FIVE LESSONS
OF A GREAT VICTORY
(WINTER 1966 - SPRING 1967)

FOREIGN LANGUAGES PUBLISHING HOUSE
HANOI — 1967
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THE WINTER 1966 - SPRING 1967 VICTORY AND FIVE LESSONS CONCERNING THE CONDUCT OF MILITARY STRATEGY

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After the heavy failure of their Winter 1965-Spring 1966 strategic counter-offensive unleashed with 200,000 G.I.'s, half a million puppet troops and 28,000 of U.S. satellite countries, 2,300 aircraft, 1,200 guns, 1,400 tanks and armoured cars and 50 warships, the U.S. imperialists launched their second strategic counter-offensive in Winter 1966-Spring 1967 with 410,000 American troops, some 500,000 of the Saigon army, 54,000 of satellite countries, 4,300 aircraft, 2,300 heavy guns, 3,300 tanks and armoured cars and 203 warships. Such an effective strength and materials were concentrated in South Viet Nam with an area of less than 170,000 square kilometres. Compared with the previous counter-offensive, this one, that we related in A great victory, sustained a much more bitter fiasco.
In this booklet, Truong Son, a famous military commentator in South Viet Nam, puts forward a few experiences on the conduct of the military strategy of the South Viet Nam Liberation Armed Forces during the recent Winter-Spring campaign.

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THE WINTER 1966 - SPRING 1967 VICTORY
AND FIVE LESSONS CONCERNING
THE CONDUCT OF MILITARY STRATEGY

by TRUONG SON

Having sustained a staggering initial blow in the 1965-1966 dry season and other bitter setbacks in the ensuing rainy season in both parts of our country, Johnson and McNamara, though still shutting their eyes to hard facts, could not help being aware of the following:

— Far from faring smoothly, U.S. strategy of "limited war" of aggression waged with American expeditory troops as the main force, had made heavy weather of a time beset with difficulties and complexities.

— In execution of the said strategy, the lightning war and lightning victory policy had proved, through the test of time, devoid of any sound basis.

— The temporary elation generated by the introduction of the U.S. expeditory force to rescue the Saigon army in 1965 had evaporated and given way to a nightmare
haunting the American imperialists, now confronted with
thorny problems. What are the prospects of the war in
South Viet Nam? How to bring it to a military victory?
How to accomplish the political task in South Viet
Nam? What to do in the immediate future? and so on
and so forth.

In such a situation, though already somewhat disap­
pointed, the Americans still showed obduracy and hoped
for a military solution; at the beginning of the 1966-
1967 dry season they firmly decided to launch another
strategic counter-offensive involving two and half times
more troops, two to three times more war materials—
firepower included—and financial resources than in the
previous dry season.

Their strategic objectives this time were basically
similar to those which had been set forth by West­
moreland's five-point strategy save for some ways and
means regarding the methods of execution and the
extent to which their forces would be used. One point,
however, arrested attention, namely, the Americans'
big ambition to win far-reaching "search and destroy"
and "pacification" successes to pave the way for deci­
sive victories in a short period.

Thus, the aggressors hatched wicked and perfidious
schemes, commanded a tremendous troop strength and
exerted strenuous efforts to realize very big ambitions.
But Greek meets Greek and diamond cut diamond.

On their part, the armed forces and people of South
Viet Nam, led by the N.F.L. Central Committee, had
taken a decision of a strategic character which found its
expression in these basic objectives:

- Resolutely to defeat one million American puppet troops, to foil their so-called "two-strategy" and smash their second strategic counter-offensive.

- To aggravate the U.S.-puppets' loss of initiative and impasse and afflict it with new elements of a greater defeat.

- To create for themselves a new strategic situation, enabling them to forge ahead and win more important victories.

Driven by the momentum of their successes in the
previous dry and rainy seasons, holding firm the initia­
tive, and thanks to the close co-ordination and wholehearted aid of the army and people in the Winter­
campaign with impetuous enthusiasm, swearing to overcome all difficulties and trials, to translate grim determination into major victories in a bitter struggle of strength with one million adverse troops.

Another dry season has come to a close with the result, heavy losses for the enemy and big successes for us. This has hardened our resolve and will, increased our stamina and strengthened our position; the situation is just the opposite on the other side.

With not a very large territory and not a very large population we have checked one million U.S., puppet and satellite troops, thus tilting the balance of power still more in our favour. How far-reaching is such a victory and how important, its significance?
If one analyses this correlation of forces from the bourgeois military viewpoint or from any other outmoded one and according to formal logic, one would hardly understand why we have succeeded, whereas with one million men, a tremendous firepower, a modern material and technique, considerable and up-to-date means of transport at their disposal, the Americans have failed—both politically and militarily, strategically as well as tactically, in the South just as in the North. The main failure of the United States resides in the fact that after two years of confrontation with us and two successive dry seasons, the “limited war” strategy has landed it in a grave impasse. The U.S. aggressors, who were for a moment so pleased with the idea of the “limited war” have now to swallow a bitter pill.

The statistical figures given by the State Department itself and information from various Western circles, though still very remote from the truth, largely suffice to illustrate the U.S. failure. Let us mention the following few points:

— The more the G.I.’s were brought into the longer the American casualty list became. From an average of 25 per cent in 1966, the casualty ratio rose to 74 per cent in 1967. Apart from the number of bodies blown to pieces, lost or left behind on the battlefield, on the average, the Americans had to carry home 175 corpses every week. According to the statistics for the first three months of this current year, the monthly number of U.S. troops killed or injured ranged from 6,000 to 8,000 which means an annual toll of 70,000 to 100,000 U.S. troops were knocked out not just individually but by the company, the battalion, the combat team, and the Americans themselves have admitted that after the Tay Ninh operation their 196th Infantry Brigade “had gone back to the drawing board”, and that its commander—General De Saussure—had been dismissed while on the field (AP, UPI, AFP).

— The introduction of U.S. forces accelerated the weakening and disintegration of the Saigon army. On the basis of on-the-spot investigations the U.S. Senate Armed Forces Commission placed the number of puppet deserters in 1966 at 120,000 whereas another Western source put it at 180,000.

At the recent Guam Conference Westmoreland himself acknowledged that only 7 out of the existing 150 puppet battalions were combat fit. Thus, the Americans have come to the conclusion that the Saigon army is a shaky one, incapable of both strategic offensive and strategic defensive. In fact, this army is mainly assigned to the “pacification” task and still they repose no confidence in its ability to bring it to fruition.

— With U.S. forces directly committed to South Viet Nam, the political position of the Americans here sensibly deteriorated. Also according to a report of the U.S. Senate Armed Forces Commission*, the “Viet Cong” still control 80 per cent of the territory. Nguyen Van Thieu stated of late that the elections to village councils would take place only in one-third of

South Viet Nam villages. Lodge, Lansdale and the bulk of the American responsible officials have been removed from office for a reason known to all, viz, the failure of the "pacification" program and the serious worsening of the political situation in the South Viet Nam urban centres. All this testifies to the frustration of the hope pinned by Washington on the "limited war" to improve the political situation in the southern part of our country, and to the fact that the more it attempts to do so, the further the situation deteriorates. Antagonism between the American aggressors and the Vietnamese people goes on deepening and widening. The internal contradiction plaguing the Saigon army and administration has become a sort of chronic, incurable disease: rivals wrangle with one another all the year round in the face of their U.S. bosses.

Since the introduction of the expeditionary force the economic situation in the occupied zones has kept declining and inflation has been considered serious by American sources. In 1967 Saigon has to import one million tons of rice; the cost of living has been steadily soaring up, industry has been at a standstill, culture and customs have been degenerating, and so on. This eloquently demonstrates that, after two years of the U.S. "limited war", Saigon's economy has grown much worse. This constitutes a bitter failure of Washington's neo-colonialist policy in the economic field and a major danger for the United States.

The "Vietcong's backbone", i.e., the Liberation war forces, American correspondents also say, instead of being broken, has been strengthened, while the guerillas and militia have constantly been growing and numbered probably some hundred thousand. This is like a thorn in the U.S. aggressors' side.

— After two years of the U.S. air war of destruction also according to Western and American news agencies comments, the people in North Viet Nam have stiffened their resolve, closed more tightly their ranks round the Viet Nam Workers' Party, the D.R.V.N. Government and venerable President Ho Chi Minh, and given more substantial, more effective assistance to the South Viet Nam revolution.

Such is the picture of the U.S. military, political and economic situation in South Viet Nam drawn after data provided by American and Western news agencies. Such are the significance and character of the U.S. setbacks in the current dry season. Nevertheless, the aggressors remain stubborn and brutal and are still contriving cunning schemes. We should therefore stand ready for a hard, arduous and protracted struggle to achieve complete victory. However, the prospects of such a victory are opened more clearly than at any preceding period.

Our successes in Winter 1966 and Spring 1967 and their significance were as great as the enemy's failures were heavy.

According to incomplete figures, from early October 1966 to late March 1967, the L.A.F. wiped out more than 150,000 officers and men (not counting 60,000 puppet deserters), over half of them being American and satellite troops, some 40 infantry and artillery battalions and tank and armoured squadrons, over 200
To us this victory has demonstrated that the absolute political superiority of the South Viet Nam revolution has been preserved and developed most powerfully, that the absolute moral superiority of the people and the Liberation Armed Forces has stood the trial of strength with the enemy more steadfastly than at any other time. It has also shown us that in face of a million strong army and a huge mass of steel, we were capable of attacking them with great effectiveness, of holding our initiative in strategy, operational conduct and fighting, and of winning the control of the battlefield with original combat methods. And this explains why the longer we fight, the stronger we grow. Clearly, our dry-season victory has created a steady political and strategic situation fraught with new elements, new possibilities, new premises for us to surely secure much bigger successes although we have to struggle hard and relentlessly against the adversary's wicked and perfidious manoeuvres in the days ahead.

We have relied on the unshakable determination of an entire people to vanquish the U.S.-puppet modern professional army of one million men. Over the past months our compatriots all over the country, particularly those in the South, our cadres and combatants clinching their teeth, have been undergoing countless trials and sufferings, and struggling most heroically in this grand test of strength. They have not recoiled from any difficulty and sacrifice, deeply conscious that in face of foreign invasion they would lose everything — from the most common up to the noblest and the most
should they fail to safeguard their motherland.

President Ho Chi Minh said: "Nothing is more precious than independence and freedom."

That is a lofty thought, the expression of our people's most profound feelings and most cherished aspirations handed down by our ancestors from generation to generation.

It reflects an established law governing the existence and the development of our people who, through the thousand years of their glorious history and its numerous ups and downs, have never failed to meet and drive out foreign invaders wherever they came from.

Our people's determination is possessed of a powerful reality and an inexhaustible potential as nowadays it built on ardent and thoroughly revolutionary patriotism combined with genuine internationalism. That foremost motive force pushing forward the South Viet Nam revolution. Our victory in the Winter of 1966 and Spring of 1967 was above all a triumph of determination over the enemy's.

Not only were we resolved, we also knew how to wage war and to fight well. We waged military and political struggle and merged these two forms of struggle into an all-around strategy, arising from the nature and characteristics of U.S. imperialist policy, on the one hand, and of the Viet Nam revolution, on the other, at the same time and properly old and new experiences to the present situation, we devised original, unique combat methods. We could thus solve many problems in a creative manner, such as to map out our military strategy and tactics, the principles governing the use of armed forces, the relation between the three categories of armed forces and the three kinds of theatres of operations (rural areas, urban centres, hill and forest regions), how to organize our forces and array them on the battlefields, how to win the control of these and win successes, and so on. All that was made possible by the fact that we based ourselves on the realities of South Viet Nam, we grasped the laws ruling the development of the South Viet Nam society, revolutionary insurrections and people's war. That was because we made a combined use of these laws, which allowed us to bring into full play their individual effects and their interaction, thereby creating a situation in which the South Viet Nam revolution could advance steadily, powerfully and by great strides. We also grasped the peculiarities of neo-colonialism and correctly appraised the capabilities of the American forces. Our Winter-Spring victory, therefore, constitutes the outcome of a correct strategy and the clever execution of this strategy. This explains why with one million troops at their disposal, the U.S. imperialists were deprived of freedom of action and were unable to regain military initiative nor to dominate the battlefield, a thing that they will not be in a position to realize in the future. We gradually reduced their combat and operational effectiveness and prevented their huge build-up from attaining the strategic effect that they wanted to achieve by means of thrusts around us, major engagements of a strategic
character, counter-offensive and “pacification” operations, encirclements and splitting thrusts, terrorist and nibbling raids, and so forth. As a result, we have driven them into a more and more defensive position and inflicted upon them ever more bitter failures.

As for us, we embarked on the Winter-Spring campaign from a firm strategic position and maintained our initiative on the battlefield, thereby having the objective possibility of acting as we wished and fighting in our own way while forcing the enemy to accept battles of our choice. Consequently, we progressively increased our operational and strategic effectiveness.

A question of great importance has recently arisen regarding strategical conduct: which side would secure the initiative of action on the battlefield and control on both the military and political planes? For he who gained the upper hand on this point would win. A close contest took place and it turned out that we won and are now in a winning position.

In view of the above we can safely conclude that our strategy and our fighting methods have triumphed over the enemy.

Once again our Winter 1966-Spring 1967 victory tested to the correctness of our political and military and the firm determination of our people and armed forces. It also demonstrates the effectiveness of our fighting methods, and the close, all-sided co-ordination of our big rear and our big front. Our victory is linked with the wholehearted support and assistance of the socialist countries, of our friends all over the world. With this great victory we have considerably steered ourselves and grown up; we have also acquired valuable experiences that should be summed up.

I — TO ASCERTAIN THE ENEMY’S STRATEGIC INTENTIONS, CORRECTLY TO ASSESS HIS RULES OF ACTION AND HIS CAPABILITIES IN ORDER TO DEFINE OUR OWN STRATEGIC INTENTIONS AND COMBAT METHODS

To know the enemy and ourselves is a principle which any belligerent should abide by to secure victory in a war. In South Vietnam, and specifically during the Winter of 1966 and the Spring of 1967, this principle required that we should, first and foremost, ascertain the adversary’s strategic intentions, be aware of his rules of action and capabilities. Only by so doing could we accurately define our own strategic intentions. For prior to any engagement, operation or campaign, the first thing that the command at all levels normally has to do is to know exactly the enemy’s situation and relying on past experiences and on all data available ascertain his schemes, the way in which he carries out his activities, and his capabilities.

For this purpose, right since Summer 1966, the N.F.L., the L.A.F., Command and Front bodies at various levels, had been focusing their attention on
studying the enemy situation in various respects. We had in the main accurately appraised our opponent’s strategic scheme and rules of action.

I. We had accurately appraised the strategic objective that the enemy was determined to attain.

In Spring 1966 we had already foreseen that in the 1965-1966 dry season the adversary would certainly meet with heavy setbacks and that in the following rainy season he would carry out routine activities to prepare for a large-scale counter-offensive in the 1966-1967 dry season, involving probably up to one million American, puppet and satellite troops, among them the number of G.I.'s might reach the 400,000-mark. This prediction was of great importance for the ideological preparation of all our armed forces and people just as for our organizational preparations. Though we did not anticipate all eventualities, we had already forecast right then — and it was a striking success — that, after sustaining big losses with a 700,000-strong army in the 1965-1966 dry season, the enemy could not, in the next, turn the tide in their favour even with one million men.

Beginning with the rainy season, having studied the situation in each theatre of operations and in South Viet Nam as a whole, as well as related world events, we arrived at some conclusions which formed a basis for us to ascertain the opponent’s strategic intention. They were:

First, since early 1965, i.e. from the moment the Americans launched their "limited war" of aggression and in mid-1966, the situation in South Viet Nam had been developing to our, not to their, advantage. In effect, it was unfavourable for them in the following points:

a) Politically, it went from bad to worse in spite of their efforts to improve it.

b) On the battlefield, though the Americans and their puppets had not suffered very heavy losses, they could not achieve any of their strategic objectives. The Saigon army had further weakened while the Yankees, who managed to maintain some of the expeditionary corps’ strong points and have at hand reinforcements, had slid however into a political, strategic and tactical crisis. Particularly, their lightning war and lightning victory strategy could not water any longer. Such a situation disturbed the United States conduct of the war.

c) Our armed forces and people, who had won victories over the U.S. and puppet troops from the start and grown stronger as they fought, kept the initiative and were masters of the situation on operation theatres. Against the enemy’s wish, instead of falling back to guerilla activities, all the three categories of the L.A.F. were capable of small, medium and large-scale actions, depending on the circumstances.

Second, the U.S. war of destruction in North Viet Nam had failed to reach its basic objectives whereas our resistance had been proceeding smoothly. As a result, the North Viet Nam economic and defence potential had been substantially strengthened.

Third, in the world and in the United States itself, the U.S. "limited war" of aggression and in relation to North Viet Nam, as well as the U.S. bi
his own technique, strategy and tactics, and to ours as well.

To know the rules governing his military actions we should first of all start from these points: his military, political and diplomatic intentions and strategic objectives, his armed forces and their capabilities; the over-all situation on the battlefield; our strong and weak points that are known to the enemy, and so on.

The following was a number of those rules that we had clearly gauged and ascertained:

a) Combination of the “search and destroy” and “pacification” pincers. Here in the South what the adversary calls “search and destroy” operation and “pacification” essentially means the use of both the American and puppet armed forces and military action.

These two problems related to his strategic objective had to be tackled simultaneously in the 1965-1966 dry season. Nevertheless, he then concentrated more efforts on striking at our regular forces with the hope of breaking our “backbone” first. In this dry season he was sticking to this “search and destroy” objective while paying particular attention to “pacification” and striving to better combine these two actions.

That was one of the enemy’s most important rules. His approach to the problem seemed to be correct and promising, too. But the Staley-Taylor plan was much less and much more promising, which did not prevent its ultimate failure. For, that a plan is promising for one thing, and whether it comes to fruition or not quite another thing. Besides, that “correct”

approach to the problem was something he was not happy about. For first he had to spread his forces thinner; second, his strategic objective was too vague: it did not specifically center round any thing; third, the Americans and their puppets had no definite way of utilizing their mobile and occupation forces; fourth, he would reap still worse political results while the prospect of a military victory that he would leave a stone unturned to achieve appeared to be more remote, he did not know when the U.S. expeditionary force could get out of the South Viet Nam quagmire.

Guided by such a rule, numerous, brutal and pernicious as they are, the adverse troops would use over and over again, and if need be, change their tricks and methods of which we should not underestimate the effect.

However, that rule did not spring from a strong strategic position but from a weakening strategic and political one, from a sense of frustration born of several years of repeated setbacks in their scheme of “pacifying” the countryside, and “searching and destroying” the Liberation armed forces of South Viet Nam. It would engender, as it had, many shortcomings by which we should benefit to attain our own strategic objective.

b) Combination of the offensive and the defensive.

In the previous dry season our opponent laid emphasis on the offensive while coupling it with the defensive. Now his counter-offensive strategy was to combine the offensive and the defensive in an effort to firmly strengthen the defensive, preserve his forces, bases an
defensive zones by fanning-out raids, by foiling our preparations for attacks, breaking our grip and enlarging the cordon around his bases, and at the same time to mount attacks in order to prevent or restrict our large-scale operations. Unlike the French formerly, the Americans' defensive was mobile. But after two years of confrontation their rear and rear bases enjoyed no safety and they found themselves forced to fight longer than they had expected. To adjust themselves to the situation, they resorted to new measures such as deep raids, raiding thrusts, occupation of more territory, increased prefab fortifications with a no-man's land round, etc. As to their offensive, it did not differ from the French. However, to better suit the situation they attached importance to both large and medium-sized operations, lasting for many days on end and simultaneously in several theatres. They combined pacification and defensive activities to deliver steady and strong blows, to strike after or in the course of sweeps, to hit after tightening the noose, to destroy and decimate at the same time, etc. All those tactics had been tested by the French in Indo-China and Algeria and had not staved off their failure. For they were nothing short of a passive expedient made up and as such could not help the U.S. aggressor militarily or politically.

Combination of actions inside and outside South Viet Nam to encircle and isolate it. By intensifying the war of destruction in North Viet Nam, the Americans wanted to halt the assistance provided by the big to the big front. Simultaneously, they stepped up their operations on land in the South and their air strikes against the North with their air force, navy and ground artillery in an attempt to cut the front off the rear and pin this down, hitting at both the front and the rear.

d) Combination of military, political and diplomatic actions; extension of activities in all the hill-forest, rural and urban theatres. The enemy combined his military and political counter-offensives on these three fronts and their diplomatic counter-offensive with his "peace negotiation" hoax with a view to bringing military pressure to bear on us, deceiving people politically and bribing them economically. All that in the hope of impairing our revolutionary combativeness and our people's resolve to fight.

3. Correctly to appraise the capabilities of a million-strong army to devise efficient combat methods.

Preparing to confront and fight off one million American and puppet troops, the South Viet Nam armed forces and people, with their experience in the 1965-1966 dry season and the revolutionary and scientific appraisal of the correlation of forces and both sides' strategic positions, came to the following conclusions: the enemy had very substantially increased his effectives and war materials but not his combat effectiveness; from a defensive, losing position his million-strong troops could exert no appreciable strategic effect and devise strategically effectual combat methods as they had in the European and Pacific theatres.
That the Americans had a big force at their disposal was one thing, and how they would use it, how it would fight to secure a victory of strategic significance was quite another one. Trying hard to find the causes of U.S. failures, Westmoreland himself had ascribed them to insufficient troop-strength. In the early days of this dry season, with nearly one million men available — the strength he had dreamt of — he was forced to admit that on the South Viet Nam battlefield the problem facing the United States was not just one of effective but also of fighting methods.

What then — according to the Americans' wishful thinking — should the result they had to score be like, to be regarded as a strategically significant success? What could be considered a strategic effect? Some points may be raised:

— First, the enemy did his utmost to force our regular troops back into scattered guerilla actions. For him, to materialize this intention of his would mean that strategically he would have achieved a victory after which he could end the war in terms of large-scale operations to enter into the phase of "pacification", liquidation of guerilla warfare and consolidation of his rear. And thus, on the battlefield the anxiety among the Americans and their puppets caused by the "evacuation regular forces" large-unit-operation, would be removed. Then they would be free enough to concentrate on ending guerilla warfare and to create a strategic situation in their favour so as to eventually win the initiative that they had lost. It was in view of this that the commitment of sizable forces to repeated "search and destroy" operations against our regulars in South Viet Nam's key theatres in the previous dry season and recently was regarded as aimed at an important objective.

— Second, the Americans were bent on forcing our regular forces to fight positional warfare in disadvantageous conditions so that they might bring into play their best combat methods and the superiority of their firepower and inflict heavy losses upon us. They would have thus forced us into giving battle of their choice in order to wipe out or decimate our regular troops, particularly in what they considered key theatres. They thereby wanted to change the balance of forces in their favour and pave the way for a strategic change advantageous to them in all attempts to win a decisive victory within a short time.

— Third, it was the wish of the adversary really to "pacify" a number of large zones so as to stabilize an expand his rear, while disturbing and narrowing down our own, and to consolidate his foothold with an eye to future military counter-offensives. As a result, he would have encroached upon some more territory and "caught" some more population in execution of his set plan, thereby separating our people from their armed forces in order to destroy our guerilla and other bases and to put an end to guerilla warfare. It was with this in mind that during this dry season the Americans made great exertions for the implementation of the "pacification" program, combining it with "search and destroy" operations into two large "pincers". They had pinned much hope on this program which they reckoned would
A number of Western military authorities who have studied the U.S. strategy there also hold that the way the Americans use has become a laughing stock.

In World War II, no more than six months after the deployment of their forces, Japan and Germany had, though temporarily, secured strategic victories. In the South of our country, two years after it committed its expeditionary corps the United States is still unable to attain any strategic objective. Why is that?

To answer this question one has to get at many complex underlying causes. The following are some immediate ones:

- The United States unleashed its "limited war" after the failure of its "special warfare".

- For this reason, it has been on the defensive from the very outset.

- The U.S. forces are not so strong as people think; they do have some strong points, but their weak points are many and these are important, basic ones.

The strategy of the U.S. aggressive "limited war" has to rely on two strategic forces — the American and puppet troops — the latter being too weak and, as a result, undermining the strength of the former.

- The U.S. local rear is also very weak, while its social and political bases in South Viet Nam are very shaky, the puppet administration which constitutes its prop being rotten to the core.

- The United States unleashed its "limited war" after the failure of its "special warfare".
The U.S. forces are not confronting the army of a bourgeois country, but a people's war, in a land where the armed forces and people hold a winning position and the initiative on the battlefield, and do not fight single-handed.

In the final analysis, the outcome of any war depends on two basic factors — objective laws and subjective efforts.

We may thus conclude that the American troops' strategic effectiveness in South Vietnam is crippling down by two "pincers". These are the reactionary, unjust nature of the U.S. war of aggression doomed to failure, and U.S. indifferent and faulty conduct. Such a conduct did not stem from chance but well from objective causes, which explains why the more the aggressor tried to remedy his mistakes the more errors he committed. The U.S. imperialists can land men on the moon but they will be absolutely incapable of resisting the laws of social development, or less of buying any another law with dollars to replace these.

The U.S. aggressive war is waged in a new era which witnesses a new correlation of forces in the world and in a new Viet Nam. That is why, in spite of their large number and their modern war materials and techniques, the American troops cannot bring their effectiveness to full play, for the simple reason that this effectiveness is limited by many complex factors.

Failing to realize those characteristics, one cannot possibly understand the Viet Nam situation in its essence. Lyndon B. Johnson is a United States President and Commander-in-Chief most boastful of his country's might. He himself has committed serious blunders in appraising the characteristics of the time he is living in. Hence, U.S. neo-colonialist policy and aggressive "limited war" in Viet Nam have met with one setback after another the causes of which Washington has so far been unable to determine.

II — TO MAINTAIN AND IMPROVE OUR UNRELINQUISHING OFFENSIVE POSITION, HOLD AND DEVELOP OUR INITIATIVE ON THE BATTLEFIELD AND FORCE THE ENEMY INTO FIGHTING BATTLES OF OUR CHOICE

Since the beginning of the 1966-1967 dry season while widening the target area of our actions we have been speeding up the tempo and increasing the size of our attacks on the enemy. We have also been holding and developing our control over the theatres of operations.

Here below are the prominent features of the situation on the battlefield during the dry season.

On our side, the L.A.F.'s continual offensive position and control over the battlefield kept developing evenly and in depth, leading to a series of offensive actions and counter-offensive ones with an offensive character.
from mid-October 1966 to mid-February 1967. At the same time we lured adverse troops out of their positions to hit at them, successfully countered their “search and destroy” operations, large and medium-size terrorist raids and struck them in the close vicinity of their bases just as deep in their rear. Strengthened by their earlier successes and thanks to adequate preparations in every respect — morally, organizationally and technically — the armed forces and people of South Viet Nam soon unleashed their offensive, delivering telling blows simultaneously in many theatres from Quang Tri, Thua Thien and Central Trung Bo to the Western High Plateaux, Eastern Nam Bo and the Nam Bo plains.

The offensive took place on both the military and political fronts with the participation of both our military and political forces, the three categories of the L.A.F., our three spearheads — military struggle, political struggle and agitation among enemy troops — on the hill and forest, rural and urban theatres. All people’s war methods were put into operation against all the adversary’s forces — American, puppet and satellite — to wipe them out, frustrate “pacification” activities and nibbling operations as well as to preserve and expand the liberated areas, maintain and promote the right of the population to be masters of their land.

On the adverse side more troops were committed in the dry season and deployed rather early. Instead of active fielding in all theatres as before, they carried out attacks and “pacification” activities by priority to launch large-scale “search and destroy” and “pacification” operations, in which they raided the same places again and again, and for many days running on the hills, in the forests, in the plains and around urban centres. As they had lost their strategic initiative, on the whole the trend towards the defensive all through the dry season became more obvious though they had been able at times to mount big campaigns such as Operation Junction City (Tay Ninh) to hit at us before we came into action or to cope with us as on Highway 9 (Quang Tri). The number of troops fielded in operations and “pacification” activities rose in comparison with the previous dry season operations of division-size upward also doubled within a year.

Nevertheless, the dry-season trial of strength has resulted in the South Viet Nam armed forces and people holding a firmer position in the operation theatre and a greater initiative of action. As for their opponent, he has been driven into a more defensive and puzzling situation.

From the above, the following conclusions may be drawn:

1. To attack unremittingly is the most active and the most effective method to maintain and extend our control of the battlefield. The Liberation armed forces and people are in a winning and offensive position while the Americans and their henchmen are in a losing and defensive one. Both sides are deploying large forces, both have
strategic objectives and the determination to achieve them. We have acquired many experiences and the enemy, too, is trying hard to learn his own lessons. Our struggle to maintain and promote our initiative and his efforts to wrest back his own continue unabated. Our armed forces and people in South Viet Nam hold that the adversary is bending all his energies to extend his strategic counter-offensive with very big forces in an attempt to turn the tide of the war in his favour, and that unless we resolutely attack without let-up, to keep and strengthen our control over the theatre of operations, not only shall we be unable to wipe out his forces and win ever bigger successes, but he himself will deplete our troops and drive us into a defensive position.

So, the most effective way to preserve and develop our control of the battlefield is to attack resolutely, uninteruptedly everywhere and at all times, leaving the enemy no respite to cope with our strikes.

While the strategic initiative that we have secured is the objective basis of our revolutionary war, unremitting offensive on the battlefield precisely constitutes the subjective condition for the maintenance and expansion of that strategic initiative, even in the case of the Americans bring their build-up to 400,000, 500,000 more officers and men. The strength of relentless offensive is the resultant of all our military, political and other forces on the battlefield and elsewhere, and of those of our diverse combat methods and forces being directed at maintaining and developing our initiative in our revolutionary war.

As the South Viet Nam Liberation armed forces and people's approach to the problem is correct they therefore have accurately defined their strategic objectives with a great resolve to achieve it. This also explains why they have won repeated and ever bigger victories. That was what happened on the battlefields. Did not our position of unremitting, powerful and well co-ordinated offensive above anything else in the 'dry seas' cause to one million U.S. and puppet troops numerous difficulties of a strategic character? Wasn't it true that the Americans had had to spread, very thin their considerable troop strength, that the number of their mobile forces was not proportionate to their total effectives, that the trend towards the defensive which forced them to send troops to cope with our attacks everywhere from Quang Tri and Thua Thien down to the Nam Bo plains became more and more obvious. Wasn't it true that our continually offensive position secured for the South Viet Nam armed forces and people the initiative in their operational plans? That was our big achievement in strategic and tactical conduct and execution. It bespeaks our firm grasp of the conception of active and resolute offensive in revolutionary war and revolutionary war, and reflects the close combination of the objective requirements of the South Viet Nam revolutionary war and subjective conditions, our all-out efforts to tide over every difficulty with a view to achieving ever greater victories and bringing our resistance war against U.S. aggression and national salvation to a higher stage.
To keep our forces well in hand and concentrate their activities on meeting our basic requirements in order to maintain and develop our control of the battlefield, and thereby also remain masters of the battlefield.

Second, we drove the enemy into a more disadvantageous position. To keep their opponent in a disadvantageous strategic position, the South Viet Nam Liberation armed forces and people successfully accomplished three tasks:

First, they landed him in a still more critical political situation. He had always been in an absolutely favourable political and moral position. Politically, he was faced with a crisis in South Viet Nam, in the world and in the United States itself. The morale of troops — both officers and men, American like puppet satellite — was on the downgrade. This situation necessarily sprung from the unjust character of the U.S. war of aggression and became particularly serious due to the enemy’s heavy losses on the battlefield. More and more G.I.’s corpses were brought home, more puppet troops killed and disintegrated every day. Deep contradictions besetting U.S. war escalation, political passivity and crisis had a direct and strong impact on the military field where, in fact, he met with further complications and setbacks. 

At the beginning of the dry season, the L.A.F. and people of South Viet Nam perfectly realized this very weakness of the Americans and started an all-out political and military offensive, aggravating their conditions and rendering their political position much worse than before. So long as we succeed on this front we can hold and develop our initiative on the battlefield, and thereby also remain masters of the battlefield.

Second, we drove the enemy into a more disadvantageous position. Clearly, in face of the development of the war in the southern part of our country, whatever the number of troops he fielded, he could not snatch any strategic victory. Tied down to a distressed strategic position he did not even know how to win and, in spite of his increasing build-up, always felt he ran short of effectives and strategic effectiveness. Such a state of affairs made his subjective efforts in the theatre of operations futile and pushed the U.S. war, costly in human lives and material resources, farther into the tunnel with no end in sight.

Third, we drove the U.S. tactics and operational conduct into an impasse. Over-confident in their big build-up and strong firepower, the Americans expected that their tactics and military operations would make good their defensive, faulty strategy. Indeed, they earnestly hoped that by wresting back the initiative in combat and operations they could step by step regain the strategic initiative that they had lost. So, to check and foil their operations and tactics of all types, thus endangering their tactical and operational conduct and to restrict to the minimum the combat effectiveness and operational effect of the U.S. and puppet forces would amount to frustrating their hope to be masters of the battlefield again.

In order to preserve and extend their control of the battlefield, the Liberation armed forces and people satisfactorily met following basic demands:
First, to be firmly determined to fight and vanquish a million American and puppet troops. Stimulated by successes, resolute to fight, strengthened by abundant experiences and in addition, having made careful preparations, all our armed forces and people started a Winter-Spring campaign with the desire to emulate one another in inflicting other defeats on the enemy. Our absolute political and moral superiority formed precisely the source of immeasurable strength, the solid basis of our unabated offensive capacity and of the tenance of our initiative — the chief architect of the victories of the L.A.F. and people of South Viet Nam, an extraordinary force that was decisive for our victory over a million-strong army in this dry season.

Second, to extend and bring people's war — fought by our people on all fronts — to a higher stage. We used integrated forces of a highly developed people's army to defeat the enemy's aggressive professional army, maintain and develop our control of the battlefield, strengthen the three categories of our armed forces, absolutely to attain by all means our three strategic objectives, namely, to wipe out adverse forces, expand and develop the liberated areas, hold and increase the people's control of the battlefield. From analyses that they had learned at the cost of their lives, the South Viet Nam Liberation armed forces people hold that only by doing so could they be called the operation theatre and that if, in this task, they actually controlled them.

Third, to push ahead our offensive on all the hill-forest, rural and urban regions. The realities of the revolutionary war in South Viet Nam have demonstrated the necessity of attacking the enemy in all these three regions, both politically and militarily. We have to strengthen our initiative not only in the hill-forest and rural theatres but also, gradually, in urban centres. Failing this, we cannot gain the control of the battlefield, but if on the contrary we manage to bring our activities to fruition, then we shall be really master there.

Fourth, constantly to develop among the fighters and people on each theatre the sense of being always ready to co-operate with other theatres, to achieve a harmonious co-ordination between all theatres. Evenly effective actions in all parts of a given theatre generate strength, but they do not suffice. A much bigger strength will emerge if the good actions of all theatres are closely co-ordinated. Unco-ordinated attacks that we have to mount at times are useful. If on the reverse, we stage many engagements in which our actions are properly co-ordinated for some time or for a whole campaign, the resulting effect will increase substantially, and the effectiveness of people's war, of the three categories of our armed forces, of military and political struggle will be brought into full play.

Fifth, to consolidate our rear and liberated areas, to preserve and expand our bases. We have to build our liberated zone into a solid rear from all the military, political, and economic points of view, and thereby strengthen our bases. At the same time we must fight...
The aggressor and consolidate the areas under our control in many respects such as setting up anti-U.S. combat villages, strengthening the militia and self-defense forces, setting the land problem, eliminating traitors and spies and, above all, boosting production and practising thrift along the lines of a national and democratic economy.

The realization of the points mentioned above involves a relentless struggle between the maintenance and gaining of the initiative during the whole process of the war. From the point of view of military strategy, armed struggle and fighting in particular, this initiative should be expressed in a condensed manner by combat methods, and wrested by our own combat methods, the basic principle governing these being: he must force the enemy to fight battles of our choice so that he cannot bring into play his best combat methods and his strong points.

3. To force the enemy to fight battles of our choice is a prerequisite of the control of the battlefield.

To compel the opponent to fight as we want him to constitutes a principle ruling the utilization of his force by any commander. The question is whether objective conditions are available for the implementation of this principle.

What do we mean by forcing the enemy to fight battles of our choice, and how to achieve this so as instantly to keep him in the defensive and maintain initiative? From experiences drawn from our victory over one million adverse troops in this dry season, some main conclusions can be reached:

a) To force the enemy to scatter and spread thin his forces. In other words, we have to make him disperse his troops with a view to hitting at him everywhere while our own stand ready for attack in all places and are in a position to concentrate their actions on priority areas and sectors. This was possible in view of the fact that we held the initiative and could make the fullest use of the three categories of our armed forces, properly arrayed on the theatre of operations. In practice, the enemy had to disperse his troops on extensive areas from Highway 9 down to the Mekong delta and found himself in a very scattered strategic battle-array and, consequently, caught between the horns of intricate dilemmas between concentration and dispersal, mobility and occupation, defensive and offensive.

b) To prevent the opponent from using his best combat methods. These consist in fielding large units in a definite line facing his adversary's and backed by a safe rear, in such a way as to be able to move freely his troops from a given point to another, and with his combat and operational objective well in sight, to use as best he can his strong firepower and high mobility for the wiping out of adverse troops in each engagement as well as in an entire campaign. As for us, we fight without a clear cut front-line, without an objective set once for all, operating rapid concentration and dispersal, appearing up and fading away unexpectedly, fielding now a big force, now a minor one or combining large-unit and small-unit engagements, attacking th
enemy in many places at the same time, in front, in the rear, on the flanks and even at the centre of the formation deployed for an engagement or a whole operation. As a rule our troops rely on their fighting spirit and resourcefulness to win in a most surprising manner.

c) Not to allow the enemy to encircle and split our forces while striving to do so against him strategically, operationally and in combat; to promote the sea-saw pattern of the war to the highest degree in an effort to encircle and split him strategically. We engage our opponent head on and in his rear, from within and without, and give battle quickly as we move off, making it impossible for him to cope with the situation and avoid being split, and creating favourable opportunities for us to wipe him out rapidly. That was why many of his sorties in this dry season, designed to encircle the L.A.F. were tantamount to beating the air, and worse still, resulted in their being invested, split up and badly mauled.

d) To deprive the enemy of the possibility of steady defensive and efficacious offensive actions by bringing into play such strategic people’s war fighting methods as guerrilla warfare, communication-demolition operations, concentrating forces on a definite target, etc. This to make him unable to deal with our successive attacks from all sides and our powerful counter-attacks of all sizes and in all forms simultaneously as in Tay Ninh, Quang Nam, Ben Tre, the Western High Plateaux, Quang Tri, Thua Thien, Tan An, Cholon, and so on, thereby rendering both his offensive and defensive actions futile. In this dry season our well-mounted assaults of the type seen at the Long Binh munition depot, at Da Nang, Tan Son Nhat, Can Tho, Pleiku, Chu Lai and Quang Tri air bases, as well as our artillery shelling of Highway 9, disrupted all the enemy’s tactics in South Viet Nam.

e) To prevent U.S. forces from serving as a shield for puppet troops. We have to continue inflicting much more bitter losses on the GI’s and at the same time resolutely to wipe out puppet troops and disintegrate the Saigon army which, though slighted by the Americans, constitutes a military prop and a political asset for the U.S. neo-colonialist policy in South Viet Nam.

f) Not to give the adversary the chance of mounting engagements with combat effectiveness and operational and strategic effect. However, as far as we are concerned, exertions should tend to achieve such a result by making the best of our abilities of the strategic and other advantages like climate, terrain and the people’s support. So much so that, in spite of a huge military build-up and an immense quantity of war materials, our opponent has sustained heavy losses and scored an indifferent effect. To put it in capitalist-business terms, he has paid too high a price in currency and his balance-sheet shows a deficit.

g) To prevent the enemy from laying control of the theatre of operations, even of the areas adjoining to the U.S.-puppet big bases and the urban centres.
We develop fighting on three different regions, combine troop annihilation with liberation of territory and the extension of the people’s control over it, combine military offensive with political struggle and persuasion work among the enemy forces, combat actions with insurrections, fighting off “search and destroy” operations while smashing “pacification” plans by priority sectors.

By realizing the afore-cited point we shall really force the adversary into giving battle of our choice, or as the people say “eating soup with a fork”.

As a result, we shall tie him down to an ever more defensive position and the more he thrashes about, the further he will embroil his strategy and tactics. As for us, we shall create a more advantageous strategic position and hold and develop our initiative in offensive. This is a key problem in which lie our strength and the enemy’s weakness with regard to the conduct of military strategy in the South Viet Nam theatre.

According to classical military science, that is a point hard to understand. That is, however, the living reality offered by war in South Viet Nam: in face of an opponent lesser in effectives and many times weaker in terms of military equipment, a most modern army one million strong, has proved unable to mount a number of fierce strategic battles to turn the tide of the war in its favour, something that seems as easy as turning the palm of one’s hand. The fact remains nevertheless that not only has it been incapable of doing so, but it has lost its own freedom of action, simply because from the very outset that tremendous army has been the “captive” of its own desperate strategy, whereas its opponent has enjoyed freedom of action.

III - TO GRASP AND SATISFACTORILY SETTLE THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE ENEMY FORCES AND THE HOLDING AND PROMOTION OF THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE AS MASTERS OF THEIR COUNTRY; TO INCREASE THE COMBINATION OF MILITARY ACTION, POLITICAL STRUGGLE AND PERSUASION WORK AMONG ADVERSE TROOPS

In his war of aggression on neo-colonialist pattern, the enemy couple military operations with political and economic manoeuvres under his “two-pincer” plan — “search and destroy” and “pacification” — aimed at three objectives: wiping out of the Liberation armed forces, occupation of territory and submission of the people. These are closely related. He holds that unless he knocks down the L.A.F., he cannot occupy territory, nor submit the population. And failing in the occupation task he will be deprived of a territory to deploy his troops in and unable to restrict the scope of the L.A.F. activities. However, occupation without the people’s submission
would simply amount to spreading thin his forces which would face annihilation by chunks and, as a result, to going on fighting without a local rear.

After drawing lessons from their failures in the previous dry season, the U.S. aggressors exerted new "pacification" efforts towards a close combination of the "search and destroy" plan and the "rural pacification program". In the utilization of their forces they relegated the bulk of the puppet army to "pacification" activities and made a clearer division of responsibilities between the GI's, Saigon troops and "pacification cadres", i.e. wicked and bloodthirsty agents recruited on the spot in various localities. The new "pacification program" was concentrated on four key-areas round Saigon, Da Nang, Binh Dinh and An Giang. All large-scale "search and destroy" raids of the size of operations Attleboro, Cedar Falls and Junction City aimed at expanding the occupied areas into the liberated zone and providing a "security shield" to the puppet forces and "pacification" cadres who began "pacification" work. Inversely, utterly barbarous "burn all, kill all and destroy all" actions undertaken in the course of terrorist and nibbling operations were combined with, and made to bring into full play the results of "search and destroy" raids, and directly served the task of wiping out the Liberation armed forces.

But the enemy met with repeated attacks and powerful counter blows of the L.A.F. and people of South Viet Nam. Both the "pacification" and "search and destroy" pincers were broken, the "pacification program" went bankrupt with pretty numerous military forces and "pacification cadres" knocked out.

Through their successful struggle on two fronts against the "search and destroy" plan and the "pacification program", the L.A.F. and people have drawn the following practical experiences:

First, the relationship between the wiping out of enemy forces and the upholding of the right of the people as masters of their country should be grasped and settled in accordance with the characteristics of the South Viet Nam revolutionary war and our strategic line. All liberation wars have in common tightly related strategic objectives, i.e., liberation and holding of the territory, protection and liberation of the people. In addition, people's war in South Viet Nam has distinctive features which do not bear complete resemblance to others. It has specific methods of struggle based on the common characteristics and laws of liberation wars and revolution in general. Ours is a country with no large territory and population. The enemy, however, is doing his best to encroach on its land and enslave its people with the recourse to wicked military actions and very treacherous political and psychowar tricks. In South Viet Nam the annihilation of adverse troops and the safeguard of the right of the people as the country's masters are constantly linked to the realities of the revolutionary war and depend on our strategic line and guiding principles. On this basis the South Viet Nam Liberation armed forces and people have always maintained that, together with the wiping out of the enemy, the territory and population problems constitute
intertwined strategic questions of paramount importance. The revolutionary movement and development of people's war in South Viet Nam are closely connected with the control of the land by the people. Those are also problems concerning front and rear, fighting and protection and the replenishment of our resistance potential, the destruction of the opponent's rear and on-the-spot war potential.

The fact that Long An, Quang Nam, Cu Chi and other places stand in the van in the smash-the-pacification movement, which has strongly impelled armed and political struggle and resulted in the destruction of substantial enemy military and political forces, just as in the powerful advance of our own, is due to our handling of the relation between troop annihilation and safeguard of the people's control with accuracy, initiative, creativeness and determination.

Knocking out adverse troops aims at maintaining and extending the people's control, while the purpose of preserving this control is to destroy them. We should not therefore over-emphasize this necessity, though it ranks first in any war, to the detriment of the task of controlling territory and defending the population. Reality has shown that failing to maintain and widen the people's control of the land we cannot succeed in the annihilation task. We should neither overrate our objective regarding the territory and the population and overlook the annihilation requirement. For, obviously, short of clinging to the adversary so as to wipe out both his military and political forces, there is no question of holding the territory and the people, let alone extend the latter's control. Besides, the destruction of armed forces, the defence of the territory and the maintenance of the people's control constitute also the result of an over-all strategy which, implemented separately in different areas, sometimes may not be successful. In the final analysis, it is a comprehensive strategy involving many aspects.

The problem has been understood and posed correctly by our command at every level, in every area and army unit, which precisely explains why in conduct and execution they have given expression to our viewpoint in their plans. They have never ceased bringing to the fore the initiative of action and thus found multifarious and efficacious forms of fighting to combine the wiping out of enemy troops, the defence of the territory and the extension of the people's control. In many places they knew how to take advantage of the results of annihilation actions to enlarge the people's control, to consolidate and expand our bases, and reversely, to use the success of the expansion of the people's war to score bigger and bigger military and political achievements.

Second, we should regard the combination of military and political struggle and the co-ordination of the three offensive thrusts - military and political attacks and persuasion work among enemy troops - as basic methods of struggle to enhance ceaselessly the effect of troop annihilation, maintenance and extension of the people's control, and to counter "pacification".

Coupled political and armed struggles constitute the basic method of the South Vietnamese people's
The combination of these two forms of struggle is the rule which they have to observe to achieve successes. That is also the basic method to wipe out enemy troops and secure the people's control, the great strength of which has found an illustration in our numerous victories. Co-ordinated with the powerfully and evenly developed military struggle is the high tide of political struggle which involved over 11 million people in 1966, twice more than in 1965. Ideological and organizational work to mobilize the masses in rural areas and urban centres keep progressing. Land distribution and the struggle for reduction of rent and interest rates assumes an extremely important significance. The various boost-production drives have brought about far-reaching results while the Front policy and the nationalities policy have recorded striking successes. The political offensives on the puppet army and administration, too, have proved to be more and more effective. Persuasion work among enemy troops, though still having room for improvement in some areas, has on the whole made a substantial contribution to the disintegration of over 60,000 of them in Winter 1966 and Spring 1967. The latter activities have played a major part in our successes in combat and operational actions in many regions at the same time as they actively helped the political struggle of the popular masses.

The experience of numerous areas demonstrates that unless we bring into full play all our forces and every form of struggle, and adequately combine political and military struggles, we cannot solve the problem of defending the territory and people in face of the enemy deployment of a formidable military force into a dense occupation network. Hence this fact: in places though the enemy has set up nearly one hundred garrisons and posts, he cannot subdue the people in whose hands, however, lies the control of the situation. Our people call such places "a liberated area with enemy posts". From the lessons they have learned at the cost of their lives the Liberation armed forces and people of South Viet Nam conclude that only by sticking to those forms of struggle can they stand firm in face to their opponent's relentless strikes, and eventually foil all his schemes. That is our approach to the problem. And that is why military and political struggles must be closely combined.

Military and political forces play equally important strategic roles and generate equally significant effects. Political struggle serves military struggle which in turn support the former to win victory in the war with our own methods, and eventually accomplish the political task of the South Viet Nam revolution.

IV — TO UNCEASINGLY INCREASE FIGHTING EFFECTIVENESS AND THE OPERATIONAL AND STRATEGIC EFFECT OF PEOPLE'S WAR UNIQUE COMBAT METHODS

In this Winter-Spring period a bitter contest has taken place in the operation theatres between our and the enemy's combat methods.
Our people’s war methods have grown richer, attained a new degree of development and repeatedly held in check all U.S. tactical initiatives.

Nothing testifies to this more eloquently than the realities on the battlefields themselves:

- Our activities unfolded evenly in all theatres with all the three categories of armed forces fighting well and scoring major victories. We undertook big and minor engagements, large and small-scale operations, and those of long duration bore a marked character and yielded rather good results. Offensives, counter-offensives, counter-raids and anti-pacification actions were equally successful.

Our combat guide-lines have been more or less thoroughly enhanced and used in close combination not only in separate theatres but in every area, every campaign, every operation and engagement as well.

Guerilla warfare has risen into a high tide everywhere, spreading thin adverse forces and tying them down in many theatres from Quang Tri and Thua Thien to the Nam Bo plains. Large-unit fighting advanced steadily with the L.A.F. hitting rapidly and ending the fight rather swiftly, striking still harder towards the closing phase. Our strong attacks on the enemy’s bases and leading bodies hit home and took place in succession. Repeated and widespread actions against communications and logistic bases were undertaken many times against the same place, a number of them well-mounted and well-fought.

- The increasing impact of such a combat method lay in that it was directed exactly against the right troops and targets, in that it afforded us the possibility of wiping out, decimating and disintegrating military and political forces while reducing our own losses.

In the annihilation of enemy forces we paid particular attention to the most important among them such as officers, pilots, armoured car drivers, artillery-men and technical personnel. We also attached importance to the destruction of technical equipment and other war materials. We did not only strike at C.P.’s and airfields but also at logistic bases and communications as well, and caused numerous difficulties to the adversary’s supply service. We concentrated our blows not exclusively on the GI’s but also on puppet and satellite troops, and did not neglect the wiping out of wicked thugs, puppet reactionary authorities and “pacification” teams. While confronting the U.S. forces, we strove to impair the wide co-ordination between their various arms and services, between their air and ground forces, their armour and infantry, the latter and artillery, just as to neutralize their operational and tactical mobility in an effort to further weaken U.S. infantrymen.

- Our tactical forms of fighting substantially developed. In every theatre, in every area and army unit we devised new diversified combat methods: spiked and mine traps, sniping, ambushes, nibbling and surprise attacks, assaults, movement warfare, artillery shelling, actions against heliborne troops and armoured personnel carriers, attacks inside and outside fortifications, in encampments and rear bases, combination of all those methods, fighting on a round-the-clock basis.
in the plains and in hill and forest areas stretching up to the border, and so on.

The superiority, originality and effectiveness of people’s war methods have been shown in a condensed manner by the realities in the South Viet Nam theatre in the following points;

1. Those fighting methods reflect a rational distribution of combat tasks which notably increases the annihilating capabilities of the liberation armed forces and the fourteen million people of South Viet Nam.

As an agricultural co-operative in North Viet Nam owes its high labour productivity to a proper division of responsibilities among its members, so combat effectiveness and operational effect derive from a rational distribution of combat tasks. Thanks to their most diversified forms, our fighting methods suit all and each of our forces, civilians and armymen, all sections of the people, people of every age, since they fit the health conditions and the abilities of everyone. Everyone, therefore, can take part in the fighting, using the method the most suitable to him. For otherwise how could one explain that everyone, from an artilleryman, a scout and a war-supply fighter to a guerilla, a self-defence member of a government office, from a nine-year boy to old-agers of both sexes, even a woman who ad a baby no older than ten days, managed to kill enemy troops. With such combat methods our fourteen million compatriots in South Viet Nam, organized into a steady bloc, and assigned to responsibility in a very rational manner, form a closely-knit people’s battle-array extremely dangerous for the enemy. In this resides the marked mass character of those methods, as well as their creativeness, originality and high effectiveness.

2. We have brought into play the effect of all our weapons from the most rudimentary to the up-to-date ones, and created an integrated force with a very great destructive power.

With our combat methods everything in our people’s hands can be turned into a weapon against the enemy, even a stick, a carrying pole or a heap of stones. With the rudimentary weapons that we use very skilfully, cleverly and widely, we have caused rather heavy losses to the GI’s. And it is not fortuitous that these American “play boys” dread the spiked pits and booby traps laid by our guerillas and people, into which they fall every day. The American press has admitted that 25 percent of the casualties sustained by the U.S. marines stationed in the 1st Tactical Area resulted from traps of all kinds. U.S. troops are still more frightened by our infantry weapons, our cannons and mortars of various types which have enlarged their casualty list to a new high in the first few months of the current year. Thus, by using to the fullest extent possible the efficacious weapons at our disposal, our combat methods have constantly increased the results of our annihilation actions. By their cleverness, they enable us to combine the action of different units and services and, together with the utilization of our technical materials, they
have not just a devastative effect in combat but also an operational and strategic effect. Their superiority is to bring into play our various rudimentary and modern weapons and to have a combined use of these two sorts of arms with a view to generating an integrated force in all the theatres as well as in each engagement, to raising fighting effectiveness incessantly, and to turning this gradually into an operational and strategic effect.

3. To defeat the enemy, one usually employs a big force against a smaller one and inversely, or combine both of these methods.

Usually, when dealing with operational and combat action one almost exclusively has in mind the use of a big force to fight a smaller one to secure victory. In practice, however, we resort to varied methods and on splendid successes, fielding now more troops than the enemy, now less, now as many as he does. Not only in guerrilla warfare but also in large-unit operations we employed all those methods, depending upon the circumstances. When necessary and in favourable conditions we deployed a large force to overwhelm the enemy in inferior number and, in this case, fought rapidly and destroyed wholesale his important units. On the other hand, we tried to seize every opportunity to fight a bigger force than ours by bringing into full play all our fortes, by restricting to the minimum the adversary’s powerful firepower and high mobility in combat and operation, and from our strong position and with the superior quality of our troops—by overwhelming the opponent to achieve victory. Whether we confront a bigger, a smaller or an equal force, we have invariably to create for ourselves a stronger position than the enemy’s and apply different, appropriate methods, for short of such a position we cannot possibly win. The question is what this position means and how to build it up. We should rid ourselves of outmoded conceptions regarding the notion of “strong position”, still less simply rely on numerical superiority and greater weaponry. Thus construed a strong position does not stem merely from the number of troops one disposes of, but also from clever combat methods, high fighting spirit, resourcefulness, terrain facilities, surprise factor, the correct appraisal of the enemy’s weaknesses, etc. We can win with a weaker or a stronger force, and combine these two tactics to wipe out the opponent in both combat and operational actions.

4. We were able to undertake small and large-scale actions and to combine these two forms of fighting.

In South Viet Nam evenly developed small-scale actions have made it possible to knock down enemy forces on a very extensive area, to pin them down and spread them thin. Large-unit actions of various sizes were also frequently resorted to with flexibility and determination, resulting in powerful blows to enhance our annihilation capacity. This reality has clearly demonstrated that if we only went in for big-unit actions and overlooked the development of minor ones and the close combination of these with middle-size engagements, practically it would be
impossible and very dangerous too to mount large-scale operations. It would be equally wrong to confine to small-unit actions. Because, failing to create resolutely every facility for eventual large-unit actions, not only could we not boost our operational effectiveness and change the correlation of forces in our favour, but we would find ourselves in the impossibility of carrying on and promoting small-unit actions themselves. In the South Viet Nam theatre our combat methods have evolved from small to large-scale fighting and with the combination of small, middle and large-scale combat we have substantially increased the effectiveness of both guerrilla warfare and big-unit fighting. Even in each operation we carried out this combination in a balanced and flexible way, fielding now a large force first and a small one next, now the other way round, now small and big units simultaneously. We could thus hit the enemy without set-up, one engagement paving the way for the next, our combatants becoming stronger as they fought, and scoring more important successes towards the losing phase.

6. We defeated the enemy in all situations, inside and outside fortifications, in hinterland bases, by day and by night, in hill-forest, rural and urban theatres.

Ours are flexible, diverse and highly effective combat methods as they prevail over our adversary's not only in situations of a single type, for a definite me and in a definite theatre, but also in situations of various types for different durations and in theatres of different sorts. While attaching importance to knocking out enemy forces on the move, just after landing from the air, or in provisional encampments, etc. by means of ambushes, surprise attacks, movement warfare or artillery shelling and so on, the L.A.F. and people of South Viet Nam tried to take advantage of every opportunity to strike at them in their own fortifications (point d'appui or hinterland bases) in very appropriate and bold attacks, whereby using sometimes not many troops, and limiting the effect of the adverse firepower, they scored major successes and reduced their own losses. On the other hand, at the same time as they paid due attention to luring the enemy into the hill-forest battlefields and forcing him into accepting battles of their choice so as to annihilate him, they actively and resolutely stuck to him and hit at him in the plains and urban centres. Striking accurately at his leading bodies in towns and cities not only did we wipe out part of his forces and impel forward armed and political struggles but also stabbed him in his very heart. By raising their own effectiveness, our combat methods aimed at enhancing the role and strategic importance of different operation theatres and regions and, thereby, at creating for us a position of unremitting and well co-ordinated offensive. Thus, we pinned down and spread thin adverse troops everywhere and at the same time delivered him heavy annihilation blows so that he could not cope with the situation in spite of his big effectives and his huge technical apparatus.
6. Our armed forces and people were capable of independent action, sustained action for a definite period and operational action.

Our combat methods derived their superiority from the fact that they made it possible for every fighter and every unit to independently search out the enemy to knock him out or to closely co-operate with other fighters and units according to a common plan in each series of activities or in each operation. That is why fighting took place in every theatre, in every area, at any time and in every direction; our combatants stuck to adverse troops wherever they were to engage them. They carried out independent activities simultaneously with small and large-scale operations and co-ordinated actions lasting for many days running. The Liberation armed forces and people of South Viet Nam fully developed the capabilities of every fighter, every grouping and every unit in every area to keep close on the enemy's heels and strike at him. Better still, they knew very well how to conduct co-ordinated actions in the whole theatre according to a single plan, launching small, middle and large-size operations. This was a correct combat method which should be promoted. They could mount successfully not only separate engagements but entire operations, series of offensive actions and counter-offensive actions, counter-raids and attacks on communications and enemy hinterland bases. That was a very important factor to increase unceasingly our combat effectiveness and the operational effect of our fighting methods as well, so as to strengthen our unremitting offensive position, to maintain and extend our initiative on the battlefield.

7. We combined activities of various types to attack the enemy in the military, political and economic fields. Ours are people's war combat methods directed against the adversary in all respects. This spirit permeated every of our combat guide-line, every form of fighting, every tactics. In practice, certain engagements had no great military value but assumed a far-reaching political and economic importance. Our attacks on Saigon city and the provincial capital of Quang Tri (April 6, 1967) for instance, owed their significance not only to the annihilation of a number of enemy officers and men and the destruction of a quantity of war materials, but especially to their great political impact on the U.S.-puppet command and the Saigon administration. Apart from their military effect, our communication-demolition operations again and again scaled off the land connection between Ca Mau and Saigon, which forced the puppet authorities to import nearly one million tons of rice, thereby causing many difficulties to them. Here lies the strong comprehensive effect of our strikes on the military, political and economic fronts.

In brief, people's war combat methods used in South Viet Nam was brought to a high degree of development and possessed an extremely great strength. This strength sprang from the resolute offensive spirit of the masses, from their wonderful intrepidity, their boiling impatience to wipe out enemy troops. It reflected also the organizational, strategic and tactical abilities of the
V — TO ATTACH IMPORTANCE TO THE BUILD-UP AND DEVELOPMENT OF OUR TWO FORCES, THE THREE CATEGORIES OF TROOPS: TO SETTLE CORRECTLY THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN QUANTITY AND QUALITY

The victory of our army and people over one million American, puppet and satellite troops by itself eloquently bespeaks our great successes in the build-up and development of our forces. Those successes have resulted from our correct handling of the combat and strategic guiding principles governing this build-up that we have realized creatively and with utmost exertions. All that has been done in accordance with the specific conditions of our country, our own fighting methods and the trend of development in the South Viet Nam theatre, in order to vanquish an adversary having a great troop-strength and overwhelming superiority in war materials and technique. The following are some manifestations of that achievement in the Winter 1966 and Spring 1967.

First, we developed both our political and armed forces in a powerful and well-balanced manner.

In face of U.S. intensification of the war, fraught with very serious consequences, during the process of building and developing our forces, we never wavered while grasping firmly our strategic guiding principles and our other principles ruling the combination of military and political struggles. We were always able to define the strategic position of our armed and
political forces in the South Viet Nam revolution. We satisfactorily tackled the relationship between these two forces in the process of their build-up, thus making it possible for them to grow up powerfully and in a well-balanced manner, as well as to bring their effectiveness into full play. True, never our political forces underwent such an impetuous development as in this Winter-Spring period. They encompassed all strata of the population, all patriotic-minded elements regardless of their social classes, religious creeds, nationalities, political tendencies, in a vast struggle against the U.S. aggressors and the traitors for national independence, democracy and neutrality pending reunification of the Fatherland. On the basis of this widespread movement, the political army of the popular masses — mainstay of the political struggle — was also strengthened in number and quality. The political front and the political army were enlarged in the hill-forest, rural and urban areas. Those are precisely the forces which accounted for all our successes in political struggle, and which have made an active contribution to the build-up and fighting of our armed forces.

Parallel with the strengthening of the political forces, we strove our utmost to increase our armed forces. The three categories of our troops had grown up evenly, in a planned and well-balanced manner and in keeping with the realities of each theatre of operations and the combat tasks of each category of troops.

Born of the political movement and the political forces of the people, the militia and guerilla forces had gone through a far-and-wide development, taking on multifarious, appropriate organizational forms and bringing the whole people's strength into action against the enemy. Our fourteen million southern compatriots had been militarily organized, equipped and trained, and politically educated to deal with the situation and tasks facing our country. They entered the dry season boiling with the determination to defeat one million enemy troops. Through the trial, we have built up plenty of guerilla and self-defence units which distinguished themselves with excellent fighting and production records. Our guerillas are strong not only because of their courage and fairly good equipment but also because of their sharp, very clever combat methods with which they proved able to knock out their opponent by the groups and the platoons, be they American or puppet troops.

Our regional troops have been strengthened in every theatre into strong mobile units capable of independent action, of co-operating with our regular forces in large-unit fighting, and of co-ordinating their activities with militiamen and guerillas to wipe out enemy troops, defend the population, expand guerilla warfare and support political struggle. Together with evenly developed and efficacious guerilla warfare, their operational efficiency has been gradually raised and consequently they were able to put out of action whole U.S. companies and whole puppet battalions.

Our regular forces have also grown up and acquired a great fighting capacity and good mobility. They are versed in confronting their opponent in every tactical form, with every combat method, at every strength
and in every terrain condition. They can destroy rapidly and wholesale one or several American, puppet or satellite battalions of enemy’s infantry, tank and armoured car units.

Thus, each category of our armed forces is possessed of a fairly high fighting spirit capable of accomplishing its tasks. Particularly, all of them have been rationally deployed in all theatres of operations and can to the best of their abilities play their role and bring about the strategic effect that we expect from them. That’s why, during this Winter-Spring campaign, they realized a close co-ordination in every theatre, every drive of major actions, every operation and every engagement, thus setting up the pattern of unremitting offensive on the enemy. At any time, a unit of one category could replace one of another category to harass him for the latter to attend a refresher course or take a rest. Meanwhile, adverse troops were worn out as they had to be kept on the move to cope with our activities in many strategic directions. As admitted by the U.S. commanders, their mobile units in the East Nam Bo theatre such as the 1st Infantry Division, the 25th Division, the 175rd and 196th Brigades hardly had the time to relax.

In our people’s war in South Viet Nam, the strategic position of the three categories of our armed forces has been strongly enhanced and this can be seen on the battlefield in the quite even and balanced development of both guerilla warfare and large-unit fighting. Reality has clearly shown that there cannot be large-unit fighting so long as guerilla warfare is non-existent. This is the biggest asset of any liberation war. As we fight against a neo-colonialist enemy in South Viet Nam, guerilla warfare holds a most important, basic strategic position. At the same time, in favourable conditions and to meet the revolution’s objective requirement, we have resolutely and creatively promoted large-unit fighting, for failing to do so our revolution and people’s war would mark time instead of forging ahead, even guerilla warfare itself could not hold on and, naturally, we should not be in a position to win the war. On the other hand, to vanquish the U.S. aggressors and their henchmen in accordance with our rules of action, large-unit fighting necessarily plays a very important strategic part. Guerilla warfare should be co-ordinated with large-unit fighting and inversely, both playing a decisive role in our present armed struggle on people’s war pattern.

Second, in the process of the build-up of our armed forces, we correctly settled the relationship between quantity and quality. In order to prepare ourselves to defeat one million enemy troops, basing ourselves on our strategic guiding principles, we advocated the building of revolutionary armed forces including a widespread and powerful militia and guerilla force, crack regional and regular troops in appropriate number. Such an organizational form can bring into full play the strength of our armed forces and people to secure big successes; it is conform to our people’s war combat methods in South Viet Nam and to our economic, geographic and population conditions. At the same time it makes it possible for us to wage a protracted war, to carry out production and replenish
our people's strength, so that the longer we fight the stronger we become and shall surely defeat a numerically superior enemy.

One of the key methods to bring into play the usefulness of such a finished organization is the improvement of the quality of the armed forces. This quality involves high combativeness, determination to maintain the offensive, light numerical strength, strong and well-equipped troops, good technical and tactical capabilities, organizational ability of cadres and a qualified command, a high sense of discipline, creative combat methods suitable for the material, technical and other means available and good application thereof.

In essence, that is the problem of further raising the fighting capacity not only of each big unit but of each company, platoon, each section, each three-man group, each officer and man of the regular, regional, militia and guerilla forces. On this basis we should constantly increase combat and operational effectiveness in view of the accomplishment of the armed forces' strategic task in the war.

The South Viet Nam Liberation armed forces and people also hold that a high-quality unit of the armed forces is not only one which fights well, and satisfactorily discharges other everyday military responsibilities, but one which, depending on the situation and its own possibilities, also takes part in production. Not only militiamen and guerillas, regular troops, too, should produce to improve their own living conditions and to a certain extent reduce the people's contribution to their upkeep.

The great successful experience acquired by our armed forces and people throws a strong light on the principle governing the build-up of the forces of revolutionary wars, that is, to build while fighting, to closely combine fighting and building in order to win, and to win in order to build and develop the armed forces according to the following guideline: the longer one fights, the more successes one scores, and the stronger one becomes.

So, with an appropriate number of top-quality troops, with the combination of the three categories of our armed forces properly arrayed in the operation theatre, with the co-ordination of their activities with those of the political forces, with the favourable position of people's war, and particularly with an intensive application of their highly effectual combat methods, the Liberation armed forces and people of South Viet Nam are in a position to defeat their opponent superior in number.

Above are some remarks related to the five lessons from our successes in the conduct of military strategy. They are the results of creative actions by the fourteen million people and Liberation armed forces of South Viet Nam, actions summed up time and again by the N.F.L. Central Committee over more than ten years. We have, by and large, made a good application of those lessons but in given places, at given moments, there are still shortcomings which we should strive to make good so as to advance steadily.
The heroic armed forces and people of South Viet Nam have been scoring splendid victories over one million American and puppet troops.

Their counterparts in the North equal them in resisting the U.S. war of destruction.

The Yankee aggressors have suffered heavy losses, their forces have been decimated. Though running short of arguments to justify their enterprise and though finding themselves in a quagmire, they remain obdurate, and they are still strong and wicked.

Having won another round in our struggle for national salvation we now find ourselves in a more advantageous situation than ever before. However, to achieve still greater victories, we have to face many difficulties and hardships, among them some still unknown so far.

But pure gold stands the test of fire.

We have been fighting against one million American and puppet troops. We shall fight two million if necessary.

And if necessary we shall fight five, ten, twenty or more years.

Having tasted the bitters of life as slaves for generations and enjoyed the sweets of it our people are aware that nothing is more precious than independence and freedom.

For independence and freedom, let us push ahead our fight against the U.S. aggressors!

For independence and freedom let us march forward and resolutely defeat the U.S. aggressors!

Final victory will surely be ours!