In May, two Viet Cong regiments clashed with two ARVN battalions at Ba Gia in Quang Ngai Province, and the 32d NVA Regiment seized the outpost at Duc Co and overran the district town as well as effectively seizing control of Route 19 from Pleiku to the Cambodia border. In May, at Dong Xoai, the Viet Cong had laid out the battlefield so well that they completely decimated an ARVN battalion in less than 30 minutes. This battle was followed by another multi-regimental operation at Song Be which was fought to a standoff with both sides receiving heavy casualties. In early June, the 95th NVA Regiment surrounded and badly mauled an ARVN airborne task force in Phu Bon Province. In August, the 101st NVA Regiment ranged through Kontum Province overrunning Ton Moroung District headquarters and seizing control of Route 14. The outcome of this fierce six months of fighting was that the Communist forces managed to establish effective control over the border area with Laos, the terminal point for the infiltration corridors. To all intents and purposes, they held overall control of the Central Highlands. It was the massive introduction of regular North Vietnamese Army units which enabled them to do it.136
By early 1966, the input of both manpower and material from North Vietnam was so extensive and important to the war effort in the south that Hanoi in a secret Central Committee resolution could already state that "the North Vietnamese main forces are the organic mobile forces of South Vietnam" -- i.e., the backbone of the insurgent war effort in the South.\textsuperscript{137} By mid-1966 Communist roadbuilding efforts in the Laos panhandle, which began in 1964, had extended the original roadnet to about 700 miles and it now approached the borders of South Vietnam.\textsuperscript{138} Hundreds of trucks are now estimated to be using these roads to ferry supplies south. Infiltration continued to climb during 1966, and the direct violation of the Demilitarized Zone by entire North Vietnamese combat units was initiated. The ratio of infiltrators to indigenous personnel continued to increase, despite heavy casualties and the expansion of the southern units. In addition, modern infantry assault weapons and mortars introduced in large numbers since 1964 now make up a portion of the combined North Vietnamese and Viet Cong arsenal.

Laos: Backbone of Hanoi's Logistics Effort

With the eastern portions of the Laos panhandle securely under Communist control, Hanoi as early as 1964 decided to augment its labyrinth of paths and trails used for infiltration of personnel by
initiating an extensive roadbuilding program which would facilitate trucking supplies to South Vietnam. At that time the motorable roads from the Laos-North Vietnam border at the Mu Gia Pass, south to the vicinity of Muong Nong in Laos, measured approximately 180 miles. A sizeable contingent of several North Vietnamese army units were deployed there to oversee the development of this roadnet. The scope of this effort, which was not to become fully evident until 1966, indicates the scale of Hanoi’s planning in 1964. They foresaw the need not only for a sizeable increase in manpower but also for the need to establish an adequate channel to supply these forces in increased levels of combat. The net result of the Communist roadbuilding effort in Laos since 1964 has been the extension of the existing roads more than 440 miles further south -- right across the borders into South Vietnam. From here, supplies which are trucked deep into the Laotian panhandle are transferred to pack animals or human porters which fan out into the wilderness and cross into Communist supply areas in the Central Highlands of South Vietnam.

This expansion of the roadnet indicates an ever increasing dependence on truck transport for logistic support. Judging from aerial photography and pilot sightings, it is estimated by intelligence authorities that over 300 trucks are operating on the infiltration routes in Laos alone, delivering at least 35-40 net tons of supplies each day of the dry season.
to the South Vietnamese border area.

The Impact of Infiltration on the Force Structure

The Central Committee in Hanoi in late 1965 reaffirmed its earlier decision to send organic North Vietnamese units to the South and called for their continued introduction.

A total of seven additional regiments were confirmed by intelligence as infiltrating south in early 1966. In January, three regiments were drawn from various regular line units in the north. The 141st Regiment of the 312th Division deployed south through Laos to Phouc Long Province near the Cambodian border. The 24th Regiment of the 304th Division left its garrison area with 2,000 men and moved to Kontum Province, while the 88th Regiment of the 308th Division, also with 2,000 men, moved to Pleiku Province.

In February and March 1966, Hanoi dispatched four more regular army units through Laos. The 3rd Regiment, 1,500 men strong, went to Quang Tin Province. The 52nd Regiment, with 2,000 men deployed to the southern portion of South Vietnam. In March, 1,600 men of the 165th Regiment also departed for the same area of South Vietnam.

The 84th Artillery Regiment which was a composite unit drawn from two separate North Vietnamese outfits -- the 68th Artillery Regiment and the 351st Division -- also left in March arriving in South Vietnam.
### The Infiltration of Organic North Vietnamese Army Regiments into South Vietnam

1964 - 1966

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Infiltration Data</th>
<th>No of Prisoners Which Confirmation Based</th>
<th>No of Captured Documents on Which Confirmation Based</th>
<th>Total No Prisoners Taken From Each Unit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>95th Regt</td>
<td>Oct 64 Dec 64</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>101st Regt</td>
<td>Dec 64 Feb 65</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18th Regt</td>
<td>Feb 65 Apr 65</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32nd Regt</td>
<td>Sep-Oct 64 Jan 65</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22nd Regt</td>
<td>Jul 65 Sep 65</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33rd Regt</td>
<td>Jul 65 Oct 65</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>250th Regt</td>
<td>Jul 65 Oct 65</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>66th Regt</td>
<td>Aug 65 Nov 65</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6th Regt</td>
<td>UNK Oct 65</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21st Regt</td>
<td>Aug 65 Oct 65</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>183 Regt</td>
<td>Dec 65 Feb 66</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<td>Dec 65 Mar 66</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>141st Regt</td>
<td>Jan 66 Mar 66</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24th Regt</td>
<td>Jan 66 Feb 66</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>88th Regt</td>
<td>Jan 66 Mar 66</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd Regt</td>
<td>Feb 66 Mar 66</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>812th Regt</td>
<td>Jun 66 Jun 66</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>803rd Regt</td>
<td>Jun 66 Jun 66</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>165th Regt</td>
<td>Feb 66 Jul 66</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52nd Regt</td>
<td>Mar 66 Jul 66</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>13</td>
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<tr>
<td>84th Arty Regt</td>
<td>Mar 66 Aug 66</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
in August. This apparently completed the buildup of regular units Hanoi had planned, for the time being, to introduce via the Laos corridors.

In May and June, Hanoi began moving units directly across the Demilitarized Zone into the northern section of Quang Tri province. Three regiments of the North Vietnamese 324th Division, the 812th, the 90th and the 803rd were in place south of the DMZ by July.

Subsequently, battalion elements of the NVA 341st Division also moved south across the DMZ. Although the 324th and the other units which came across the DMZ suffered heavy casualties in encounters with allied forces from July through October, sizeable elements of these divisions are again operating in Quang Tri province after regroupment and replacement in southern North Vietnam. They pose part of the extensive Communist military threat now evident in northern South Vietnam. During 1966, in addition to the regiments described above, the infiltration of 37 other groups of infiltrators, totalling over 24,000 men was confirmed by the capture of two or more prisoners. Many of these were sent to indigenous Viet Cong units as replacements upon their arrival in the South.

There is sufficient evidence available to indicate that another 112 groups of infiltrators containing over 37,000 men came south during this same period. Total infiltration reported during 1966
# Infiltration of Personnel into South Vietnam

1959 - 1966

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Confirmed Category 1 &amp; 2</th>
<th>Confirmed Category 3 &amp; 4</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1959-60</td>
<td>4,556</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>4,582</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>4,118</td>
<td>2,177</td>
<td>6,295</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>5,362</td>
<td>7,495</td>
<td>12,857</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>4,726</td>
<td>3,180</td>
<td>7,906</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>9,316</td>
<td>3,108</td>
<td>12,424</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Confirmed Accepted</th>
<th>Probable Accepted</th>
<th>Possible Accepted</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>23,770</td>
<td>1,910</td>
<td>8,050</td>
<td>33,730</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>40,900</td>
<td>9,000</td>
<td>28,700</td>
<td>78,600</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. In mid-October, MACV performed a complete review of available information relating to NVA infiltration into South Vietnam. This review included a reexamination of all captured documents, interrogation reports, and agent reports in the MACV files from 1 January 1965. As a result of this reexamination, new criteria and terminology for listing infiltration totals were adopted.

2. **Accepted**
   - Accepted Confirmed: A confirmed unit/group is one which is determined to exist on the basis of information provided by a minimum of two captives, returnees or captured documents (any combination).

   **Accepted Probable**: A probable infiltration unit/group is one believed to exist on the basis of information which can be evaluated as probably true provided by one captive, returnee or captured document.

3. **Possible**: A possible infiltration group/unit is one which is believed to exist on the basis of information which can be evaluated as possibly true, even though no captive, returnee or document is available to verify the report of reports.

4. The total does not represent all infiltration data on hand. Other information is held which, based upon the application of consistent criteria and the professional judgement of analysts has been evaluated as insufficient to warrant inclusion in either of the above categories.
thus amounted to over 78,000 men.

The ratio of North Vietnamese to indigenous Viet Cong battalions rose considerably during 1966. At the end of 1965 there were 66 Viet Cong battalions and 32 North Vietnamese battalions operating in the south. The northern units then comprised about 32% of the overall Communist battalion strength. By the end of 1966, however, the number of regular North Vietnamese battalions had more than doubled over the previous year with 67 battalions in the south. The Viet Cong's force had expanded to 81 battalions during the year. Thus, in one year, Northern units had expanded to approximately 45% of the overall number of 148 Communist maneuver battalions, a fact which testifies to the growing predominance of the northern units and the increasing dependence of the southern Communist forces on Hanoi in order to continue the overall expansion of their military apparatus.

The extent of this dependence cannot be precisely quantified since the exact indigenous manpower resources available to the Communists in South Vietnam, the rate at which they can commit this manpower and their exact combat losses are unknown. The number of Communist troops killed in action is both the most important and the least reliable statistical measure used to assess the military progress of the war. The figure is subject to error because of duplications, omissions, possibly inflated body counts, and the frequent inability to
## Expansion of Communist Force Structure in South Vietnam

### 1960 - 1966

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Viet Cong</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battalions</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>VC Main Force</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strength</td>
<td>5,500</td>
<td>26,700</td>
<td>33,800</td>
<td>34,400</td>
<td>49,300</td>
<td>61,700</td>
<td>64,300</td>
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<td><strong>VC Guerrilla</strong></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Force Strength</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>40,000</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>60,000</td>
<td>60,000</td>
<td>103,600</td>
<td>112,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>North Vietnamese</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battalions</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>67</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>North Vietnamese</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strength</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>26,100</td>
<td>48,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
pinpoint non-military battle casualties. These problems arise from
highly mobile combat situations and the physical impossibility of
accurately counting the dead in a hostile environment. The problems
are compounded by Viet Cong practices of engaging impressed civilian
labor as porters on the battlefield. The number of bodies buried in
caves, tunnels or under debris cannot be assessed, nor can we estimate
the deaths caused by aerial strikes and artillery attacks, where no
follow-up ground action is taken.

According to the best information available, more than 165,000
Communist troops have been reported killed in action since 1959. With some 100,000 of the losses inflicted since 1963. In 1966, over
55,000 were killed in action. Many of these were irregular troops,
however, and the losses cannot be applied directly to the Communist
regular forces. On the other hand, these figures do not include
enemy wounded in action nor those captured or lost to the Communist
force structure through desertion or sickness. Still, however, the
Communists were able to match these losses and even expand their
force structure considerably during 1966. We know, however, that
they did it largely by dint of the additional North Vietnamese
regular units and replacements sent to the South, since the casualties
absorbed by the Viet Cong have begun to put a strain on their
ability to mobilize additional manpower from the local populace in
South Vietnam. There is no way to accurately determine exactly how many men are conscripted or recruited. In 1966, one of the manpower under Viet Cong control (when considered in the light of the amount of territory either directly controlled by the Viet Cong or under no control), indicated that the male population base was adequate to support a theoretical recruitment or conscription levy of approximately 7,000 men per month this and, from what limited evidence is available on the subject, it presently appears that the Communists are having difficulties meeting such levies. There are captured documents which indicate that the increasing requirement for manpower during 1965 had already forced the VC to resort to monetary inducements and to forced conscription and returnee programs to obtain local recruits. During 1966, the manpower requirements increased even more, and the growing seriousness of the problem was reflected in many other captured documents and captive statements.

One particularly knowledgeable source on the subject of recruitment was a North Vietnamese Army Lieutenant Colonel who deserted the Viet Cong cause in the summer of 1966 after serving as the Assistant Chief of Staff for the 5th Viet Cong Division. He stated that his division was short one regiment because of the lack of recruits from the area. He further complained of the quality of the recruits that were able to enlist or conscript stating that the
regular Communist Party cadre had trouble keeping them disciplined under fire as many were under 16 years of age.

The presence of North Vietnamese in large numbers in the South has apparently become so well known among the rural populace in the Viet Cong affected areas by 1966, that the insurgent command found it necessary to provide an official explanation. In a captured document containing propaganda instructions for "questions raised by the public," insurgent cadre are told to admit that "North Vietnam is a large and stable rear area for South Vietnam and is providing us everything we need, including soldiers". The southern insurgent command had also, by 1966, issued instructions for the correct treatment of ethnic North Vietnamese replacement personnel sent south to fill up insurgent units. According to a captured document issued by a division-level military authority in the South, "recruits from North Vietnam" have been assigned to South Vietnam "to liberate this part of the country." The majority of them are "proud of their job," but many have had a hard journey getting to the South and should be given considerate treatment, the document stated. Military personnel were instructed in the document to "absolutely avoid friction . . . disrespect . . . and division" between South Vietnamese and North Vietnamese.

While it is too early to say that the Viet Cong are entirely
dependent on Hanoi for the supply of manpower -- the only war-making commodity that on the surface appears plentiful in the south -- the growing number of North Vietnamese regular units and replacements in Viet Cong units indicates a definite trend in that direction. It might be concluded that if the Viet Cong wished to maintain the present levels of combat indefinitely or increase the intensity of the fighting with the hope of achieving a quick victory, their actions would be predicted almost entirely on the extent of Hanoi's willingness to supply the manpower.

The Viet Cong Arsenal as a Measure of Dependence of Hanoi

The Communists in the South with Hanoi's help, have armed their men in the years since 1964, with the latest automatic weapons from the Communist World. By late 1964, the "new family" of Communist weapons which all chamber a short 7.62 round of ammunition appeared in large numbers in Viet Cong units. This new assortment of weapons included the Soviet AK-47 assault rifle, the SKS carbine, and the RPD light machine-gun. The term family is used because all of these weapons fire the short 7.62-mm cartridge model 1943.

In addition to small arms, the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army units are now supplied with a variety of Soviet and Chinese machine-guns, mortars and rocket launchers. The Soviet 7.62-mm heavy
machine-gun (SGM/SG-43) and the Soviet 12.7-mm heavy machine-gun (DSHK 38/46) are both in wide use. The 40-mm grenade launcher and the 60-mm, 82-mm, and 120-mm mortars are now in the hands of both VC and NVA units. The 57-mm and 75-mm recoilless rifles have also become commonly used weapons by the enemy. The Soviet 140-mm rocket launcher has come into use in recent months.

The percentage of weapons captured since 1963, shows the steady increase in the use of Chinese and Soviet manufactured arms. In 1963, only 8 percent of the captured weapons were of Chinese or Soviet manufacture. In 1964, 17 percent of the captured weapons were from China or the Soviet Union and in 1965, the percentage rose to 24. Another rise was noted in 1966, to 33 percent, and presently, the weapons captured from Viet Cong main and irregular forces contain 41 percent Soviet and Chinese weapons, reflecting the degree of support required from Hanoi.

This percentage can be expected to rise even higher as the Communists attempt to simplify spare parts and ammunition resupply problems. Modern Communist arms have even trickled down to the local guerilla forces which, traditionally, are the poorest equipped elements of the Communist forces in the South. French, US and homemade versions still make up the bulk of local arsenals; however, the French arms are holdovers from the Indochina War and their use is decreasing.
rapidly because of loss, lack of spare parts and general deterioration. The smooth-bore, homemade weapons are not efficient, and they are frequently used merely to show the local populace the VC's manufacturing capability. While a limited capability to hand produce crude weapons has been developed there, no native industrial base exists which would provide the Communists with the modern arms and ammunition required to maintain levels of combat such as we have witnessed in the past three years. Future equipment for these local guerilla forces will increasingly depend on newer weapons provided by Hanoi.

As significant as the weapons themselves is the ammunition requirement for these new arms. Battle demands for rifle, machine-gun, and mortar ammunition are counted in tons. Captured or stolen U. S. Ammunition of the same caliber is not interchangeable with the "new family" weapons, and it presently appears that the Communist main forces are more and more becoming dependent on external supply to meet these increasing needs.
## COMMUNIST LOSSES IN SOUTH VIETNAM

### 1960 - 1966

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>TOTAL KILLED IN ACTION</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>5,669</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>12,133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>21,158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>20,575</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>16,785</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>35,436</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>55,524</td>
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WEAPONS CAPTURED FROM COMMUNIST FORCES
IN SOUTH VIETNAM
1960 - 1967

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>TOTAL WEAPONS CAPTURED</th>
<th>WEAPONS MIX</th>
<th>SOVIET</th>
<th>US</th>
<th>FRENCH</th>
<th>HOMEMADE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>Data not available</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>2,753</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>4,019</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>5,397</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>5,881</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>11,595</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>15%</td>
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<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>18,666</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>15%</td>
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<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>8,970</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>15%</td>
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<tr>
<td>1st quarter</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER I

1. The term Viet Minh is an abbreviation of the Viet Nam Doc Lap Dong Minh Hoi or Vietnam Independence League which was established in 1941 as an anti-Japanese organization. Through a series of purges, the Communists continually gained control of the Viet Minh although it still contained a number of non-Communist nationalist elements. It was under the aegis of this organization that the anti-French forces operated in both North and South Vietnam during the Indochinese War.

Although Vietnam was technically a single country before 1954, the terms North Vietnam and South Vietnam are used here loosely in discussing the pre-1954 period to refer to northern and southern regions. These were, in fact, administered separately along with Annam or Central Vietnam.


3. Ibid., p. 154

4. Ibid., p. 23


6. Op Cit., (footnote 2) Truong Chin, p. 21
FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER I (CONTINUED)

7. Op Cit., Nhan Dan

8. See Volume II, item 1

9. See Volume II, item 2

10. Op Cit. Truong Chin, p. 36

11. See Volume II, item 12

12. See Volume II, item 13

13. See Volume II, item 14

14. See Volume II, item 15


16. See Volume II, item 3
FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER I (CONTINUED)

17. See Volume II, items 4, 5, 6, 7. In addition Hanoi radio announced Le Daun's presence in South Vietnam as "Political Commissar" on 19 September 1951.

18. See Volume II, item 8

19. See Volume II, items 3, 5, 6, and 7

20. See Volume II, items 3, 5, 6, 7, and 9


22. Several leaders were named on Hanoi radio on 8 Sept. 1950 and 6 Nov. 1950.

23. See Volume II, item 16

24. *Ibid*

25. See Volume 2, item 4, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22.

FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER I (CONTINUED)

27. See Volume 2, item 27

28. See Volume 2, item 8

29. See Volume 2, item 28

30. See Volume 2, item 29

31. See Volume 2, item 30

32. See Volume 2, item 31

33. See Volume 2, item 32

34. See Volume 2, item 27

35. Op Cit. Nhan Dan

36. See Volume 2, item 33

37. There are numerous accounts of these violations in the early Diem White Papers. See
FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER I (CONTINUED)

38. An excellent account of North Vietnamese policy during this period is contained in Hoang Van Chi's "From Colonialism To Communism" (London, 1964). Chi was an eyewitness to many of the events he describes. See also Volume II, item 34 for an account of the refugees and the rebellions in North Vietnam.

39. See Volume II, item 22

40. See Volume II, items 18, 20 and 35

41. See Volume II, item 20

42. See Volume II, item 35

43. See Volume II, item 36

44. Hanoi, Vietnamese News Agency 3 September 1957

45. Hanoi, Vietnamese News Agency 30 October 1957

46. Hanoi, Vietnamese News Agency 19 February 55 also see Volume II, item 37

47. See Volume II, item 20
FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER I (CONTINUED)

48. Nhan Dan op Cit.

49. See Volume II, item 38

50. See Volume II, item 39

51. Hanoi, Vietnamese Nen Agency 27 December 1959

52. Hanoi, NCC TAP issue 8 and 9 August-September 1960

53. Nhan Dan Op Cit.

54. Ibid


56. Ibid p. 63

57. Ibid p. 188-189
CHAPTER II

58. Ibid p. 63

59. See Volume II, item 40

60. See Volume II, item 41

61. An excellent example of the party role and goal for the Front in guiding the populace is contained in a set of instructions issued by a Viet Cong regional Committee in February 1961 to provincial committees and captured later in Tay Ninh Province. It is contained in the Department of State white paper A THREAT TO THE PEACE. Washington, 1961 pp. 96-97.

62. See Volume II, item 42

63. See Volume II, item 43

64. See Volume II, item 44

65. See Volume II, item 45

66. See Volume II, item 46

FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER III (CONTINUED)


69. See Volume II, item 47.

70. See Volume II, item 48.

71. See Volume II, item 49.

72. See Volume II, item 50.

73. See Volume II, item 51.

74. See Volume II, items 52 through 62.

75. Ibid

76. See Volume II, item 57.

CHAPTER II (CONTINUED)

78. Liberation Broadcasting Station (Clandestine) 25 January 1964 (FBIS Far East Daily Report 29 January 64)

79. See Volume II, item 63

80. See Volume II, Items 52-62

81. See Volume II, item 64

82. See Volume II, item 65

83. See Volume II, item 66

84. See Volume II, items 67 through 74

85. See Volume II, item 75 also see photograph on page _______.

86. See Volume II, items 64-74

87. See Volume II, items 64-74

88. See Volume II, item 76
FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER II (CONTINUED)

89. See Volume II item 77

90. See Volume II, item 78

91. See Volume II, item 79

92. See Volume II item 80
FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER III

93. See Volume II, item 81

94. See Volume II, item 82

95. See Volume II, item 83

96. See Volume II, item 84

97. See Volume II, item 85

98. See Volume II, item 83, 86, 87 and 88

99. See Volume II, item 89

100. See Volume II, item 90

101. See Volume II, item 91

102. See Volume II, item 92, 93, 94
FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER III (CONTINUED)

103. See graph on page _______ for a detailed breakout of infiltration data from 1959 to 1966.

104. See Volume II, item 95

105. Ibid

106. Ibid

107. See Volume II, item 91

108. Ibid

109. See graph on page _______ for a detailed breakout of infiltration data. Attention is invited to the intelligence criteria established for "confirming" and accepting as "probable-possible" the infiltration of personnel which is explained in the footnotes.

110. See Volume II items 93 and 94.

111. See Volume II, item 96

112. See the graph on page _______ for a detailed breakout of the expansion of the Communist force structure from 1960 to 1966.
FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER III (CONTINUED)

113. See the graph on page for a detailed breakout of weapons captured in South Vietnam.

114. See Volume II, item 96.


116.

117. See Volume II, item 97.

118. Ibid

119. The introduction of large size North Vietnamese units has been amply documented. Sample interrogations of at least one prisoner from each regular regiment which came South are included in Volume II. The total number of prisoners taken from each unit is shown in the chart on page______.

120. See Volume II, item 98.

121. See Volume II, item 99.
FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER III (CONTINUED)

122. See Volume II, item 98.

123. See Volume II, item 100.


125. See Volume II, item 102.

126. See Volume II, item 103.

127. See Volume II, item 104.

128. See Volume II, item 105.

129. See Volume II, item 106.

130. See Volume II, item 107.

131. See Volume II, item 108.


133. See Volume II, item 110.
FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER III (CONTINUED)

134. See Volume II, item 111

135. See graph on page______ for chronological listing of the infiltration of North Vietnamese regiments into South Vietnam. Shown also on the same chart are the number of prisoners on which the confirmation of these units is based as well as the number of captured documents used in the confirmation. The total number of prisoners taken from each regiment is also shown.

136. The above narrative describing the late 1964 and 1965 engagements was gleaned from a multitude of daily, weekly, and monthly operational reports submitted by US MACV headquarters, J-2 Staff, Saigon.

137. See Volume II, Item 90.

138. See the map on page______ which shows the yearly progress of road construction in Laos since 1964.

139. See Volume II, items 112 and 113

140. See Volume II, item 114

141. See Volume II, item 115
FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER III (CONTINUED)

142. See Volume II, item 116

143. See Volume II, item 117

144. See Volume II, item 118

145. See Volume II, item 119

146. See Volume II, item 120

147. See Volume II, item 121

148. See the graph on page_______.

149. See illustrations on pages_______.

150. A detailed breakout of the number and origin of weapons captured in South Vietnam is provided in the graph on page_______.

151. See the graph on page

152. See Volume II, item 122

FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER III (CONTINUED)

153. See Volume II, item 123

154. See Volume II, item 124.
12.7MM HEAVY MACHINEGUN (SOVIET DBKH 38/46, CHICOM TYPE 54) STANDARD FOR NVA UNITS, ANTI-AIRCRAFT SUPPORT AUTOMATIC ARMOR PIERCING – INCINDIARY AMMUNITION, 600 RND/S/MIN (CYCLIC). 80 RND/S/MIN (PRACTICAL) EFFECTIVE RANGE–GROUND 1640 YDS, AA 1100 YDS, (CHICOM AND SOVIET TYPES CAPTURED)
7.62MM ASSAULT RIFLE (SOVIET AK-47, CHICOM TYPE 56) STANDARD FOR NVA UNITS, AUTOMATIC, SEMI-AUTOMATIC, M-1943 AMMUNITION, 400 RND/MIN (CYCLIC) 80 RND/MIN (PRACTICAL).
EFFECTIVE RANGE - 440 YARDS SOVIET, CHICOM AND NORTH KOREAN MODELS CAPTURED.
82-MM MORTAR (SOVIET M 1937, COMMUNIST TYPE 53) USED BY BOTH VC AND NVN UNITS
5.9 LB. HE PROJECTILE CAN FIRE US 81-MM AMMUNITION
MAX. RANGE 3,320 YARDS
ONLY COMMUNIST CHINA TYPE CAPTURED.
50mm Mortar (US Design, CHICOM Type 31) Used by Both VC and NVA Units
3.25 lb HE Projectile
Maximum Range - 1675 YDS.
(Only CHICOM Type Captured)
40MM ANTI-TANK GRENADE LAUNCHER
(SOVIET RPG-2, CHICOM TYPE 76)
USED BY BOTH VC AND NVA UNITS.
8MM HEAT GRENADE EFFECTIVE
RANGE—110 YDS., ARMOR PENETRATION
7 IN. (ONLY CHICOM TYPES CAPTURED
DESIGNATED B-40 BY NVA)
7.62MM CARBINE (SOVIET SKS, CHICOM TYPE 56) PRINCIPALLY USED IN NVA UNITS, SEMI-AUTOMATIC, M1943 AMMUNITION, 20 RND/MIN. EFFECTIVE RANGE 440 YARDS (BOTH SOVIET, CHICOM, AND NORTH KOREAN TYPES CAPTURED).

7.6MM LIGHT MACHINEGUN (SOVIET RPD, CHICOM TYPE 56) STANDARD FOR NVA UNITS (SQUAD SUPPORT). AUTOMATIC, M 1943 AMMUNITION, 750 RND/MIN (CYCLIC), 150 RND/MIN. (PRACTICAL) EFFECTIVE RANGE- 875 YARDS (SOVIET, CHICOM AND NK TYPES CAPTURED).
120-MM MORTAR (SOVIET M-1543, CHICOM TYPE 15) USED BY NVA AND POSSIBLY VIET CONG UNITS
33.9LB. HE PROJECTILE
MAX. RANGE 6,233 YARDS
CHICOM AMMUNITION AND BIPOD CAPTURED

57MM RECOILLESS RIFLE (US DESIGN, CHICOM TYPE 36) USED BY BOTH VC AND NVA UNITS
HE AND HEAT AMMUNITION
MAXIMUM RANGE—4,900 YDS.
(ONLY CHICOM TYPE CAPTURED)
75-MM RECOILLESS RIFLE (US DESIGN, COMMUNIST CHINA TYPES 54 AND 56) USED BY BOTH VC AND NVA. HE AND HEAT AMMUNITION MAX. RANGE 3,300 YARDS ONLY COMMUNIST CHINA TYPE CAPTURED
MACHINE GUNS, MORTARS, & RECOILESS RIFLES IN USE BY COMMUNIST FORCES IN SOUTH VIETNAM

7.62MM HEAVY MACHINEGUN (SOVIET SGM/SQ-43, CHICOM TYPE 57/53)
STANDARD FOR NVA UNITS, BATTALION SUPPORT, AUTOMATIC.
M 1908 AMMUNITION, 700 RND/Min (CYCLIC), 250 RND/Min (PRACTICAL)
EFFECTIVE RANGE - 1100 YARDS
(BOTH SOVIET AND CHICOM MODELS CAPTURED).
Evidence of the thoughts of the National Liberation-Front leadership on the question of peace negotiations and on world politics, including Sino-Soviet dissension, is contained in a notebook of an unidentified Communist party cadre. The notebook is one of a number of enemy documents captured by the U.S. 199th Light Infantry Brigade last July on operations in and around Nau Nghia province, west of Saigon. The main portion of the notebook, reprinted herewith, records guidance given in an 1967 re-orientation course to party personnel of Viet Cong Military Region IV (Saigon and adjacent area).

The cadre's re-orientation notes also include a report of comments purportedly made by Ho Chi Minh and Hanoi Politburo officials to "our delegation." The comments of Ho Chi Minh — President of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, chairman of its National Defense Council and chairman of the (Communist) Workers' Party (Dang Lao Dong) — as reported are not indicative of any change or new development in the party's concept of the revolutionary war in the south.

The passages reporting the party hierarchy's views on the question of peace negotiations likewise confirm the policy stated in previously captured secret Viet Cong documents — that of fighting while negotiating. Peace negotiations will be entered into only from a military position of strength and will serve primarily to "provide us the groundwork (or the objective preconditions) from which to launch our general offensive"..."This means that the war will be settled only on the battlefield, not in the conference room."
The brief's statement of Vietnamese Communist party's position toward the Sino-Soviet contention, as reported by the cadre note-taker, was one of discreet disapproval of the way China and the Soviet Union are doing things. But the brief's pointed out that both major Communist powers have been helping the Viet Cong--Hanoi war effort "in all sincerity." He noted, however, that the Soviet Union has not given Hanoi its most modern weapons types (particularly the newest rocket and missile systems) for fear of their being copied by the Chinese.

The cadre's notes indicate that the Vietnamese Communists are critical of certain aspects of the "cultural revolution" in China and of the "revisionists" in Russia. Nevertheless, he noted, "China is determined to help us fight until the generations of our sons and grandsons." The Soviet Union, on the other hand, "wants us to go to the peace negotiation table."

Throughout, the document reaffirms the Communist leadership's basic strategy of protracted revolutionary warfare through what they call the "three-pronged attack": that is, military action supported by a political offensive and proselytizing within the enemy ranks. The "two-pronged attack" is the standard phraseology used by the Communist side to characterize the South Vietnamese-Allied strategy of coordinated and mutually supporting military and pacification campaigns.

In this document, as in many others, it will be noted that the revolutionary leadership, despite repeated expressions of optimism, displays serious concern both with the allies' military power and equally with the "other war," especially with the Chieu Hoi (Open Arms program of welcome and reconciliation for Viet Cong defectors) aspect of pacification.

The cadre's notebook entries covering the 1967 political re-orientation course are reprinted verbatim herewith.
### Significance

*Reason for the 1967 Orientation:*

Through one year of bitter combat, we have attained many great achievements, but we have also displayed many shortcomings in ideology, viewpoint, and understanding. Consequently, the 1967 orientation was held with the view of elevating and developing our ideology and viewpoint in addition to overcoming deficiencies. Naturally therefore, this phase bears a characteristic difference from other phases of orientation.

**Purpose:**

1. Promote awareness of resolutions and letters from the Central Headquarters which pertain to policy lines and strategy resulting from evaluations of our victory and of the enemy's cruel schemes (their two-pronged attack plan in the dry season failed).

2. Elevating ideology means to eliminate rightism pessimism which destroys combat spirit, sacrifice, and the elimination of the fear of Americans, etc. and to break the spirit of internal dispute which makes one dissatisfied, negatively affecting his work. The internal dispute also materializes as a result of literal attitudes, irresponsible speech, violation of regulations; and desire for fame and position.

3. Efforts should be made at all times to display professional skill and to have a correct attitude.

4. Our basic viewpoints should be strengthened:
   - Viewpoint concerning the people
     - Staying close to the people
     - Understanding the people
   - Concept of the use of violence
   - Concept of unrelenting revolution
   
   We should develop the concept of thriftiness and loyalty and the concept of building up the Army.

5. Types of forces should be improved, and emphasis should be placed upon quality. Organization should be simple and neat to ensure fulfillment of battlefield requirements.

**Slogans:**

- Self-critique for self-improvement
- Collectivity is important.

**Causes of Casualties:**

During the first 3 months of 1967, 120 comrades were killed, captured, or surrendered; this is the highest total so far.

The reasons:

- Incorrect evaluation of the enemy situation and friendly requirements.
- Our leadership is not yet good; thus we have regrettable losses.

The guerrilla failed to rise:

- Lack of grenades
- The leading ideology
- Poor guiding thoughts

**Methods:**

- Letters from the Central Headquarters (called directives)
- Resolutions
- Self-critiques
- Documents recommended by the Military Affairs Committee, Cell 7/1.

Difficulties met during the orientation:

* Normally a problem concerning a battle, a mission, etc., requires the coordination of work within the area, as 6th Bn 7 and various branches. At present, we are unable to reasonably solve any question when we work alone.

* We are not in a position to remain in Areas 3 and 5; Thus we cannot plan operations there.

**RESOLUTION OF THE CU - [Party Committee or Political Commissar]**

* Situation in Red China:
  - Definition of the Cultural Revolution
  - Its content
  - Its methods
  - Its influence toward the Vietnamese Revolution

1. We conclude that every country should stage a cultural revolution; however, that of Red China has been applied even along the political, tactical and strategical lines. Consequently, different collectivities have stood against one another. (It is a thing we should avoid in the future).

To correctly conduct the cultural revolution, we should rely upon the Party, the people, and the workers, ! but not upon the Red Guards.

Does this situation influence the Revolution in Vietnam? No. Although the two factions oppose each other on internal matters there are no contradictions in their resolve to help us unconditionally in our struggle against the U.S. They consider us just like themselves. If North Vietnam was attacked by US troops, China will not be left in peace.

However, this political crisis has affected us in that it resulted in the U.S. escalating the air war in North Viet-Nam. Because the U.S. thought China was weak, they escalated the air war. But the more the US escalates the war of destruction in North Viet-Nam, the more China will help us.

* Soviet Union's situation: There have been many changes in the Soviet Union since Sup So Khrushchev was removed from power. Recently, the Soviet Union has given us anything we wanted, however, a number of revisionists still exist among the authorities of the Soviet Union.

The following are viewpoint differences between China and the Soviet Union:

The Soviet Union wants us to go to the peace negotiation table.

But China does not agree with the Soviet Union. China is determined to help us fight until the generations of our sons and grandsons.

Do these differences influence the Revolution in Vietnam? In general, this has no influence because both China and the Soviet Union help us in all sincerity. The Soviet Union, however, does not provide us with modern weapons because the Soviet Union fears that the modern weapons types would be copied by China.

Some friendly political Parties in Eastern Europe told us that the Soviet Union has many types of rifles (S.R.C.) that fire rockets or missiles.

* Our Party's attitude toward this problem:

We have not yet had any conclusion on this problem because the Cultural Revolution in China has not ended. We, however, do not approve of the way China and the Soviet Union are
In the mean time, our Party have a policy of its own.

* Our delegation was received by Bác Ho Chi Minh / and members of the Political Department.

After the report at the reception which assessed the situation in South Vietnam (made by our delegation), Bác / Ho Chi Minh / and members of the Political Department offered the following comments:

Strong points:
- The revolutionary policy is historically true.
- Our fighting spirit is high; our people are a heroic race.
- Party leadership is determined to win in all situations, in any type of war, and is continuing to fight very fiercely.
- The SVN Party Guiding Committee displays resourcefulness and initiative (depending on the place and time).
- The revolutionary forces in SVN stay close to the people, keep the people well in hand and know how to base their plans upon the people.

In particular, in our districts:
- Our workers are strong and work hard.
- We are all active in missions because we have launched continuous attacks on the enemy.
- We know how to take advantage of contradictions among the enemy ranks in order to make them fight against each other.

US "PIN CER" Plan

Why do changes occur in the US policy in Vietnam:

To directly take part in the war in Vietnam, the US sent its troops to SVN. But, in only a short period of time, US troops have suffered three strategical defeats.

First time: In the Summer of 1965, we heavily defeated the 500,000 soldier puppet troops, and they became disrupted; the US was then forced to send its troops to SVN.

Second time: Totally unsuccessful in the dry season counter-attacks, the US increased its troop strength in SVN to 200,000 soldiers, and then to 250,000 soldiers at the end of the dry season.

Third time: Continuously defeated during the dry season of 1966, they became passive and confused.

- Why do US troops change approaches a number of times?

- Because US troops have known many failures in using special forces to attack us. Of the puppet army's 10 divisions only five are able to fight in a limited way while the other five are disorganized and demoralized. In addition, the puppet government has been continuously disrupted.

What did the US troops do in the face of these defeats?

- They sent more US troops to SVN to save the puppet troops from being destroyed.

Because of the strength increases in the South, US troops drew up the counter-attack plan for the dry season of 1965 and 1966 (the Cabot Lodge and Lansdale plan) in order to:

- Annihilate our main forces
- Pacify the rural areas
- Reconsolidate the puppet troops and government.

Results: They have failed because they could not destroy our main force - not even 1 C company or 1 b platoon or our key agencies while they suffered heavy losses.

* Change in our "Canh" / Sub-Region 7

Even though the enemy used the Popular Forces and Regional Forces and increased their forces from two to three d's / battalions, they were unable to operate; therefore, they had to launch 8d's / battalions / of Regular Forces to combat the friendly army. But all their soldiers were afraid of death.

* Military comment: The enemy forces were in blocking but defensive positions.
* Political comment: The enemy scheme was cunning and demagogic.

LH / sic When the enemy conducted a sweep-operation in the 22nd area for 11 days and nights, we had to delay and we attacked their inspecting vehicles such as in TH, etc. / sic

The enemy scheme was aimed at destroying and dispersing our force. But we were still able to engage in the big battles. This fact was recognized by the enemy; the forces used to attack Da Nang, Quang Tri etc. / sic were of regimental and battalion size.

In our local area, we saw that the enemy realized the pacification program by using a double envelopment maneuver, in areas 1, 2, 3 and 4 and the outside areas.

Past situation: The puppet troops would conduct a Chieu Hoi / Open Arms / program as a pacification program.

- The enemy would conduct a demagogic policy.

The evaluation of the chapter committee is true in that the Americans would be killed. But what should the guidance be? What type of explosive charge should be used? None.

The trouble is that our leaders are far away. Shall we ask their instructions? We would lose the opportunity.

* The puppet army and government proved ineffective; they could not control the people and gain their backing. The puppet army was disrupted, even their division; the divisions were merely in charge of holding the roads.

* The enemy pacification program has failed while the guerrilla warfare movement has been developing. We continuously attacked the enemy even in the deep areas of S/g / possibly Saigon /.

* Because of the fierce war, the US has lost much manpower and materiel. The Americans gain nothing, and the cost of the war became increasingly expensive.

* Although realizing their failure, the enemy's aggressive intention still existed, and they twice summoned conferences at Honolulu and Manila.

* 1. The double-envelopment maneuver:

1'. The enemy concentrated their military to terrorize and massacre the people and to destroy our bases, our jungle area and field fortifications.

2'. They pacified the weak areas of S/g / possibly Saigon / to drive out the friendly forces (they destroyed parts of our structure and bases).

- They tried to gain the support of the people.

* 2. The enemy plan failed but it was cruel and inhuman.

- We should understand from what situation the plan developed and the cause of its failure.

- The enemy established their installations.
The US forces launched sweep operations.

- The symbol of our determination.

The enemy classified three areas to attack:

- The priority areas for pacification.

In our local area, three areas were attacked at the same time. The enemy used military power to drive out our forces.

It is incorrect when it is said that we were passive and active at the same time. When the enemy launched a Corps in Tay Ninh Province, were we passive? And when they retreated, were we active?

* Is the enemy situation in our area active or passive?

- They were in a passive position.

* The enemy's cunning scheme:

They attacked three areas and used three plans at the same time.

* Our difficulties:

- At our base QY

- Our strength was not supplemented with replacement personnel.

- Weapons, ammunition, and medicine

- Our organizations in weak areas

We saw that the Americans were defeated but they still had an intransient attitude. They used makeshift tactics.

* Our ability to defeat the Americans:

- Our military power was used to continuously attack the enemy

- Our forces gained the support of the people

- The contradiction between the enemy was developed.

- The puppet troops had been disrupted

- The Americans were isolated.

The puppet troops were defeated during the French domination. Now they are continuously attacked by our forces. Some of their units were so depleted that they were dissolved and lost their identity.

- The priority areas for operations.

- The areas for future operations.

The enemy attacks:

The enemy strove to gain the support of the people and attacked our forces in three phases:

- Clear

- Control the security situation

- Reconstruct.
In brief: The enemy increased their strength because they wanted to restore the situation; we saw that they were very wicked and obdurate.

*3. The new US plan would fail because their weak points were basic and our advantages were fundamental:

The contradictions and difficulties were:

1. Previously, the Americans intended to defeat the friendly force with their military power, and then they returned to conduct the pacification program. That was a backwards step. As a result any plan of theirs would fail.

2. If they wanted to gain the backing of the people, they had to have a stabilized government. But it is a fact that their government is a corrupted one. So how could they carry out the pacification program?

3. The main force for their pacification program was the Regular Force. But this force could only fight against our guerrilla force, our agencies, and our people. It could not confront our Main Force. The enemy forces were very fragile and the friendly forces were very strong; therefore, the outcome would be in our favor.

4. The Americans used the puppet troops for the pacification program because they wanted to avoid our heavy blows. The puppet soldiers consider this action contemptuous so the dissenion between the enemy ranks increases.

5. The Americans intend to control and hold the people; however, the methods they use are cruel and show many contradictions. As a result, their pacification program and the scheme for holding the population are difficult to implement successfully.

The hostile troops are always annihilated whether they are concentrated or dispersed.

All the plans drafted by the enemy contain self-contradictions. This is attributed to the fact that they want to defeat us quickly, but their means and methods of attack cause the war to drag on. The longer they extend the war, the more isolated the Americans become.

*4. To disrupt the two pronged attack, what problem should be solved first?

In an attempt to defeat us quickly, but their means and methods of attack cause the war to drag on. The longer they extend the war, the more isolated the Americans become.

In order to achieve final victory, we must not only gain achievements in the military field, but in all other fields. From this beginning, we must motivate the people in order to obtain their widespread participation in our activities.

Resolution: (There are two parts: the supplementary part and the part concerning Party Committee echelons).

1. Supplementary part
   - Definition of policies
   - Definition of guidelines
   - Definition of strategems