RECAPITULATIVE REPORT

[Phase of attack on Hue from 31 January to 25 February 1968]

A. Overall Situation:
- Enemy Situation before the day of the Attack on Hue
- Terrain Situation
- People's Situation
- Friendly Unit's Situation
- Main Advantages and Difficulties

B. Missions of the Regiment:
Policy and Determination of the Party Committee and the Commander
Combat plan.

I. Missions of the Regiment

II. Policy and determination of the Party Committee and Commander

III. Combat plan

C. Combat Evolution:
* Phases of Movement, bivouacking and temporary halting at the assembly point.
* Phase of troop deployment, opening fire and combat evolution
* Constantly fight the enemy counterattacks inside and outside the citadel
* Organize withdrawal from the City.

D. Results of the Battle:
- Causes for Victory
- Main Strong and Weak Points
- Lessons of Experience
Successfully realize the First Phase of the General Offensive and Uprising. The Regiment achieved great victory when attacking Hue Citadel which was the main objective defined by the Military Region.

All Overall Situation

1/ The enemy situation inside and outside the Citadel prior to the 30 January 1968 attack on Hue.

A. Inside the Citadel:

- The Headquarters of the 1st puppet Division was in greater Mang Ca area.

- Staff agencies of the Division Headquarters consisted of Military Operations Section, Military Strength Section, Artillery Section, Signal Section and Intelligence Section.

- The Paywar Company consisted of: "Open-Arms" Section, Reform Section and Signal Section.

- The Division Rear Service Office consisted of: Military Medical Company, Quartermaster Section and Supply Section.

- The Headquarters Company consisted of [possibly 150] men in charge of protecting and guarding high ranking officers' residences.

- One guard platoon was at smaller Mang Ca area to protect the jail.

Tây Lộc Air-field: Enemy forces consisted of one airfield protection company, one transportation company with 12 helicopters and one to three L19 reconnaissance aircraft, one technician element and advisory pilot team.

- When the date of our attack was drawing near, the enemy increased over 50 aircraft and approximately 100 vehicles of various types.

- Ordnance area.

- There was a repairing shop for various equipment. The area was safeguarded by a protection force with fortifications and strong firepower points.

- Đài Noi [Imperial City]:

One reconnaissance company was stationed in this area. This was also a gathering place of officials, cruel tyrants and reactionary party members. The reconnaissance company members usually operated in the airfield area and a number of places in the City.
In general, the equipment used for defense and mobility was full. Therefore, enemy troops were usually ready for operations to protect the City. In addition to the forces mentioned above, there was also one battalion of field policemen, national policemen, and traffic control policemen who were fully armed and had enough transportation means.

This battalion was organized into platoons stationed in the citadel and its vicinity as follows:

- Police platoon stationed at An Hoa Post
- Police platoon stationed at Đồng Ba Post
- Police platoon stationed at Gia Hội Post
- Police platoon stationed at Cửa Trai Post
- Police platoon stationed at Đô Thành Post
- Police platoon stationed at Cầu Đất Post
- Police platoon stationed at Tây Lộc Post

Units protecting various precincts. The unit protecting the Citadel was stationed at Đặng Dung Street, the National Public Security Agency was stationed at Chi Lăng Street and the Citadel police station at Thị Diệm Street. The M-113 APC Company was sometimes stationed in the Citadel and surrounding areas to support patrol teams and provide reinforcement.

B. Outside the Citadel:

To the north was the Hướng Tra Sub-Sector and the radar station. The area was manned by one Regional Force Company protecting An Hội Bridge, two Popular Force platoons and Seventy US engineers constructing the bridge.

* In the south west, there was one Regional Force Company stationed here to protect the Bạch Thò and Gia Viễn Bridges. Mobile units were usually stationed outside the Citadel. For examples: one Rehabilitation Center Battalion stationed at Văn Thanh, Kim Long and Kẻ Van. One airborne battalion usually stationed at La Chữ, Chợ Thống, Hướng Căn and Tiên Phước and another battalion usually stationed at Ru Lâu, An Hội, An Lộc. These forces usually launched sweep and pacification operations to protect Huế and stationary units.

At Bồng Bong, there was one US marine battalion and at Mỹ Khánh one US cavalry battalion; at Phố Trách one artillery battalion and one M41 Armor Group; one battalion at Tự Ngũ Tây, two battalions at Phú Bài, and D2/E3 [2nd Battalion, 3d Regiment] at Rù Lâu.
There were 32 fully-equipped Popular Force Platoons stationed at the following hamlets [sic].

- Enemy Defense Systems Inside and Outside the Citadel:

  The City was occupied by the enemy for a long time [in the Citadel, there was also the population]. The enemy set up three lines for defense.

  1. Positions outside the Citadel [mobile units, Hướng Trà [district unit], Regional force and Popular force units]

  2. Positions around the old Citadel.

  3. Various quartering areas inside the Citadel.

  Enemy troops used high, thick walls to build their defense systems. There were blockhouses at every wall-corner and strong firepower positions at the main gates.

  The open emplacements and watchtowers were also placed on and under the gates in order to control all roads leading to the City. The gate doors were made of ironwood and carefully locked.

  The main positions in [Huế] such as Mang Ca Lớn were surrounded by walls four meters high, and ... [sic] thick.

  Blockhouses and watchtowers with firepower were located on top of these walls.

  On each side of the road, there were two or three double apron fences and concertina wire two meters high and from three to four meters wide.

  Walls and houses were built around the Imperial city and Ordnance area.

  The double apron fences, concertina wire, blockhouses and communication trenches were established around the airfield for defense and combat purposes. In addition, another system of communication trenches was dug inside the Citadel.

  Furthermore, the enemy laid mines at various positions around these fortifications.

  + Guard and patrol in the day and Night:

  In the city, the enemy used to concentrate his troops in the guard positions in each area. For example, many watchtowers were built around the Mang Ca area. More than one squad of troops was assigned to guard the gates [of the Citadel]. They usually slept on the upper parts of the gates of the Citadel or in the houses close
to the gates. They were always ready to light the walls of the Citadel and engage in combat. In addition, the Popular Forces units also guarded around the Citadel and various quarters.

**Patrol:** The enemy patrolled the main positions around the Citadel during the night. There was from one squad to one platoon which patrolled inside the Citadel. They usually used motorbikes or trucks to patrol various watchtowers and to inspect positions. According to the regulations, they generally conducted patrol one to three times every night beginning at 2200 hours and later.

+ During the day, besides the guard and patrol teams mentioned above, the police elements also operated inside and around the Citadel. Their mission was to maintain security and order.

With the characteristics of a division headquarters agency and subordinate units, the activities of the enemy were to defend and protect the city of Hue, especially the military area. They also had the mission of maintaining security, order and protecting the Citadel and its surrounding areas. The mobile forces outside the Citadel had to carry out the pacification program and cope with large attacks launched from the outside. The officers and soldiers who work in the division headquarters usually closed their office and returned to their homes after the administrative working hours. Only a fixed number of them who were on duty had to stay there.

+ Composition and **Spirit of Enemy Soldiers:** Most of the enemy officers working in the Division Headquarters were sons of the bourgeois and landlord classes, or the officers who were physically unfit and released from various units. The major part of the police and reconnaissance units were tyrants and scoundrels who carried out subversive activities. They had a weak morale and poor combat capability.

**Conclusion:** Although the enemy soldiers were numerous, most of them were in stationary and defensive positions. They relied only on the outer perimeter defense and were overconfident and negligent. The defense system outside the city was stronger and more effective than the system inside.

- The officers, Air Force personnel such as those working at the division Headquarters, and the soldiers working at various officers did not form a complete combat unit.

- The Precinct Police unit did not set up fortified defenses, had little experience and a low level of combat and technical skills. The Popular and Regional Forces were even weaker.

+ During the past period the enemy has increased his forces such as the Puppet Airborne and Marine Battle Group, also US and South Korean units. They were the mobile forces which were much more perfect because of strong air support, artillery and armored vehicles. All the same, the enemy was basically still in the defensive position and showed a low morale. Many combined units demonstrated their poor combat capability.
II. SITUATION OF THE TERRAIN:

Being a big city which was built a long time ago, the Citadel was enclosed by a wall made of soil and brick, measuring from 5.8 meters to six meters high, and from eight to 50 meters wide.

There were eight large gates to allow movement in and out of the Citadel (the rear gate in the north was closed) [Hue] city was divided into four quarters.

- The first quarter was the one inside the Citadel.
- The second quarter included Trần Hưng Đạo, Phan Bội Châu and Huỳnh Thúc Kháng streets.
- The third quarter included Thông Nhất and Lê Văn Duyệt streets.
- The fourth quarter was the eastern area of the Citadel.

The city was divided into areas according to intersections and crossroads. Brick houses with one or two floors are intercatated with houses roofed with corrugated iron.

In the middle of the Citadel, besides different deep, large and small ponds there was the Nhi Hà River flowing from east to west. At its two ends there were two culverts (the Thủy Quan and Thanh Long culverts) some sections of the River were swimmable but some others were shallow and muddy like the section at the Mỹ Lợi Bridge. There were one or two walls encircling the Imperial City and the Greater and Smaller Mang Cá areas. These walls were from three to four meters high and were very thick. Inside the Citadel pits were dug along the walls. They were ten meters wide and three or four meters deep and contained water. The border of the Citadel was surrounded by pits, from five to ten meters away. They were about 20 meters wide and three or four meters deep. They contained muddy water. Dense grass also grew in some places.

Roads: The National Road 1, stretching from north to south, was near the west of the Citadel and a railroad ran parallel with it. The surface of the road was higher than the two sides. One road stretched from the end of Trang Tiền Bridge bordered the west of the Citadel and ran to Văn Củ, Hương Cầu. Two roads sketching from the two ends of the An Hòa Bridge ran to Bảo Vinh Bridge. One road stretched from the end of Bach Thố Bridge to Gia Rọi Bridge. One road ran from Bach Thố to Thiên Mụ [Pagoda] and another one led from Cửa Hậu [the rear gate] to Le Khi. All the above roads were large, paved with stones and covered with asphalt. All kinds of vehicles could pass over these roads which were very favorable for transportation. Besides the above roads, there were dirt roads running from them to various hamlets and villages.

Waterways: The perfume river was in the south of the Citadel and flowed to Cửa Thuận [geaport]. It was deep and about 250 to
400 meters wide. All types of boats, motor-boats and small warships could pass on it. One canal was dug in the exterior of the Citadel, stretching from the Hương River (Perfume River) [near Bach Thọ bridge] and flowing around the Citadel to Bao Vinh and then returning to the Hương River.

For each Section, it has different names such as Kế Văn, Sông Dào, Cạ Hầu or Đồng Ba. They were from 15 to 30 meters wide, swimmable in some sections and small boats could easily pass on them. The Long Hà river is connected with the Kế Văn river. It ran along Long An and Ninh Hà, then along the wall of the Citadel to the west.

It was deep with water, about 50 to 80 meters wide and entered the city of Huế from the north west. In addition, there were a few other rivers, from 25 to 70 meters wide. They were shallow but swimmable at some places.

Villages and ricefields: Villages were crowded in the west of the citadel but were scattered in the north. They were in different sizes and bamboo trees were grown around them. Roads, houses, gardens, ponds and pits in the villages were disorderly. The villages of An Hoà, Kim Long, Kế Văn, La Chữ were relatively well organized. However, outside these villages, there were large fields cultivated with rice and other crops.

Notably the fields of Đốc Xo, Bao Vinh were full of water. In addition, large and small mounds of tombs were interwoven in the villages. They were higher than the surface of the fields and are among short trees which grow in some sections of dug pits. Adjacent to the above fields and villages there were hills covered and not covered with trees. These hills stretched from north to south.

Conclusion:

The area surrounding the Citadel had high, broad and solid walls and was surrounded by rivers and roads. In the Citadel there were houses and a rather complicated system of lakes and ponds which divided the area inside and outside the Citadel into many quarters. Therefore it had a big value and was very favourable for defense. In those villages amidst the rice fields, spotted by small and large mounds and filled with groves and rivers, the providing of mutual support was difficult especially in daytime. Particularly in the areas of Xuân Hòa, Văn Xuan, Trúc Lâm and Phú Xuân Village, troop movement could be conducted in daytime with relative secrecy.

III. SITUATION OF THE PEOPLE:

In the city, there were about 100 thousand inhabitants. In the area occupied by the enemy for a long time, there were only shops and stores for consumers but not factories. Besides the old population, there were people coming from various rural areas. Many parties,
facts and reactionary elements gathered and operated in this city, creating a rather complicated situation. But with the struggle traditions of the people, since the August Revolution to the present resistance, the enemy, had used many schemes and tricks in order to destroy our organization. Many struggles were conducted and supported numerously by the people to gain victory.

We still had our organizations such as party chapters, cadre, self-defense units, people's covert or overt organizations and the movement had developed quickly. The suburban and rural area, such as An Ninh Ha, Xuan Hoa, Kim Long, An Hoa and Doc Sh Villages sustained the most oppressive control of the enemy. Through many periods, the enemy established hamlets here to plant his personnel. Now, most of the areas are liberated. Particularly we had strong organizations as in quarter 4 [a city division] and weak areas as the ones in the Citadel.

Although our forces were not equally strong in various areas and quarters all the people had confidence in the Front, in the Liberation army and in victory, particularly, the people in Huong Tra Area they sustained the heaviest enemy oppressive control.

Their resentment against the enemy was in a high degree and they were waiting for the opportunity to arise. However, on the whole, the movement was still weak.

A number of middle-class people gradually lost their confidence in the Americans and their henchmen and inclined to wards the revolution.

IVI. Situation of the Unit:

- In preparing for the new phase of activities the Regiment, had gone through the period of combat coordination and had performed other tasks to realize an overall improvement for the unit.

- In regards to the policies it had successively conducted many political training courses to study directives, the situation, the missions, various policies, the traditions of the Unit etc [sic] These studies were conducted for Party members cadre and soldiers in order to develop 4 excellent Party Chapters and improve low level units.

The degree of knowledge was increased, the ideological problems were solved perfectly. Units, with a new pride were determined to accomplish every mission. The people's organizations were consolidated and stepped up. Their activities could meet the requirements of the missions. Additional cadre and soldiers were assigned and improved.

They were equipped more adequately with various weapons. But in comparison with the former missions, they were still weak in some respects.
Training activities. Since the beginning of July 1967, the Regiment has held many courses of training in combat technique and tactics in order to develop a long-range capability and to serve the immediate missions. In a fixed period of time, various units succeeded in motivating their members to get everything ready before participating in the training courses. Therefore, they attended the training courses with a sense of urgency. At any place they used any spare time for training. They studied day and night. There were many exemplary trainees. The typical examples were in units such as ... Company ... Battalion ... Division.

The wounded and sick comrades also used spare time for training and gained achievements. They used their weapons skillfully. They specialized in using one kind of weapon and knew about the other weapons. Some units succeeded in meeting the new requirements and fought harder. From individual cells to various detachments, they understood more clearly the principles of combat tactics, techniques and movements. They were trained in accordance with the combat plan. The handling of situations and the coordination of combat was based on the targets. The Regiment also based on the particular requirements of every unit such as battalion, sapper unit, firepower unit, signal unit, reconnaissance unit etc [sic] to provide guidance in studying the contents of subjects in order to correspond with every unit's specialized mission and to increase the strength and capabilities of sapper, infantry and heavy weapons units. They also studied the experiences gained by the units who had once attacked the city and the areas of Sia Tu Ha and An Lô ... [sic]. All this was aimed at fully developing our forces in combat in order to gain victory. Cadre studied documents and experiences of the headquarters and various units to clearly understand their principles, contents and viewpoints in order to apply them in training, development of units and combat. Cadre and soldiers at each echelon are urged to successfully carry out the activities and to display creativeness in order to improve their level of knowledge so that they might be put on an equal footing.

Rear Service: It was a big task. It had a situation filled with difficulties, for many troops were sick. Some battalions had only 86% of its troops present at the destination. The newly-arrived 2d Battalion had not yet completely recovered. The transportation and replacement of equipment and supplies met difficulties, because the facilities, manpower and material resources were limited and the requirements were great. The units recruited in the local areas must be equipped more fully in all respects so that their troops can embark upon a long range and continual fighting.
The Rear Service Section clearly understood the missions of the Party, Cadre and soldiers assumed the development and combat missions, under planned guidance. They perfectly accomplished all tasks. For the specialized missions, they worked out plans that would be used before, after or during combat. They also succeeded in anticipating the situation.

The organization and replenishment of units were improved to establish and enlarge the transportation units at the front and rear line in order to follow closely the combat units, to supply them with provisions and ammunition and to evacuate wounded soldiers according to the requirements.

The medical Section had a plan on the prevention and treatment of diseases, on the preparation of medicines and on the insurance of troops' health. They also established medical stations, surgical cells ... [sic] to systematically treat the wounded at the front line and rear line, from high to low levels.

- Ordnance Section - Based on the reviewed missions, the ordnance section distributed supplies according to a fixed quantity and ensured the providing of all supplies to various agencies.

- Quartermaster Section - The quartermaster was charged with providing rice, food, money ... [sic] in order to ensure the adequacy of foodstuffs for the units. However this task was heavy and filled with difficulties. Under the guidance of the Party Committee and the commanders of various echelons, with the assistance of higher echelons and its available capabilities and relying on the local rear service the unit perfectly accomplished its missions and met the requirements of the forthcoming mission.

Advantages and Difficulties:

- Advantages

"As a unit which possessed a combat tradition and which had gone through the preparation period it developed "four excellences" Party Chapter and improved low-level units. Cadre and soldiers from high to low levels achieved solidarity and unit of mind and received missions with an enthusiastic spirit, a heroic pride and a high determination. They emulated one another in order to accomplish every mission with outstanding achievements. The number of cadre was adequate. Many comrades became familiar with the battlefield after carrying out the activities.

- The population hated the enemy, they inclined towards the Front and Liberation Army and had confidence in victory. They were ready to support our troops and coordinate activities intensively.
Before attacking the large city we noted that the enemy was overconfident and had many deficiencies. He was strong outside but weak inside. Although it contained all the leading agencies of the enemy, the enemy troops in the city were heterogeneous and inexperienced in combat, possessed poor combat techniques, and had a deteriorating and declining morale. During the past phases of activities we gained many successes in both North and South Vietnam. Especially in the Tri Thién Huế Military Region our successes aroused enthusiasm among the entire army and people. The enemy was pushed back to a defensive position and we were in a favorable position, capable of attacking the enemy continuously. This constituted a great opportunity for us.

The activity phase of attacking the city was framed up within the plans of the entire region and of the SVN Liberation Army. It created favorable conditions for us and put us in a strong position while it caused dispersion of troop strength and fire power of the enemy.

We also secured the close leadership of the Region Party Committee, the Military Region Party Committee, the Military Region Headquarters and the assistance of various higher echelons as well as the close coordination of friendly troops with the Regiment.

Difficulties.

In a large city we failed to perfectly grasp the enemy situation or send cadre close to every objective for terrain reconnaissance.

We met many difficulties on the movement route such as crossing rivers, eluding enemy's crowded troops. In addition the dog barking, electric light or flares made it difficult for us to keep secret the infiltration of our forces with heavy weapons, especially when we were drawing near the city.

The transportation and supply of food or ammunition and the evacuation of wounded soldiers required a lot of time. On the other hand, the enemy also caused us difficulties in carrying out the above missions.

The organization and the coordination of leadership though being improved left much to be desired. Cadre and soldiers failed to seriously and timely execute orders because their technique and tactics for attacking large cities were limited. They were accustomed to fighting with a dispersed formation rather than as a concentrated unit. Some of them had poor health while the others had just recovered. Moreover they still thought of their own interests and those of their own units.

We met difficulties in attacking the enemy in a large city while his forces were strong and had many facilities and efficient
mobility. Moreover, the activities of various political Parties and the wicked tyrants were very complicated.

We exercised strong leadership, increased our successes and were determined to overcome all difficulties. We sent the Regiment to go to battle with an effervescent pride and a determination to win in order to be worthy of being members of an heroic indomitable Regiment of the People of Tri Thien Hue [MR].

B. Mission of the Regiment, Plan of Activity and Determination of the Party Committee and the Commander.

Combat Plan.

I. Mission of the Regiment.

The mission of the Regiment is to attack and destroy the enemy; occupy Hue Citadel, motivate the populace to revolt and seize the power.

II. Plan and Determination of the Party Committee and the Commander.

Based on the mission assigned to the Regiment by the Military Region and to the realistic situation, it was decided that:

All Party Committee Members, cadre and soldiers must clearly understand their missions, the guidelines and principles of leadership in combat, the coordination among the infantry, the sapper forces and the firepower. They must be ready.

We must conduct raids in superior force in order to destroy and occupy the targets in any situation with the coordination of military and political activities (between offensive and uprising).

We must have a determination to win during the process of preparing for combat; entirely believe in our capability to gain victories; have the thought of conducting continual attack, of being independent and resolute in combat and in carrying out various missions, but must never make the decision to retreat without receiving the order from higher echelon.

The leadership must be specific, the mission of every element and individual should be carefully discussed or assigned with the plan in detail.

Attention must be paid to the development of the forces and the development of the "Party, the determination to carry out various activities and the successful coordination for combat. The common goal is to gain outstanding victory and to accomplish the mission assigned by the Military Region in order to be worthy of the tradition of the Regiment.
III. Combat Plan:

* Use the entire regiment which includes the 1st, 2d, 6th Battalions, the 12th Sapper Battalion, various subordinate companies (the 15th, 16th, 17th and 18th Companies) with a recoiless rifle company, in coordination with the entire local troops of Hướng Trà District and two Special Action Units estimated at about 40 comrades located east and west of the Huế City.

* Mission in the Night of D-Day.

Various forces must be concentrated to occupy all the objectives inside the Citadel, such as the Greater or Smaller Mang Cá Areas, the Tây Lộc Airfield, the Ordnance area, the Imperial City, the blockhouses the sentry posts and the gates of the Huế Citadel. At the same time, the Airborne Battalion at An Hoà Village and the Hướng Trà Sub-Sector must be annihilated so that we can occupy the entire quarter No. 4 [a division of the City].

* The principles concerning tactics, maintenance of secrecy, element of surprise, preparation for raid in superior force, preventing the enemy from knowing our objective or detecting the presence of our troops.

* The main objective is the entire Citadel. The key point is Mang Cá Area. The point where the fire will be opened is the Mang Cá Area, in which the airfield gets first priority.

The objectives for penetration attack are the western main gate or the northern wall of the Mang Cá Area and the An Hoà Gate.

* The secondary objective is the Airborne Battalion located at An Hoà Village. Then the attack will be expanded towards the direction of the Hướng Trà District.

* We shall use the fire power to attack the objective situated at Tự Ha and coordinate with friendly troops to protect the rear base.

Specific plan for the Night of D-Day.

1. The 82mm mortar Company (minus one platoon) will be sent to occupy the Van Xi Village. We shall use fire power especially shellings to neutralize the armored troops at Tự Hà. We have only 300 [mortar] rounds. We shall use 200 during the night and from 30 to 60 rounds of recoiless rifles at dawn, followed by 50 to 100 mortar rounds. Then we shall move with friendly troops to attack the enemy in day-time preventing him from providing support by delivering artillery shellings or moving vehicles and infantry troops from his position to the Citadel.

If we have timely supply of mortar shells we shall destroy the enemy by using an assault force and firepower with the coordination of friendly troops in the following night.
2. We shall use one platoon of Unit 126 to occupy the positions on the hills before the fire-opening day.

This platoon has the mission to destroy the [GNU] Special Forces and prevent them from occupying key positions for defense.

We also will use many fields of controlled mines to attack the enemy infantry troops landing in helicopters.

3. The engineer element, along with the people, have the mission to destroy and paralyse the lines of communication from An Lọ to An Hòa. Then destroy An Lọ bridge on the night of D-Day, carry out all mission regardless of the circumstance. With the help of the infantry organize the position of nine fields to continuously attack the enemy, force them to operate following our plan.

4. The 6th Battalion, provided with two additional 75mm Recoilless Rifles, has the mission to annihilate the enemy Airborne Battalion stationed in An Hòa Village, and prepare to move and regroup forces before D-Day [sic]. Assign missions, conduct operations along the route from [sic] to Văn Xà Thương, La Chư.

Take D-Day to concentrate troops at the burial-ground of Triệu Sơn Tây Village, at a distance of 500 meters from it. The troops will be organized into three elements.

First element: Composed of a reinforced platoon equipped with strong firepower, at a fixed time will penetrate, An Hòa village, move in the direction of the An Hòa bridge. On D-day [sic] hour it will secretly approach the objective. When arriving at the objective it will use the firepower it prepared. When the fire is opened it will use B.40 and B.41 rockets to destroy the blockhouse located in the north of the An Hòa bridge. Launch a storm attack to occupy the northern area of the bridge. Afterwards establish liaison with friendly elements which attack the blockhouse at the south of the bridge, then advance to the junction of the National Route 1 to enlarge the penetration route for the main force to move in.

Second element: The main element of the Battalion, a reinforced company, will launch an attack from the northeast against the enemy command post stationed at the An Hòa gate and annihilate the enemy at the east of the railroad. It will advance to the national road junction to destroy the enemy M113 APC's parked in the same area.

- Third element: Consisting of one Company, at a fixed time will move from the regrouping area, pass through the stream [sic] move toward the market area where it will be divided into three arrows, to launch attack from the National Road 1 to the road junction. One platoon will send two squads to attack the An Hòa Pagoda and the
head-office at the west of the village. One squad will conduct the attack along the stream, up to the An Hòa road junction and make contact with the Battalion.

The two remaining platoons are used as a reserve force for the Battalion.

The tactic of attacking the enemy troops which biovouvack in open fields is as follows: the principle of this type of operation is to attack the enemy secretly and by surprise and thrust into the heart of the enemy, to split him up and destroy him. After having carried out the immediate mission at night, the Battalion will leave behind one company which, along with the upspring mass, will motivate the people to captured local [RVN] administrative personnel and spies.

Build up defensive fortifications in two directions to attack the enemy.

The main direction will start from Tù Ha.

The second one will start from the north. At the same time rapidly motivate the people to penetrate the Citadel and seize the power.

One of the two remaining companies will advance from An Hòa to Bao Vinh. Arriving at Cửa Ngàn junction it will prepare firepower to attack objective 2 (Hương Trà sub-sector) when receiving orders.

One company, along the stream, will progress toward [No word in OT] destroy the radar site area, move troops across the river [No word in OT] and prepare firepower to attack the sub-sector (Hương Trà). After the attack, the Battalion's firepower will be reinforced with two 75mm Recoilless rifles, plus six machine-guns and two mortars of the first Battalion. After the attack in the inside of the Citadel, emplace guns on the northern section of the Citadel and coordinate with the 6th Battalion to destroy the engineer area, then advance toward the Bao Vinh bridge.

To attack the sub-sector (Hương Trà), the engineer area, we shall adopt this form of tactic: "modern method of raid in superior force".

- Use firepower and (Make use of the M113, APC seized from the enemy at An Hòa village) to attack the sub-sector.

The command post of the Battalion will be stationed at Dốc Xò village.

When the attack on Hương Trà sub-sector ends, the 6th Battalion along with the people of Dốc Xò and Bao Vinh Villages heighten the people's uprising pride. In addition, it will get
ready to fight the enemy and launch counter attacks in several directions.

The defense position of the Battalion is located at the An Hoa [Village] gate. To attack the enemy, the Battalion should consolidate troops while fighting. At the same time, rally enemy soldiers and young men to our units. Control and oblige them to fight and carry out military proselyting missions. Urge them to rise up, and organize them into uprising troops to appeal to other enemy units to revolt. Fight the enemy with his own weapons. During the fighting, make maximum use of the local people's facilities such as: drums, groups, firecrackers to oppress the enemy.

The Battalion will cooperate with local forces to set up one guerrilla squad in each village in coordination with its available equipment capability. In combat, carry out the policy on the basis of defeating the enemy to the end.

The direction of the Battalion's progress will be as follows:

- First: Attack the enemy in Sinh, Quang and Quang Dai.
- Secondly: The position of Tu Ha
- Thirdly: Remain as reserve force for the Regiment and get ready to cross the river when receiving orders.

Objectives in Hue Citadel.

Use forces which are composed of the first and second infantry battalions, a sapper unit, one mortar company equipped with two guns, one 75mm Recoilless Rifle element equipped with two guns and one special action unit.

The mission to be carried out in the night of D-day is: Attack and occupy the areas of greater Mang Ca, smaller Mang Ca, the Tay Lôc airfield, the ordnance area, the Imperial City, precincts, services blockhouses and gates around the Citadel. Prepare forces for demonstration, create an uprising prestige and an encircling line, coordinate our internal with external forces and occupy the whole city of Hue.

The next mission is: Continue to occupy the remaining objectives, destroy the enemy)organize the defense at each objective, urge the people to revolt and set up the revolutionary government. Organize on-the-spot an Armed force among the people. Each street should leave one self-defense platoon, and at least one squad. Each quarter should have at least one self-defense company. At the same time the firepower element stationed south of the Citadel and directed to the triangular quarter will stand ready to provide its reinforcement to overrun the enemy force in the triangular quarter.
During combat it is possible to receive new missions.

The battalion is allowed to use 1/3 or 1/2 of the on-the-spot force.

The guideline is: Use armed force as a lever.

Form of operation: Concentrate firepower secretly and get ready to raid in superior force when discovered by the enemy.

Adopt the principles of secrecy, resourcefulness, liveliness, and be resolute in combat.

Be quick to carry out the mission, launch continuous attacks and urge everybody to attack the enemy. The main objective is the greater Mang Ca area. The points for opening fire are the Mang Ca area and the Tây Lộc airfield.

First direction of attack: Cross the river, when you reach the banian tree, use its roots and cords to swing into the Citadel.

[Page 11 of original text]

- Second Surprise attack direction: Remain secretly at Thuy Quang Culvert from the beginning to the end the strength must be adequate before opening fire.

- Direction of attack: Break Chinh Tây [Western Main] Gate, attack An Hòa gate if the sappers have not opened it.

Specific organization:

Northern direction: The 1st Sapper Company, 2d Infantry Company and the 1st Battalion coming from the regroupment position at [No word in OT] should move along the road Văn Xa to Cờ Hủ, then to the islet of tombs in Triệu Sơn Tây hamlet.

- Four ten-man squads of the 1st Sapper Company should be organized into four arrows under the common leadership of the Sapper Battalion Commander.

- The main arrow will be placed under the leadership of the 1st Company Commander.

- Each squad will be armed with two B.40 rocket launchers, one B61 rocket launcher, AK assault rifles, CKC carbines 200 rounds for each gun and 20 compound shaped charges for each man.

- The 2d Infantry Company of the 1st Battalion must select four comrades having a good degree of technical skill of swimming to form a strong platoon under the direct leadership of comrade Thanh, Executive Officer of the 1st Platoon. The weapons will include automatic rifles, sub-machine guns, B40 rocket launchers, grenades and shaped charges.
For the equipment, to cross the river, each comrade will get 0.60 meters of nylon sheet to be used as a float. Each squad has two to three nylon sheets to be used for packing weapons. In addition, the 2d Infantry Company is issued two four-meter nylon sheets and four twelve-meter nylon sheets used as boats to cross the river.

Upon arrival at [not clear in OT] the troops must be regrouped for the last time at the islet of tombs in Triệu Sơn Tây Hamlet.

Upon arrival on D-Day ..., at one o'clock, the Sapper Company has to look for the way to close in on the enemy. The forward arrow leader must be more skillful than the rear one he must follow the stream ... to penetrate.

Attention: While looking for the penetration way, use poison to kill the dogs.

Order to be followed: After the 1st arrow has reconnoitered the river bank and inspected the field, the three-man -cell must secretly cross the river first (submerge sampans turning face upwards). Then it will perform its reconnaissance task.

- The 2d arrow will contact the 1st arrow and continues to cross the river twenty minutes later.

- The 3d arrow will contact the 2d arrow, and ten minutes will cross the river.

- The 4th arrow will contact the 3d arrow and continue to cross the river five minutes later. The methods of crossing the river will be the same applied by the 1st arrow.

- The 2d Infantry Company will assign men to contact the 4th arrow and reconnoiter the tank when all is ready, the Company orderly will cross the river in the manner mentioned above.

After crossing the river, the 1st Sapper Company will close in on the enemy secretly by climbing on the wall of the Citadel.

The 1st arrow will move directly to the greater Mang Ca area. If it is impossible to approach nearer, a ready firepower must be directed to a three-floored building (do not fire on the third and first floors but on the second).

The 2d arrow on the Citadel wall will be divided into three cells:

- The 1st cell will stay on the An Hòa gate

- The 2d cell will be in charge of annihilating the guards in the inside of the An Hòa gate.
The 3d cell will be in charge of destroying the blockhouse at the corners of the Citadel.

Firepower must be ready for destroying the blockhouse at the north-western corner of the Citadel. If encountering difficulties at the gate ... of the Citadel, an element must be assigned to return to open the gate and conduct the forces into the Citadel.

At the rear of the 1st arrow, the 3d arrow will move along the lake to the greater Mang Ca area. Together with the 1st arrow, the 3d arrow will prepare B.40 (rocket launcher) firepower to destroy the main front blockhouse on the Western wall of the Mang Ca area.

The 4th arrow will follow the 3d arrow. In combat, if there is mortar fire support, the element in the firepower section has to adjust the shelling by radio or by signal flares.

To continue the combat, the 1st arrow will attack the blockhouses #1 and #3 on the wall of the Citadel to facilitate the occupation of the Citadel and the camp gate.

After climbing down the Citadel, wall the 3d arrow will direct the attack from Dinh Bô Linh Street, annihilate the enemy psywar Company, open the gate, contact the main body of troops outside and conduct it inside to destroy the entire Mang Ca area.

The 4th arrow will follow the 1st arrow by going along the corner of the inner street to attack the company headquarters, cutting the Mang Ca area into two parts.

Common requirements: In any situation the Sappers should succeed in occupying the main position in Mang Ca area, the inner part of the An Hoa gate and the blockhouse at the corner of the citadel in the north-west, and make every effort to hold them from one to one and a half hours so that the forces can penetrate to join the battle.

When the fire is opened, the 2d Infantry Company will have to cross the Song Dao river quickly to establish contact with the Sappers in the Citadel. The Company must launch a penetration attack directly on the An Hoa gate, use explosive charges to attack if the sappers do not still succeed in opening the gate, and be coordinated so we can overrun the inner part of Mang Ca area.

A mortar company should be formed with the crew-served weapons of the Regiment (Provisional 82mm mortar Company armed with the mortars of various Battalions). The weapons of the Company will include six mortars with complete ammunition. The Commander of the 16th Company will take charge of this mortar company.
To implement the task of occupying the edge of the cemetery in An Roa Village, the preparation of firepower will be completed before D-Day at one o'clock. The main objective is the Mang Ca area and its inner part. The concentrated firepower must be directed on the headquarters area.

The firing range must be urgent and accurate at the first two to three volleys. Listen for the indication of the command radio station to fire.

When requested shelling may be delivered during ten minutes or by volleys. This is determined by the commander in the Mang Ca area.

After having accomplished the first step of the task, the mortar unit will disperse on the way back to the Battalion to carry on the task.

**Western direction:**

+ With the firepower of the Regiment, a Common mortar position will be established with ten to twelve guns and a complete load of ammunition, under the leadership of the Company Commander and the Political Officer of the 4th Company, 1st Battalion.

**Mission:** Occupy the two river banks... (tombbs) [sic] and direct the firepower on the western wall of the Citadel. In case of being discovered by the enemy, fire along the front and at the foot of the Citadel, then concentrate the firepower on the western main gate of the Citadel to annihilate the enemy. In this way, the enemy in the Citadel cannot deploy the troops to shoot at our formation.

If the secret attacking arrows have overrun the Citadel and the gate is sabotaged, the above mortar unit will disperse on the way back to the Battalion to continue the combat in the inner part.

**Attention:** The mortar support depends on the order of the Regiment and the request of the 1st Battalion Commander.

**Sapper and Infantry units:**

- The 2d Sapper Company and the two arrows of the 3d Sapper Company are the forward units of the main element to penetrate the Citadel on the west.

**Movement order:** two Arrows of the 3rd Sapper Company will go first, then the 4th Arrow of the 2nd Sapper Company will follow.

In the equipment for each Arrow, besides the weapons, such as RPD [Light Machine Gun] AK rifles, CKC rifles, there will be two more B.40 rocket Launchers. The two Arrows of the 3rd Sapper
Company will receive in addition two B.41 Rocket Launchers. Each comrade will carry at least twenty fire shaped charges. Following the 2nd and 3rd Sapper Companies are the 3rd Infantry Company of the 1st Battalion. Their missions will be to attack the eastern gate and to take the flag at the gate of the Citadel. Following the 3rd Infantry Company are the 1st Infantry Company, the 4th Sapper Company, then the 2nd Artillery Company of the Battalion. There must be reserve firepower (sic).

**General Leadership and Attack on the West [of Citadel]:**

- The Regiment Commander and the [field grade] Political Officer of Regiment will directly assume the command.

- Comrade Luc, Political Officer of the Sapper Battalion will go with the First Sapper Arrow.

- Comrade Thanh, Battalion Commander of the 1st Battalion will go with the 1st Company and be in charge of commanding the whole Regiment. Before D [Day], the First Arrow of sappers will arrive at the last assembly AREA and prepare to cross the river. Then the 2nd Arrow of the 2nd Sapper Company will occupy the islet of tombs to support the two Arrows of the 3rd Sapper Company.

- The 1st Arrow of the Sapper Company will be directed into three Cells which will move along the bank of the river toward the Chánh Tây [Western Main] gate.

- The 1st Cell, having one B40 Rocket Launcher, will move to An Hoa bridge to set up firepower a position at its southern blockhouse (to insure the safety for the whole unit. The weapons will be directed to Bôc Rô Village and it will not be authorized to fire along the road) The 2nd Cell, having a B41 Rocket Launcher and a directional mine will join the two other Assault Cells to occupy the railroad in the west. Choose a good place to lay mines and direct the firepower toward the Chánh Tây [Western Main] gate.

The 2nd Arrow will follow the 1st Arrow and move to the right bank of the river and then reach Cửa Hữu [Right Gate] of the Citadel.

- Direct a B.41 Rocket Launcher towards Bach Tho bridge and a B.40 Rocket Launcher towards Cua Huu [Right Gate] the common task of the above Arrows will be to warn and protect the entire Sapper Troop's formations and the defined targets. While approaching the bridge and occupying watchtowers, we must take precautions against the enemy because he may advance from the bridge end, and at the same time we must communicate with the Elements inside the Citadel in order to unanimously attack the gate of ...

Comrade Lộc, Political Officer of Sapper Battalion will establish contact with friendly units and, in order, assign every Cell of Sappers to cross the river without making any noise.
Attention: Kill dogs with poison.

Then, the Elements of the 2nd Sapper Company will secretly cut off the barbed wire, creep in and occupy the inside of the Thuy Quan Culvert. The remaining will continue to enter the area every 5 to 10 minutes.

After entering the Citadel, the 1st Arrow must assign one Cell to the Chanh Tay (Western main) gate to annihilate the enemy guards overthere, occupy the gate and contact the other Element on the outside. The 2nd Cell will secure the Citadel and advance to the block-house located at the southwest corner of the Citadel. It must prepare firepower to destroy the blockhouse and the guards at Cua Huu Gate.

Attention: The soldiers at Chanh Tay [Western main] Gate must communicate with the other comrades, if any. The sappers inside or outside the gate must avoid standing at the middle of the entrance.

The 2nd Arrow will move along the road of Thuy Quan Culvert and along the Nhi Ha river bank. Upon arrival at the church [sic], we must deploy and develop troop formations to the right side, move across the fence, then be ready to open fire.

The 3d Arrow following the 2d Arrow will move to the left side of the church and stand ready to embattle.

The 4th Arrow will pass the Culvert, move along the Cuong De street to a corner two hundred meters away from Thai Phien street. Then infiltrate the air base and when ordered, open fire at the targets together with other Arrows to annihilate the enemy. Occupy the whole Tay Loc air base. Assign the 2nd Arrow to attack from the corner of the church to the military area. Use one Cell to attack and secure the entrance of the Ordnance area, and what follows will depend on the development of the situation. The 3rd Arrow will attack the area from the left side of the church to the air base and separate the air base into two parts. The 4th Arrow from Thai Phien and Tran Huu Duc streets will attack the section reserved for technicians in the air base, then have contact with other Arrows to attack the Ordnance Area.

After the 2nd and 3rd Sapper Companies, the two remaining Arrows (of the 3rd Sapper Company), with the 3rd Company of 1st Infantry Battalion must be ready to cross the river. To cross the river, we must move by Squad or by Arrow. Array troops along the railroad, contact the warning units and then enter Chanh Tay [Western] gate to contact the Elements and sappers inside. The 1st Platoon of the 3rd Infantry Company will attack and occupy the areas along the Western side of the Citadel with the aim of protecting the Elements entering through the Chanh Tay [Western Main] gate.
The 2nd Platoon, being a spearhead of the Company (when the 1st Platoon has occupied the defined area), together with the remaining strength will move on Thái Phien street and turn to the left upon arriving at the crossroad, then to the right at the 2nd cross-road. They will continue moving along Tây Lộc street to approach the objective of Mang Ca. They must communicate with the Elements in charge of attacking Mang Ca and occupy a half of the southern part of Mang Ca. Coordinate with the 1st Sapper Company and 2nd Infantry Company to annihilate the enemy in the 1st greater Mang Ca Area, After controlling the battlefield and annihilating the enemy in that area immediately organize an attack on the Smaller Mang Ca Area.

Attention: to attack the Smaller Mang Ca Area, we must use troop proselyting, quickly provide reinforcements, commit a small Element to secure Bao Vinh and coordinate with the Battalion [sic] to annihilate the enemy at Hướng Trà Sub-Sector.

When the 3rd Infantry Company has crossed the river, the Infantry Company [unspecified] will communicate with the 2nd Sapper Company and with that Sapper Company to annihilate and get aid of the enemy in Tây Lộc air base and the ordnance area. Comrade Lục, Political Officer of the Sapper Battalion and comrade Thanh, Commander of 1st Battalion will cooperate together to command the attack at the air base and the ordnance area.

The 4th Sapper Company will penetrate the Chanh Tây [Western main] gate and the Hòa [Regt] gate, move on Yết Kiêu street then turn left to Hòa Bình street. From there, it will be directed into four different Arrows.

1st Arrow. Comrade Chung, Arrow Leader will conduct air attack to occupy one key position of the Imperial City. If the conditions are favorable, the Arrow will carry on it attack or stay at the position. The 2nd Arrow will follow the 1st Arrow to attack enemy troops inside the Citadel. They will act as a reserve unit for the 1st Arrow.

The 3rd and 4th Arrow will occupy Yết Kiêu street and will attack the enemy guarding the big flagpole. Then, set the firepower at a high point to support the Elements inside the Imperial City. Coordinate the firepower and assault force to attack and divide the Imperial City into two or three parts. If there are favorable conditions, seize the whole place or occupy two important points at the two entrances for the infantry troops to come inside in order to occupy the Imperial City at night or during the next morning.

The 2nd Company of the 2nd Infantry Battalion will follow the 4th Sapper company, enter the rear gate [Cửa Hậu] and move along Yết Kiêu, Hòa Bình, Mai Thúc Loan streets.
The first platoon will attack and occupy Đông Ba Gate, and extend to the southeast corner of the Citadel.

The second platoon will attack inside the Citadel and on the top of its walls, reach the end of Nhi Hòa river (Thanh Long gate) and establish contact with comrades Hồng and Thanh who will direct attacks in the Mang Ca area. If necessary, the platoon must cooperate with the attacking forces in Mang Ca. All of these will be put under the command of the 1st Battalion.

The third platoon will attack and occupy various enemy Agencies. Attention: One armed public security cell will be appointed to accompany the platoon in charge of attacking the enemy open-arms (Chiếu Hòa) office, information service and court of appeal in order to make contact with Local Agents and arrest key enemy personnel. After our main forces have occupied the above objectives.

The 3rd Company of the 2nd Infantry Battalion will follow the movement of the 2d Company in moving to the right gate [Cầu Hậu] and then extend to the flagpole. One platoon will move out on the street, two platoons will move into the Citadel to link with Sapper units and provide support for them to overrun the Imperial City area in case the Sapper units encounter difficulties. The 1st Company of the 2nd Infantry Battalion will attack, and destroy the enemy Regional Force Company, occupy Bach Hồ bridge, and together with the engineer company and 18th company use two hundred kilograms of explosive charges to ablish the Bach Hồ bridge. Simultaneously assign an elements to move straight to Đông Ba market and to guard Trương Tiền bridges.

In the moving, the company will make contact with guerrillas stationed at Gia Hợi bridge and together with a special action unit occupy the entire quarter 4. It is advisable to prepare and be ready to fight possible counter attacks launched by the enemy from the direction of the Hương [perfume] river (up to Cầu Thuan port).

Local forces: Special action unit will assemble in the east, and move straight to Tay Linh Village when the fire is opened.

They must use boats to move to occupy Bái Đậu area to prevent enemy movement from Phú Vang. They will make contact with the 2nd Battalion which will be attacking from another area. The place where the two arrows of attack will meet together is Chí Lăng precinct.

Armed public security unit: Overrun and kill enemy officers in Cầu Đạt area and areas outside the Citadel.

- 10 minutes after the fire is opened, use Forces to oppress the enemy especially in quarters 2 and 4.

- Use explosives and means available in the city to Create explosions and secure entire areas.
After the objectives liquidated, we must divide them into different sections for control and at the same time deploy troops to attack the enemy in all directions:

The 3rd Company of the 1st Battalion is responsible for the areas northeast of the Nhi Ha river to Cây Da [the banyan tree], the areas of Bach Chung and Bach Ha Culverts in the middle of Tay Minh area.

- The 2nd Company of the 1st Battalion deploys close to the 3rd Company and Thuy Quan culvert.

- The 1st Company of the 1st Battalion deploys from Thuy Quan Culvert to the big flagpole.

- The 2nd company of the 2nd battalion deploys from the southeast (the right side of the Nhi Ha river) to the corner of Đông Ba to the big flagpole, and adjacent to the responsibility areas of the 1st Battalion.

The 1st and 3rd Companies will deploy in Mang Ca area and the Central area. The 2nd company will deploy in Tây Lộc area.

The 4th company will deploy in the area inside the Citadel. Various companies of the Sapper battalions which do not deploys the top of the walls of the Citadel and do not attack objectives must become reserve units for each element.

The reserve unit of the 2nd Battalion will move to the big flagpole, crosses the Gia Hôí bridge, attack and occupy the entire quarter 4, organize defense, destroy enemy motor boats, ships from Cửa Thuận port up to the Hương [perfume] river.

Emplacement and Deployment of Firepower:

- Gun Section 1 will be positioned block house 2 (at the corner of Mang Ca area).

- 12.7mm AA machine guns will be positioned between blockhouse 2 and the Rear Gate.

- 82mm recoilless rifle, will be positioned just at the rear gate.

- 12.7mm A.A machine guns will be positioned 12 meters from the rear gate.

- Mortar unit (use enemy seized mortars in stead of ours in combat)

- Repare firepower in order to move toward Hương Tra Sub-Section in accordance with the combat coordination orders of the Regiment to completely destroy objectives in Hương Tra and radar station. The 6th Battalion will use its forces to destroy Hương Tra and the radar station.
The use of weapons for longrange firing or short range firing will be dependent on the decision of the Regiment. The battalion uses assault forces to occupy and destroy the objectives defined.

- Organize anti-aircraft net when Hương Trà (Sub Sector) has been occupied.
- A group of weapons will be emplaced at the corner of Mang Ca area, surrounding block-house 2.
- A group of weapons in block-house 1
- A group of weapons at blockhouse 3 at the corner of the Citadel and the Bach Hồ bridge.

In combat, if we seize weapons of the enemy such as 12.7mm AA machine guns, 20mm AA guns, we must position them on the top of the the Citadel walls in order to provide support to friendly units during the fighting against enemy counterattacks.

Anticipation of incidents during the course of combat and measures to cope with them.

1 [In case we are], Discovered from a distance
2 Discovered at the assembly area
3 Discovered at the foot of the Citadel walls
4 In case high hills are occupied by enemy Special Forces.

Solution:

The commitment of the rear base platoon to attack enemy Special Forces must be an immediate and principal mission.

- Find as many streets as possible to go in order to avoid meeting the enemy.
- Conduct inspections make careful preparations as well as camouflage and organize movement with small sized units.
- Outside the line of defense, the reconnaissance units must follow up the enemy and firmly grasp the situation of the area at least 20 minutes before our troop's arrival.
- Use small sized elements at the front of the formation to attack the enemy if he is stationed on the route of movement.
- If the enemy forces are large, our main units should avoid engaging with them and we just use reserve units to attack them. The mortar unit must destroy and limit enemy artillery operations at a distance.
In case we are discovered at the foot of the Citadel walls:

- 60mm mortars of various companies must be ready to fire on the Citadel to support the raids.

Other weapons must aim at the Citadel, infantry units will continue their advance, chiefly conduct attacks spearheads with strong support of rear elements to occupy Thông Nhất Street, then destroy and occupy gates. Sappers will secretly climb up the walls of the Citadel to approach the objectives.

Attacking enemy counter attacking forces:

If the objectives are successfully liquidated at night, the enemy will be slower to launch a counter attack.

If the objectives are not successfully liquidated, enemy counter attacks will be launched more quickly.

- The directions for fast enemy counter attacks will be from the 7th fleet and Cú Trân port (because US battalions are stationed there). During the day, various units must move to Sinh [river] junction and meet other forces at Bồng Bông area, then move toward the Citadel. Units must prepare and follow up the enemy situation and be ready to defeat the above [US] battalions. The directions of enemy counter attack 2 are from north and northwest and east of Quarter 4.

The 1st and 2nd Battalions will continue their preparation, for the strong attacks on the positions of the Citadel.

Problems of Command and Plans for the Accomplishment of missions:

A) Headquarters: [consists of] Regiment Commander and [Field grade] political officer, Regiment executive officers will direct the western direction.

The assistant [Field grade] political officers will accompany the rear element of the Regiment and Canh [Element].

Cadres of battalions and companies will go with their own units in every direction and every arrow of attack.

B) Plan for Ensuring Successful Fighting:

1. Ensure a close reconnaissance to grasp the enemy situation up to the day we close in on them.

- Methods of Grasping the Enemy Situation in a Direct Manner or Through Our Agents. Organize one cell in charge of the northern direction and another cell in charge of the western direction.
Their missions are to follow the enemy troops' situation and to lead the way for our units. Aside from assessing the enemy situation at the predetermined targets and preparing the next attack at other targets, they are charged with leading the main forces to the offensive.

In movement, together with infantry cells, they will hold close to the enemy. They will also lead the way and control routes for the troops in the predetermined areas.

Succeeding missions: Lead concerned detachments to various attack directions and targets. When the fighting begins, they must participate in the battle with their units; and show the way while executing deep thrust into enemy positions to hold him close. They will also note any changes in the enemy ranks and report the situation directly to the units and command posts.

- Pay attention to the key points for reconnaissance such as those in Tô Ha, Văn Thanh, An Hóa [sic]. When the time for opening fire begins, we must hold close to the enemy in order to take appropriate measures and to timely increase the war results.

2. **Ensurance of successful Implementation of Signal Missions:**

- Lead units to the predetermined bivouacking areas.
- Lead units from their bivouacking areas to the movement routes 1 and 2.
- Well Ensure the Signal activities in combat
- Ensure the liaison between agencies and local authorities, and between the front line and rear agencies.
- Organize the adjusting stations at the predetermined intersections and cross-roads.
- Lay guide posts from the temporary bivouack position to the troop deployment position. In combat, four means are used to ensure the signal liaison:
  a) Messengers
  b) Two-watt and 15-watt radio sets
  c) Telephone-sets
  d) Cells in charge of emitting and recognizing signals.

3. **Ensurance of the Rear:** Mission is to ensure our troops a capability of enduring long range and successive fighting and a spirit to serve the combat mission.

Organize transportation to supply our troops with ammunition
and provisions and to evacuate the wounded and the dead. Be prepared for combat day and night also, organize warning activities to protect various units.

4. Ensure security during movement and in bivouacking. Based on the situation and the characteristics of terrain features, on the anticipation of possible events, the Regiment adopts the following plan:

- In bivouacking and choosing direction for the attack of bridge
  - 1st Battalion will move in from Dù Bai Tranh slope.
  - 2d Battalion will move in from route 12.
  - Sống Bò 12th Battalion will move in from Gió Khè slope
  - 6th Battalion will move in from a special area.

- Various units must work out a combat plan according to the missions entrusted and must make a very careful and reasonable assignment [of tasks].

[Page 18 of original text]

- There must be sufficient trenches, holes and explosive for every comrade.

- Set up warning cells, mount guards, follow the activities of aircraft in the bivouacking area and organize combat stand by duty. The Company or Battalion Command Section will directly assume these responsibilities.

- Do not move disorderly and do not cut or destroy forests, but carefully camouflage.

- Perfectly conceal fire and smoke while cooking. Begin cooking at 200 hours [?] and extinguish fire at 0300 hours.

- Equip individuals with very compact belongings and be ready to attack Special Forces and helicopters.

- Pay attention to the prevention of diseases. In one platoon, there must be at least one to two holes for urination.

- In the security maintenance, we must place added emphasis on the individual control. Various units must request instructions and submit reports to higher echelons in a timely manner.

- This movement will begin at 1200 hours and start from the route [unspecified], following the main element. At 1900 hours, the troops will arrive at the temporary bivouack area at Ong Am slope. They will continue the movement at 1930 hours.
I. **Time of Arrival at**

1) Bôn Tri Canal  
2) Tienen Giang Canal  
3) Dao River  
4) Arriving at Citadel

**Advance element** 2030 hours  
2400 hours  
0100 hour at 0130 hour

**Rear element** 2330 hours  
Destroy the citadel gate.

The Route of advance 2 follows the roads of Lieu Thuong, Que Chu and Trieu Son Tay. The forces following this route consist of the 6th and 416th Battalions also the 15th Company.

6th Battalion: Departs at 1400 hours from the route. At 1800 hours, it will arrive at the temporary halting area located at Lieu Thuong and Que Chu roads.

(Some words missing) In the South, there is Trieu Son Tay island.

At 0100 hours, various areas must be at least 400 meters from the objectives.

416th Battalion, At 1900 hours, arrives at the temporary halting area
At 2000 hours, reaches Lieu Thuong and Que Chu.
At 0200 hours, arrives at the deployment position for combat development less than 400 meters from the targets.

16th Company and the recoilless rifle company: At 2030 hours, gets everything prepared for shelling.

C. **Progress of the Combat**

*Period from the Departure of the Movement to the Temporary Halting Area and Assembly Area.*

This process of preparation was aimed at meeting the exact time requirement for combat coordination.

- From 25 Jan 68 to 0630 hours of 28 Jan 68 all units succeeded in moving to the final bivouacking position by foot march. This position was in the area of Huong Tra District (coordinates ...[sic])

- From 28 Jan 68 to 29 Jan 68, various detachments continued getting everything prepared and carefully made a general inspection in all fields of preparation.

From 1200 hours on 30 Jan 68, various detachments under careful camouflage and in formation moved to the temporary halting position. This foot march ended at 1900 hours on 30 Jan 68.
The 6th and 416th Battalions and the 16th Company arrived at the temporary halting area from the strategic road. The 1st, 2d, 12th Battalions and the subordinate firepower units also arrived at Ong Am Lopez.

At 1930 hours, the 16th Company followed the route that leads to the deployment position.

The 6th Battalion moved to the direction of An Hoa Village by Van Xa Trung, Leu Thuong and Trieu Son Tay roads. Following was the 416th Battalion. It moved on the same route and reached La Chuo Village for deployment.

[Page 19 of original text]

The 1st, 2d and 12th Battalions and subordinate firepower elements... [sic] moved through An Luu and Cau Ke towards the Huế Citadel.

At [unspecified time]..., they were split up into two elements, advancing towards the east and the north to enter the Citadel.

Elements moving toward the north were the 1st Company of the Sapper Battalion and the 2d Company of the first Infantry Battalion.

At 2203 hours, the elements approached the Dac Xo Village. The enemy inside, using mortars, automatic rifles, and individual rifles, fired at the troops formation. To keep our movement secret, these elements did not react and continued to advance toward the pre-determined positions.

From 2230 hours to 2330 hours various units arrived at the last assembly point and prepared for combat.

The 6th Battalion arrived at the southwest of the islet of tombs [Cau Ha], Cau Ke [islet] and advanced towards the An Hoa Hamlet. The 6th Battalion already completed the preparations for firing. The elements in the north approached Song Dao [Cau]

- At 0100 hours, the 62mm mortar company prepared for firing.
- At 0105 hours, the elements in the West approached the Song Con [River] In movement, the enemy used artillery, flares and reconnaissance aircraft which circled over the city and the points surrounding the Citadel until 0145 hours.

Phase for Deployment and Opening fire

a) Deployment Phase

From 0145 hours to 0200 hours on 31 Jan 68, all the elements moved regularly to the pre-determined positions such as the inside of the Citadel, An Hoa, and Cau [Bridge].
6th Battalion: Its 2nd Battalion reached the areas north of the An Hoa bridge; the 1st 2nd and 4th Companies moved in the direction of the railroad and National Road #1. Every element had the mission to close in on the enemy objectives such as the Command post, the pagoda area ... [sic]

Troop strength and firepower were directed towards the An Hoa Village and ready to destroy the enemy Airborne Battalion and the bridge head area.

Elements in the North

One by one the spearheads of the 1st Sapper Company crossed Sông Đào [Canal], climbed up the walls on the north and headed towards the Mang Cà area and the An Hoa gate. Some elements of the 2nd Company, 1st Infantry Battalion lost their way. They delayed on the Sông Đao [canal] and finally found the way to enter the Citadel by An Hoa gate.

Elements in the West

The 3rd and 2nd Sapper Companies crossed Sông Con [river]. The firepower and Infantry cells which encountered guards at two ends of their formation directed their attention towards the blockhouse in the south of the An Hoa bridge, the Chanh Tây [Western main] gate, the Bach Tho bridge and the Cửa Hữu [Right] Gate. The four remaining arrows of the Sapper Company continued to secretly move to the route adjacent to the Citadel. They tried to find a way into the Citadel. At the Thủy Quản Culvert they met two guerrilla comrades who helped them to do reconnaissance and cut baibed wire, then each section moved in and advanced towards the airfield ... [sic]. The 3rd Company crossed the river and moved to the Chanh Tây [Western main] Gate, then came the other companies and the command pool.

At 0230 hours the 2nd Battalion and the heavy firepower element were the only two that had not crossed the river. They were seeking means to cross the river.

Commencement of fire

Various units continued to secretly close in on the enemy and prepared to fight.

At exactly 0223 hours on 31 Jan 68 recoilless rifles fire at the Triangular area (in the South of the Hương [Perfume] river), and at the same time various advanced sections opened fire at assigned objectives.

The 82mm mortar company launched a quick raid against the Greater Mang Cà area by firing more than 130 mortar rounds. This effectively intercepted enemy reinforcements and supported the sapper and infantry units in their assaults.
+ Elements operating in the North of the Citadel

The 1st 3d and 4th advanced elements of the First Sapper Company moved around the Citadel and attacked the Mang Ca area while the second arrow entered the Citadel and got out by the An Hòa gate. The arrow in charge of infiltrating the Mang Ca area discovered a blockhouse on the wall of the Citadel. This one was immediately destroyed by our B.40 and B.41 rocket launchers. The main units penetrated the Citadel but they were stopped by three lines of wire.

To rapidly penetrate inside and destroy the enemy, the Battalion Commander ordered us to follow the route leading towards the main gate of the Mang Ca area. After several waves of assault, we destroyed a number of enemy soldiers and stand-by trucks and controlled a number of houses used as stepping stones. The second advanced element attacked the enemy at the An Hòa Gate and the blockhouse at the corner. The enemy countered with machine guns and other weapons fire from the inside. Although losing the way, our 2d Company had tried to cross the river, then together with the sappers and machine guns and B.40 rocket launchers, to destroy the enemy inside. When they succeeded in occupying and opening the An Hòa Gate, they continued to attack the blockhouse in the north-west and sent the forces into the Citadel and moved towards the Mang Ca area where they contacted the interior sapper elements. At 0345 hours the 3d Infantry Company headed towards the Mang Ca area.

+ Elements in the West of the Citadel

The advanced elements of the 3d Sapper Company were passing the Thuy Quản Culvert when the gun fire started. Some of these cells succeeded in entering the Citadel, then advanced toward the church and attacked the Tây Lộc airfield. However they were stopped by barbed wire. They had to trample the wire down or jump over it to attack the airfield. Some other cells ran towards the Nhị Hà river bank. These men lost the way and met the enemy who fired at them from the ordnance area, but they used their firepower to cut into the enemy and separate the airfield from the ordnance area. As a result they successfully protected the flank of the formation and allowed the friendly elements to attack the airfield. They also enabled each advanced element to move and assault the targets along Cửa Hữu [Right Gate] area, the corner of the Citadel in the south and the Chánh Tây [Western Main] Gate. There were a number of comrades who lost their way or slowed down. Consequently only a few enemy were killed by the advanced element at the airfield. However we successfully held this position and used it as a stepping stone.

+ The 3d Infantry Company, together with the Sapper units and Special Action Units destroyed the enemy resistance with their firepower. The demolition cell laid an explosive charge destroying the Chánh Tây [Western Main] Gate. The Front [NPLSVN] flag was planted on the Citadel gate and over cadresmen occupied the western
part of the Citadel. Then various elements advanced towards the areas inside the Citadel. Not familiar with the complications of a large city's streets, these elements lost the way and were embarrassed for a while. However, with the help of the comrades who guided the way, with the contact with the urban people, and with the light of flares dropped by the enemy for observation, they succeeded in moving to the pre-determined objectives. Sapper and Infantry units along with firepower attacked the Mang Cả area, the Tây Lộc airfield and the bus station at Cửa Hữu [Right Gate]... At 0335 hours we succeeded in overrunning and occupying the Citadel Gate, a part of the Mang Cả area and the Tây Lộc airfield and used them as stepping stones for our combat progress.

Those units which stayed outside [the Citadel] had crossed the bridge and river to penetrate the Citadel.

At An Hoa:

After opening fire on the main objectives the 6th Battalion, in coordination with the Second Company and their subordinate firepower, destroyed and occupied the blockhouse at the North of the An Hoa bridge head in spite of strong enemy resistance and support from the South of the bridge. At 0320 hours we succeeded in destroying and controlling the whole area. The 1st and 3rd Companies moved into the Village [possibly An Hoà]. Each element was responsible for one section of the Village (but on that night the enemy Airborne Battalion had moved away). Only one Popular Force Platoon remained, and we used the tactic of encirclement and search, called upon the enemy to surrender and seized his equipment. At 0330 hours we succeeded in controlling the whole village after this victory, various units rapidly prepared a defense element which together with the local agent searched for the local administrative personnel and urged the people to revolt. The Second Company was ready to attack the southern area of the bridge. A large element of the Battalion was ready to attack the sub-sector [unspecified]... in order to coordinate with the elements operating inside the Citadel.

At the same time, one element of the Second Battalion attacked the enemy on Thông Nhất, Kim Long streets and Bach Thố bridge. They then made contact with the elements operating in the Citadel at Cửa Hữu [Right Gate] to guide the remaining forces into the Citadel.

At 0340 hours, the Regiment Commander, the [Field Grade] Political Officer and a number of staff assistants and the entire command post stayed close to the unit and penetrated into the Citadel to command the battle.
At this time, the enemy aircraft kept on circling and dropping flares over the city area. After the penetration attack had been accomplished and the above elements had performed the offensive against the prescribed objectives, the coordination of the infantry, sapper and fire support units and the units that had penetrated deeply into the enemy areas to split enemy forces was closely implemented.

**Combat Progress of the Units in the Northern Direction:**

- The elements in charge of occupying the An Роа gate and the blockhouse at the corner of the Citadel had already contacted the exterior forces at the Chahh Tay [Western main] gate and were fighting the enemy in the Mang Ca area. From 0230 to 0400 hours, the 2nd and 3rd Companies of the 1st Infantry Battalion and the 3rd Sapper Company followed the [unspecified] road to move to the gate and overran the Greater Mang Ca area. One element was fighting at the corner within the Citadel. The overrunning elements concentrated their assault force and firepower to attack the main gate in accordance with the combat coordination between the units inside and outside.

From the inside of the Citadel and the areas of high buildings, the enemy used the firepower to block our attacks from all directions. He fired straight at the houses occupied by our troops. To knock out the enemy positions before dawn, we had to use the firepower of recoilless rifle, B40 and B41 rocket launchers to shoot at the buildings occupied by the enemy and some dangerous points of fire to provide effective support for one another. After several waves of coordinated attacks, various arrows both within and without the Citadel successfully split the enemy forces and further expanded the fighting. We succeeded in controlling the Medical Service area, the Fawar Office and moved directly to the main gate, along the western wall to the northern wall of the Citadel. Our troops were then divided into two arrows. One continued advancing along the [U/I] street on the north of the Citadel and the other moved to the buildings in the Southern area of the Citadel. It was late and the day got clearer and clearer. The enemy mustered the assault forces and M113 APC's to organize the counter-attack and contain the progress of our various arrows. A number of our comrades were killed or wounded. Therefore, we encountered difficulties in the combat development. Various arrows and cells had quickly reoccupied from house to house, area to area and organized the defense. The firepower of B40 and B41 rocket launchers were used to destroy the blockhouses, armored vehicles were used to annihilate the counter-attacking infantrymen. Our troops and the enemy were fighting continually to take over the houses that we had occupied previously.

Although the communication of some of our cells and groups with friendly units was interrupted, they insisted on fighting bravely against the large-sized infantry unit of the enemy supported by the armored vehicles. And in spite of his strong
forfe, the enemy was unable to beat off our elements. Our troops stayed close to the enemy to fight him. But we could not advance further. Later our fighting was still limited in spite of the coordination of the fire support and the assault force. At 1005 hours, after having requested instructions from and submitted reports to higher echelons, we kept on organizing the fighting against the enemy to cut away towards the west of the Citadel and to collect the wounded and dead and withdraw out of the Mang Ca area. However, an element was left here to encircle the enemy and split his forces in this area from Tay Loc airfield. An element of the local force conducted a clean up operation from the Mang Ca area to the Chanh Tây [Western main] gate towards the north, and at the same time, prepared for the forthcoming attacks.

The next days and nights, we continued fighting. Due to the strengthening of the defense, the gathering of the serving soldiers of [enemy] units from various places and the increase of the firepower and armored vehicles of the enemy, we were still not able to overrun all the designated positions. Later, we only used the firepower to carry out the harassing attack on the enemy.

+ Combat Progress of the units in the Western direction:

Crossing the gate of the Citadel, the 3rd Infantry Company and the 3rd Sapper Company rushed straight towards the objective and attacked the Mang Ca area together with the units coming here previously. An element of the 3rd Infantry Company seized the western part of the Citadel and ensured control at the gate.

The 1st Company of the 1st Infantry Battalion penetrated into the Citadel and got in touch with the 2nd Sapper Company to attack the Tay Loc airfield. Two platoons ran to the south of the airfield, another platoon ran to the right of the bus station and broke away to attack the airfield in the direction of the ordnance area. As the bangalore torpedo did not blow up, the platoon had to run back to the Ordnance area. At 0345 hours, together with the sappers, the platoon opened fire to attack the airfield. One arrow conducted the attack at the dispensary area and the pilot quarters. Another moved along the communication trenches on the west to destroy the blockhouse, and then reached the parking area used for aircraft and vehicles. Over twenty aircraft, twenty vehicles, four machineguns and two 12.7mm heavy machineguns were destroyed. The ammunition dump was blown up and the gasoline depot was set afire. The enemy withdrew and used the firepower to check our progress, inflicting casualties upon our forces. From the ordnance area, the machineguns of the enemy were providing strong support for the airfield. As the alleys inside the airfield were wide, to move across them was impossible. From 0700 to 0900 hours, the enemy fired violently from the blockhouse and the houses on the north east of the airfield. From the rear side, his infantrymen launched a counter-attack on the water tower area. One after another, our various elements occupied the communication...
trenches on the west and launched constant assaults to beat off the two counter-attack waves of the enemy. B40 rockets slammed into the command post area. A number of enemy troops were killed, so he was obliged to withdraw to the Eastern area. We succeeded in occupying one half of the airfield and used various weapons to sabotage the facilities along the alleys in the airfield.

At 0930 hours after the counter-attack wave, we again got back to the communication trenches on the southwest of the airfield. The defense was organized to break up the enemy attempt at reoccupying the airfield. We used the firepower to split the enemy force coming from the ordnance area, and to prevent his aircraft from taking off and landing. We withdrew out of the airfield at 2000 hours on 31 Jan 68 and left a small force to stay close to and encircle the outside of the airfield. To annihilate the enemy and exploit the victory in the night, we had maneuvered the 3rd Company of the 1st Infantry Battalion along with the [unspecified] force to conduct a raid on the airfield. When the three barbed-wire fences at the blockhouse near the northwest corner of the airfield were cut, we promptly launched an attack directly on the command post area, and the enemy troop concentrations in order to split them up into different small groups and to develop the fighting throughout the airfield. The enemy survivors used the firepower, grenades ... to resist individually. After thirty minutes of brave fighting, we succeeded in destroying all the aircraft and vehicles. We dominated the airfield completely and ended the battle. However we did not hold it. The following day, the enemy re-occupied the airfield and we again organized a new raid. Once more, we succeeded in reoccupying the entire airfield and a defense system was established to cope with the enemy's counter-attack and to exert strong pressure upon him in the ordnance area.

At 0300 hours, we completely occupied and opened the three great gates on the northwest of the Citadel. From the rear, the 4th Sapper Company ran quickly across the Cửu Hỏa [Right gate] to attack the Reconnaissance Company in the Imperial City. The Imperial City was a large area with high walls and surrounded by pits. In the inside, there were many big brick houses with high bell-towers, secret cellars and treasures. When losing the way during the attack, we captured an enemy soldier who revealed that the [RVNAF] Reconnaissance Company had 120 men and we could not attack them with a smaller force losing the way and faced with a large-sized enemy unit, the 4th Sapper Company with a high determination, has succeeded in destroying the gate. They occupied the gate and a number of important points inside the Citadel after a few minutes of fighting outside the gate. A number of enemy troops were killed, the rest drew back little by little to resist. The ammunition dump was blown up terribly. Members of various reactionary political parties, henchmen and wicked tyrants were annihilated. The survivors fled in confusion.

Along with the arrow attacking the inside of the Citadel another was on the way to attack the flagpole area.
The enemy was on the walls, they fired at out troops then draw back. We seized two 12.7mm heavy machine guns.

At 0430 hours, the main flagpole was occupied. One element remained here to let down the enemy flag and to hoist the Front's flag. Another element, in coordination with the infantry unit, continued running into the Imperial city. At 0500 hours the Imperial City was occupied so we assigned various cells to deploy in different directions. The other cells were in charge of conducting a mopping-up operation. We had found out the dump of arms and ammunition, signal equipment, vehicles and many quarter-master depots.

At 1200 hours, the 4th Sapper Company was replaced by the Infantry Company to organize the defense.

The 2nd Company of the 2nd Infantry Battalion.

During the attack on the Imperial City we passed the Yêt Kieu, Mai Thúc Loan and Lê Huân Streets, then we went straight to our objective to exterminate the enemy stationed at Đông Ba and Thượng Tu Gates we also destroyed blockhouses in the southeast of the Citadel, government offices and killed sentries in the north of Tràng Tiền Bridge. Attacked from the inside and from the top of the Citadel wall, the enemy troops concentrated an taking a defensive resistance but they could not defend the Citadel Gates. At 0700 hours we thoroughly occupied the entire area. The elements which were in charge of attacking and seizing the enemy's positions then organized for defense and maintained liaison with Quarter 4. In order to attack the enemy from the river and motivate the local forces to control, search and annihilate fleeing enemy troops and cruel tyrants. Also we had to motivate the people in the southeast of the Citadel to join the fighting or prepare for a demonstration of the uprising people.

The 3rd Company of the 2d Battalion entered the Right Gate, climbed up the Citadel wall, passed across a collapsed house to overrun the flagpole area. We then attacked the enemy at Thượng Tu area. Then one element coordinated with the 4th Sapper Company attacked the Citadel and hoisted the Liberation. Front flag on the Citadel at 0500 hours.

The 1st Company of the 2d Infantry Battalion went along the Thông Nhất street to attack and destroy the Civil Guard Company in Kim Long and Bạch Thọ (Bạch Rẻ) bridge area with reinforced firepower from the Citadel guard posts.

We only destroyed and captured a number of troops quartered in separate positions at Kim Long while the troops stationed at the end of the bridge strived to stay close to their fortifications.
We used firepower to retain and encircle them at the end of the bridge and to annihilate various troops in separate positions. Then we thoroughly destroyed the troops stationed in the blockhouse at the end of Bạch Thồ [Bach Rò] Bridge on 1 Feb 68. At the same time coordinated with the engineer cell then blew up the bridge, and cut the lines of communication to prevent the enemy movement from the Southern area towards the Citadel.

While various elements were fighting inside the Citadel, the 6th Battalion used an element with heavy firepower to annihilate the remaining troops in the blockhouse area located South of the An Hoà Bridge.

After fighting for 25 minutes, we destroyed a number of the enemy fire bases, infantry troops in various directions then finally conducted an assault across the bridge.

At 1030 hours on the morning of 31 Jan 68, as soon as we had occupied the head of the bridge, an Engineer Cell brought along the explosive charges and facilities and blew up the An Hoà bridge to cut off the lines of communication from the north of the Citadel. At the time, one Airborne Battalion from a position at Tù Ha was moving to the An Hoà Village to reinforce Huế Citadel.

The 16th Company due to the assigned mission, used several methods of fire and gained efficient results. They destroyed and oppressed the Tù Ha position and by using firepower prevented enemy reinforcements from entering the Citadel.

The anti-aircraft firepower helped [VC] reinforcements to advance. It was coordinated with various elements to annihilate the enemy at different points and conduct counter-attacks from different directions. It prevented the enemy from providing infantry reinforcements and supplies to his remaining positions.

It downed the enemy’s helicopters and AD6 fighters within the city. This created favourable conditions for us in various directions of attack against the enemy and reduced the power of the enemy artillery and airstrikes.

During combat, various units, together with special action units and armed public security units, captured thousands of local [RVN] administrative personnel puppet troops and cruel tyrants to prevent them from doing reactionary activities. Though being engaged in continual fighting, our units also had to motivate the people to participate in the attack on the enemy.

In addition, about one hundred young men were selected for the replacement of personnel in the unit. These men received practical training from the unit which improved them for immediate fighting. Attention was paid to the organization of the self-defense force in each quarter. Thus, from the moment of opening fire at 0233 to 0630 hours on 31 Jan 68, our forces entered the Citadel, attacked and occupied all gates and
the area around the great Citadel (excluding the northeastern section of the Mang Ca area). We also destroyed a number of positions in the Imperial City, the flagpole area, the bus-station area and the area north of the An Hoa Bridge, ... [sic] [Except the airfield, the Mang Ca area and the Ordnance area which were not entirely occupied]. At 0700 hours we controlled the Citadel basically from the Mang Ca area to the Thăng Long Culvert (excluding half of the airfield and the Ordnance Area). On the night of the 31st Jan we occupied the entire airfield.

At 0800 hours on 31 Jan 68, the Liberation flag was flying on the main flagpole in the Citadel.

Also we entirely occupied the An Hoa and Kim Long areas; surrounded the Bach Thọ area and coordinated the rear element with the forward one. Various units deployed their troops to fight enemy counter-attacking forces, readily prepared themselves for attack and were coordinated with local troops to exterminate cruel tyrants and motivate the people to uprise inside and outside the citadel.

+ Continuously conduct counter-attack in various directions inside and outside the Citadel.

After attacking on days and nights, we occupied and controlled the Citadel. The enemy's remaining troops at the Mang Ca area and the Ordnance area coordinated with reinforcement troops to conduct counter-attacks to reoccupy the Hue Citadel.

The enemy strengthened and consolidated his fortifications, firepower and defense systems at various points. On the other hand, many phases of counter-attack were launched in various directions extending to the immediate objectives. Infantry troops were used separately or in coordination with mechanized vehicles, artillery and aircraft to launch counter-attacks.

We attacked the Citadel continuously for twenty-four days and nights and gained great victories.

+ Fighting Large Enemy Counter-Attacks Outside the Citadel.

In the Citadel at various points such as the Mang Ca area, the airfield or the ordnance area, the enemy concentrated his forces to resist and organize many phases of counter-attack to hinder us but he was thoroughly destroyed and beaten off.

About 0800 AM the [enemy] 2d and 7th Battalions, one Airborne Battle Group and the 3rd Armored Troop of the 7th E [Armored Squad] moved from the direction of An Lộc, Tư Hà with 700 troops and 15 vehicles to conduct counter-attack toward the An Hoa direction in an attempt to provide reinforcements
to the Hue Citadel.

The 6th Battalion did not move to attack the Ruong Tra Sub-Sector but came back to counterattack. It deployed its troops along the railroad, on Road #1 and in the An Hoa Village.

The 1st Company remained in the Railroad Station area, the 3rd Company in the An Hoa Village and at the An Hoa Bridge. The 2nd Company went to attack the radar site area.

The troops moved back to the Duc Xo Village. They were followed by the reserve fire power element, the command post and the rest of the troop formation.

As the enemy infantry troops and vehicles came nearer, all units strove to complete all preparations and were ready for combat. We opened fire with the slogan: "We are determined to annihilate the enemy and will not let any of his troops enter the Citadel, also to create favourable conditions for us to occupy other positions."

At 1230 hours the enemy began to attack the main front. One arrow of the 1st Battalion advanced toward the railroad station area, while another arrow moved around the left flank. When the enemy were found within our firepower range, we fiercely attacked him and at the same time each attack element was sent to engage in a battle lasting almost one hour. Finally, the enemy had to retreat.

At 1300 hours a second attack wave was launched in the same direction. Two arrows were on the right side, three others on the left of the An Hoa Canal while one arrow was conducting the attack directly on the 3rd Company. We launched an assault to repel the enemy, seized a number of weapons then quickly withdrew to organize our ranks and prepare for the next battle.

[Page 25 of original text]

At 1430 hours, six enemy vehicles crossed the railroad and road 1 to attack Doc Xo Village. Deployed in line formation they made an assault into the village. Although the enemy was reinforced with artillery, helicopters, and armed vehicles, he was not able to move forward. We assigned each arrow to offensively attack and vehicles had to withdraw to strengthen their ranks for the following wave of attack.

At 1603 hours, three enemy vehicles moved toward the 1st Company. The enemy Infantry troops moved on the right toward the direction of the 3rd Company. Five enemy M113 APC's moved on road 1 with the intention to split up and to annihilate and throw our troop formation into confusion. When the enemy was within the range of our firepower, we destroyed one of their APC's. Among explosion of grenades and shouts of assault, the enemy jumped out of their tanks and did not have the time to fire back. One tank was laid across the road, another hit a tree but its engine was still running. At the same time through coordination all the arrows captured three M113 APC's on road 1 and attacked infantry reinforcements moving into the battlefield. The remaining [enemy]
infantry troops and tanks moved back. With our firepower we destroyed three more tanks.

At 1715 hours, with heavy reinforcements of artillery and mortars, the enemy concentrated his infantry troops and vehicles to attack directly the Đăc Xoài Village, trying to occupy it before dark. The 2nd Company attacked the enemy at the main front, the 1st Company at the flank, dispersing the enemy on the road and at the entrance of the village. Using many phases of attack, the enemy was still unable to occupy the place. Giving up, he withdrew to the field to organize its defense. Through five continuous enemy combat wares and small penetration attacks supported by aircraft and artillery, with our brave and courageous combat spirit we could apply clever combat tactics, stay close to the enemy, launch continuous counter-attacks and frustrate the enemy plan of attack. We annihilated a great number of enemy and seized weapons and equipment. We seized three M113 APC's. Our casualties remained light. We could protect the people's lives and property and intercept the enemy's reinforcements moving into the Citadel. The unit eagerly accomplished its missions, and encouraged, it received new assignments.

Counter-attack of the enemy on Tây Lộc airfield, An Hóa gate and Chanh Tây [Western main] gate.

Our Battalion moved in to occupy the Citadel. It occupied the areas of An Hóa gate, Chanh Tây [Western Main] gate and Thuy Quan Culvert.

The enemy was staying at the Mang Ca area and was conducting counter-attacks on the Tây Lộc air field with the intention to re-occupy the air field and connect with the Ordnance area. They were moving cautiously and with heavy firepower they attacked the air field. With a small element we defended the airfield and did not allow the enemy to move forward. At the flank of the air base our Cells jumped over the fortifications to pursue the enemy. They ran back to the Mang Ca area and from that place they attacked us with their firepower. The following days they attacked again the airfield, the An Hóa gate, the Chanh Tây [Western Main] gate. We attacked the enemy in many waves, defending each section of trench, each area in the airfield. On the outside the enemy was unable to move forward, he had to stop to consolidate his fortifications. At the An Hóa gate with tanks and infantry troop the enemy was uniting two and three arrows to attack along the Citadel and at the back of the Citadel. Inside the Citadel we occupied and defended it by portion and we used firepower to intercept and split up the enemy infantry and tanks. Each Cell started to assault the enemy troops formation. The combat dragged on. The enemy withdrew toward a high building. We were in front of the building and the enemy was behind it, shooting at us and preparing for another attack. The following day the enemy tried to re-occupy the upper part of An Hóa gate. Fighting until the enemy re-occupied the place, we surrounded him to prevent him from expanding. At night we launched another raid, annihilated the enemy and re-occupied the place.
When the enemy re-occupied the airfield and the position on the upper part of An Hoa gate, our elements still stayed close to him to attack. On 4 and 5 February 1968 the enemy launched a counter-attack on Chanh Tay [Western Main] gate from the Mang Ca area, the airfield and An Hoa area. Besides his infantry force and tanks he was also supported by artillery and aircraft. The enemy used aircraft to drop bombs and strafe the top of the Citadel wall, the inside and outside of the Citadel trying to annihilate our forces so that their infantry troops may assault. In spite of bombs, shells, solid fortifications and casualties we still stayed close to the battlefield, by using our method of attack.

Even with one Cell remaining, we still attacked. So we blocked the enemy's movements to Chanh Tay [Western Main] gate and pursued him to the hospital area and along the street.

A section of the Citadel at Chanh Tay [Western Main] gate collapsed but the enemy was still unable to re-occupy the place, they left behind a lot of casualties and equipment. Our coordinated element elements used firepower to reinforce and attack the airfield and Ordnance area. We annihilated and cut off the rear part of the enemy troops, caused them many difficulties, protected firmly the Chanh Tay [Western Main] gate and stopped any enemy counter-attack.

After several days of fierce combat, with high resolution for combat, clever application of tactics and by staying close to the enemy at the fortifications and by coordinating our fire power, we destroyed many waves of the enemy counter-attack on the Chanh Tay [Western Main] gate. We occupied the Citadel until the day we handed it over to our friendly unit [illegible]. The later held the Chanh Tay [Western Main] gate until the day of withdrawal.

Fighting enemy counter-attacking forces at Thanh Long Culvert, Đông Ba and Thượng Tu gates, and on Mai Thúc Loan street.

The enemy forces in the Citadel including vehicles, artillery guns and mortars was increasing everyday. They were divided into many directions to counter-attack us. Some of them were concentrated at a certain area in the main direction of counter-attack. There were also secondary directions of counter-attack such as the concentrated unit in the northwestern area of the Citadel (Chanh Tay [Western Main] and An Hoa gates.) or the concentrated unit in the southeastern area of the Citadel (Đông Ba, Thượng Tu, Mai Thúc Loan). The purpose of the enemy counter attack was to re-occupy the Citadel. We continued to attack the enemy and firmly held the occupied area. Counter-attacks between us and the enemy were becoming more violent.

During the first days they launched a counter attack in the northwestern direction, from the Mang Ca area. They were counter-attacking toward the Thang Long Culvert, moved to the southern direction to occupy Đông Ba gate. With only two squads we beat off all counter-attacking waves and held firmly the place from the morning till dark.
Suffering heavy casualties, the enemy was not able to pass the Citadel's gate and was forced to withdraw to ensure safety for his unit.

Counter-attacking in that direction without success, the enemy changed to the southeastern direction along the Mai Thuc Loan street. He was divided into many arrows to attack in order to gain the southern area of Nhi Ba river and to attack the southeastern gates. The enemy moved on many roads, using many arrows. But they were all blocked and annihilated by us. The enemy was increasing reconnaissance and landing more troops at the Dong Ba market (southern part outside the edge of the Citadel) using diversionary tactics to counter-attack. We still stayed close to the enemy fighting him inside and outside the Citadel.

[Activities] of the 2nd Battalion from 5 to 16 February 1968-

The enemy was concentrated to attack the southeastern area of the Citadel, using a large force with airstrikes and artillery to continuously annihilate our forces for several days. Each day they launched from two to five counter-attacks. Once, the enemy infantry and vehicles divided into two or three arrows and attacked the Dong Ba gate. Our comrades staying close to the fortifications and with our firepower blocked and annihilated them. Our method of concentrated fire blocked the enemy's arrows, destroyed the concentrated enemy troops, and prevented them from moving forward. In each phase, each day, each counter-attack we gained many experiences such as using only one small force. We assigned Cells to approach near the target (where the enemy was concentrating his firepower) attacked him by surprise and beat off many enemy counter attacking waves. While we used only one Cell in fighting the enemy had to drop bombs, chemical and gas grenades etc...[sic] in order to destroy us and occupy the Citadel, but no success was gained.

[Page 27 of original text]

When the enemy resorted to chemical poison and smoke, our men used only simple measure to stay close to him and fight against him. And when the enemy had occupied the Cửa Hậu [Rear gate] at 1100 hours on 16 February, we assigned our Sapper elements to conduct raids upon him and caused him heavy losses. We pinned him down and did not let him expand [his forces]. He reoccupied the Dong Ba and Thượng Tu walls on 18 February.

In conducting the enemy counter-attack, in the above manner, we had used coordinated firepower to shoot down two enemy boats on the Huống [Perfume] river.

The 1st Battalion occupied and held the Mai Thuc Loan street for 19 days. The 1st Company continuously countered the enemy's attack conducted by the puppet airborne troops, US Marine and South Korea's force, killed many enemy [soldiers] and firmly held the battlefield to the end. Experiences were drawn from the deployment of troops in line formation, disposition for a counter-attack and array of troops at every key position in an intercolated manner. We increased the firepower and used more methods of attack. Coordinated with the firepower, our infantry [force] had conducted sniper attacks and
assaults on the enemy staying in a distant area. We attacked him from behind, attacked him before he could attack us and took initiative to attack him. In addition, coordinated with the assault and firepower force, we destroyed the enemy vehicles and infantry troops every day and barreled their route of advance.

We organized three or four firepower or infantry cells to stay close to the enemy, attack him and force him to withdraw, thus creating favorable conditions for us to hold the battlefield until next day. Sometimes, we had to continuously conduct three to five attacks in one day. Since 12 February, we fought against the US and South Korean units. The enemy troops used their recoilless rifles and took advantage of the fact that their positions were on storied houses, they destroyed our bases of fire attacked our [lines of] defense. In addition, being supported by the firepower of armored vehicles, and artillery, their battalions concentrated in one direction to counter attack us. But, they never managed to dislodge us [from our positions].

On some days, we killed many enemy soldiers and destroyed many armored vehicles. Through effective combat coordination, such as the case of comrade Lanh’s cell which launched many salient assaults, killing 15 to 30 enemy soldiers at each wave [of assault], seized a great number of enemy’s weapons and successfully protected the cell.

Coordinated with the enemy force fighting inside the Citadel, one enemy element bivouacked outside Nhà Đô gate and one enemy battalion staying at Đông Ba conducted a counter attack on Bạch Thọ bridge. But, our 6th Battalion used firepower to destroy them, then dashed out to counter attack them, capturing a number of their soldiers and seized a great number of their weapons and facilities the rest of them had to withdraw in confusion to the rear.

**Fighting enemy counter attacking force on the Yết Kiệt road, the Thủy Quán culvert and the Cửa Hữu [Right Gate].**

The enemy troops stationed at the Ordnance area tried many times to attack the Thủy Quán culvert. But, they always failed to occupy it. They concentrated their forces on 16 February and succeeded in occupying the Thủy Quán culvert. They assigned one force to defend that area, but we always stayed close to the enemy and did not let him expand his forces. At night, we conducted raids upon them again and destroyed the main part of their position, leaving only one base of fire. The enemy increased their forces to defend the area, but we launched the second raid, completely annihilated them and reoccupied [the area]. We deployed our troops from Cửa Chánh Tây [Western Main Gate] to Cửa Hữu [Right Gate] and continuously launched raids at the Thủy Quán culvert and the Mỹ Lợi bridge. We caused great losses to the enemy and barred their route of advance. The enemy launched two advanced attacking elements, on the Thủy Quán culvert on 19 February 1968 and moved to Yết Kieu crossroad. They were annihilated and beaten off by our force.
Taking advantage of the gap at the adjoining area, the enemy moved from Thụy Quán Culvert to the south of the Nhi Hà river and occupied a section of the wall of the Citadel, south of Thụy Quán Culvert, 300 meters away from Cửa Hũ [Right Gate]. He increased his defense force and strafed to support his friendly unit.

In two or three successive nights, we coordinated infantry with firepower [heavy weapons] to reoccupy that position, but we only succeeded in killing a number of enemy soldiers, blocked the enemy forces and barred their advance. Clinging to the south of Thụy Quán Culvert, the enemy concentrated his force and fiercely attacked Yet Kieu street and Cửa Thuận port. For our part, we also organized our base at each area of emphasis, reinforced by strong firepower, such as 12.7mm heavy machine guns, to annihilate the enemy and protect the gate. And along with the infantry force, we continuously fought enemy counter attacking forces and forced them to return to their defensive position. On 22 February 1968, one marine Battalion launched a counter attack on Cua Huu [Right gate]. (It occupied one position on the top of the Citadel, one near the border of the wall and another one on the Yet Kieu cross-road, followed by M113 APC’s and supported by aircraft and artillery. It tried to launch two assaults but was beaten off by one of our cells The other arrows used firepower to support it, but it could not advance and had to withdraw.

We continuously attacked the enemy in day time, stayed close to them and used B40 Rocket Launchers to destroy their base of fire as well as their [line] of defense. We did not let them rest but always created favorable conditions for us to be able to successfully hold the battlefield until the following days. In 27 days' attack against the enemy in the Citadel, we had fully understood the concepts and principles of combat. We continuously attacked the enemy even when we still had only one man or one cell left. We gained additional experience, applied it cleverly and appropriately stayed close to the enemy to attack him. Although, the enemy had concentrated their infantry [troops] and armored vehicles and were reinforced by air artillery and although they even used chemicals and smoke, we were also able to positively annihilate them and hold the battlefield for many days.

Withdrawal from the Citadel:

On 23 February, the Regiment was ordered to leave the citadel. The Party Committee and unit commander transmitted that order to all members of the unit [and called on our men] to continue to prepare for another combat phase. We had a plan to withdraw our troops in order to ensure common security and secrecy.

The entire Regiment and various friendly units left the citadel and moved to a new position at 2400 hours on 24 February.
One element of the 1st Battalion barred the enemy's attack at 1645 hours to ensure security for the Regiment and friendly units to withdraw.

At 2000 hours on 24 February, the withdrawal to rear base proceeded in order. From the plan, all wounded soldiers were safely evacuated to the medical station and rear base (except for the element which was sent to the lowland).

On the road leading to the rear base, various elements made every effort to clearly understand the situation in all fields in order to be able to cleverly lead the unit in combat.

D. Results of the battle:

During the 25 successive days of fighting, the entire unit fought 416 battles including 23 attacks, 259 counter attacks, 32 raids and 3 shelling. We killed 5000 enemy soldiers including 1070 American and South Korean soldiers, captured 214 others. With the help of our local [agents] we killed 1,000 local administrative personnel, spies and cruel tyrants.

We seized: 408 weapons of various types, eight PRC-25 radios, 21 PRC-10 radios, three 15 watt-radio sets, 16 telephones and 26 receiving-sets.

We destroyed: 11 machine-guns, 14 automatic rifles, eight blockhouses, one depot of weapons and ammunition, seven 105mm and 175mm howitzers, 97 aircraft of various types, 18 M113 APC's (3 APC's were captured) 115 armored vehicles of various types, two warships of small size, three large bridges and we had controlled the city for 25 days.

Reason for success:

The Regiment gained great victories which would be mentioned in the Golden-Book. The historical tradition of the Regiment, in particular and of the Army, in general, has been praised by the Army and people of both regions [North and South Vietnam].

1. The policy of the Party and the Front concerning the [General] Offensive and Uprising was accurate and correct. It was in keeping with the real situation and the aspirations of the people. Trusting in victories our troops properly executed all instructions from the higher echelon.

2. The leadership provided by the Region Party Committee, Military Region Party Committee and Military Region Headquarter was in keeping with the situation of the Regiment every hour and minute, from the preparations for combat, during the fighting until victory was gained.

3. Due to the thorough understanding of the mission by the Regiment Party Committee and cadre of various levels, and due to the great efforts made by the entire Party Headquarters, we clearly
understood and strictly carried out all missions assigned by the Party and the People. Based on [that] close leadership, we did not balk at difficulties and always set good examples in all activities.

An infinite-loyalty, a marvellous bravery, a creative mind, a will to overcome difficulties under any circumstances, close coordination in combat between cadre and soldiers were the traditions of the Regiment. The people outside and inside the Citadel took past with their capabilities and collaborated with the units in every field of activities. The attack on Huế Citadel was part of the plan for general attack in the entire South Vietnam; the coordination of various battlefields and friendly units, and combat in the past produced favorable conditions for us to take over Huế City for a long time, in comparison with the past exploits in the histories of the Regiment and the Army so far.

STRONG AND WEAK POINTS

Strong points:

1. The missions were fully prepared; our troops prepared the battlefields carefully. Although the units had urgent missions and had to handle many wounded and sick soldiers, they regarded ideological and political indoctrinations as top priority missions, increased tactical and technical trainings, strengthened their forces, fulfilled requirements.

   In the units cadre and soldiers were very enthusiastic, determined to fight, they endured and successively fought the enemy under any circumstances and placed confidence in victory.

2. Secrecy was maintained, movement for deployment, movement of a large force through enemy areas and complicated terrain features were carried out in safety.

   Penetration attacks were conducted in accordance with the schedule and combats were carried out continuously.

3. The preparations for missions as well as for combat were made collectively and fully; the plans were consistent. Individuals and units drew experiences from attacks so that in combat they could fight independently and often took the initiative.

4. In combat, various units made best use of plans for attack, acted quickly, understood fully and completely, continuously attacked the enemy on the offensive as well as on the defensive, overcame difficulties to fight the enemy.

5. Various units organized withdrawals from the Citadel safely, attacked the enemy intensively while withdrawing, settled problems of wounded soldiers in difficult conditions.
6. Various units destroyed enemy forces, seized and destroyed combat facilities of the enemy, controlled the city for a lengthy period.

Weak points:

1. Various units did not fully understand the enemy activities in the Citadel; therefore the plans of attacks at objectives were not perfect and objectives were not completely destroyed (as in the Mang Ca area and in the military area).

2. Coordination between sappers and infantry units in attacks on objectives was close nor fast enough, and they adversely affected the attacks.

A great number of cadre and soldiers lost their way in the city.

3. In combat a number of cadre did not fully understand the coordination of infantry and firepower (facilities) to develop power in support of penetration attacks as well as counter-attacks while in defensive positions.

4. Various units which committed their reserve units in combat early to deal with difficulties in attacks on objectives, received no reinforcements to take over the objectives (the Mang Ca and airfield areas). The maneuvering of troops was slow and not coordinated.

5. Attacking inside the Citadel, the units did not concentrate their forces strongly to kill more than 100 enemy soldiers gathering outside the Citadel at Nhà De Gate, and did not grasp the opportunities to kill them when they were confused and their reinforcements were weak.

6. Various agencies incompletely developed their capabilities to serve the Party Committee and commanders in combat, they sometimes used their capabilities not in accordance with the situations.

LESSONS OF EXPERIENCE

1. Cadre and soldiers fully understood the missions, had high determination, they placed their confidence in the Party line, understood the political responsibilities of a party member, a cadre. They developed the traditions of their unit and successiocly consolidated their determination in the course of combat.

Party Committee and commanders paid much attention to and thoroughly understood the realization of cadre and soldier's missions assigned by the Regiment and Party Headquarters as top priority missions and fully understood that indoctrinations must be conducted many times, not only once or in the conference. They reviewed and evaluated preparations for missions, combat in the past, indoctrination and struggles.
They corrected inaccurate thoughts concerning the accomplishment of missions, rightism, passiveness, and fear of the rigors of the battle; they gained the initiative to cope with any development of the combat in which the enemy force was more and more increased with US advisors, puppet government troops and South Korean troops, aircraft and artillery, armored vehicles, chemicals.

They analyzed and evaluated the strength and weakness of the enemy, the defensive reaction of the enemy, and understood that impeding and attacking the enemy for a long time would produce unity in the Party. Cadre and soldiers in the units had the determination to attack the enemy under any difficult and complex conditions.

Our fight against the enemy's reaction forces in the areas of Chinh Tay [Western Main] Gate, Thuy Quan Culvert, Dong Ba, Mai Thuc Loan took place continuously for a long time. The enemy resorted to many plans. Cadre and soldiers in various units had to thoroughly understand their missions and political responsibilities so that they could develop and invent appropriate methods of attack, overcome difficulties; for instance, they strove to follow the enemy closely and kill them to a man. They organized two-man assault cells to attack Thuy Quan Culvert and occupied this area for two days and nights. They organized three-man cells to intercept and attack the enemy at Dong Ba despite they were forced with the shortage of personnel and ammunition, with the enemy infantry units stationed here, and with intensive power of enemy aircraft, artillery and chemicals.

A cell of comrade Tanh attacked the enemy on Mai Thuc Loan street. The great number of exemplary cadre and soldiers showed that the indoctrination to make all personnel fully understand the mission was conducted continuously in the past period of activities and must be improved to gain greater victories.

2. In the past combat activities the role of Party leadership was enhanced in the carrying out of political responsibilities in order to maintain collective activities. If our unity was consistent, we could overcome any difficulties and gain greater victories. In combat we had many things to do as the situations were complicated and urgent and charged quickly. We had not launched an attack for two or three days when we withdraw to strengthen our troops but prior to that we had to launch many waves of attack for a long time with many elements concentrated and dispersed. We had to attack the enemy, consolidate and improved our positions and at the same time meet requirements and conduct attacks and uprisings. The Party Committee fully understood these characteristics, determined the responsibilities of Party members, cadre, according to the criteria prescribed for "A excellence" party member, "A excellence" party chapter, under any circumstance and everywhere to implement a historical mission.

Each party member and cadre had to be responsible to the Party and the people.
Varios party members took firm hold of the role of leadership, were brave and exemplary in combat, not fearful of hardship and death and enthusiastic in various missions, and overcame numerous difficulties.

Although engaging in a protracted and urgent combat, the Party committees and commanders of various levels firmly maintained the patterns of activities with simple and appropriate contents, especially in the most trying circumstances. They also produced a proper assessment of complicated situations, good collective command and organization as well as employment of forces and firepower to continuously assail the enemy. In addition, they strictly and successfully implemented the policies in the city, strengthened Party Committee echelons, improved Party members and encouraged the imitation of good combat examples. These helped the effective accomplishment of missions and the improvement of Party members' sense of responsibility in their various activities. The development of new Party members and the improvement of Party members' sense of responsibility were for the purpose of supporting and serving the combat mission. In addition, the sense of responsibility was heightened in order to better the relations among various ranks, to help the people and to better the mutual support of different elements.

On the basis of the collective command, to be heightened, the unity of mind among Party members was achieved. As a consequence, many elements had satisfactorily performed all the missions in both coordinated and separate battles.

3. The bigger, the longer and the fiercer the fighting was [with the enemy using aircraft, artillery and chemicals], the greater attention we had to pay to the political and ideological tasks and motivate everybody to engage in various activities.

Cadre were regularly provided with political and ideological indoctrination, therefore they showed a high determination during the past battles.

In combat, there were many complicated evolutions, so the soldiers had some weak points in ideology but we could remark that various echelons had known how to follow to the political situation and settle all the collective and individual problems under perilous circumstances.

The enemy's strength was large, and enemy air and artillery activities was increasing yet, our soldiers still could destroy many enemy soldiers. The unit showed itself exemplary in activity and in combat. It assaulted and captured enemy tanks. When the enemy counterattacked fiercely, one combat cell succeeded stopping one enemy company, and killed many soldiers. It succeeded in holding the battlefield even while some of its men were seriously wounded.

Conduct indoctrination in order to motivate the unit in time. This was a large city occupied by the enemy for a long time, therefore we faced many complicated problems.
The enemy used this place to implement propaganda, to set up traps and to create a psychological influence among the people. This fact greatly affected the fighting spirit of our soldiers and the contact between the troops and the people. But our units unmasked the enemy scheme in time, and preached hatred against him among the people. Our soldiers were highly determined to destroy the enemy and to keep in close contact with the people. In the fighting against enemy counter offensive and long range defense, we had fully grasped the situation, disseminated all information received and announced the victories to friendly units to bring confidence to our cadre. Our counter-offensive at An Hoa gate, Chánh Tay [Western Main] gate, Đông Ba gate and Mai Thúc Loan street was widely spread. Sometimes, our cadre had to pass over pits and communication trenches to inform other elements of the situation and news of victory. Everybody had the responsibility of spreading the news. Requests and aspirations of soldiers within the unit were satisfied. The fighting spirit of soldiers was promoted and we successfully accomplished the mission.

4. Master basic tactical principles based on everyday fighting.
Experiences were to be drawn from each combat phase and based on actual fighting to create more realistic combat techniques (in a flexible manner).

The characteristics of a protracted fighting in the city was that we employed general tactical forms, and fully employed violence to defeat the enemy. Concerning the improvement of political knowledge, the Regiment provided soldiers and cadre additional training on basic military principles of the Party, particularly principles of continuous attack so that they could operate everywhere, at any time and in any circumstance. Though realistic combat, many soldiers, units and elements employed the tactics flexibly and effectively. For example: formerly sapper units only attacked the enemy at night, but presently they attacked in daytime and the targets for their attack were places where enemy troops had just arrived. In these cases, we did not take much time for preparation such as in attacks on Đông Ba, and An Hoa. We did not withdraw and remain to stay close to the enemy after liquidating the basic part of the battle.

While the enemy fiercely attacked road 1 and An Hoa, we reacted, destroying many enemy vehicles and capturing several M.113 APC's. In an attack or counter-attack, our forces were not necessarily larger than that of the enemy, and with a smaller force, we still could win the battle. Our small cell or element succeeded in attacking and intercepting an enemy company or battalion with air and artillery support at Đông Ba gate, Chánh Tay [Western Main] gate. In defensive activity, we fully understood the spirit of attack, used small firepower and force to protect key positions and large forces to stay close to the enemy on Mai Thúc Loan street and Đông Ba gate. We offensively conducted surprise attacks to upset the enemy plan.
and when the enemy reacted, we attacked him from his rear then on their flank. Infantry troops and firepower were flexibly employed according to the time, circumstances and battlefields. Sometimes, the power of five B.40 rocket launchers was directed to one enemy position.

Our units and elements corrected their shortcomings by experiences gained from every fighting day or phases of attacks. Enemy troops were supported by air and artillery fire, the US and puppet troops, especially marine troops established different defense systems. To destroy US defense systems, we had to use recoilless rifles, and counter offensive was to be kept secret. When attacking enemy defense systems, we succeeded in killing many enemy troops, destroying several facilities, limiting his resistance power, maintaining our forces available for the following successive attacks, and holding the battlefield for some time. We obtained great results.

30 March 1968
Công Trưởng [Regiment] Commander