**Figure 8**

**THE CHIEU NOI DIRECTORATE 1970-1971**

- **DIRECTOR**
  - **DEPUTY DIRECTOR**
    - **MILITARY LIASON SECTION**
      - Interrogation
      - Intelligence Exploitation
      - Kit Carson Scouts
    - **PROGRAM PLANNING AND REPORTS SECTION**
      - Coordination of Policy Planning
      - Liaison with PP&P and USAID/PROG
      - Reports Analysis
  - **ADMINISTRATIVE AND FISCAL DIVISION**
    - Personnel
    - Administrative Support
    - Budget
  - **FIELD OPERATIONS DIVISION**
    - APT
    - PSYOPS
    - Training
    - Resettlement
    - Follow-up
    - Special Projects
  - **PROGRAM SUPPORT DIVISION**
    - Resettlement Support
    - Construction
    - Logistics
    - Rewards/Awards

*In 1971 this Division was abolished and Personnel, Administrative Support, and Budget was put under Program Support.*
And the U.S. did contribute the major part of the 1967 funding (over $8.0 million), with the GVN contributing roughly $1.7 million, for a total budget of $9.9 million. A glance at the breakdown of expenditures in the Chieu Hoi budget gives a good insight into operation of the program and the expansion of benefits now offered under it.

Piastre funds were spent for such purposes as salaries and allowances of the Chieu Hoi cadre, the Armed Propaganda Teams, and political orientation teachers; for food, clothing, and allowances of the Hoi Chanh; for weapons, special missions, transportation and per diem expenses for Hoi Chanh on duty; for psychological operations, political orientation and vocational training, special "allowances" for high-ranking returnees, furniture allowances for families settling in Chieu Hoi hamlets, reinstatement (separation) allowances for Hoi Chanh, survivor allowances to relatives of Hoi Chanh and APT members killed or wounded in action; for the expansion and improvement of Chieu Hoi Centers, construction and improvement of Chieu Hoi hamlets, and equipment for Centers; and for construction of the National Chieu Hoi Vocational Training Center.

Dollar funds were spent for roofing, cement, reinforcing bars, salaries of Americans and Third Country nationals functioning as Chieu Hoi Advisers, and vehicles and other equipment which had to be purchased outside South Vietnam. A similar budget breakdown continued in subsequent years, though the amounts varied.

CORDS found this budget adequate to support the target for the year of 45,000 returnees (2.2 times the actual 1966 rate), with this caveat:

It has been demonstrated repeatedly that GVN funding and administrative procedures do not admit of adequate flexibility or rapidity of response to permit the Chieu Hoi Program to go forward at the pace the priority demands.15

To hurdle this obstacle, a contingency fund (something Williams had been urging for sometime) of VNs$10 million was set up which could be "drawn down" at the request of the Chieu Hoi Program Manager. Some VNs$55 million (approximately six times the amount available in 1966) was allocated in 1967 for the construction of new Centers and the expansion or improvement of existing ones.
One of the targets of the new CORDS team was inept and ineffective performance of some of the Chieu Hoi service chiefs at province. In addition to negotiating directly with GVN Chieu Hoi officials, Williams periodically supplied Komer with lists of those who should be removed, and some of these men were indeed removed as a result of Komer's interventions with the GVN at higher levels. It was necessary in many cases to resort to a "Vietnamese solution." There were many factors bearing on the appointment of a Chieu Hoi Chief, none of them necessarily related to the effective running of the program. In one instance, when the Chieu Hoi Minister attempted to remove four Chieu Hoi service chiefs in MR 4 who were Hoa Hao, leaders of that sect accused the GVN of a systematic policy of removing their brethren from government posts and informed the Prime Minister that the "Hoa Hao would be obliged to draw the necessary conclusions." When the Minister explained the men were being removed because of ineptitude and not because they were Hoa Hao, "this line of reasoning was so novel as to leave the Hoa Hao without comment -- but still skeptical." The solution was to play musical chairs with the recalcitrant Chieu Hoi chiefs to prove the principle that, despite local politics, government appointees could be removed to break up local accommodations, and, in the words of a CORDS Adviser, to "stimulate the tired blood of these officeholders."

By April 1967 it had become apparent that an organized, sustained effort had to be made on a nationwide basis to find jobs for Hoi Chanh if the credibility of the program was to be maintained in the eyes of potential returnees. The problem had been intensified by the influx of returnees into the Centers, which were filled to capacity and over. Failure to place returnees in jobs where they could earn a decent living was having an adverse effect. Through interviews with Hoi Chanh it was learned that many Viet Cong ready to rally were reluctant to do so because they were unsure as to how they would be able to support themselves and their families. In April, regional directors and provincial representatives were directed to establish an organized employment program or system for bringing Hoi Chanh into contact with prospective employers and generating interest on the part of potential employers in the Hoi Chanh as prospective employees.
Primary to any successful employment program for Hoi Chanh was the matter of the vital ID card. A long, involved security check was required by the National Police before it would grant one, necessitating clearance by the police of the village where the Hoi Chanh had been born or was inscribed -- a procedure which was oftentimes impossible or at the very least time-consuming -- all the way up to Saigon, where the Hoi Chanh was checked against the so-called "black list" of Viet Cong criminals. This process sometimes took six to eight months. Between 1966 and 1969 the time delay was gradually overcome, and reduced to two months (i.e., approximately by the time the Hoi Chanh were ready to leave the Center). By 1969, issuance of an ID card to Hoi Chanh as a means of identification and not necessarily as proof of security clearance, did much to alleviate the problem.

Wade Lathram, writing to Komer in mid-1967, saw the GVN as a whole "grudgingly supporting the Chieu Hoi Program although a slow improvement is discernible." Finally, in December 1967, the GVN upgraded Chieu Hoi to a Ministry with a corresponding change in personnel at the top -- "with one of the bright and influential 'inner circle' groups as the new Minister" (Nguyen Xuan Phong). Recruiting able personnel for the operating level, however, was still very much a problem. The GVN staffed the program either through appointment of army officers (Lathram had recommended to Komer that he take up with Prime Minister Ky the "transfer of at least 50 good quality ARVN officers to MCH as a matter of high priority") or by selection from civil service ranks. The GVN was generally not cooperative. Caliber and numbers continued to be inadequate.

The early 1967 rate followed a pattern similar to that for 1965 and 1966, i.e., high in the first quarter (almost one-half the annual returnee rate is achieved during the first quarter of the year because of Tet). There was also an expansion of GVN and allied presence into "virgin territory" in II and III Corps through clear-and-hold operations (e.g., IRVING in Binh Dinh and CEDAR FALLS in Binh Duong), which created a potential "defector pool." Later in the year there was a steady decline in the rate, as political activity surrounding the fall national elections (September and November) intensified. The program became paralyzed while cadres, administrators, and potential ralliers speculated
on the future of the Thieu government and the possibility of a coalition government after Tet as predicted by Communist propaganda.

Overcrowded centers (though total capacity had been increased 112.9 percent during the year, i.e., from 3,105 in December 1966 to 6,610 by December 1967); mistreatment of returnees; corruption (e.g., GVN officials sometimes took a "cut" from returnee allowances); failure of the GVN to provide opportunities for employment without prejudice -- shortcomings known to the Viet Cong via the jungle grapevine and subsequently propagandized -- were other serious deterrent factors explaining the declining rallier rate.

More important, however, than these factors, in the fall of 1967 the enemy was preparing for the 1968 Tet Offensive, tightly controlling his troops, promising a coalition government after Tet and the end of the war in 1968. In retrospect, there were ample indications of a forthcoming major effort by the enemy, but its precise nature and timing were not clear. Under these circumstances the enemy seized the psychological initiative and the number of returnees fell off severely -- from 2,100 in August to only 889 in December.

Data by corps area show that in 1967 I Corps consistently provided less than 10 percent of the total returnees, not surprising in view of its proximity to North Vietnam and the larger number of NVA troops in the area. The distribution from other corps areas was fairly even, though II Corps was able to produce more than 30 percent of the total number of returnees in every quarter from October 1965 through June 1967, primarily because of aggressive allied military clear-and-hold operations in provinces such as Binh Dinh.

The total number of ralliers in 1967 -- 27,178 -- fell far short of the estimated 1967 goal of 45,000, but still represented a 34 percent increase over 1966. The VC military forces neutralized through Chieu Hoi (17,671) were equal to about one-fifth of the total of all enemy forces killed or captured by military action (91,595). Had it been necessary to eliminate these armed VC on the battlefield, it would have meant the loss of more than 3,000 Free World forces.

Impressive as these statistics are, there is reliable evidence of somewhat less substantial, long-range effectiveness. Kellen believed
that the number of surrenders was never actually big enough seriously
to affect the enemy, that wars are not won through defectors, and that
the defectors left their forces in body only but not in spirit, and
tended to retain a good deal of their faith in VC leadership and faith
in their cause.18

Berman agrees somewhat with this latter contention, viz.

... they quit because the hardships had become too much
for them, but more frequently they gave up the struggle
for reasons of personal grievances due to lack of promo-
tion, or for family reasons. ... This would indicate
... that support for the cause might return in most of
these defectors under more favorable conditions.19

CORDS in a blunt May 1967 assessment of the program saw insuffi-
cient GVN participation in the psychological aspects, a lack of quality
and quantity in the GVN staffing of the program; inadequate and inef-
fective political orientation of the Hoi Chanh while in the Centers;
no adequate system for "follow-up" on the Hoi Chanh after he left the
Center; insufficient tactical and intelligence exploitation of the
Hoi Chanh; and an absence of flexible funding procedures to permit
rapid response to problems and "targets of opportunity."20

Further evidence of a lack of optimum imaginative approach in the
GVN exploitation of the program is contained in an analysis done by
the Chieu Hoi Division of CORDS and the Simulmatics Corporation.21
Nor had the new GVN (elected in September) developed an image of demonstrable, aggressive forward action which could replace that of the Viet
Cong "revolution."

DAI DOAN KET

Probably the most important innovation in the Chieu Hoi Program
since its inception was the Proclamation in April 1967 by Prime Min-
ister Nguyen Cao Ky of a Policy of National Reconciliation (Dai Doan
Ket).22

Williams recalls that "the U.S. side had dreamed up national recon-
ciliation in the fall of 1966 and that it had been negotiated with the
highest levels of the Vietnamese government at the Manila Conference
in October 1966." The Proclamation provided that Hoi Chanh who returned
to the GVN would not only be given amnesty and guaranteed their political and civil rights as before under the earlier Chieu Hoi Program, but would also be helped by the government to find careers commensurate with their experience, ability, and loyalty. In the words of the Proclamation,

... all citizens who abandon the Communist ranks will enjoy all the rights set forth in the Constitution, including the right of freedom, the right to have life, property and honor protected by law, the right to take part in elections, the right to rejoin families, the right to choose the place to settle and the right to enjoy national assistance toward improving the standard of living.

(It should be noted that the "rights set forth under the Constitution" and the promise of amnesty did not include amnesty from punishment for major crimes committed prior to joining the Viet Cong.)

President Thieu reaffirmed this policy of national reconciliation in a Joint Communiqué (with President Johnson) issued July 20, 1968, after the second Honolulu Conference. Noting that the Vietnamese government had rejected "the principles of retaliation and revenge," he offered full participation in political activities, including the right to vote and to be elected, to all individuals and members of groups who agreed to renounce force, abandon Communist ideology and atrocities, lay down their weapons, and abide by the Constitution of Vietnam.

Here again, however, was a U.S. initiative pressed on the GVN at the highest levels. The Vietnamese Cabinet was very much against the new proposal. Moreover, because the NRP offered full political participation to the rallier, the Vietnamese thought it would eventually lead to a coalition government. While the GVN went ahead and issued the Proclamation, the Vietnamese never really accepted -- or implemented -- this "American program."

The NRP -- as the name implies -- sought to use the concepts and the structure of the older and less ambitious Chieu Hoi Program as a nation-building device. Indeed, Pike actually saw Dai Doan Ket as a means of ending the war:

... whereas Chieu Hoi seeks to bring the insurgents back into society, the NRP seeks to bring them back into the decision-making arena. Dai Doan Ket concerns itself
not only with integration into society but with polit­
ical participation, political rights, and political
opportunities. 3

Specifically, the NRP was a campaign to induce hard-core, high­
ranking Viet Cong to surrender with a guarantee of "job equivalency."
While over 50,000 former Viet Cong had rallied to the government since
1963, it had become evident that the incentives offered had not been
sufficient to attract high military and civilian cadres in the enemy
ranks. Indeed, there was a rather widespread misconception that the
GVN policy of amnesty applied only to those joining the Front recently
(and therefore of lesser rank); that the government viewed with
suspicions any defectors who had been in the Front for any length of
time; or that Viet Cong leaders would meet with severe retribution.

Another deterrent to defection by the higher level cadres was
the matter of status. The potential for upward social mobility is
greater in the Viet Cong organization than in the traditional Vietnamese
social structure and is cited in many cases as a reason for joining the
insurgency. Thus, status once achieved in the Communist organization
would not easily be given up to return to the GVN and an uncertain
future. Most of the officers and high-ranking civilian cadres of the
Front had worked their way up from peasant status to their present
position. The Simulmatics Study makes an interesting point in this
connection:

The careerists who constitute this cadre, while they are
professional revolutionists who use the tools of conspir­
acy and violence without compunction, also have many
bureaucratic civil service characteristics. They
operate to a remarkable degree by the rule books. They
fill out or demand forms in great detail. They concern
themselves with promotions. . . . That is why . . . the
offer of good jobs to the Hoi Chanh is not just a matter
of assuring them of the wherewithal to feed themselves
and their families well. . . . Viet Cong leaders must be
offered the chance to continue in their chosen profession
with the same kind of status and opportunity for advance­
ment that the Viet Cong offered. . . . Nowhere else in
Vietnam can one find as extensive a . . . group with
administrative skills and relatively high standards of
honesty and performance as in the Viet Cong.

In the past numerous GVN officials had regarded with mixed feelings
any policy that would give amnesty to former enemies responsible, in
many cases, for the death of relatives and friends. To welcome them into
government service and reward them with jobs was even more unacceptable.

Since the GVN recognized that a prerequisite to the success of the
proclaimed reconciliation policy was the unqualified acceptance of it
by GVN civil and military officials, some attempt was made at an informa-
tion and education program directed toward all government employees. As
late as June 1968, however, only the Ministry of Chieu Hoi, within the
government, had demonstrated any interest or capability in following
through on the NRP. High-level jobs were found for several prominent
returnees within the Chieu Hoi Ministry, but except in one or two out-
standing instances neither the Defense Ministry nor other civil ministries
demonstrated any initiative or desire to make national reconciliation a
reality.25

The government has offered Viet Cong medics and doctors who rally
an opportunity to resume their medical practice, but requires them to
take additional examinations and internship. By the end of 1971, six
ex-VC and 15 medical technicians had been approved officially by the GVN
and were working in province hospitals.

For Viet Cong army officers "the same kind of status," etc. means
equivalent rank in the ARVN but even though the natural disinclination
of ARVN officers to accept their erstwhile enemies be overcome, the like-
lihood for the same "opportunity for advancement" would appear even
dimmer. ARVN did agree to give examinations to ex-VC officers and NCOs,
allowing them to join the military at the rank achieved during the
examination. However, even by the end of 1971 no Hoi Chanh had volun-
teered to take the examination.

In discussing Dai Doan Ket, Ambassador Komer stated in an inter-
view in May 1971:

...we found the Vietnamese a pillow on it. They accepted
it in principle. Ky and Thieu said a few of the right words.
But they never executed it in practice. The rationale was
to try to offer something more than just amnesty for ralliers.
We were trying to get some of the bigwig politicians on the
other side if there were any. The reaction of the GVN was
tapid. The results were almost nil. Here was an example
of our pushing a program that the GVN just did not want,
indeed most of the nationalist Vietnamese, not just the
government itself. The politicians in Parliament (sic) were
even more vigorously opposed.26
TWO STEPS FORWARD ONE STEP BACK -- 1968

In 1968 U.S. funding of the program was taken over by the Department of Defense as an AID/DOD "realignment activity" with all U.S. inputs funded by DOD on a reimbursable basis and administered by CORDS (except for U.S. commodities furnished directly from U.S. military stocks). Total cost of the program for 1968 was $22.9 million, of which the GVN contributed $0.38 million.27

(U) Provision was made in the 1968 budget for additional advisory personnel. The following breakdown shows an interesting shift in emphasis, in an effort to "Vietnamize" the advisory effort via an increase of 44 Vietnamese personnel.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>On Hand as of 12/31/67</th>
<th>1968 Program</th>
<th>Increase</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U.S.*</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TCN*</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnamese</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total:</strong></td>
<td><strong>132</strong></td>
<td><strong>190</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CORDS believed the above personnel increases would permit adequate staffing of the advisory program. American, Australian, or Filipino Chieu Hoi advisers were assigned to the Regional MACCORDS staffs in the four military regions and to the CORDS senior advisers in each province to work directly with the Vietnamese Chieu Hoi Service. However, by December 1968 Williams complained he was still trying to operate the program with "the leanest operating staff in CORDS ... at the field level we are severely anemic in terms of advisory personnel."28 Eight provinces were still without Chieu Hoi advisers and in three provinces the Chieu Hoi adviser had other primary functions and took care of Chieu Hoi when he had time.

On the GVN side, there were now 1,615 Vietnamese employees on MICH rolls (not counting APT members). There was to be a substantial recruiting campaign with emphasis on improving the quality of Chieu Hoi cadres as well as numbers. Representatives of MICH at region were to provide technical supervision over the program. At province there was

*Third-country nationals.
a representative of the Chieu Hoi Service who supervised all province Chieu Hoi activities, including the province Chieu Hoi Center. A three-man Chieu Hoi team (one of whom was the District Chieu Hoi Chief) was authorized for each district, but many districts were, in fact, uncovered.

In early 1968 the program was taken out of MICH and a Ministry of Chieu Hoi (MCH) was created. The resignation of Minister Nguyen Xuan Phong six months later was, in Williams' words, "a tragic loss." Phong, resigning to become an "éminence grise" in the presidency, had only just managed to get the new ministry going. Phong recommended that as an "acceptable new status for Chieu Hoi a Special Commissariat be set up in the President's office" on the assumption that from such a position a Special Commissioner (possibly Phong) would have more influence on the military (e.g., on G-2 in the matter of interrogating high-ranking Hoi Chanh), though admittedly under such an arrangement the Commissioner's liaison with other ministries would have to go through the Prime Minister's office, which would "hinder his mobility." Komer backed the proposal for such a reorganization. However, upon Phong's resignation the program once again was put under a Minister for Information and Chieu Hoi (Nguyen Ngoc An) with an Under Secretariat for Chieu Hoi.

Program goals remained substantially the same and, despite a decrease in total number of returnees for the year, showed continued improvement in implementation. Specific goals outlined in the 1968 Pacification Guidelines were to

1. Recruit, train, arm, equip, and operate 75 APT companies (an increase from 69);
2. Press for increased use of returnees in tactical and intelligence operations in U.S./GVN forces (goal set for a total of 1,800 Kit Carson Scouts by end CY 1968);
3. Continue to support use of returnees in Revolutionary Development and other GVN civil programs;
4. Improve vocational training in Chieu Hoi centers and on-the-job sites;
5. Help find jobs for returnees (with a goal of 9,000 placements);
6. Construct reception/holding facilities in 118 districts;
7. Improve political training in Chieu Hoi centers (number of instructors was to be increased to 100);
8. Continue improvement in normal elements of the program, i.e., inducement, reception, and interrogation, training, tactical use, resettlement, and follow-up.
The GVN also sought to improve the program by setting up a Third Party Inducement Program, in which an individual was to be paid to bring in defectors (see pp. 71-72 for further description). There was increased emphasis on a "turn-around program" (in which a selected returnee was briefed and sent back to his former unit to induce other VC to defect), and on monetary awards for weapons brought in by ralliers. Total amount paid out during 1968 for this weapons award program came to about VN$20 million, an amount greatly in excess of previous annual expenditures.

The returnee goal for 1968 was put at a "conservative" figure of 30,000, with funds provided in the budget for an additional 30,000. This, however, was admittedly a planning and budgetary figure based on an arbitrary assumption that, if the military situation continued to improve, there could be mass desertions from VC ranks:

It had become clear in 1967 that massive returnee rates could be expected only when new areas and new "populations" were opened up and transferred suddenly from VC to GVN control. As an area is pacified the Chieu Hoi rate inevitably declines. 31

A more realistic figure was around 20,000, based on a continued low level of VC recruitment, the expected shift of allied military operations to the sparsely populated border areas, and the "inefficiencies of the program."

THE 1968 TET OFFENSIVE

The basic change in VC/NVA strategy which began in the second half of 1967 culminated in the celebrated 1968 Tet Offensive. 1968 was to be "the year of decision." P. J. Honey, a noted British expert on North Vietnam, believed that the drain on enemy manpower and intelligence caused by the Chieu Hoi Program was one of the major reasons why the enemy was forced to press for an earlier solution to the war than his previous protracted war strategy had contemplated. 32

The impact of the new strategy on the Chieu Hoi returnee rate was severe (though Williams believed it did not substantially affect the
structure or doctrine of the program). Whereas in the first quarter of 1967, primarily because of a stepped-up Tet campaign, some 10,603 Viet Cong had rallied, in the corresponding 1968 period (during the Tet Offensive and its immediate aftermath), there were only 2,541 — the lowest quarterly total since 1965. Not only the heightened political uncertainty of that period but also the increase in allied search-and-destroy operations undoubtedly inhibited large-scale rallying. A comparison of the January and February 1968 rates with those in January 1967 amply illustrates the sensitivity of the returnee rate to military-political activity.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>February 1968</th>
<th>January 1968</th>
<th>January 1967</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>272</td>
<td>234</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>221</td>
<td>780</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>1,096</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV</td>
<td>421</td>
<td>535</td>
<td>807</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total:</td>
<td>763</td>
<td>1,179</td>
<td>2,917</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Paul Neilson, Acting Chief of the Chieu Hoi Division in Saigon during the 1968 Tet attacks, wrote to the field in February 1968:

Most of you know at this writing that with few exceptions the Chieu Hoi Program has come through the past few weeks largely unscathed as far as its physical assets are concerned. The expected popular uprising which the VC expected did not materialize ... even in the form of defecting Hoi Chanh. ... Until such time as the current relatively high intensity of combat subsides, we cannot really expect much reaction in the form of increased returnee rates ... engaged forces are often reluctant to recognize even POWs let alone ralliers ... important activities such as vocational, political training, resettlement activities have remained at a standstill since the inception of the Offensive ... experience has shown that once momentum is lost, a very trying, time-consuming process must ensue before the loose ends can be picked up again. 

The GVN Chieu Hoi Ministry "weathered the storm" with apparently few ill effects. The Minister and his staff continued to visit critical provinces as security permitted, presented meritorious service awards to deserving individuals, and continued to exert pressure for improvement in management and performance. Personnel losses had not
been severe, though a substantial number of ex-Hoi Chanh were engulfed by the Viet Cong along with the rest of the population as the GVN pulled back from the countryside to protect the cities.

Damage to facilities was not as heavy as had been feared except in six provinces: Quang Tri (which suffered the heaviest damage), Thua Thien (with 60 percent of its facilities damaged), Kontum, Pleiku, and Vinh Long (with major damage), and Kien Hoa (with minor damage to the Center but with total destruction of the Chieu Hoi office). Construction goals for 1968 suffered a substantial setback. Political and vocational training programs also were slow to recover momentum. The most serious impact was at district, where most ralliers are received and which therefore forms a vital link in the Chieu Hoi structure. The security situation continued tense and inhibited effective operations of the centers.

On the other hand the Tet Offensive was a "watershed" in the GVN's attitude toward the program. Hoi Chanh with few exceptions had remained loyal to the GVN, the APTs had proved worthy of confidence, and the inability of the enemy to hold territory and to fulfill the promised uprising of the people, created a new and even larger group of potential Hoi Chanh.

An upturn in the Chieu Hoi returnee rate began in April and continued for the rest of the year. The Accelerated Pacification Program -- set in motion by President Thieu in November 1968 -- set a goal of 5,000 Hoi Chanh for the following three-month period. Of the year's total (18,171), 42 percent (7,631) came in during the fourth quarter of the year, with 33 percent attributed to IV Corps as the result of the Third Party Inducement Program.34

New patterns were discernible. The percentage of military ralliers rose from 65 percent in 1967 to 69 percent, while the percentage of political ralliers dropped from 29 percent in 1967 to 21 percent. (It is interesting to note, however, that in 1969 the percentage of military ralliers dropped to 60 percent and the percentage of political ralliers rose to 27 percent. This trend continued through 1970. See Fig. 4, p. 11.)
While Kellen stated that "Tet which had been both a great success and a great failure in different ways for the enemy had not shaken his morale and the cadres had been able to redress the fighters' morale," the trend of increased military Hoi Chanh continued throughout the year. One reason was perhaps the rallying of recruits impressed into military service for the Tet Offensive (estimated VC recruitment rose from approximately 3,500 a month in 1967 to 7,000 a month during corresponding months in the first quarter of 1968), who were now taking the Chieu Hoi route home. MACV also reported "a distinct rise in the rank of ralliers," but there are no figures on numbers or percentages considered statistically reliable. There was also some sporadic mass defection of Viet Cong military units and of dissident Hoa Hao and Cambodian KKK but no nationwide trend.

Williams saw 1968 as a year of testing for the program, with many factors operating against it:

... the Paris negotiations, the U.S. Presidential elections, the cessation of bombardment of the North, the greater presence of NVA in the South, the nature of the military confrontation, and better enemy control measures. ... The fact that Chieu Hoi was able to make a credible showing against all these obstacles is in a large measure due to the dedicated efforts of field advisors throughout Vietnam. 36

One of these advisers saw the situation through a different prism. William Lenderking, a USIA PsyOps adviser at district, writing in early 1968 and admittedly discouraged by the 1968 Tet Offensive, says:

The Chieu Hoi Program was indeed significant and imaginative but the sophistication required to administer it properly which would have involved detailed recordkeeping and efficient follow-up on Hoi Chanh after they left the Chieu Hoi Centers, was simply beyond the capabilities of the GVN at that time. Further, the requirement that the program be made really appealing and credible by offering ralliers meaningful positions in society was not lived up to at all. The result was another program that was moving erratically, propped up by figures which were not inaccurate as to total numbers, but which actually concealed the most important elements of the story. 37

Notwithstanding the obvious flaws in the program, the influx of returnees during the last half of 1968 (an influx which was to continue in 1969) led Jones, then head of the Chieu Hoi Directorate, to state:
These returnees are not only out of action in a negative sense; they are beginning to make the significant positive contribution to the national effort which characterizes the bonus aspects of the Chieu Hoi Program, the most important of which involves their becoming GVN supporters at least in some form. . . .

OVER THE TOP -- 1969

By 1969 Williams believed that Chieu Hoi was "now a major political plank of the GVN, regarded as partial proof that the people of South Vietnam support the GVN more than the Viet Cong."39

The influx of returnees in the last quarter of 1968 (under the Accelerated Pacification Program) came to full flood in 1969. A goal of 20,000 had originally been set, but because of the great numbers rallying during the first half of the year (by the end of May, 12,383 VC had already rallied), the figure was revised upward to 33,500. In July 5,091 rallied, the highest monthly rate since 1963. By the end of the year there had been 47,023 returnees with pronounced increases in all regions. IV Corps was setting records, accounting for 70 percent of the year's total. (Later some of these returnees were reclassified as refugees or impressed laborers -- i.e., not actually VC -- or were found to have been party to false inducement practices under the Third Party Inducement Plan, described on pp. 72-73.) Countrywide, 28,405 VC in the military category rallied (the highest since inception of the program). Political cadres totaled 12,648 and the "other" category came to 5,970. There were about 368 NVA, up from 284 in 1968.

Jones summed it up:

... in the entire history of the Program there have been only five occasions when the monthly rate exceeded 3,000; four of them occurred during the first half of 1969 (only February with its pre-Tet depression dropped below this 3,000 mark).40

VC reaction was violent. In a document defining and analyzing the problem and setting forth countermeasures to be taken, the VC admitted that they "rarely discover a potential desertion. It usually
occurs before we know about it. The reason for this is that we lack vigilance and neglect to take preventive measures in a serious manner.

In June Jones instructed all field personnel to evaluate their situation in view of VC retaliation against the program. Particular attention was to be given by the Chieu Hoi advisers to uncovering in the interrogation process the countermeasures being employed by the VC in their area. To this end there was to be close coordination with local intelligence and PsyOps people. Earlier in February MACV issued a directive setting out military intelligence procedures for the handling and utilization of Hoi Chanh (see Appendix 3).

By early March the program on both the U.S. and the GVN side had attained full momentum. The budget had now reached a figure of $28.5 million, with a cost per rallier of $350 (up from $150 in 1966). There was a three-to-five-man Chieu Hoi Advisory Team in each region, there were American or Filipino Chieu Hoi advisers in all 44 provinces (though none at district). In an effort to arouse greater local interest and effort in support of the program in each village there was to be for the first time a newly created position for a "Chieu Hoi Cadre." The U.S. agreed to support this new plan for 1970 (e.g., pay the cadre) with the GVN budgeting for it thereafter.

Until September MICH was headed by Nguyen Ngoc An, a dynamic, able man with a good Deputy Minister for Chieu Hoi, Colonel Hien. Together they made tours of the provinces and the Chieu Hoi Centers to assess progress. An actively supported other GVN programs bearing on Chieu Hoi activities, e.g., PHUNG HOANG. Notwithstanding An's efforts, however, coordination and execution of government policies among the various ministries and between the Saigon ministries and the field continued to be a pressing problem. Jones believed that An never really got to the point where he placed much trust in Hoi Chanh and, capable though he was, "this showed through." Lack of coordination and cooperation was particularly evident in psychological operations. In fact, Jones felt that the relationship between the Ministries of Information and Chieu Hoi was never sufficiently close to bring about maximum impact on the returnee rate:
The two just didn't work together. It was apparently difficult for the MOI to see the importance of working closely with Chieu Hoi. There was a very difficult problem in achieving a balance between having a well-managed operating Chieu Hoi Program and the kind of inducement which should go into it. It was difficult to get these people to understand that Chieu Hoi was more than just an inducement process and the necessity for good Centers, training programs, and other incentives to substantiate the credibility of the Program.  

Planning became an integral part of implementing the program. In March Jones sent a memorandum to the field with instructions that every province was to have some kind of a Chieu Hoi plan which would  

(a) force the operator to develop realistic goals imposed from higher echelons into an appropriate local proportion;  
(b) set forth procedures and processes in proper priority by which goals are to be achieved;  
(c) inform all concerned as to what is to be accomplished and how it is to be done;  
(d) enable resource requirements to be anticipated and properly budgeted for;  
(e) serve as a check list for the necessary recurrent measurement of the program.*  

In regard to (a) Jones stated bluntly that "provinces are not to be assigned returnee goals from higher authority." Past experience "has clearly established this as entirely counterproductive in a Chieu Hoi sense," though provinces themselves could establish such goals.  

Long a problem, particularly when contrasted with the sophisticated techniques practiced by the Communists in what they considered one of their most important tasks, the quality of political indoctrination given the Ho Chanh at the Chieu Hoi Centers began to improve. By 1969, as a result of a greater display of interest and comprehension of this vital element of the reconciliation process on the part of GVN leaders, personnel at the all-important district level were more carefully selected and trained, with emphasis on instruction by VC political cadres who had rallied and were experienced in such indoctrination. Greater  

*See Appendix 7 for the outlines of the plan.
effort was made to explain government policies and objectives and the need by the government to win the allegiance and support of the Hoi Chanh and the Vietnamese people. The content of the lectures became more substantive and was geared to the different educational levels of the Hoi Chanh.

Though under the National Identity Registration Program (NIRP) all Hoi Chanh were required to be fingerprinted, lack of follow-up on the ralliers after they left the centers led to duplication and inflation of Chieu Hoi statistics, e.g., ralliers who returned to their villages could very likely again be impressed by the VC and thus become once more eligible for Hoi Chanh status.

There was also growing fear that the program was being infiltrated by the enemy on a major scale. In 1968 and continuing into 1969, in conjunction with MACV/J-2, a program of intense surveillance and interrogation was undertaken to assure the bona fides of the Hoi Chanh, particularly in the Delta, and to discover any countrywide strategy by the enemy for subverting the program. The program came off "clean" with little evidence of widespread infiltration. Actually, by 1969 the interrogation process had reached a rather high level of refinement and there was good coordination and collaboration among the various agencies involved (the Province S-2, the National Police Adviser, Special Branch, etc.). On the U.S. side, senior military intelligence officers kept in close contact with the interrogation procedures at region and province, and MACV/J-2 stated that his organization gained some of its most valuable intelligence from the interrogations conducted at the Chieu Hoi Centers. There were also at each region Returnee Liaison Officers directly responsible to Jones who made regular inspection trips to the centers and reported on intelligence procedures there.

Even given all the problems and allowing for possible inflationary figures, the influx of ralliers (47,023) during 1969 was phenomenal. One of the main reasons was the new momentum of pacification and the expansion of the GVN presence in theretofore Viet Cong-controlled or contested areas. The revival and improved effectiveness of the RF/PF was of particular significance to the Chieu Hoi Program. These were the paramilitary forces which brought security to the villages and hamlets; NES security scores for rural population showed an increase
to 90.5 percent in relatively secure areas (ABC). The people now had to accommodate their lives to the GVN presence, and could do so without fear of enemy retribution. For example, their young men, now subject to the draft, could "Chieu Hoi" and become members of the local Popular Forces.

Also, studies had consistently shown that concern for the safety and economic livelihood of their families was a primary motivation for Viet Cong to rally. When their families moved into GVN-controlled areas and away from their own land, which exacerbated their economic plight, or when an area came under GVN control, thus relieving the fear of VC retaliation (by holding the family hostage or confiscating ancestral land), this could mean the climax of an oftentimes long-delayed decision to rally. It also, of course, offered an opportunity to do so.

Increased ARVN/U.S. pressure increased the hardship of the rank-and-file VC soldier, creating intense physical danger and fear, disrupting supply lines, and causing food and medicine shortages. Such deprivations, coupled with a loss of morale by the now-evident failure of the 1968 Tet Offensive and the prospects of a long protracted struggle envisaged in COSVN Resolution 9, also were inducements if not compelling reasons to rally.

In September President Thieu appointed Dr. Ho Van Cham as Minister of Chieu Hoi. From the outset, this young medical doctor (with a Master's Degree from Columbia University) demonstrated leadership and an understanding of the true meaning of national reconciliation and greater national unity. The revitalization of the ministry and the program began in earnest. But in assessing the 1969 program Jones still saw an innate distrust of the program by GVN leaders which resulted in certain brakes being put on any expansion of its concepts. The GVN never quite came through on the reintegration of Hoi Chanh (particularly the higher-level cadres) into the economic and political life of South Vietnam. Jones could see that as the GVN found it necessary to provide for some solidarity within Vietnamese society, to find some form of accommodation with the members of that society involved in the insurgency, the Chieu Hoi process could become the instrumentality by
which members of the Viet Cong transferred their allegiance to the GVN. But by 1969 the reconciliation aspects of the program were far from being fully developed.

MAINTAINING MOMENTUM -- 1970

During 1970 the nature of the war changed from a struggle for control of territory to one for internal security and consolidation. The enemy's strategy of protracted guerrilla war, terrorism, and covert political penetration failed to stall the GVN pacification drive, although progress was not as great as in 1969. The 1970 Cambodian operations brought about significant increases in the rallier rate in MR 3 and MR 4, as VC crossed the border to rally in Vietnam. There was an interesting increase in MR 4 in the number of ralliers from Kien Hoa (the "seat" of the National Liberation Front) which accounted for 62 percent of the 4,443 fourth-quarter 1970 ralliers, the result of the opening up of VC strongholds and erection of permanent outposts to maintain the GVN presence. There was also a significant increase in the quality of ralliers, as 640 ranking VC came in from MR 4 alone.

The 1970 Pacification and Development Plan (see Appendix 8) was in general an improved version of the 1969 Plan, providing for continuity and completion of the 1969 program, with emphasis on strengthening internal security. There was a need to regain momentum in pacification (and in Chieu Hoi), particularly in MR 2, where security was bad. However, overall terrorism and sabotage was down and was concentrated in less than a dozen provinces. Komar found that

. . . by 1970 the war had become largely localized. Analysis of the 1970 incident rate and HES statistics show clearly that both the military war and terrorism now impact on a few key areas. Insurgency-type activity is largely concentrated in three provinces of southern I Corps (Quang Nam, Quang Tin, and Quang Ngai): Binh Dinh, Phu Yen, Pleiku, and Kontum in northern II Corps; and Kien Hoa, Vinh Binh, An Xuyen, and Kien Giang in IV Corps. In most populated areas of the other 33 provinces the intensity of the conflict and even terrorism has radically declined in many cases only to sporadic harassment.
The total number of Hoi Chanh decreased from 47,023 in 1969 to 32,565 in 1970 (the goal had been 40,000). Sixty percent of the total (or 19,587) came from MR 4. One analyst estimates it would have cost Free World Forces about 1,400 lives to neutralize the 10,925 military included in this 19,587 if they had not rallied. The largest drop countrywide was in the "military category" which decreased from 28,405 in 1969 to 17,092 (or from 60 to 52 percent), reflecting the enemy's growing dependence on NVA. Estimated VC recruitment had dropped from approximately 57,000 in 1969 to 33,000 in 1970 with the expansion and consolidation of the GVN presence in previous Viet Cong-controlled or contested areas. The number of "political" Hoi Chanh also decreased from 12,648 to 11,361, though the latter figure was actually 35 percent of the total number of Hoi Chanh for the year -- an increase from the 29 percent of 1969. Vann, operating in MR 4, attributed this increased percentage to greater emphasis on pacification rather than military operations. NVA ralliers were also down from 368 to 245, probably because of reduced enemy presence in RVN due to combat in Cambodia, reduced infiltration from North Vietnam, and anticipation of an imminent ceasefire.

By 1970 the objectives of the program had not much changed, but emphasis had shifted to reflect an attitudinal change on the part of the GVN, i.e., the apparent intent to make Chieu Hoi a "true national reconciliation program." The number of inducement cadres was decreased and those in the political rehabilitation-vocational training fields increased to implement this change in emphasis.

Poor, unimaginative, unfocused, and inept political indoctrination -- by untrained, indifferent personnel -- had been a problem ever since the program developed into something more than an amnesty program (around 1967). As Jones puts it,

"... when a guy rallies he is like a body count; what you do with him in the Center is the crucial point because it is there he really makes up his mind as to whether he made the right decision. ... This is where the really important aspect of the program as far as nation-building is concerned comes in. We either build bridges or we merely neutralize these people."
Ralliers wise in VC training and indoctrination techniques had viewed with alarm and astonishment the lack of time, effort, and emphasis placed on political rehabilitation of Hoi Chanh. Some improvement was apparent by 1969 (though only about 60 percent of the Hoi Chanh were provided political indoctrination because of a lack of facilities and qualified instructors); by 1970 budgetary support for improved political indoctrination was firmly established. Instructors were to be trained at the National Training Center at Vung Tau and efforts made to enlist the support and personnel of other GVN agencies and ministries. By the end of 1971 MCH was to have 100 Hoi Chanh trained political instructors.

Another vital element of the nation-building process, preparing the Hoi Chanh to reenter the economic life of the country by giving him thorough vocational training, a means of making a living, had been an integral part of the Chieu Hoi Program ever since 1964. But given the lack of skilled instructors and length of time most Hoi Chanh were in the centers, it had been minimal. However, as a result of a visit in early 1970 by Deputy Secretary of Defense Packard, impetus was given the vocational training program for Hoi Chanh (and for veterans and refugees). With the assistance of USAID-sponsored contract personnel, vocational training in agriculture, animal husbandry, building trades, and engine mechanics was to be provided. Initially, the program was to be a joint activity of MCH, the Ministry of Education, and the Ministry of Labor. Eventually the Ministry of Labor would take over all vocational training.

Fundamental to the successful employment of Hoi Chanh was the all-important identification card. According to the 1970 Project Status and Accomplishment Report issued by the Chieu Hoi Directorate, the identification card problem had been largely solved. The goal of 70 percent of all Hoi Chanh processed for identification cards had been met; only a shortage of National Police personnel to process the large backlog of cards precluded 100 percent achievement. By the end of 1971, 95 percent of all Hoi Chanh rallying in 1971 were processed for ID cards.

Another means of social and political reintegration of the enemy was the conversion of VC/POWs to Hoi Chanh. While such conversion was
possible and had been implemented on a limited ad hoc basis in previous
years, in March 1970 in Danang in the first public ceremony of its kind
74 VC/POWs were given Hoi Chanh status. By the end of 1970 Hoi Chanh
status had been granted 313 VC/POWs. This process was to be accelerated
in 1971.

Yet another significant 1970 development was an attempt to rectify
a long-standing problem connected with resettlement of Hoi Chanh and
their protection from Viet Cong retaliation -- a follow-up procedure
to determine where they went after release from the Chieu Hoi Centers.
Did they return to their village or remain in urban areas? What, if
any, was the impact of the vocational training received in the Center
on their ability to find employment and support their family? There
was also a need to know just how many Hoi Chanh returned to the Viet
Cong.

Buried in the 1970 budget was funding for the activation of an
automated tracking system (to be combined with the Ministry of Chieu
Hoi Management and Information System) under the Director General of
National Police. Each time a Hoi Chanh moved from one province to an­
other, he was to be fingerprinted and the data were to be forwarded
to the National Police Command to be automated for quick accessibility
to determine his status. In addition Ministry of Chieu Hoi village
cadres were to maintain regular personal contact with the Hoi Chanh.

While, particularly in the interrogation of Hoi Chanh, Chieu Hoi
had been geared into PHUNG HOANG (the program to neutralize the Viet
Cong infrastructure) as early as 1968, when PHUNG HOANG was set up,
coordination steadily improved and by 1970 was successfully accel­
nered. Armed Propaganda Teams were assigned to each operational PHUNG
HOANG DIIOCC (District Intelligence Operations Control Center), through
contacts with their families to induce VC to rally. By the end of 1971,
this means of neutralizing a VCI had become a very important part of
the PHUNG HOANG Program.

In 1970 the GVN contributed about $44 million to the total U.S./GVN
expenditures for 1970 of $12.9 million, a substantial decrease from the
high 1969 figure of $28.5 million, ballooned by the influx of returnees
and increased salary expenditures for U.S. employees. The original
Chieu Hoi budget for 1970 had called for VN$460 million of counterpart funds for all Chieu Hoi operations except the Armed Propaganda Teams (which was estimated at about half of total program costs). The GVN was to fund the remainder but was unable to do so because of a shortage of piastres. Without U.S. assistance it was feared the GVN would reduce the program, severely impairing its operations and effectiveness. Hence DOD undertook funding of 1970 operational costs. Chieu Hoi continued to be an AID/DOD "realignment activity," with U.S. assistance "inputs" funded by DOD. Except for U.S. commodities furnished directly from U.S. military stocks, all U.S. support was administered by USAID/CORDS on a reimbursable basis.

U.S. advisory assistance was to be maintained at the level of 26 direct-hire personnel (as of September 1970, 19 positions were filled) with a reduction to 21 in FY 1971. By November 1970 U.S. advisers were no longer being recruited into the Chieu Hoi Program because of the planned U.S. "phase-out." Of the 39 Third-Country Nationals (38 of whom were Filipinos), it was contemplated that 32 would be phased out by the end of FY 1971, when, presumably through improved management, MCH would be able to take over advisory functions.

In November a Special Pacification and Development Campaign was undertaken to complete the 1970 Plan and to effect a smooth transition to the 1971 Community Defense and Local Development Plan, which was to begin in March 1971. Emphasis was to be put on inducement of high-ranking military and political VC/NVA cadre to rally.

(1) The satisfactory result of the security and pacification and the large-scale operations conducted by the RVN and Allied Forces to attack and destroy the VC sanctuaries across the borders have created a favorable environment for the expansion of our Chieu Hoi campaign. Thus, every effort should be made to propagandize and appeal to high ranking Communists, youth, and the enemy units that have infiltrated into either provinces or border areas. Especially in III and IV CTZs we must aim for their logistical areas and the Communist command now being destroyed in Cambodia.

(2) There should be separate appeals for cadres and soldiers infiltrated from the North, and cadres and soldiers of COSVN. Use to the fullest all information and psychological warfare means, as well as armed propaganda teams for more effective action.
Organize teams of high-ranking ralliers to talk to organizations of people, college students, and other associations in order to motivate those families with relatives following the Communists to call them back to the Nationalist cause.

(3) The training program to create cadres and retrain ralliers who are capable of effective participation in the Pacification and Development program should be continued.

(4) Officials must follow up and assist ralliers in order to create favorable circumstances for their participation in the self-development program.\(^{30}\)

A goal of 12,000 ralliers was set for the Special Campaign, but during the four months of the campaign only 9,560 Viet Cong rallied (4,761 in November/December). The overall 1970 Chieu Hoi results (32,661), while not as spectacular as in 1969, continued to be a contribution to the overall pacification effort. There was a noticeable improvement not only in planning but also in the general operation and administration of the program, which had now been "injected with a sense of discipline, responsibility and urgency although there are still cases of mismanagement and inefficiency. . . ."\(^{51}\) As Richard Riddle, an Australian Chieu Hoi adviser and an old hand in the program put it at the end of 1970,

The present Ministry is the best in my experience and they, from the Minister down, would certainly continue the program even if the Americans left. They have replaced more incompetent chiefs in twelve months than all other ministries put together and generally speaking the quality of the replacements are quite superior. . . .

PHASING DOWN -- 1971

In 1971, as in 1970, the number of ralliers fell short of the official goal; only 20,244 rallied during the Calendar Year,\(^{52}\) with the monthly rate fluctuating wildly from a high in February of 3,070 (probably attributable to a diminution of enemy military activity and terrorism until after Tet) to a low of 754 in September, the month preceding the Presidential elections. A comparison by month with the 1970 influx also indicates that with the expansion of the GVN control and "presence," the "soft-core" VC areas had been cleaned out, leaving the "hard-core" areas which produce fewer Hoi Chanh.
The specter of enemy infiltration again reared its head in spring 1971. Thirty-one RF/PF outposts were overrun by the enemy (compared to nine for the same period in 1970), with indications of collusion between some of the RF/PF and the VC, i.e., VC agents defecting to the GVN as "false ralliers," joining the paramilitary forces, and then helping their VC comrades overrun the posts. This is probably the first time in the history of the program that any countrywide strategy of infiltration had been discernible.

Given the fluid situation in the country -- the decrease in the level of hostilities, the political atmosphere surrounding the 1971 National Elections -- the GVN funding for the program remained minimal for FY 1971 (at about the $0.3 million level). The DOD-projected budget figure for 1972 was set at about $13.3 million. GVN allocation of manpower to the program appeared acceptable. A reorganization of the Ministry of Chieu Hoi was approved by the Prime Minister's office giving more authority and flexibility at the local level in the utilization of manpower. The Minister of Chieu Hoi (Dr. Ho Van Cham) continued the coordinated management and leadership largely lacking prior to his takeover in 1969. He constantly pressed all GVN (and U.S.) agencies and ministries to take full advantage of Chieu Hoi resources and sought to awaken every segment of the GVN and the general public to the true meaning of "greater national unity." Hoi Chanh began

<table>
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<tr>
<th>CY</th>
<th>1970</th>
<th>CY</th>
<th>1971</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>2,347</td>
<td>1,729</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>2,391</td>
<td>3,070</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>3,239</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>2,373</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>3,656</td>
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</tr>
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<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>2,801</td>
<td>754</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>2,238</td>
<td>1,889*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>2,180</td>
<td>3,090**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>2,565</td>
<td>858</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Total: 32,37953 20,24454

The specter of enemy infiltration again reared its head in spring 1971. Thirty-one RF/PF outposts were overrun by the enemy (compared to nine for the same period in 1970), with indications of collusion between some of the RF/PF and the VC, i.e., VC agents defecting to the GVN as "false ralliers," joining the paramilitary forces, and then helping their VC comrades overrun the posts. This is probably the first time in the history of the program that any countrywide strategy of infiltration had been discernible.

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* Includes 444 POWs granted Chieu Hoi status.
** Includes 2,297 POWs granted Chieu Hoi status.
to hold more of the key positions in the Ministry, especially in the propaganda and exploitation areas. TV and radio programs, leaflets, etc. were written and managed by Hoi Chanh.

... But there was a phasing down of certain elements of the program. Chieu Hoi resettlement hamlets were put under local administration. There was a reduction in the number of Armed Propaganda Teams -- though an increased emphasis on training and effectiveness. By the end of the year the number of Kit Carson Scouts was down to around 400 (from a high of over 2,500 in 1970). The American advisory effort was also phasing down; by June 1972 the Chieu Hoi Division was to be reduced to a staff of three advisers to the Ministry. Chieu Hoi had, in fact, become a Vietnamese program.
VI. KEY PROGRAM ELEMENTS

INDUCEMENT*

Psychological Operations

The importance and priority that the Communists put on psychological warfare (PsyWar) and psychological operations (PsyOps) is well known, as in the slogans "Political activities are more important than military activities," and "Fighting is less important than propaganda." Vo Nguyen Giap in his *People's War, People's Army* quotes as one of Ho Chi Minh's cardinal principles of political warfare, "Do not attempt to overthrow the enemy but try to win over and make use of him." This quotation could also well be one of the cardinal principles underlying the key element of the Chieu Hoi Program -- inducement.

Many believe that the Vietnamese paid a high price for paying too little attention to countering the Communist psychological offensive even (after 1963) in connection with Chieu Hoi. U.S. agencies in Vietnam between 1955 and 1960 made the same errors as the Vietnamese: they discounted the power of Communist agitation and armed propaganda, and they gave no priority to encouraging the Vietnamese to counter the Communist psychological warfare campaign in the rural areas of the country.

Had the U.S. given a higher priority to finding out precisely what the Communists were doing psychologically in remote areas of South Vietnam between 1955 and 1959, and then urging the GVN to develop and use a counter-psychological operations strategy . . . the VC would have been less able to exploit peasant resentments and to get them organized to support a guerrilla war the people did not want.3

Not until 1959, when the VC guerrilla warfare increased in intensity, did the U.S. turn to psychological warfare and operations as a weapon to use against the insurgents. And even in 1959 it was apparent that

*For discussion of the Armed Propaganda Team, probably one of the most effective single inducement tools available to the Chieu Hoi Program, see Section VII, Exploitation and Utilization of Hoi Chanh.
the Americans little understood the nature and significance of psychological operations and political warfare. Not only was there a lack of American expertise in the field but little knowledge of the Vietnamese language, the people, and culture necessary to initiate and design in-depth policy and message content to wage such a war. Nor was there adequate coordination among the agencies in Vietnam involved (MAAG, USIA, USOM/AID), concentrated for the most part in the Saigon area with little contact with the rural population.

In 1965, as a result of a National Security Council decision, a Joint U.S. Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO) was established to coordinate the U.S. policies and personnel involved in psychological operations (Defense, USIA, AID, CIA, etc.). A major portion of the new U.S. psyops effort was to be devoted to the Chieu Hoi Program.

Barry Zorthian, the first Director of JUSPAO, was assigned the responsibility of establishing U.S. Mission psyops policy and implementing it. Military psyops remained under COMUSMACV but was subject to JUSPAO guidance and general supervision (see Figs. 9, 10, and 11). Johnston writes:

This centralization of U.S. psychological operations policy in a threatened country was a milestone. Even more important, for the first time a psychological operations expert was on the first team where he could have a say in strategic decisions before they were made and not left with the job of supporting them after the decision was taken. Equally important was the boost given to military psychological operations. At MACV a Psychological Operations Directorate was formed and authority was provided to deploy into Vietnam a Psychological Operations battalion and an Air Commando squadron to support U.S. Free World and Vietnamese combat operations. At the same time, about 120 U.S. PsyOps Advisors were authorized to provide advice and assistance to the Vietnamese PsyWar organization at Corps, Division, Province training camps and schools. This new JUSPAO concept and correlation of effort brought great progress in PsyOps in 1965-1966 even though the money budgeted was minute in comparison with overall costs of the war and in spite of the great lack of PsyWar experts.

The new unified concept for management of psychological warfare and operations not only proved cost-effective but brought cohesion and coordination to Chieu Hoi inducement efforts. General Westmoreland
Figure 9
JOINT UNITED STATES PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE (JUSPAO)

MISSION PSYOPS COMMITTEE

DIRECTOR

DEPUTY DIRECTOR

ASST. DIRECTOR

PROGRAM LIAISON OFFICE

POLICY PLANNING RESEARCH OFFICE

INFORMATION DIVISION

CULTURAL DIVISION

NORTH VIETNAM AFFAIRS DIVISION

FIELD DEVELOPMENT DIVISION

BRANCHES

LOCAL PRESS, RADIO, TELEVISION, MOTION PICTURES, PUBLICATIONS, EXHIBITS

EXCHANGES, AMERICAN CULTURAL CENTERS, VIETNAMESE-AMERICAN ASSOCIATION, FORC, ENGLISH TEACHING, BOOK TRANSLATIONS, CULTURAL ACTIVITIES

NON-PSYOPS PROGRAM, DOCUMENTATION, ARCHIVES, MULTISERVICE LIAISON, MACP NSVN PSYOPS LIAISON

PSYOPS MATERIALS DEVELOPMENT, NATIONAL CAMPAIGNS SUPPORT TO FIELD OPERATIONS, MACP NSVN PSYOPS LIAISON, VAN TAC VIETNAMESE SPECIAL PROJECTS

LEGEND

COMMAND LINE

TECHNICAL SUBSTANTIVE DIRECTION, SUPERVISION, SUPPORT
Figure 10

U.S. MISSION
PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS STRUCTURE

THE AMBASSADOR

DEPUTY AMBASSADOR

MISSION COUNCIL

DIRECTOR JUSPAO

DEPUTY DIRECTOR

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR

ADMINISTRATIVE & TECHNICAL SERVICES

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR

PROGRAM RELATIONS OFFICE

POLICY PLANNING RESEARCH OFFICE

MACV

CORDS PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS DIVISION

I Corps

II Corps

III Corps

IV Corps

PROVINCES

PROVINCES

PROVINCES

PROVINCES

INFORMATION DIVISION

CULTURAL DIVISION

NORTH VIETNAMESE AFFAIRS DIVISION

FIELD DEVELOPMENT DIVISION

FIELD & COMPONENT COMMAND PSYOPS OPERATIONS

SUBORDINATE UNITS PSYOPS OFFICERS

LEGEND

COMMAND LINE

TECHNICAL SUBSTANTIVE DIRECTION, SUPERVISION, SUPPORT, COORDINATION

STAFF SUPERVISION
Figure II

MINISTRY OF INFORMATION

MINISTER
OF
INFORMATION

VIETNAM PRESS
VTVN (Radio)
PSYOPS COORDINATION

DIRECTOR
OF
CABINET

CHIEF OF
CABINET

ASSISTANT FOR
OPERATIONS

ASSISTANT FOR
ADMINISTRATION

ASSISTANT FOR
RESEARCH, TRAINING & PLANNING

MOPIN
DIRECTORATE

T. V.
DIRECTORATE

PRESS
DIRECTORATE

INFORMATION
DIRECTORATE

SUPPORT
DIRECTORATE

TRAINING
DIRECTORATE

RESEARCH & PLANNING
DIRECTORATE

ADMIN. &
PERSONNEL

BUDGET &
FISCAL

LOGISTICS &
MAINTENANCE

INFORMATION
SERVICE (VIS)

INTERNATIONAL
INFORMATION
PROGRAM

CAPITAL
CITY

CORPS

PROVINCE

DISTRICT

June 1968
in his "Guidance for Commanders in Vietnam" dated July 22, 1966, directed them to "capitalize on psywar opportunities." A "National Psychological Operations Plan" was issued. JUSPAO Regional Directors were to be responsible for preparation, coordination, submission, and execution of regional plans. JUSPAO Field Representatives were to generate indigenous local interest and support of Chieu Hoi campaigns, including development of local plans and materials. There was to be optimum coordination and integration of both U.S. and GVN operations at all levels, with overall supervision from JUSPAO and the GVN Ministry of Information (MOI) through the Vietnam Information Service, vested in a Combined U.S./GVN Coordinating Committee at the national level with representation from MACV, JUSPAO, GPWD, and MOI.

"Guidelines to Chieu Hoi Psychological Operations: The Chieu Hoi Inducement Program" were prepared in April 1966 by the JUSPAO Field Development Division, which centralized policy planning, with decentralized operational planning and execution at the local level. Development and mass production of psyops materials was to be done by JUSPAO in accordance with tactical needs and conditions determined by the field. In addition to JUSPAO, MACV (the 6th PsyOps Battalion) operated an extensive psywar program, much of which was devoted to the inducement operation. On the GVN military side, the General Political Warfare Department (GPWD) supervised the psywar program of the RVNAF.

The Audience. While it is difficult to prove any close and direct relationship between content and dissemination of Chieu Hoi psywar material and the returnee rate, there is little doubt of its impact, e.g., many ralliers cite the "Safe Conduct Pass" as being a prime incentive to their rallying.

Information about the program reaches the population and potential rallier through different channels: leaflets dropped from aircraft or distributed by hand, newspapers, aerial loudspeaker broadcasts, radio, TV, movies, family influence, contact with ex-VC who have rallied (e.g., the Armed Propaganda Teams, etc.)

Sir Robert Thompson in his *Defeating Communist Insurgency* sees any inducement program as having two target audiences: (1) the
population -- that under GVN control (which must be educated to accept
the rallier back into society) and that in VC-controlled areas, spe-
cifically the families of insurgents; and (2) the insurgents --
military and civilian. In addition, in Vietnam, as the program de-
veloped, it soon became apparent that the RVNAF and Free World Forces also
had to be made aware of its concept, implementation, and relative worth.

Content. Zorthian early in the program initiated a series of
structured surveys to measure the "who, what, and why" of VC defection
as a means of designing more effective Chieu Hoi appeals and targeted
dissemination. There was a crying need to devise and coordinate rel-
evant inducement material and pre-test it to measure its effectiveness.
Much of the material in the early days was incongruous and tainted with
what Grinter calls "the operational environment and culture orientation
of the American psywarrior." For example, the Viet Cong would be cast
in the role of villain, or a Vietnamese peasant might be shown sitting
(the Vietnamese peasant squats -- a traditional posture -- he does not
sit). Grinter found too that to introduce a nationalist appeal into
the material was counterproductive. There should be no hint of implied
disloyalty in the appeal of the message. The themes devised were many
and sought a delicate balance between inducing the insurgent to rally
and antagonizing him. Fall in *The Two Vietnams* states the basic
attitudinal approach:

One of the essential elements of counterinsurgency is . . .
that the counterinsurgent must assume that the insurgent is
basically amenable to certain normal human motivations --
fairness, justice, kindness, love for his family -- and,
therefore, remains "winnable."

Content of psychological war material, targeted on the potential
rallier, had to be focussed on his grievances, emotions, and aspira-
tions, not -- except in the case of hard-core VCI or NVA -- on ideo-
logical commitment. The insurgent must be encouraged to surrender by
the creation of trust in the government as just and generous. His
vulnerabilities must be thoroughly analyzed. Here close coordination
with intelligence operations -- in the interrogation of ralliers and
POWs -- was to play a most important role. Former insurgents were
used in preparation of the material to the maximum extent possible—they, rather than the "American psywarrior," knew the modus operandi of the enemy, their erstwhile comrades, and were themselves a part of the indigenous culture and social and political environment. Until 1967 the GVN would probably have been hard put to present itself as a revolutionary government committed to the welfare of the people. Indeed, Johnston and others have pointed out that the basic source of Viet Cong power "... did not lie in their Communist ideology, but rather in the slumbering needs, grievances, emotions and hatred of the people. . . ."10 In the Chieu Hoi psyops program which emerged, this was a real problem. As Ogden Williams put it,

The Chieu Hoi program could only sell the GVN image that existed. The Vietnamese ruling establishment was dominated by the more educated elite, the new urban rich, and the bourgeoisie left behind by the French. There was still inadequate concern for the peasant and worker. In this respect the Viet Cong had a more revolutionary image whatever their ultimate intentions. Unless the GVN's revolution was as sincere and authentic as that of the enemy, little appeal could be made to the Viet Cong on an ideological or political level. Psychological warfare, for the most part therefore, had largely to concentrate on the fears and hardships. This is also why the more motivated Viet Cong rarely defected under Chieu Hoii.

Dissemination. The leaflet -- distributed from aircraft by the 5th Air Commandos of the USAF, by the VNAF, and by hand -- proved to be the most effective means of disseminating the Chieu Hoi message. The ubiquitous, multilingual "Safe Conduct Pass" which had literally blanketed South Vietnam has been the most effective of all (see Fig. 12). Though there are thousands of other leaflets stressing other themes, the pass is most often described by ralliers during interrogation as the one most seen, the one most conducive to rallying. After one battle during OPERATION PAUL REVERE 90 percent of the VC who could be searched -- the dead, wounded, and captured -- had the leaflets.

During a typical month (March 1969), according to the Vietnam Information Service, 713.4 million leaflets were dropped from planes and 3.3 million distributed by hand.12 By the spring of 1971 it is
Figure 12

THE CHIEU HOI SAFE CONDUCT PASS
estimated that JUSPAO had distributed nearly four billion leaflets in
the campaign to persuade "men to rally to the GVN under its amnesty
program." 13

The Tet Campaigns. Each year during the Vietnamese New Year (Tet)
an intensive psyops campaign has been mounted, requiring immense effort
and coordination of all U.S./GVN military and civilian agencies involved
in the Chieu Hoi Program. Statistics show that each year a large num-
ber of VC -- two to three times the normal rate -- rally during Tet
(which usually occurs in January or February of the Lunar New Year). 14

The Tet holiday is the most important of all Vietnamese holidays;
it has been celebrated for centuries and is by custom more sacred and
sentimental even than the marriage day. It is the traditional time of
family reunion and provides a unique opportunity to convince families
of the safety and good treatment which will be accorded the rallier by
the government. The Tet psyops campaign is thus focused on the family
and on the homeward-bound VC, emphasizing not only sentimental family
ties but also the concrete opportunities presented by the holiday to
rally. Indeed, most ralliers report to their village and hamlet councils.

Grinter states that on January 19-20, 1966, 132 million leaflets
were dropped "signaling the beginning of the homecoming campaign" and
that in the following three weeks 2,336 Hoi Chanh rallied. 15 (There
appears to be an interesting correlation between the level of education
of the potential rallier and the rate of rallying. In a survey conducted
by JUSPAO in 1967, over half of the higher educated ralliers stated that
their reasons for rallying were associated with Tet; only one out of
de three of the uneducated gave this as reason.) Most of the big returns of
1967 were associated with Tet, and with the operations of late 1966 and
early 1967 which established a U.S./GVN presence in untapped areas of
traditional VC control.

In December 1966 the Office of Civil Operations (OCO) was formed,
and JUSPAO field personnel were placed under its operational control.
In May 1967 they came under CORDS, the new U.S. pacification agency
which combined OCO and the Revolutionary Development Directorate of
MACV. On a national level the inducement or psychological operations
phase of the Chieu Hoi Program was carried out primarily by MACCORDS/POD and JUSPAO in coordination with MACPD. In the field at province and district, CORDS psyops personnel were assigned responsibility for support of all U.S.-sponsored civilian programs assisted by the G-5 (Civil Affairs) and S-5 elements of the sector and subsector military commands. Priority was given the Chieu Hoi but lack of sufficient personnel precluded exploitation of rallier potential. Lathram wanted "every Hoi Chanh . . . tapped for some psyops purpose,"16 but as late as 1967 there were provinces without a full-time information and psyops adviser. The GVN information service at province and district was almost nonexistent—all this in the light of what Johnston calls "the long-term psychological complexity of the Vietnam war."

Johnston believes that the effectiveness of the psyops people under OCO and CORDS suffered because their performance was dependent to a large extent on whether the U.S. advisers at province and district had an appreciation of psychological operations as a primary weapon in the conduct of the war—and unfortunately, in many cases, these men were not psyops-oriented.

The problem came more than once to the fore. In January 1968, Zorthian in a memorandum to Komer deplored what he saw as a lack of responsiveness on the part of CORDS personnel in connection with keeping monthly records on psychological operations in a province.17 Zorthian had found that part of the problem of mounting an effective psyops program was not only in the targeted dissemination of psyops material but in "feedback" to determine what factors actually were conducive to rallying. The Viet Cong propaganda expounded by VC agitprop cadres was geared to the economic and social grievances of the rural community. GVN psyops operations should similarly be based on such detailed investigation and analysis. Zorthian felt we could, for example, achieve "more mileage" from our leaflet program by being more selective in content and dissemination. To this end he had requested field reports on psychological operations in the field—only to find that statistics as to the number of ralliers, the number of Viet Cong families contacted, APT operation, number of leaflets dropped, aerial loudspeaker sorties flown, etc. were practically nonexistent.
Komer replied to Zorthian on January 6, 1968:

The record of non-responsiveness by MACCOrDS and its field organization described in your 1/4 memo is shocking. My only retort is why didn't you let me know sooner? . . . Now we are developing action programs for 1968 is the time to crank in results of the study and your thoughts on the matter. . . . We will hit the points in our Chieu Hoi and PsyOps action programs.

He followed up with a memorandum to the Chief of Staff: "Please have the staff prepare necessary guidance to the field. . . ."

Actually, however, Komer was diffident about imposing more reporting requirements on his CORDS people, feeling they were already laboring under the burden of the new reporting systems (e.g., the Hamlet Evaluation System) he had initiated as management tools. Nor did he consider that psychological operations per se contributed much to achieving pacification objectives, except in the Chieu Hoi Program. However, a communications revolution was sweeping Vietnam and much of the "word" about Chieu Hoi was now getting to the people and the potential rallier over radio and TV. Thus, in mid-1968 Komer agreed to relinquish operational control of psyops personnel to JUSPAO except for a small liaison group which remained in CORDS.

In July 1971, MCH took over from JUSPAO the full responsibility for the development and implementation of its own psyops program. Hoi Chanh had been trained by JUSPAO to develop themes and messages for leaflets and conduct tests of the leaflets. Printing, which had been funded by JUSPAO, was now included in the MCH budget. All psyops materials and activities (such as the Long Me magazine, weekly newsletters, TV programs, two radio programs, and general leaflet and poster production) were supervised by MCH personnel with some support (such as distribution) being received from the General Political Warfare Department of ARVN and the Vietnamese Air Force.

The Chieu Hoi Weapons Reward Program

No discussion of the factors motivating defection is complete without mention of the carefully structured program of rewards proffered to those who rally and indeed even to those who influence a Viet Cong to rally.
Sir Robert Thompson advocates such a program as one of the most important aspects of a defector program:

If there is a well-publicized standard rate of rewards for information leading to the killing or capture of terrorists, and the recovery of weapons, the natural cupidity of many members of the population soon involves them in the hunt, particularly if they know that their identity will not be revealed and that they will be paid on the nail in cash in accordance with results.\textsuperscript{18}

It is of course crucial that rewards be paid promptly, be equitable, and in line with those previously paid.\textsuperscript{19} One "snag" developed in the Chieu Hoi reward system: Allied units to whom the VC rallied were prone to keep the weapons brought in (as trophies), refusing to issue the necessary receipt to the returnee. In order to ensure the credibility of the reward program, such practices should be forbidden and made subject to severe penalties.

The Chieu Hoi Weapons Reward Program "pays a returnee for weapons he turns in or for weapons to which he leads units after he has rallied. This program has been most successful and the finding of large weapons caches which are widely publicized are usually the result of this program."\textsuperscript{20}

The weapons reward system was established by Decree No. 0144 of September 18, 1964, issued by Nghiem Xuan Hong, then Special Commissioner for Chieu Hoi. The system and rates for weapons brought in (from VNs$800 for a pistol to VNs$20,000 for a 75mm recoilless rifle) were reaffirmed in 1967 by the basic decree covering the organization and functioning of the Chieu Hoi Program (see Appendix 5). CORDS kept pressing for higher rewards, partly to increase inducement and partly to keep pace with inflation. In July 1967 (by Decree No. 148), rates for weapons turned in by ralliers were again increased, and by March 1970 the rate ranged from VNs$1,200 (approximately U.S.$10) for a hand weapon to as much as VNs$1 million for leading allied troops to large enemy caches.
Funds for payment of the awards were calculated in the 1967 Chieu Hoi budget on the basis of a possible 2,000 cases and an average award of VNS3,500 per case. Awards were paid according to an official table of prices (see Appendix 5). From 1967 through 1970, some 25,129 weapons were turned in. Yet the cost of the program was miniscule in proportion to the gain:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Payment (VNS)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>17,838,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>24,698,629</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971 (1st quarter)</td>
<td>1,777,196</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Third-Party Inducement Program

A basic principle underlying Chieu Hoi was that a man's loyalty cannot really be bought. However, it is possible -- without dragging a defector program down to a monetary exchange for a man's loyalty -- to pay a third party for rendering a service, i.e., inducing a potential rallier to defect and having the rallier attest to his sponsor's bona fides in getting him to do so.

Such a program was inaugurated in the summer of 1967 in Vinh Binh and Vinh Long Provinces in MR 4. It proved quite successful. The November 1968, Accelerated Pacification Campaign extended the program to the whole country. An intensive effort was undertaken to pay rewards to any Vietnamese citizen or Hoi Chanh instrumental in getting a VC/NVA to rally. Eligibility for reward was determined by a special committee at province, and amounts -- based on the rank of the rallier -- varied from VNS250,000 for a commander of a Military Region to VNS3,000 for a member of the guerrilla force.

Initially, particularly in MR 4, there was a significant increase in the number of ralliers (in the first six months of 1969, three-fourths of those rallying were attributed to this program). It went more slowly in MR 1 and MR 3; it never really "got off the ground" in MR 2 because of poor psyops and organization.

The program, however, contained the seeds of its own destruction. It can be assumed, of course, that there are "third parties" involved in any rallying situation -- families, friends, other government contacts. Certainly over the period of time, sometimes months, before the rallier actually crosses the line he has often made contact to
determine the best point at which to rally, etc. Indeed, Pike believes
that 50 percent of the rallyings take place in this manner, by "nego-
tiation" rather than by "simply walking out of the jungle, hands in the
air, waving a safe conduct pass."23 But it soon became apparent that
under the "Third Party Inducement Program," too many rallyers turned
out to have a "third party inducer" -- sometimes a GVN official -- who
in fact had done nothing to induce the rallier. Chieu Hoi cadres at
the centers were also found to be in collusion with rallyers coming into
the centers with whom they would offer to split the "third party" reward.

The program was finally terminated in the summer of 1969. The
general consensus was that there had been a considerable expenditure of
piastre funds without any substantial increase in the number of rallyers
whose defection could actually be attributed to official inducement.
There was also damage to the image of the Chieu Hoi Program as a whole,
because oftentimes bona fide claims were paid only after much delay and
red tape if they were paid at all. U.S. advisers were prone to withhold
support of the program not only because of the corruption connected with
it but also because the rewards were paid out of AID funds on a priority
basis, leaving no money for other pacification projects they considered
more worthwhile.

In the spring of 1971, a proposal from the Central Pacification
and Development Council for a Third Party Inducement Campaign aimed at
high-ranking VCI was under consideration. The campaign was to be directed
at the families of the VCI, and rewards were contemplated for families
who succeeded in persuading VCI members to rally. Similar rewards
were to be paid to Hoi Chanh successful in inducing a member of the VCI
to rally or in providing information leading to his neutralization. How-
ever, the proposal was never implemented.

RECEPTION

With the steady rise in the number of Hoi Chanh from 1966 on, it
became apparent that the initial reception accorded the rallier was of
the utmost importance. Promises given by the psyops appeals had to be
fulfilled if credibility of the program was to be sustained. The first
reception accorded the rallier has a direct bearing on whether and how
much he will contribute to the GVN or, conversely, whether he will be
an easy target for enemy reindoctrination and redefection. Stressing
that politeness, respect, and even deferential treatment have an importance in Vietnamese culture which Americans have underestimated, and that lack of consideration produces a subtle resistance on the part of the rallier difficult to counteract, Simulmatics recommended that "every effort be made to ensure that the psychological as well as the material needs of the Hoi Chanh are looked after."

Thus it became essential that every soldier and every adviser in the field know about Chieu Hoi and how to receive and handle the returnee -- "a brave man who has not only decided to break from a close Communist organization but has risked his life to do so." Anyone, with or without a Chieu Hoi Safe Conduct Pass, who voluntarily turned himself in under any circumstances was to be given Chieu Hoi status, his exact classification to be made later by proper authorities (see Appendix 3).

The Chieu Hoi Center

One of the primary objectives of the early Chieu Hoi Program was to establish a reception center in every province so that the potential rallier could rally close to his original home. The center, protected by APT units, provided relative security from VC reprisals (though, as one knowledgeable adviser put it, "it was sometimes unnerving to see an erstwhile VC walking around the Chieu Hoi compound armed with an M-16").

By 1965 Chieu Hoi Centers (under the direct control of the Province Chief) had been set up in the majority of provinces. In a 1966 JUSPAO survey (when a significant expansion of center facilities was contemplated with AID support), most Hoi Chanh stated they were satisfied with their stay at the centers, though living quarters were described as cramped (men, women, and children often having to share the same quarters) and not always clean, and the quality and quantity of food as less than adequate.

In the early years the facilities varied greatly -- from well-equipped, spacious, brick-and-mortar buildings with an office, mess hall, sleeping quarters, and exercise yard (long-range plans for the centers envisaged converting them to schoolbuildings when the war was over) to open-air sheds. Grinter found that the ability of the center officials to operate a good program did not necessarily correspond to the cost of the quarters, however.
The year 1967 saw a major expansion of center facilities throughout the country and construction was largely completed. By 1968 Simulmatics reported that conditions at the centers, while primitive by American standards, were adequate and according to the Hoi Chanh were better than what they had experienced with the Viet Cong.

The 1968 budget had funds to construct a standard two-room holding facility in 118 districts (where interrogation and intelligence exploitation first occurred) for the Hoi Chanh until they could be moved up to province. In the wake of the Tet Offensive an interesting exchange of correspondence took place between Komer and the Chieu Hoi Minister, Nguyen Xuan Phong. Komer wrote:

While agreeing in the desirability of these facilities, I feel that the recent VC Tet Offensive has presented us with a number of reconstruction problems which demand our immediate attention and I am therefore recommending that the construction of the proposed district facilities be deferred until (1) the Chieu Hoi rate picks up to a point where district facilities are essential; (2) it is clear that construction assets, including commodities and funds, are adequate for higher priority programs; and (3) construction and repair work has been completed on all provincial centers. . . .

Naturally it is disappointing not to be able to go forward with all programs as rapidly as possible, particularly in the case of Chieu Hoi to which I have always assigned a high priority, but the recent emergency has required us to reprogram our assets which is why I have felt it necessary to make this recommendation.

Phong, however, replied on March 29:

While I am in agreement with you about the great pressure of our recovery efforts, I feel that in the present circumstances it is vitally essential for us to place Chieu Hoi among such high priorities as defense and pacification since it is directly aimed at disarming and reducing the enemy's ability to fight and create further destruction which would draw us into endless recovery programs. The Chieu Hoi Program . . . has been developed up to now horizontally and totally lacks in depth. Although we have developed our facilities at the provincial level where the burden is already great from many areas of activity, our failure to date to concentrate on the district level has resulted in the following:

1. inability to get the Chieu Hoi message to the people at the district, village and hamlet levels. People at these levels are the best vehicles and the most effective medium to induce would-be returnees;
(2) Most returnees prefer to rally through the civilian channel rather than to any military forces and we must therefore improve the capability of the civilian authorities to induce and receive these returnees.

(3) Our only civilian Chieu Hoi representation is now at the provincial level and while I am not ambitious to have large facilities at the hamlet level, we must have a point of rally at the district level.

The above is the best course of action if we are to expect the returnee rate to pick up. If not our efforts will continue to be superficial.

Phong then indicated that his two priorities for the program were the development of APTs and 118 "points to rally" at the district level.

By 1970 there were centers in Saigon, in the four military regions at Danang, near Qui Nhon, Bien Hoa, and Can Tho, in all 44 provinces, and in three autonomous cities (Danang, Cam Ranh, and Vung Tau), and Phong's district program was being expanded.

Hoi Chanh interviewed in the JUSPAO survey generally described the center cadres as fair and sympathetic. Indeed, Grinner states that in his sample the biggest surprise to the Hoi Chanh seemed to be the fair treatment accorded them. Simulatics found, however, that all too often the cadres, the majority of whom were recruited from the "weaker elements" of the GVN civil service, adopted condescending and patronizing attitudes toward the Hoi Chanh and recommended training the cadres in human relations as an urgent matter. It was also recommended that returnees be hired to fill as many of the permanent administrative jobs in the centers as possible, since they knew the problems of the rallier and could be very effective in ways and means of successfully rehabilitating him. Both recommendations were to be followed in the next few years.

First aid and such limited pharmaceutical treatment as antimalaria injections and vitamins were introduced into the centers by late August 1966, though to forestall pilfering and illicit sale of the drugs they were kept under lock and key. The rallier is given what medical attention he needs.

The Interrogation Process

The intelligence community can play a vital role in psychological operations because, if feedback as to why insurgents have rallied is
timely and valid, it can be used in inducement appeals. As early as 1967 Simulmatics was stressing the value of such feedback and the value of compiling biographic data from this intelligence interrogation to be used in efforts targeted on the rallier's families and relatives.

O'Brien deals with this interrogation period in some detail and points out that the "interview" should be initiated as soon as possible and should be designed to produce initial perishable intelligence (though in some instances there is hesitancy to use such intelligence) and at the same time provide an answer to the question "Is the defector bona fide or a questionable and potential infiltrator?" Many times sheer numbers of ralliers reduce this interview to a mere screening, which unfortunately leaves the program vulnerable to infiltration.

In early 1967, in an effort to exploit the intelligence value of the ralliers (up to that time nobody was getting much out of them because the GVN was not geared to do so), MACV assigned a major from military intelligence to work at each region. His job was to move around from province to province and ensure that the proper people were interrogating the returnees. These interrogators were to be from all interested agencies -- Special Branch (of the National Police), Local RF/PF, Free World Forces, ARVN, and (after 1968) PHUNG HOANG. The coordinated efforts paid off. By fall of 1967 MACV/J-2 admitted "to all and sundry that the great bulk of valuable intelligence received was coming from returnees." The language barrier has been a principal roadblock to the successful collection and the prompt and effective use of intelligence. Captured personnel and documents which might have yielded valuable information generally by-passed the American adviser because he was not equipped to deal with them unless he happened to have an interpreter at his disposal at the critical time.

During the interrogation period, if it is determined that the rallier has knowledge of weapons or supply caches, he can be "borrowed" from the center by the military to assist in locating and destroying the caches. He must, however, volunteer for such duty, which not only makes him eligible for the reward but also proves his good intent in rallying.

In his summation of Chieu Hoi activities in 1969 Williams stated:

... the intelligence by-product of Chieu Hoi was nothing short of spectacular. [Fare Van Binh: [Revelation of the VC] (A Chih Man)]
attack plans in April 1968 led to the total failure of the enemy's "Mini-Tet" Offensive in early May and alone more than justified the total investment in the Chieu Hoi Program in 1968. A majority of the weapons caches, including long-range rockets, discovered around Saigon before they could be launched were located as a result of the efforts of Hoi Chanh, APTs and Kit Carson Scouts.

The National Police have the responsibility of verifying the curriculum vitae of the rallier (there are at least two police at each regional and provincial center and a larger, more experienced group conducting the interviews at the National Center). The Chieu Hoi Ministry is held responsible for fingerprinting all Hoi Chanh, and the prints are registered under the National Identity Registration Program (NIRP).

After the interrogation interview the ralliers are sorted. Lower-level ralliers in terms of rank and education are retained at province for political orientation, vocational training, and possible participation in intelligence, tactical, and inducement operations. Regional centers receive those ralliers from province requiring more advanced political and vocational training than can be provided at province, and to relieve the overflow caused by seasonal influx of ralliers. "Elite" ralliers (those of cadre level and all NVA returnees) are sent to the National Center in Saigon for further intelligence processing, political instruction, national-level psychological operations, and vocational training appropriate to their capabilities.

The returnee's family may and often does live with him in the center. Each Hoi Chanh receives an allowance of 80 piastres per day for food, VNS2,500 (U.S.$13.00) for clothing, VNS500 (U.S.$2.50) a month spending allowance, and a VNS1,200 (U.S.$10.00) separation allowance upon leaving the center. The family is also given certain allowances.

Political Rehabilitation

This is supposed to begin at the center as soon as the rallier has been released from the interrogation process. Most ralliers are highly apprehensive of what to expect, entertaining doubts as to whether they made the right decision in rallying. Various techniques are used to deal with such fears. The new rallier is introduced to the other ralliers in the center, earlier ralliers talk to the new ones, possibly a
rallier who has been at the center for sometime is assigned as sponsor. The rallier then proceeds through a 72-hour political indoctrination course designed to counteract previous Viet Cong indoctrination, to develop loyalty to the GVN by giving him some comprehension of the social and political objectives of the government, and to acquire a sense of citizenship.

In 1966, according to a JUSPAO survey, 78 percent of the Hoi Chanh interviewed said the political indoctrination course had taught them things they had not known before, mainly about GVN policies and objectives, and about VC strategy, tactics, and organization (with only a few learning anything about U.S./Allied objectives). Indeed, the survey found that "political training is conducted in an effective manner."

In subsequent years, however, in contrast with what came to be known about VC indoctrination methods and techniques, advisers found the indoctrination of Hoi Chanh "pretty sad," dwelling more heavily on the need to kill VC than on the GVN's goals of peace and prosperity. The essence of VC indoctrination was the three "withs": sleeping, eating, and working with new recruits. In contrast, GVN Chieu Hoi instructors were thought to be "undemocratic" and lacking enthusiasm for what they were teaching, being unfriendly, condescending, and generally aloof from the problems of the men they were instructing.

The lectures were pitched at the group without regard to educational level or degree of political sophistication and with little regard as to whether they were even understood much less accepted. Often they were read from a prepared text with little or no audience participation. Course content seems to have been a mixture of anticommunism and nationalism, with final emphasis on memorized rules of behavior calculated to further the "just cause" of the GVN and "to keep the Hoi Chanh branch pure." Grinter found that

the less intelligent or poorly motivated Hoi Chanh simply bear the boredom with typical peasant passivity; the cadres come away completely disappointed ... with a sense of nostalgia ... a yearning for the emotional ignition so many of them experienced at the hands of the Front's agitation cadres.

He recommended that, since the ralliers are organized within the center into cells (as in the Viet Cong organization), this grouping should be
extended to the political indoctrination course, with the cells based on age, education (in many cases literacy training was required), regionalism, and degree of political sophistication. Instructors should be the higher level, more politically experienced ex-Hoi Chanh who admittedly would have to be reindoctrinated by broadening their understanding and acceptance of SVN objectives.

The 1967 goals for the Chieu Hoi Program called for expansion and improvement of political orientation as a necessary prerequisite to Hoi Chanh taking their place in the political, social, and economic scene. One hundred specially trained motivational teachers with adequate remuneration were to be employed. The training was to be carried out at province, region, or Saigon, depending on the category of rallier.

Not all the improvements called for were undertaken, and political reindoctrination remains a weak point of the program. There has been considerable improvement over the last three years. Visual aids, group discussions, and role-playing are now integral components of the program. O'Brien noted in 1970 that political training was now based on the level of responsibility the rallier had held in the Viet Cong and was conducted with differing degrees of intensity. Returnees were divided into "hard-core and the politically naive" (about 70 percent of the ralliers fall into the latter group).

For the hard-core rallier emphasis is placed on the inadequacy of Communist government and on individual rights under democracy. With the "politically naive," an attempt is made to develop some kind of ideology through a recounting of Vietnamese history from the pre-Chinese period through the Viet Minh, the Viet Cong insurgency, and the current struggle against North Vietnamese aggression. Much class time is spent on Viet Cong organizational network, the part even the low-ranking rallier played in it, and how he was controlled and maneuvered to implement overall Communist strategy and objectives.

The target for fiscal years 1971-1973 is the political rehabilitation of all Hoi Chanh at an average of 30,000 a year. The Chieu Hoi Ministry projects the training of approximately 100 political instructors (many of them higher-level, more politically experienced Hoi Chanh) to be