After nearly one month of continually launching desperate attacks to overwhelm the enemy and due to the extreme heroism and unyielding determination to win which was displayed by our soldiers and people in Hue and Thừa Thiên province, we have gained a great, overall success.

I. General outlines of Huế before the campaign was started

- Huế is located 23° east of 100° longitude, 23° north of 16° latitude. To the north, it is bordered by Quang Tri province, and is 60 Km from the Quang Tri district seat.

- To the south, it is bordered by Quang Nam province and is 105 Km from Đà Nẵng.

- Huế or Thừa Thiên province has 6 districts: Phong Điền, Quang Điền, Hương Thủy, Phú Vang, Phú Lộc and Điện Trích [sic]. The total population is 800,000.

- Huế city itself is 2 to 2.5 km long and wide. Its population is approximately 200,000.

- At the time of the French, Huế was the nest of feudal mandarins and monarchs.

- During the August Revolution, the people of Huế joined the general uprising and seized power on 23 August 1945.

- During the Resistance against the French, the people of Thừa Thiên participated in the common heroic fight, and Thừa Thiên battlefield was considered the fiercest in Central Vietnam.

- When peace was reestablished under the control of the US and Diệm, Huế became the center for reactionary activities in all South Vietnam.

- Ever since the Liberation Front for South Viet came into existence in 1960, the people of Huế and Thừa Thiên stepped up their struggle movement, most typically the one of Buddhists in 1964 which scored great successes at Cau Ngu, Tri Ha and inside Huế.

- Considered in general, the movement in Huế developed quite slowly, if compared with the other battlefields in South Vietnam, because Huế is located within Inter-Region 5, which is immense and our leadership has failed to cover it all.
In April 1946, the Central Office for South Vietnam and Central Military Affairs Party Committee decided to make Quang Tri and Thua Thien a separate region and set up a Region Party Committee with a MR Party Committee.

Assignment of missions.

1. Intensify guerrilla warfare, attack communication lines, destroy and wear down the enemy potential, raise the Quang Tri Thua Thien battlefield to the importance of all others after one year.

2. Under the guidance of the Resolution from Central Office, the movement in Tri-Thien and Hue developed steadily day by day. Guerrillas attained the 200,000 mark, and they destroyed almost entire d/a of enemy personnel in Gau Nhi and An Le battles.

3. Of 58 battles, there were 28 sapper attacks and 21 attacks on Hue city and surrounding areas for drawing experience.

Our armed forces also attacked the armored regiment and Marine units and acquired good experience. We killed approximately 20,000 enemy soldiers.

By the end of 1967, after we destroyed the artillery battalion at Tri Ha, the enemy made great efforts to sweep 2,660 villages and his air force and artillery attacked Phong Dien and Phu Vang districts.

In this year's dry season, the Central Office decided that the battlefield on Route # 9, Thua Thien and Hue would serve to attract the enemy and our forces would win great victories.

II. Evolution of the campaign in Hue.

1. Enemy forces:

At the time the campaign began, the enemy was 25,000 strong. There were the 3rd USMC Division and the 1st Division of puppet forces, approximately 13 infantry battalions, three 105mm artillery battalions, one anti-aircraft battalion, one Special Forces battalion, two police field force battalions, four engineer battalions, two armored regiments, ten regional force companies, fifty popular force platoons, eighteen pacification units with 10,000 cadre. There were three military training centers with 4,000 trainees, three airfields: Tan Loc, Phu Bai and Hau Khanh; two harbors at Thu An Hoa and Toa Kham; three artillery sections at Bong Bong, Phu Bai and Tri Ha; one hotel at Thu An Hoa for the US Advisory Personnel, and 48 offices for the puppet administrative personnel.
* Position of the enemy forces.

In the innermost areas, were located the puppet authorities and police force. Then, there were the puppet forces, the administrative and spy network. The US forces were outermost.

The Central Military Affairs Party Committee and Region Party Committee decided, after careful consideration of the situation, that the enemy had strong firepower and great mobility. In addition, the population was dense. However, the enemy had also many weak points:

The morale of enemy soldiers was very poor. They feared our regular units on Route #9 and those coming from North Vietnam. Worse yet, the puppet 1st Regiment had been opposing Thieu and Ky and its personnel was renamed as being disunited and torn by different, parties (Quoc Dan-Dang, Dai Viet, Buddhist organizations) of the loyal opposition. If we attacked fiercely, it would be easily disintegrated.

Though the enemy strength was large, his actual combat strength was low. Only 7,000 soldiers out of 25,000 were able to fight successfully. Furthermore, it consisted of diversified arm branches that would be confused in combat. The enemy's outer defense system was thick with 100 strong points and the support of armored units. But his inner perimeter was nearly unprotected. (No defense system was organised. Only the agencies were guarded). If we took advantage of secrecy and surprise factors to attack the inner area then move outwards, the enemy would be greatly alarmed.

2. Friendly forces:

We had only two infantry regiments, three sapper battalions, one DKB battalion, one 12.7mm HMG company and a moderate quantity of weapons and ammunition. We had 12 DKB, one basic load of small weapon ammunition, one B40 with 40 rounds, one mortar with 40 shells, eight DKZ rounds, and 300 rockets for DKB.

Though our armed forces and ammunition were limited, our soldiers had strong determination and high combat ability.

We had the advantage of secrecy and surprise and great mobility even when near the enemy's units.

We had 400,000 people on our side who continually struggled against the enemy, 14 Special Action units and 50 self-defense units which were able to destroy the enemy's administrative personnel and spies, giving the start for the general uprising.

According to the general plan, the attack would take place in March, that is, after another month of preparation. But the
opportunity presented itself and we could not miss it. Moreover, the Central Military Affairs Party Committee had reviewed the plan twice, and our soldiers had practiced 26 attack exercises which gave them good experience.

3. Evolution of the campaign.

**Remark:** This was a long term, large scale campaign. The general attack was combined with a general uprising. Hue city and three other districts were chosen as the main objectives.

**Nature:** Our general attack and general uprising was directed against a strong enemy, and the situation was drastically different from that of the August Revolution. The French and Japanese were then in a position of defeated forces. They had no mind to resist, enabling the uprising movement of the people to secure complete success. This time, we had to destroy much of the enemy's potential before we could hope to win success.

- The struggle of classes was now fiercer. The civil war came to a phase when one of the two adversaries must disappear.

- The entire control machinery of the feudalists and bourgeois was centered in Hue. The enemy continually oppressed our people. Hatred and vengeance prevailed everywhere, in the hearts of children as well as of old people.

- The general plan was to combine attacks with uprising. The people must be strongly urged to stand up, because our armed forces alone would fail to win.

For instance: The ramparts of the Citadel were 14 meters thick. We would need many bangalore torpedoes and much artillery shelling before they could be breached.

**Characteristics:** The three following features were important:

- Concentrate our forces on destroying the puppet troops and authorities and wear down part of the US and satellite forces, because Hue was the brain of reactionary spirit.

- Mobilize all armed and political forces to overwhelm the enemy and crush the puppet authority.

- All actions must be decisive, well orchestrated and kept secret to prevent the unguarded enemy from taking retaliatory measures.

**Surprise factor:** After we attacked, we did not withdraw as we had usually done. As the enemy's police investigated the situation, we captured them in groups. We resisted for a long time (25 days) and the enemy had been caught unguarded. All his
leadership, maneuvering and concentration of troops was disorganized.

- For the few first days, the enemy failed to control the people and deploy his air and artillery activities. We were masters of the city. Bicycles and taxis ran busily in the streets.

 d/. Missions of the campaign:

The campaign was to fulfill three missions assigned by the Central Military Affairs Party Committee:

1. Conduct general attack and uprising to destroy the puppet troops and authorities in Hue. Wear down part of the US potential.

   (Another target was Route # 9 where we must destroy the US forces).

2. Through the revolutionary force of the people, overset the puppet authorities and set up a revolutionary administration. Our armed forces should therefore fight until this mission was accomplished. (Throughout South Vietnam, the only administration we could establish was in Hue).

3. Continue to pursue and counter-attack the enemy for protecting the revolutionary authorities and our area of activity.

Actual evolution of the campaign.

The campaign could be divided into 3 phases:

1st phase: For the first 20 days, from 7 to 27 January, we made all preparations,

- We infiltrated the masses to propagandize among the people going in and out, and obtain information of possible intelligence value.

- We motivated the people to kill tyrants and puppet administrative personal, attacked the communication lines between Da Nang and Hue, destroyed 70 vehicles, occupied a number of districts, namely Nuoc Ngoc district.
- We shelled Phu Bai airfield, destroying a US c

2nd phase.- Attack on Hue city:

In accordance with the general plan, we started firing at 0230 hrs. Our forces were divided in two prongs with one regiment advancing from north of Hương River and another from south of Hương River. This detail was worthy of notice: Approximately six thousand soldiers had crossed the river at two spots without being detected by the enemy. He even ignored our presence when we were close to him. On the night of 30 January, our sappers stayed close to Phu Bai airfield, the puppet armored regiment at Tam Thai mountain, and the engineer units at Nam Giao. We took advantage of the surprise factor to operate and destroy rapidly. We pushed our attack forward against Thuần Hòa hotel where the US advisors were. We killed 100 US advisors, 500 soldiers of 58K armored regiment, also the regiment commander and the chief of staff. We paralyzed the Phu Bai airfield, burned 70 helicopters and the POL depot. On the same evening, our sappers, disguised as women, penetrated the citadel in preparation to fight out from the center.

- We destroyed the company on guard at Tan Loc airfield and paralyzed this. On 3 February, we burned 86 helicopters.

Our forces of the northern prong: infiltrated Măng Ca military post and destroyed it completely. We also killed the commander of the 1st division, advanced toward the citadel area and coordinated with the sappers to attack Tan Loc airfield. On the night of 31 January, the forces of the southern prong continued to attack the Gia Hòa-Dương Ba area. The two prongs finally met and completely occupied Hue city. The fiercest phase of the battle took place when a detachment in our rear assaulted the unit of enemy soldiers defending the flag pole. We raised the 14-meter long flag of the Liberation Front at 0900 hrs of 1st February, near the palace where the old emperors had lived. The enemy forces were not far from our place but they did not retaliate. The people continued to take to the streets. Most noticeably, they used 20 rolls of cloth to sew flags. We seized 50 enemy trucks for the use of our soldiers who moved in the streets, persuading the people to demonstrate or transport supplies.

- The people joined our soldiers in their search for tyrants, reactionaries and spies. For instance, Mrs Xuan followed our soldiers to show the houses of the tyrants, she knew, although she had, only six days before, given birth to a child.

Meanwhile, our forces continued to move by Trang Tien street and attack the outskirts of the city.

On 2 February, we occupied the residence of the town chief, captured Dương Văn Khơ, then seized 4 million piasters in the Treasury and occupied the radio station. We also attacked Thua Phu...
prison and appealed for the support of the prisoners. One guard responded to our call. He opened the gate to release 1,800 persons when our cadre reached it. They formed a combined force to fight desperately. At the same time, the Front's artillery prevented the enemy units from advancing. Our forces captured two colonels, 1 b of US soldiers, three deputy province chiefs, one province chief, one service chief, many members of political parties including six of Dai Viet and Can Lao parties and 60 of Quoc Dan Dang party.

3rd phase.- Our forces had the mission of occupying Hue city as long as possible so that a revolutionary administration could be established. They had to resist all enemy attacks from 1 February to 23 February before they withdraw.

- On 5 February, enemy warships with American soldiers attempted to enter Hue along Huong River. Our soldiers and people succeeded in repelling them back.

- On 4 February, two warships loaded with US soldiers came from Gia Ho. But they were sunk by our troops.

- Also on 4 February, a prong of enemy soldiers from An Cuy advanced toward Trang Tien bridge. We halted them, using their own tanks to destroy them.

- On 7 February, the 4th squad of 2nd reconnaissance company advanced toward the center of the city. Our soldiers intercepted and destroyed it in 20 minutes.

- Also on 7 February, the Liberation soldiers downed one aircraft and captured the pilot.

- On that night, as we guessed that the enemy would send more reinforcements, we destroyed many bridges.

In only a few days, our forces had destroyed three enemy battalions, four artillery weapons and one platoon of US soldiers. The soldiers in eight military posts had deserted and surrendered their weapons to the Liberation troops. Some units even requested to fight by the side of the Liberation army.

- On 11 February, one infantry battalion neared Lo Ren bridge. Our forces attacked it, killing 400 soldiers, and capturing 400 others, or convincing them to surrender.

- On 14 February, the enemy ventured another counter-attack. We killed 400, destroyed two US warships and burned two others on Huong river. In all, we destroyed 10 ships on Huong River.

- On 15 February, the enemy sent four battalions to attack us from all directions, expecting to dominate the city. We killed 100 enemy soldiers. Some areas were re-occupied by our forces after
they had changed hands many times. We were determined to resist at all costs. On 18 February, the "Coalition Front for Peace" came into existence with the following Committee members:

- Professor Le Van Hao, 34
- Mrs Luan Chi, 60
- Venerable Thich-Don Nhu

and two comrades Communist Party members.

- "I am very happy. The Revolution has saved me. It is regrettable that I have worked for it only 7 days". The sentence must have been a quote of someone else's words. The

- Some women extolled the achievements of our troops.

- On 22 February, one enemy battalion attacked 5 defended by Miss Nguyen Thi Lien. The squad under her command included four Party members and seven group members. They fought heroically. In another place, two girls intercepted 100 US soldiers and killed 17. Three Liberation soldiers worked together to attack an enemy tank.

- On 23 February, our forces decided to withdraw. During the withdrawal, one company lost liaison with the friendly units. While seeking its way out, it killed 36 American soldiers.

This long term attack on Hue city was typical of the Vietnamese military technique. We resisted and defeated larger forces with smaller forces. This technique was adopted effectively in a city like Hue.

- In Huong Thy district, we had established a political force whose mission was to propagandize and appeal for enemy soldiers to surrender with their weapons. When we attacked the self-defense camp, the soldiers were so frightened that they crossed the river without even knowing how to swim and 21 of them were drowned. In all, we killed 1,938 enemy soldiers. 774 others surrendered including 670 of the puppet authorities. We also killed one member of Dai Viet Party Committee, one senator of South Vietnam, 50 Quoc Dan Dang Party members, six Dai Viet Party members, 13 Can Lao Nhuan Vi Party members, three captains, four 1st lieutenants and liberated 35 hamlets with 32,000 people. Our forces downed three aircraft, seized 400 assorted weapons, mobilized 1,600 civilian laborers, recruited 600 youths. Our units in this area consisted only of five Special action companies, one sapper company and one guerrilla platoon in Phu Vang.

Phu Vang.- Our forces in this area consisted of one local company and one special action company.
The enemy strength was two regular battalions, two regional force companies, 15 regional and popular force platoons, and seven pacification units. Our soldiers attacked Area 5 and Đap Đa area until 23 February before they withdrew. We seized twelve trucks to transport food and 60 rolls of cloth for our flags.

We eliminated 1,892 administrative personnel, 38 policemen, 790 tyrants, six captains, two 1st lieutenants, 20 second lieutenants and many N.C.O. Of those who surrendered, there were 160 puppet soldiers, 220 administrative personnel including four members of Đại Việt party chapter, another from the party region committee and a third from the Central Committee. We also captured the Nαm Bọ Party Committee member of Quoç Đan-Dang party and two others from the party chapter, seized 272 assorted weapons, 113 tons of rice, 10 tons of salt and four million piasters.

Significance of our success.

The most outstanding feature was that we won an overall success, militarily and politically. This was a typical example of our tactic on how to occupy and defend a city.

- We extended the fight with the enemy and destroyed much of his potential.
- We attacked many places, liberated an immense rural area for reconstruction.
- Hue was the place where reactionary spirit had existed for over ten years. However, it only took us a short time to drain it to its root.

2. This was the largest success ever won in our resistance. Our strategy was most effective. The most significant fact was that we were masters for an extended period of time and completely reversed the economic and political balance in our favor, rendering the enemy helpless.

3. Hue had been transformed into a front line for our forces. The revolutionary authorities had attracted all influence to our side. The enemy was confused and demoralized.

Reasons for success.

1. The leadership of higher echelons was effective. All plans were reviewed many times.

2. Our cadre and soldiers were brave, resourceful and determined to win.

3. We secured unreserved support from the people. For instance, 1,800 political prisoners joined the fight three days after they had been released. The youths and students of Hue participated in fighting the enemy. They seriously carried out the resolutions of the revolutionary levels.
- The people heartily praised our armed forces for their achievements. They assisted the soldiers in labor duties and entertained them with fine revolutionary songs.

- In some places, they prepared to welcome the troo with cakes and candies.

- Some families volunteered to evacuate wounded soldiers and bury dead soldiers.

4. We successfully coordinated the various battlefields, units and secured the support of many friendly countries.

**Complete destroyed:**

**Enemy soldiers:** 25,000  
**US soldiers:** 7,812  
**Captured:** 1,723  
**US soldiers:** 37  
**Surrendered:** 5,946  
**Completely destroyed:**  
- One armored regiment  
- 11 battalions of US and puppet troops  
- 26 companies (including one air cavalry company)  
- 1 South Korean company  
- 169 platoons.

**Worn down:**

- One US armored regiment  
- Three battalions of US Marines  
- Five battalions of US Air cavalry  
- Three battalions of puppet airborne troops  
- Ten military posts responded to our appeal for surrender.

**Burned:** 250 aircraft  
**Damaged:** 553 mechanized vehicles  
- 52 warships  
- 36 artillery pieces and storage points in town  
- 2,500 assorted weapons  
- 100 machine guns  
- 100 army trucks  
- 8 tanks  
- 13 rice storehouses with 1,000 tons of rice.

We liberated 20 villages and 101 hamlets, and promoted revolutionary spirit for 450,000 people in suburban areas.

-----------------------------END OF TRANSLATION-----------------------------
Mar 68 Resolution of Current Affairs Committee Characteristics:

It will take us ten more days to reach the battlefield command post. The first element there will attack first.

During the dry season, we must make every effort to overrun the enemy. Heavy equipment, long trips and many sick men are our problems. However, in order to foster the struggle tradition of the Vanguard troops, after we travel 90 kilometers by trucks, we will walk for four or five days and continue our march on foot for seven to ten days. The sick will also be requested to march.

While passing through liberated areas, we must pay attention to the situation of the people. We must find out those who are good or bad, also their language and attitude. There is the presence of POW's so, we must enhance the prestige of the victor.

Leadership requirements:

1. Political ideology:

We are in the final struggle phase. We must strive to make an overall improvement:

Troops: Move fast and orderly. Have enthusiasm in combat, observe solidarity and help each other. You must not rely on higher echelons, stay behind while in movement, or be demoralized before difficulties.

Cadre: Be serious and careful to reconnoiter the area prior to attack. Know the enemy and friendly situation. Observe security maintenance measures. Always be the "Four-Excellences", cadre (Excellent ideology, excellent discipline, excellent leadership, and excellent study). Indoctrinate troops to give up the fear of hardships and difficulties. Improve the sense of discipline. Effectively execute the Party regulations. Prevent hesitation, and successfully implement the civilian proselyting policy.

Information on Hue obtained by a propaganda and training cadre of Military Region.

Hue is one of three large cities. The others two are Saigon and Ha Noi.
have 20 or more cars. Police and combat troops consist of three battalions. There is a great number of secret agents. Popular and Regional Forces are always on the airfields, Hue Capital, An Cuu Area, and the Huong Giang Hotel Area. Mang Ca Area was protected by the 1st Puppet Division, an artillery regiment and three mobile battalions.

The walls of the capital are from four to six meters in height, with electric lights mounted on top. Phu Bai Airfield is 13 kilometers away. The 3rd US Marine Division Headquarters includes ((not very legible)) three regiments and one US artillery regiment.

**Situation from south of Hue to Hai Van Pass:** The area east of Phu Bai Airfield is white sand.

Political reorientation course. After the Dec To Battle, the morale of the soldiers was much better. The people were indoctrination on the Spring-Winter Campaign to improve their determination to win and to overthrow the Puppet Government.

Our unit enjoyed Tet five days early. Why did we attack Hue during Tet? Because if we attacked the enemy before Tet, he would have discovered our plan and would have taken precautions. Therefore, we had to attack at that time. We used two regiments and attacked main objectives in Hue by using 1d 800 ((possibly 1,800 personnel)) split into three elements. At 1215, we infiltrated Hue Capital. Our sapper units seized all objectives. At 1216, our infantry units attacked and destroyed all of their defenses. The streets were crowded and the people were enthusiastic.

The enemy troops had returned to Hue. Therefore, his strength increased. When we infiltrated Hue, the enemy ran. During the first 15 minutes, we did not hear any enemy gunshots and we captured many enemy troops.

2 Mar 68

"Seeking the reasons that caused our units weakness", was the topic for a political session held by cadre and Party members.
Cell 8: In general, the unit's spirit and determination were strong but some soldiers still complained about their health and relied on their units' vehicles, and weapons. For instance, they said:

I thought that they would not force me to continue the work because I was very sick, but they did. Now we are encountering difficulties. Probably my life will be torn before the nylon sheet is ((sic)).

- The solidarity among cadre has not yet been successful.
- The assignment has not yet been regular.
- The cadre's exemplary role has not yet displayed.

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9 Mar 68 "Studying the ethnic minority policy".

1. Situation:

The ethnic minority is kind-hearted. After saving enough food, what was left they gave to the units.

- They endear the troops ((VC)) - especially the troops from the north. They usually said”. "If we give something to them, they will give back".
- They extremely hate stealing and careless defection.
- We should not change anything with them. (For example: One soldier had changed a pair of shorts for an umbrella with a Montagnard but his son disagreed and made some trouble).
- When they give something to us, we can receive but we should give them back other things.
- We should not make trouble with them.

2. Some necessary matters in the coming situation and movement.

We will meet the Montagnard worker with bare clothes and sometimes uncovered (imperialists). In this case we must be polite and gentle, not laugh at or flirt (In some cases they beat and intended to kill troops because of this reason).

3. Shortcomings:

- Comrade Tuan stole some under garments.
- C7 stole a teaset.

- Do not despise ethnic minorities.
- Motivate the district unit to study the NVA policy concerning the Montagnard people. The minorities have an absolutely revolutionary spirit. They even abstained from eating to attend the Party meeting. They are very united and endure grave hardships to help each other.
- Do not exchange too many items with them (help them dig spike pits and traps. Install poisonous spikes).

Questions: What are the characteristics of a Montagnard?
- What should we do to implement the policy toward these people.

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A ((SIC))

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Remarks on D ((possibly on the personnel of the battalion))

Duong Van Gap Jan 66 ((possibly date enlisted))
Kieu Van Phuc Sep 65 (( " " " ))
Nguyen Van Cho Sep 65. (( " " " ))
Mai The Bao Feb 65 (( " " " ))
Nguyen Van Thac Sep 65 (( " " " ))
15 Mar

- The movement was carried on because the situation was critical.
- We had to take rice for ten more days.
- We received some more shovels and pickaxes.
- The departure time took place between 0800 to 1000 hrs, otherwise, we would not arrive at our destination by dark. The quantity of rice was large and the transportation facilities were few. (We had to stop on the way for a rest).

Movement route: We went with a guide for the first hour.
- We took the road used by the people for another hour.
- Then we went on a large road for one hour. We took the rice, and went in south direction.

During the movement, we were separated from each other by 1-2 km.
(In short, the route was complicated).

One CO, XO, plus three comrades went ahead to take rice and prepare messing and billeting for the troops. At 1745 hrs we came to D. (1400)
Regiment's cadre conference.

5. Comments on the results of movement.

* The route of movement was over 1000 kilometers. It took one month and six days.

Foot march: 28 days, ten days by car. Try to get to the destination in order. Solidarity, excellent discipline, and excellent determination. Soldiers were enthusiastic while performing their tasks. All unit members were healthy.

* The leadership organization succeeded in carrying out its task. Some were given leadership classes thus enabling their leadership ability.

* All unit members were healthy during the movement. The Duan (Group) E assigned three comrades, previous units assigned 300 comrades, 60 comrades died from disease. The healthy soldiers were reduced, but they were still strong.

* In general, the safety was good, one comrade had his leg fractured, three comrades were hit by trucks, but there were no fatal accidents. Some equipment was lost or damaged.

Advantages: The Party Chapter had a high sense of responsibility.

The troops are very aggressive. We have met favorable conditions.
- During the movement, troops displayed their prestige of victory.
- They have been transported by trucks many times.
- Had sufficient food supply.
- The SVN people are enthusiastic in our struggle.

Our weak points: Our troops' enthusiasm and determination was not high enough. They still need to be encouraged.

They have only paid attention to the immediate task but not to the long range task.

Their sense of discipline, and organization has not been well maintained. (They still seek food for themselves). They have not properly executed the Party regulations.
Inventory of the people's property.

II. The situation and mission.

1) Move to fight in Inter-Region 5

a/ The situation in Inter-Region 5:

The enemy: 102d ((Battalion))
Hai Van Khanh Boa
34 US and Puppet troops
24 battalions of satellite troops.

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- The enemy suffered many heavy losses; most of his bases were attacked and communication lines cut off. He also sustained 30,000 KIA's, lost one warship, and ((blank)) vehicle. He did not pay attention to the conduct of many operations nor the intensification of the defense in towns and main villages.

In addition, the enemy suffered many defeats in the political and economic fields.

Friendly forces gained many greater achievements. They are now thoroughly developed and coordinate together to continuously attack the enemy.

In order to initiate the general offensive and uprising phases, political forces motivated the people to participate in the struggles and demonstrations. They achieved the following results:

- The people rose up 400 times. 2,000 people were arrested by the enemy.

In Qui Nhon, 600,000 people participated in the movement and in Quang Da ((the Quang Da Special Zone)) there were 250,000 people who participated in the uprisings.

b/ The performance of assigned missions:

The immediate missions were to construct roads and prepare for concentration attacks.

((Page 52 of Original Text))

- Road construction missions:

- Characteristics:

Unlike the previous actions as (in the airfield at the Bai Mai Tam Village) the unit worked with a shortage of rice, salt, and equipment. However,
Sometimes, the enemy launched fierce attacks forcing the unit to work in secrecy.

The unit strived to complete the roads which the friendly combat forces used as soon as they received orders.

During this mission, the unit had a food shortage and had to work in bad weather.

Results of the leadership:
- Most soldiers requested to participate in combat actions but they were not healthy enough. Many soldiers were sick.

(!Page 53 of Original Text!)
- Shortage of food.
- Combat readiness.
- Industrial accidents.

2. Requirements on leaderships:

In the political field:
- Make cadre and troops understand the significance of road construction, it is as important as the battlefield.

It is not necessary to go to battlefield to fight the enemy. Road construction is also a combat mission. It should be organized in order to successfully ensure combat capability.
- Heighten the spirit of democratic solidarity among the units to promote constructive ideas.
- Keep strict discipline to fix working procedures. We must be happy to successfully carry out our political activities.

In the military field:

The following requirements should be met:
- Troop strength.
- Technical capability and combat plan.
- Productivity:
- Insure the laborers' life

(!Page 54 of Original Text!)
- Combat readiness.

In addition, troops should have enough food to ensure their health.
also have sufficient sanitary arrangements to take precautions against
disease; as follows: *Pestesia*, *Malaria* and scabies. They gathered vegetables
in forests for their units. These units did not exchange the vegetables for
anything from the people. The troops successfully maintained their equipment.

Cadre and Party members set an example.
- They also fully understood the missions of their units and the
determination of the Party.
- Units discussed the standards of production.

((Page 35 of Original Text))

One mess personnel should supply 17 soldiers with a large quantity of rice
and firewood.

We should motivate 50% of the medics to fulfill the assigned mission.

The Adjutant should disseminate the company letter pertaining to the
following tasks.

**Time:**

We must work ten hours a day as follows:

**Morning:** 0600 - 1130 (Laborer)
**Afternoon:** 1200 - 1730
**Evening:** 1800 - 2030 Internal organization activities.

There is a 15 minute break in the morning and afternoon. Criteria:

One C (possibly one kilo) of explosive charges ((sic))

Six cubic meters of soil should be dug each day. Three cubic meters of
stone should be moved each day. One tree, 25 centimeters in diameter should
be out each day. Three meters long should be built each day. Criteria for
workers:

((Dig))) eight cubic meters of soil each day.

((Move))) four cubic meters of stone each day.

((Build))) an embankment meters long each day.

((Cut))) five trees each day.

((One line illegible))
timber: Three cubic meters each day. Criteria for leveling
land:
Clear 150 square meters each day.

Surface of road:
If the slope is above 100 meters, the road should be 12 meters wide.
If the slope is below 100 meters the surface of the road should be 15 meters wide.
If the road is 15 meters wide, we should secure it and conduct ambushes there.

The embankment should be five meters high and five meters wide.

Surface of the bridge: Three meters. A large road should be six meters wide. Two comrades of the explosive cell were hospitalized. Three others failed to achieve the highest output. We should prescribe criteria for their work.

Four or five cells had only one crowbar.

Each two-man cell needed:
- One shovel
- One crowbar
- One hoe
- One basket
- Two beetles ((a heavy wooden hammering or ramming instrument)).
- Three pillars (0.80 meters, 1.2 meters, and 1.5 meters).

A pack of explosive charges.

17 Mar 68

Attacl plan to be drafted for Party Chapter C8 ((sic)).

I. Obtain the best operational results.

1/ Repeat the following Resolution: Conduct speedy marches, attack and
annihilate the enemy fiercely. Fight to the bitter end. We should have
revolutionary pride and implement discipline to attain many achievements in
the first battle.

2/ Operation orders should be implemented in time.
Cadre of squad, platoon and company level should be in charge of organization and leadership.

**Shortcomings:** A number of cadre did not fully understand their mission, therefore they balked at difficulties and hardships, feared fierce attacks and did not want to make sacrifices.

A Sense of discipline is still lacking.

Some soldiers stayed in the rear areas when they were supposed to fight.

Other soldiers moved freely and had no regard for secrecy.

Rear bases: There was not enough food, therefore, a number of cadre stole food; such as, sugar, beef, etc...

Engineer and sanitation activities were not properly implemented.

Unsanitary food and water were being used.

II. The future tasks:

1/ The immediate task is to clear roads.

2/ Combat tasks?

Why should we clear the roads? To conduct great and concentrated attacks. We should have techniques, arms, food and control of the roads. One of our slogans is "The roads are battlefields, policies are weapons". Soldiers in the forward areas are determined to attain the greatest victories.

b/ Leadership requirements:

Fully understand the missions of clearing the roads. The following plan should be implemented.

We should carefully prepare good tools.

Try to attain great achievements and prevent waste. (Ground 8m³ (sic)).

We should unite to counter the US.

We should observe discipline while performing the labor task.

Weapons and ammunition should be properly maintained. It is forbidden to use mines for gathering fish.
Strengthening of forces:

Cadre and Party members should fully understand Party's policy in order to serve the Party effectively. They should set examples for probationary members and sympathizers.

Cadre should develop the Party by increasing the Party cell, from three to five members.

They should improve their organization and command skills.

The triangular organization should be strictly observed by the three-man cell ((sic)).

Mutual relationship among the members of the Group should be kept close.

Cadre should make every effort to carry out their assault missions.

Political activities should be conducted successfully. Political sections should pay attention to such matters as: hanging flags, slogans, and disseminating news of victories.

An emulation movement should be waged for individuals and cells.

Strengthening command skills:

Plans should be drafted carefully. Each comrade should dig eight cubic meters of soil each day.

Therefore, in a day with the exception of the clerk, the liaison agent, the adjutant, and seven cooks, 110 men should be able to dig 880 cubic meters of soil.

Activities of the rear Advice:

Troops have been provided sufficient food. Daily, they have three hot meals served with vegetables found in the forest. The prevention of disease is well maintained. Lodgings are good.

Criteria fixed for emulation:

The emulation criteria consist of:

1/ Ensuring good production.

2/ Maintaining good security, discipline, and solidarity.

3/ Ensuring the highest strength.

4/ Observing cleanliness and order.
The leadership has sometimes encountered many difficulties. It should do its best to overcome them.

The 9th cell should observe order during movement.

Shortcomings: Cadre and Party members have sometimes displayed laxity in the performance of their duties. They have showed many difficulties in the construction of defensive positions and in camouflaging.

Requirement of the leadership:

The troops should be authorized to take a rest after working.

To be successful in leadership, the leaders are required to create an enthusiastic atmosphere for their men.

Troop strength:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Troop</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>27</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2 = 24</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1 = 23</td>
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<tr>
<td>HL ((training))</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>AN ((security))</td>
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<td>8</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

The following personnel were recommended to be cited:

1st Squad: Cat, Dan, Dieu

2nd " : Thinh, Khai, Xuan, Phuc, Khai, Hai, Tai

3rd " : Giap, Minh, Loc, Trang

4th " : Binh, Cam, Hai (Linh) Thong

5th " : Tuan, Giai

6th " : Thanh

7th " : Lan, Thang, Mech, Quat, (Sau, Tat)

8th " : Tham, Chin, Nhieu (Nhieu)

9th " : Long, Bon (Long)

10th " :

11th " : Tu, Chien, Sinh, Kha

((Page 63 of Original Text))
3 Squad 9 comrades

Total 25 + 2 = 27 comrades

4 " 9 comrades

5 " 8 "

6 " 9 "

Total 26 + 8 = 28 comrades

7 " 8 comrades

8 " 8 "

9 " 5 "

Total 21 + 2 = 23

10 " 10 comrades

11 " 10 "

Cadre 4

Liaison 3

Agents

Total: 106 + 3 = 109 (sic)

((Page 63 of Original Text))

Troop strength from various squads engaged in the daily labor works,

as of 19 Mar 68.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Number of troops</th>
<th>19</th>
<th>20</th>
<th>21</th>
<th>22</th>
<th>23</th>
<th>24</th>
<th>25</th>
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<td>Cadre</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Comrade Pham talked with cadre on 20 Mar 68.

1. The movement of friendly troops was performed in the most favorable conditions because of the following reasons:
   - The whole country was in an advantageous position.
   - The troops had been trained on movement by the division and the regiment headquarters.
   - The movement was made on the road (by motor cars). The troops did not have to carry heavy loads.
   - The dry season made it advantageous for the movement.
   - During the movement, the troops were furnished with a full supply of food provisions, sugar, cigarettes, milk, and rice. This was provided thanks to the help of higher echelons, engineer forces, assault youth forces.

2. The followings were indispensable needs which had to be prepared for combat activities:
   - Equipment
   - Food provisions
   - Reorganization
   - Construction of roads, which was one of the most essential preparations for combat activities.

3. Characteristics of the construction of roads:

   We had to construct roads leading to Hue and linking roads constructed by the enemy in the vicinity of the Huong River ((Perfume)). Troops had to construct many sections of roads in various areas for many days in the heavy rain, many of them got sick and became weak.

   The enemy's pacification plan was basically unsuccessful. In Region 5, this plan was of primary consideration.

   The monthly reinforcement total, for personnel has increase from six thousand in the past to eight thousand at the present.

   The enemy's great failures, especially in the military field have essentially affected the whole course of the war.

   Propaganda on the development of the Party was weak.
We should prevent the enemy from attacking in the near future, because he will attack our bases if he can discover them or he will use psywar activities.

We have a good cause and we should spread the news of our successes to the people.

To go to war, we should be completely equipped carrying enough rice for 12 days. We will follow the "Liberation Liaison Line". (50% of our strength will participate in combat and 50% will stay at home for self-sufficient production.

**Action to be taken:**

1. **Safety measures:**

1) Fortifications should be constructed at the bivouac sites. These fortifications should have air vents (to reduce the blast caused by B-52 bombings). They should be 1.60 deep and 0.40 to 0.60 meters wide. We should surround the area with bamboo wattle fence and consolidate it with pressed earth.

There should be separate cells with three personnel each. There must be pegs to hang our hammocks.

Fortifications must be extremely strong because the enemy's bombs sometimes exploded before we hear the aircraft, especially when they are B-52's.

The 175 mm artillery rounds of the enemy fire very rapidly and sometimes they exploded before we hear the sounds of the guns.

2. **Precaution about smoke, fire, and lamps.**

In this case, smoke, fire, and light from lamps will endanger our lives.

We should take precautions with lights.
3. We only move within the bivouac site and avoid making noises. These noises can be recorded by tape recorders in the enemy aircraft.

We should strictly keep order at that moment. We should not sing, call one another, or turn the radios on loud. Shooting is not permitted here.

It is not permitted to blow a whistle or to shout to wake up personnel. Verbal orders should be transmitted from one person to another.

**Bathing and washing:**

The area fixed for bathing and washing was secured. Despite this, the personnel, because of fear of enemy aircraft have moved in disorder in all directions. This is dangerous because it may enable the enemy to spot the area. The road was not used. Another trail was used instead. The sentry was well prepared.

**II. Sanitary measures and prevention of disease:**

1/ Food should be clean. We should not use our fingers when eating and should change two ends of the chop-sticks for eating our meals. We should dig a well for drinking water. Meals should be fixed daily. We should select clean food for eating (we must eat vegetables because they contain Vitamin B1).

2/ We should keep sanitary measures, completely destroy flies, mosquitoes, jungle leechs, snakes, and scorpions. Our tunnels should be dry and clean.

3/ We should drink boiled water.

4/ Concerning infection, we must assign personnel to clean the latrine carefully.

These are the best measures for feeding troops and preventing disease.

**III. Ineffective administration of materials.**

1/ Subjects to be studied:

- Strength
- Weapons
- Equipment
- Military equipment.
1. Strength and character and revolutionary ethics: Although we are starving and are exposed to fierce situations, we never do anything regretful.

2. Each day we disseminate the information and analyze the victories.

3. Political activities: Excellent soldiers who crossed the Truong Son Mountains to liberate SVN are to be praised, (they receive a letter of appreciation for that deed).

4. Educate the soldiers on the purpose of what they must do.

V. Organization:

1. Concentrate into the organization of three-man cells and companies which play a key role ((sic)).

22 Mar 68.

We received orders to take one platoon for combat.

1. Enemy: According to the urgent order, about one platoon of Special Forces is in the area.

2. Equipment:

- 100 rounds of CKC carbine.
- 150 rounds of AK assault rifle.
- Four grenades
- One medic
- One basic load for a machinegun
- Rice for five days.
- One first-aid man
- One liaison man

3. Requirements:

The comrades may select either fighting outside the resistance area or fighting secretly.

Be conscious of the unit discipline (when opening fire). Carry out civilian proselyting. Attack fast.

Win the first battle.
27 March 1968

Experiences learned from the past phase in carrying out laboring tasks:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Company</th>
<th>5.6 cubic meters of ground</th>
<th>3.6 cubic meters of rock</th>
<th>28 OT ((possibly tons))</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Company 6</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Company 8</th>
<th>3.2 cubic meters of ground</th>
<th>1.8 cubic meters of rock</th>
<th>217</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Company 7</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Company 9</th>
<th>4 cubic meters of ground</th>
<th>4.2 cubic meters of rock</th>
<th>124</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Construction 5 dams, each 1.2 meters high to separate the rice fields.</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Ended at 16° ((possibly 16 hours)) The present reorganization:

Troop strength: Reorganized strength:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Company</th>
<th>117</th>
<th>127</th>
<th>1</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>6</td>
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<tr>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>10</td>
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<td>&quot;</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>12</td>
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<tr>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>6</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

The support strength

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Company</th>
<th>16</th>
<th>1</th>
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<tbody>
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</tbody>
</table>

Twelve comrades were assigned with their missions according to the Regulation 28.

EQUIPMENT

Nine automatic rifles with 270 bullets (30 bullets for each rifle)
- 25 CKC carbines with 150 bullets.
- 50 AK's with 10,000 bullets (200 bullets for each AK)
- 6 B-40 grenade launchers and 36 grenades (six grenades for each B-40 grenade launcher).
- Three grenades for each comrade but two grenades for men using automatic rifles.

- 100 AK's bullets for each comrade in the Party Chapters.

- 140 x AK's and 50 C3C bullets for each comrade in various agencies.

One squad consisted of seven comrades. Mission of carrying rice.

At 4:00 hours on the morning of 23 March, troops carried rice, tents, and hammocks.

((Page 71 of Original Text))

4 Thong Nhiem San
5 Giai Tuan Thuc
6

4 Six comrades 30 meters 82 4.3 meters
5 five " 22 " 6 4 ((sic))
6 seven " 36 " 10 
7 Thang, Manh, Quat, Lau (Lau)
8 Nhien, Tinh, Chinh, Than (Chinh)
9 Dan, Long (Long)
9 six comrades 24 = 8
8 7 2 28 = 18 ((sic))
7 5 3 20 = 20

10 Thanh, Dinh, Ngoc, 36 meters (Binh)

((Page 72 of Original Text))

27 Mar 68

The resolution of the Party Committee and the preparation of Party Chapters.

I. Assessment of operational results:

1) Results of operations.

- Urgently lead the unit to the battlefield. With powerful strength, strict discipline, and close coordination, troops will attack, strengthen, and they should attain greater achievements.
Shortcomings: The improvement of determination was not effective.

Troops had pessimistic and confused attitudes, such as 38 comrades in the 2nd Company including two comrades of the 7th Company. 26 March-68.

- They had bad attitudes. They lost their weapons and equipment. They were stealing in their units.
- They did not fully understand their mission of building roads. The working atmosphere was not good so their output was decreased.

Experience was not gained and adopted to practical situations.

Working methods were not very effective.
- Considering safety, our comrades still cut trees, make fires, and talk noisily. Many comrades were in poor health. Some comrades lacked initiative. The implementation of tasks was slow. The indoctrination of Party members was not permanently carried out.

II. The resolution for the coming activities:

1. We must clearly understand the resolution and measures. We must counter pessimistic attitudes (supervise the work of each platoon).

The construction of roads has a strategic meaning for the campaign.

2. We must improve our working methods and plans.

3. We must be resolved to comply with the orders. If day-light hours are not enough we must work at night.

We must be determined to counter pessimistic attitudes and disobedience of orders.

4. Troop messing:

Handling of the food supply was effective. The unity of the internal organization was ensured. The reorganization of cooking methods was successful. Maintenance of troop health was good; weapons must be dispersed.

5. Labor work: Assigned missions to every platoon and squad.

Personnel assigned to the battalion

1. Than
The Field grade political officer talked about the future mission.

Plan of Reorganization:

Number of personnel performing tasks:

Subsistence, food: No

Squad Leader: Phuoc

Subsistence food: 1

Security 7

Liaison 3

Medic 3
The 1st Squad: Giao 1 ((possibly cell numbers)) 2 3
The 2nd Squad: Hoc 1 (( )) 2 3
The 3rd Squad: Gian 1 (( )) 2 3
The 4th Squad: 1 (( )) 2 3
The 5th Squad: 1 (( )) 2 3
The 6th Squad: 1 (( )) 2 3

The 7th Squad: Le 1 ((possibly cell numbers)) 2 3
The 8th Squad: Tham 1 (( )) 2 3
The 9th Squad: Khoa 1 (( )) 2 3
The 10th Squad: Ngoc 1 (( )) 2 3
The 11th Squad: Tham 1 (( )) 2 3

29 March 58°

Content of the political activities on 30 March 68°

We did not work in the morning and in the afternoon, we met to discuss the following matters.
Main point in political activities.

Method to strengthen the soldiers determination to outstanding achievements (this idea was suggested by Comrade Thuan). Criteria for selecting individuals with the following two titles:

- Outstandig Soldier in Crossing Truong Son Mountain.
- Outstandig Soldier in Crossing Mu U Pass.

Purpose of the selection:
- Heighten the achievements gained during the movement.
- Study the good examples set during the movement.
- Initiate an emulation movement.
- Promote revolutionary pride. Another title will be given to the soldier who deserves to be the "First soldier in the Anti-US, Dien Ban Campaign".

It is forbidden:
- To desert (The deserter will be arrested and punished).
- To violate discipline
- To commit waste (stealing)

Criteria for the title of "Outstanding soldier crossing Truong Son Mountain):

1) Determined to reach the destination.
2) Observe solidarity and mutual support.
3) Enhance discipline and maintenance of security.
4) Have enthusiasm while performing tasks and strengthening the unit.

Election mechanism of outstanding unit. It must attain 30 to 40 percent of the criteria.

The smallest unit for the election is squad size.

In the Party Chapter elect the best cell.

- The Command Committee of the company will select the "Outstanding Soldier Crossing Truong Son Mountain" (Squad cadre and soldiers).
The battalion will select the "Outstanding Soldier Crossing Truong Son Mountain". (Platoon cadre and soldiers).

The regiment will select the "Outstanding Soldier Crossing Truong Son Mountain". (Company cadre and agencies).

30 Mar 68

Party Chapter meeting

Discussion and planning

Work at H5 + H9 = 400 meters 7 and 8 were completed H5 is being completed.

Remaining: 230 m of stone
300 m of earth

1,030 meters

1,500 day work.

Explosive charge: Remaining: 40 kilos
Other types: 170 kilos

Assignment of work:
- The 1st squad must take charge of the construction of a 30 m dam.
- The 2nd squad must repair work.
- The 3rd squad must carry stones.
- The 4th and 5th squads must work at H5. (possibly unit).
- The 8th and 9th squads must work at H9. (Possibly Unit).
- The 10th and 11th squads must work at H6. (possibly unit).

The work must be completed in two days.

The sense of responsibility of KT (possibly inspection) was not heightened. Phuoc was admitted to the (Party).

- He was liberated. He was hospitalized and returned his home.

12 comrades (sic).

Linh, sometimes, to accomplish his mission.

He refused the position of assistant squad leader.

He longed for civilian life and to work in a high position.
Roster of soldiers

1 ((possibly 1st Squad))

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<tr>
<th>Giao</th>
<th>Dan</th>
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<td>Giap</td>
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<td>Tha</td>
<td>Trang</td>
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<tr>
<td>Phuong</td>
<td>Giap</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dien (x)</td>
<td>Minh</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dan</td>
<td>Thuc</td>
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Implement the resolution of E

1. Assessment on the situation:

After studying the resolution of E Party Committee, all units have made good progress; our comrades had the spirit of overcoming difficulties and provided a good output in the performance of tasks.

The number of personnel taking leave to carry out labor activities was numerous (15 days).

- The activities of citing names and awards were not permanently conducted.

- Cause: ((unspecified))

Thanks to the leadership of the Party, our cadre have a good sense of...
I am uncertain how long we can hold this line. We have been in a deal to stay this line. The men are much better off. We have to wait for the word from the other side. We should move quickly.

The men are in high spirits. We should expect them to be here by nightfall. We have to be ready. The weather is bad. We should expect a storm. We should move quickly.

We have to be ready. The men are in high spirits. We should expect them to be here by nightfall. We have to be ready. The weather is bad. We should expect a storm. We should move quickly.
Subject: The events of the weekend

Date: Saturday, May 28, 2023

Dear Diary,

The weekend was filled with various activities and events. On Friday evening, I had a small gathering at my place with a few friends. We played board games and shared stories. The night ended with a bonfire where we sang songs and talked about our dreams.

On Saturday, I went to the local park for a picnic with my family. We had a lovely time enjoying the sunny weather and playing with our pets. Later in the afternoon, I attended a community event where we discussed environmental conservation.

In the evening, I attended a concert by my favorite band. The music was fantastic, and the atmosphere was electric. It was a memorable night, and I hope to attend more concerts soon.

On Sunday, I stayed at home and read a book. I enjoyed the peacefulness of the morning and found it to be a great way to unwind.

Overall, the weekend was relaxing and enjoyable. I look forward to the next one.

Yours truly,
[Your Name]