CONCLUSION OF CUU LONG ARTICLE ON GUERRILLA WARFARE

Liberation Radio [Clandestine] in Vietnamese to South Vietnam 0930 GMT 23 Apr 72 S

[Article by Cuu Long: "Some Problems of Guerrilla Warfare in the Southern Rural Areas in the Phase of Struggle to Defeat the U.S. Vietnamization Strategy"—part 3: "The Problem of Building and Developing Forces." For parts 1, 2 see 21 Apr DAILY REPORTS]

[Text] In order to defend hamlets and areas and advance to liberate them, we must carry out propaganda, organize and lead the masses in struggle at low and high level, and motivate the masses to rise and use revolutionary violence to win power. This process of struggle gives rise to the current important and foremost requirement—that we strive to build and positively develop forces. Only when we have forces can we talk about attacking the enemy. Once our forces are developed, we will be able to launch many offensives to annihilate or wear down the enemy forces and attack the enemy in all domains, in all places and in a continuous manner.

On this basis, we must strive to develop a new offensive position with a view to changing the balance of power increasingly in our favor. In building and developing forces at the basic level we must not think only, in recruiting for the guerrilla organizations, of seeking out persons who dare to hold weapons to fight the enemy. If we do this, we have not yet understood the invincible strength of the people's war at the basic levels—that is, the strength of the people as a whole.

To motivate all people to participate in uprisings and war, the first thing is to build a broad political force among the masses. The masses' political force is a basis for forming and developing the people's revolutionary armed forces. Let us take a village or a hamlet as an example in order to better understand the problem.
a firm answer of the South Vietnamese people to the die-hard warmonger. The splendid victories scored by the armed forces and people in the north in bringing down over 3,500 U.S. aircraft, particularly the exploits of the armed forces and people in Haiphong and Hanoi on April 16 in blasting down 15 U.S. aircraft including one B-52, are due punishing blows dealt at Nixon's criminal war escalation.

No brutal war act and no perfidious slanders of the U.S. can help it prevent the patriotic struggle of the Vietnamese people from winning bigger victories or save Nixon's "Vietnamization of the war" policy from complete bankruptcy.

The U.S. has sent troops to invade South Vietnam and carried out the air and naval war of destruction against North Vietnam. The Vietnamese people have the right to defend the independence and freedom of their fatherland. This is the legitimate right of self-defence of all nations. As long as the U.S. continues its aggression and maintains the bellicose traitor Nguyen Van Thieu in an attempt to impose its neo-colonialism on South Vietnam, the Vietnamese people will continue their fight against the U.S. The wonderful struggle of the South Vietnamese people under the correct leadership of the National Front for Liberation and the PRG of the Republic of South Vietnam, with the wholehearted assistance of their kith and kin in the north and with the great sympathy and effective support of their brothers and friends in the five continents, will certainly win total victory.

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To motivate all people to participate in uprisings and war, the first thing is to build a broad political force among the masses. The masses' political force is a basis for forming and developing the people's revolutionary armed forces. Let us take a village or a hamlet as an example in order to better understand the problem.
In a village or a hamlet where attention is paid to organizing, leading and accelerating the activities of old people, youth, women and peasants organizations, many outstanding persons will emerge from these mass organizations, making possible the building of quantitatively and qualitatively strong guerrilla units. The masses political force in this village or hamlet is not only a basis for developing the armed forces, but is also a force to attack the enemy by revolutionary violence both in uprisings and in the revolutionary war, and especially in uprisings.

This political force, in coordination with the armed force, has created a strength to overwhelm the enemy by diversified and active wars. When we say the political and armed forces are two different forces, we mean in a general sense on a nationwide scale. In fact, in a village or a hamlet if a political force is well organized any citizen can be both a political struggle force and an armed struggle force. We have seen many elderly people, old mothers, sisters and teenagers engage in the three-pronged [military, political and troop-proselytizing] struggle in a very lively and resourceful manner.

Guerilla warfare plays a coordinating role and serves as a lever to stimulate the political and troop-proselytizing struggle. On this basis the masses political force can be quickly built and developed. The guerrilla forces cannot do the work for the masses political force nor can they replace the latter.

In order to wage the people's war at the basic levels to defeat the enemy's current rural pacification plan it is absolutely necessary to motivate all the people. President Ho has taught: "If guerrilla warfare is well organized all people, irrespective of sex, age or social class, can participate. They can be entrusted either with directly fighting the enemy or with other tasks such as carrying supplies to fighting units and performing intelligence, liaison and propaganda activities. In this way everyone is given an opportunity to serve the fatherland."

This is a very fundamental viewpoint on building our people's war forces. It reflects implementation of the principle that revolutionary violence is violence by the masses in building forces for the revolutionary war. It also reflects creative application of Marxist-Leninist thoughts on mobilizing and arming the people and on building a new-type revolutionary army in line with the real conditions in our country.

Implementing uncle Ho's instructions and applying them to the conditions in the hamlets and villages that are actively opposing the enemy's pacification, we must overcome a number of erroneous viewpoints on building forces. In this way we will be able to develop deeply and broadly the people's war forces at the basic levels. It is necessary in this period to avoid erroneous conceptions and to have proper knowledge of the organization of militia and guerrilla forces at the basic levels.

Concerning the militia, individuals who volunteer for combat activities must be admitted into militia units. Activities in the militia force are not as closely organized as in the guerrilla force. Also, its tasks are more varied. However, we must not confuse militiamen with civilian laborers. A militiaman can serve as a civilian laborer for a time but remains a member of the paramilitary organization. He can participate in combat on the basis of his ability.

Concerning guerrillas, those who voluntarily choose combat as their main duty and fight at the appropriate time must be organized into a guerrilla force.
The guerrilla force is a body with close organization and leadership and with strict discipline. In hamlets and villages, the underground self-defense organizations are mainly responsible for supporting combat activities, and the underground guerrillas are mainly responsible for combat activities.

The responsibility for organizing the militia and guerrilla forces falls not only on particular village or hamlet units but also on everyone. Village party committees and village party echelons have the duty to lead and motivate the people's organizations to participate in the struggle. Organization members must participate actively and exemplarily. Organization executive committees and boards must actively enlist suitable members into militia and guerrilla units. These members will continue to belong to their own organizations to insure that they will be permanently motivated and educated.

Village and hamlet units have the responsibility to organize and command militiamen and guerrillas, along with actively coordinating with various organizations to develop their own forces. We must strive to enable every hamlet and village in weak and contested areas to have sufficient, protected, basic organizations such as village and hamlet units [words indistinct], village guerrillas, sapper and engineer guerrillas, hamlet and militia guerrillas and underground guerrilla and militia forces.

It is necessary to closely adhere to the principle that militia and guerrilla organizations are the masses' military organizations. Militiamen and guerrillas are both civilians and militarymen. Each party member and organization member must produce, or carry out a certain task, and must participate in the guerrilla or militia force on the basis of his condition. Every citizen must produce, along with fighting to protect production, especially in war. If there is assignment of tasks in every sector of activity in a village, but only some people participate in the guerrilla force, it is very difficult to motivate and organize the entire people to fight the aggressors. Therefore it must be realized that the militia and guerrilla forces are forces that both produce on the spot and fight on the spot. A number of cells have currently had to stop producing because of the situation. But this is temporary. In the coming period, the responsible leading echelons, on the basis of requirements and when conditions permit, must map out plans to send the cells back to carry out their tasks in their hamlets and villages.

The members of the people's organizations who have participated in guerrilla organizations but who are still assuming their responsibilities as members of the people's organizations must place themselves under the educational and operational leadership of these guerrilla organizations and, at the same time, report their achievements in annihilating the aggressors to the people's organizations. In order to strengthen the guerrilla cells quantitatively and qualitatively, and to enable them to fulfill their mission as levers in countering the enemy's pacification activities, the party members or the cadre of the mass organizations at the village level, in addition to the main tasks entrusted to them, must be admitted to the guerrilla ranks so they can engage in military training, and in combat activities when necessary.

We have recently concentrated on building and developing our guerrilla forces. However, in various localities, we are still suffering from various shortcomings. For instance, we have not yet positively built our guerrilla forces, or the guerrilla forces are still small in number and of low quality.
Meanwhile, we have also erroneously attached little importance to the abilities of the masses, especially women, and our still incorrect and narrow viewpoints vis-a-vis the militia and guerrilla organizations have not yet been severely dealt with. We must overcome all this in order to most rapidly and satisfactorily build and develop the guerrilla forces.

Our experience shows that to accomplish this we must have precise guidelines and long-range plans aimed at motivating, guiding and organizing the masses to intensively participate in various aspects of struggle and combat. On this basis, and with a determination to change the balance of forces in each hamlet and village, it is necessary to have militia forces larger than the guerrilla forces, the guerrilla force in hamlets larger than those in the villages [as heard] and, as an ultimate objective, have the people's revolutionary forces overpower the enemy's counterrevolutionary forces.

Guerrilla warfare in the southern rural areas is developing vigorously. As its forces grow, so does its strength. On all our southern battlefields, guerrilla warfare is splitting the enemy in order to annihilate or wear him down. Guerrilla warfare is firmly maintaining and developing its continuous offensive impetus and is seeking to gain mastership in each area. This is creating great strategic, operational and combat difficulties for the enemy. When the enemy concentrates his regular forces to cope with our regular forces, the guerrillas deal heavy blows from the rear and he must spread his forces thin. Because the enemy's mobile forces are scattered, our regular forces have more and more opportunities to make larger and larger troop concentrations and as a result have dealt, are dealing and will certainly deal the U.S.-puppets heavy annihilating blows and will even more seriously panic them.

From 1959 to 1965, relying on our absolute political superiority and the revolutionary masses' overpowering forces, and using the political force as a main prop, our people's war defeated the U.S. special war strategy. Following this, the enemy stubbornly continued to wage and expand the war through his limited war strategy and by using a huge U.S. expeditionary corps as the core force.

Relying mainly on people's war, our armed forces and people finally defeated the enemy.

In the present phase of implementing the Vietnamization strategy, the U.S. and satellite troops have been dealt heavy blows and have been forced to withdraw. The puppet troops are collapsing and their network of fortifications is seriously shaken. The enemy can by no means avoid complete defeat in the face of the strong development of the guerrilla warfare movement in the rural areas, our forces' stormy offensive thrusts, and the seething movement in the majority of our cities.

By closely combining political forces with military forces, the three troop categories and the offensive blows of our armed forces and people coming from three directions [as heard] and the three offensive spearheads against the enemy's pacification activities in the rural areas—in which the guerrillas serve as levers in coordination with the regular forces' concentrated combat activities and the broad struggle movement of the urban compatriots of all walks of life—we will certainly completely defeat the U.S. Vietnamization strategy in the coming days.
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