1. CONDITIONS AND ATTITUDES IN VILLAGE
BEFORE JOINING VIET CONG

1.01 Subject's satisfaction with life before joining VC; personal history, attitudes toward economic & social conditions.

1.02 Situation in home village regarding control, resource distribution.

1.03 Situation & attitude regarding RVN-US-French attacks against village & environs.

1.04 Situation & attitude in village regarding VC attacks on village and environs.

1.05 Situation & attitude in village regarding behavior of US-RVN-French troops.

1.06 Situation & attitude in village regarding behavior of RVN-French officials.

1.07 Situation & attitude in village regarding behavior of VC troops & officials.

1.08 Political allegiance in the village (favor VC or RVN, dislike RVN-French policies, dislike VC policies, number with each side.)

1.09 RVN aid, assistance, or reform in the village.

1.10 VC aid, assistance, or reform actions in the village.
2. CONDITIONS AND ATTITUDES IN VILLAGE
AFTER JOINING AND IN GENERAL

2.01 Physical security in the village, village reaction to insecurity, to strategic & new life hamlets, and to physical insecurity.

2.02 Villager's attitudes toward the war, hope for the future.

2.03 Villager attitudes toward US-RVN-French (allegiance, complaints, service in forces).

2.04 Situation in village & villager attitude toward VC political system & aims (land reform, officials, control, etc.) and toward VC military service (troops, service in, etc.).

2.05 Situation & attitude regarding VC taxes, contributions forced labor, (level of taxes, change in rate, protests).

2.06 Statements of change in villager attitude toward other RVN or VC.

2.07 Attacks on village.
3. VIET CONG POLICIES AND METHODS REGARDING
   THE CIVILIAN POPULATION

3.01 VC organizational structure in the village district,
    methods for infiltrating structure, gaining intelligence,
    counter-intelligence.

3.02 VC control policies & methods in village propaganda
    and re-education, coercion, terror, force.

3.03 VC policies & methods for aiding the village, (land
    reform, food, etc.).
4.01 Reason for joining the VC, prior knowledge of life in VC.

4.02 General villager attitude about joining VC (pro & con), reasons for villagers supporting or joining VC.

4.03 VC recruiting methods, procedures, appeals.

4.04 Morale of unit, quality, morale, performance of recent recruits, controls for new recruits, changes in quantity & quality of unit's man-power & reasons for).

4.05 Rate of & readiness for desertion & defection, themes suggested to get more defections.

4.06 Individual reasons for defecting & deserting & reasons for not defecting & deserting.

4.07 Circumstances of leaving VC.

4.08 Role of women in VC.

4.09 Comments on VC beliefs & doctrine regarding RVN treatment of captured & defected VC.

4.10 Controls against defection, VC & civilian attitudes toward ralliers & deserters, VC actions against friends of family following defection.
6. SERVICE IN THE VIET CONG

6.01 Chronology of service in VC, combat experiences, reaction to combat, allocation of time by task.

6.02 Length & content of military training & political indoctrination.

6.03 Likes & dislikes in VC, effects of hardships, separation from family.

6.04 Identity, size, equipment of units (T.O. & E.).
7. ADMINISTRATION, CONTROL, AND PERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS IN VIET CONG

7.01 VC administrative structure, control methods, surveillance, 3-man cell, discipline, criticism, re-education.

7.02 Personal relationships in VC, frictions, rank & file-cadre, cadre-cadre, etc.

7.03 Policies & attitudes toward personnel (promotion, reward, discipline, recreation, etc.).

7.04 Background of VC cadre, changes in characteristics or promotion rules.

7.05 Communist party, Labor Youth, rules for joining, benefits, responsibilities, ejection, discipline, etc.

7.06 Subject's knowledge about & attitudes toward communist nations other than North Vietnam.

7.07 Subject's statements about Front other than his unit (especially higher organization).

7.08 Knowledge of & attitude toward North Vietnam relation of North to Front.
8. VIET CONG MILITARY OPERATIONS.
   TACTICS AND STRATEGY

8.01 VC camps: where, preparation of, shelters, camouflage, dispersal, move between camps (why, when, how often, effect on operations).

8.02 VC military operations: frequency, preparation, practice, contingencies, description of operations.

8.03 VC operational tactics & methods—deployment, cooperation with other units, guards against air, artillery, withdrawal procedures, etc.

8.04 VC strategy, general goals, overall methods.

8.05 VC intelligence: methods, reliability, failures, lead time.

8.06 Communication & Liaison in VC methods, frequency, shortcomings.

8.07 News and information in VC (sources, extent, controls, etc.)
9. US-RVN OPERATIONS AGAINST VIET CONG EXCEPT HERBICIDE

9.01 Effects, level, & reaction to ground sweeps, patrols & ambushes.

9.02 Effects, level, & reaction to air attacks (except B-52).

9.03 Effects, level, & reaction to (so-called) B-52 raids.

9.04 Effects, level, & reaction to air surveillance.

9.05 Effects, level, & reaction to artillery attacks.

9.06 Weapons & tactics considered most effective & feared (except air).

9.07 Comments on special weapons, flares, etc.

9.08 Knowledge of, effects of, & reaction to US-RVN psy-war including Chieu Hoi.

9.09 Knowledge of & reaction to raids on the North.

9.10 Comments on VC casualties.


9.12 Contrast VC capabilities with others (weapons, training, personnel, tactics).
10. VIET CONG REACTION TOWARD GVN, US, OTHER ALLIES

10.01 Attitude regarding US fighting capabilities (ground forces).
10.02 Comments on aims & role of US in war.
10.03 Any comments on other allies.
10.04 Statements of possible Communist reactions to US-allied presence.
10.05 Attitude regarding RVN fighting capabilities.
10.06 Attitude regarding aims & roles of RVN.
11. HERBICIDE

11.01 Knowledge of areas & methods of spray (myths, facts, rumors).

11.02 Effect of spray on VC, VC attitude & countermeasures (except propaganda).

11.03 Effect of spray on civilian population, civilian attitude on spray, VC propaganda.

11.04 Comments on other chemicals.
12. INTERVIEWEE ATTITUDES

12.01 Progress of the war.
12.02 Hopes & desires for the future.
12.03 Reaction to political turmoil in RVN, knowledge about national government.
13. REFUGEES

13.01 Magnitude of problem in operation area & effects on VC.

13.02 General reasons for taking & not taking (deterrents) refuge, circumstance of taking refuge.

13.03 RVN or VC treatment of refugee (food, housing, aid, etc.)
14. ITEMS UNIQUE TO REGROUPEDS AND NVA

14.01 Comments on & description of life in the North.
14.02 Attitudes toward the war & service in South in NVA before coming South.
14.03 NVA training & indoctrination.
14.04 Personal experiences on infiltration South except attacks (time, hardships, food, equipment carried, transportation methods).
14.05 Comments on attacks against infiltration route.
14.06 Observation on other activity on route, quality of road, anti-air, supplies moving, etc.
14.07 Special NVA problems of operating in South.
14.08 NVA relationships with villagers.
14.09 NVA relationships with VC.
14.10 NVA desertions & dejections.
15. ODDS & ENDS

15.01 Treatment since coming into US or RVN hands.

15.02 Statements about negotiations to end war.
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The G3 (PSYWAR section) of I Field Force, Vietnam (I FFV) is responsible for the psychological operations conducted by the military units which make up I FFV, including United States and Republic of Korea forces, i.e., tactical psychological operations. It has as a psychological operations asset the 245th Psychological Operations Company, which has its headquarters also at Nha Trang and its teams located with units of the Free World Military Forces.

G3 (PSYWAR) coordinates psychological operations between the tactical units and the 245th PSYOP Company, the 9th Air Commando, and Saigon. It coordinates and monitors psychological operations (principally leaflet and loudspeaker) by the divisions making up the FWNF; the divisions of the FWNF are responsible for planning and conducting psychological operations in their areas of operation. In each US division there is a psychological operations staff, and in each US brigade a psychological operations officer.

The G3 (PSYWAR) at I FFV presently consists of two officers and two enlisted men. Following are the positions in G3 (PSYWAR):

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<th>RANK</th>
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<tr>
<td>Major</td>
<td>Psychological Warfare Officer</td>
<td>9305</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>Assistant Psychological Warfare Officer</td>
<td>9305</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E5</td>
<td>Intelligence Analyst</td>
<td>96B20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E4</td>
<td>Clerk/Typist</td>
<td>71B20</td>
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This organization is based upon a modified TOE; the TOE 52-1D, Headquarters Corps or Airborne Corps, 2 May 1961 which applies to I FFV, authorizes only one Lieutenant Colonel, MOS 9305, as psychological operations officer.

G3 (PSYOP) relies upon the 245th PSYOP Company for much of its psychological operations support, including intelligence research and analysis in support of psychological operations. For more information about the 245th PSYOP Company, see a description of its activities in a following section.
G3 (PSYWAR) relies principally upon G2 I PFV for intelligence research and analysis in support of psychological operations, but also to a limited degree obtains some research and analysis support from the 245th PSYOP Company. G3 (PSYWAR) does not receive direct dissemination of intelligence information reports; G2 I PFV, which has a cooperative relationship with G3 (PSYWAR), scans all incoming intelligence information reports which it receives from lower echelons, other local units, and higher headquarters for items which it considers of interest to G3 (PSYWAR). G2 routes such documents containing information of value to psychological operations to G3 (PSYWAR). Reportedly G3 (PSYWAR) sends out such items of information to psychological entities and officers under it. Guidance to G2 I PFV regarding what kind of information is valuable to psychological operations was reported to be provided in the form of informal oral briefings through personal contact; the officers are located in neighboring buildings.

G2 I PFV indicated that it received distribution of intelligence information reports and finished intelligence analyses from forty or fifty agencies, from above, below and laterally. All US units under operational control of I PFV send in reports, and so do US intelligence advisors. Reports also come in from ARVN units; these are translated into English at I PFV. G2 utilizes the combined Document Exploitation Center (CDEC) Document Retrieval System. There is a local translation capability for captured enemy documents; those documents of value to psychological operations including enemy propaganda, are passed to G3 (PSYWAR).

The primary orientation of G2 I PFV is toward tactical intelligence and order of battle in support of military operations of the FMF; psychological operations intelligence support is not a planned or organized function in G2 I PFV. Any intelligence information support provided to G3 (PSYWAR) can be considered a secondary supporting activity that is done when someone sees an item in a report and thinks to or takes trouble to call it to the attention of G3 (PSYWAR). In no sense is there an activity in either G3 (PSYWAR) or G2 which can be termed organized and planned intelligence analysis in support of psychological operations. There is no target analysis being conducted, except on an informal, ad hoc basis, in support of the planning of psychological operations against specific target groups or in support of psychological operations media output.
G3 (PSYWAR) reportedly levied some specific intelligence collection requirements (SICR) through G2 for intelligence information for psychological operations from intelligence collectors who collect such information in addition to the usual tactical intelligence information. Interrogations of prisoners of war and Hoi Chanh are conducted at the sector, division, and corps levels, as well as at I FFV. When an important source is identified, I FFV may send a special interrogation team with special G2 essential elements of information (EEI) to interrogate him. All US units have a document translation capability; after a document is captured, it is scanned for information of immediate tactical value. After being tactically exploited, it is sent to CDEC in Saigon. At all levels, through local coordination, a psychological operations officer may obtain information of value to him from captured documents for his tactical psychological operations.

One problem area that was noted was that although Hoi Chanh are of great value as intelligence information sources at the tactical level, the tactical commanders do not usually have access to them. The reason is that Hoi Chanh most often rally to civilian administrative centers rather than to military units because of the physical danger in walking into a combat unit. As a result Hoi Chanh go into sub-sector or sector units, and are interrogated in those channels; the tactical commander does not find out about such Hoi Chanh and consequently cannot exploit them for information which would assist his tactical operations. Likewise psychological operations officers in tactical military units do not have access to such information.

G3 (PSYWAR) had FM 33-1 and FM 33-5, but did not have any other books or reports related to psychological operations doctrine and techniques, or background materials on the ethnic groups located in its area of responsibility. There were no books in the office about Vietnam culture, history, or government; Pike's book, The Viet Cong was not available.

It was mentioned that the degree of coordination between the intelligence function and the psychological operations function at levels below I FFV vary depending upon the value the local commanding officer places upon psychological operations, and depending upon the personali­ties of the people involved in the two functions. Apparently such functions are not as close as they could be at lower levies in I FFV, but no information was obtained to confirm or deny this allegation.
G3 (PSYWAR) maintains daily contact with the CORDS psychological operations people at the Region II Headquarters in Nha Trang; the contact is related to operations, rather than intelligence support. However, the Chieu Hoi people at CORDS do pass some information to the G3 (PSYWAR) and sometimes a man from G3 (PSYWAR) goes to a Chieu Hoi centers to conduct psychological operations interviews.

It was asserted that the quality of the greater part of offshore printed leaflets was poor because they were developed with quantity in mind rather than upon intelligence analysis of specific target groups and identification of vulnerabilities. Such leaflets did not take into consideration the great diversity to be found among target and ethnic groups in Vietnam.
The 245th Psychological Operations Company, located at Nha Trang, supports the tactical operations of the Free World Military Forces under the command of I FFV in the II Corps area, and works closely with G3 (PSYWAR) I FFV.

A detachment of the 245th Psychological Operations Company is located at Pleiku to support the tactical operations of US units located in the highlands and to provide some support to Vietnamese POLWAR through the US Military Advisors at II Corps Headquarters, Pleiku. Such support includes assistance to the ARVN 20th POLWAR Battalion.

The 245th Psychological Operations Company has eight field teams located with US military units, except for one team which supports the Republic of Korea forces. Usually one field team supports a brigade; a field team consists of an officer and an enlisted man and may perform either loudspeaker or audio/visual operations as its primary task.

Psychological operations printing support is provided by the 245th Psychological Operations Company from its presses located in Nha Trang and Pleiku. Most printing is of locally produced leaflets designed to be dropped from aircraft.

The 245th is connected to MACPD through two channels; the one through its parent organization, the 6th PSYOPS Battalion in Saigon, and the other through G3 (PSYWAR) I FFV to MACPD.

Intelligence research and analysis in the 245th PSYOPS Company is carried as part of the Operations Section which includes: Air Operations Intelligence, Printing, and Field Teams. Working in the intelligence function are two intelligence NCOs who principally do intelligence research and analysis in support of the eight field teams, working in reaction to tactical requirements. The two men in addition to doing intelligence analysis are also reportedly used as printers. Also, in the intelligence function are two Vietnamese interpreters and one Vietnamese interrogators.

According to its Table of Organization, the 245th PSYOPS Company is authorized one Team FC propaganda (Current Intelligence) and one Team PD propaganda (Research and Analysis), or a total of twenty-one people to perform intelligence research and analysis in support of psychological operations. As noted above two people are actually performing such intelligence analysis on a part-time basis; the others, actual number assigned could not be
discovered, are believed to be used as printers, motor pool sergeants, members of field teams, and other such unrelated tasks.

The sources of intelligence information utilized by the intelligence function in the 245th PSYOP Group include information contained in II Corps STREPS, Combined Military Interrogation Center and National Interrogation Center interrogation reports, field team reports, area studies prepared by Special Forces units, reports from local files of CORDS, and information obtained at local interrogation centers, including Chieu Hoi centers, National Police, POW compounds and the 55th III.

Interviewing and interrogations are conducted by the two Vietnamese interpreters and one Vietnamese interrogator who use questionnaires prepared for such purposes by the 245th PSYOPS Company, the PSYOP Interrogation Form (See item 8, Appendix B).

The intelligence function in the 245th Psychological Operations Company, reportedly reviews all media output that is handled by the Company. The interpreters use a questionnaire called the Leaflet Pre-Test Check List (See item 9, Appendix E) to determine the reaction of Ho Chi Minh to proposed leaflets. All media output, it was asserted, is reviewed also to see that it conforms to JUSPAO, MACPD, and I FFV guidances.

The 245th PSYOPS Company has prepared some provincial area studies and it puts out a bi-monthly PSYOP summary which is a compilation of psychological operations intelligence pertaining to the II Corps area. Copies of the report are disseminated to CORDS, I FFV, all tactical units, 6th PSYOPS Battalion, and MACPD.

The locations of enemy units for targeting leaflet drops and aerial loudspeaker broadcasts are obtained from the Order of Battle Section, G2 I FFV. The air operations function in Operations Section, 245th PSYOPS Company uses such information to target Air Force missions.

The 245th PSYOPS Company, as far as could be determined, did not have any basic reference books and publications on psychological operations in Vietnam.
CORDS Region II Headquarters
Nha Trang, Republic of Vietnam

The CORDS Region II Headquarters is presently being established from the former CCO office. The CORDS organization includes the following components: Management Support, Civil Affairs, Public Safety, New Life Development, Revolutionary Development Workers, Information/Psychological Operations, Chieu Hoi, Plans/Programs Reports, and Operations Analysis/Evaluation.

The Information/Psychological Operations component is responsible for the conduct of psychological operations by CORDS Psychological Operations Division field representative in each province/sector in Region II. This component receives informational support from JUSPAO through the CORDS POD office in Saigon, and obtains local intelligence information support from Revolutionary Development cadre teams and I FFV military intelligence.

It was mentioned that a committee was being established to coordinate the collection and exploitation of intelligence information, and that it might have a psychological operations representative on it, possibly from Information/Psychological Operations, but no additional information could be obtained on this as it was in the formative stage, being generated by a directive from Saigon. The apparent aim of the committee is to better organize the exploitation of the masses of intelligence data being produced; apparently no action has been taken on much that is being produced.

Collection sources believed to be under CORDS control include Census Grievance teams and possibly a Rural Technical Team.

No other information was available at CORDS; most of the staff was not at the office because it was a period when wives could come in to visit.

Psychological Operations Officer
5th Special Forces Group (Airborne), 1st Special Forces
Nha Trang, Republic of Vietnam

The 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne) is the administrative headquarters for over one hundred Special Forces camps located all over Vietnam. The Special Forces units are under the operational control of that Corps Headquarters in whose area they are located. The Special Forces teams are co-located with Vietnamese Special Forces units (LLDB) which they advise.
Special Forces teams reportedly, are heavily involved in psychological operations on the ground in face to face situations. Each team tries to have one officer and one NCO assigned to conduct psychological operations, sometimes it is two NCOs. Psychological operations conducted by Special Forces include the following: loudspeaker operations (ground and aerial), leaflet dissemination (ground and aerial), cultural team performances, movies, dissemination of posters, signs, newspapers, pamphlets, and magazines, REDCAPS, and the holding of meetings and conferences with villagers. Based upon their experience, the Special Forces have found that face to face operations on the ground are the most effective form of psychological operations, and that aerial distribution of leaflets to be the least effective and aerial loudspeaker operations the next least effective forms of psychological operations.

At 5th Special Forces Headquarters, Nha Trang, psychological operations is the responsibility of the PSYOPS Officer in the S3. He is assisted by an intelligence NCO. It is their responsibility to monitor, coordinate and support psychological operations being conducted by subordinate Special Forces units throughout the Republic of Vietnam. It may be noted here that the Special Forces are believed to be engaged in classified psychological operations in addition to the overt types noted above.

The Special Forces obtain in a large amount of information from their units located all over Vietnam. Each team collects information from informants and sources in the area where it is located. Such information is valuable for immediate support.

The 5th Special Forces receives all information reports produced by Combined Military Interrogation Center, Combined Document Exploitation Center, Combined Intelligence Center, Vietnam, National Interrogation Center, and other intelligence producers located in Saigon. In addition it receives classified and unclassified reports and studies produced by organizations in the United States.

The Psychological Operations Officer and the intelligence NCO extract information from incoming reports and documents and break it down to support their psychological operations, leaflet and loudspeaker research.

The members of Special Forces teams in their area of operation do area assessments prior to developing civic action and psychological operations programs. These area assessments, reportedly, vary as to quality, the men doing them are not fully trained professional researchers, but they do give
general indicators and are based upon first hand knowledge, direct observation. The men are in the area where their operations are conducted, and their different problems depending upon the area in which it is located, and as a result area assessments are specifically oriented. Such studies fill the needs of the Special Forces more than do country-wide area assessments, which by their nature are too generalized.

The specific area assessments produced by Special Forces units are not disseminated outside the Special Forces, but they can be seen and used at Special Forces organizations. Also the Special Forces responds to requests for information on areas where it has detachments which can obtain the data.

There are two intelligence analysts at each Corps level Special Forces organization; they monitor order of battle and do a limited amount of intelligence analysis. There may also be some military intelligence augmentation to the Special Forces. Psychological operations and military intelligence in the Special Forces Group are reportedly very close.

The 5th Special Forces Group apparently has had difficulty in obtaining materials from MACPD. There seems to be no response to requests for distribution. It took five months reportedly to get a package of enough copies of the MACPD Newsletter to distribute to all of the detachments of the 5th Special Forces Group.

Because it must often develop psychological operations on a quick response basis, the 5th Special Forces Group tries to maintain an information base at Nha Trang which can be used to quickly develop specific psychological operations based upon specific vulnerabilities. Printing of leaflets generated by such quick response psychological operations is handled by the companies of the 6th PSYOPS Battalion.

A need was mentioned for a psychological order of battle concept which could be used to post on maps social and psychological operations information. Under this concept related activities should have special symbols developed so that they can be posted. For example, information regarding a recurring country market representing the time when otherwise scattered people gather together in one place to exchange goods and exchange information could be indicated in the same fashion on a map, and thus provide a periodic target for a psychological operation. A psychological operations order of battle map may reveal some crucial patterns which might not be apparent on a military order of battle map.
The Special Forces indicated a need for psychological operations materials in the other languages besides Vietnamese which are used in Vietnam. There is a need for dynamic tape recordings in a number of languages explaining the Chieu Hoi and Revolutionary Development programs. Perhaps a primary support center could be established to provide such leaflet and loudspeaker materials, because now the Special Forces considered it quite difficult to get the materials that it needed.

Psychological Operations Advisor
II Corps
Phan, Republic of Vietnam

The Psychological Operations Advisor to the Deputy Chief of Staff for Political Warfare, II Corps, until early July 1967 was carried under the G5, but at that time he was placed under the G3. The G5 Advisory Staff was eliminated because of the creation of CORDS; some of those people will be integrated into the CORDS operation. The PSYOP Advisor considered that it was a much better arrangement have psychological operations under the G3, rather than the G5.

The Deputy Chief of Staff for Political Warfare, II Corps, has five areas of responsibility: Troop indoctrination, PSYWAR (tactical psychological operations and some refugee operations), social service, PX and commissary, and security; the PSYOP Advisor provides assistance with regard to the first three areas of responsibility. He provides the ARVN with a means of access to U.S. resources, and a much faster chain of communication through the command (U.S. people take action based upon telephone messages; the ARVN rely upon written messages). He can schedule Air Force aircraft on loudspeaker and leaflet operations, can obtain quick access to stockpiled U.S. leaflets, and see that leaflets are printed by U.S. units when the ARVN cannot do so. The 245th Psychological Operations Detachment is a local asset which the PSYOP Advisor can call upon for assistance.

The PSYOP Advisor relies upon the G2 Advisors for intelligence support. For example, if the ARVN develops a leaflet, they give him the leaflet layout, the intended target group and its location, and a translation. He takes these materials to U.S. G2 people and checks out the leaflet to see that it actually applies to an identified vulnerability in the target group, and that the target group's location is correct. If necessary the language of the leaflet may be modified. A problem exists in the ARVN G2 and POLWAR units at II Corps, in that they will not deal with each other at all, the commanders do not speak to each other.

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Intelligence people also support the PSYOP Advisor by notifying him when a questionable Ho Chi Minh or prisoner of war was become available for interrogation. He responds by sending the essential elements of information (EEI) related to psychological operations. They try to get several Ho Chi Minh from the same organization in order to confirm the information obtained from them. The PSYOP Advisor does not have any intelligence analysts or interrogators to assist him, but can call upon the 245th Psychological Operations Detachment for assistance. They have a couple of people who can conduct interrogations for psychological operations information.

By briefing local U.S. intelligence people on the information requirements of psychological operations, the PSYOP Advisor has found that the flow to him such information has increased. He considers that the intelligence people are well aware of in kind of information needed. The intelligence people scan all incoming intelligence reports, and pass those which have information of utility to psychological operations to the PSYOP Advisor. He considers that this effort is hurt by a lack of intelligence people to perform intelligence analysis; the PSYOP Advisor has no intelligence personnel assisting him. There is a need for a number of intelligence people who can perform intelligence analysis in support of psychological operations in the II Corps area. The PSYOP Advisor does not maintain any intelligence research and analysis files. He passes intelligence information reports to the 245th Psychological Operations Detachment when he has finished with them.

A PSYOP Support Center (PSC) exists at II Corps, jointly staffed by the ARVN and U.S., to coordinate psychological operations, especially aerial leaflet and loudspeaker operations by the aircraft of the 9th Air Commando Squadron, and to facilitate obtaining permission from the ARVN to fly each operational mission. Reportedly the ARVN does not provide support to PSC, and the operation is handled by an NCO supplied by the 245th Psychological Operations Detachment. The targeting of aircraft missions is handled by the PSC.

The PSYOP Advisor considered that intelligence information contained in reports produced in Saigon at the Combined Military Interrogation Center, Combined Document Exploitation Center, and other such facilities, although it was several months old, did serve to provide depth and historical background to intelligence information obtained locally, for example by confirming or identifying trends. This provided a solid basis upon which to identify vulnerabilities in enemy units and to develop media output based upon them.
It was reported that approximately 300,000,000 leaflets in the Vietnamese language will be dropped on II Corps during the year, but the II Corps people do not see the leaflets until they are dropped. It was considered that it would be appropriate for II Corps people to be consulted to determine whether or not such leaflets are appropriate to local target audiences. The question exists as to whether or not these leaflets, mostly designed by JUSPAC, are based upon vulnerabilities of specific groups identified through target analysis. It was considered that it probably was not the case. For example a large proportion of the population inhabiting the highland area, i.e., that area extending from the edge of the coastal plain to Cambodian and Laotian borders, are Montagnard tribal groups which do not speak or read Vietnamese. Further most of the leaflets are too general in nature. Psychological operations to be effective should be developed based upon a determination of specific vulnerabilities in specific villages, groups, and enemy units. At the national level information becomes too generalized or is handled in too generalized a fashion to be satisfactory when applied to operations in Corps areas. It is at the Sector and Corps levels that current detailed information exists that will provide the basis upon which to conduct satisfactory, meaningful psychological operations. The problem, however, is that at those levels, no intelligence analysis capability exists which can satisfactorily exploit available data. There is a real need for a Corps level psychological operations intelligence research and analysis center adequately staffed with intelligence analysts to handle the large numbers of specific target groups which can be distinguished at that level and to provide analytical assistance to PSYOP Advisors at the Sector level.

245th Psychological Operations Detachment
Pleiku, Republic of Vietnam

The 245th Psychological Operations Detachment is a component of the 245th Psychological Operations Company, Nha Trang. It has the missions of printing leaflets (1,000,000 impressions a week) for the U.S. forces in the highlands and the ARVN, when required, and to service the requirements of leaflet dissemination. They provide leaflet dissemination requirements to the 9th Air Commando Squadron component located at Pleiku; such dissemination requirements may come from the 4th Infantry Division or PSYOP Advisors to ARVN divisions and sectors. Some assistance is also provided to the Special Forces when requested.
The 245th Psychological Operations Detachment is divided into three teams: Operations/Intelligence (which provides the U.S. personnel in the 245th Support Center, an FC-PD Team combined), Graphics (SP Team), and Printing (HC Team). The mission of Operations/Intelligence is to screen and analyze current intelligence with emphasis on area studies and enemy troop disposition, and to plan leaflet operations. As far as could be determined one man, an NCO manning the PSC, actually constitutes the operations/Intelligence Team; probably more are assigned to that team, but are probably performing tasks on the Graphics and Printing Teams. One NCO, from time to time, does some intelligence analysis, but it is an occasional thing.

Intelligence information is obtained by going through the intelligence summaries produced by the 245th Psychological Operations Company, I FFV, and II Corps. Documents containing intelligence information pertinent to psychological operations are passed to the 245th Psychological Operations Detachment by the PSYOP Advisor to II Corps. These documents are retained only as long as they are of use in preparing a specific psychological operation; when they have been used they are sent to the 245th Psychological Operations Company. The 245th Psychological Operations Detachment does not maintain any intelligence files. It did not have any library of books and papers on psychological operations doctrine (FM 33-5 and FM 33-1) and on Vietnamese culture, history, and so forth; it did not receive the JUSPAO Guidances.

The 245th Psychological Operations Detachment noted that intelligence analysis was primarily performed by U.S. tactical units. For example, they obtained advice and information pertaining to leaflets from the G2 4th Infantry Division. It obtains its targets from II Corps PSYOP Advisor, and G2 4th Infantry Division through the Division PSYOP Officer.

The 245th Psychological Operations Detachment was authorized a total of 27 persons, but 14 were actually assigned to it. No psychological operations intelligence personnel were assigned at all. It had to use personnel where they were needed regardless of rank or MOS.

It was considered that locally produced leaflets were superior to those produced at the Saigon level because they are based on first hand information and tactical intelligence, and are designed with specific targets in mind.
The 245th Psychological Operations Detachment was aware that a real need existed for a psychological operations intelligence section in the Detachment which could work with the intelligence people to analyze and evaluate intelligence information in support of leaflet and other media operations.

A problem area cited by the 245th Psychological Operations Detachment was the lack of overlap of new and departing personnel to allow for adequate preparation and briefing on all aspects of the local operation so that the knowledge and experience of the departing man would not be lost; three to four weeks was considered a satisfactory amount of overlap.

PSYOP Advisor
20th POLWAR Battalion
Pleiku, Republic of Vietnam

The mission of the 20th POLWAR Battalion is to conduct political warfare operations in support of II Corps, conduct programs concerning military, civil and enemy propaganda, support consolidation and internal security in pacification operations, and to collect POLWAR intelligence in operational areas. The 20th POLWAR Battalion is authorized 519 people, and has actually assigned to it, 388 military people and 12 civilian entertainers.

The 20th POLWAR Battalion conducts tactical propaganda against the enemy by leaflets, loudspeakers, and other media. It provides mobile loudspeaker teams in support of army operations, provides a reproduction facility for leaflets, and provides personnel to prepare and assemble propaganda messages and materials.

The 20th POLWAR Battalion has its subordinate Civic Action companies and POLWAR Companies stationed at Pleiku, Qui Nhon, Ben He Thuot, and Kontum, where they work with the ARVN divisions stationed at the same locations.

U.S. military assistance and advice is provided by a U.S. PSYOP Advisor to the 20th POLWAR Battalion. Most of his assistance is related to the procurement of printing and other supplies for the Battalion. Occasionally he passes intelligence data to the POLWAR Battalion when it becomes available. It was reported that the ARVN G2 and POLWAR people do not speak to each other. The POLWAR Companies each have a four man intelligence team. The U.S. PSYOP Advisor could provide no further information on the functioning of intelligence in the POLWAR Battalion.
Leaflets produced by the POLWAR Battalion are reviewed in the PSYOP Support Center (PSC), and pertinent data may be introduced into that Center. For the past five months or so the 20th POLWAR Battalion had no supplies with which to print leaflets. The reason for this was that supply requisitions which were sent to Saigon were not being acted upon; the requisitioning procedure had been changed. Rather than bouncing back incorrect requisitions they were just not acted upon. The former U.S. PSYOP advisor was aware of the change in requisitioning procedures, but because there was no overlap with his successor this information was not passed on. The Saigon POLWAR Directorate had not received the proper supply requisitions, and had not informed ARVN II Corps of the change in the supply system. As a result for five and one half months the 20th POLWAR Battalion had no printing supplies. When the I FFV found out about the situation, it instructed the 245th Psychological Operations Detachment to provide the 20th POLWAR Battalion with one day's supply of printing materials per week until their normal supply flow resumed. Requisitions in the new system were submitted in June 1967, and it is expected that normal supplies will be received in two or three months. At present using supplies from the 245th Psychological Operations Detachment, the 20th POLWAR Battalion prints about 50,000 leaflets a week on its own presses. Other leaflets are printed on the presses of the 245th Psychological Operations Detachment. These leaflets are reviewed in the PSC and at the 245th; they are checked with U.S. intelligence sources to see that they are accurately based upon intelligence and correct targeting; some changes may be made in them based upon this.

Psychological Operations Officer
4th Infantry Division
Pleiku, Republic of Vietnam

Under a special MACV authorization, psychological operations in the 4th U.S. Infantry Division is handled by a section consisting of four people under the G5. These include the following:

Major Psychological Operations Officer
Captain Assistant Psychological Operations Officer
E5/E6 Psychological Operations Intelligence Analyst
Clerk/Driver

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At present all the positions are filled except that of the Psychological Operations Intelligence Analyst, a requisition has been submitted to fill the slot.

The Psychological Operations Officer is responsible for psychological operations in the 4th Infantry Division; he coordinates such operations with the 9th Air Commando Squadron, the 245th Psychological Operations Detachment, and the II Corps PSYOP Advisor. The 4th Infantry Division has priority with the 245th Psychological Operations Detachment for getting printing done, and with the 9th Air Commando Squadron for aerial loudspeaker operations and leaflet dissemination. He coordinates his activities also with the CORDS Psychological Operations Division (POD) Province Representative. CORDS POD provides the 4th Infantry Division with posters and other JUSFO materials, and also with tape recordings in the Bahm and Jarai languages prepared by Radio Ban Me Thuot. Two teams from the 245th Psychological Operations Company, a loudspeaker team and an audio/visual team, are attached to the 4th Infantry Division, and provide an operational asset for the Psychological Operations Officer.

Intelligence information support is provided to the Psychological Operations Officer by the G2 4th Infantry Division. G2 scans all intelligence which are disseminated to it from higher headquarters, local agencies, or lower units; if any reports contain information of value to psychological operations, they are passed to the Psychological Operations Officer. The Psychological Operations Officer does not receive direct dissemination of intelligence materials, but depends upon G2 for such information. He considers that he has a close working relationship with the G2 4th Infantry Division and that they are well aware of his informational requirements.

An additional G2 source is provided by the interrogation of prisoners of war and Ho Chi Chans. The Psychological Operations Officer has passed essential elements of information (EEI) and questionnaires to the Division interrogators to be used on sources after they have been exploited for tactical information. The normal Division interrogation includes questions relating to morale, food shortages, and fear of B-52 strikes, and so forth.

The utilization of the loudspeaker team for quick reaction is based upon spot intelligence reports from actual contact with an enemy unit in an area of operations. When contact is made, the Psychological Operations Officer contacts the U.S. unit to see if there is anything or anyone exploitable, e.g., a Ho Chi Chanh, and then the loudspeaker team is flown
out in a helicopter to the unit which has established contact. There the team receives a brief briefing from the commanding officer, and then enters a Locate from the ground or the helicopter to the enemy troops. If there is a Hoi Chanh, he is induced to make a live appeal over the loudspeaker to his comrades; a Vietnamese interpreter who controls the switch on the microphone is with him all the time to insure that he does not say the wrong thing.

In addition a polaroid photograph may be taken of the Hoi Chanh and a written statement obtained from him. These are sent to the 245th Psychological Operations Detachment in Pleiku where they are made up into a quick response leaflet which is printed and disseminated over the enemy unit by an aircraft from the 9th Air Commando Squadron station at Pleiku.

The effectiveness of leaflet operations is judged by the fact that prisoners of war have the National Safe Conduct Pass on them as well as Chieu Hoi and 4th Infantry Division leaflets. This shows that the leaflets are at least getting to them.

In addition prisoners of war and Chieu Hoi are asked if they have seen any leaflets, their reaction to them, and so forth. Also, questions are asked related to the audibility of ground and aerial loudspeaker broadcasts.

By the way many of the leaflets are posters used by the 4th Infantry Division are bilingual, in Vietnamese and a Montagnard language such as Bahnar or Jarai. Also the 4th Infantry Division has some tapes prepared in Bahnar and Jarai as well as Vietnamese. These were prepared by an interpreter with the 4th Infantry Division who is fluent in those languages.

In addition to psychological operations conducted by the teams provided by the 245th Psychological Operations Company, elements of the 4th Division also conduct psychological operations. This mostly involves dissemination on the ground by patrols and civic action teams of leaflets and JUSPAO materials. They have also placed leaflets in plastic bags, sealed them with some air inside, and floated them downstream and rivers in their area.

B Flight
9th Air Commando Squadron
Pleiku, Republic of Vietnam

The 9th Air Commando Squadron of the U.S. Air Force is responsible for disseminating leaflets from the air and
for providing aerial loudspeaker operations support to the U.S. and ARVN forces. Operations in the highland area are coordinated by the II Corps Psychological Operations Control Center (PSC). PSC is jointly staffed by ARVN and U.S. personnel (an ADC from the 245th Psychological Operations Detachment), and is the vehicle for obtaining ARVN permission to conduct a given operation. All leaflet and loudspeaker flights to be conducted in the II Corps area must be cleared by the ARVN, except where a specific area of operations has been granted to the Free World Military Forces (FWM). In such cases no prior clearance is required because in giving the FW M a specific area of operations, freedom of action in that area is also given.

Because II Corps is divided into two natural geographic and climatic regions, the densely populated coastal agricultural plain, and the highland area extending from the coastal mountains across the highland plateau areas to the Cambodian and Laotion borders, the 9th Air Commando Squadron has divided its aircraft in II Corps between Nha Trang on the coast, and Pleiku in the central highlands. Further dispersion of aircraft in each area is being arranged through coordination between the Air Force and psychological operations personnel to insure close support in operating areas by reducing ferrying time to leaflet drop points. In the highland area this will include the possible stationing of aircraft at Kontum and Han No Thuot in addition to Pleiku.

Presently twenty-five percent of Air Force leaflet/loudspeaker missions are flown in support of the ARVN, and seventy-five percent are flown in support of the U.S. forces.

Leaflet/loudspeaker targets are provided by the PSC at II Corps, but at the Province/Sector level, target may be provided by the U.S. PSYOP Advisor, or the CORDS POD Province Representative. Where operations are initiated at the province level, permission for the operation must be obtained from ARVN province/sector authorities. At the province/sector level it is considered that the importance of leaflets developed based upon specific target analysis is most important. At that level leaflets are dropped upon discrete targets, e.g., a known Viet Cong unit passing through a certain valley at a given time.

Soon II Corps will be receiving about 200,000,000 nationally produced leaflets a month for dissemination in the Corps area, but the question must be asked whether these leaflets will have been based upon proper target analysis of the specific, discrete target groups in the II Corps area?
The answer is that they have been developed at the national level based upon generalized target groups, and cannot be considered as applying to specific vulnerabilities in II Corps target groups. The need still exists then in II Corps for leaflets based upon proper target analysis of Corps area target groups; the huge quantity of nationally produced leaflets may have little impact upon such target groups because they are not specific and cannot really be used for point target leaflet drops. It is considered that Saigon is too far removed from the Corps area to provide such target analysis in support of leaflet development. Presently at the Corps level there is no real target analysis being done in an organized way by a group charged with that responsibility in supporting leaflet output. The need then exists at the Corps level for a real constituted psychological operations intelligence organization.

Edap Enang, Jarai Resettlement Village
Tan An Sub-Sector Advisor
Pleiku Sector

There are about fifteen U.S. personnel at the Edap Enang Jarai resettlement village, including a five man U.S. advisory team, a Civic Action Team, and three MACV personnel. The 11th ARVN Ranger Battalion provides security.

Psychological operations conducted in Edap Enang include broadcasts over a fixed loudspeaker system in the village and from several Vietnamese Information Service (VIS) audio/visual jeepsters. A psychological operations team from the 20th POLWAR Battalion is located in Edap Enang. The Americans considered that the VIS and POLWAR people were doing an excellent job.

The U.S. Civic Action Team does face-to-face psychological operations. Sometimes the 245th Psychological Operations Company Audio/Visual Team attached to the 4th Infantry Division comes to Edap Enang to show movies. Aerial loudspeaker broadcasts are sometimes used over the village and the surrounding area.

The Vietnamese officer in charge of Edap Enang was trained in psychological operations, and he uses meetings which he holds several times a week with the hamlet chiefs as a means to disseminate information to the people. The primary aim is to persuade the Jarai living in the village to remain there, they were resettled in Edap Enang between April and June 1967 from forty-eight Jarai villages. The
Viet Cong have engaged in psychological operations directed towards the Jarai in Edap Enang, using as a theme that the Americans will soon move away and abandon them. The responses to this has been that the Americans are not going to move away immediately, and that when they do there will be adequate protection provided to the village. Reportedly the Viet Cong propaganda has met with only limited success; less than five percent of the tribespeople have returned to their former villages.

A primary source of intelligence information is agent nets. Also, information is also gathered during MEDCAP operations in the village and the surrounding area.

The only information source available about the culture and customs of the Jarai was the Ethnographic Study booklet on the Jarai produced by CRESS (formerly SORO); this was available to the U.S. personnel at Edap Enang.

Psychological Operations Advisor
Darlac Sector
Ban Me Thuot, Republic of Vietnam

The U.S. Advisors to the ARVN for Darlac Sector are located in Ban Me Thuot, the capital of Darlac Province, the largest province in Vietnam and the location of the Rhade tribe. (Sector is a military term and province a political term for the same geographical area). Ban Me Thuot is also the location of the headquarters of the ARVN 23rd Division which is responsible for an area encompassing seven provinces. The normal channel is Sub-Sector to Sector to Division to Corps; the II Corps headquarters is located at Pleiku.

The U.S. Psyop Advisor is located in the G5 section. He has two functions, to advise the ARVN on psychological operations, and to conduct psychological operations in Darlac Sector. About eighty-five percent of his time is spent in activities related to psychological operations, including target analysis, psychological operations, improving his knowledge of psychological operations, and so forth. He works very closely with the CORDS POD Provincial Representative, who it is believed will be subordinated to him after CORDS is fully established under military authority in Darlac Sector. He has other duties in addition to psychological operations, these are Revolutionary Development and advisor or defoliation. He advises the ARVN official responsible in Darlac Sector for psychological operations, but because that official has other responsibilities he reportedly cannot give
psychological operations a high priority. Psychological operations, it was mentioned, receives emphasis by the U.S. but Vietnamese staff officers are only interested in what their Chief of Staff tells them to be interested in. If he is interested in psychological operations, then they are. In Darlac Sector the Chief of Staff is interested in psychological operations, but the problem is that he is spread very thin. Consequently he has only limited time available in which to show interest, but he has done what he could for psychological operations. Another problem which the ARVN faces is that U.S. Air Force operations supporting psychological operations, e.g., leaflet and loudspeaker aircraft missions, give third priority to the ARVN, and fourth priority to the RF and PF. The order of priority was U.S. FWFP, ARVN and then RF and PF. The RF and PF are the forces under the control of the Sector commander. It was mentioned, however, that recently the RF and PF had been getting more support from the Air Force.

The Psyop Advisor has no intelligence analysts assigned to work with him on psychological operations intelligence analysis, and he receives no dissemination of intelligence materials. All intelligence support that he receives comes from the G2 Advisor located in the Darlac Sector Intelligence/Operations Center, from other members of the intelligence community in Ban Me Thuot. The Center was established about a year ago in accordance with a MACV directive. The Psyop Advisor has briefed the three members of the U.S. intelligence component (two officers and one NCO) of the Darlac Sector Intelligence/Operations Center on the informational needs of psychological operations, and as they are scanning the large body of intelligence materials which come to them they keep on the look out for materials which they think the Psyop Advisor might find useful. The office of the Psyop Advisor is about fifty feet from the Center.

Local intelligence collection sources include advisors working with the Vietnamese in running clandestine agent nets, counter-intelligence advisors, and advisors to the National Police. The Revolutionary Development cadres are another source of information through their advisors. There are two types of RD cadre in Darlac Sector: Truong Son which are shaded tribesmen, and Vung Tau which are ethnic Vietnamese.

It was considered that all intelligence collection seemed to come into focus at the Sector/Province level. The collectors maintained an excellent working relationship with each other, and exchanged intelligence information daily through frequent informal meetings. Reports are fed into
the Sector Intelligence/Operations Center, and when required, action is generated by the Center. Such action may take the form of a military operation, artillery fire, a psychological operation, and so forth. All psychological operations, such as aerial leaflet and loudspeaker operations in Darlac Province must be cleared through the Darlac Sector Intelligence/Operations Center. It was considered that the Sector is the basic working or operational level; it is where the action is. The Corps level is already too far removed from this level, remote. It is at sector that meaningful operations are generated based upon specific and discrete elements of intelligence information applicable to the sector area.

It was estimated that from twenty-five to thirty agent reports were received every day at the Sector Intelligence/Operations Center. Also locally produced interrogation reports are received at the Center from interrogations conducted at sub-sectors, the Sector Interrogation Center, the Province Interrogation Center (operated by the National Police, and the Chieu Hoi Center. In addition, the 23rd ARVN Division was also reported to have an interrogation facility.

The Sector Interrogation Center, located at the Sector Compound, is operated by a group of untrained ARVN personnel, and it was considered that at present they are capable of conducting only superficial interrogations. The main aim of the Sector Interrogation Center is to obtain tactical information. There is a real need for the ARVN interrogators to be trained to do a professional interrogation job; it was estimated that two U.S. advisors who were professional intelligence interrogators could train them to a good level of proficiency in six months. The only assistance they now can receive is from two of the three men staffing the intelligence side of the Sector Intelligence/Operations Center, who are supposed to assist them as an additional duty, but who are not trained interrogators themselves. However, they must spend most of their time in activities connected with the Center, because there are not enough men there to adequately handle all of the intelligence data that requires analysis. As it is they can only skim the cream off the top; there is not enough time available to adequately exploit all of the data which comes to them.

In addition to locally produced intelligence information reports, the Sector Intelligence/Operations Center also receives dissemination of such materials from higher echelons, including those produced by the Combined Document Exploitation
Center, National Interrogation Center, Combined Military Exploitation Center, and other Saigon producing organizations. These documents represent a huge volume of information flow. One problem associated with processing all of these reports is the fact that they contain information pertaining to all of the Republic of Vietnam, not just Darlac Province. To just sort out the reports containing information about Darlac Province is a time-consuming task. The C&IC, NIC, CDEC, and other reports series do not carry an indicator showing what areas of Vietnam are covered in the report, such an indicator would be helpful to sector intelligence facilities which are interested mainly in those nationally produced reports pertaining to their specific provinces.

There is a lot of information available at Sector on the personalities, names, idiosyncrasies, and so forth about Viet Cong and NVA leaders, but there is no manpower available to exploit the information for psychological operations purposes. There is no one available to work fulltime on a detailed personality file.

Rice collection was mentioned as an indicator of Viet Cong unit locations, and information comes in on such activities. No analytical manpower is available to perform the necessary intelligence analysis.

Clandestine agent reports and Army Security Agency information are used to plot enemy unit locations on an order of battle map. Although enemy unit identifications are believed known to the ASA, they only provide the Sector Intelligence/Operations Center with the fact that an enemy unit was located at a given place at a certain time. This kind of information is of marginal utility, because the lack of unit identification does not permit it to be integrated with information garnered from clandestine agent reports, interrogation reports, and other information.

The Darlac Sector Intelligence/Operations Center maintains two types of order of battle maps. The one is the usual sort of order of battle map showing enemy unit locations, name and size of unit, and unit movements over a period of time. It was considered that the information maintained on that order of battle map was more current than that to be found on similar maps at Corps Headquarters and I PPV G2. Color coding on the map uses orange to show confirmed unit locations, and black for Revolutionary Development areas (the areas where the Truong Son conduct coordinate searches based upon the National Police Black List).
The other map is one which may be considered a kind of psychological operations order of battle map. It shows the locations of Viet Cong incidents, abductions, threats, propaganda team activities (including themes used), base camps, rice fields, infiltration routes, administrative boundaries, and so forth. Following is the color coding system used on that map:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Color</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Red</td>
<td>Abductions, threats, and so forth.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yellow</td>
<td>Propaganda theme, unknown.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brown</td>
<td>Propaganda theme, anti-FULRO.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Green</td>
<td>Propaganda theme, anti-U.S.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These maps provide a useful tool to assist the Psyop Advisor in his work. For example, it was determined based upon the pattern of movement revealed on the order of battle map that a Viet Cong unit would be moving through a particular valley during the following twenty-four hour period. Based upon this information, the Psyop Advisor arranged for an Air Force airplane to drop leaflets in the path of the Viet Cong unit. At the province level based upon the kind of information available there such operations can be conducted all the time, and if more intelligence analytical assistance were available to the psychological operators, media output based upon specific target vulnerabilities could be used.

In addition to maintaining the two order of battle maps, the intelligence people in the Darlac Sector Intelligence/Operations Center also maintain two loose leaf notebooks on the Viet Cong guerrilla order of battle (RITZ Report series) and Viet Cong political order of battle, the infrastructure (CORRAL Report series). Mimeographed copies of the pages for these two order of battle notebooks are disseminated, new copies being produced as changes are determined. Following is the dissemination of the RITZ Report series:

Two sheets to each Sub-Sector in Darlac Sector
One sheet to: Team B-5th USSF
File
USCRD, Ban Ne Thoxt
JTAD, Ban Ne Thoxt
OCO, Assistant PR, Sp Br. (Ban Ne Thoxt)
OCO, Assistant PR, Cadre (Ban Ne Thoxt)
G2, 4th U.S. Infantry Division
S2, 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division
CORUSAVY, CIV

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Following is the dissemination of the COMRAI Report series:

Darlac Sector  
Quang Duc Sector  
Phu Yen Sector  
Phu Yen Sector  
Khanh Hoa Sector  
Phu Yen Sector  
Tuyen Doc Sector  
Each Sub-Sector in Darlac Sector  
Team E-23 USSF (Ban Me Thuot)  
CHD (Ban Me Thuot)  
G2, 4th U.S. Infantry Division  
S2, 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division  
National Police (Ban Me Thuot)  
CONUS:ACV, CICV

The intelligence people in the Center are trying to start a biographic file listing the names of all known members of enemy units in Darlac Sector. In addition, they are trying to start a file on each Buon (name given to Rhade villages) in the Sector showing events associated with it, e.g., Viet Cong rice collection, taxation, incidents, propaganda, and so forth.

The intelligence people have available to them a print-out of the Hamlet Evaluation/Classification Summary Report. This is a machine listing that is run every month showing details on each village, hamlet, province, and corps area. Categories of information include: secure, undergoing security, contested, uninhabited (i.e., people living in an area that is not a recognized GVN population), and Viet Cong controlled. Geographical coordinates are given for each village. The input is provided by a Hamlet Evaluation Worksheet which is completed by, as far as could be determined, the G5 Sub-Sector or Sector Advisor. This listing has utility for targeting psychological operations. If a similar machine listing were developed with psychological operations in mind the efforts of the Psyop Advisors would be materially assisted. Categories that could be included on such a listing might be for each village, language spoken, ethnic group, Viet Cong propaganda activities, U.S. propaganda activities, listing of all leaflet drops and loudspeaker operations, and so forth.
The CORDS Psychological Operations Division Province Representative reports to the CORDS Information/Psychological Operations Office at Region II Headquarters, Nha Trang. In Dalat it was reported that he will be subordinated to the U.S. Army Dalat Sector Psyop Advisor in line with the concept of subordinating the civilians to the military under the CORDS concept. At any rate, in the past, the Psyop Advisor and the CORDS POD Province Representative have customarily worked very closely together; the one handling the military aspect of psychological operations, and the other, the civilian aspect.

The CORDS POD Province Representative has among his duties that of acting as advisor to the local components of the Vietnamese Information Service (VIS). Other duties include: distribution of JUSPAO produced materials such as Free World, posters, pamphlets, and so forth, producing a weekly attitude report, advising Radio Ban Me Thuot, supporting a weekly Revolutionary Development radio program, increasing the power output of Radio Ban Me Thuot, organizing seminars for Revolutionary Development cadres, handling the showing of films, establishing bulletin boards, increasing press run of local newspapers, increase psychological operations activities among the Rhade tribal villages, supporting the Dalat Chieu Hoi program, assisting Revolutionary Development in psychological operations activities, providing psychological operations to refugee groups, and supplying standard publications to ARVN units.

The CORDS POD Province Representative receives dissemination of background materials, including guidance from JUSPAO, as well as propaganda material. Local intelligence support is obtained through the Sector Psyop Advisor. He also has developed a questionnaire which is used in interviews with Hoi Chanh at local Chieu Hoi Centers to obtain information on their attitudes, and determine effectiveness of psychological operations. (See Appendix E, item 11). He is notified by the Chieu Hoi Center when a good source of information for psychological operations comes in.

Formerly the VIS local unit used to have an intelligence section which provided some support to psychological operations, but this section was done away with.
The materials sent from JUSPAO, such as the Guidelines, are too general and don't really pertain to existing problems in Dalac Province. Some typical guidances were found useful, and so were some informational materials on how to conduct psychological operations, e.g., how to disseminate leaflets on the ground. However, much of the materials that are received fall in the category of high-level psychological operations, e.g., a Haun mask speech, or information on the Manilla Conference, and do not really have much to do with meaningful psychological operations at the province level.

The Province Representative prepares some leaflet layouts. Sometimes the printing of them is requested from JUSPAO, or sometimes they are printed locally. It takes at least several months to get a leaflet produced and printed at JUSPAO, but since funds are available he often has leaflet printed locally. The average press run is 50,000 leaflets. Leaflets he produces are in both the Vietnamese and Rhade languages. The Rhade tribe has the highest literacy rate of any Vietnamese tribe, about 10 percent, and it is considered that the information contained in the leaflets will be disseminated by literate tribesmen. Information on vulnerabilities for locally produced leaflets is obtained from the Sector Psyop Officer, and from interviews with Hoi Chanh. As part of distribution from JUSPAO, the Province Representative receives a large number of nationally produced leaflets, and although they are generalized in nature, they are used in leaflet drops.

Work is underway on producing a safe conduct pass using the picture and the signature of the Province Chief, and with the text in both Vietnamese and Rhade.

There is a great need that all leaflets used in Dalac Province also be in Rhade as well as Vietnamese. The Rhade make up the rural population, except for some ethnic Vietnamese in Viet Cong units, and the Vietnamese make up the bulk of the town-dwelling population, Ban Me Thuot being defined as a town.

A problem is that there are no books available locally on propaganda and propaganda techniques; there are no books on Vietnamese and Rhade cultural patterns, except for the CRESS Ethnographic Study Series booklet on the Rhade. It was considered that there could be more intelligence support by the intelligence collectors in Dalac Province to psychological operations.
Leaflets produced in Darlac Province, as noted above, are based upon information obtained principally from Hoi Chanh. There are two types of leaflets commonly used: safe conduct passes and leaflets about local Hoi Chanh. The leaflets about Darlac Province Hoi Chanh are about local people and always carry their photographs. People in the province do not put much credence in printed statements and names, but belief is established by having the man's picture on the leaflet as well.

The nationally generated TET campaign did not really have much pertinence to Darlac Province. During that campaign about four and a half million Vietnamese language leaflets were dropped over Darlac Province. It should be noted that TET is a celebration of the ethnic Vietnamese who are concentrated in the lowland coastal areas of Vietnam, and only in the towns in the highland area. Such leaflets are valueless when directed toward the Rhade tribesmen in Darlac Province; they do not celebrate TET.