SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 1st Infantry Division, Period Ending 31 January 1968 (U)

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1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 5b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT RD, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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Regraded unclassified when separated from classified inclosure.
Subject: Operational Report-Lessons Learned (NOR-CSFOR-65), (U)

I. Significant Organizational and Unit Activities.

A. (C) Introduction.

1. This Operational Report-Lessons Learned covers the reporting period 1 November 1967 through 31 January 1968. During this period the 1st Infantry Division continued to conduct combat operations designed to locate and destroy Viet Cong (VC) and North Vietnamese Army (NVA) forces and installations in the III Corps Tactical Zone (CTZ) and overwatched the Division's Tactical Area of Interest (TAl). Phase II of Operation SHELTON continued into this reporting period with the Division employing six infantry battalions (one OPCON from the 25th Infantry Division) on a rotational basis under the OPCON of the 1st Brigade in the LUC MNMN area until the operation terminated 15/2/68 February 1968. Road clearing and route security operations continued along Highway 13 in conjunction with Operation SHELTON II continued with the opening of Highway 13 to CMQ-LOI to daily convoy traffic beginning 3 November. Route Security Forces along Highway 13 under the OPCON of the 1st and 3d Brigades had three significant night engagements with attacking NVA forces during the period. In a rapidly developed unannounced operation beginning 29 November in the vicinity of BU XEP, two significant engagements occurred between VC forces and two of the three battalions employed under the OPCON of the 1st Brigade, Operation ATTILA, a II PLD-FSCS operation conducted in the 1st Infantry Division TAOR and aimed at locating and destroying the 164th NVA Regiment, met with no results. In reaction to the VC TET offensive in the III CTZ the 1st Infantry Division moved the 1-18 Infantry and 1/1-4 Cavalry to TAN SON NHUT and Task Force Hoyers (0/2-16 Inf, 3/3/1-4 Conv) OPCON to the Capital Military District on 31 January 1968.

2. The indirect support of the Government of Vietnam (GVN) Revolutionary Development Program by the 1st Infantry Divisions Operation LAM SON 67 was continued during the reporting period by the 2d Brigade. VC activity in the LUC SON area increased during January after six months of relative calm with light, sporadic encounters. Operation LAM SON 67 terminated 31 January.

3. Base Camp activities increased during the period as the 101st Airborne Division elements moved into the PHUC VINH base camp during December and the 1st Brigade, 1st Infantry Division moving from PHUC VINH and established a base camp at QUA VINH formerly a forward support base. Headquarters, 1st Infantry Division continued to consolidate the Headquarters activities at the LUC SON base camp. Forces were positioned along Route ZUC (Route 7B, 2A, 1A) beginning 21 November preparatory to opening the route to PHUC VINH for convoy operations. The 1st Brigade and the 101st Airborne Brigade conducted and completed convoy operations without significant enemy contact through 22 December at which time the route was closed.

B. (C) Personnel and Administration.

1. Personnel.

a. Strength

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
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<td>Nov 67</td>
<td>1090</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>12577</td>
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<tr>
<td>Authorized</td>
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<td>1083</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>12521</td>
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<td>Nov 67</td>
<td>1109</td>
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<tr>
<td>Assigned</td>
<td>Jan 68</td>
<td>1088</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>16143</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
b. Gains, qualifications and status.

(1) Enlisted

(a) Replacements received: 14718

(b) Outstanding requisitions: Senior enlisted Grades:

(c) Credits: None

(d) Qualifications: None

(e) Status: Same

(c, n=2) Officer:

(a) Replacements received: 307

(b) Outstanding requisitions: 1 Officer: Number


(c) Credits: Ample replacements were received for

losses, however, a shortage of Captains still exist in Combat Arms, particularly in Infantry.

(d) Qualifications and status: Lieutenant fills are

being received for requested captain requirements, particularly in Infantry and Artillery.

c. Losses:

(1) Enlisted: There were 4034 losses during the quarter

due to reassignment within Vietnam, rotations, JTS, and board action.

(2) Officer: There were 8 losses during the quarter due

to reassignment within Vietnam, rotations, JTS, and board action.

d. Losses due to casualties were as follows:

(1) November:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Grade</th>
<th>OFF</th>
<th>90</th>
<th>90</th>
<th>40</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KHA</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HHA</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>304</td>
<td>228</td>
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<tr>
<td>NBI</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>NBE</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>37</td>
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</table>

(2) December:

<table>
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<th>40</th>
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<td>4</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NBE</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
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</table>

(3) January:

<table>
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<tr>
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<th>90</th>
<th>40</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HHA</td>
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<td>237</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NBI</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NBE</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2. **Discipline, Law and Order:**
   a. During the past quarter there were no strangers apprehended. There were 26 serious incidents and 26 AWLTs reported to the PM during the period and 28 apprehended.
   b. There was a General Courts-Martial tried during the quarter. A total of 103 records of trial for Special Courts-Martial and 9 records of trial for Summary Courts-Martial were received for review.

3. **Graves Registration:** During the quarter there were 160 remains processed and evacuated.

4. **Development and Maintenance of Morale:**
   a. Chaplain: During the quarter there were 1762 religious services conducted with a total of 61,025 attendances.
   b. During the quarter 4423 out-of-country NAA allocations were utilized.

5. **Awards and Decorations:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Award</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Medal of Honor</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distinguished Service Cross</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distinguished Service Medal</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Silver Star</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legion of Merit</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gold Star</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distinguished Flying Cross</td>
<td>146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bronze Star/Valor</td>
<td>1599</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bronze Star/Merit</td>
<td>1293</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Medal/Valor</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Medal/Merit</td>
<td>277</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army Commendation Medal/Valor</td>
<td>1879</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy Commendation Medal/Merit</td>
<td>524</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purple Heart</td>
<td>381</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TOTAL:** 6645

5. **Civilian Personnel:**
   a. As of the end of the quarter the Division employed 1345 daily hire local nationals.
   b. There were 1150 permanent hire local nationals employed at the end of the quarter.

6. **Personnel Management:**
   a. Unusual situations: The shortage of middle grade personnel, particularly in combat MOS, continues to be acute. The further liberalization of promotion policies effective in January 1968 has not been in use long enough to determine its effect on the situation. A critical shortage also exists in maintenance MOS's. Additional losses will be experienced within the next 30 days. An emergency requisition has been submitted with the January 1968 requirement month. This requisition, however, is still partially outstanding, primarily in maintenance MOS's.

   b. Problems Concerning Classification, Assignment and Management of Personnel: The relative number of replacements received having a physical profile "C" continues to be high, particularly in the Senior enlisted grades. While we receive excellent cooperation from USAW in reassigning these personnel, a minimum of 90 additional days is required to re-requisition and receive another replacement. In actual practice a replacement is not normally received for 4-5 months from requisition date.
C. (C) Operations.

1. General. During the reporting period the 1st Infantry Division continued military operations to extend and to consolidate the Government of Vietnam's control and influence in the III Corps Tactical Zone. Three named operations were conducted in the division's TMZ. These were Operation LAM SON 67, Operation BUKIYH./121, and Operation TETILA. The overwatch of Special Forces camps, friendly military installations, and Republic of Vietnam Governmental Headquarters in the division's TMZ continued with the division employing forces to counter VC/NVA attacks at BUI DOF (XU971289) and SONG SC (XU171122).

2. Operation LAM SON 67. Begun 000700 February 1967, the operation continued to support the Revolutionary Development Program through this reporting period under the control of the 23 Brigade, 1st Infantry Division. Operations consisted ofordon and search, reconnaissance in force, harassment, jungle clearing operations, population control, civic action, and psychological warfare operations directed against priority targets as developed from current intelligence. Operations stressed the maximum participation of GVN forces. Contact in the LAM SON area with enemy forces had been characterized until 060007 January 1968 when HMU 101 Base Camp (XU80415) received 123 rounds of 60mm and 82mm mortar fire. 46 aircraft were damaged, 19 of which were 1st Division aircraft. Six of the 1st Aviation Battalion aircraft were repairable in 24 hours. Six US personnel were wounded. Counter-mortar fire was returned at 0013H and incoming rounds ceased at 0016 hours. Enemy casualties are unknown. Later in the morning ARVN elements located imprints of five 60mm mortar base plates and two 82mm mortar base plates at XU87192. Company H, 2-18 Infantry conducted an airmobile insertion 050727 January at XU804289. Continuing on a northeasterly route the unit conducted a reconnaissance in force operation. At the point element entered a wood line in the vicinity of XU879239 at 0930 hours, small arms fire was received from 20-25 meters further in the woods. It appeared to the company commander that the contact was with a squad size element, initially. This had been the normal size enemy force encountered in this area for several months. Placing two platoons on line, Company H, 2-18 Infantry conducted an airmobile insertion 12356, Section 33, SON 67. Operation TETILA II, with enemy forces having a total strength of 160 men. One prisoner indicated that the unit did not have mortars and were not involved in the mortar attack on HMU 101 Base Camp 6 January. Operation LAM SON 67 terminated 312300 January 1968 resulting in losses to the US: Personnel - 56 KIA, 572 WIA; equipment destroyed - 12 APC's, 2 tanks, 3 bulldozers, 71 mm plows, 7 trucks, 64 helicopters, 1 tractor, and 2 track vehicles (SP) (/13) equipment destroyed - 11 APC's, 1 truck vehicle (SP) /13/0, 3 helicopters, 1 tank, 1 105mm howitzer, and 4 trucks; equipment lost - 7 small arms, 1 crew served weapon and 1 starlight scope. Enemy losses: Personal - 327 KIA (SC), 265 WIA, 184 KIA (possible), 337 detainees, and 365 returnees; equipment captured - 2 bangalore torpedoes, 133 grenades, 15 mines, 161 rounds of small arms ammunition, 20 artillery and
mortal rounds, 174 small arms, 530,000 plasters, 24 lbs of TNT, and 4 HGF-2
launchers; destroyed equipment - 128 bunkers and structures, 6423 rounds of
small arms ammunition, 340 artillery and mortar rounds, 170 CBU's, 2038 granite
boulders, 180 mines, and 6.8 tons of fire.

3. Operation SHABA-II: a. Phase II of Operation SHABA-II, beginning 29 October 1967, continued into this
reporting period in the vicinity of LOC NINH (XU738097) in reaction to a multi VC/NVA Regimental
attack on USSF camp, CIDG compound and District Headquarters located immedi-
ately west of the LOC NINH airfield. Six infantry battalions (including 2-12
Infantry, 25th Division) OCON to the 1st Infantry Division) OCON to the 1st
Brigade were employed in the vicinity of LOC NINH, supported by five batters
of artillery. The artillery batteries were co-located with infantry at five loca-
tions to provide fire support areas bases (FSPA) from which search
and destroy operations by infantry were conducted. The terrain in the LOC
NINH area is predominantly rolling hills covered with rubber plantations with
secondary and virgin jungle along the slopes, elevation varies between 85
feet and 222 feet. On 29 October the 1-18 Infantry conducted an airborne
assault in the vicinity of XU697102, established a night defensive position
(NDP) and had significant combat, as previously reported, on 29 and 30
October with enemy forces later identified as elements of the 165th NVA Regi-
ment. Also on 29 October, a PFEV was established at the south end of the LOC
NINH airfield (XU738097) comprised of 1/6-13 Artillery and B/1-7 Artillery
secured by 2-28 Infantry (-). On 30 October B/1-7 Artillery and B/2-28 Infan-
try were withdrawn to LOC 101. As previously reported, an attack against
the FSF, USSF camp, CIDG compound and District Headquarters compound was
launched by the 1st and 2d Battalions, 27th Regiment on 31 October result-
ing in heavy losses to the Viet Cong. The 1-28 Infantry conducted an air-
mobile assault into the vicinity of XU761070 followed by B/2-33 Artillery
establishing a PFEV at XU766072. 1/2-33 Artillery was lifted into the 1-18
Infantry NDP.
b. The 1-18 Infantry FSB came under heavy mortar attack com-
encing 000030 November and lasting for 20 minutes, in ambush patrol to the
south of the FSB reported the Viet Cong mortar positions as south and south-
west of the FSB. Approximately five minutes later, the ambush patrol re-
ported heavy mortar coming from the south, detonated its explosives and
returned to the FSB. An ambush patrol to the east and north also detected
heavy movement. The Viet Cong attacked the FSB from the northeast, east and
south employing small arms, automatic weapons and RPG's. An attempt was also
made by the Viet Cong to employ two flamethrowers, however, the operators were
killed before the weapons could be fired. Artillery from 2-28 Infantry FSB
and light fire teams supported the 1-18 Infantry with effective fire. As
artillery fire was brought in close, the Viet Cong would shift the direction
of attack. Light fire teams, FIC and the 30 recoilless fire from 12 heavy machi-
ning guns at these locations to the south. Air strikes eliminated the positions.
Theillery battery inside the FSB prepared to fire anti-personnel rounds but their use was not required. Contact was broken at 0415 hours.
US casualties were 1 KIA and 8 WIA. Viet Cong losses were 160 KIA (EC) and
22 KIA (IC) in the immediate vicinity of the FSB. For the next five days
patrols found additional Viet Cong bodies bringing the total body count to
263 VC KIA and 6 FC's. Captured equipment included 12 individual and 10 crew
served weapons and 3 flamethrowers.
c. On 2 November, two battalions of the 25th Infantry Division
were air lifted to and become OCON to the 1st Infantry Division. The 3-22
Infantry landed at QU700070 and become OCON to the 3d Brigade upon being
imported into 1-18 Infantry C/155TH VI (XU774907) and VII (XU776894) replacing the last
Infantry Division's 1-26 Infantry which was inserted into the LOC NINH area
of XU770142, OCON to the 1st Brigade. The 1-26 Infantry secured an area in
the vicinity of XU771149 and with B/2-33 artillery established a PFEV. The
2-26 Infantry Division landed at LOC NINH and made an airborne assault in the
vicinity of XU768036, OCON to the 1st Brigade, and established an NDP.
d. On 3 November, the 2-12 Infantry came under mortar attack
from the north followed by a ground attack at 0320 hours from the northeast,
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...
field (XU973701) in PHU V514. The mortar fire was then continued when a light fire was opened to the northwest of the area. Aircraft received .50 cal or 12.7mm machine gun fire from the north and southeast of the area. The area was then closed by the 1-2 Infantry. The attacking force was identified as the 3d Battalion, 27th VC Regiment.

3. The 1-2 Infantry continued to be mortared and on 4 December the 2-28 Infantry was committed to the vicinity of Bien Hoa and established an HTO at XU966775 protected by a 4.2" mortar platoon. On 6 December the 1-2 Infantry was committed and established an HTO southeast of Bien Hoa at XU962461 protected by B/1-6 Artillery (105).

4. 110000 December the 1-2 Infantry was attacked by the 3d Battalion, 27th VC Regiment. The attack began with 60mm and 81mm mortar fire followed by a ground attack from the southeast. The 1-2 Infantry commander ordered direct fire from the supporting artillery battery to be placed from west to north. The artillery firing resulted in a buy line for 200 to 400 meters south of the northwestern side of the VC mortar fire. The 1-2 Infantry was attacked by the 27th VC Regiment. The attacking force was identified as the 3d Battalion, 27th VC Regiment.

5. The 1-2 Infantry continued from its field position and replaced the 1-28 Infantry at the Bien Hoa Airfield. The 1-28 Infantry returned to Bien Hoa on 15 December. The VC forces were killed by the 82mm mortar and 12.7mm machine gun fire. All but one of the VC forces were killed by the 82mm mortar and 12.7mm machine gun fire. The 1-28 Infantry was withdrawn 20 December and replaced by the 1-16 Infantry which returned to Bien Hoa on 29 December. The VC forces were killed by the 82mm mortar and 12.7mm machine gun fire. The 1-28 Infantry was replaced by the 1-16 Infantry which returned to Bien Hoa on 29 December. The VC forces were killed by the 82mm mortar and 12.7mm machine gun fire. The 1-28 Infantry continued to be mortared without having encountered significant activity.

6. Operation Attala: On 21 January, 11th Field Force Vietnam initiated Operation ATTALA to the west of Highway 13 in the 1st Infantry Division. The 3rd Battalion, 27th VC Regiment in the 1st Infantry Division, in conjunction with the 101st Airborne Division established blocking positions with three battalions from the 7th and 8th Divisions to prevent movement of the 165th to the east. The 1-28 Infantry was replaced by the 1-28 Infantry which returned to Bien Hoa on 29 December. The VC forces were killed by the 82mm mortar and 12.7mm machine gun fire. The reinforcing action ceased further VC activity in the area.

7. Operation Attala: On 21 January, II Field Force Vietnam initiated Operation ATTALA to the west of Highway 13 in the 1st Infantry Division. The 3rd Battalion, 27th VC Regiment in the 1st Infantry Division, in conjunction with the 101st Airborne Division established blocking positions with three battalions from the 7th and 8th Divisions to prevent movement of the 165th to the east. The 1-28 Infantry was replaced by the 1-28 Infantry which returned to Bien Hoa on 29 December. The VC forces were killed by the 82mm mortar and 12.7mm machine gun fire. The reinforcing action ceased further VC activity in the area.
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January with no results.

B. TF Contingency Operation: The 1ST cease-fire terminated at 2010 00 January. The 1st Infantry Division increased surveillance in the IZM in the event VC/NVA forces broke the cease-fire during the announced IED holiday period. Due to increased activity by VC/NVA forces throughout South Vietnam, the 1ST cease-fire terminated 300945 January. On 31 January VC forces出击ed key facilities in the BIOTOWN area and BCI C.T. (XY7438) in the 1st Infantry Division Task. At the direction of II Field Forces Vietnam a force consisting of the 3d Brigade Forward Command post, 1-18 Infantry, 1/2-4 Cavalry and Task Force Neosar (3/2-16 Inf. and 3/2-1-4 Cavalry) became TEMP to the Capital Military District. The 1-18 Infantry and 1/1-4 Cavalry moved to TFN 292 UDT and Task Force Neosar to BCR 519 Bridge (JX715840). Increased contact with VC forces continues. At BCR C.T. O/1-10 Infantry and O/1-4 Cavalry reinforced ANV elements in contact with a battalion of the 165th NVA Regiment resulting in 46 VC NIA in the joint operation.

D. (C) Training and Organization:

1. Training: The training posture of the division remained excellent throughout the reporting period. The main training activities conducted during the period were as follows:

a. Replacement Training: This is a course consisting of at least 61 hours with approximately 75% devoted to practical work. Emphasis is placed on weapons firing, patrolling and ambush, much of which is conducted at night. The following number of men attended replacement training during the reporting period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st Bn</td>
<td>627</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d Bn</td>
<td>722</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3d Bn</td>
<td>935</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Div Army</td>
<td>420</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spc Cond</td>
<td>504</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>3256</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. Mobile Training Team: This team conducts training for the infantry junior leader. The team consists of one captain who has been a company commander and five NCO's, company sergeants. They are selected based on their performance within the division. The course presented by the team is designed to develop the junior leaders and make them proficient in division doctrine on small unit tactics. Since the inception the team has trained over 2,500 men in all infantry battalions. The team has been enthusiastically accepted by commanders and staff as well as the men.

c. ARVN Battalion Refresher Training: The 1st Infantry Division was given the responsibility to conduct Refresher Training for 12 infantry battalions of the 5th ARVN Division, the 51st and 52d Artillery Battalions and the 1st Armored Cavalry Regiment. Each battalion is given six weeks of refresher training culminating in a concluding evaluation exercise. The emphasis is placed on leadership of the officers and NCO's. During the reporting period the 1st CCR and the 5th Engineer Battalion completed the training, and infantry battalion, the 3d of the 9th Infantry was selected to attend the National Training Center, three infantry battalions were undergoing training as of the TF holidays and two more remain to receive the training. One Artillery Battalion, the 35th Artillery, has completed the training, and, as of the beginning of T5, two platoons in the 51st Artillery and 52d Artillery remain to be trained.

d. Mobile Advisory Teams: The ARVN teams program is organized under II PFW and III WIV direction. 1st Division has provided 6 teams, each consisting of 1 officer, 2 NCO's, 1 medic and 1 NCO. The teams have the mission of providing a wide range of advisory functions for RE/IR units. The objective of the program has been to improve the units effectiveness and thereby enhance security of the AR effort.

DECLASSIFIED PER EXECUTIVE ORDER 12356, Section 3.3, as of 823.341
By AB/CP, NARA, Date 2-26-83.
This program was initiated by the 1st Division with the same mission as KTF's: to improve the RF/IP unit effectiveness. The team consists of 1 officer, 1 NCO, and 1 interpreter, plus specialists in medical, signal, ordnance, engineer, etc., as well. The working method of the 3D-CF team differs from the KTF team in that the 3D-CF team's visit is of short duration and emphasizes high value - low cost projects stressing Vietnamese self-help. The assistance rendered is across a broad spectrum with the team tailored to meet the needs of the unit being trained.

The Schools in and out of Vietnam: Schools and number of personnel attending are listed below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COURSE</th>
<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>NO STUDENTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MVCV Recce.</td>
<td>NML TL-05</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADT R</td>
<td>VUNG TAU</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JAS</td>
<td>Republic of Philippines</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3d Brigade, 101st Airborne Division in Country Orientation Training. The Division Mobile Training Team, per 4, above, was sent to conduct two weeks training with the 3d Brigade, 101st Airborne Division upon that unit's arrival in Vietnam. The 1st Engineer Battalion sent instructors to present classes on road clearing and VC mines and booby traps. The training of both teams was well received by commanders and troops of the 101st Division.

The total estimated strength of the enemy military units operating in the 1st Infantry Division Tactical Area of Interest and its periphery is approximately 11,900. This figure represents a combat strength of 11,700 and 200 personal providing administrative services support. These figures represent an approximation at best because our knowledge of the enemy infiltration rates is not complete. The VC goal for infiltration into III CTZ is 1200 per month and our best estimate is that he generally maintains a rate of 1100. These rates are sufficient to maintain personal manning levels in terms of numbers despite of heavy losses during this quarter in the 9th VC Division. However, combat effectiveness is low because of lack of training due to successive attacks over long distances.

Specific reinforcements available from outside the division TAI are from the south-west the D-14 IF Bn and from the south the 2d and 8th VC NP BN's in region E-2.

The accepted locations of confirmed enemy units within the TAI and along its periphery are:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>CURRENT</th>
<th>STRTEBT</th>
<th>CNT ACTIV NLS</th>
<th>TAKED LOC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5th VC Division</td>
<td>1425</td>
<td>Marginal</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RG &amp; Sp Units</td>
<td>735</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td></td>
<td>PHUC LONG</td>
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to hide. This has forced the VC into small sized groups to live with the population in hamlets.

F. Logistics

(See Support Command GRL, Enclosure 7)

(C) Psychological Operations, Civic Action and Civil Affairs.

1. General. During the three month period which ended on 31 January 1968, the 1st Infantry Division continued to develop, expand and revise its aggressive psychological operations, civic action, and civil affairs program.

2. Psychological Operations. a. During November the 115th PNL established a new focus for its psychological operations by initiating a three-phase program designed to make maximum use of organic, attached, and supplementary resources for disseminating propaganda to target audiences. The three phases were:

(1) area saturation of the entire Division TAD
(2) increased support of combat and civic action operations
(3) increased utilization of night poplar missions.

b. Psychological operations during the quarter were aimed at three prime target groups

(1) VC soldiers and their relatives and friends who are susceptible to TAD themes.
(2) Innocent civilians who resided in hamlets scheduled to be targets for search and seal operations.
(3) VC soldiers.

c. Throughout the quarter emphasis was placed on improved quality of propaganda material, improved target selection procedures, and more efficient dissemination. Interesting results were realized from the use of an armed propaganda team together with coordinated ground and airborne loudspeaker broadcasts against the NVA and VC. An assigned payphone interrogation team from the 6th Logop Battalion was used to conduct an attitude survey among the civilian population in the CAS LON - N1 LOC area.

d. Psychological operations during the quarter resulted in
1,277,100 leaflets being dropped in direct support of the 3rd Brigade and
1,267,100 leaflets utilized in support of the 5th Brigade. There were 21,016
leaflets employed in support of 2nd Brigade operations. Finally, 14,351,100
leaflets were distributed in general support of Division operations.

e. During the quarter a total of 17 hours and 6 minutes of broadcast time were employed in support of 1st Brigade, 106 hours and 30 minutes were used to support the 3rd Brigade and 577 hours and 45 minutes of loudspeaker messages were broadcast to support the 2nd Brigade. Finally, 56 hours and 50 minutes were broadcast by OS.

3. Civic Action/Civil Affairs.

a. The 1st Infantry Division continued its participation in various civic action programs and civil affairs activities during the past quarter. The main emphasis of Division efforts in this area continues to be concentrated in the CAS LON area. Although there were significant projects in other segments of the TAD, among the more significant projects conducted throughout the TAD were the construction of the 1st VN Women's Right Dispensary, the CRO CROH Housing project, the 1st KHU culvert and drainage system, the Chu Thoai Women Dispensary, the renovation of the NUN CAS soccer field, and the rebuilding of the LOC NINH market place. The Vietnamese people took an active part in all these projects, resulting in a feeling of accomplishment for themselves and the GVN.
b. Another indication of progress during the quarter was evident in the maintenance of security along the main LOCs within the T2G, principally along Highway 13 north to the AB LOC - Q'N N-120 cordon. Such security proved to be a big boost to the morale of the people, both psychologically and materially.

c. A third important aspect of Division efforts in the civic action/civil affairs field was refugee assistance and support. In two situations of an immediate tactical nature, the Division was able to step in and provide emergency supplies in order to temporarily assist the people. Food and supplies were provided to GVN personnel for distribution to the people in the area of GVN. In both the battle of LOC KHN in November 1967 and the recent T2G crisis, 1st Division efforts contributed significantly toward relieving the immediate hardships caused by the VC attacks.

d. The MG and GII also participated in rejecting two bunkers which lacked security in their former locations. Working closely with GVN officials, Division personnel assisted in making both moves successful operations.

II. Commander's Observation and Recommendations.

A. (G) Observations (Lessons Learned).

1. Personnel
   a. See Section II, Inclosure 4.
   b. See Section II, Inclosure 9.

2. Intelligence
   a. See Section II, Inclosure 4.
   b. See Section II, Inclosure 9.

3. Operations
   a. Item: Road Clearing

DISCUSSION: A continuing problem is the ability to use the road network in the Division T2G without undue cost in vehicles or troop commitment on the road. Unless the road is under continuous observation the VC will mine the road while it is not in use resulting in loss of vehicles and personnel.

RECOMMENDATION: An effective way to control the road during periods when it is not actually used and cut passed with troops is by using road ends towers set up at each PSC along the route. This, coupled with an active N2I program and aggressive ambush patrolling, will eliminate all or almost all attempts to activate the road.

b. Item: Defense

DISCUSSION: A change in VC tactics during the quarter enabled the 1st Division to render stunning defeats against the enemy. Mass attacks of multi-battalions and multi-regionalize size supported by rocket and mortars were soundly defeated with minimal friendly casualties.

RECOMMENDATION: A carefully planned and well prepared defensive position that utilizes standardized procedures for construction and conduct of the defense is one of the cheapest ways to defeat the VC.


5. Logistics
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6. Psychological Operations

DISCUSSION: 20 NOI CHNRS are now employed by the G5 and 3 are employed by
G2 under the provisions of the Kit Carson scout program. Several of these
NOI CHNRS have already been used in armed propaganda work in the BBI area.
Logistical problems like providing sufficient food, uniforms and
shelter have been experienced. Training and continuous administration of
the program are the principal problems which still require immediate attention
prior to the full operational use of these individuals.

RECOMMENDATION: Adequate training and utilization should be developed before
more persons are hired under the Kit Carson program.

b. Item: Target Selection Procedures

DISCUSSION: There is a need for a coordinated list of relatively stable
propaganda targets within each province. Such a target list would assist in
expediting target selection procedures for routing propaganda to the target audience
for the acceptance of desired attitudes, opinions and actions.

RECOMMENDATION: This subject should be discussed at the next III CTZ "new
coordinating Committee" meeting. If feasible, province officials should be
directed to prepare such a list.

c. Item: Leaflet Resupply

DISCUSSION: A suitable system for resupply of leaflets has evolved. This
problem emerged as a result of the G5 sections move from DI Ann to LII KHs.
The 6th Scout Battalion now drops leaflets at the LII KHs airstrip. Leaf-
lets are stored in 3 caches near the airstrip.

RECOMMENDATION: Leaflets should continue to be sent to and stored at LII KHs.

7. Civic Action/Civil Affairs
   a. Item: Coordination

DISCUSSION: Significant progress has been realized toward improved coordi-
nation between OCHAS officials and members of the Division G5 section on
various civic action projects and civil affairs matters.

RECOMMENDATION: Representatives of the various provinces OCHAS offices should
continue to meet with Division representatives.

b. Item: Integrated Planning

DISCUSSION: Psychological operations should not be omitted from the planning
of civic action projects. These two areas of endeavor should complement
each other where practicable.

RECOMMENDATION: The feasibility of planning civic action projects to obtain
political and psychological objectives whenever possible should be explored.

II. Recommendations: None

III. Department of the Army Survey Information

There was no DA directed submission for this reporting period.
FOR THE COMMANDER:

THOMAS L. VERRILL
CPT, ASC
Asst AG

14 Inc 1

1-Organizational Structure
2-List of Key Commanders
3-1st Div Operational Report - Lessons Learned
4-24 Div Operational Report - Lessons Learned
5-34 Div Operational Report - Lessons Learned
6-31st Arti Operational Report - Lessons Learned
7-Oper-Command Operational Report - Lessons Learned
8-Division Chemical Section Operational Report - Lessons Learned
9-1st Aviation BN Operational Report - Lessons Learned
10-1st Bn Engr BN Operational Report - Lessons Learned
11-1st Signal BN Operational Report - Lessons Learned
12-1st Inf BN Company Operational Report - Lessons Learned
13-Commanders Notes Numbers 20-21
14-Hq 69 Inf Div
45-1st Inf Div - 350,1 - Published separately as 682001

DISTRIBUTION:
Special

Hqs, DA

Withdrawn, Hqs, DA

DECLASSIFIED PER EXECUTIVE ORDER 12356, Section 3.3, page 82341
By: AB/CAP NARA, Date 2-26-53.
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Infantry Division

HQ and HQ Co

Avn En

Engr En

Armd Div

Sqn

Inf Div

MP Co

Sig En

Sd En & Sq Co

Div Arty

Inf En

# 8 Infantry battalions and 1 infantry battalion (mechanized)

ASSIGNED UNITS

HHC 1st Inf Div
Co F, 52d Inf (LRT)
HQ HQ and Land Spt Cnd
1st Avn Co
1st MG Co
701st Mnt En
1st MGEn
124th Sig En
1st Avn En
1st Med En
1st MI Det
50th MI Det
266th CML Flt
224th CML Det
43d FI Det
45th FI Det
17th Mil Hist Det
1st Sqdn 4th Cav

HHC 1st Div
1st En 2d Inf
1st En 26th Inf
1st En 39th Inf
41st Inf Flt (Scout Dog)

HHC 2d Div
2d En 16th Inf
2d En 18th Inf
35th Inf Flt (Scout Dog)
7th Combat Tracker Team (Prov)
13th C-Chat Tracker Team (Prov)

HHC 3d Div
2d En 26th Inf (MCH)
1st En 16th Inf
1st En 18th Inf
2d En 28th Inf

HHC 4th Div Arty
1st Bn 5th Arty
1st Bn 7th Arty
2d Bn 334th Arty
6th Bn 6th Arty
234th Flx Det (Sadar)

ATTACHED UNITS

340th Avn Det

6th Bn 15th Arty

OF COM UNITS

D Co, 2d Bn 34th Armor
D Btry 71st Arty (2民D 50)

A Btry 5th Bn 2d Arty (-)
1st Flt 1 Btry, 29th Arty

(E Sect)

DECLASSIFIED PER EXECUTIVE ORDER 12356, Section 3.3, 1953

By NARA, Date 2-26-53
TO: Commanding General
1st Infantry Division
ATTN: AVDB-T
APO San Francisco 96345

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Lessons Learned (RCL)(CSPG-2)

AVDB-SP-T
3 February 1968

1. (C) INTRODUCTION:

a. During the previous reporting period, 1 August - 31 October 67, the 1st Brigade participated in three Brigade-level operations: Operation AO STRIKE, Operation PORTLAND and Operation SHENANDOAH II. At the close of the reporting period the Brigade was conducting S&D operations in SHENANDOAH II.

b. Principal Headquarters and Commanders of Task Forces during this reporting period were the following: (1 Nov 67-31 Jan 68).

1) Operation SHENANDOAH II (OPORD 22-67) 1st Brigade, Colonel George E. Newman (1-20 Nov).
   (a) 1st Battalion, 2d Infantry, LTC Mortimer L. O’Connor.
   (b) 1st Battalion, 16th Infantry, LTC Calvert Benedict.
   (c) 1st Battalion, 18th Infantry, LTC Richard E. Cavazos.
   (d) 1st Battalion, 26th Infantry, LTC Arthur D. Stigall; LTC Floyd G. Stephenson (7 Nov-20 Nov 67).
   (e) 1st Battalion, 28th Infantry, LTC James F. Cochran, III.
   (f) 2d Battalion, 28th Infantry, LTC Louis F. Menetrey.
   (g) 2d Battalion, 12th Infantry, (25th Infantry Division).
   (h) 1st Battalion, 5th Artillery, LTC Joseph E. Spitler, Jr.
   (i) 6th Battalion, 15th Artillery, LTC Frank E. Serio.
   (2) Operation QUICKSILVER, Hqs 1st Infantry Division (OPORD 20-67) (21 Nov-20 Dec 67)
      (a) 1st Battalion, 2d Infantry, LTC Mortimer L. O’Connor.
      (b) 1st Battalion, 16th Infantry, LTC Calvert Benedict.
      (c) 1st Battalion, 18th Infantry, LTC Richard E. Cavazos (21 Nov - 12 Dec 1967), LTC George H. Tronsrue (13 Dec - 20 Dec 1967)
      (d) 1st Battalion, 26th Infantry, LTC Floyd G. Stephenson.
      (e) 1st Battalion, 28th Infantry, LTC James F. Cochran III.
      (f) 2d Battalion, 28th Infantry, LTC Louis F. Menetrey.
      (g) 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry, LTC John N. Seigle.
      (h) 1st Battalion, 5th Artillery, LTC Joseph E. Spitler, Jr.
      (i) 6th Battalion, 15th Artillery, LTC Frank E. Serio.
   (3) Operation ATTALA (OPORD 1-68, Hq 1st Inf Div)(23-28 Jan)
      (a) 1st Battalion, 2d Infantry, LTC Mortimer L. O’Connor.

DECLASSIFIED PER EXECUTIVE ORDER 12356, Section 3.3, para 823541
2. (C) TACTICAL OPERATIONS:

a. Elements Affecting the Operations:

(1) Effectiveness of Intelligence: Aerial reconnaissance was highly effective in the SHENANDOAH, QUICKSILVER, and ATTALA areas of operation. Increased use of OH-13 aircraft from the Brigade Aviation Section in close coordination with Air Force O-1 Aircraft resulted in a highly productive visual reconnaissance program. Maximum use was made of VSLR, REDHAZE and SNIFTER returns for target acquisition within the areas of operation. The expeditious handling of captured enemy documents and prisoners of war materially assisted in the early identification of the enemy units with which the Brigade came in contact.

(2) Nature of Terrain: The Terrain in the areas of operations varied from dense secondary growth areas to heavy jungle with double and triple canopy. Sizeable rubber plantations were located in the YELLOWSTONE and the Northern SHENANDOAH areas of operation. The terrain was generally flat with relief normally under 150 meters in elevation. The entire area afforded both friendly and enemy forces excellent concealment. The terrain had normal effect on the operations.

(3) Weather: With the exception of scattered periods of reduced visibility caused by early morning ground fog and haze, the weather had no significant effect on the operations.

b. Combat Actions: Operations during the period consisted of:

(1) Operation SHENANDOAH II (OPORD 22-67 Hqs 1st Bde)(1-20 Nov 67)

(a) The mission as stated in the order was: 1st Bde continued to secure the PHUOC VINH Base Camp, executes a three Battalion air assault into the assigned area of operation, to search out & destroy the 273d VC Regiment.

(b) Concept of Operations: 1st Bde conducts air assaults and S&D operations in assigned AO, and conducts contingency operations at LOC NINH, employing assigned and attached Battalions and Cavalry units.

(c) Operations Summary: The Bde continued to S&D and conduct security Ops via QUAN LOI and PHUOC VINH. At 0101H on 1 Nov 67, 1-26th Inf NDF received 175-200, 60mm mortar rounds resulting in 1 US KIA. In the vicinity of LOC NINH on the evening of 2 Nov 67, the 1-18th Inf received periodic attacks throughout the night. US losses were 1 KIA and 6 WIA while the enemy lost 208 KIA and 6 WIA. On 3 Nov 67, at LOC NINH the 2-12th Inf (25th Div), received a mortar attack followed by a ground attack resulting in 3 US KIA and 24 WIA. Enemy losses attack followed by ground attack resulting in 3 US KIA and 24 WIA. Enemy losses were 40 KIA and 5 PM. Small contacts and finding continued until 7 Nov 67 when 1-26th Inf made heavy contact to the east of LOC NINH. US losses were 16 KIA and 21 WIA. Enemy losses were 66 KIA. The Bde closed out the operation on 19 Nov.

(d) Results:

(1) Friendly Losses: (Totals are for 1-20 Nov 67)

(a) Personnel: 5 KHA, 52 WIA.

(b) Equipment damaged: None.

(c) Equipment destroyed: None.

(2) Enemy losses: (Totals are for 1-20 Nov 67 only)

(a) Personnel: 361 KHA (BC), 88 KIA (poss), 25 PM.

(b) Equipment captured: 16 AK-47s; 15 RPG-2s; 5 RPG-7s; 1-9mm pistol; 18 VC gasmask; 3 flamethrowers; 1-60mm base plate; 20 shovels;

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1 telephone; 1, 12.7 MG barrel; 5 lbs documents; 1 radio pack; 8 ponchos; 8 packs; 1 ammo; 3 hampocks; 1 cooler; 2 packs; 24 canteens; 1 60mm sight; 4 aiming stakes; 1 LMG's, 2 CHICOM carbines; 1 sec earphones.

(c) Equipment destroyed: 3 packages narcotics; 150 lbs rice & 10 lbs tea; 60, 60mm rounds; 13,82mm Rds; 76mm ammo-520 Rds; medical supplies-5 lbs; 10 cans 82mm charges; 7.62 ammo-100 Rds; 12.7 ammo-106 Rds; bengalere torpedoes-1; 9 rocket charges; 60mm fuzes-12; 26 CHICOM grenades.

(2) Operation QUICKSILVER 1st Inf Div (OPORD 20-67) (21 Nov-20 Dec 67) (Involved in the relocation of 1st Brigade from PHUOC VINH to QUAN LOI, with the 3d Bde, 101st Abn Div assuming control of PHUOC VINH Base Camp.)

(a) The mission as stated in the order was: 1st Inf Div was designated a sponsor unit for 101st Abn Div (-) to carry out requirements outlined in USARV Reg 220-10.

(b) Concept of Operation: The 101st Abn Div arrives by air and sea commencing 19 Nov 67 and closes by 29 Dec 67. The 101st Abn Div was staged and deployed from BIEN HOA.

PHASE I: 19-25 Nov. Elements of the 3d Brigade Task Force commences group move by air to PHUOC VINH of/a 21 Nov. Selected equipment and vehicles, moved by convoy. PHASE II: 2-12 Dec 3d Brigade Task Force, and troops (3507 personnel) arrive PHUOC VINH.

(c) Operations Summary: The first substantial contact was made by 1-16th Inf on 27 Nov 67. Results were US 3 KHA; Enemy 1 VC POW, 13 KIA. During the time frame for QUICKSILVER, the brigade also participated in contingency operations for the defense of BI DOP. On 29 November the 1st Battalion 28th Inf air assaulted into BI DOP to defend it against aggressive enemy attacks. At 2200H, 1-28th Inf came under mortar and rocket attack. At 2230H a heavy ground attack commenced. At 2245H all firing ceased. Results were US 7 KHA, 16 WHA; Enemy 31 KIA. On 1 December 1967, 1-28th Inf made contact with 3 VC with neg US casualties and 2 VC KHA. On 2 Dec 67, 1-28th Inf received mortar and rocket attack periodically all day with 2 US KHA. On 5 Dec 67, 1-28th Inf (-) Company B (+) made contact with estimated 2 VC platoons dug in with 2 heavy machine guns. Contact was broken by fire and maneuver with Air and Artillery following withdrawal. Results US 4 KHA, 14 KIA; Enemy 15 KIA. By 6 Dec 67, 1-2d Inf had been moved to NOP vicinity of BI DOP. On 8 Dec, 1-2d Inf received a mortar attack followed by a ground attack. Results US 44 KHA, 14 WHA; Enemy 46 KIA (pass). On 12 Dec 67, 1-28th Inf received a mortar attack followed by a ground assault by an estimated Battalion. Results were US 1 KIA, 17 WHA; Enemy 145 KIA, 52 KIA (pass), 2 PM. The 1st Bde terminated operation QUICKSILVER on 20 Dec 67 when 3d Bde 101st assumed responsibility for the defense of PHUOC VINH.

(d) Results:

(1) Friendly Losses:
   a. Personnel: 16 KHA, 54 WHA.
   b. Equipment Damaged: None.
   c. Equipment destroyed: None.

(2) Enemy losses:
   a. Personnel: 260 KIA (BC), 171 KIA (pass), 99PM.
   b. Equipment Captured: 51 AK-47's; 9 light machine guns; 2 CHICOM Carbines; 5 Russian pistols; 1-45 caliber pistol; 20 RPG-7's; 43 RPG-2's; 2 machine gun carts; 2 telephones; 1 gasmask; 8 wallets; 4 notebooks; 41 lbs documents; 1 compass.
   c. Equipment destroyed: 7580 rounds AK-47 ammo; 70 RPG boosters; 124 grenades; 2 claymores; 11 RPG-2 rounds; 20, 60mm rounds; 35 bengalere torpedoes; 10-60mm fuzes; 2 cans 30 caliber ammo.

(3) Operation ATTALA (OPORD 1-68) (HQ 1st Inf Div) a multi-Bde operation in AO North, East and West of CHON THANH.
   (a) The mission as stated in the order was: the 1st Inf Div reinforced with 11th ACR(-) conducts operations in AO ATTALA commencing 25 Jan 1968 to Xecon in Force suspected area of operation of 165th NVA Regiment.
   (b) Concept of Operation: 1st Infantry Division employs 11th ACR to block enemy movement North and South from AO ATTALA, conduct
operations in designated AOIs, and overwatch Special Forces/CIDG Forces on West
flank. Conducts operations with 1st Bde to Recon in Force against VC/NVA forces
and installations in AO DIVN. Secures Highway #13 and blocks East-West passage
of enemy.
(c) Operations Summary: At 1400H on 22 Jan, 1-18th Inf made contact with 2 VC at KTBX6696. No other contacts were reported during the
operation.
(d) Results: None.

3. (C) INTELLIGENCE: This reporting period opened with continued enemy
offensive action in the LOC NINH area. This enemy offensive had begun during the
early morning hours of 29 Oct when the US Special Forces/CIDG camp and the LOC
NINH District Headquarters were subjected to a major Viet Cong attack by fire
followed by a ground assault. This was the first in a series of significant en­
gagement in the LOC NINH area. During the next two days, there continued to be sporadic contact and some indications that major
272d and 273d VC Regiments and probably rocket and A/A artillery units of unknown
size. Information received from documents and prisoners indicated that the 272d
VC Regiment operated on the West of LOC NINH and the 274d VC Regiment operated on
VC Regiment operat...
(1) Total replacements to attend Jungle Devil School - 617.

(2) There is a continuing need to provide sufficient replacements in grades 5 and 6. These grades are not available and the experience level of the NCO Corps suffers proportionately.

e. Discipline: No major problem.
d. Enemy Personal captured and/or detained:
(1) POW - 21.
(2) Civil Defenders - 0.
(3) Détainees - 7.
(4) Draft Dodgers - 0.
(5) Deserters - 0.
e. Burial and Graves Registration: All such matters were handled through Division channels.
f. Civil Assistance:
(1) Over all civil assistance (both PHUOC VIHN and QNN LOI):
(c). As of date, 1st Brigade has treated a total of 3321 Medical patients under NURCARE and 237 Dental patients:

PHUOC VIHN Area: 1775 Medical patients

QNN LOI Area: 159 Dental patients

Total: 3321 Medical

237 Dental

(2) A total of 1,256 Local National Day laborers were hired during the reporting period.
3,235 Local Nationals were hired under Division Appropriated Funds.

(3) The following commodities were distributed in both the PHUOC VIHN and QNN LOI areas as gifts and for self help projects during the report period:

a. 113 bags of com
b. 27 bags of bulgar wheat
c. 1,530 lbs of rice
d. 230 cases of powdered milk
e. 235 cases of cooking oil
f. 1,188 gallons of paint
g. 2,000 lbs of lumber
h. 1,100 lbs of clothing
i. 1300 school kits
j. 150 lbs of cloth
k. 90 sheets of tin
l. 85 toothbrushes
m. 225 tubes of toothpaste
n. 160 lbs of candy
t. 120 textile kits
u. 15 lbs of nails
v. 10 plastic buckets
w. 250 pairs of slippers
x. 10 55 gallon water cans
y. 20 5 gallon water cans
(4) PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS:

(a) A total of 2,047,500 leaflets were distributed in support of 1st Bde operations.
(b) 375 CHIEU NOI Posters were distributed to tactical units to be posted by search and destroy patrols in areas likely to be occupied by VC.
(c) A total of 70 hours and 15 minutes of tape broadcasts were played in forward areas in support of 1st Bde operations. Subjects were CHIEU NOI, Rally instructions, Search and Seiz, Weapons Reward, GVN vs VC, MEDCAP and the Commanding General Chieu Ho Message.
(d) No Psychological operations were conducted in PHUOC VINH Area.

(5) REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT: A support program of the Revolutionary Development Program in BINH LONG Province is still being prepared. MEDCAP II continues to make valuable contributions to the RD program. A VETCAP Program was introduced in the QUAN LOI area on 11 Jan 68 during which 16 chickens and 6 dogs were treated. This was the first assistance of this type to be performed in the QUAN LOI area. Another visit by the VETCAP Team is scheduled for February. Engineer units in the 1st Bde have also made valuable contributions to the RD Program. Their work has included: laying foundations for HAILHAP Hospital in AN LOC, and much road and bridge construction work in the QUAN LOI and AN LOC area. The Engineers are programmed to undertake a clearing project for construction of a CHIEU NOI Hamlet.

(6) CLAIMS AND SOLATIU PACMENTS:

(a) No claims were filed against the 1st Bde during the reporting period.
(b) Solatium payments: A total of 6 RVN people have been paid Solatium Payments for injuries received as a result of US actions against Infiltrant Forces. The total amount paid in those payments was 9,000 $VN.

(7) OTHER REPORTABLE INFORMATION:

(a) The 1st Bde Civil Affairs program was affected by the relocation of Brigade Headquarters from PHUOC VINH to QUAN LOI which took place during Nov 67. The Civic Action program had been very effective in PHUOC VINH. The relationship between US personnel and the Phuoc Vinh populace was considered to be warm and sincere. This relationship was bolstered by a continuing civic action program which consisted of MEDCAPs, road and public works improvements, assistance to schools, and distribution of relief commodities. US installations in the 1st Bde area employed over 500 RVN laborers.

(b) Prior to moving to QUAN LOI the following civic action activity were accomplished in the Phuoc Vinh area:

(1) Commodities distributed:
   (a) 30 feet of Culvert
   (b) 350 lbs of cement
   (c) 300 lbs of clothing
   (d) 2000 lbs of chemical fertilizer
   (e) 1200 lbs of canned food
   (f) 1000 boards feet of lumber
   (g) 1 midwife kit
   (h) 50 lbs soap
   (i) 3500 lbs of rice
   (j) 24 sheets of tin
   (k) 30 tooth brushes
   (l) 500 tubes toothpaste
   (m) 200 lbs candy
   (n) 80 cases of cooking oil
   (o) 120 cases of powdered milk
   (p) 120 textile kits
   (q) 75 lbs natis
   (r) 50 bags of bulgar wheat

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During MEDCAPs 1,375 Medical and 149 Dental patients were treated in the PHUOC VINH area.

Two sections of washed out roads were repaired.

A construction self-help project was initiated on repairing the PHUOC VINH Market place. This project was turned over to the 3d Bde, 101st Abn Div.

Plans were made and lumber was procured for the repair of the LOC NINH Market. A total of 4200 VN Piasters was contributed by members of the 1st Bde for this project.

Lumber was provided for walkways and shelters in the PHUOC VINH's Popular Forces Quarters. Previously, their shelters consisted of structures with roofs and no siding.

The first 15 days of Nov 67 were primarily concerned in getting equipment moved from PHUOC VINH to QUAN LOI and turning the Civic Action program over to the 3d Bde, 101st Abn Div. Members of the attached Civic Affairs Platoon remained on PHUOC VINH and were attached to the 3d Bde, 101st Abn Div.

As soon as the Bde S-5 and CA officials became familiar with the populace in the QUAN LOI area, they began series of daily MEDCAPs which continued through 25 Nov 67 in many villages and hamlets. These MEDCAPs treated a total of 408 medical and 37 dental patients. These MEDCAPs helped the 1st Bde identify itself with the people in the QUAN LOI area.

In December a Christmas program was undertaken to help various schools and orphanages in the QUAN LOI and NON QUAN areas. Three orphanages and a Montagnard boarding school were treated to Christmas parties sponsored by 1st Bde units. A total of 470 children received gifts and the following commodities were distributed:

- 6 cases, powdered milk
- 9 cases, cooking oil
- 5-100 lbs bags of bulgar wheat
- 5-100 lbs bags, cornmeal
- 187 lbs candy
- 350 toys
- 80 bar soap
- 55 tooth brushes
- 55 tubes toothpaste
- 100 lbs clothing
- 39 care gift packages

Throughout December the people continued to respond well to MEDCAPs. On 2 Jan 68 a daily MEDCAP Dispensary was opened on the QUAN LOI Base. The majority of the patients are employees of US units on the base. The employees of the Terres Rouges Rubber Plantation continue to use the hospital provided for them by the plantation directors.

ATTITUDE OF THE PEOPLE:
Based on Civic Action programs and projects conducted by the 1st Bde, 1st Inf Div and the Civic Affairs Team in the QUAN LOI area during the past quarter it is sincerely felt the attitude of the people is most receptive, cordial and warm.

5. (C) SIGNAL:
With the arrival of units in the Quan Loi area, many communication problems were experienced with the FM radio due to the density of the rubber trees. As a result, frequent changes in frequencies utilized by FM radios were common. Since most units in the field used RC-292 antennas or modified versions of the VEF antenna system, quite a few difficulties arose in changing antenna sections to match the transmitting frequencies. The 1st Bde, 1st Inf Div has found that the use of the antenna AT-912 will increase communications transmission ranges and cause fewer problems in matching antennas. The unit is employed in much the same manner as vehicular mounted radios with the exception that the base antenna support AT-719/VRC is mounted on top of a suitable mast (usually fabricated), with a long antenna lead utilizing RG-58 cable running to the matching unit. The only extra component required for this type installation not supplied with the equipment is an adapter PL-258. Whenever a change in frequency is desired the physical length of the antenna is changed electrically thus resulting in a savings in time and labor required to effect the frequency change. It has provided reliable communications between two stations utilizing the AT-912 up to 60 miles. Care should be taken to insure the lead in is not shorted or broken and that the antenna is in good working order for the desired frequency. In the event RG-58 cannot be obtained in suitable lengths, two RC-292 cables can be used with a straight adapter PL-258.
LOGISTIC

1) The 1st Brigade was based at FUKS PAVILION 1, and was resupplied primarily by ARL-LOC with intermittent resupply by LCH-101. The Brigade moved its base camp to OWAN LOI during November 1967. The road to OWAN LOI has remained open for the reporting period and essentially all resupply has been by LCH-101 during the reporting period.

b) Supply:
(1) Class I:
(a) Troops within the base camp consumed primarily B rations supplemented with A rations.
(b) Troops in field locations normally consume two hot meals and one C ration daily.
(2) Class II & IV:
(a) Shelves in Class II items continued to be those items placed on the Central APIC's supply list by USAV.
(b) Classes III items were available in desired quantities.
(2) Class III: No shortfalls.
(4) Class V: Class motor ammunition continues to be a problem due to malfunctions and restricted overhead use.

b) Medical: Evacuation and Hospitalization: Fast continued support in an excellent manner.

d) Transportation: Shipment exists at supporting unit level due to increased road resupply and build-up of base camp.

8. (c) CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS: LESSONS LEARNED

a) SIMULATION I and II MAN contingency operations: The tactical value of a well constructed Night Defense Position was proven beyond any doubt in both of these operations. US forces defeated in detail all enemy forces which attempted to breach the Brigade positions. The contingency plans for LOC MN1 proved to be a great assist in the expedient employment of US forces. It is very important to keep area information up to date.

b) SIMULATION II and contingency operations at LIVE FIRE: During the live fire operation on 1st Battalion, 26th Infantry was subjected to mortar and rocket attacks. The overwatch protection for the individual soldier was extended to include his sloping position. This is a must when subjected to frequent and heavy mortar attacks.

c) ATTN: This operation involved three Brigade size units which subsequently involved much planning. However after only two days one unit was pulled out and two days later the operation was terminated. The mission was to locate and destroy the 15th ENN Regiment however the duration of exercise did not allow the accomplishment of the mission.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

ANTHONY W. LA CASELIA
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 2D BRIGADE 1ST INFANTRY DIVISION
APO 96345

8 February 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968, Reports Control Symbol CS for 65 (U)

TO: Commanding General
ATTN: ADC
c. 1st Infantry Division
APO 96345

Section I Significant Organization or Unit Activities

1. The 2d Bde continued Operation L.W. SGN, Ope. The 2d Bde oriented upon local forces within the L.W. SGN. Operations consisted of cordoning and search, reconnaissance in force, harassment, jungle clearing operations, population control, and civic action. Psychological warfare operations directed against priority targets as developed from current intelligence. Operations stressed the minimal participation and integration of SVN forces. No unusual experiences were encountered with tactical operations during the reporting period. During the reporting period, the 2d Bde Training Team, in conjunction with SVN forces, trained 2 AVG Bms (750 personnel). The 2d Bde Replacement Training School trained 727 incoming personnel. The Bde 55 section conducted 74 HCNISs (11,826 patients) and 24 CENISs (2,148 patients). The 2d Bde accounted for 81 VC KIIs (6), 69 VC KIIs (2), and 30 FMNs during the reporting period.

2. Training and operations were conducted daily, with the exception of the Christmas cease-fire period.

Section II Commanders Observations

Personnel:

1. Item: Base Camp Strength

Discussion: A study was initiated in early January 1968 of the base camp organization of the three organic battalions in the Brigade. Based on this study, it was determined that by combining certain administrative and logistical functions at battalion level, the base camp strength per battalion could be reduced to a maximum of 115 personnel (primary duty and security personnel).

Observation: This reduction of approximately 40 personnel per battalion helped to raise the average field strength to over 75% of the personnel present for duty.

2. Item: Field Strength

Discussion: A means of increasing force strength is through the initiation to a second cycle of replacement school training, beginning 4 days after the regular cycle.

Observation: The initiation of a second cycle en-lists those soldiers missing the first few days of training to start four days earlier than previously and be available for field duty much sooner.

Operations:

1. Item: Ambush Patrols

Discussion: Many varied techniques are used for the employment of ambush patrols. The primary considerations for ambush being enemy activity and especially in the L.W. SGN area, the availability of water. The 2d Bde has utilized the technique of the stay-behind ambush to a great extent.
Observation: The stay-behind ambush has proven quite successful in the LVN SON area, especially in lightly vegetated areas.

2. Item: Search and Combat Operations:
Discussion: The 24 Bde has conducted numerous search and combat operations during the reporting period and have been quite successful in the conduct of the operation. A search and combat is a joint GVN-US operation and requires close coordination to secure success.

Observation: Search and combat operations are normally successful if accurate time (CT time) is available for coordination with GVN personnel.

Intelligence:

1. Item: 02 Section Improvement
Discussion: The augmentation of 1 officer and 1 E1 to form an 02 section of the 24 Bde 02 section has provided a capability for collection and evaluation of detailed intelligence data in the Brigade SO to support the Revolutionary Development Mission of the Brigade. It provides a limited liaison capability, as essential to maintain contact with the multitude of GVN agencies in the area. The 02 section is also responsible for the establishment and maintenance of relations on each village and hamlet in the area, to include information on infrastructure, blacklists, incidents, unit sightings, and other activity in and around hamlets/villages.

Observation: This augmentation has proved invaluable in revolutionary development intelligence collection and in the neutralization of infrastructure. Although general information may be maintained by the BDE Brigade 02 section, detailed information requires this augmentation.

Logistics:

1. Item: Number of CM7 sorties
Discussion: The number of CM7 sorties increased considerably during this reporting period.

Observation: Reasons for increased number of sortie were: 1. GVN Battalions were established in 2 to 3 MEF's which increased the requirements for concertina wire and pickets that had to be furnished in. It became necessary for the Bde 22 to establish the amount of concertina & pickets a unit would use for each MEF. 2. Field mess was placed in each MEF. This necessitated additional requirements for sorting out rations and also additional daily sorties for water trailers. 3. The enormous amount of search and road missions resulted in extractions one day and sorties the next day.

2. Item: Road Recovery
Discussion: During road clearing operations GVN units established their DEPs along the roads which they "opened" every day for convoys.

Observation: Some r.luis in the number of CM7 sorties were in close proximity to their log base. A large convoy ran to all radiated DEPs to extract as much equipment as possible upon completion of road clearing operations.

3. Item: Shortage of Ice
Discussion: Frequently, units logging out LAV KHE, PHU LOI, and PHUOC VINH encountered difficulty in obtaining sufficient ice.

Observation: The 24 Bde did alleviate the shortage of ice by providing ice from a civilian contractor and "sliding" the ice to the DEPs.

Other:
1. Item: Impact Team Activities

Discussion: Impact Team members periodically visit HF/FF outposts to make recommendations and to check progress on the upgrading of the defensive posture of these installations.

Observation: Before entering an HF/FF compound, the US personnel should first gain the attention of the HF/FF personnel and let one of the Vietnamese lead the visitors through the barricades into the outpost or compound. This technique minimizes the possibility of an Impact team member inadvertently detonating a trip flare, mine, or booby trap.

2. Item: Impact Team Activities

Discussion: Conex containers, loaded with sandbags and other fortification materials, were delivered to the sites of HF/FF outposts on trucks. To unload these fully loaded conex containers from trucks, the boom of a wrecker was used.

Observation: When lowering the boom of the wrecker into a position perpendicular to the long axis of the wrecker vehicle while lifting a loaded conex container, there was a tendency for the wrecker to tip over due to the excessive force moment exerted through the boom. Drivers of wrecker vehicles are apparently not fully informed as to the capabilities and limitations of their vehicles.

3. Item: Civic Action Projects

Discussion: Various civic action self-help projects were initiated which required the use of various types of lumber.

Observation: It was found that considerable amounts of usable lumber could be obtained from the S/LICON docks in the form of used crates and excess lumber.

4. Item: Civic Action Projects

Discussion: The problem of obtaining foodstuffs for use in supporting civic action projects at schools, churches, hospitals and similar institutions is a continuing one.

Observation: The Pol Pot's PX calls out various quantities of canned foodstuffs that have been decanted or slightly damaged each month. These items are available at no cost to the Army for distribution to needy charitable/humanitarian institutions.

5. Item: Base Camp Hodod Operations

Discussion: During the reporting period, daily Hodos were conducted outside the base camp adjacent to the West Entrance of the DI AK base. The purpose of these Hodos was to provide medical care to the populace of the nearby local villages.

Observation: It was found that only about 5 people per day would show up at these daily Hodos, probably because the nearest village of any significant size was four kilometers away. On the other hand, Hodos that are conducted in the towns or villages habitually attract approximately 150 patients or more in one half of a day. Therefore, it seems that it is more worthwhile to take the medical teams to the people, rather than expecting the people to seek out and find the Hodo teams.

6. Item: Hodod Operations

Discussion: Fortification by Vietnamese personnel in Hodod operations tends to decline significantly as the Tet (Lunar New Year Holiday) period approaches. Apparently this reaction is due to superstitions beliefs on the part of the populace to the effect that visits by the doctor during Tet are bad luck signs.

DECLASSIFIED PER EXECUTIVE ORDER 12356, Section 3.3, para 823.541

By A/C/NR, NARA, Date 2-26-53.
Observation: It was agreed that since Medcap operations involve Vietnamese nurse personnel as well as Vietnamese patients, and that since the success of Medcap depends upon maintaining the good will of the local populace and receiving large numbers of patients, it is desirable to suspend Medcaps entirely for the week of the Tet Holiday celebrations.

7. Item: Medcap Operations

Discussion: Medcap teams are often airlifted by CH47 helicopters from the base camp to the target village of a seal and search operation. At the departure helicopter pad there sometimes are groups of other troops waiting transportation to the forward areas. This can very easily result in confusion as to which troops should lead up on the helicopter when it touches down at the departure helicopter pad.

Observation: When careful on-the-spot coordination is made between the officer in charge of the Medcap team and the senior individual of the other group (or groups) of troops, confusion as to who boards which helicopter can usually be eliminated or at least minimized. Another technique that improves the smoothness of Medcap helicopter outlying procedures is to have a portable PRC25 or a vehicular mounted radio operational and tuned to the Medcap Adm/Log frequency as to the helicopter air coordinate directly with the personnel on the ground.

8. Item: Medcap Operations

Discussion: Medcap operations are planned by the Brigade S5 in conjunction with the Division Medical Battalion, pacified field team, military police and the SVN District officials concerned. The exact date, time, place, and security arrangements must be firm up well in advance of the date of the operations in order to insure a smooth, successful Medcap.

Observation: On two occasions during the reporting period, the Medcap team did not locate its site at the last minute upon arrival at the hamlet. In both cases the relocation was required because the PF/VP forces security unit in the hamlet did not set up security at the site previously agreed upon between the Bde S5 and the Vietnamese district order. It appears that extremely close coordination must be made by the US and SVN authorities during the planning stages, to include double checking a day or two before the scheduled date to preclude embarrassing confusion at the actual Medcap.

9. Item: Medcap Operations

Discussion: It is deemed advisable for Vietnamese personnel to participate to the maximum extent possible in civic action projects in keeping with the spirit of "self-help." It is often necessary to firmly state to the Vietnamese District CO that personnel that unless the members of the local populace uphold their portion of commitments on joint QM/US civic action projects, that further US support will be withheld.

Observation: This type situation occurred during the construction of the OUM/THC village dispensary. The village chief had promised to provide four Vietnamese Laborers from the village to work under the supervision of a US medical carpenter. However, on the first day of construction only one laborer was on hand. Construction work was curtailed until the Laborers were provided by the village chief. Construction was then resumed and the project was successfully completed.

10. Item: Civic Actions Projects

Discussion: During the Christmas and Tet (Lunar New Year) celebrations, the Vietnamese and US organizations tend to engage in numerous joint projects such as parties for Vietnamese schools, orphanages, hospitals and similar institutions. These efforts can do much good for the civic action program if properly controlled and coordinated.
Observation: It has been noted that US military and civilian agencies don't always coordinate their support of these worthy institutions through a central office to avoid needless duplication of effort and the temptation on the part of institutional personnel to divert an overabundance of commodities through black market channels. More coordination and control is desired and needed in the future, to avoid extraneous support to some institutions while inadvertently shorting others.

11. Item: Psychological Operations

Discussion: Air-dropped leaflets are used in the Operations LAK SON area of operations to encourage VC to rally under the Chieu Hoi Program, to generally discourage the VC concerning the hopelessness of their cause, and to encourage support of the SVN by the local populace.

Observation: Leaflets have been dropped by C-17 and UO fixed wing aircraft and also by UH-1D helicopters. Most of the drops at brigade level have been by helicopter. What drawing by helicopter considerably raise must be taken by the personnel conducting the drop to insure that the leaflets are thrown out and down a handfull at a time to avoid fouling air intakes or the rear rotor. Of particular importance is the necessity of securing the cardboard leaflet cartons inside the helicopter so that as the box is emptied the air drafts do not cause the box to be sucked out of the helicopter where it might contact and damage either the main rotor or the rear stabilizing rotor. If care is not taken, it is believed that this type accident could easily occur with a resultant loss of lives if and may.

12. Item: Psychological Operations

Discussion: New personnel are prone to overlook the fact the dropping leaflets is hard work and requires skill and practice in order to drop the leaflets efficiently and safely. Leaflet loads should be planned and organized thoroughly on the ground before departing the base pad. Time over target is needed and is not allowed for sorting and organizing the heavy boxes of leaflets while airborne over the drop area.

Observation: The most effective drops are those that are carefully planned and arranged on the ground. An experienced person can quickly and also tend to check their loads and arrange the sharp edges of the crisp cardboard leaflets in their hands to prevent the leaflets from the cardboard boxes.

13. Item: Mobile Resource Control Teams

Discussion: Mobile Resource Control Teams are groups of US military police and Vietnamese National Police that operate together at check points on roads, highways, and pathways to interdict the flow of supplies, money, and contraband to illegal destinations and/or to the VC.

Observation: These teams have been extremely successful in the LAK SON area. During the annual tet holidays these teams must stand down due to the Vietnamese police being off-duty during this period. Experience has shown that when the teams are not operating, the VC tend to move and supplies extensively over the main arteries of the local transportation network.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

FELIN, E. O. C. U. D.
Major, Infantry
Adjutant

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

HEADQUARTERS 3D INFANTRY AND LAI KHE BASE

1ST INFANTRY DIVISION

A.G. 96345

AVDB-WC

8 February 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report on Lessons Learned (RSC GFRU-28 [R])

TO: Commanding General

1ST INFANTRY DIVISION

ATTN: G3

APO US Forces 96345

I. PART 1. INTRODUCTION.

a. During the previous quarter no major large unit operations were conducted. The Bde concentrated its major effort on opening and securing Hwy 13 from Lai Khe to An Loc. This effort has been highly successful as demonstrated by the relatively few incidents that have taken place on the road. The establishment of semi-permanent NDPs along Hwy 13 has enabled the Bde to completely open and secure the road within two hours, enabling a full day's use of the road by military and civilian traffic.

b. During the last month of this quarter the Bde has conducted numerous A/A resulting in the seizure of a great quantity of VC rice and food stuffs from a supply area to the north-east of Lai Khe. A concentrated effort was also put into sealing and searching villages in the Bde TICU.

2. PART II. NARRATIVE OF TACTICAL OPERATIONS:

a. Major operations conducted by the 1st Infantry Brigade during the reporting period include the following:

(1) Track clearing operation (unnamed). Nov found the Iron Brigade continuing to secure Hwy 13 from Lai Khe to An Loc. Having already established FPs (Caissons) the Bde turned to establishing semi-permanent NDPs at strategic locations along Hwy 13.

b. The VC reacted by periodic mortar and IED attacks on the NDPs. On Nov 9 at 0025 hrs Caissons VI received 14 rds of 82mm mortars. Again at 0055 hrs Caisson VII received 15 rds of 81mm mortars. In both cases the units and IBU's suffered no casualties or damage.

c. Lai Khe base camp also experienced an increase in mortar and IED attacks during the reporting period. On 21 Nov at 2200 hrs Lai Khe received 6-8 rds of 82mm mortars and 1 RIG-40 rd; there was no damage or casualties.
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On 28 Oct the NHP XT706720 of B Co 1-16 Inf came under 5/4, A/N, R/F, and ground attack by elements of the 5th NVA Bn/704. The contact was broken at 0345 hrs resulting in 2 KIA, 21 WIA, 1 tank and 2 APC's damaged. The enemy left behind 57 KIA (24), 2 WIA, 11 RPG's, 6 R/B launchers, 1 Claymore and 2 120mm Rocket launchers. At 2235 hrs the same night Lai Khe received 1.18mm mortar rounds causing no damage or casualties.

Between the 15th & 20th of Nov the 3d Bde had attached to it, C Troop 3-17 ARVN. This unit conducted reconnaissance within the N17 ThOR and assisted with Air Support during contacts.

On 1 Dec at 0553 hrs 1-16 Inf (2-16) NHP (XT767720) came under mortar attack, while this contact was ongoing the NHP of 8 Co 1-16 Inf at 0110 hrs received 10-15 140mm rds, continuing the NHP of 6 Co 1-16 Inf at 0110 hrs received 10-15 140mm rds. At 0900 hrs the VC left 27 KIA, while US Forces suffered 5 KIA & 21 WIA. On the same day the VC launched a patrol from B Co 2-16 Inf (XT722190) engaging 5 VC at XT766737 killing 2 and capturing one. A total of 8 AK-47, 1 60mm mortar, and 1 HMG launcher were lost by the VC.

From 0230 hrs until 0436 hrs on 10 Dec the NHP of 0 Co 1-16 Inf (XT765787) received 22-240mm mortar rds. Only 2 rds landed inside the NHP and caused no damage.

At 1100 hrs 1-26 Inf from D Co made an A/A via XT700710, while sweeping area via XT614253 a base camp containing a total of 47 women, children, & old men was found. All were evacuated to Lai Khe along with 200 lbs of rice.

On 10 Dec the construction of the well-entrenched NHP was almost completed. The name Caisson was dropped and the NHP's renamed Thunder 3 thru X.

On 13 Dec the 3d Bde assaulted overwatch of Song Bo area. The 1-16 Inf moved from 13 to Song Bo to secure the Phase with air support beginning 2030 hrs on 13 Dec. Continuing with their policy of increased pressure in and around Lai Khe, 1 KIA was killed & 1 wounded when their Jeep detonated a booby trapped 105 rd rocket which had been left behind at CP-26 XT752558.

On 17 Dec 3d Bde released G/2/20 of the 1-18 Inf and the Song Bo area to the 1st Bde.

On 21 Dec the first of several village search & seals by the 3d Bde took place. At 0730 hrs 2-20 Inf (-) attacked Lai Khe village XT663980; the search produced 55 detainees, 5 A/Vs, 1 grenade, and assorted US equipment. At 1600 hrs a fire was set at the Lai Khe base camp resupply pad and 6 VC were killed & 4 wounded. The area was sealed off with 8-inch wire. On 2 Jan the 3d Bde attacked Lai Khe village XT752558; the search produced 55 detainees, 5 A/Vs, 1 grenade, and assorted US equipment. At 1600 hrs a fire was set at the Lai Khe base camp resupply pad and 6 VC were killed & 4 wounded. The area was sealed off with 8-inch wire.

On 24 Dec the 3d Bde conducted Operation Holly. The massive mortar & air support of 5,000 1st Inf Bn soldiers & 1st Inf to Lai Khe was able to carry off with great success and no losses. At 2400 hrs Dec the Christmas cease fire went into effect lasting until 251800 hrs Dec.

On 29 Dec the village of Lai Khe Lai XT714616 was sealed and searched by 1-26 Inf resulting in 4 detainees.

On 311800 hrs Dec the New Year cease fire went into effect lasting until 200000 Jan 68. On 2 Jan the 3d Bde started tactical operations with an A/A by the 1st Inf/16thInf/739550. Several sightings of VC were made, but no significant contact was made. On 3 Jan the NHP of the area were not engaged. On 4 Jan an 1-16 Inf (XT744351) between 1900 & 2000 hrs received 150 rds of 120mm mortars & 15 R/F's, a total of 13 lbs. At 6 Jan 1-18 Inf conducted an A/A XT709920, KIP & 4 elapsed on the NHP.

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DECLASSIFIED PER EXECUTIVE ORDER 12356, Section 3.3, para 823,451

By J/H, LCP, NARA, Date 2/26/83
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On 13 Jan D Co 1-28 Inf XT6777 located and evacu- 
anted 1-60mm mortar refit. On 11 Jan at 2311 hrs 1-16 Inf-
sealed Ben Co village XT673945. The BN received 3/A fire periodically throughout the 
night. Results of search were: 1 US M1A1, 2 US M16, 2 US M1A1, 
11 VC SMG, 4 bolt action rifles, 1 AK-47, 2 carbines & 1 Russian pistol.

a. On 12 Jan at 2200 hrs 1-18 Inf sealed the village of 
B-Tac XT733497. Search produced 4 transit cases and 5 VC suspects. On 
13 Jan 1-26 BN (-) conducted an A/A XT672042, RIF and established an RDP 
with incident. On 14 Jan 1-16 Inf conducted an A/A XT831196 RIF and estab-
lished an NDF, BN located and evacuated 105-100lb bags of rice. On 15 
Jan 1-16 BN located XT824296 and evacuated 32A-100lb bags of rice, 100 
Ibs of peanuts, 250 lbs salt & 100 lbs of peas. Seal of village at 
XT733777 by 1-18 Inf produced 1 mile detaining. 1-16 Inf conducted an 
A/A via XT869478 & RIF to west. At 1500 hrs BN (-) at XT864283 destroyed 
16-12mm mortar rds & evacuated 2-12 machine shots.

b. On 17 Jan 1-28 Recon at XT746678 engaged 2 VC both 
died later from wounds. VC were carrying over 4,000 VC rounds and a 
carbine. Documents found indicated they were a tax collection team 
redistributing tax mony to VC families in village at XT767777. At 1100 
hrs A Co 1-26 Inf sealed the village and evacuated 25 persons; there were 
no detaines.

c. On 18 Jan 1-28 Inf BN (-) located a BN size base 
camp at XT824763 which had been recently occupied as there were chickens 
pigs and cattle in area. One sewing machine, 6-8mm rds, 7 rifle grenades 
and 2 lbs of documents were evacuated. Arty and TAC air was put 
in on the camp. On 19 Jan 1-16 BN (-) made an A/A via XT690494 RIF and 
established an NDF. On 20 Jan 1-16 BN (-) received 1-40mm mortar rds and 
A-75mm Hk rds. There was no damage or casualties. On 21 Jan 1-26 Inf 
C Co conducted an A/A XT625346 and RIF. On 22 Jan 1-26 Inf B Co at 
XT738225 engaged 6 VC killing one. On 23 Jan 1-18 Inf and 2-28 Inf sealed 
12-12mm mortar XT673189. Search produced 120 detainees. 2-28 Inf also 
conducted an A/A XT804519 and RIF at XT675507. On 24 Jan 1-28 Inf 
A Co conducted an A/A XT814138. At 1500 hrs A Co engaged 5 VC array 
and again at 1555 a VC array. Unknown VC casualties. 3,500 lbs of rice 
were evacuated. 2-12 Inf C Co conducted an A/A 
XT864519 and RIF at XT815077. C Co destroyed 2 bunkers and evacuated 
1-20. 6-12mm mortar rds and evacuated 1 shotguns, 1 bolt action rifle, 1 transistor radio and some documents.

d. On 25 Jan at 2251 hrs two buildings at LR were hit 
with RPG rds. One building was completely destroyed resulting in 10 KIA 
and 22 WIA. 2-28 Inf BN (-) RIF via XT803570 destroyed 1 military 
structure, 5 crates, 3 bicycles and 2 bunkers. Some medical supplies, 9,300 
Ibs of rice, and 51 lbs of documents were evacuated. On 27 Jan at 2005 
hrs an AP from D Co 1-26 Inf via XT767774 evacuated an approximately 
75 W. VC returned fire w/A-40, A-40 and RPGs. A Nacht IFF evacuate to pick 
ap on also conduct. LFT, Spooky, Arty & TAC air supported. Us cas 
were 1 KIA & 9 WIA. At the same time on AP from D Co 2-28 Inf XT804430 
made contact with 10-15 VC. VC fired 5/A and 3 RPG rds. Arty and mortars 
supported; there were no US casualties. At 2020 hrs an AP from D Co 1-16 
Inf via XT864691 spotted 75 VC, LFT, Spooky, 3-12 air and Arty worked over 
area of sighting.

e. On 28 Jan 1-28 Inf found 4 VC bodies in area of 
previous contacts and picked up 2 P787's, 9/2mm BR rds, 8 antitank mines, 
48-2 rds, 7 grenades, 9 Bangalore torpedoes, 4-8mm rds, 1 anti tank 
grenade, 1,000 lbs of rice, 200 lbs of clothing, 50 lbs of documents, 2 
boxes 7.62 linked ammo, 1 box 50 Cal ammo, 9 Navy mg, 10 lbs medical 
supplies and 30 packs. D Co 2-28 Inf via XT864400 at 0620 hrs located 
and evacuated 10 tons of rice, 800 lbs of rice food stuff, 250 tons of 
milk, 100 lbs of tobacco, 200 lbs of salt, 150 gal cooking oil, 125 lbs 
of soap, 100 mandirains, 87 tubes of toothpaste and 48 toothbrushes. At 1200 
hrs 8 Co at XT604143 located and evacuated 10 tons of rice. During the n 
night the 1-16 Inf sealed Ben Co village XT743442; there were 517 in-
dividuals screened and 2 were detained. On 30 Jan D 2-28 Inf via 
XT802442 at XT343412 located and evacuated 27.1 tons of rice.

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On 31 Jan between 0230 and 0235 hrs, Lai Khe was under mortar attack, estimated 18 120mm rocket and 75mm killing rounds were received. There were 3 LOR aircraft launched, 1 OHID and 12 buildings damaged. Between 0730 and 1000 hrs Lai Khe received 5-122mm rocket rounds. There was no damage on VM casualties. Between 0845 and 0900 hrs Lai Khe received 11-122mm rocket rounds. At 1625 hrs 1 rd of 82mm mortar was received. Between 1410 and 1432 hrs 2 more rds of 82mm mortar were received. At 1600 hrs 6-9 122mm rocket rds were received. There were 2 US WIA and 1-5/4 and 3-4 ton trucks damaged. At 1918 hrs 7 rds of 82mm mortar were received. There was a total of 82 wounds due to the mortar and rocket attacks but only 19 required hospitalization. At 0723 hrs A Co 1-26 Inf captured 1 VC via Thunder VIII. At 1955 hrs via XT6A3329 1-26 Inf captured 1 VC via Thunder VIII. At 1955 hrs via XT6A3329

b. At 1100 hrs A Co 1-26 Inf made contact with an unknown number VC, there were 3 US WIA and 2 KIA.

c. At 1100 hrs A Co 1-26 Inf made contact at XT732727.

Results were 9 VC KIA, 3 AK-47's, 1 chicom mg and 3 RPG rds captured.

During the day the 3d Bde repositioned many of its units in order to combat the increased VC aggression during the Tet period. During the reporting period the Air Force supported the Bde ops with 696 tactical air strikes resulting in 418 separate air strikes.

3. PART III. INTELLIGENCE

a. Enemy activity during the reporting period was characterized by sniper, mortar attacks, 120mm attacks, and major assaults against fortified enemy. Major enemy engagements with elements of the 3d Bde occurred on 21 Nov and 3 Dec, and 26 Jan 1968. Principal units in the 3d Bde area of interest which could have influenced any battle situation include the following:

(1) 9th VC Division:
   (a) 271st Regiment-Binh Duong Prov via the Fishook (XT5991)
   (b) 272d Regiment-Binh Duong Prov via the Fishook
   (c) 273d Regiment-

(2) 7th NVA Division
   (a) 101st Regiment-Binh Duong Prov south of the Mekal River Rubber Plantation (XT5590)
   (b) 111st Regiment-Binh Long Prov NE of the Ming Tanh Rubber Plantation (XT6369)
   (c) 165th Regiment-Binh Long Prov east of the Ming Tanh Rubber Plantation (XT6369)

b. A brief summary of significant actions during the reporting period is presented as follows:

(1) On 200230 hrs Nov 1967 B/1-18 Inf XT6J3764 in a well-prepared night defensive position, (Thunder VIII) came under a ground attack by an estimated reinforced company of the 165th NVA Regt. Contact was broken at 0015 hrs but sporadic sniper fire continued until 0515 hrs. The VC were unable to penetrate the outermost portion of the perimeter and suffered 37 KIA (20), 25 (unknown) while losing 11 AK-47's rifles plus 3 FON captured, 6 RPG's and 2 M79 7 rocket launchers in action.
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(2) 0300 hrs Dec 67 the 1-18 Inf (-) NDP at XT766732 Thunder VII received a coordinated RPG mortar attack followed with a ground attack by nr. The attack was broken at 0325 hrs but sporadic sniper fire continued until 0405 hrs. VC losses were 31 KIA (BC), 35 (pres), 8 AT-4 Fittles, 1 RPG-7 rocket launcher, 1 complete 60mm mortar, and some 600 rds of S/A ammo captured in action.

(3) During the second day of a three day operation at 0915 hrs Jan 68 1-18 Inf (-) NDP XT705349 came under an estimated 150 rds of mortar and RPG attack for 45 minutes. The VC made no attempt to conduct a follow up ground attack and no further incidents of this type were reported.

(4) An extremely successful ambush was conducted by A/2-28 Inf on 091950 hrs Jan 68 at XT787533 on a trail which had been discovered and monitored carefully prior to finally positioning the patrol. An estimated 25 VC were moving west on the trail and of this number 9 were killed (BC) and 1 KIA (pos) due to a large pool of blood and drag marks. Two individual weapons and one crew served rocket launcher were captured as well as nine lbs of documents. There were no casualties.

(5) A seal of Ben Cui hamlet XT74435 was conducted by A, B, and C CO's, 1-16 Inf on the night of 11 Jan and maintained until 1200 hrs the next day. This operation was initiated due to numerous reports of local VC entering the hamlet early each evening and departing before sunrise. Before the seal was broken 9 VC were killed and 11 captured; 8 individual weapons were captured in the action. Seals were later conducted on Long Chieu hamlet XT73333, an Eclan hamlet XT73334, and Ben Cui hamlet but were not as successful as the first probably due to a more keen awareness of the VC for this type operation.

(6) A ten man patrol from D/1-26 Inf 272006 hrs Jan 68 XT767743 engaged an estimated 75 VC from the 141st NVI Regt who were attempting to cross Hwy 1 from W to E. After contact had been made a reaction force of armored vehicles was dispatched from Thunder VII (XT767730) and they became embroiled with another 50 VC. At 2015 hrs the friendly forces joined up and returned to the NDP by 2052 hrs. A search of the area on 28 Jan resulted 4 VC KIA (BC), 2 POS, 33 VC KIA (pos), 1 individual weapon captured, numerous rds for heavier organic infantry weapons, and over 800 lbs of clothing, food stuffs and medicines.

(7) The Division Officer's Club (3d @olonel's Villa) was destroyed 252255 hrs Jan 68 by an unknown number of VC, suspected to have been from a supper unit, using RPG-7s.

(8) Large caches of rice and other food stuffs were located by 1-16 Inf at XT8442 (447-100 lbs rice), 2-28 Inf at XT8483 (93-100 lbs rice), on 25 Jun 68. On 29 Jun 2-28 Inf at XT8483 (400-100 lbs rice), XT838442 (220-100 lbs rice), and XT845440 (600-100 lbs rice).

a. Terrain in the area was generally flat with broad leaf evergreen forest, intermingled with bushes and bamboo forests. The area along Hwy 13 was some flowed back on both sides for 200 meters. The weather was characterized by rain showers during Nov and no rain at all in Dec and Jan and did not impede tactical operations.

4. (C) PERSONNEL:

a. Strength:

(1) Authorized: Officers: 144; Men; 12 EN: 2,684
(2) Assigned as of 30 Nov 67: Off: 141; Men: 12 EN: 2,522
(3) Assigned as of 31 Dec 67: Off: 140; Men: 9 EN: 2,599
(4) Assigned as of 31 Jan 68: Off: 147; Men: 11 EN: 2,480
(5) Replacements gained during the period 1 Nov 67 thru 31 Jan 68: 1,075.
(6) Hospital returnees during the period 1 Nov 67 thru 31 Jan 68: 135
(7) Other troops authorized and assigned during the period:
   One (1) Liaison Officer (ARVN), one (1) Liaison NCO (ARVN), and eighteen (18) interpreters (ARVN).

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By NARA, Date 2/6/53
b. Replacements: Presently, this unit is short (considering projected losses) 12 Officers, 30 Senior NCO's and 335 EM. All newly assigned EM in the grade E-5 and below and Officers in the grade O-1 and O-2 attend the Combat Indoctrination Course conducted by the Brigade S-3.

c. Discipline: During the period 1 Nov 67 thru 31 Jan 68, one (1) EM was tried by Summary Court-Martial, six (6) EM were tried by Special Court-Martial and one (1) EM was tried by General Court-Martial.

d. Prisoners of War: There were 25 VC processed through US and SVN channels.

e. Burials and Grave Registration: None

f. Moral and Personnel Services: Morale of the Brigade continues to be high. Fifty-two (52) Silver Stars, seven (7) Distinguished Flying Crosses, 257 Bronze Stars w/o, 300 Bronze Stars (Nori), 77 Army Commendation Medals w/o, 605 Army Commendation Medals (Merit), 25 Soldier Medals, 89 Air Medals, and 4 Legion of Merit, have been recommended for award to members of the Bde. Radio Lai Khe is now operating 24 hours a day for the enjoyment of the troops garrisoned at Lai Khe. AMC continues assisting members of LX base in an outstanding manner. Chaplains attendance is high and all units have assigned chaplains.

g. Personnel Management: Assignment of newly assigned replacements has been allowed whenever necessary to allow an equalization in the redistribution of personnel with the battalions. No major personnel management problem exists.

h. Civil Assistance

(1) Psychological Operations:

During the month of November, December, and January 5,660,000 propaganda leaflets were air-dropped and 100,350 were distributed by hand in the Bde TOLA. 136 missions accounted for 77 hours and 10 minutes of airborne loudspeaker propaganda broadcasting in support of the brigade tactical operations. All PsyOps was conducted in coordination with the Brigade S2 and S3.

(2) Civic Action:

(a) During the reporting period eight (8) civic action projects were supported by the brigade. 60 sheets of tin, 103 lbs of nails, 23-200x16", 20-200x14" and 372 anno boxes were provided to the victims of a fire in Lai Khe Hamlet which destroyed 5 houses. These materials were used by the people in building their homes. Two (2) truck loads of army canteens, 2 rolls of concertina wire, and 5000 gallons barrels were provided for the people of Lai Khe which were used in installing 300' of fence in support of the brigade tactical operations. 14 truck loads of army canteens were provided for construction of a sewage system in Lai Khe. 29 truck loads of sand, 400 bags of cement, and 1,440 Gvino-ram bricks which were made by the GI platoon, were provided for the construction of a new market place in Lai Khe. 10 hours of roadgrader work was also done on the market place, and 1 hour was spent on road improvement in Lai Khe. 40 lbs of sugar, 1 case of kool-aid, 2 boxes of candy and toys, 9 cases of powdered milk, and 275 friendship kits were distributed to dependents of the 9th ARVN Regiment in Chon Thanh. 1000 sandbags and 13 cases of C-rations were given to the Lai Khe Village Chief for improvement of bunkers and feeding detainees. 1,400 sandbags, 5 used vehicle batteries, 2 cases of apples, 4 cases of oranges, 80 cases of surplus food, 410 cases of surplus food, and 4,000 lbs of rice were given to the Ben Cat District Chief for use in his district. 11 GP large tents and 3 trucks were provided the Chon Thanh District Chief to assist him in moving Trung Lai Hamlet. 300 toys, 12 cases of food, and 35 gift boxes from OCMC were given to the children of Lai Khe Catholic School for Christmas. 50 anno boxes, 125 lbs of canned food, and 1 case of candy, gum, and soop were distributed to the orphanage at Ben Cat. 300 sandbags, 355 steel pickets, 2-65 gallon barrels, 100 ammo boxes, and 10 "alls of concertina wire were given to the Ben Cat National Police to improve their compound.
(b) During the quarter, 6,665 persons were treated under the Brigade MEDCAP program.

(c) 22,000 Vietnamese patients were paid in solatium during the quarter.

(d) Mobile Resources Control teams operating in the Brigade TACR during the quarter screened 88,753 persons, checked 11,014 vehicles, and detained 209 persons.

1. Civilian Employment:

(1) 860 Vietnamese personnel are employed within the base perimeter.

(a) 190 are employed by concessions and clubs.

(b) 250 are employed by the firm of Pacific Architects and Engineers.

(2) Additionally, there are 35 Koreans, 11 Philippino's and 10 US citizens employed within the base camp.

5. PART V. LOGISTICS:

a. The majority of operations during the reporting period were resupplied from the Lai Khe base. The majority of resupply was effected by road primarily from Lai Khe; however, a small portion of resupply was made from Quan Loi.

b. Supply:

(1) Supported strength 7,700 average.

(2) Supply Levels: 

   (a) Class I 15% 15
   (b) Class II & IV Here as needed
   (c) Class V 3 days 3 days +
   (d) Class III

   Jet 45-60,000 23,500
   Kerosene 10-15,000 5,000
   Diesel 35-45,000 21,000
   Diesel 50-60,000 28,000

   (e) Items in short supply, 5' and 8' pickets, generators, 45 Cal magazines, armor vests, trucks—all types, water trailers, PRC-25, 5 gallon water cans, X-small trousers, M2 and M57 field range generators.

(3) Local procurement: None

c. Evacuation:

(1) Casualties:

   (a) From hostile action: 908
   (b) Disease: 92
   (c) Injury: 833

(2) Prisoners of War: 25

(3) Refugees: None

d. Transportation:

(1) Highway 11,719 tons of cargo were moved to Lai Khe over Hwy 13.

(2) Air 14 tons of cargo were airlifted into Lai Khe.
e. Service:

(1) Maintenance: The direct support ordnance unit has been able to keep abreast of maintenance problems in the vehicle category. Radar, Cryptographic and Photographic equipment are evaluated because of a lack of personnel or test equipment which is required to repair the equipment.

(2) Construction: Approximately 70% of the currently approved base plan has been completed.

6. PART VI. CHRONOLOGY:

   a. 1 Nov-31 Jan: Road clearing and security
   b. Nov-15 Dec: Construction of semi-permanent NDP's along Hw1 13
   c. 21 Dec-31 Jan: Village seal and search ops

7. PART VII. DISCUSSION AND RECOMMENDATION:

   a. After the initial heavy contact on an NDP is broken, a critical period develops with the arrival of Dustoff aircraft. All personnel not assisting in loading casualties must remain in their fighting positions and be prepared to resume the fight. On two occasions, 3 Jan and 27 Jan, VC resumed the attack on the NDP upon departure of the Dustoff. On 3 Jan, subsequent attacks caused casualties which required two additional dustoffs.

   b. Successful ambushes performed by 1-16 Inf, 1-26 Inf and 2-25 Inf within the reporting period were a direct product of detailed planning and violent execution. Each ambush was planned over a relatively long period of time. Until movement was observed on a daily basis, recon patrols through the area familiarized the ambush members with the actual site. In two of the actions a recognized NDP moved to the site and further engaged as well as extricated the ambush force.

   c. The seal and search of Ben Cat was another example of detailed planning and violent execution. Extensive reconnaisance and air photo studies were made, air recon were conducted by BN staff and Company Commanders, and a road recon was completed to include illumination. Convoy as a cover. Artillery plans were completed to include illumination. Direct fire was supported by town advisor personnel at Ben Cat. Night fire teams were positioned at Lai Kho and Phu, Ao, and Xonon light aircraft were overhead. The operation, through bold, depended on the principle of surprise and sound intelligence.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]

THOMAS E. MILLER
Major, Infantry
Adjutant

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