PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES
# PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS—TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES

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*This manual supersedes FM 33-5, 20 October 1966.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

1-1. Purpose
The purpose of this manual is to provide to all commanders, staffs, and advisors, as well as psychological operations (PSYOP) personnel, information and guidance concerning the techniques and procedures for the conduct of psychological operations and to augment doctrine contained in FM 33-1.

1-2. Scope
This manual is applicable to general, limited and cold war operations, which include internal defense and development (IDAD) operations. The techniques and procedures contained herein should be used in conjunction with FM 33-1, official dictionaries, and with other publications which provide guidance for field operations, operation and maintenance of equipment, and for staff organization and procedures.

1-3. Recommended Changes
Users of this manual are encouraged to submit comments or recommendations for changes to improve the manual. Comments will be keyed to the specific page, paragraph, and line of text in which the change is recommended. Reasons will be provided for each comment to insure understanding and complete evaluation. Comments will be forwarded direct to Commandant, US Army Institute for Military Assistance, ATTN: Doctrine and Training Literature Division (ATSU–CTD–DTL). Fort Bragg, North Carolina 28307.

1-4. Background
a. General. Psychological operations (PSYOP), with the broad purpose of creating a favorable image, gaining adherents and undermining opponents, has become a major weapon in 20th century warfare. As such, PSYOP has contributed to blurring the traditional concept of peace. Since World War II, psychological operations have become a major weapon in peace and war, causing peace to become simply a period of less violent war.

b. Definition. Psychological operations include psychological warfare and, in addition, encompass those political, military, economic, and ideological actions planned and conducted to create in neutral or friendly foreign groups the emotions, attitudes, or behavior to support the achievement of national objectives.

(1) Target audiences. First, PSYOP is a general concept, including three subcategories, based on the relationship between the psychological operator and his audience.

(a) Psychological warfare toward hostiles.
(b) Psychological operations toward neutrals.
(c) Psychological operations toward friendly groups.

(2) Aimed at foreign groups. Second, PSYOP are directed at foreign groups as target audiences. Economic and political warfare refer to the means used. That is, military, political, and economic actions are PSYOP when planned and used to attain psychological objectives; i.e., to influence foreign groups.

(3) Concepts. Third, PSYOP encompass at least three important concepts:

(a) PSYOP involve a variety of means of communication.
(b) The intent of these communications is to influence foreign nationals.
(c) PSYOP are directed exclusively at foreign groups.

c. Components of PSYOP. A detailed examination will clarify this connotation of PSYOP.

(1) The psychological component. "Psychological" refers to the modification of the attitudes, reasoning, and/or behavior of the target audience(s). "Psychological" also refers to the social or political structure of the audience and to group schisms, which are vulnerabilities that make audiences receptive to communications. To be effective, PSYOP require profound knowledge of the target, for the psychological makeup of audiences determines whether com-
munications beamed to them are understood and credible. Even given such knowledge, it is never safe to assume that the attempt to communicate, or the particular approach will produce the desired results. Nor can it be assumed that an attempted communication will merely fail. There is a great risk that an attempted communication will be misunderstood, to the extent of damaging the objectives of the originator. This boomerang effect is more possible in cross-cultural communication efforts. American value orientations and assumptions about the world may not be compatible with those of the target audience. A key function, therefore, of psychological operators is to determine whether, or to what degree, the approaches being used are achieving the intended results. What is said, how it is said, and to whom, may need to be adjusted to achieve the psychological objectives. This flexibility is difficult to achieve when a psychological operator lacks knowledge of the language and culture of the target audience. There is a tendency to fix on one mode of communication and a few standard themes or messages without verifying the utility of the themes, messages, or media used to communicate them. It is the intended impact that must determine and guide PSYOP approaches. Efforts that do not take into account psychological factors may be nonproductive or counterproductive. For this reason, PSYOP planning must include provisions for continuous evaluation of PSYOP themes and messages, that is, by testing, prior to and after delivery. (chap 4).

2. The operations component. An operation may be defined as a sequence of plans/activities/events directed to a specific objective. Operations may vary with respect to type, duration, and the level of the US political or military structure from which they emanate and the level of foreign hierarchies to which they are directed. Psychological operations may be planned by the person who conducts them or planned by one group and conducted by a different group. An operation may involve a single action or a program of suboperations carried out over a period of time. Operations may be verbal communications or actions. All military activities will probably have some psychological impacts. For definitive purposes, an operation should be characterized as psychological only when there is the intent to influence the attitudes or behavior of the audience. The criterion must be the intent of the psychological operator. Therefore, if psychological impacts are not considered in the planning and conduct of operations, the operations would not be psychological operations, whatever the impact. However, as the US becomes involved in lower level conflicts, it becomes increasingly important that psychological impacts be anticipated. Adverse acts by the military can have counterproductive psychological impacts which undermine the impact of planned PSYOP communications. Because of this, probable psychological impacts must be considered at every level of planning and operations.

1–5. Operational Areas and Augmentation

a. Foreign National Augmentation. US Army PSYOP units and personnel must function cross-culturally; i.e., target foreign audiences. Therefore, in order to be effective, PSYOP units require augmentation, primarily by local target nationals, or by former nationals or persons formerly resident in a target area (or among a target group) for such extended periods of time that they acquired the cultural traits of the target. Augmentation is the rule rather than the exception.

b. Knowledge of Language NOT Qualifying. Augmentation by such personnel is required because mere knowledge of a language by US military personnel does not assure the thorough understanding of a target required for effective PSYOP. Professionally, the psychological operator must have complete empathy with, and vicariously be wholly immersed into the total current environment of his target audience. His background must enable him intellectually, emotionally, and culturally to visualize the situation of the target audience from their point of view, situation, and conditions. He must know his target audience thoroughly.

c. Spectrum of Requirements. The spectrum of requirements for foreign augmentation will range from researchers, professional communicators, engineers, and artists; through qualified translators/interpreters, technicians, artisans, maintenance service personnel; to semiskilled and unskilled laborers, etc.

d. Role of Foreign Personnel in Processing Material. Virtually all propaganda material will filter through foreign augmentation personnel from the time the raw material is received as unprocessed information, through the processing stages, to final presentation to the target, whether as propaganda deeds, face-to-face communication, audio, visual, audiovisual, or printed propaganda. These requirements are true for the entire spectrum of conflict and PSYOP activities (strategic, tactical, IDAD, UW, or advisory-training-assistance, etc.)

e. Security Clearance. Ideally, and normally, foreign augmentation personnel must be vetted
and approved by appropriate security organizations. However, circumstances may arise when personnel may be hired who do not possess desired security qualifications. The US psychological operator must be aware of this environment.

f. Allegiance. In addition, the psychological operator must constantly keep in mind that foreign augmentation personnel owe primary allegiance to their own country, political entity, region, ethnic group, culture, and self-interest. It should be expected that such allegiance will take precedence over that given to the United States. Normally, allegiance to the United States will extend to those areas, and to the extent, that US interests coincide with those to which the foreign augmentation personnel give primary allegiance. This may best be summarized by a statement of a foreign employee: "... after all, you Americans must realize that I must live and work here after you are long gone."

g. Identifying With United States. Conversely, some local national augmentation personnel may take on a US orientation (coloring); i.e., identify primarily with their US employers, thereby losing their local perspective, perceiving the local target audience from a pseudo-US point of view. The work of such personnel will lose its original accuracy and authenticity. The US Army psychological operator must be alert to, and cope with, this situation.

h. The Aim to Please. A third, not uncommon, situation is that in which foreign augmentation personnel attempt to “please” the US Army psychological operator by producing work, or a propaganda product, that they believe will be pleasant to their US employer, regardless of its authenticity or potential effectiveness.

i. Duties and Responsibilities. The use of foreign augmentation personnel, even in the most sensitive and important positions and duties, does not relieve the US Army psychological operator of any of his supervisory responsibilities or duties to perform his assigned tasks and accomplish his missions.

j. Constant Evaluation Required. Use of foreign augmentation personnel requires continuing, independent evaluation and cross-checking to assure that themes are appropriate, symbols correctly interpreted, cultural factors accurately evaluated and placed in proper perspective, and that messages are relevant to the frame of reference of the target audience and the PSYOP mission.

1–6. History

a. The Greeks. As indicated above, psychological operations are not new. One of the earliest examples is recorded by Herodotus, a Greek historian, who described the war between the Greeks and Persians. Themistocles, a Greek leader attempting to separate the Ionian and Carian allies of the Persians from the naval forces, took some of his fastest ships and raced ahead of the Persian fleet to watering places along the coast. At each watering place he had inscriptions cut into the rocks to be read by the Ionians on their arrival. The inscription appealed to the Ionians not to “fight against your own fathers” but to come over to the Greek side.

"If you cannot do this, then, we pray you, stand aloof from the contest yourselves and persuade the Carians to do likewise. If neither of these things be possible, and you are hindered, by a force too strong to resist, from venturing upon desertion, at least when we come to blows, fight backwardly..." Herodotus describes Themistocles’ efforts as being twofold; either Xerxes (the Persian leader) would not discover the inscriptions “in which case they might bring over the Ionians to the side of the Greeks; or they would be reported to him and made a ground of accusation against the Ionians, who would thereupon be distrusted, and not allowed to take part in the sea fights.” Similar appeals to “venture upon desertion” and “fight backwardly” are used in psychological operations today in an effort to weaken the will to resist and to sow discord among enemy troops.

b. The Hebrews. The bible recounts the successful use of pitchers, lamps, and noise by Gideon in the battle against the Midianites to create panic among his enemy by suggesting he had superior numerical strength when the opposite was true.

c. The Chinese. The first known writing on the subject originated in the fiftieth century B.C. when Sun Tzu, a Chinese military strategist, stressed the value of destroying the enemy’s will to fight, through surprise, noise, rumors of treason in high places, and assassination.

d. The Romans. The Roman Emperor, Nero, attempted to undermine the growth of Christianity by the calculated use of rumor. Genghis Khan eased the conquering rush of his army by spreading rumors exaggerating the strength and ferocity of his troops, “like the grasshoppers, impossible to be numbered, who feed upon wolves, bears, and dogs.”

e. The Thirteen Colonies. Psychological techniques have been used by the United States throughout its history. The Declaration of Independence which opens with these words, “With a decent respect to the opinions of mankind,” was and continues to be a brilliant and
effective propaganda instrument justifying revolution. In military operations during the Revolutionary War, the colonists resorted to psychological warfare techniques against the British. Leaflets, emphasizing class differences separating officers and enlisted men in the British forces, were disseminated at Bunker Hill by the revolutionaries. Propaganda appeals to the German mercenaries fighting for the British were prepared at the suggestion of General Washington.

f. The United States Civil War. During the Civil War, the Federal Government sent agents abroad to plead its cause. In England this plea was supported by the Union sending a shipload of foodstuffs to mitigate the suffering of unemployed textile workers in London. Not unlike the Declaration of Independence, Abraham Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation was issued at a time calculated to produce the greatest possible impact on selected audiences.

Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points manifesto was a powerful propaganda instrument for the Allies in the latter days of World War I. The Allied and Central Powers major propaganda efforts attempted to win new friends and prevent the neutral nations from joining the enemy. In the trenches, the American Expeditionary Forces focused on combat propaganda appeals emphasizing food for hungry men.

h. Post-World War I. The post-World War I period gave a new impetus to propaganda as an instrument to help achieve national and international objectives. Lenin and Hitler used propaganda to gain and solidify their positions at home and abroad. They gave a modern cloak to this weapon to justify their schemes of aggression, including the subversion of other governments. They made use of methods and techniques derived from the social sciences and joined them with the accelerated development of all media of communications to give the weapon its formidable power.

i. World War II. World War II brought improvement in the organization, personnel selection, and operations of propaganda as an adjunct of US foreign policy and military operations.

1. Outbreak of hostilities. At the outbreak of hostilities the meager propaganda efforts of the United States were concentrated in the Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs (CIAA) and the Office of the Coordinator of Information (OCI). These were absorbed or replaced by the Office of War Information (OWI) and the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) early in 1942, with responsibilities for overt and covert PSYOP respectively.

2. Psychological Warfare Section, SHAEF. Military propaganda responsibilities brought into being the Psychological Warfare Section, Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF). The mission of this office was to:

(a) Wage psychological warfare against the enemy.

(b) Sustain the morale of friendly nations occupied by the enemy, and to cause the people of these countries to acquiesce in the wishes of the Supreme Commander.

(c) To conduct "consolidation" propaganda operations in liberated friendly countries.

(d) Control information services in Allied-occupied Germany.

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Post-World War I. The post-World War I period gave a new impetus to propaganda as an instrument to help achieve national and international objectives. Lenin and Hitler used propaganda to gain and solidify their positions at home and abroad. They gave a modern cloak to this weapon to justify their schemes of aggression, including the subversion of other governments. They made use of methods and techniques derived from the social sciences and joined them with the accelerated development of all media of communications to give the weapon its formidable power.

World War II. World War II brought improvement in the organization, personnel selection, and operations of propaganda as an adjunct of US foreign policy and military operations.

1. Outbreak of hostilities. At the outbreak of hostilities the meager propaganda efforts of the United States were concentrated in the Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs (CIAA) and the Office of the Coordinator of Information (OCI). These were absorbed or replaced by the Office of War Information (OWI) and the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) early in 1942, with responsibilities for overt and covert PSYOP respectively.

2. Psychological Warfare Section, SHAEF. Military propaganda responsibilities brought into being the Psychological Warfare Section, Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF). The mission of this office was to:

(a) Wage psychological warfare against the enemy.

(b) Sustain the morale of friendly nations occupied by the enemy, and to cause the people of these countries to acquiesce in the wishes of the Supreme Commander.

(c) To conduct "consolidation" propaganda operations in liberated friendly countries.

(d) Control information services in Allied-occupied Germany.

Within the Allied-occupied Germany. At the outbreak of hostilities the meager propaganda efforts of the United States were concentrated in the Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs (CIAA) and the Office of the Coordinator of Information (OCI). These were absorbed or replaced by the Office of War Information (OWI) and the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) early in 1942, with responsibilities for overt and covert PSYOP respectively.

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Psychological Operations support for pacification came under the supervision of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Civil Operations and Rural Development Support (CORDS).

(4) Single manager concept. To insure unity of effort, the National PSYOP Plans for the US and Vietnamese were coordinated at the national level. Psychological operations coordinating committees were organized at region and province to avoid conflict. The doctrines of centralized policy guidance, decentralized execution, and single manager were adopted. This meant that all policy guidance stemmed from one source, but individual discretion was allowed at subordinate levels. The Commander, United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) controlled and directed, through a single manager, all PSYOP and psychological advisory activities conducted by MACV elements. Field force commanders/senior advisors extended the single manager concept to the lowest operating level.

(5) Technological advances. Technological advances increased the potential for PSYOP during tactical situations. Standardized propaganda, developed at the national level by JUSPAO, was available to tactical units. Master catalogues of themes were distributed to PSYOP units and, upon request, were made into leaflets and disseminated. Prepackaged contingency tapes were available for use in tactical PSYOP support. These contingency materials allowed a wide range of PSYOP alternatives essential to rapid exploitation of the psychological situation. Vietnam marked the first use of television as an instrument of strategic propaganda. Other innovative PSYOP devices included careful control of news and information on the internal radio and television networks, broadcasts to the North by the “Voice of Freedom,” magazines targeted at groups in the South, and the use of armed propaganda teams (composed of former enemy soldiers who returned to control of the RVN). Finally, a small handmade adapter named, “Early Word,” made possible airborne transmission of PSYOP appeals directly from a ground-based, tactical radio, through an aircraft mounted loudspeaker system. A radio signal received by the aircraft could be simultaneously taped in the aircraft for further replay. Tactical limitations of this apparatus were dependent only on the range of the ground transmitter (Early Word, chap 5).

(6) Since World War II, the major PSYOP efforts of the United States have been in the hands of the Department of State, and, subsequently, the USIA, which includes the Voice of America (VOA) radio broadcasting operation. (a) Primary responsibility. The USIA has primary responsibility for these programs.

(b) Policy guidance. Foreign policy guidance flows to the agency, as it does to all parts of the executive branch, from the President and the Department of State.

(c) The USIA director. The USIA director also participates in making the foreign information policies of the executive branch. He or his deputies meet regularly with the President and White House staff officers, and with the Secretary of State and other State Department officials. He participates in meetings of the National Security Council Senior Review Group, the Under Secretaries Committee, and responsible civilian advisory groups. Under congressional supervision and controls, he is responsive to the President's established psychological objectives.

(7) PSYOP in politico-military affairs. The foregoing points up the broadening impact of psychological factors in human activity, particularly in international and politico-military affairs. If used intelligently, valuable results can be achieved. This manual is intended to help provide understanding to the military commander who must come to know this weapon, psychological operations, which daily affects him, his troops, his mission, and his country's purpose.
CHAPTER 2
CONCEPT OF PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

Section I. ROLE OF PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

2-1. Introduction
Psychological operations are one of the tools available to a commander to assist him in accomplishing his mission. This chapter will discuss the role of PSYOP, the responsibilities of non-PSYOP unit commanders and soldiers in the attainment of PSYOP objectives, and the environmental background information that must be understood.

2-2. Role of PSYOP
   a. General. Psychological operations assist the commander by persuading target audiences to behave in a desired manner. Psychological operations personnel must insure that their efforts support and complement planned operations and that recommendations and advice are given to the commander regarding the psychological effects of planned operations.
      (1) Demoralize and undermine. Psychological operations attempt to demoralize the enemy soldier or hostile civilian, to undermine his cause, and to develop attitudes that will support behavior favorable to the friendly commander’s mission.
      (2) Keep friends. Friendly civilians, whether in friendly or hostile territory, must be kept friendly and assured of the eventual victory of the side they support.
      (3) The uncommitted civilian. Psychological operations must develop in the uncommitted civilian the necessary attitudes and behavior to support the friendly side.
      (4) Means of attaining objectives. These objectives are attained by propaganda and actions with psychological impact.
   b. Mission. US Army PSYOP, planned and conducted in support of military operations, support the attainment of US national objectives abroad.
   c. Capabilities.
      (1) Use of media. Psychological operations provide communication with target groups through use of such media (individually or combined) as printed material, radio, television, loudspeakers, motion pictures, and face-to-face communication. Messages may be transmitted by overt or covert means to effect desired changes in attitudes and, ultimately, behavior.
      (2) Targets. The primary targets of PSYOP are groups, such as political, social, economic, religious, military, and intellectual elites; also farmers, laborers, white collar workers, government employees, members of military forces, etc.
      (3) Purpose. Psychological operations attempt to influence foreign policy decision, the determination of military missions, ability to govern, ability to command, will to obey and support, and the will to fight.
      (4) PSYOP in support of political objectives. In the area of foreign policy, PSYOP may have the mission of supporting political objectives, gaining the support and cooperation of neutral countries, strengthening or weakening alliances, deterring a nation from aggression, and bringing about the final capitulation of an enemy nation.
      (5) Military PSYOP capabilities. Joined with the persuasive psychological pressures generated by combat situations, military PSYOP can assist in accomplishing the following:
         (a) Depress enemy morale. Sustained use of PSYOP can produce a cumulative depressing effect upon the morale of enemy units and the civilian population by stressing unfair treatment of ethnic groups and minorities, or by exploiting the deteriorating situation of the enemy.
         (b) Reduce combat efficiency. Consistent psychological attacks upon morale, integrated with other military operations, can lower the combat efficiency of enemy soldiers by reporting on the growing power of the Allied forces, the low civilian morale in the enemy country, destruction of the enemy in dustrial capacity, and enemy military defeats.
         (c) Encourage defection. Enemy soldiers subjected to PSYOP over extended periods can
be induced to malinger, surrender, desert, or refrain from last ditch resistance.

d) Deceive. Psychological operations can be used to support deception plans of the commander; e.g., to convey deceptive intelligence. However, no deceptions will be conducted which are contrary to the law of war; e.g., broadcasting falsely that an armistice or cease fire has been agreed upon.

(6) Positive effects. Psychological operations may be used to achieve the following positive effects, among others:

(a) Direct and encourage dissident elements. Psychological operations can sustain the morale of dissident elements in enemy territory, and may be used to direct the activities of such elements against the enemy war effort.

(b) Encourage friendly populations. Psychological operations can be used to gain the confidence of friendly populations under enemy control, to sustain their morale, and to direct passive or active activities against the enemy war effort.

(c) Promote good will. Informative and good will programs can be directed toward neutral nations within a theater of operations to win active or moral support for the United States and its Allies.

d. Limitations.

(1) Enemy countermeasures. The effectiveness of PSYOP is limited by the ability of the enemy to use all available means and media in effective countermeasures.

(2) Incomplete information. Accurate knowledge of all factors affecting the target audience situation is not usually available to intelligence agencies, thereby restricting the number of exploitable vulnerabilities.

(3) Difficulty of evaluation. Stringent enemy restrictions on news, public discussion, and travel limit the information available to evaluate effectiveness.

(4) Lack of coordination. Failure to effect coordination between military and civilian PSYOP agencies will provide the enemy with opportunities for effective counterpropaganda and limit the effectiveness of a message or campaign.

(5) Lack of qualified personnel. Effective PSYOP require imaginative personnel with an intimate knowledge of the language of the target audience, and of the political, economic, social, and ideological conditions of its society. These persons are difficult to obtain.

(6) Law of War. In addition to the above limitations, the user is limited in his actions by the proscriptions listed in FM 27-10 that set forth the various laws of war contained in the Hague Conventions, Hague Regulations, Geneva Convenant for the Protection of War Victims, and other sources. The prohibitions are affirmative proscriptions which constrain the actions of the United States in conflict situations and which must be observed by its military personnel.

2-3. Employment of Psychological Operations

a. Strategic PSYOP. Strategic PSYOP are generally designed to further broad or long-term aims in coordination with general strategic planning with gradual results realizable in the indefinite future. They are directed at enemy troops and civilians behind the combat zones, or in any enemy, friendly, or neutral country.

(1) Objectives.

(a) To support and explain a nation's political policies, aims, and objectives.

(b) To relate those policies and aims to the aspirations of the target audience, where practical.

(c) To arouse public opinion or political pressures for or against a military operation.

(d) To influence the design of enemy strategy and tactics.

(e) To support economic and other non-violent forms of sanctions against an enemy.

(f) To stimulate dissension between enemy military and political elites.

(g) To undermine confidence in enemy leadership and war aims.

(h) To lower the morale and efficiency of enemy soldiers and civilians, seeking a reflection of lower morale and efficiency in the combat zone.

(i) To encourage disaffection in the enemy nation on the part of religious, ethnic, social, political, economic, and other elements having grievances against the government or against each other.

(j) To interfere with control systems or with communications.

(k) To elicit the moral or active support of neutral nations or perhaps to insure continued neutrality.

(l) To make friendly leaders stronger and enemy leaders weaker.

(m) To give hope and moral support to resistance elements in the enemy area.

(n) To support a counterelite.

(o) To gain support in newly liberated areas.

(p) To augment or complement tactical propaganda operations.

(2) Attainment of objectives. Conditions aiding the successful attainment of strategic
psychological objectives include—
(a) Military successes of friendly forces.
(b) Shortages of food, housing, clothing, and other necessities on the enemy homefront.
(c) Graft and corruption among enemy leaders.
(d) Manpower shortages in the enemy's military.
(e) Enemy country inflation and unequal and exorbitant taxation.
(f) Enemy country racial and religious intolerance.
(g) Political disunity and lack of confidence in enemy leaders.
(h) Lack of resources to support the enemy economy and the war programs.
(i) Enemy police state practices, including terrorism, midnight arrests, censorship, and travel restrictions.

b. Tactical PSYOP. Psychological operations are prepared and executed in combat areas in direct support of tactical operations.

(1) Objectives.
(a) To lower the enemy's morale and combat efficiency.
(b) To increase the psychological impact of combat weapons.
(c) To confuse the enemy.
(d) To facilitate the occupation of enemy areas by delivering ultimatums and giving rally or surrender directions.
(e) To support strategic PSYOP by furnishing more detailed and timely knowledge of local vulnerabilities which may be used in strategic plans and operations.
(f) To give information and directions to friendly elements operating in the enemy combat zone.
(g) To give specific and direct support to tactical commanders on short notice.
(h) To build a favorable image of our soldiers and leaders.

(2) Limitations. The limitations of tactical psychological operations include—
(a) Lack of specific intelligence on short notice.
(b) Changes in an exploitable psychological situation before the message can be brought to the enemy.
(c) Static situations where no forward progress is being made. These are difficult to exploit, but are less difficult than those situations in which friendly forces are on the defensive.

(3) Success of objectives. Some conditions which can contribute to the success of tactical psychological operations objectives are—
(a) Numerous enemy defeats and high casualties.
(b) Heavy and effective artillery or air bombardment.
(c) Precarious enemy military situations.
(d) Insufficient or inferior enemy supplies and equipment.
(e) Inexperienced or unqualified enemy officers.
(f) Bad news from the enemy home front.
(g) Excessive periods of combat for enemy troops.
(h) Ethnic or political minorities forced into combat against their will.
(i) Over age, inexperienced, or untrained troops and leaders.
(j) Soldiers poorly indoctrinated in their nation's ideology.
(k) Epidemics and lack of adequate medical services.

2–4. Propaganda

a. Propaganda is any information, ideas, doctrines, or special appeals in support of national objectives, designed to influence the opinions, emotions, attitudes, or behavior of any specified group in order to benefit the sponsor. The propagandist must closely coordinate with other members of the staff. To fail to do so could result in disjointed activities and propaganda that might hinder accomplishment of the mission. The first goal of propaganda is to achieve credibility. Propaganda will not be effective if the source and content are not credible to the target audience. The audience must be persuaded to trust the source of the propaganda. The source attains credibility by transmitting “truthful” messages, as perceived by the target audience. The statements must be verifiable or known to the target. Successful propaganda is credible and persuasive.

(1) Use of symbols. In its broadest sense,
propaganda is the technique of influencing human action, primarily by the manipulation of representations (symbols). These representations may be spoken, written, pictorial, or musical. It focuses its attention on the exposition of a particular doctrine and, if effectively employed, does it so intensely that it deliberately closes the mind to all but one course of action—the desired one.

(2) Education and information. Fundamentally, propaganda is communication, in common with education and information. But, it is distinguishable from both education and information. Education opens the mind to all alternatives and does not insist upon action. Information is the objective collection and representation of facts, although all information is selective.

(3) Purpose of propaganda. Propaganda attempts to influence an audience, whether it is enemy soldiers, guerrillas, civilians, neutral or friendly. Propaganda fits within the cultural context of the audience and avoids direct attacks on the core beliefs and traditions cherished by the audience.

(4) Psychological pressure. The essential ingredients needed to structure the peculiar psychological environment which will bring about a desired response by a selected group are psychological pressure and a potentially receptive target.

(5) Must offer an honorable solution. In combat, propaganda is most effectively addressed to the men who would never surrender, but who might submit to capture if the situation were hopeless for them. It is the job of the propagandist to offer a means of fulfilling the propaganda recommendations which appear to be honorable to the target.

(6) US propaganda emphasizes truth. United States propaganda seeks to create or strengthen a favorable image by emphasizing truth and credibility. Propagandists emphasize the real, suggested, or alleged weaknesses of the opponent, seeking to win over a target audience or, at least, to insure that it does not join the opponent.

(7) The task of the propagandist. Broadly, the task of the propagandist is to intensify attitudes and behavior favorable to his purpose, and to reverse obstructive attitudes and behavior.

(8) The key to successful propaganda. The key to successful propaganda is presenting truths which are required by the psychological operator, and which are credible and unrecognized as propaganda by the target audience.

b. Gaining, Holding, and Influencing the Audience. In order to achieve effective results, the propagandist must gain, hold; and influence the audience.

(1) Gaining an audience. The mass communicator is faced with numerous obstacles in attracting an audience. These problems are magnified for the military propagandist, who, except in consolidation and IDAD operations, generally must attempt to reach a noncaptive or hostile audience.

(a) Enemy resistance. Normally, the enemy will exercise some control over the target audience, and will seek to defeat a propaganda campaign. The enemy regime will have some popular support, if only that of the hard core of the ruling hierarchy. Regardless of previous attitudes, the enemy population will become hostile as a result of war. There will be hostility and suspicion toward anything foreign, particularly propaganda. Steps will be taken to prevent the reception of propaganda. Sanctions will be imposed against those who listen to or read enemy propaganda, or rewards may be offered for turning in leaflets or other printed material. However, while such measures tend to decrease the audience, they also serve to inform the public that the propaganda is worthy of interest, and may arouse feeling of doubt toward the target regime.

(b) Overcoming resistance. The most important factor in overcoming resistance to propaganda is a thorough knowledge of the audience. Without it the propagandist cannot establish rapport. This requires exhaustive study of the history and current background of the target audience.

(2) Holding an audience. Once the target audience has come into contact with friendly propaganda, it must be made a regular consumer. It must be induced to overcome its distrust before it can be open to influence. To overcome this distrust is to convince the target of the truth of what the propagandist says. Here again, knowledge of the target audience is a prerequisite, but certain specialized techniques are also important.

(3) Influencing the audience. In attempts to weaken enemy fighting effectiveness, the propagandist seeks to divide the forces opposing him. He exploits any enemy weaknesses, such as, ill feeling between frontline soldiers and civilians, or rivalries among enemy groups. When these weak points cannot be attacked openly and directly, the propagandist must resort to insinuation. He increases frictions within the enemy camp and tries to produce disunity. Before the propagandist can encour-
age dissension among the enemy, he must first determine the vulnerabilities. If the propagandist does not have accurate intelligence reports, or, if he does not interpret these reports correctly, he risks failure. After the nature of enemy vulnerabilities have been uncovered, the propagandist exploits them. He raises a suspicion, wherever possible, and enlarges it into strong distrust. He encourages distrust, until it results in active manifestations of diuinity in the enemy camp. He tries to create dissension indirectly, by the use of insinuation.

c. Effectiveness of Propaganda Techniques. Unfortunately, propaganda techniques will not always guarantee success. Though such techniques are frequently successful in politics and advertising, their effectiveness, when applied to foreign audiences, can be determined only after employment and evaluation.

d. The Limitations of Propaganda. Psychological operations must also be understood in relation to the limits which are imposed on them.

(1) Political limitations. Propaganda is dependent on politics, even for such frontline requirements as "definition of the enemy." Domestic national policy or other considerations may prevent removal of these limitations. Unanimous agreement among allied powers even in the most general terms is seldom obtainable on policies affecting their national interest and future freedom of action. Conflicting requirements of other agencies of government operating abroad, and military necessity, make policy uncertain and can result in courses of action which reduce credibility and good will.

(2) Security. Security restrictions may limit the use or timing of certain propaganda themes and messages.

(3) Media. Media are the means by which propaganda is conveyed. Because each medium has limitations, the propagandist seeks to increase his effectiveness by an optimum mix of media and targets.

(4) Audience. Audiences are seldom predisposed to believe that the motives of the propagandist are compatible with their interests and, because of differing backgrounds, do not respond to the same line of persuasion. Their means to see or hear the foreigner are limited. Therefore, as the enemy regime has in its own land greater access to its people, its efforts to prevent the foreign propagandist from influencing them are more effective. Moreover, an enemy which has developed extensive political party and security police organizations controls resources for persuasion and coercion which are difficult to counter.

(5) Personnel. Finally, as in any operation, success depends most of all on the availability and proper use of qualified personnel.

2-5. Propaganda Techniques

a. General. There are a number of propaganda techniques which can be employed in propaganda production. These techniques may be used as aids in the effective presentation of propaganda appeals.

b. Glittering Generalities.

(1) Glittering or favorable generalities are words or phrases so closely associated with commonly accepted ideas or beliefs that they carry conviction in themselves, without benefit of reason or supporting information. They appeal to such emotions as love of home, a sense of honor, generosity, desire for freedom, etc. They are composed of "virtue" words such as peace, honor, right, and freedom. They ask for approval without looking into the reason.

(2) By means of glittering or favorable generalities, the propagandist identifies his program with the sense of virtue. The words and phrases which he uses are vague and may suggest different things to different people. Their connotations, however, are always favorable. Glittering generalities may be employed in the following ways:

(a) Transfer. Glittering generalities evoke an emotional response which stimulates the reader to identify himself and his opinions with recognized authorities.

(b) Vagueness. Glittering generalities are deliberately vague so that the target audience may provide its own interpretation. The intent is to move the audience by the use of undefined phrases without seeking detailed explanations.

(c) Rationalization. Individuals or groups may use favorable generalities to rationalize questionable actions or beliefs. The use of vague and pleasant phrases often serve to justify such actions and beliefs.

(d) Simplification. Favorable generalities provide simple answers for complex social or political or economic problems.

(3) Glittering generalities may gain or lose effectiveness with change in social, political, or economic conditions. Overuse may create cliches that are of no propaganda value. They must be synchronized to current conditions, as phrases which call up pleasant associations at one time may evoke unfavorable connotations after their frame of reference has been substantially altered.

c. Testimonial. The testimonial device is an attempt to place the official sanction of a respected authority on a propaganda message. This is done in an effort to cause the target
audience to identify itself with the authority or to accept the authority’s opinions and beliefs as its own. This device is commonly employed in commercial advertising where a popular personality endorses the product of an advertiser.

(1) Official sanction. The testimonial authority must have officially given the endorsement attributed to him or she must be clearly on the record as having approved of the object, idea, or belief attributed to him.

(2) Respected authority. The authority must be respected by the target audience. Four factors bear upon this problem:

(a) Accomplishment. People place confidence in an authority who has demonstrated outstanding ability and proficiency in his field. This accomplishment, however, must be related to the subject of the testimonial.

(b) Identity with target. People have greater confidence in an authority with whom they have a common bond. The soldier, for example, will more readily trust another soldier who, presumably, has undergone similar experiences.

(c) Position of authority. The official position of the authority may instill confidence in the testimonial. The propagandist will frequently use statements by high enemy officials where those statements support his purposes.

(d) Attributes of the authority. Inanimate objects may be used in the testimonial device. In such cases, the propagandist seeks to transfer his physical attributes to the message. The Rock of Gibraltar, for example, is a type inanimate object associated by some with strength.

(3) Source of authority. Five principal sources of testimonial authorities are—

(a) Enemy leaders. The enemy is more likely to believe the statements of his own leaders as a source of information.

(b) Fellow soldiers. Because of their common experience, soldiers form a bond of comradeship. As a result, men in the service are inclined to listen carefully to what their comrades-in-arms have to say.

(c) Friendly leaders. Testimonials by leaders of the opposing nation are of particular value in messages that outline war aims and objectives or plans for administering the enemy nation after it capitulates.

(d) Famous scholars, writers, and other personalities. Frequently, statements of nonbelligerents and nonmilitary persons known to the target can be effectively employed in propaganda messages.

(e) Nonpersonal authorities. Institutions, ideologies, national flags, religious, and other nonpersonal sources are often used. The creeds, beliefs, principles, or dogmas of respected authorities may make effective propaganda testimonials to transfer persuasion.

(4) Plausibility. The testimonial must be at least plausible to the target audience. The esteem in which the authority is held by the target audience will not transform an implausible testimonial into effective propaganda messages.

(5) False testimonials. False testimonials should never be used. Testimonials may be highly selective but not fabricated. Fabricated testimonials are ineffective because they lack authenticity and they are vulnerable.

d. Simplification. Simplification is a device in which the subject matter of propaganda is reduced to clear, concise statements that are credible to the target audience. It is used to make complex subjects appear uncomplicated and easy to understand by offering simplified interpretations of events, ideas, or personalities which appear wholly right and virtuous. Qualifying words such as “almost” and “more or less” are never used in connection with the simplification device. Statements must be firm and positive. Many persons are specialists in one field of activity and have a detailed knowledge of the techniques and vocabulary of this main subject, but the limitations of time and energy force them to turn to simplification in order to understand other areas of human activity. The following are the characteristics of simplification:

(1) It thinks for others. Some people accept information which they cannot verify personally as long as the source is acceptable to them or the authority is considered an expert. Others absorb whatever they read or hear with little discrimination. In addition, some people are too lazy or too unconcerned to think problems through for themselves. Therefore, they accept convenient substitutes.

(2) It is concise. Simplification gives the impression of going to the heart of the matter in a few words. The propagandist uses this characteristic to make his simple, concise statement appear authentic so that the average member of the target audience will not even consider that there may be another answer to the problem or another side to the story.

(3) It builds ego. Some people are reluctant to believe that any field of endeavor, except possibly their own, is difficult to understand. A layman, for example, is pleased to hear that “law is just common sense dressed up in fancy language,” or that “modern art is really a hodgepodge of aimless experiment.” This reinforces his ego. It is what he would like to believe because he is inwardly afraid that law and mod-
ern art may actually be beyond his understanding. He needs easy explanations of complicated problems and subjects.

e. Plain Folks. The "plain folks" or "common man" device is designed to win the confidence of an audience by talking or writing in the manner or style used by that audience. The propagandist uses ordinary language when he wants to identify his point of view with the average man. With the plain folks device, the propagandist can win the confidence of persons who resent or distrust "foreignsounding," "intellectual" talk. It is a useful device for the following reasons:

(1) Identification. The propagandist attempts to make the audience identify its interest with his points of view. By speaking or writing in the manner of the target audience, he tries to establish a common bond that will help transfer its sympathies to his side thereby making his message more believable.

(2) Presenting soldiers as plain folks. The propagandist wants to make the enemy feel that he is fighting against soldiers who are "decent, everyday folks," much like himself, and countering themes indicating the opponents are "blood-thirsty killers."

(3) Presenting civilians as plain folks. The above description applies to civilians as well. The "plain folks" or "common man" device can help convince the enemy that the opposing nation is not composed of "arrogant," "immoral," or "deceitful" people, but rather of persons not unlike himself wishing to live a peaceful life with everyone.

(4) Humanizing leaders. "Plain folks" can paint a more human portrait of our military or civilian leaders to counteract false impressions created by enemy propaganda.

(5) Categories of plain folks device.

(a) Vernacular. Vernacular is the language of a specific area or country as it is popularly spoken or written; it includes slang, idioms, and jokes. The propagandist must use accurate and up-to-date vernacular for a given group. If the vernacular is used, it must be consistent with the speech of the area in which it is used and with the type of audience to which it is directed.

(b) Dialect. Dialect is a variation in pronunciation and accent from the norm of a region or nation. In propaganda, dialect is almost entirely spoken. Spoken dialect must be completely accurate, however, because the audience will be quick to detect deficiencies in tone and accent.

(c) Speech errors. Perfect pronunciation, enunciation, and delivery suggest that what the speaker has to say has been carefully planned. To give the impression of spontaneity, some speakers deliberately hesitate between phrases, stammer, or mispronounce words. When not overdone, the effect is one of deep sincerity in presentation. Errors in written material may be used only when they are commonly committed by the members of the reading audience.

(d) Homey words. Homey words are forms of "virtue" words used in the everyday life of the average man. These words are common, familiar ones such as "home," "family," "children," "farm," and "neighbors." These words evoke an emotionally favorable response from the listener or reader and help transfer his sympathies to the propagandist's message. Homey words are widely used in evoking nostalgia on the part of the enemy.

(6) Dangers in use of plain folks.

(a) The propagandist must take extreme care to conceal the use of this device. If it lacks naturalness, if the audience recognizes that it is a device, resentment is certain to follow.

(b) If the plain folks technique is to be effective, it must have a subject that will serve as a credible basis. There must be some factor in a man's personality, his background, or in his experience that can be used as a basis for the foundation of this idea. Without such a logical basis, the device loses its authenticity.

(c) The opinions and ideas of the audience concerning our leaders must be taken into account. The propagandist should attribute to our leaders those qualities the enemy admires in a leader.

f. Card-Stacking. "Card-stacking" or "selective omission" is a device describing the selection and presentation of those facts that most effectively strengthen and authenticate a particular point of view. It includes the collection of all available material pertaining to the subject and the selection from this material of those portions which most effectively support the propaganda. The propagandist's success or failure in gaining a favorable audience reaction will depend on how successful he has been in selecting his facts or "cards" and presenting or "stacking" them in his favor. "Card-stacking" is used to place the allied effort in a favorable light, the enemy's in an unfavorable light, and to contrast the two as "white" and "black," "good" and "evil."

(1) Use.

(a) Card-stacking. The propagandist uses "card-stacking" or "selective omission" to present his aims in the best possible light and to degrade those of the enemy. In those rare cases when the enemy's propaganda must be directly
countered, the propagandist uses this device to rebut enemy statements.

(b) Increasing prestige. In time of war, leading personalities, economic systems, and other institutions making up a nation are constantly subjected to propaganda attacks by the enemy. "Card-stacking" is used to counter these attacks by publicizing and reiterating our best qualities.

(c) Other uses. Like most propaganda methods, "card-stacking" is used to supplement other methods. Thus, "selective omission" may be used to simplify propaganda tasks, describing the subject in black and white themes, and to provide simple answers to complicated subjects.

(2) Selecting facts. An intelligent propagandist makes his case by imaginative selection of his facts and does not mix falsehood and truth. His opponents can challenge his conclusions and his opinions, but they cannot refute his facts. The "card-stacker" operates on a bed-rock of facts. His work is divided into two main phases: first, the propagandist selects certain facts and presents these facts to the target audience in such manner as to create a favorable mental reaction; second, the propagandist uses these facts as a basis for his conclusions, trying to lead his audience into accepting his conclusions by accepting his facts.

(3) Presenting the other side. Some persons in a target audience realize that neither belligerent is entirely virtuous. To them, propaganda that deals solely in terms of right and wrong, may not be credible. Obvious defects should be reported if only to reinforce credibility. Another use of "presenting the other side" is an effort to reduce the impact of propaganda that opposing propagandists are likely to use in their "card-stacking." Presenting the adverse material in the best possible way with rebuttals may preclude its widespread use by enemy propagandists or, at least, lessen the enemy impact.

g. Bandwagon or "Inevitable Victory." This is a device reinforcing people's natural desire to be on the winning side. In conflict situations, the propagandist generally will use it in an effort to convince his audience that his program is an expression of the irresistible mass movement. This is aimed at motivating an individual's tendency to follow mass public opinion. In his attempt to persuade the mass to act together, the propagandist also tries to reduce the target to manageable proportions. The "inevitable victory" device is used to—

(1) Secure new adherents. Those not already on the "bandwagon" are invited to climb aboard. Why be left out?

(2) Consolidation. Those already on or partially on the bandwagon are reassured that climbing and staying aboard is the correct thing to do.

(3) Secure disapproval. The propagandist uses the device to get his audience to disapprove of ideas as well as to approve of them. He may suggest that an idea is popular with groups hated or feared by the target audience. Thus, if individuals who supported a certain policy were led to believe that undesirable or subversive elements also approve it, they might decide to change their position.

h. Insinuation. Insinuation is used to create or stir up suspicions of the target audience against certain ideas, groups, or individuals in order to divide the enemy. The propagandist seeks to shift the enemy's hatred by suggesting that the blame for their problems rests on their leader. He suggests, hints, and implies, but he allows them to draw their own conclusions. He uncovers latent suspicions within the enemy nation and tries to structure them into active expressions of disunity which weaken the enemy's war effort.

1) Exploitable vulnerabilities. Potential cleavages in the enemy camp which may be exploited by the use of insinuation or other techniques include—

(a) Political differences between the enemy nation and its allies or satellites.

(b) Ethnic differences separating one region from another.

(c) Religious, political, or ethnic grievances.

(d) History of civilian animosity toward combat soldiers.

(e) Comforts available to rear echelon soldiers and kept from combat soldiers.

(f) People against hierarchy.

(g) Political differences between the ruling elite, between coalition members or between rulers and the party/faction/group out of power.

(h) Economic differences, showing a few benefitting at the expense of the general populace.

(i) Unequal or inequitable tax burdens, or the high level of taxes. Inform the target of hidden taxes.

(j) The scarcity of consumer goods and their availability to the dishonest, the rich, and other elites.

(k) Costs of present undesirable government policies in terms of lost opportunities to accomplish constructive socially desirable goals.

(l) The powerlessness of the individual.
This would be used to split him from the policies of his government, by disassociating him from those policies. This technique could be used in preparation for a campaign to gain opposition to these government policies.

(2) Insinuation techniques. To exploit these and similar vulnerabilities, a number of techniques are used, including—

(a) Leading questions. The propagandist may ask questions which suggest only one possible answer. Thus the question, “What is there left to do, now that your unit is surrounded and you are completely cut off?” insinuates that desertion or surrender is the only reasonable alternative to annihilation.

(b) Humor. Humor can be an effective form of the insinuation. Jokes and cartoons about the enemy find a ready audience among those persons in the target country who normally reject straightforward accusations. Jokes about totalitarian leaders often spread with great rapidity. Obviously the appreciation of humor differs among target groups and great care should be taken to keep the humor within the appropriate cultural context.

(c) Pure motives. The propagandist will always suggest that his side is acting in the best interest of the target audience, thereby insinuating that his opponent is acting to the contrary. For example, we can indicate that a satellite force fighting with the enemy is insuring the continued subjugation of its country by helping the common enemy win the war. Whereas, by aiding our side that force will ultimately achieve freedom.

(d) Guilt by association. When fixing guilt by association, the propagandist links a person, group, or idea to other persons, groups, or ideas repugnant to the target audience. He insinuates that the connection is not accidental or superficial, although he does not say so explicitly.

(e) Rumor. Malicious rumors are also a potentially effective form of the insinuation.

(f) Pictorial and photographic insinuation. A picture or cartoon can often insinuate a derogatory idea or charge more effectively than mere words. In this context, selected and composite photographs can be highly degrading.

(g) Vocal insinuation. Radio propagandists can artfully suggest a derogatory notion not only by the selection of words they use, but also by the way in which they deliver them. Significant pauses, inflections of the voice, sarcastic pronunciation, and other means can be more subtle than written insinuation.

(i) Name Calling. “Name calling” or “moral labels” is the device by which the propagandist seeks to arouse prejudice in his target audience for, or against, ideas, persons, or institutions by labeling the object of his assault as something which the audience hates or fears. This is done to make people hate, mistrust, and reject opinions, persons, or groups opposing the propagandist. It is most effective as a gray or black propaganda device. The propagandist may use insinuation if he feels that his audience would be antagonized by a direct attack. But if he believes the audience is in sympathy with him or is neutral, he can use the techniques of denunciation, defamation, and sarcasm is describing an idea, policy, person, or institution.

(1) Types of name calling.

(a) Direct name calling is used when the audience is sympathetic, and sometimes when it is neutral. It is a simple, straightforward attack on an avowed opponent.

(b) Indirect name calling is used when direct name calling would antagonize the audience. It is simply a convenient label for the various degrees of attack that are between pure name calling and insinuation. Sarcasm and ridicule are frequently used in otherwise straightforward messages.

(2) Pictorial and photographic name calling. Cartoons, illustrations, and photographs are often used in name calling.

(3) Vulnerabilities. In its extreme form, name calling may indicate that the propagandist has lost his sense of proportion. But the intelligent, effective propagandist remains calm at all times. Before using name calling, he weighs the benefits against the possible harm it may cause. Even if conditions suggest the use of name calling, it may be better to avoid it. Timing and an intuitive sense often will dictate what action to take in a situation particularly difficult to assess. The obstacles are formidable, despite ostensibly obvious clues; e.g., a group of soldiers may thoroughly dislike or even hate their commander and even criticize him openly, but when they hear the enemy make disparaging remarks against him, they may resent it simply because the name calling emanates from the enemy. Hence, it is usually best to leave name calling to black or gray propaganda (chap 12).

j. Stalling. “Stalling” or “postponement” is used by the propagandist to hedge, to evade, or to divert, hide, or distract attention from particular subjects that are embarrassing to his side.

k. Entertainment. Entertainment is successful in gaining and holding an audience. It is particularly effective when offered in the form of gentle satire.
Understanding Techniques. The propaganda techniques discussed above are useful in the development of offensive propaganda as well as in counterpropaganda. Additionally, an understanding of these techniques enhances the propaganda analysis process.

2–6. The Message

A message, at the source, is a symbol or group of symbols, verbal or nonverbal, made and controlled by the sender. It can get its response only by first communicating symbols to the minds of men; that is, it must first get a hearing. At the target, a message is a stimulus, an event among many, competing for attention that can bring about an action only by causing a stimulation and response within the human organism. In brief, a message must be received, be understood, be believed, and bring about a desired result.

a. Manipulation of Variables. Given a policy, intelligence, a specified target, and a directive stating general thematic content and desired results, the propagandist then proceeds to manipulate such variables as he can command. The chief variable at his command is the message.

b. Attracting Attention. He must construct, time, and transmit his message so that it, at least, gets a hearing. He must attract attention to the message in competition with all other stimuli being presented to the target.

c. The Target Must Understand the Message. He must communicate his intended message in terms of the target's frame of reference; i.e., in terms the target understands.

d. Arouse Needs. He must bring about a change in the target, an attitude change, and, preferably, also an overt action. To do this, he must organize his message or messages so as to arouse needs in the target, and tell his target how to satisfy these needs in ways which will be favorable to the psychological operator. The actions urged or implied in the message must appear to be important and appropriate to the target audience. The best target is an organized group.

e. Assured Desired Action. In essence, the psychological operator must take all necessary steps to assure that the action he desires will have the best possible opportunity to succeed, and the action he does not desire will have the least opportunity for expression in the target society.

2–7. Reception of the Message

People see the world in terms of their needs, previous experience, and moods. They organize experience to make it fit into their frames of reference—and to resist change of the beliefs and attitudes they strongly hold. Humans tend to group bits of experience, people or events, in terms of the language they have to describe it. Different people will perceive different meanings in the same experience, so that it is essential to know as much as possible about the frames of reference, needs, moods, and language of a target, in other words, to know the cultural makeup of a society, if one is to predict confidently whether an intended meaning will get across. Not all words have the same meaning for all peoples. The inability of the opposing groups to agree on the meaning for such words as "democracy," "freedom," "peace," "just," and "unjust wars," is a case in point. All experience, then, is perceived and interpreted in terms of the individual's own needs, emotions, personality, and previously formed attitudes. Any message will be seen in the context of experience and be weighed in the light of the value system of the individual target. The target will accept the message and react as it urges him to, only if he thinks it is in his own best interests to do so and if that action is "acceptable" within his own ethical framework.

2–8. Response to the Message

a. Target Attitudes. The attitudes of the target will be a major factor in determining the response to the message. It is the job of the psychological operator to create favorable attitudes toward his message. The strength of an attitude and the possibility of the action receiving group reinforcement are also related to the likelihood of the attitudes being translated into action. And it is clear that barriers to action will lessen the likelihood of action following an attitude change, just as the existence of channels will facilitate action.

b. Barriers and Channels. Barriers and channels to action are two of the important variables the psychological operator will manipulate, if he can. There are some situations in which he will want to erect a barrier to action, and other cases in which he will want to clear a channel for action. Barriers and channels may exist in the form of government or group sanctions, reinforcement and rewards. In each of these areas, there are ways by which the psychological operator can increase or decrease the likelihood of actions by manipulating or making use of barriers or channels.

2–9. Actions With Psychological Impact

a. General. Words and symbols are not the only causes of attitude and behavior changes—actions also are. Any action that
causes a psychological impact in any audience, intended or not, is called a psychological action. Commanders and psychological operations officers must continually be aware of the possible effects of actions taken to accomplish the tactical mission and weigh the value of the accomplishment of the mission against the psychological harm that may be caused.

b. Purposeful Psychological Actions. Actions may be taken primarily for their psychological effect. Many combat actions taken by insurgents are not made for the purpose of military victory, which they may know is not imminently possible, but to demonstrate to the populace that it is not possible for the government to protect them. Civic action and nation-building projects are examples of actions the government can take to show the people the government is on their side and is willing and able to help them. An attack may be conducted when a victory is assured even if the success will not be tactically significant just to raise the morale of the troops or people on the home front.

c. Nonpurposeful Psychological Actions. As stated above, every action can have a psychological impact. Of primary importance is the harm that can be caused when the psychological impact of an action is not considered during the planning phase. An attack on a village that kills a few insurgents and is a tactical success may also have resulted in the killing of a few non-combatants. Even though a temporary tactical victory was gained, the voluntary support of the people of that village may have been lost to the government for a long period of time. It might have been better to set up loudspeakers to inform the villagers that the commander of the pro-government forces thinks they are more important than the death or capture of a few insurgents. Or, the villagers could be persuaded to turn in the “inconsiderate, selfish” guerrillas who are endangering their lives. Perhaps, the guerrillas could be persuaded to surrender or to just leave the village and no longer endanger the populace. The good will of the people that is so necessary for the government to defeat an insurgency may have been assured by the purposeful psychological action of sparing the villagers’ lives. Similar parallels can be drawn for conventional war such as the declaration of Paris as an open city by both the French and German government, the bypassing of Rottenberg by Allied forces, and the exclusion of Kyoto from the Army Air Force target list for bombing.

d. Increasing the Effectiveness of Purposeful Psychological Actions. The possibility of success of purposeful psychological action is increased by explanation of the actions and the voluntary involvement of the target. The probability of success is further increased if one or more (preferably more) of the recognized leaders of the target audience are given credit for conceiving the action—manage and direct its progress—and if the entire target audience is given favorable publicity at appropriate stages of implementation. Appeals to the self-preservation, self-interests, and ego of the target audience can be effective in obtaining willing cooperation in implementing purposeful psychological actions.

Section II. RESPONSIBILITIES

2–10. The Commander

It is, of course, axiomatic that the commander is responsible for all his command does or fails to do. This paragraph will treat the non-PSYOP unit commander’s responsibilities with regard to psychological operations planning, training, and execution.

a. PSYOP Staff Officer. The commander must assure that at least one person in his command is assigned the staff responsibility for PSYOP. Where none is assigned by TOE or TD, someone must be responsible for advising the commander on the utilization of PSYOP and the possible psychological effect of the command’s actions.

b. Planning. The commander must always consider the possible psychological effects of his courses of action when making his estimate. He must be alert to the possibilities of using psychologically exploiting any incident to the benefit of the command and the mission. The commander must assure that a PSYOP staff officer is included in all planning sessions and is kept aware of all developments affecting the command. A PSYOP officer should be included in the intelligence briefings after receipt of the mission, receive guidance from the commander, prepare a PSYOP staff estimate, make recommendations as to courses of action, and prepare annexes to plans and orders. The PSYOP officer should be given an opportunity to specify PSYOP related EEI.

c. Training. PSYOP training should be an integral part of a command’s training program. PSYOP training should be integrated into other instruction and training.
(1) The soldier's responsibilities as a psychological operator should be emphasized during regularly scheduled periods of instruction. This is especially important for units with riot or civil disturbance contingency missions. This training should include the study of the cultural environment of the location to which the soldier will move.

(2) Simulated enemy propaganda may be directed at troops during training exercises.

(3) PSYOP field teams may be requested to participate in field training exercises.

(4) Subordinate unit commanders can be required to be alert to situations which can be exploited by PSYOP.

(5) One of the tasks given to the commander's PSYOP staff officer should be to integrate PSYOP into all training.

2-11. PSYOP Officer Responsibility
It is the duty of every PSYOP officer to keep aware of the plans and actions of the units of the command to which he is assigned and to advise the commander of any possible harmful psychological effects of any planned action.

2-12. The Soldier
The soldier is a direct representative of his government to the people with whom he comes in contact. His actions, his words, his attitudes may be considered the action, words, and attitudes of his government. Therefore, it is his responsibility to behave in a way that will cast credit upon himself and his government. This is especially important in an insurgency environment where it is essential for the government to have the good will of the people in order to succeed. The soldier should not fire his weapon indiscriminately. He must make every effort not to endanger the lives of innocent civilians. It is understood that the security of a soldier and his unit is extremely important, but a decision must be made, sometimes in split seconds, whether firing upon seemingly innocent civilians is essential to his unit's mission and security. Such action might adversely affect the accomplishment of his unit's mission and reduce its security due to the hatred engendered in the surviving civilians. The soldier must make every effort to protect property, especially private property, religious edifices, and cemeteries. The soldier can be utilized to actively conduct PSYOP, particularly in IDAD operations environments. He can disseminate leaflets. He can get to know the local national civilian populace better through involvement in civic action type projects. Once the soldier has been accepted by the civilians, he can transmit ideas through face-to-face communication. The soldier must be adequately trained and briefed, to include the applicable laws of war and rules of engagement, in order to conduct such PSYOP without counterproductivity.

Section III. FOUNDATION FOR PSYOP

2-13. General
Essential to the effective conduct of psychological operations is an understanding of the way people behave and communicate and why they do these things in the way that they do. This section presents a short treatment of this subject.

2-14. The Individual
a. General
(1) The psychological operator must know the psychological and social factors affecting a target audience, he must therefore—
(a) Penetrate the target audience.
(b) Communicate with them.
(c) Motivate the target audience to accept the PSYOP message.

(2) The successful use of propaganda requires knowledge of man and the factors which influence his behavior. The individual must be examined in terms of motivation, perception, goals, frustration, structure and heredity, environment, stimulus, and sensation.

(a) Structure and heredity. Heredity and bodily structure establish physical and psychological limits. Man's body is able to assimilate food and grow. Man is also able to learn. Physiological and learning needs are, in turn, influenced by the environment in which man lives.

(b) Environment. Man's environment includes the physical aspects of the world about him, the inner world of his own body, the people with whom he associates, and the rules under which this association occurs.

(c) Stimulus. A stimulus represents any change in the environment (internal and external) that causes a reaction. Stimulation always implies a response.

(d) Sensation. Man is in contact with his environment through the general sensory systems: sight, sound, touch, taste, and smell. Each sensory system has receptors, which react only
to specific ranges of stimuli. Learning, in turn, enables the individual to blend the sensations received through different senses into a single stimulus.

b. Motivation. The study of motivation considers what makes an individual act, how his needs are expressed, and how the individual goes about satisfying them. The terms, needs, drives, and motives, are applied to internal forces that incline an individual toward behavior.

(1) Needs. A need may be described as a lack within an individual involving a tension that tends to result in behavior which will bring about a reduction of tension. Tension reduction is the most important factor in satisfying physiological needs. Thirst is an example. In PSYOP, two categories of needs must be considered, Primary and secondary needs.

(a) Primary or physical needs must be satisfied for the individual to live. These are inborn, and possessed by all men. Examples are hunger, thirst, and fatigue. The way in which these needs are satisfied varies according to secondary or culturally learned needs.

(b) Secondary or learned needs are derived from the social and cultural environment. The goals and behavior for satisfying these needs are not inborn, but are learned from other people. Learned needs differ from culture to culture. The psychological operator must take into account the secondary or learned needs of the target audience. This requires a careful study of the target audience's cultural background.

(2) Drives. Drives give the individual the impetus to move toward satisfying a need. For example, a drive directs behavior toward finding any goal that will satisfy thirst.

(3) Motives. A motive is a drive with direction toward some particular goal. The motive is drive plus learning, and enables behavior that is most likely to fill a need according to the individual's past experience. The psychological operator and planner must control motives and goals of the target audience to obtain desired behavior.

c. Goals. A goal is the end toward which effort or ambition is directed. It is an aim or purpose.

(1) A goal is capable of eliminating the precipitating need. It may be positive or negative. That is, the goal may be a reward (positive); or it may be the avoidance of punishment or prevention or elimination of pain (negative).

(2) Goals give direction to behavior, and motivation continues until the goal is reached or until the need for it ends. Goals of social or secondary needs may persist indefinitely, making them prime targets for PSYOP. Behavior patterns used in reaching goals tend to be repeated.

(3) When selecting goals, the psychological operator must take into consideration the following factors:

(a) Social standards and values of the target audience.

(b) Physical capability of the target audience to respond to the PSYOP message.

(c) Personal experiences and prior learning of the target audience with respect to need satisfaction.

(d) Accessability of the PSYOP directed goal.

d. Perceived Needs. People may not be aware of certain needs. The lack of awareness may be caused by poor education, diversion, or for other reasons. For a person to be motivated to attempt to reach a goal to satisfy a need, he must perceive the need. PSYOP must direct its efforts toward causing behavior to satisfy perceived needs. The psychological operator must also cause the target to perceive dormant needs (needs which are outside his focus of attention). Or he must cause the target to perceive new needs upon which the psychological operator can base his campaign.

e. Perception.

(1) Movement to behavior is determined by the way an individual perceives his environment. Perception is the process of interpreting the environment. Although perception is based to a large extent on cultural and social factors which form a common background, each individual will perceive things differently. The psychological operator must therefore be able to recognize individual variances in perception due to—

(a) Biological (or physical) capacity.

(b) Motivation.

(c) Frame of reference, learning, and past experience.

(d) Physical and social environments.

(2) Different people perceive the same stimulus in different ways, and different stimuli are perceived the same way by different people. The psychological operator must realize that it is what is perceived as true that is important. This means that the message must be perceived by the target audience as the truth.

(3) In PSYOP, the operator can sometimes change target audience perceptions to obtain changes in attitudes and behavior. It is difficult to change an individual's goal or need, but the
perception of these goals and needs can be changed. To achieve this, the target's attention must be obtained.

(4) Perception is response to a change or to a difference in the environment. Without change, there would be neither sensation nor perception. At any given time, one or, at most, few events receive the attention of the individual; that is, enter the individual's "focus of attention." After the individual has focused his attention, he can concentrate on ideas rather than specific words and examples. It is for this reason the perceptual factors of attention-getting must be considered in PSYOP communication. These factors can be grouped into two categories: internal and external.

f. Internal Factors of Attention-Getting.

(1) Motivation. The forces that mobilize an individual's efforts, direct attention, and establish focus. An individual who is motivated toward some goal may perceive events as reinforcing his aim even if the goal is, in fact, neutral.

(2) Set. Set occurs when an intention focuses attention. Set is, in effect, anticipation of the event. Because sets tend to direct the succession of perceptual experiences, it is probably the most important internal factor in perception. For example, the information counter at an airport might be the focus of attention for an individual planning a trip in the future; therefore, he would perceive it immediately when he entered the building.

g. External Factors of Attention Getting.

(1) Intensity and size. A stimulus that is larger or more intense is more likely to attract attention than a lesser one because the most obvious stimulus is the best attention-getting device. An example is the brightest colored package in a supermarket.

(2) Contrast. A conspicuous stimulus tends to become the focus of attention. Conspicuousness is the contrast between an object and its background. Orange leaflets in the jungle are more noticeable than green leaflets. The essential element is the degree of contrast. Contrast is a key element. Perception requires a change in sensation. An unchanging stimulus will not hold the focus of attention indefinitely and other means will have to be used.

(3) Movement. Our eyes are involuntarily attracted to movement. Therefore, an object moving against a motionless background normally would be selected for perception. It is for this reason that signboards with moving lights are presented to the passersby.

(4) Novelty. A new sight or sound gains in strength because it differs from the old.

(5) Repetition. The repetition of a stimulus produces a two-fold effect. It increases the probability of perception, as well as the individual's sensitivity to the particular sight or sound. Prolonged repetition may reduce the chance of the event becoming the object of focused attention. In general, the behavioral patterns of the target audience are strengthened by repetition, though there is a limit. Popular television commercials are repeated for this reason.

h. Frustration.

(1) Roles of the psychological operator. The psychological operator must be aware of the environmental blocks which keep an individual from attaining his goals. He must know what happens when an individual in a specific culture is blocked from attaining his goal, what his reactions to frustration are likely to be, and how the psychological operator can assist in removing these blocks.

(a) The frustrated individual. Frustration is the result of something which keeps an individual from getting something he wants. PSYOP may be concerned with frustrations such as lack of food, shelter, or terrorism (lack of security). The frustrated individual is a prime target for PSYOP.

(b) Blockages. When an individual is blocked from obtaining his goals there is deprivation. Deprivation results in increased motivation, with the individual trying even harder to obtain his goals. When deprivation occurs, the psychological operator can often succeed by providing a substitute goal for the target audience.

(c) Motivational conflict. Motivational conflict occurs when two or more needs with incompatible goals arise.

(2) Results of frustration. The results of frustration are alternative goal-seeking behavior. If PSYOP can provide an alternate goal that will satisfy the need, a friendlier attitude may develop within the target audience.

(3) Sources of frustration and stress:

(a) Limitations of physical capacity.

(b) Obstacles in the physical environment.

(c) Obstacles in the social environment.

The social norms may bar participation in certain activities.

(4) Defense mechanisms. PSYOP success may lie in helping the target audience resolve its frustrations, which may be evidenced by such defense mechanisms as—

(a) Substitution of goals.

(b) Compromise.

(c) Withdrawal.

(d) Aggression.
(e) Identification.
(f) Regression.

i. Conclusion. By being aware of the factors which influence behavior, the psychological operator will be able to adjust his communications to take advantage of the vulnerabilities and susceptibilities of the target audience.

2-15. Attitudes

a. Definition of Attitude. An attitude is a person's organization of beliefs about an object or situation, predisposing him to respond in a certain manner.

b. Importance of Attitudes. Attitudes play an important role among the psychological factors which motivate, guide, and direct behavior.

(1) Attitudes determine a group's or an individual's orientation to, and reactions in, his surrounding environment.

(2) Attitudes are reflected in behavior.

(3) Attitudes exert a consistent influence upon a wide variety of human actions directed toward an object, person, or group.

(4) Attitudes are subject to change and directly effect the target's behavior.

(5) Attitudes must be taken into account throughout a PSYOP campaign.

c. Components of Attitudes. An attitude is made up of three components: affective, cognitive, and behavioral. These correspond to one's evaluation of, knowledge of, and predisposition to act toward an object. For example, when considering a target group's attitude toward its government, the psychological operator is interested in the group's general feelings toward the government. Secondly, he wants to know how well the group understands the government's programs. Finally, the group's predisposition to act toward the government, or its officials, in a certain manner, such as supporting or rejecting government programs, is important. For PSYOP to be effective, each of these components must be considered, for change in behavior does not necessarily mean that the target group's attitudes have also changed. For example, a person, newly under an authoritative regime, may be forced to refrain from expressing his viewpoints, a privilege he formerly had, though he would like to. His behavior has changed, but not his attitude.

d. Attitude Change. To change attitudes, PSYOP planners and operators must take into account relationships which exist between the attitudes desired by the PSYOP element and the attitudes presently held by the target group. Another relationship to consider is between the target group and the change agent. For example, change originated by a member of the group may meet with less resistance than change directed from an external source. The latter may be perceived by the target as a foreigner, interloper, or enemy.

(1) Attitudinal change can be considered under the headings: compliance, identification, and internalization. Each may be a target in PSYOP. The mission will determine the target.

(a) Compliance. Compliance occurs when the target accepts influence because it hopes to get a favorable reaction from so doing. The target adopts the behavior not because it believes in the behavior, but because it expects to be rewarded or gain approval, and avoid punishment or disapproval by conforming. The satisfaction from compliance is due to the effect of accepting influence. Change, under these circumstances, usually persists only so long as the influence remains present. Compliance is frequently achieved through force or coercion. Under conditions of compliance, favorable reactions by an influencing agent are crucial to the continued maintenance of the attitude. If the favorable reactions cease, the attitude could be readily changed.

(b) Identification. Identification occurs when the target group adopts the attitudes of others with whom they have gratifying personal relationships. This is the process of modeling oneself after individuals or groups. Through identification, the individual incorporates the attributes of other individuals or groups, and adopts similar behavior. This type of change is more likely to persist because, unlike compliance, it is not dependent upon the presence of the influencing agent. The psychological operator can take advantage of this characteristic by obtaining support from leaders or status individuals in the target group.

c) Internalization. Internalization is the acceptance of influence when the direction of change is consistent with the attitudes or values of the target. An internalized attitude is the most difficult to change. In this process the target group accepts the attitude desired by the psychological operator because it supports the basic values of the group. For this reason, internalization affects long-range behavior. Individuals who have internalized an attitude actively seek support for it, unconsciously. This characteristic can be utilized by the psychological operator to gain or increase his influence with the target and its peer groups.

(2) Factors in attitude change. Three factors can be instrumental in bringing about attitude change in PSYOP: social support, support of experts, and support of experience. Each relies heavily upon the influence of social pressure
upon decisions to accept or reject a persuasive communication or appeal for attitude change.

(a) Social support. This motivates the target audience to conform to another’s attitude for social acceptance, prestige, increased status, esteem, praise, achievement, and recognition. It is very powerful if integrated with social programs of mass involvement and mutual responsibility.

(b) Support of experts. The use of social support of experts (individuals recognized by the target group as knowledgeable or as authorities) takes advantage of the human tendency to believe experts and follow their advice. In PSYOP, this principle can be used in conjunction with the identification process of attitude change.

(c) Support of experience. Support of personal experience is the most powerful tool available to use in attitude change programs, particularly when it has been influenced and reinforced by learning. If the psychological operator can show the target that his behavior partially supports the final goal of the PSYOP program, a persuasive campaign can be used effectively.

2-16. Group Behavior

a. General.

(1) The term “group” refers to a collection of individuals interacting to achieve common goals. Through interaction, the group develops attitudes which become standards of the group. Adherence to these norms is enforced through the use of positive and negative sanctions.

(2) Because groups apply social pressures on their individual members, they present an ideal target audience for the psychological operator. If the psychological operator can cause the group to adopt new attitudes and beliefs, the group in turn will use sanctions to enforce conformity.

(3) An individual always belongs to more than one group. The PSYOP planner or operator must, therefore, consider the total pattern of interaction the individual has on a 24-hour, 7-day week basis, because each group will have an effect on his overall behavior and attitude.

b. Group Distinctions.

(1) Groups vary in their organization and the intensity of involvement required of their members. Groups may be classified as primary or secondary, also as in-groups or out-groups.

(2) Primary and secondary groups.

(a) Primary groups, such as the family, are the principal sources of emotional conditioning and satisfy the emotional and social needs of the individual. Intermember relations within such groups are intimate, personal, and total. Primary groups are useful as psychological targets when the members of the primary groups can exert influence or when primary groups are the only form of usable social organizations in a given society.

(b) Secondary groups, such as business associations, satisfy the environmental needs. Secondary group relations are largely utilitarian. By targeting a secondary group, the psychological operator may affect a larger number of people than in a primary group. The secondary group uses social, economic, and physical sanctions. Key communicators are more easily identified in the secondary group because it normally has more formal organization than does the primary group.

(c) Since the industrial revolution, the general trend of social organization has been toward the increasing importance of the secondary groups at the expense of the primary groups, particularly in the area of socialization. As a consequence, there has been a loss of intimacy and security among the individuals who make up an industrialized society. However, a countertrend is noticeable in the growth of new primary groups within larger secondary groups. If the members of this type of primary group have power and influence within the secondary group, the primary group can be an effective target for PSYOP.

(3) In-group vs. out-groups. The distinction between in-groups and out-groups is based on an individual’s viewpoint.

(a) An in-group is one to which the individual gives his allegiance and loyalty.

(b) An out-group is one to which an individual feels alienation and a sense of suspicion. Alienation is generally caused by differences, such as religious, racial, ethnic, economic, political, social, or geographic. The successful psychological operator is able to expand or minimize intergroup alienation, as may suit his purpose.

(c) In PSYOP, every effort must be made to make communications appear, to the target, to originate from in-group sources.

c. Dynamics of Group Interaction. Group members usually have unequal access to communication within a group. This inequality can affect morale, the participation of members in attaining group goals, and the degree of commitment that the individuals have to group objectives. Such intragroup conflicts, whenever they arise, provide an ideal vulnerability for PSYOP.

d. Group Leadership.

(1) All groups have leaders, categorized as either authoritarian or democratic. The former
set the common goal. The latter attempt to involve other group members in the decision-making process. Traditions within a culture may cause members to prefer one type over the other.

(2) Emergent leaders, i.e., individuals who assert their leadership because new or changing situations are not handled adequately by the established leadership, are prime targets for PSYOP because of their propensity for action.

(3) Leadership involves a combination of power—the ability to control the actions of others regardless of their wishes; and authority—the established right to make decisions and order the actions of others. This combination is not static. The degree of power or authority an individual holds within the group varies over time, depending upon how well he conforms to group expectations.

(4) Group leaders are prime PSYOP targets. If the psychological operator can change the attitudes and behavior of a group leader, the leader will use his influence to change the beliefs and attitudes of the group. If the group has an authoritarian leader, the primary PSYOP effort should be directed toward the leader. If, on the other hand, the group has a democratic leader, PSYOP efforts should be directed at the leader and those he consults when making decisions.

e. Types of Social Action. There are two types of social action which require special consideration: mass behavior and social movements. Either type has inherent vulnerabilities of potential PSYOP significance.

(1) Mass behavior. Mass behavior, such as that of crowds, mobs, or rioters, generally is episodic, unstructured, unpredictable, and irrational. However, this is not always true. Various mass movements have developed techniques whereby they create, manipulate, control and direct crowds, mobs, riots, etc. They utilize them effectively as tools to mobilize public support, generate martyrs for the cause, weaken government control, and even as tactical weapons to destroy predetermined installations, such as radio or television stations, government buildings, embassies, libraries, etc. Within a mass, individuals see themselves as anonymous, and not under any social control. Individual members respond to, and influence, one another, through a process of social contagion. As such, the following conditions must be present before mass behavior may occur.

(a) Population and social structures conducive to large gatherings.
(b) Strained relations between various factions, because of political, social, economic, or other conditions.
(c) Precipitating factors which can be used as a reason to mobilize for action.

(2) Social movements. A social movement may be the outgrowth of mass behavior, but it is longer lasting and better organized. Typical stages in the development of social movements may evolve as follows:

(a) Incubation. A long stage of growing awareness of the problem.
(b) Initiation. During initiation, there is an increase in aggravation and wider national or community interest in the problems. During this stage, mass behavior, such as that of crowds, may help focus attention upon the grievances and lead to the emergence of leaders.
(c) Organization. During organization the social movement leaders make decisions as to the appropriate action to take. If the movement is to succeed one dominant group will emerge.
(d) Enforcement. During enforcement the group that comes to power attempts to make corrections, and the leadership becomes part of the bureaucracy.
(e) Decay. During decay the leaders become estranged from their base of support because they are part of the bureaucracy and no longer need the group for their support. It is during this stage that the seeds for new social movements are sown.

(f) PSYOP effectiveness. Psychological operations can be effective during any of the five stages of development of the social movement. The psychological operator may be concerned with focusing attention on the problem during the incubation stage, inciting the people to action during the initiation state, or using PSYOP to bring about an organizational structure favorable to his objective during the organization and enforcement phases. During the decay phase, the psychological operator may sow the seeds for a new social movement.

f. Other Types of Target Audiences. The PSYOP planner may have to rely on superficial classifications of collections of individuals, such as the category and the aggregate. The individuals have very little sense of belonging to these classifications. And, as aggregates and categories have no means of enforcing conformity, they are not as effective PSYOP targets as are groups.

(1) Category. A collection of individuals that can be identified by some common characteristic, such as age, sex, and language.
(2) Aggregate. Classification may be by common geographic location. As the members of
an aggregate have no social relationship to one
another except the temporary one of a common
physical location. Aggregates, as with
categories, are not prime targets.

3) Creating Groups. The psychological
operator may try to create groups from
categories and aggregates. If he is able to do
this, the new group will be able to utilize san­
tions to enforce conformity to the attitudes and
beliefs that the psychological operator has been
developing as he assists the group to form.

2-17. Social Communication

a. General. To be successful in PSYOP, one
must understand and appreciate the prime
importance that communications, and particularly
language, has on the accomplishment of the
mission.

(1) Communication, the interchange of
meaning among people, is possible to the degree
that individuals have common knowledge,
needs, and attitudes. It is the primary PSYOP
method for changing attitudes, for arousing
needs and emotions, and for inducing changes in
behavior.

(2) Words can alter the environment just as
the material world can be altered by the intro­
duction of automobiles and buildings. The plan­
ne d use of language can accomplish changes in
behavior as surely as those that would be
caused through the manipulation of material
objects.

(3) There are models which can be used to
explain the communication process. The one
shown in figure 2-1, however, provides a simp­
lified but workable explanation for PSYOP pur­
poses.

(4) The meanings of the various terms used
in the diagram of the communications process
are as follows:

(a) Stimuli—components of the sender's
and receiver's frame of reference.
(b) Sender—the initiator of the message.
(c) Receiver—the intended object of the
message.
(d) Message—a group of signals, for ex­
ample, language.
(e) Transmitter—vehicle used for carry­
ing the message, such as a pamphlet or the
human voice.
(f) Encoding—a process in which the mes­
sage is structured to give it meaning.
(g) Decoding—a process in which the re­
ceiver translates the message to give it mean­
ing.
(h) Feedback—the information returning
from the receiver to the sender by the same
communication process.

(i) Noise—factors which interrupt the
transmission and reception of the message.
Noise is anything which interferes with the
transmission or reception of the intended mes­

b. Communication Process.

(1) As illustrated in figure 2-1, the com­
munication process requires, at least, three
elements: a source or sender (encoder), a mes­
 sage, and a destination or receiver (decoder).
Two of the most critical actions in communicat­
ing are encoding and decoding. As a result of the
decoding, there is normally an indication of the
effect of the message (feedback) upon the re­
c eiver.

(2) The success or failure of the communica­
tion process can often be traced to encoding or
decoding. One basic cause for failure is that the
encoder and decoder may not assign the same
meaning to the symbols used in the message.
For example, figure 2-2 shows the difference of
meaning for terms given in standard American
and Soviet dictionaries. Additionally, there are
many factors called noise, which can interrupt
the transmission and reception of a message
and cause it to lose the meaning the encoder had
intended it to have.

b. Mass Media and the Communication
Process. Communication to large audiences can
be looked upon as a two-step process as shown in
figure 2-3.

(1) Step one occurs when the information is
passed from the mass media, such as radio, tele­
vision, newspapers, and movies, to the key
communicator.

(2) Step two occurs when the information is
passed from the key communicators to the vari­
ous members of the groups composing the mass
population.

(3) Key communicators do not actively pass
information automatically, but often remain
passive. People who respect the expertise of the
key communicator in a particular field, look
upon him for advice. It is at this point that the
second step occurs. Consequently, if the
psychological operator can identify the key
communicators and persuade them to pro­
selytize in behalf of the objectives of the PSYOP
campaign, the uncertainty of this second step in
the information flow will be reduced considera­

(4) The reason for the two steps is that mass
media does not reach nor is it internalized by all
people. Many people cannot read and others do
not have radios, or the time, desire, or opportun­
ity to receive the message.

(5) The message reaches only those indi­
viduals in the communication network who
have the time, desire, and ability to receive it. This group is the key communicators who furnish the average individual second hand information and interpretation concerning what they have heard, read or seen, and thus their identification is extremely important in PSYOP campaigns. They are the ones to whom PSYOP messages should be directed.

**d. Barriers to Effective Communications.** There are a number of barriers which can develop in intercultural and intracultural communication which cause a PSYOP message to fail to obtain the desired response. The most
important ones concern the meanings attached to symbols and the backgrounds of the communicator and the target audience.

(1) Symbols are created within a cultural context. For this reason, communications between individuals from different cultural backgrounds create problems. They do not know the meanings attached to each other's symbols. The psychological operator must know the meanings the target audience assigns to their symbols. He must realize that continual attention must be given to message feedback to determine the meanings given to his message by the target.

(2) The psychological operator must take both his own cultural background and that of his target audience into account in developing messages which will be meaningful to them. The most likely source of difficulty in PSYOP directed towards people of a different culture is often centered in the mental habits, attitudes, and assumptions which the psychological operator has acquired through experience in his social and cultural environment. Lingual and cultural differences act as constraints upon cross-cultural communication and can be analyzed as differences in objectives, behavioral patterns, cultural values, and assumptions.

(a) Objectives. The life goals of the target audience and the psychological operator may vary significantly. The objectives of one culture may be oriented toward achievement of harmony with its environment, while another may be oriented toward individual achievement. Such differences are obstacles to understanding and, therefore, to effective PSYOP.

(b) Differences in behavioral patterns. The meaning of another person's behavior, the appropriateness of one's own behavior, and the measure of success in work, are all affected by cultural beliefs. The acceptance of certain words, gestures, or symbols also depends upon the meanings given to them in specific societies. For example, a clenched fist may be a gesture of anger in one culture, a salute in another; or traffic moves on the right side of the road in some countries, on the left in others. Innocuous words in some countries become foul vulgarities in others. In some societies it is proper and desirable to ask about the well-being of the female members of the family of a friend, in others it is a serious breach of etiquette.

(c) Differences in cultural values and assumptions. This is one of the most critical aspects of working cross-culturally. There are certain experiences shared by most individuals within a society so that common reactions to a particular event can be anticipated. These values and assumptions are so much a part of the individual that the target audience will be unaware of how much they influence its behavior. The psychological operator must plan his communication to fit these group expectations as closely as possible. Effective use of feedback information is essential.

(d) Cultural and social taboos. The psychological operator must acquaint himself with the established customs and taboos of his target audience to prevent inadvertent disparaging remarks or actions. Phrases, comments, expressions, and actions that are normal in our society, may be offensive in other cultures and may discredit the offender. Credibility could be lost.

(e) Audience Illiteracy. Communicating with nonliterate people is a problem that deserves special attention. Collectively, they represent great potential power. Approximately 60 to 80 percent of the people in many countries, where technical assistance programs are implemented, fall within this category. Furthermore, a large number of people who are considered literate possess such a limited reading ability that they should be classified as semiliterate. In view of their low status, nonliterate and semiliterate groups are fertile for support of ideas and action (insurgencies, civil wars, revolutions) which promise to alleviate their suffering. It is particularly necessary to know what the nonliterate audience considers valid evidence and how they can be convinced. Here, the identification of individuals they consider leaders or status-people is extremely important. Consequently, these status-people should be the first target of the PSYOP communication. They are the ones who can get the populace to accept an idea. In addition, consideration must be given to their traditional method of decision-making. In many cultures, the leader may have no control over the final decision, but can only vocalize the decision reached by the group as a whole. For nonliterate and semiliterate groups, audiovisual and face-to-face communications are of great value. This includes communications between individuals and groups through meetings, discussions, lectures, demonstrations, and various other face-to-face contacts. The latter has been shown repeatedly to be the best but most difficult form of persuasive communication.

(f) Language in Communication.

(1) Language is probably the most powerful force in structuring the world as an individual sees it and reacts to it. As such, it performs the following functions:
TWO STEP FLOW OF MASS COMMUNICATIONS

NEWSPAPERS, RADIO, TELEVISION, MOVIES

MASS MEDIA

FIRST STEP

KEY COMMUNICATORS

SECOND STEP

VARIOUS GROUPS COMPOSING THE MASS OF THE POPULATION

Figure 2-3. Two-step flow of mass communications.
(a) An informative function, which is to formulate and record knowledge.

(b) A practical function, which is to produce a psychological effect upon others and influence them to react upon others with a desired activity or attitude.

(c) A ritual function, which is to create feelings or attitudes strongly associated with particular institutions.

(2) In actual practice, it is almost impossible to separate the various functions of language. The difficulty comes when language has the primary function of arousing emotions and stimulating action, while the target is led to believe he is being given facts about actual events. This confusion is best illustrated in the field of political and economic discussion, where terms such as "liberty," "democracy," "imperialism," and "free enterprise" are used to perform all three functions of language simultaneously.