP SECRET NODIS

73. Deptel 5327 to London, Feb 24, 1965 TOP SECRET NODIS

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74. The ROLLING THUNDER Program: JCS Proposals and Implementation, Feb 20-Jun 3, 1965 TOP SECRET

75. Deptel 4444 to Paris, Feb 25, 1965 SECRET EXDIS


78. Ibid.


81. Moscow 2569 to SecState, March 2, 1965 SECRET NODIS

82. B-52's on Guam were alerted but not used. See Van Staaveren, op. cit., p. 13.

83. Memorandum for the SecDef. CM-446-65, 23 February 1965 SECRET.

84. Memorandum for General Wheeler from Military Assistant to SecDef, March 2, 1965 SECRET.

85. CJCS Memorandum for the SecDef, CM-469-65, 10 March 1965 TOP SECRET.

86. Memorandum from Secretary of the Air Force to SecDef, "Report of USAF Combat Operations in SEA", May 22, 1965 SECRET.

87. JCS 6692 (JCS send) to CINCPAC, 9 March 1965 TOP SECRET.

88. As noted by McNamara's hand on McNaughton Memorandum to SecDef, Subject: "Use of Napalm Against NVN Targets", 9 March 1965 TOP SECRET.

89. Saigon 2889 to SecState, March 8, 1965 SECRET NODIS.

90. Saigon 2888 to SecState, March 8, 1965 TOP SECRET NODIS.

91. Deptel 1975 to Saigon, March 12, 1965 TOP SECRET EXDIS.

92. Saigon 2949 to SecState, March 13, 1965 TOP SECRET EXDIS.

93. COMUSMACV Situation Report, appended as Tab B to Report of General H. K. Johnson, Army C/S to SecDef et al. 14 March 1965, Subject: "Vietnam Trip 5-12 March 1965" TOP SECRET.
94. DEF 6181 to Saigon March 2, 1965 TOP SECRET NODIS.
95. CINCPAC 262155 February 1965 to CJCS TOP SECRET. See also CINCPAC 050400 March 1965 to Gen. Westmoreland from Sharp TOP SECRET.
96. C/S Army Report to SecDef, March 14, 1965 TOP SECRET.
97. JCS 7484 to CINCPAC (JCS send) 20 March 1965, TOP SECRET SENSITIVE EXDIS.
98. Deptel 3000 to Saigon March 16, 1965 TOP SECRET EXDIS.
99. CM-438-65 to the SecDef, 19 February 1965 SECRET.
100. SecDef Memo to CJCS, 27 February 1965 SECRET.
101. COMUSMACV MAC J31 7315 March 10, 1965 TOP SECRET
102. Deptel 809 to Vientiane, March 20, 1965 TOP SECRET LIMDIS.
103. CINCPAC 210525 March 1965 to JCS TOP SECRET LIMDIS.
104. Van Staaveren, op.cit., p. 22.
105. JCSM-221-65, 27 March 1965 TOP SECRET SENSITIVE
109. CINCPAC 310407 March 1965 to JCS TOP SECRET.
110. National Security Action Memorandum No. 328, April 6, 1965 TOP SECRET.
114. Joint Defense/State cable to Ambassador Taylor from Asst. Sec'y McNaughton, dated April 18, 1965 TOP SECRET.

115. Address made before the American Society of International Law at Washington, D. C. (Department of State Press Release 82).

116. In his "Key Elements" Memorandum (see Sections IX A and D).

117. See Evans and Novack, op.cit., p. 547.


119. Saigon 3632 to SecState, May 4, 1965 SECRET LD/DIS.

120. Memo TS #185843-c, revised April 22, 1965 TOP SECRET.

121. JCSM-275-65 to SecDef, 14 April 1965 TOP SECRET.

122. CM-500-65 to SecDef, 6 May 1965 TOP SECRET; the Joint Chiefs continued to urge throughout May and June that attacks be authorized against the SA-2 sites near Hanoi as well as against IL-28's and MIG's at Phuc Yen. But since the SAM's had not then interfered with US operations, and since Ambassador Johnson, with General Westmoreland's concurrence, recommended against striking the IL-28's, Secretary McNamara disapproved (Memo for CJCS from SecDef., 15 June 1965 TOP SECRET).

123. Deptel 2553 to Saigon, May 10, 1965 TOP SECRET NODIS.

124. Saigon 3731 to SecState, May 11, 1965 TOP SECRET NODIS.

125. Deptel 2557 to Saigon, May 11, 1965 TOP SECRET NODIS.

126. DEF001900 SEC DEF SENDS, 11 May 1965, TOP SECRET LMDIS.

127. Deptel 2565 to Saigon, May 12, 1965 TOP SECRET NODIS.

128. Deptel 3101 to Moscow (Info. to Saigon) May 11, 1965 TOP SECRET NODIS ( Strictly Eyes Only for Ambassadors from Secretary).

129. Deptel 3104 to Moscow, May 11, 1965 (Info Saigon) TOP SECRET NODIS ( Strictly Eyes Only for Ambassadors from Secretary).

130. Made before the Association of American Editorial Cartoonists at the White House on May 13 (White House press release; as-delivered text).

131. Moscow 3378 to SecState, May 12, 1965 TOP SECRET NODIS.
132. Deptel 3105 to Moscow (also transmitted London for Secretary's eyes only) May 12, 1965 TOP SECRET NODIS.

133. Moscow 3393 to SecState May 13, 1965 TOP SECRET.

134. Moscow 3391 to SecState (Info London, for Secretary's eyes only) May 12, 1965 TOP SECRET NODIS.

135. Moscow 3394 to SecState (Info London for Secretary's eyes only) May 13, 1965 TOP SECRET NODIS.

136. Moscow 3425 to SecState (Info Vienna for Secretary's eyes only) May 14, 1965 TOP SECRET NODIS.

137. Saigon 4064 to SecState, June 6, 1965 TOP SECRET EXDIS.

138. Saigon 3781 to SecState, May 16, 1965 TOP SECRET NODIS.

139. Moscow 3395 to SecState (Info to London - eyes only for Secretary) May 13, 1965 SECRET NODIS.

140. Moscow 3416 to SecState, May 14, 1965 SECRET NODIS.

141. Vienna 29 to SecState (For Undersecretary from the Secretary) May 15, 1965 SECRET NODIS.

142. Deptel 7323 to London (1211 to Ottawa) from Secretary to Ambassadors May 17, 1965 TOP SECRET NODIS.

143. Moscow 3444 to SecState, May 17, 1965 TOP SECRET NODIS. Deptel 3171 to Moscow, May 17, 1965 TOP SECRET NODIS.

144. Deptel 2425 to New Delhi (From Secretary to Ambassadors) May 18, 1965 SECRET NODIS.

145. Saigon 4083 to SecState, June 6, 1965 CONFIDENTIAL LIMDIS.

146. Deptel 3696 to Bonn, June 9, 1965 TOP SECRET EXDIS.

147. JCS 002230 to CINCPAC (JCS send), 171201Z May 1965 TOP SECRET.

148. Memorandum to the Secretary from W. W. Rostow, May 20, 1965 SECRET.

149. Memorandum to the Secretary from W. W. Rostow, "An Electric Power Cut-through in North Vietnam", April 1, 1965 SECRET.

150. COMUSMACV 16006 (from MAC J-312) to CINCPAC, May 14, 1965 TOP SECRET.
151. JCS 002249 (JCS send) to CINCPAC, CINCSAC, COMUSMACV, 17 May 1965
TOP SECRET.

152. Memoranda for the SecDef CM-534-65, 6 April 1965; JCSM 498-65,
2 July 1965 TOP SECRET.

153. Memorandum for the JCS, CSAF M-105-65, 30 June 1965 TOP SECRET.