APPENDIX C. PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH AND ANALYTIC UNITS

CONTENTS

Joint United States Public Affairs Office Planning Office 1 - C
Combined Intelligence Center, Vietnam, MACV J2 Psychological Desk 5 - C
Production Division, MACV J2 Strategic Resources Branch 9 - C
Psychological Operations Directorate Research and Analysis Branch 10 - C
6th Psychological Operations Battalion Research and Analysis Team, S2 Section 13 - C
7th Psychological Operations Group Propaganda Branch 18 - C
Foreign Broadcast Information Service Propaganda Analysis Division 19 - C
United States Information Agency Office for Policy and Research 19 - C
The Rand Corporation 20 - C
APPENDIX C. PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS INTELLIGENCE
RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS UNITS

Planning Office
Joint United States Public Affairs Office
Saigon, Republic of Vietnam

The Joint United States Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO), a part of the U.S. Mission to Vietnam, is responsible for psychological action in Vietnam. It is the policy agency for psychological operations in Vietnam. JUSPAO is an integration of USIS Vietnam and the Communications Media Division of USAID Vietnam, which was responsible for providing communications equipment, technical and program advice to the national information program of the Government of Vietnam. MACV assigns military officers to JUSPAO, and the Department of State assigns Foreign Service Officers. JUSPAO provides guidance to the Psychological Operations Directorate of MACV and to FSYOP Division of the Office for Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development (CORDS) of MACV, thus assuring common policy guidance an operational coordination between U.S. military and civilian psychological operations at the national and provincial level.

The JUSPAO psychological operations programs are concerned with six groups:

The Government of Vietnam, especially the Ministry of Information
The Vietnamese on a national basis
The Vietnamese on a provincial basis
The Viet Cong
The North Vietnamese
The Free World

The JUSPAO Planning Office which is directly under Director of JUSPAO is responsible for the preparation of policy guidances, planning, research, effects evaluation, liaison and reporting. It is in the Planning Office that psychological operations intelligence is conducted for JUSPAO.

JUSPAO: Use of classified materials.

At present in Field Development Division in JUSPAO, for example, one man has been appointed to read classified materials. The men responsible for planning JUSPAO activities just don't see such materials themselves, and consequently do not base their planning of psychological operations upon a direct knowledge of the intelligence information base.

It was recommended, by Capt. White House, that JUSPAO Planning Office, Research and Analysis Branch, have its research mission expanded so that intelligence materials could be adequately handled and be a real
factor in the planning of psychological operations. The fact appears to be that in JUSPAO, the responsible officials do not know what they have in the informational sources available to them, let alone the gaps in such information. The elements of the JUSPAO Planning Office that are involved in psychological operations intelligence research and analysis are Research and Analysis Branch, Evaluation and Analysis Branch, Survey Research Branch, and the MACV J2 Liaison Officer to JUSPAO. The intelligence analysis effort is an input to the following products of the Planning Office: JUSPAO guidance, JUSPAO memoranda, reports on the Viet Cong, survey results, and Evaluations of the effectiveness of psychological operations.

Intelligence produced by the Planning Office is used in support of psychological operations, to popularize information (e.g., the declassification of captured enemy documents for distribution to the Free World press), to support the operating divisions of JUSPAO. All of the JUSPAO divisions levy intelligence analysis tasks upon the Planning Office.

JUSPAO Planning Office obtains its intelligence information from all of the intelligence information producing organizations in Vietnam through a MACV J2 Liaison Officer who has been assigned to JUSPAO for this purpose. The J2 Liaison Officer through daily visits to the MACV J2 intelligence information collection elements located in Saigon (e.g., Combined Document Exploitation Center, Combined Military Interrogation Center, Combined Materiel Exploitation Center, and so forth) insures that Planning Office obtains pertinent intelligence information reports. In addition the Liaison Officer through daily contact ensures that the intelligence information collectors are kept briefed on the specific information requirements peculiar to psychological operations intelligence analysis. It is through the J2 Liaison Officer that intelligence analysis tasks may be levied on components of MACV J2, e.g., Psychological Desk, Combined Intelligence Center, Vietnam (CICV).

The J2 Liaison, as noted above, during his daily visits to intelligence information producing organizations gathers copies of their reports; in his office he reviews these documents, amounting to approximately 1500 pages a day, and routes them to the specific components of JUSPAO which may have use for the information contained within them. Reportedly approximately ninety-five percent of these documents are marked for destruction by the recipients. This implies that no real psychological operations intelligence capability exists within the JUSPAO framework that can adequately handle such a massive input of raw intelligence information, and that the analysis capability which does exist has too few people to do the job.

Another task of the J2 Liaison Officer is to assist in the identification of captured enemy documents which should be declassified, and to
conduct the necessary liaison with MACV J2 for the declassification process. Because of the large number of captured enemy documents that have been translated into English, it is considered that many which should be declassified have not been.

Research and Analysis Section of the JUSPAO Planning Office, consisting of two intelligence analysts, engages in propaganda analysis and in the identification of enemy vulnerabilities. Its psychological operations intelligence research and analysis is used to support the psychological operations of the JUSPAO Divisions. In addition it provides briefings to correspondents, scholars, officials of other governments on Vietnam. Such briefings may either be specific or general. It assists in the identification of captured enemy documents which should be declassified, and assists in the staffing required for such declassification proceedings.

In addition to the large number of MACV J2 intelligence information documents obtained by the Liaison Officer, Research and Analysis Branch receives a number of documents from other sources. It receives every day a complete set of carbon copies of the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) teletypes directly from PBIS; FBIS also provides them with copies of its Press and Radio Highlights, and with propaganda analysis reports prepared by Propaganda Analysis Division, FBIS Washington. Rand interviews are also received by Research and Analysis Branch.

Research and Analysis Branch utilizes on occasion the Combined Document Exploitation Center (CDEC) Document Retrieval System through the J2 Liaison Officer. However, it does not have in its office a 3M Reader Printer so that the film output of the CDEC Document Retrieval System can be utilized. Considering the fact that Research and Analysis Branch has two analysts to handle and analyze the entire body of intelligence information produced in Vietnam, acquisition of a 3M Reader Printer and greater use of the CDEC Document Retrieval System would greatly enhance their capability to do research and analysis in psychological operations. No information was obtained on the indexing categories used in their present manual filing system.

The Survey Research Branch of the JUSPAO Planning Office through the use of surveys determines the soundness of the JUSPAO approach, and ways in which it can be improved by providing additional guidance. For example, it conducted a survey to determine the effectiveness of the Tet psychological operations campaign. In addition, it determines through its surveys exposure to leaflets, and suggestions to make them more effective.

Survey Research Branch, consisting of about two people, uses the Saigon Center for Vietnamese Studies, a social science survey organization, to conduct its surveys. The surveys coordinated with other offices engaged in psychological operations utilize structured questions.
and are conducted by Vietnamese interviewer teams in Saigon and in the provinces. The results obtained are edited, coded, and analyzed in Survey Research Branch which publishes summary reports and distributes them to components in Vietnam and to USIA in Washington.

Evaluation and Analysis Branch of the JUSPAO Planning Office evaluates and pre-tests JUSPAO propaganda media output. It does this through a staff of eight Vietnamese interviewers and the Vietnamese Propaganda Evaluation Panel.

The Vietnamese interviewers conduct interviews in Saigon and surrounding rural areas within safe driving distance of Saigon. All JUSPAO propaganda output, including pamphlets, leaflets, posters, news sheets, tape recordings, and so forth, is pre-tested using prepared questionnaires; a specific questionnaire has been prepared for each medium, additional questions being added as required. The kind of questions asked are as follows: "Is there anything inimical to allied interests in this leaflet?" "Is there anything the Viet Cong could use as counter-propaganda in this leaflet?" Attention is given to colors used in the media output because of the significance given colors have in Vietnamese culture, e.g., white, black and purple represent mourning. It was found in one publication that the Vietnamese legislature was printed in purple, and the people being interviewed asked why the legislature building was in mourning? Also attention is given to the language used in media output to insure that it accurately represents the intended message.

The Vietnamese Propaganda Evaluation Panel consists of five full-time experts, reportedly experienced, astute people. In addition, the panel members select three additional members who are Hoi Chanh. They attempt to select those who have a low educational level, about third grade, but are verbal, sharp, with high natural intelligence. They try to have two of them who recently come from North Vietnam, and one from South Vietnam. The Hoi Chanh members of the panel are changed periodically to maintain a fresh outlook. The panel evaluates all JUSPAO media output, and suggests appropriate changes. In addition, when not evaluating JUSPAO output, the panel reviews and evaluates all obtainable Vietnamese language printed materials that have been printed with U.S. funds to identify any Viet Cong influence in them.

The JUSPAO interviewers do not have access to military interrogation facilities to obtain information and to conduct pre-testing of JUSPAO media output, but they do have access to Hoi Chanh centers near Saigon where they can conduct these activities.

The results of the work of Evaluation and Analysis Branch are disseminated within JUSPAO.
The Combined Intelligence Center, Vietnam (CICV), jointly staffed by U.S. and ARVN military personnel, has as its mission to perform intelligence analysis for the U.S. and ARVN forces in Vietnam. The U.S. component falls organizationally under the Deputy J2 Production in the Office of AC of S J2 MACV. Psychological operations intelligence analysis is conducted by the Psychological Desk in South Vietnam Section of Research and Analysis Division. Psychological desk consists of five U.S. officers and one U.S. enlisted man; all of these men have had intelligence training, none, psychological operations training.

Psychological Desk engages in the following psychological operations intelligence activities:

- Propaganda analysis
- Identification of vulnerabilities
- Impact of friendly psychological operations
- Assessment of strengths, weaknesses, and failures of Revolutionary Development

Intelligence information sources are made available to Psychological Desk through the CICV distribution system, and include interrogation reports, captured document translations, translations of radio broadcasts and press articles, and so forth, but do not include intelligence information reports classified SECRET and carrying the NOFORN restriction. Analysts who must work with such intelligence materials use them in Strategic Resources Branch, MACV J2 where they are available. Propaganda analysts from Psychological Desk frequently visit the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) officer where copies of all their outgoing teletype translations of radio broadcasts and press articles are available to them. Psychological Desk does not receive copies of the teletypes in its office; only Press and Radio Highlights published by FBIS Saigon.

Psychological Desk as a result of its analytical efforts produces every two weeks a contribution to the MACV J2 intelligence briefing. In addition it periodically publishes special studies in the field of psychological operations intelligence.

Dissemination of Psychological Desk reports is handled through MACV J2 channels.

Psychological Desk files the information it wishes to retain in file folders in an indexing system based upon the Intelligence Subject Code (ISC). A copy of the Psychological Desk Filing Categories will be found at the end of this section.
The analysts use the Combined Document Exploitation Center (CDEC) Document Retrieval System as a research tool. In addition, they mentioned that CICV has just started an automatic data processing system of its own, but no information was available about that system. No 3M Reader Printer used for reading the film output of the CDEC Document Retrieval System was observed in the Psychological Desk area.

The tasks of Psychological Desk are generated by themselves based upon reading and analysis of intelligence information reports, and are received through the Chief of Production, CICV from Strategic Resources Branch (SRB) MACV J2 and from Intelligence Operations Division MACV J2. In addition they respond to a number of requests for information and analysis which come to them through personal contact with other members of the intelligence community, with whom they are in contact. It did not appear that Psychological Desk was being tasked by units directly engaged in psychological operations. The nature of their work seemed to be the preparation of background materials for use by people who were engaged in psychological operations.

In connection with the acquisition of unclassified research materials, Psychological Desk has been unable to obtain subscriptions through channels to periodicals pertinent to its mission.

CICV Psychological Desk Filing Categories

VC Psychological Warfare

AVMOO8

135.263 Sabotage
135.265 Terror and Extortion
135.561 VC Propaganda Organization

A. Propaganda and Training
B. Military Proselyting
C. Civilian Proselyting
D. Political Struggle

135.562 VC Propaganda Goals and Plans
135.562A VC Exploitation of RVN Political Unrest
135.563
135.564 VC Propaganda Organs

A. Liberation Press
B. Liberation Radio
C. Publication
D. Printing Facilities
E. Films

6 - C
VC Propaganda Techniques

VC Propaganda Incidents Against Specific Targets and General Themes

A. RVNAF
B. GVN Employees and VN Employees of US Agencies
C. US Troops
D. FMMAF Troops (Koreans, Filipinos, Australians, etc.)
E. Urban Residents
F. Buddhists
G. Catholics
H. Hoa Hao
I. Cao Dai
J. Montagnards
K. Elmers
L. Chinese
M. Youth
N. Peasants

VC Propaganda Training Courses and Instruction
VC Propaganda Policies
VC Propaganda Effects
VC Civilian Proselyting Propaganda
VC Military Proselyting Propaganda
Non-VC Dissident Propaganda

Public Attitudes, Etc.

AVNOOS

255.461 Internal Migration (Refugee Program)
258.000 to 258.020 Provincial Filing Categories
258.022 Public Opinion and Attitudes toward US and US Nationals
258.401 Attitudes toward VC and VC policies
258.402 Life and Outlook in VC controlled Areas
258.402A Anti-VC Incidents
258.50A Hopes, Fears, and Frustrations
### VC Life, Outlook, Morale, Etc.

#### AVNOOS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>VC Morale and Motivation (Main Force)</th>
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<tr>
<td>748.200A</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>748.200B</td>
<td>VC Morale and Motivation (Local Force, Guerrilla, and Self-Defense)</td>
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<tr>
<td>748.200C</td>
<td>Morale and Motivation (NVA in SVN)</td>
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<tr>
<td>748.200D</td>
<td>Morale and Motivation (Civilians in VC-controlled areas)</td>
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<tr>
<td>748.201</td>
<td>VC Draft and Conscription</td>
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<tr>
<td>748.202</td>
<td>VC Reasons for Continuing to Fight</td>
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<tr>
<td>748.203</td>
<td>VC Leave, Pass, and Mail Policy (i.e., VC Isolation)</td>
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<td>748.204</td>
<td>VC Fear of Allied Tactics and Weapons</td>
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<td>748.205</td>
<td>Treatment of Dead and Wounded (Included condolences to families)</td>
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<td>748.206</td>
<td>Frequency of Movement</td>
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<td>748.207</td>
<td>VC Awards and Incentives</td>
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<tr>
<td>748.208</td>
<td>VC Marital Problems</td>
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<td>748.209</td>
<td>Impact of US/GVN Payops</td>
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<td>748.210</td>
<td>VC Measures to Counter US/GVN Payops</td>
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<td>748.211</td>
<td>VC in Combat with US/GVN Units</td>
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<td>748.212</td>
<td>Frictions in VC Ranks</td>
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<td>Possibilities of a Protracted War</td>
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<td>748.214</td>
<td>VC Assessment of the Situation</td>
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<td>748.215</td>
<td>Impact of Chemical Warfare</td>
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<td>Provisions for families of NVA Soldiers in SVN</td>
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<td>VC Treatment of PWS</td>
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<td>VC Suicides</td>
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<td>748.219</td>
<td>General Impact of Chemical Crop Destruction</td>
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<td>748.220</td>
<td>General Impact of Defoliation</td>
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<td>748.221</td>
<td>VC/NVA Indoctrination and Training</td>
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<td>748.222</td>
<td>VC Assignments, Promotion, Demotions</td>
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<td>Health and Medical Care</td>
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<td>751.000</td>
<td>VC/NVA Mercy Killings</td>
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<td>VC Discipline</td>
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<td>759.000</td>
<td>Impact of GVN  Doan Net Program (National Reconciliation Program)</td>
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<td>759.210</td>
<td>VC Deserterion</td>
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<td>VC Surrenders</td>
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<td>759.212</td>
<td>VC Terrorism Against Revolutionary Development Program</td>
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<td>759.213</td>
<td>VC Plans and Policies to Counter RD Program</td>
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<td>759.214</td>
<td>VC Returns and the Chieu Hoi Program</td>
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<td>759.215</td>
<td>Chieu Hoi Statistics</td>
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<td>Reasons for Rallying</td>
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<td>759.217</td>
<td>VC Assessment of Constituent Elections 1966 and Counteractions</td>
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<td>759.218</td>
<td>VC Assessment of 1967 GVN Hamlet and Village Elections</td>
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<td>759.219</td>
<td>VC Assessment of 1967 GVN General Elections</td>
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<tr>
<td>759.220</td>
<td>VC Economic Plans to Counter RD Program</td>
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<td>759.221</td>
<td>VC Communication Plans to Counter RD Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>759.222</td>
<td>VC Political Plans to Counter RD Program</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**8 - C**
The Strategic Resources Branch (SRB) is organizationally located within the Production Division, Deputy J2/Production, of the Office of the AC of S J2 MACV. It is responsible for performing intelligence analysis in the fields of sociology, economics, politics, and psychological operations, and it is primarily interested in South Vietnam. Psychological operations intelligence in SRB is performed by two officers, one having had extensive previous experience in the intelligence and psychological operations fields, and the other new to the psychological operations intelligence field. One of the psychological operations intelligence officers has the additional duty of conducting liaison on behalf of MACV J2 with Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, Psychological Operations Directorate (MACPD); 6th Psychological Operations Battalion; Vietnam Detachment, 7th Psychological Operations Group; the Office of the Special Advisor to the Ambassador; and Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, Studies and Observations Group (MACSOG). It is his duty as Liaison Officer to insure that MACV J2 reports are disseminated to those groups, and to see that their specific intelligence collection requirements and requests for psychological operations intelligence studies are handled by appropriate MACV J2 components. For example, when MACPD has a requirement for a psychological operations intelligence study to be performed, they contact the MACV J2 Liaison Officer who is a psychological operations intelligence officer in SRB. He then asks the Psychological Desk in the Combined Intelligence Center, Vietnam (CICV) to do the initial study. This they do using the information sources which are at their disposal. Then a draft copy of their report is staffed at SRB to see if an input should be made into it of SECRET and NOFORN data, which is not available at CICV. The Psychological Desk analysts from CICV have access to the files at SRB, and may in connection with the preparation of the report utilize those files. After the report has been coordinated with SRB, it is sent to the requester at MACPD, and it may also be issued as a CICV report and be disseminated through MACV J2 channels. The psychological operations intelligence analysts in SRB rely a great deal upon the analysts at the Psychological Desk in CICV for research support.

Reportedly the psychological operations intelligence analysts in SRB publish a weekly psychological operations trends report for consumption within MACV J2, contribute to the MACV PERINTREP and the MACV weekly intelligence estimate, and prepare special reports.
No information was obtained on the documents available in SRB, except that they include CICRC and WCGS reports which are not available at CICV. Likewise no information was obtained on the indexing and filing system utilized for psychological operations intelligence information in SRB. In fact the research team did not enter the room where SRB conducts its work.

Before Research and Analysis Branch was established in MACPD, the Liaison Officer who also performs psychological operations intelligence analysis in SRB used to scan all intelligence information documents crossing his desk for items of interest which might assist the psychological operations intelligence capability at all; it had to rely entirely upon the Liaison Officer and the Research and Analysis Team from the 6th Psychological Operations Battalion for intelligence information and analysis. Now that Research and Analysis Branch has been established it is anticipated that such functions will be performed with MACPD in support of psychological operations.

Research and Analysis Branch
Psychological Operations Directorate
Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
Saigon, Republic of Vietnam

Research and Analysis Branch falls organizationally under Plans and Programs Division of the Psychological Operations Directorate, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACPD). A new Branch, constituted a few months ago, it consists of two officers. A request has been sent forward through channels to expand Research and Analysis Branch to include five officers, two enlisted men, two U.S. civilians, and a number of Vietnamese employees. Final approval for the enlargement of Research and Analysis Branch has not been given. Until the establishment of the branch with two officers, no psychological operations intelligence research and analysis capability existed in MACPD. Therefore, MACPD had no in-house capability formally designed to identify targets for its psychological operations and to develop detailed information on the characteristics of such targets, including vulnerabilities and locations. Such target information as was employed was developed by the media operators themselves, and also to some degree from the psychological operations intelligence capability of Research and Analysis Section of the 6th Psychological Operations Battalion, and requests for such psychological operations intelligence support as were submitted through the MACV J2 Liaison Officer to Strategic Resources Branch of MACV J2, and Psychological Desk of the Combined Intelligence Center, Vietnam, MACV J2. In addition, the MACV J2 Liaison Officer, who also performed psychological operations intelligence work in Strategic Resources Branch, scanned intelligence information reports, principally interrogation reports and captured document translations, for information which might be of use to the various divisions of MACPD. But, the magnitude of the target analysis effort of MACPD in
relation to its operations can only be described as limited, and not at all adequate to support well planned and targeted psychological operations.

Research and Analysis Branch was established in the spring of 1967 within MACPD to provide an internal psychological operations intelligence research and analysis capability which could directly support MACPD psychological operations by conducting target analysis, propaganda analysis, effects evaluation, vulnerability studies, area assessments, and maintain indexed psychological operations intelligence files based upon all available intelligence information. Presently (July 1967), Research and Analysis Branch consisting of two officers, is primarily concerned with devising scientific approaches to the problem of effects evaluation through the interrogation of prisoners of war and returnees. This effort has involved planning for the use of scientific research organizations under U.S. Government contract to conduct comprehensive surveys of prisoners of war and returnees using questionnaires and then subjecting that data to computer analysis to determine scientifically reasons for defection, morale, visibility of leaflets and related topics. This approach has been developed by Research and Analysis Branch out of the consideration that presently interrogations involve the use of a non-standard system of interrogations and interviews for psychological operations questions involving leading questions, and that the data obtained from such interrogations is not scientifically valid. It is considered that this effort is misoriented, and does not recognize the crucial problem of providing target analysis support to MACPD operations, without such intelligence support there is a great danger that such operations will be mis-directed and not effective.

MACPD receives intelligence information reports which fall into a number of categories and come from a number of sources. Following is a list of dissemination received at MACPD:

MACV Directives and Regulations
Reports from the 6th Psychological Operations Battalion
Reports from the 19th, 244th, 245th, and 246th Psychological Operations Companies.
Target lists, source unknown, possibly the Tactical Air Control Center
FBIS reports
Incident reports
American Embassy, incoming and outgoing messages
SITREPS and Operations Summaries
CAS Reports
Vietnam Press
Reports from the 7th Psychological Operations Group
POW/MIA Advisor Weekly reports
MACV J2 INTSUM
Interrogation Reports
Captured Document Translations
Press and Radio Highlights
All documents come into MACPD at the Administrative Section where they are sorted and routing within MACPD is assigned to each document. Most of the reports received are routed to Research and Analysis Branch, but it should be noted that they are routed to most of the other branches and divisions of MACPD as well. Research and Analysis Branch is sixth on the routing list, and must send all reports on to other MACPD units after it has read them. The routing of most reports terminates in the POLAR Advisory Division, possibly with the PSYAR Branch. Only two categories of reports terminate in MACPD files; these are MACV Directives and Regulations and Weekly Reports from POLAR Advisors. MACPD forwards two categories of reports to the 6th Psychological Operations Battalion after they have been routed through MACPD; these are Vietnam Press and Press and Radio Highlights. CAS Reports may be read by representatives of the 6th Psychological Operations Battalion at MACPD; they are not disseminated to the Battalion. MACPD requires that all intelligence information reports be routed through it to the 6th Psychological Operations Battalion. It is believed in the case of some types of reports, such as captured document translations and interrogation reports, that two copies are received at MACPD, and one is directly routed to the 6th Psychological Operations Battalion and the other one is routed within MACPD.

It may be observed in the above described dissemination procedure that intelligence are disseminated throughout MACPD, and from this it may be deduced that components of MACPD in addition to Research and Analysis Branch are utilizing the information contained within them, and possibly performing their own intelligence analysis in support of their psychological operations. After that Branch has been expanded, it is anticipated that it will be the primary recipient of intelligence information reports, and will analyze them in support of the psychological operations intelligence needs of the other components of MACPD.

As far as could be determined no intelligence information files, document retrieval system, and indexing system exist presently in MACPD. However, it was reported that quite recently they may have established some files for intelligence documents, but no information about them was obtained.

There was no 3M Reader Printer at MACPD in Research and Analysis Branch, and consequently any output from the CDEC Document Retrieval System in film form must be reviewed at another location possessing such a device. Thus Research and Analysis Branch cannot utilize as fully as it might the large body of intelligence documents pertaining to Vietnam contained in the CDEC Document Retrieval System.

Research and Analysis Branch presently contribute items to the MACPD Newsletter, a publication which goes to field units and advisors who may exploit such items tactically.
MACFID Research and Analysis Branch is served by a MACV J2 Liaison Officer who handles any requests for intelligence information or analyses they might have which can be supplied by MACV J2 components. Most of such intelligence support is in connection with leaflet operations, which MACPD is greatly involved in. Small requests for support from MACV J2 may be given verbally to the MACV J2 Liaison Officer, but requests requiring a sizeable expenditure of effort must be requested formally in writing from MACPD through MACV J3 to MACV J2. Any requests originating with the 6th Psychological Operations Battalion, must go first to MACPD and then through the same channel. The same procedure applies to the Vietnam Detachment of the 7th Psychological Operations Group when it submits a request on behalf of Propaganda Branch of that organization. It was noted that MACPD had submitted relatively few requests for intelligence information and analyses to MACV J2 considering its mission and the size of its operation.

Research and Analysis Team, S2 Section
6th Psychological Operations Battalion
Saigon, Republic of Vietnam

The 6th Psychological Operations Battalion is under the staff supervision of the Psychological Operations Directorate, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACPD). The companies of the 6th Psychological Operations Battalion are assigned to the four Corps areas in Vietnam and are under the Corps Commanders. Following are the locations of the companies of the Battalion:

19th Psychological Operations Company
244th Psychological Operations Company
245th Psychological Operations Company
246th Psychological Operations Company

Can Tho
Danang
Nha Trang
Bien Hoa

The 19th Psychological Operations Company has a detachment located at Binh Thuy, and the 245th Psychological Operations Company has a detachment located at Pleiku.

Psychological operations intelligence research and analysis is conducted by the 6th Psychological Operations Battalion, S2 Section, Research and Analysis Team. This may be described as a strategic research and analysis role; the companies have a tactical research and analysis role. Research and Analysis team provides psychological operations intelligence research and analysis support to MACPD, and to the companies of the Battalion. The Battalion's companies have a small research and analysis capability which is used directly in support of their operations.

The functions of the S2 Section, 6th Psychological Operations Battalion are as follows:
1. Staff supervision of intelligence/security advisors.
2. Control and safeguarding of defense information.
3. Liaison with civilian, paramilitary, and military agencies.
4. Psychological interrogation.
5. Translating and interpreting.
7. Determination and exploitation of vulnerabilities.
8. Reports, studies, and leaflets.

Research and Analysis Team is responsible for carrying out most of the above functions.

Research and Analysis Team, as it is actually constituted, consists of about two officers, one of whom is the Liaison Officer, three intelligence analysts, two interrogators, and one intelligence file clerk, a total of eight individuals.

According to the official Table of Organization of the 6th Psychological Operations Battalion, it is assigned one Team FC Propaganda (Current Intelligence), and two Teams FD Propaganda (Research and Analysis). Following is a breakdown of these teams showing authorized and actual strength figures:

### Team FC Propaganda (Current Intelligence)

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The actual assigned strength total for the one Team FE and the two Teams FD is 19 men. As noted above as actually constituted the Research and Analysis Team consists of about eight individuals; eleven men assigned to the 6th Psychological Operations Battalion to perform psychological operations intelligence research and analysis are apparently not being utilized in their assigned positions.

No information was available about the composition of the psychological operations intelligence activities in the companies of the 6th Psychological Operations Battalion, except that reportedly two or three men in each company handle such work as well as security.

Research and Analysis Team receives its basic intelligence information report distribution through MACPD, which because it exercises staff supervision over the 6th Psychological Operations Battalion, requires that all intelligence documents be routed through it to the Battalion. Research and Analysis Battalion does not receive all documents produced by MACV J2 intelligence collection components under this arrangement. To fill in this gap, and to be sure that all available intelligence information is available to it, Research and Analysis Team has an officer assigned the duty of acting as Liaison Officer; he maintains contact with all the intelligence information sources listed in Appendix A of this report and attempts to insure that all pertinent intelligence information reports are available to Research and Analysis Team.

The Liaison Officer maintains a contact sheet file of all sources of information with which he maintains contact. They use the organizations listed in that file to support their psychological operations intelligence research and analysis effort. When Research and Analysis Team has a question which cannot be answered by information contained in their files, the Liaison Officer is sent to the pertinent sources listed in the contact sheet file to obtain the needed information. A contact sheet of information source gives the name of the organization, name of the information facility, address, telephone number, persons contacted, and so forth.

Research and Analysis Team has contacted information centers and libraries in the United States for information to meet its needs.

Research and Analysis Team files its intelligence information documents according to a psychological operations subject code which it developed. The incoming documents are all logged in, read, and then indexed and filed according to their major subject coverage. A cross reference file is maintained of secondary subject coverage of reports. It may be noted here that Research and Analysis Team did not refer to a heavy volume of intelligence information documents coming into its office every day; the MACV J2 Liaison Officer reported that he scanned about 1500 pages of intelligence documents every day. Although Research and Analysis Team has aggressively attacked the problem of information acquisition, there may be problems in the intelligence document flow system which prevent them from getting all documents.
Research and Analysis Section utilized the services of the Combined Document Exploitation Center (CDEC) Document Retrieval System, but it does not have a 3M Reader Printer which would enable it to handle the film output of the CDSC Document Retrieval System.

Research and Analysis Team has its own internal intelligence information collection capability in its interrogators. Interrogators are assigned to psychological operations units to conduct interrogations of enemy prisoners of war and returnees at military interrogation facilities because of the fact that military interrogators are not aware of and do not have training in conducting interrogations for the kind of information needed by psychological operations intelligence research and analysis units.

The interrogators of Research and Analysis Team have through informal personal arrangements gained access to interrogation facilities in the Saigon area and conducted interrogations to collect psychological operations intelligence information. In addition they have pre-tested leaflets at those same facilities. They prefer to have access to military interrogation facilities based upon formal arrangements made with MACV J2 but they have not been able to make such official arrangements thus far. Personal interest in their assigned intelligence specialty, professionalism, and personal aggressiveness have enabled the interrogators in Research and Analysis Team to accomplish the mission assigned to them in TOE 33-500F, 10 February 1965. Research and Analysis Section has plans to produce psychological operations intelligence interrogation reports.

Research and Analysis Team has an interrogation guide which is based upon the Suggested Format, PSW: Interrogation for Psychological Warfare, found in FM 33-5, January 1962, Appendix II, page 279. Work is underway on a detailed psychological operations intelligence interrogation guide which will be used by Research and Analysis Branch interrogators, and will be supplied to military intelligence interrogators in Vietnam to make them more aware of the information requirements of psychological operations.

Research tasks are either generated within Research and Analysis Team or received from MACPD, 6th Battalion Psychological Operations Companies located in the Corps areas, Psychological Operations Advisors, etc.

Research and Analysis Team performs propaganda analysis based upon FBIS sources. It receives the FBIS Saigon Press and Radio Highlights, but not the carbon copies of FBIS Saigon's teletype traffic or the FBIS Daily Report produced in Washington. It does consult the clipboard collections of FBIS teletypes located in the FBIS Saigon office. In addition it receives Vietnam Press through MACPD.

Research and Analysis Team has done five provincial psychological operations area assessments. The information contained in these
reports was obtained from JUSTAC, SADIP, the University of Saigon, and intelligence files. These area assessments were modeled after the area assessments produced by the 7th Psychological Operations Group. In addition to basic data on the province being analyzed, they contain information about programs and projects in the province, attitudes of the people, attitudes of GVN officials, program development, Viet Cong propaganda in the province, and vulnerabilities.

Research and Analysis Team has also pre-tested some leaflets for MACPD. About seven or eight leaflet pre-test reports have been issued thus far.

Research and Analysis Team is developing a Hoi Chanh personality data sheet questionnaire which is an outgrowth of a study done on Chieu Hoi motivation. The data sheet, designed to lend itself to automatic data processing, contains topics such as personal data, date rallied, time rallied, place rallied, reason for rallying, reason for joining, and so forth. This single sheet questionnaire is being designed to be given to every interrogator in Vietnam to administer to all Chieu Hoi.

Every month, Research and Analysis Team produces Psychological Intelligence Summary — Viet-Nam. Reportedly this is the only psychological operations intelligence summary published in Vietnam. Following is its usual table of contents:

1. Chieu Hoi
2. Vulnerabilities and Opportunities
   a. The Revolutionary Development Program
   b. Cadre
   c. Soldiers
   d. Conscript
3. Propaganda Analysis
   a. VC/NVA propaganda themes
   b. Counter-propaganda
   c. GVN/Allied psychological operations themes/effects analysis

Following is the standard distribution list of Research and Analysis Team:

19th Psychological Operations Company
244th Psychological Operations Company
245th Psychological Operations Company
246th Psychological Operations Company
JUSTPAO
MACPD
The publications of Research and Analysis Team are mimeographed in the 6th Psychological Operations Battalion Message Center; about 60 copies are printed of each publication. Any organization may get on the distribution list by writing to the 6th Psychological Operations Battalion.

It is considered that Research and Analysis Team has shown professionalism, intelligence, and aggressiveness in the way it has attempted to accomplish its assigned mission in spite of the problems facing it which have been mentioned in this section, and if these problems were overcome the 6th Psychological Operations Battalion would be an even more important psychological operations intelligence research and analysis asset.

Propaganda Branch
7th Psychological Operations Group
APO 96248 (Okinawa)

Propaganda Branch of the 7th Psychological Operations Group has the mission of performing psychological operations intelligence research and analysis on all of the countries of the Far East and Southeast Asian areas. It performs target and propaganda analysis, and publishes such psychological operations intelligence analyses in its Communist Propaganda Trends, Psychological Opportunities, psychological operations area assessments, special reports, and topical reports. It responds to specific requests for psychological operations intelligence analyses form higher headquarters or from units in the field. Through its detachments located in Vietnam, Thailand, Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea, the 7th Psychological Operations Group is in a position to provide psychological operations intelligence to military units located in those areas which require such an input. The detachments also conduct liaison with local military and governmental units to provide psychological operations support from the resources of the 7th Psychological Operations Group Headquarters located in Okinawa. The detachments through local liaison collect all available information and send it to Group Headquarters as an information input to Propaganda Branch. The 7th Psychological Operations Group also
receives intelligence information reports and finished studies from the DIA Dissemination Center, and has established relationships with the Defense Documentation Center, the Foreign Area Research Coordination Center, the Center for Research in the Social Sciences, and other information centers in the United States.

The Vietnam Detachment (two officers and two enlisted men) of the 7th Psychological Operations Group is located in the same compound as the 6th Psychological Operations Battalion, and in Vietnam falls under the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, Psychological Operations Directorate (MACPD). The mission of Vietnam Detachment is to conduct liaison with psychological operations units and activities located in Vietnam, and to make available in accordance with its mission the resources of the 7th Psychological Operations Group. With regard to psychological operations intelligence, the mission of Vietnam Detachment is through its liaison function with intelligence components in Vietnam to acquire intelligence information reports and intelligence studies for Propaganda Branch. In addition it also indicates to Propaganda Branch any psychological operations intelligence analytical tasks that need to be done.

Propaganda Analysis Division
Foreign Broadcast Information Service
Washington, D.C.

Propaganda Analysis Division (PAD) of the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) performs propaganda analysis of the foreign propaganda sent to FBIS Headquarters in Washington, D.C. PAD publishes Trends in Communist Propaganda and Survey of Communist Propaganda. Eight copies of these propaganda analysis periodicals are sent to FBIS Saigon which distributes them to MACV, MACV J5, MACPD, OSA, British Embassy, JUSPAO, and the American Embassy, Political Section. FBIS Washington sends copies of these publications to the DIA Dissemination Center which distributes them to Department of Defense components which are on the Dissemination Center distribution list for them.

Units in Saigon which wish to contact PAD in Washington may do so through the FBIS Saigon office.

Office for Policy and Research
United States Information Agency
Washington, D.C.

The Office for Policy and Research (OPR), formerly called the Office for Research and Reports, of the United States Information Agency (USIA) is located in Washington, D.C. at USIA Headquarters. No information was available regarding the specific areas of psychological
operations intelligence research and analysis that will be conducted by that newly formed office. Probably the analytical functions performed in the former Office for Research and Reports will be continued in some form or other within it.

The Rand Corporation
River Road
Saigon, Republic of Vietnam

The Rand Corporation primarily conducts interviews with refugees, Chieu Hoi, and prisoners of war, but from time to time based upon the information collected through those interviews produces analytical reports dealing with attitudes, vulnerabilities, and so forth. These reports are issued as Rand Corporation Memoranda, and are printed in the standard Rand Corporation format. About 200 copies of each of these reports are reportedly distributed in Vietnam.
APPENDIX D: ANALYSIS OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM AND SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVING IT

CONTENTS

1. Intelligence Information Sources and Requirements 1 - D
2. Dissemination of Intelligence Information 3 - D
3. Intelligence Information Storage and Data Retrieval Systems 6 - D
4. Personnel 8 - D
5. Psychological Operations Intelligence 10 - D
   a. Target Analysis 10 - D
   b. Propaganda Analysis 10 - D
   c. Pre-testing 11 - D
   d. Post-testing 11 - D
   e. Daily Intelligence Summaries Should Include Intelligence for PSYOPS 11 - D
   f. Failure of PSYOP Units to Identify Their Intelligence Requirements 11 - D
   g. Relations Between PSYOP Intelligence Staffs and Other Intelligence Staffs. 11 - D
   h. Variations of PSYOP Intelligence Needs. 12 - D
   i. Deficiency of PSYOPS Intelligence. 12 - D
   j. Inadequate Intelligence Community Support for PSYOPS Intelligence Needs. 12 - D
   k. Waste of PSYOP Intelligence Effort in Scanning Masses of Routine Documents. 12 - D
   l. Lack of Intelligence Support to PSYOP Units. 12 - D
   m. Inadequacy of PSYOPS Intelligence. 13 - D
   n. Collection and Selection of Intelligence for PSYOPS 13 - D
   o. PSYOPS Utilization of Traditional Intelligence 13 - D
   p. Intelligence Collected Without PSYOP Requirements in Mind. 13 - D
   q. PSYOP Intelligence Differs from Traditional Military Intelligence. 13 - D

6. Dissemination of Psychological Operations Intelligence 13 - D

7. Psychological Operations Intelligence Research and Analysis Center 14 - D
APPENDIX D. ANALYSIS OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVING IT

1. Intelligence Information Sources and Requirements

It was found that a huge amount of intelligence information pertaining to Vietnam is being produced: intelligence sources, including interrogation, translations of captured enemy documents, translations of radio broadcasts and press articles, agent reports, enemy material reports, field observer reports, and unclassified publications. The total output of such information may amount to as much as 1,500 pages each day. But do these reports contain information which can be used in psychological operations intelligence research and analysis? Yes, they contain a great deal of information which pertains to such intelligence activities, but they could contain more because psychological operations information does not have a high priority. There are two factors which must be considered here; the existing capabilities of psychological operations intelligence units to handle the present quantity of information, and the fact that psychological operations intelligence essential elements of information (EEI) and specific intelligence collection requirements (SICR) play a minor role in guiding the collection effort, psychological operations intelligence information has a low collection priority.

Presently there are, according to our observations and in the consideration of other analysts, five components active in psychological operations intelligence research in Saigon with a total staff of about 25 people. There is some duplication of effort among those organizations. A frequent statement made by analysts active in psychological operations intelligence analysis was that because of the volume and the small number of people in the office that they could not perform satisfactory analysis and exploit all the information contained in the reports which crossed their desks. This is a problem which can be resolved by increasing the size of the staffs of such offices, assigning specific areas of responsibility to each analyst, and coordinating all psychological operations intelligence research and analysis activities with other such organizations to minimize duplication of effort. In addition greater use could be made of document retrieval systems such as the one found at the Combined Document Exploitation Center. The use of such a system reduces the need for each psychological operations intelligence office to maintain its own indexed complete set of files of all pertinent intelligence documents. Of course, each office must be able to have unrestricted access to such a document retrieval system; it should not have to go through a lot of red tape to submit each information request. It is understood that the CDEC does permit free access to analysts to use its system once their status has been verified through channels. Also, each psychological operations intelligence office should have a 3M Reader Printer which would give its analysts the capability of using the film output of the
The CDEC system, and provide a way of storing large quantities of documents pertinent to a specific research problem in a small space.

The intelligence information collection effort for psychological operations intelligence information is influenced only to a small degree by the standard guidance methods, essential elements of information (EEI), specific intelligence collection requirements (SICR), interrogation guides, personal contact, and so forth. Psychological operations intelligence units, as far as could be determined, have submitted to intelligence information collecting units few such guidance devices and the collection priority assigned to psychological operations intelligence is low. This accounts for the relatively few pertinence of the information content of intelligence reports to the needs of psychological operations intelligence research and analysis, the useful information they contain is often a by-product of the main emphasis of the report. For example, in the approximately five years it has existed, the National Interrogation Center (NIC) has received only one psychological operations intelligence SICR. Interrogators at the Combined Military Intelligence Center made the observation that they had received few such requirements, and that they had received little guidance regarding the general information needs of psychological operations intelligence. Their training as interrogators was oriented toward obtaining tactical information in support of military operations. Because of this, it has been mentioned, military intelligence interrogators when they are conducting questioning relating to a psychological operations intelligence topic do not follow through in their questioning. For example, an interrogator may ask a source, "How was morale in your unit?" The source replies, "Poor." The interrogator does not ask any more questions; based on his training he has fulfilled the requirement, but he has not the orientation to prove further into the reasons for low morale.

The training of military intelligence interrogators is conducted at the U.S. Army Intelligence School, Ft. Holabird, Maryland. One of the basic texts used in the interrogators course is The Interrogator's Guide, USAINTS No. 65145, June 1965. On page 1, under B. Coordination, is a list of twelve military activities with which it is suggested that the interrogator coordinate. The last one on the list is PSYWAR Personnel, but the first item is Order of Battle Personnel. The text does contain a few questions related to psychological operations, but these are scattered through the text.

List objects of fear peculiar to his (the source's) locality or unit.
List objects of extreme endearment peculiar to his (the source's) locality or unit.
How do replacements affect the morale of your unit?
How do you obtain the support of the local population?
Political indoctrination?
Miscellaneous data. (Listed below are topics for discussion.)
Morale and spirit.
Discipline.
Unit History.
Miscellaneous data. (Listed below are topics for discussion.)

Morale and spirit.
Discipline.
Unit History.

The Interrogator's Guide does not contain any questions relating to leaflets, loudspeaker broadcasts, radio broadcasts, and the like. In fact the approach of that guide may be described as superficial, and contains only a scattered representation of questions relating to psychological operations. It can be seen from the foregoing that military intelligence are not prepared in their training to conduct the kind of interrogations to support psychological operations intelligence. It was for this reason that interrogators were made a specific part of psychological operations Team FC Propaganda (Current Intelligence), which is authorized according to TOE33-550F, 10 February 65, two interrogators. These positions were established in recognition of the fact that military intelligence interrogators are not aware of psychological operations intelligence requirements to provide psychological operations trained interrogators to support psychological operations intelligence units. It was considered that these interrogators would have access to military interrogation facilities where they could conduct their interrogations.

In Saigon, two psychological operations interrogators are assigned to the 6th Psychological Operations Battalion. It is understood that they have been able through official channels to obtain access to military interrogation facilities; only through personal friendships and informal relationships have their obtained access to such facilities. This has proved to be a difficult way in which to operate. It is suggested that all psychological operations interrogators be granted access to military interrogation facilities to conduct psychological operations interrogations.

It is also recommended that briefing and orientation materials on the needs of psychological operations intelligence needs be prepared and distributed to military intelligence collectors, including interrogators. Thus Army Intelligence School should provide more training in psychological operations to the intelligence and interrogators which it trains. Further, through personal contact by psychological operations intelligence officers, collectors can be kept aware of psychological operations informational needs. Also, psychological operations intelligence units have been negligent in submitting ERI and SICR to intelligence information collectors; they must actively use these devices as a way of obtaining information suited to their specific needs, rather than passively using only that which comes to their in-boxes.

2. Dissemination of Intelligence Information

Intelligence information is disseminated by mail distribution systems, liaison officers, and through personal contacts. Successful functioning of this dissemination system is an important factor affecting the quality of intelligence analysis.
Mail distribution systems involve the transmission of intelligence information reports, usually classified documents, through secure routing channels from the producer to the recipient. The producer may establish a list of the names of the recipients and send the reports to them, or the producer may send a number of reports to a distribution center which maintains a list of recipients for the documents and sends them out in accordance with it. An example of the first type is the distribution of the reports produced by Research and Analysis Branch of the 6th Psychological Operations Battalion, which has a distribution list of recipients, and sends its reports to them. An organization desiring to get on the distribution list has only to write the Battalion asking to be put on the distribution list. An example of the second type is the DIA Dissemination Center which handles the distribution of intelligence documents to all Department of Defense components. It, for example, receives every day a bulk shipment of multiple copies of the Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report; it sends out each copy of the Daily Report to recipients listed on its distribution list. To get on the distribution list at DIA Dissemination Center, an organization must write to them through G2 channels and complete a Statement of Intelligence Interest (SII).

A problem exists for psychological operations intelligence units in Saigon; a number have reported difficulty in getting their names on the distribution lists for documents produced by intelligence information collectors in Vietnam. MACV J2 requires that all requests for an organization to have its name added to a distribution list be submitted to it. Units have done this, but no action has been taken on their request and they have not been able to receive the documents that they require.

MACPD does not receive all pertinent intelligence documents. The reason for this may be the one referred to above. The 6th Psychological Operations Battalion and Vietnam Detachment, 7th Psychological Operations Group face a similar problem, but it is compounded by the fact that they must communicate with all components of MACV through MACPD. Thus, their requests to be put on distribution for a series of documents must go through MACPD, to MACV J3, to MACV J2; they have not been successful in getting their names added to distribution lists.

The 6th Psychological Operations Battalion faces an additional problem in that all the documents which it receives must be routed through MACPD. Thus, it receives some documents after they have been routed through MACPD, but if a component in MACPD wishes to retain the document it will not get to the Battalion. In addition, it takes time for documents to go through all of the divisions of MACPD, and consequently when the document is received by the Battalion, it is not timely. This situation, of course, can be corrected by having all required documents routed directly from the dissemination point or producer to the 6th Psychological Operations Battalion, and having all required documents routed in the
same way directly to MACV. Each organization would receive its own complete set of intelligence information reports. This is based upon the principle that intelligence documents are not routed down through command channels, but are routed directly to the consumer for the sake of timeliness. This is the principle under which the DIA Dissemination Center operates with respect to its recipients.

Psychological operations intelligence units have reported difficulties in obtaining periodical subscriptions and purchasing books through official channels. For example, Research and Analysis Team, 6th Psychological Operations Battalion attempted to obtain a subscription to JPRS translations of North Vietnamese and Southeast Asian publications through the 1st Logistical Command which rejected their request on the basis that it was not necessary of the performance of their mission. Channels to obtain subscriptions and books must be established.

Internal routing of documents within an office presents another problem. Commonly documents are routed by a person who does not know what the documents are he is routing, and what kinds of documents the people in the organization wish to receive. No information was obtained on how documents are routed within psychological operations intelligence offices in Saigon.

Liaison officers exist to provide for coordination between organizations. MACV J2 has several liaison officers whose duty it is, among other things, to insure that intelligence information being produced by MACV J2 components is getting to psychological operations intelligence units, and to see that their ESI, SICR, and requests for intelligence analysis are handled by the appropriate MACV J2 component. Important qualities which the officer filling this position should have are detailed knowledge of the organization of MACV J2, procedures for accomplishing actions in MACV J2, the intelligence information producing components of MACV J2, both psychological operations and intelligence, the organization of the units with which he is conducting liaison, and their information needs. He should be personally aggressive, inquisitive, and intelligent; he should spend a lot of his time outside of the office gathering information, giving briefings to collectors on psychological operations intelligence requirements, determining such requirements, and insuring that the information he obtains gets to the right people. In Saigon the liaison officers between MACV J2 and the psychological operations intelligence units have a most important role; with their assistance a unit can receive the information it needs to operate, without it, it can only function at a low level of efficiency. The MACV J2 liaison officer has a full-time job; he cannot perform that duty effectively if saddled with other responsibilities, such as research and analysis. He must be free to come and go, not have to ask permission of his superior to go out of his office area, as apparently is the case with one MACV J2 liaison officer.
Personal visits are another important way in which intelligence information is disseminated. Analysts specializing in the same field can through the professional interplay of their approaches gain new insights into their work. They can call to each others attention important intelligence information which may have been overlooked. Such contacts serve to coordinate research efforts, and avoid unnecessary duplication. Mutual assistance and guidance can be provided in research efforts. Where red tape exists, and the formal structure is such as to make written communication difficult, personal friendships and contacts provide a way to act and communicate effectively.

Personal contacts are an important way in the psychological operations intelligence community in Saigon of accomplishing one's tasks. There are a lot of organizational roadblocks which can be circumvented by using personal contact. For example, if an psychological operations interrogator has a leaflet to pre-test, he may try unsuccessfully to arrange for access through MACV J2 to the Combined Military Interrogation Center, but a former intelligence school classmate working in the Center easily arranges access for him to pre-test his leaflet.

When we were conducting visits to intelligence information collectors, we tried to arrange appointments to visit them through MACV J2, but nothing happened at all. In the interests of getting the job done, through personal contact, we were able to visit most of the intelligence information collection units.

People tend to blame MACV J2 for red tape, distribution problems, and difficulties in obtaining access to facilities. Part of the problem is that knowledge is not available on MACV J2 procedures; men in MACV J2 may not know how to operate within it, not know their own organization, and not know their job. Yearly turnover (the one year military tour of duty in Vietnam) is of course a problem in this respect, as is the assignment of people with no previous intelligence experience to fill positions in MACV J2. On the other hand, people who wish to deal with MACV J2 may not have taken the trouble to learn how it is organized and what its procedures are.

Intelligence information dissemination from the collectors to psychological operations intelligence units needs to be improved. Such intelligence units must be on all pertinent dissemination lists, liaison officers must actively promote communications between the two groups, and direct contact between them must be facilitated.

3. Intelligence Information Storage and Data Retrieval Systems

Intelligence information is organized and stored in psychological operations intelligence units according to a number of different indexing systems in vertical filing cabinets. Psychological Desk of the Combined Intelligence Center, Vietnam (CICV) uses an adaptation of
the Intelligence Subject Code (ISC), the United States Intelligence Board (USIB) approved system of indexing intelligence information, designed to meet the information categories handled by Psychological Desk; documents are manually filed and retrieved from file cabinets.

Research and Analysis Team of the 6th Psychological Operations Battalion uses a system of its own design to index and file documents. Research and Analysis Branch of MACPD has, reportedly, just begun to use a filing system, but no information, other than it is a manual system, was available. The systems used in Strategic Resources Branch, MACV J2, and JUSPAO Planning Office are also manual; the filing categories were not determined. Filing cabinet space at JUSPAO Planning Office was reportedly limited.

None of the offices involved in psychological operations intelligence research had the 3M Reader Printer which could give them the capability of utilizing the film output of the CDEC Document Retrieval System, thereby permitting them to have organized on film in accordance with the ISC indexing system large numbers of pertinent intelligence documents with a minimum storage and filing problem. It is considered that all the manual filing systems presently used in psychological operations intelligence offices are incomplete and partial, because they do not represent the total body of all pertinent intelligence documents in a thoroughly indexed and retrievable form. In Saigon, only the CDEC Document Retrieval System, as far as could be determined, presently permits this to be done. Therefore it is recommended that every psychological operations intelligence office be equipped with the 3M Reader Printer, each intelligence research analyst be thoroughly briefed on the CDEC Document Retrieval System and its ISC indexing system, and that arrangements be established for direct servicing of the intelligence information needs of each psychological operations intelligence research and analysis office by the CDEC Document Retrieval System.

Psychological operations intelligence research and analysis units make only limited use of intelligence information centers located in the United States, although such use can be fairly easily arranged through written correspondence with them through the appropriate channels. Only Research and Analysis Team of the 6th Psychological Operations Battalion appeared to have actively contacted and used such facilities. Research and Analysis Branch of MACPD has recently established contacts with the Defense Documentation Center (DDC) and other information centers in the United States.

There are several reasons why such information centers are not utilized. For one thing, many people do not know of their existence, their capabilities, and the proper method to establish contact with them. Also, when units have attempted to establish such contacts through channels, such attempts have often not succeeded because the request papers have not been correctly handled.
It is recommended that greater use be made of all intelligence information centers so that all pertinent classified and unclassified information will be available to analysts working in the psychological operations intelligence field.

4. Personnel

A number of problems exist in the area of personnel staffing, training, and utilization. At the present time it is estimated that in the five main psychological operations intelligence units being considered in this study, there are a total of twenty-five U.S. nationals engaged in psychological operations intelligence research and analysis. This is considered to be a relatively small research and analysis effort considering the magnitude of psychological operations in Vietnam which must be supported. Because of the few people doing psychological operations intelligence analysis, those who are involved in it must exist from crisis to crisis, like firemen putting out fires; they do not have adequate time to do the more detailed and thorough studies that are needed. We feel that one of the reasons PSYOPS is ineffective in its overall application is because the PSYOP unit becomes part and parcel of and subject to the whim of each unit's commanding officer. This is to say - a PSYOP unit is only as effective as its CO, and if the CO stresses the value of doing a good PSYOP job, that will be the results. However, most CO's are influenced by their previous military careers, and if the CO be an infantry officer, the PSYOP unit will take the characteristics of an infantry unit, with most of the time spend on spit and polish and ceremonies, rather than on getting the PSYOP job done. With most CO's of PSYOP Units not having had any previous PSYOP experience, and in fact not understanding the intricacies of running a sophisticated PSYOP operation, how can they instill in their officers and EM the desire to do effective PSYOPS? True, some officers, and some EM do go to a PSYOP school, but is this to say that a 6 week or 10 week course is going to make them PSYOPERS; when most officers are only worried about what a PSYOP tour will do to their basic career branch ratings. All officers are rated by what their CO thinks of them, and therefore if the PSYOP Unit CO be an infantry officer and wants his unit run like a garrison infantry unit, that is how the PSYOP Unit is going to be run, for these officers are after all rated on how they carried out the desires of their CO, so must for a good rating follow the CO's wishes, even if it goes against the PSYOP Unit.

Also, there is duplication of efforts because a number of the same psychological operations intelligence functions are being conducted in most of the offices. Propaganda analysis for example, is being performed at CICV Psychological Desk, JUSPAO Planning Office, and Research and Analysis Team, 6th Psychological Operations Battalion.

Following is a listing of the approximate number of U.S. nationals performing psychological operations research and analysis in the five main psychological operations intelligence research and analysis components:
The solution to this problem is of course to assign more trained and experienced people to psychological operations intelligence research and analysis units, and thereby be able to provide vastly greater support to psychological operations programs.

It was determined that a problem exists in the utilization of people assigned to do psychological operations intelligence. There have been assigned to the 6th Psychological Operations Battalion in Saigon a total of 19 men to do work in psychological operations intelligence, but as far as could be determined, only eight of these men are actually performing such functions. This suggests that the intent of U.S. Army policy to provide adequate psychological operations intelligence support as indicated in TOE-33-5COF and assignments made in accordance with it is not being followed. (Incidentally, it was observed that FM33-1 and FM 33-5 are little used in the offices contacted.) The psychological operations intelligence research personnel have been provided to the Battalion, but it is not using them in the positions to which the men were assigned.

Until several months ago, the Psychological Operations Directorate, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACPD) had no internal psychological operations intelligence capability. Two officers have been assigned to do such analysis, and a request has been submitted to expand the new Research and Analysis Branch to a total of nine people. Presently,
however, that Branch must function in support of MACPD with only two intelligence officers, who have had no previous experience in psychological operations or intelligence. If the planned expansion of Research and Analysis Branch is approved, and if experienced trained psychological operations intelligence analysts are assigned to it, it should be able to function more effectively than it now is functioning.

In many cases, men are assigned to psychological operations intelligence research and analysis positions in the intelligence community in Saigon, who have had no experience in psychological operations, intelligence, or related fields in the social sciences. Often they do not know how to go about doing research, and to actively investigate all available sources of information. In spite of being in psychological operations intelligence for the first time, some men have made an active effort to learn their job and to actively perform its duties, but others have not. It is recommended that people be assigned to psychological operations intelligence positions who have had training and education in one or more of the fields of psychological operations, intelligence research and analysis, and social science research techniques.

5. Psychological Operations Intelligence

a. Target Analysis. Target analysis, including area assessments and vulnerability studies, is now being conducted by Research and Analysis, JUSPAO Planning Office; Psychological Desk, CICV; Psychological Officers, Strategic Resources Branch, MACV J2; and Research and Analysis Team, 6th Psychological Operations Battalion. Each of these organizations has published analytical reports based on their research of available intelligence information. The effort expended is relatively small considering the size, complexity, extent, and numbers of the targets to be analyzed. Many more analysts should be involved in this effort.

A need exists for detailed provincial psychological operations area assessments; the 6th Psychological Operations Battalion has prepared five short ones, which are quite superficial, but does not have the manpower to produce any more. The last overall area assessment for Vietnam as a whole was done several years ago by the 7th Psychological Operations Group; it is basically a re-hash of NIS information and the SORO handbook. More provincial level psychological operations area assessments are needed which contain detailed information.

b. Propaganda Analysis. Propaganda analysis is being conducted at Research and Analysis, JUSPAO Planning Office; Psychological Desk, CICV; and Research and Analysis Team, 6th Psychological Operations Battalion. As far as could be determined such analysis has been confined to scanning FBIS output for themes and trends, and has not involved detailed analysis of enemy propaganda.
c. Pre-testing. Pre-testing of leaflets, and other media output, is conducted primarily by Evaluation and Analysis, JUSPAO Planning Office; and by Research and Analysis Team, 6th Psychological Operations Battalion. Evaluation and Analysis, JUSPAO has a very extensive pre-testing program established involving Vietnamese interviewers and a Vietnamese Evaluation Panel to evaluate and pre-test the entire media output of JUSPAO. The interrogators in Research and Analysis Team, 6th Psychological Operations Battalion have been involved in a more limited way in pre-testing leaflets for MACPD.

d. Post-testing. Post-testing of propaganda media output and attitude surveying relating to psychological operations campaign effects have been conducted primarily by Survey Research, JUSPAO Planning Office; and Research and Analysis Team, 6th Psychological Operations Battalion. Survey Research has extensive survey effort in support of JUSPAO programs utilizing Saigon Center for Vietnamese Studies interviewer teams. Interrogators from the 6th Psychological Operations Battalion have in a limited way done some attitude surveying and post-testing of media output for MACPD. Intelligence information sources containing information on effects of our psychological operations campaigns are captured documents and interrogations of prisoners of war and returnees.

e. Daily Intelligence Summaries Should Include Intelligence for PSYOPS. Most G-2's - S-2's in preparing daily intelligence summaries weed out data which is uninteresting from a strict hardware point of view, but which is urgently needed by PSYOPS intelligence staffs and PSYOPS Planners.

f. Failure of PSYOP Units to Identify Their Intelligence Requirements. PSYOP Intelligence has not reached a satisfactory level of identifying PSYOP intelligence needs. This should be done so the PSYOP units can go to the intelligence community with a clear case of what they need and obtain the help required. The definition of PSYOP intelligence needs is a task which only a PSYOP unit can identify and which can be performed only within PSYOPS itself by trained PSYOP personnel; and then only if PSYOP intelligence responsibilities are clearly recognized and assigned to the intelligence community. Such as a clear requirement existing for in interrogators who are trained PSYOP interrogators.

g. Relations Between PSYOP Intelligence Staffs and Other Intelligence Staffs. The relations between the PSYOP intelligence staffs and other intelligence staffs appear to be too distant or attenuated, so that the intelligence staffs do not get a clear picture of the needs, wishes, and problems of the PSYOP intelligence staffs. In addition the PSYOP intelligence staffs do not fully understand the capabilities of the intelligence community's ability to serve them. As a result the intelligence products given to PSYOPS are not as useful as they could be, however, at the same time PSYOPS intelligence staffs do not go to the intelligence community for specific help to specific requirements as often as they might.
Variations of PSYOPS Intelligence Needs. The proper subject of PSYOPS intelligence necessarily varies from one campaign to another, from one local to another. And to this extent different campaign themes, different objectives, discrete targets, target groups, different military situations require different intelligence, media, and techniques. All of these call for supporting intelligence that involves different types of information and different types of intelligence produce. The current tendency to lump together everything under one heading of Vietnam/Vietnamese is wrong and should be discontinued.

Deficiency of PSYOPS Intelligence. Deficiency of PSYOPS Intelligence is not meeting the needs of planners and operators in the field. This is not so much for the immediate US Tactical Situation, as it is for sector PSYOP advisors, and strategic area intelligence needs. This deficiency however lays outside the direct control of PSYOPS intelligence staffs, as PSYOP Intelligence does not have its own collection activities, and must therefore depend solely upon "fallout" generated from other collection efforts.

Inadequate Intelligence Community Support for PSYOPS Intelligence Needs. Support for PSYOPS intelligence is inadequate in that only a mass release of routine documents seems to be the only intelligence sources made available on routine distribution to PSYOP units. These usually consist of CDEC and CMIC documents (which by the time they are received are HISTORY, and of value for long range studies, but not for immediate tactical PSYOPS). PSYOPS intelligence collectors have great difficulties in acquiring access to intelligence of Secret or higher nature (NOFORN), and are not given access to any other documents except through the personal effort of a friend. A flow of all intelligence collected is not distributed to PSYOP intelligence staffs, and that which is usually classified and therefore when it is utilized the final product is also classified, thus limiting its usefulness.

Waste of PSYOP Intelligence Effort in Scanning Masses of Routine Documents. Most PSYOP intelligence seems to be based on intelligence it obtains through the flow of routine intelligence documents. The amount of effort expended on scanning these routine documents does not appear to be directly related to any clear criteria of PSYOPS intelligence requirements, rather it is hoped that gleaning through these documents some scraps of information may turn up which would be of PSYOP value.

Lack of Intelligence Support to PSYOP Units. PSYOPS is not now getting, and is not likely to get in the foreseeable future the intelligence support it needs. This is largely due to the fact that major day to day responsibility for producing needed PSYOPS intelligence is lodged in one group, while the powers and facilities for producing it are entrusted to another.
m. Inadequacy of PSYOPS Intelligence. PSYOPS Intelligence output
is not — considerations of quality entirely to one side — impressively
large, or particularly inclusive as regards subject matter. A partial
explanation for this lies in the amount of time and energy that goes
into processing the vast flow of relatively raw non-PSYOP intelligence
date received.

n. Collection and Selection of Intelligence for PSYOPS. PSYOPS
Intelligence devotes most of its efforts to processing relatively raw
intelligence data that comes to it as a result of another (non-PSYOP)
agency's process of collection and selection, which differs from that
which PSYOPS would set in motion if it had its own collection — selection
operation.

o. PSYOPS Utilization of Traditional Intelligence. PSYOPS is
receiving and processing what might be called "traditional" intelligence,
not PSYOPS intelligence.

p. Intelligence Collected Without PSYOP Requirements in Mind. Most
intelligence PSYOPS receives had been collected, in the first instance,
with an eye to needs and purposes other than those of PSYOPS.

q. PSYOP Intelligence Differs from Traditional Military Intelligence.
PSYOPS intelligence is not only different from traditional military
intelligence, but different enough to require different forms of planning
and different types of personnel in its production.


Requirements to perform specific psychological operations intelligence
research and analysis projects may be generated by the analysts them­selves based upon their experience, by tasks levied by higher authority
(e.g., MACPD levies tasks upon Research and Analysis Team, 6th Psycholog­
ical Operations Battalion), and by the psychological operator upon the
researchers (e.g., psychological operations companies ask Research and
Analysis Team, 6th Psychological Operations Battalion to provide research
support).

Requests for psychological operations intelligence research and
analysis support may be transmitted as written requests through
channels (e.g., MACPD requests for research requiring extensive effort
on the part of a MACV J2 component) or verbally (e.g., a liaison officer
asks an analyst from Psychological Desk, CICV to check out a specific
topic for him, or a company in the field asks Research and Analysis Team
6th Psychological Operations Battalion for a short analysis of an enemy
group).

The analytical products of such requests for psychological operations
intelligence analyses are disseminated in a number of ways. Research and
Analysis Team, 6th Psychological Operations Battalion distributes the results of its ongoing analytical programs in the form of monthly publication, Psychological Operations Intelligence Summary--Vietnam. In addition, it produces interrogation reports, pre-test reports, and area assessments. These are distributed to units involved in psychological operations in Vietnam. Responses to specific requests may be in the form of a briefing or a letter.

JUSPAO Planning Office produces and disseminates its analyses in the form of guidances, reports, and briefings. The results of the work of Research and Analysis, and Survey Research are disseminated to psychological operators, but the results of the work of Evaluation and Analysis are used inside JUSPAO.

Psychological Desk, CICV contributes items every two weeks to the MACV J2 intelligence briefing and publishes special studies in the field of psychological operations intelligence. These are disseminated through MACV J2 channels.

Strategic Resources Branch, MACV J2, reportedly contributes to a weekly psychological operations trends report, the MACV PERINTREP, the MACV weekly intelligence estimate, and prepares special reports. Its products are distributed by MACV J2.

Research and Analysis Branch, MCAPD, is not believed to be producing intelligence analyses at this time. It relies upon other components for such studies.

Psychological operations intelligence studies appear to be given satisfactory distribution at the Saigon level, but based upon limited information available, it appears that such materials are not given distribution in the provinces so that every person conducting psychological operations receives copies of such psychological operations intelligence analyses as are being produced at the Saigon level.

7. Psychological Operations Intelligence

Research and Analysis Center

As noted in the previous section this effort is being conducted by about twenty-five people who are scattered in five separate organizations, and to some degree duplicate each others' efforts. And as was also noted above, the magnitude of the psychological operations intelligence research and analysis effort is small in relation to the size of the psychological operations effort which it is supporting. It is recommended that all psychological operations research and analysis functions in Saigon be combined at one location to form cooperative effort in support of psychological operations in Vietnam. At such a central facility all available intelligence information can be screened and all psychological
operations intelligence research and analysis functions can be conducted. In addition it is recommended that the number of trained persons assigned to such a research and analysis facility be greatly increased of the present approximately twenty-five people active in psychological operations intelligence research and analysis. Such a centralized facility should have adequate personnel assigned to provide for at least one person assigned to do target analysis of each province based upon all available intelligence information and to render psychological operations intelligence support to psychological operators in that province. Of course activities such as propaganda analysis, vulnerability studies of all enemy groups and other targets, attitude surveys, effects analysis, and so forth should be conducted in such a combined facility. A central facility could insure that all pertinent information and analyses are disseminated to all psychological operators in the field.

Between November 1965 and June 1966 discussions were held among JUSPAO, MACV J2, the 6th Psychological Operations Battalion, MACPD and other organizations regarding the establishment of a combined propaganda analysis facility. Most units were at that time interested in participating in such an effort, but MACV J2 backed out of the discussions, and nothing more happened. The concept discussed at that time was that each organization active in psychological operations intelligence research and analysis would contribute its people to a combined facility to conduct such operations. Mr. Zorthian at JUSPAO was the person who initially suggested that something along that line be done in a letter to MACV J2.

The logical place to establish a combined psychological operations intelligence activity would be in either JUSPAO or MACPD, or to keep it administratively independent of them. It should, however, not be part of regular military intelligence organizations, because of the specialized kind of support it would be designed to provide to psychological operations.
APPENDIX E. SOME PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS INTELLIGENCE INTERROGATION GUIDES, KNOWLEDGEABILITY QUESTIONNAIRES, AND INTERROGATION COLLECTION PLANS

CONTENTS

1. Psychological Operations Interrogation Guide for Prisoners of War 2 - E
2. Propaganda Knowledgeability Questionnaire Form "A" 4 - E
3. Propaganda Knowledgeability Questionnaire Form "B" 5 - E
4. Psychological Operations Collection-Interrogation Plan 6 - E
5. Psyop Subject Code, 6th Psychological Operations Battalion 12 - E
6. Psychological Operations Analysis Work Sheet, 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne), 1st Special Forces 19 - E
7. Hamlet Evaluation Worksheet, MACV CORDS (not included)
8. PSYOF Interrogation Form, 245th PSYOF Company 30 - E
9. Leaflet Pre-Test Check List, 245th PSYOF Company 32 - E
10. Field Team De-Briefing Form, 245th PSYOF Company 34 - E
11. Propaganda Assessment Interview, CORDS POD, Ban Me Thout 39 - E
12. Questionnaire Cl -- Refugee Attitudinal Survey, Human Sciences Research, Field Team 41 - E
13. AG and DT Index Categories, questionnaire, RAND Corporation 50 - E
APPENDIX E. SOME PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS
INTELLIGENCE INTERROGATION GUIDES, INCOMPATIBILITY QUESTIONNAIRES, AND
INTERROGATION COLLECTION PLANS

The four following questionnaires and interrogation guides were
obtained informally from interrogators in the 6th Psychological
Battalion. They have not been completed to the full satisfaction of the
interrogators who are still working on them, but they are included to
show the direction they are going in meeting the need for psychological
operations interrogations guides designed for use by non-psychological
operations trained interrogators.

The first item is an interrogation guide based closely upon format
of the one suggested in FM 33-5, January 1962, Appendix II, Page 279
et seq. This is the only example found during the study of use being
made of that suggestion in FM 33-5.

The Psyop Subject Code of the 6th Psychological Operations
Battalion which is used by the Research and Analysis Branch to index
intelligence information reports is included in this appendix as item #5.
This guide is based on suggested format, POW Interrogation for Psychological Warfare, FM 33-5, January 62, Appendix II, Page 297.

1. Psychological Operations Interrogation Guide for Prisoners of War

I. PERSONALITY DATA:

1. Name
2. Rank
3. Unit
4. Type position in unit
5. Former occupation
6. Region of origin
7. Place of residence
8. Age and sex
9. Education
10. Reason for being in service

II. PERSONAL HISTORY:

1. Parents
2. Childhood
3. Circumstance of capture

III. UNITED STATES PROPAGANDA:

1. Leaflet - strong and weak points
2. Loudspeaker - strong and weak points
3. Overall effectiveness

IV. AGGRESSOR PROPAGANDA:

1. Type propaganda - strong and weak points
2. Effectiveness - Strong and weak points

V. ATTITUDE TOWARD WARFARE:

1. Belief
2. Strong points
3. Weak points

VI. OUTCOME OF THE WAR:

1. Aggressor chances
2. Strong points
3. Weak points
4. Allied chances
5. Strong points
6. Weak points
VII. ATTITUDE TOWARD UNITED STATES INVOLVEMENT:

1. Party outlook
2. Self
3. Military
4. Civilian

VIII. SPECIFIC CONCERNS

1. Hostility toward SVN civilians
2. Friction between factions

IX. POST WAR EXPECTATIONS:

1. Aggressor as fighting machine
2. Party reaction to defeat
3. Terms-conditions of surrender/peace
4. Fate of defeated military
5. Fate of people who supported the defeated
6. Attitude of the defeated toward the victorious side

X. ATTITUDE OF DEFEATED TOWARDS THEIR LEADERS:

1. Loyalty
2. Continuance of membership

XII. WAR GUILT:

1. Leaders
2. Military
3. Party
4. Self
5. Attitude of SVN civilian toward defeated

XIII. POLITICAL RESPONSIBILITY:

1. Defeated political responsibility of SVN government
2. Self

XIV. FEAR OF ILL TREATMENT AS POW:

1. SVN - allies as capturing element
2. Opinion of treatment of POW-expectations
3. Fear as measured rallying-POW treatment

XV. ATTITUDE TOWARD SENIOR LEADERS:

1. Trust of leaders
2. Acceptance of responsibilities by leaders
3. Belief in capabilities of leaders by subordinates
XVI. ATTITUDE OF LEADER TOWARD SUBORDINATES:  
1. Devotion to duty and men  
2. Treatment of subordinates  

XVII. REACTION TO ALLIED RELATIONS:  
1. Most feared - cadre opinion  
2. Most known-about  

XVIII. SERVICE CONDITIONS:  
1. Food  
2. Health  
3. Mail  

XIX. RIVALRIES IN AGGRESSOR ARMY:  
1. NVA - VC officers - cadre - EM  
2. NVA and SVN population  
3. NVA and its allies in SVN  
4. NVA and outside allies  

XX. HOME FRONT:  
1. Underground  
2. How the individual family is affected  
3. Morale of population  
4. Beliefs of population concerning war  
5. Strong and weak points of war according to population  
6. Feeling of population about outside assistance (for and against) concerning war effort

2. Propaganda Knowledgeability Questionnaire Form "A"  

PERSONALITY DATA  
1. Full name:  
2. Education:  
3. Civilian Occupation:  
4. Religion:  
5. Ethnic Group:  
6. Category of Unit:  
   a. ( ) NVA  
   b. ( ) Main Force  
   c. ( ) Local Guerrilla  
   d. ( ) Other
7. Rank:
8. Data and Place of Birth:
9. Marital Status:
10. Party Membership:
11. Position in Unit:
12. Sex:
13. Date and Place of Return or Capture:
14. Reason(s), and Circumstances of returning or capture:
15. Social Status:

3. Propaganda Knowledgeability Questionnaire Form "B"

PSYOP KNOWLEDGEABILITY

1. a. Have you ever been a member of a Propaganda and Training Section?
   b. If so, at what level, when, and what were your duties?
   c. Have you ever worked for such a section?
   d. If so, at what level, when, and what were your duties?

2. a. Have you ever been a member of a Propaganda, Culture and Indoctrination Section?
   b. If so, at what level, when, and what were your duties?
   c. Have you ever worked for such a section?
   d. If so, at what level, when, and what were your duties?

3. a. Have you ever been a member of a Military Proselyting Section?
   b. If so, at what level, when, and what were your duties?
   c. Have you ever worked for such a section?
   d. If so, at what level, when, and what were your duties?

4. a. Have you ever been a member of a Civilian Proselyting Section?
   b. If so, at what level, when, and what were your duties?
   c. Have you ever worked for such a section?
   d. If so, at what level, when, and what were your duties?

5. a. Have you ever been a member of a Political Struggle Section?
   b. If so, at what level, when, and what were your duties?
   c. Have you ever worked for such a section?
   d. If so, at what level, when, and what were your duties?

6. a. Have you ever been a member of any other Propaganda Section or Organization?
   b. If so, which, at what level, when, and what were your duties?

5 - E