VC COUNTER (CVN) CHIEU HOI PROGRAM

I. Problems to be settled:

Deserters and traitors are those who break their vow to be loyal to the Army and country and defect from our revolutionary ranks to side with the enemy, betraying the Army, the people, and the country.

Desertion and defection occur both during times of war and peace. During wartime, desertion cases which betray the country (by working for the enemy) are relatively few as compared with those for other reasons. However, the former type of desertion is very dangerous. In this case, the deserters may give to enemy very valuable military information that the enemy cannot otherwise easily obtain. These deserters are those who have been indoctrinated and trained by our Army; they have worked in our ranks, received our missions and sometimes assumed a leading role. They can understand our secret military situation, especially our combat plans, our internal military situation, key units, and agencies.

This knowledge varies in importance with the situation, rank, and position of each deserter. In general, all deserters can provide the enemy with accurate information that may cause heavy damage to our Revolution.

Upon receiving a deserter, the enemy immediately exploits him to extract information, employs him as an informer or uses his henchman to sabotage our Revolution, or uses him as an anti-propaganda goal to slander us and entice more troops (among our ranks) into defecting to the (CVN).

So, the enemy always tries to cause dissatisfaction among our cadre and soldiers. Now, in the face of our temporary difficulties, the enemy is making great efforts to step up his "Open Arms" Campaign. His activities in this field have caused relatively serious losses to us. In short, the anti-desertion and defection mission is essential to ensure the security of our Army and Revolution.

II. Security missions against desertion, defection, and surrender.

The motives behind desertion and defection are:

- Pacifism, fear of death, war atrocities, and inability to sustain hardships and privations.

- Dissatisfaction with superiors, with the Party, and with military policies.

- Enticement by the enemy ("Open Arms" Campaign).
The enemy has infiltrated agents into our internal organizations who now leave our ranks to rejoin their (GVN) unit. Thus, regardless of the reason, all deserters are the enemy of the Revolution and Army and the most dangerous objectives of our security mission.

So the whole Party and Army, including security agencies, are responsible for the struggle against desertion and defection.

Security missions consist of the following:

a. Regularly keep abreast of any manifestation that may lead to a desertion so that the leaders can take effective countermeasures.

b. If the desertion or defection occurs suddenly, try to help the Party Committee and Unit Commander take all measures to prevent or limit possible damages that the deserter may cause.

c. Continue to collect documents and records of the deserter or traitor in order to ensure security today and in the future.

The problem is that we better try to prevent the desertion from taking place rather than waiting until it occurs to take countermeasures. The reason is that when it occurs, it is difficult to prevent the damages it may cause. Although we can limit them, we cannot prevent it from harming the revolutionary reputation, prestige, and tradition of our Army.

III. Characteristics and manifestations of potential desertions and defections and their effects.

To carry out the above mentioned mission, it is necessary to pay particular attention to the manifestations of potential desertions, defections, and to their occurrences; then work out effective counter-plans.

1. Characteristics:

a. An action usually comes after a duration of consideration and preparation. This duration varies with each situation (sic).

b. For traitors, their actions are usually very discreet. They anticipate a plan to cope with our disclosure and pursuit.

c. In general, they are men who display a great fear of death. Before surrendering to the enemy, they usually try to have the enemy's confidence in order to receive good treatment.

d. If the desertion or defection originates from internal dissension, its evolution is very complex. Sometimes this evolution changes very quickly. In just a few seconds, the traitors have already sided with the enemy and fought the people, although in the past, some of them had scored many revolutionary achievements, participated in many battles, or were carefully trained and indoctrinated.
Sometimes, dissatisfaction has led these people to treacherous actions which cause inconceivable disaster.

e. Once they have surrendered to the enemy they become ruthless. They may commit bloody crimes towards the people and the Revolution in order to protect their lives. In general, they remain very faithful to the enemy. Many traitors continue to annoy us even after the victory of the Revolution (sic).

2. Manifestations:

Before surrendering to the enemy, deserters or traitors usually:

- Listen curiously and attentively to secret information, steal or copy confidential documents not belonging to them in order to do some meritorious work for the enemy.

- Make false papers in order to pass through (our) control stations without arousing suspicion.

- Steal (our) weapons and equipment; keep enemy papers such as leaflets, safe conduct slips ... (sic) as proof that they intend to surrender.

- Study the enemy policy and treatment toward (our) defectors, the activities and the situation in enemy areas, the roads between our areas and the enemy's, so that they can determine their plan of action.

- Try to mislead us by working hard, volunteering to do "extra" work or missions in an area near the enemy. While doing these missions they can find favorable conditions for desertion. . . . (sic.

These manifestations vary with the social class, activity, role, and psychology of the deserters or traitors:

- For high-ranking cadre, their manifestations are much more discreet than those of soldiers.

- If the deserter operates deep in base areas, the duration of his consideration and preparation will be longer than that of those operating in areas near the enemy. The latter knows more about the enemy situation and roads in his areas.

- If the deserters assume missions deep in enemy areas or near enemy rear agencies such as an armed propaganda mission, their sections sometimes will be so quick that we can not take prompt action.

- If they are on an operational movement, they usually seek to leave their ranks or fall behind so that they can easily escape.
- In other cases, they use signals (white cloth to be put at the muzzle of their weapons) so that in a battle they can run to the enemy and the latter does not fire at them.

- Sometimes they volunteer to do vanguard or advance scout missions in order to have conditions to escape to the enemy and inform him of our combat and movement plans. In addition, they may take advantage of the engagement to kill their comrades, seize their weapons, then run to the enemy. Sometimes, after a battle, when we withdraw, they usually seek to stay behind.

- Those who commit shortcomings in a spontaneous phase and fear to be seriously punished and those who are seriously punished or show dissatisfaction, usually try to desert. These people usually leave letters behind to their friends and relatives.

- For those who infiltrate our organizations, they usually try to desert when their missions have been fulfilled or when the situation is disadvantageous for them. Before deserting, they usually try to desert when their missions have been fulfilled or when the situation is disadvantageous for them. Before deserting, they usually try to sabotage our ranks or entice other men to desert with them.

3. Situations favorable for desertion:
   a. When the living conditions are too low and difficult.
   b. When the Revolution encounters temporary difficulties caused by the enemy's intensified sweep activities or tight encirclement.
   c. In fierce battles when the enemy is stronger or when we suffer heavy losses.
   d. When dissension springs up among cadre and soldiers.

   Due to poor leadership or improper implementation of policies or when the enemy intensifies his psy-war activities.

IV. Counter-measures.

   A. Preventive and discovering measures.

   1. Additional ideological training should be given to all personnel and people to heighten their patriotism, loyalty, and revolutionary vigilance and to make positive efforts to counter the enemy psy-war.

   This is a necessary task that we should fulfill at all times in order to eliminate desertion and defection.
We should not only unmask the enemy enticement plan and his anti-propaganda themes, but also train all personnel and people to be loyal to the Army and country, to preserve the reputation and tradition of our revolutionary army. In addition we should strictly observe the ten oaths of our Army.

We should be careful when we disseminate information on the enemy 'Open Arms' policy or on desertion (to our military personnel and people). Careless speeches may encourage others to desert.

A unit where a desertion has happened has to motivate the hatred of the people toward that deserter and improve their vigilance to prevent other cases. The Party Committees and Unit Commanders at every level, the cadre in charge, and political agencies should be responsible for and give due concern to this motivation, for our security agency, we have to make a study to keep abreast of the situation in order to help the Party Committees and Unit Commanders in their motivation methods.

In addition, the leading levels should give due concern to the control and prevention of bureaucracy and indifference toward soldiers' difficulties and hardships among the leading ranks and militarism among leading cadre.

Execute complete democracy in the critique and self-critique so internal dissensions can be promptly settled and prevented from turning into opposition and desertion.

2. Strict control in political and ideological field.

a. Regular control of internal political affairs:

- Never neglect small suspected manifestations, give particular attention to those which can lead to desertion and defection.

- In the course of control, attention should be paid to general and particular manifestations of desertion as well as to the following objectives:

  - Military personnel newly assigned often are discouraged when faced with difficulties and shortages.

  - Military personnel who defect from enemy ranks and surrender to us.

  - Men who display pacifism, confusion, fear of death, and want to live in enemy areas.

  - Those who like to get near to and seek friendship from the persons who are used to going to enemy areas, although the former are not assigned to the mission.
- Military personnel who ask to go on a mission in enemy areas while the organization does not require him to do so.

- Temperamental men who were hesitant and passive and then suddenly become voluntary and active. Also, their sadness or happiness may constantly vary.

- Finally, attention should also be paid to those who assumed their missions well before, but now commit an error and fear to be seriously punished. These men can be secretly dissatisfied after the punishment. . . . (sic).

b. Implementation of three-man cell organization:

This organization is used by the people to control one another with mutual assistance and affection. Thanks to this close relationship between the people, their secret confidences will be easily revealed and we can thus discover suspected changes and have counter-measures ready.

c. Intensively employ key forces:

Chapter Party Committees and Party cell leaders, cadre in charge of squads and platoons, the Youth Group Chapter Executive Committee. . . . (sic) so that they can help us in the control, detection, indoctrination and prevention (of potential manifestations).

d. Organize agent network in charge of the detection and prevention:

Organize agents to study and detect potential deserters and traitors. Indoctrinate them on the characteristics and manifestations of desertion in order to help them in their detection. Assign them specific missions and teach them to have quick reactions when a desertion case occurs.

e. Administrative measures brought out through the control and assessment of the situation.

Bring out regulations to relate to our military personnel between our area and enemy's for the movement between two areas, for the schedule of our internal activities, the control of our strength of our daily additional duties. . . . (sic) in order to prevent the laxity of organization that facilitates the action of the potential deserters and traitors.

Bring out regulations for patrol and guard duties; establish control stations at entry and exit points, and key communication points between our area and enemy's; control carefully the papers of travellers in order to discover fake papers.
- On discovering a potential deserter, immediately transfer him to the rear area (if he is on a mission in an area near the enemy) so we can investigate.

- Never send a potential deserter to an area far from his unit, nor permit him to participate in a battle; that means try to control him strictly in order to prevent him from deserting.

3. Inspection of suspected manifestations:

When suspected manifestations are found, immediately conduct an inspection to see if they are right or not in order to have countermeasures in due time. If they are right, assign agents to detect their motives and purpose. If the inspection meets with difficulties, seek to send (the potential deserter) to (another) place favorable for the inspection.

**NOTE:** The detection and inspection missions must be promptly carried out. If the situation is advantageous (for the deserter), immediately take countermeasures, simultaneously continue the detection. If we pay too much attention to the detection, sometimes the desertion occurs so quickly that we cannot prevent it.

3. Counter-measures taken after the occurrence of a desertion.

We rarely discover a potential desertion. It usually occurs before we know about it. The reason for this is that we lack vigilance and neglect to take preventative measures in a serious manner nor do we carefully control our detection procedures.

If a desertion case occurs, the following measures must be taken:

1. Investigate to demonstrate the action and assess its influence (on the troops).

   a. Know exactly who the deserter is, what damages he may cause, what the reason and situation of his action were. Know the time and place of the action, its plan, motives, and purpose. (To know all of this we should make a study on his past political and ideological background.)

   b. Make a study to discover his remaining accomplices, to know who his accomplice leader is and where the latter still hides himself in order to prepare counter-measures.

   If the deserter is a military serviceman who deserted from enemy ranks and surrendered to us, we should make a study to know if he really is an intelligence agent whom the enemy infiltrated into our ranks to conduct sabotage, pick information, and to take away our weapons.
c. Assert if he has conducted any sabotage before deserting (sabotage procedures) so that we can have effective counter-measures.

2. Pursue and recapture the deserter:

This mission must be promptly done. It must be based on the real situation to implement effective pursuit measures. It must be based on the time, place of desertion, and the plan of the deserter.

Once the desertion case occurs and if we still have any hope of recapturing the deserter (even though the hope is little), try to pursue him at any cost.

In general, the following measures are necessary:

- Inform all agencies, military personnel, security agents, militias, guerrillas, and communication stations to organize the pursuit, control stations to check papers with care, guard stations to shut the entry and exit points, units near the communication lines to conduct patrols and ambushes with a view of recapturing the deserter.

- Check his relatives' houses on the way he probably travels, is suspected to stop at to pick up provisions, change clothes, or disguise himself.

- Anticipate the way he may take to pursue him by taking a short cut.

- Assign agents at key communication points from our area to the enemy's to follow day and night the deserter's footsteps.

Upon recapturing the deserter, immediately check him to see if he has weapons or documents on his body, then interrogate him on his motives, purpose, method, and accomplices. In addition, see if he manages to throw away anything while being pursued and try to search for it.

3. Assessment of the damages the deserter may cause and appropriate measures to be taken to prevent or limit the damages.

Right after the desertion case occurs we must do the following:

a. Study the motives, purpose, and qualifications of the deserter. Assess his knowledge about our secrecy to see what he could disclose to the enemy. From there, bring out appropriate counter-measures.

b. Report immediately to the related agencies to procure security for our agents and forces working within the enemy area or to change our combat plan and the schedule of the transportation of equipment to agencies and workshops (which the deserter knows). The reason for this is that the enemy can, with the deserter's disclosure, conduct attacks on us. . . .(sic).
c. Cook up and spread out false news so as to create doubt between the enemy and the deserter, confuse the former, and force him to be hesitant in believing what the deserter discloses. The enemy can thus mistrust the deserter or even punish him, and we will have time to take counter-measures and procure our security.

Remember that this mission must be done with care and based on the current situation in order to preserve secrecy and deceive the enemy.

4. Continue to collect documents and records of the deserters or traitors in order to ensure security for the present time and the future.

a. Concerning the collection of documents and records of the deserters, we should pay attention to the following:

- Seize their origin and past activities (this mission must be done gradually and carefully).

- Seize the motives and purpose of their desertion, their activities in the past, during the desertion, and after the desertion.

NOTE: Record their names, date of birth, physical characteristics, and keep their photos (try to procure them).

b. The collection of document and records on the deserters provides us with immediate use:

- The enemy may employ these deserters, after having interrogated them, to penetrate back into our ranks or revolutionary agencies and group, under disguise, when the situation is in disorder.

- Or we will not make a mistake in killing local administrative personnel and eliminating traitors.

These deserters are generally eliminated after the war (sic) and the remaining number have to go abroad to earn their living or join foreign reactionary, factions, some of them continue to work for the enemy.
Appendix 5

OPEN ARMS: The 1967 program: Procedures for cadre and requirements and rewards for returnees:

REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM
MINISTRY GENERAL OF INFORMATION & OPEN ARMS

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No. 111/TDTTCH/CH/SQT/KT/TT

COMMUNIQUE

to

Open Arms Chiefs throughout the Country

Subject: Procedural Operation of Foreign Aid Program for 1967 Open Arms Activity.


- Resolution No. 023-TBTTCH/CH/SQT/KT dated January 21, 1967 from Central Open Arms Organization.

This communiqué aims at fixing and giving explanations to Open Arms Chiefs so that they can have a thorough knowledge of the procedural working-out of foreign aid for open arms activity in 1967.

A. Expenditure procedure

1. General Characteristics of 1967 Open Arms Budget

The Open Arms Budget for 1967 is listed in article 13, chapter 212, code 84. It is put under the direct management of the central open arms organization, and expended in accordance with the National Budget regulations as follows:

- Expenditures can be depending on needs and circumstances, cleared at central or local Open Arms by administrative cash vouchers to be charged to funds released to the provinces.

- Provinces cannot establish an imprest fund to be charged on expenditure release (the establishment of imprest fund for local use concerning emergency activity will be dealt with below).
Expenditures should be charged on the article fixed in the budgeting project (the transfer of expenditure from one article to another should be approved by the Open Arms central office.

Clearance and justification of expenditures for personnel and materials should be made according to National Budget regulations in force.

Expenditure rate relating to the supply of materials and carrying out of activities is fixed as follows:

- Up to $20,000 Exempted from competitive pricing is obligated expenditure control procedures but purchase orders should be signed by the authorizing officer before the procurement of commodities.

- From $20,001 to $200,000 Competitive pricing is mandatory, purchasing regardless of price (bon de commande) should be controlled and approved before the receiving of commodities.

- From $200,001 to $1,000,000 Should obtain competitive bids or make a contract agreement after ample pricing.

- Over $1,000,000 Bidding is mandatory.

2. Budgeting Project of 1967 Open Arms Program

The aforementioned budgeting Project is composed of 4 categories of expenditures classified according to fixed articles of the National Budget:

**Article 1. - Payment of Salary and Allowances**

- Salary and Per Diem for Open Arms Armed Propaganda cadres (no longer borne by the National Budget as it was in 1966).
- Salary and Per Diem for instructors.

**Article 3. - Operational Expenditures**

- Feeding of returnees
- Tailoring and clothing
- Pocket money
- Transportation
- Rewards
- Propaganda Campaign
- Political training
- Vocational training
- Per diem for returnees
- Equipment for Open Arms Armed Propaganda cadres
Article 5. - Miscellaneous Allowances

- Special allowance for high-ranking returnees
- Domestic-use allowance for returnee families resettled in Chieu Roi villages
- Return-home allowance
- Allowance for dead members of returnee families
- 12-month salary allowance for Open Arms Armed Propaganda cadres killed in the course of their duties.

Article 7. - New Activities

- Open Arms Center construction, repair and equipment
- Establishment of Open Arms villages.

3. Expenditures

In principle, all expenditures concerning article 3 should be paid by central or local administrative cash vouchers (to be charged to fund released to the provinces).

However, in order to meet the necessary requirements of Open Arms activities requiring cash, ref. official letter No. 980-UBHP/NSNV/Ngy dated January 21, 1967, the Directorate General of Budget and Foreign Aid has agreed to allow the Open Arms organization set up an imprest fund in central (Saigon) and distribute money to provinces through the use of money-orders. The money sent to the province will be deposited at the treasury service concerned (or the nearest treasury service, if the province concerned has no treasury service) or a non-profit account in the name of the Province Chief or Mayor. In case the contact between the province and the treasury service is beset with difficulties, due to the security situation, the province headquarters can hold such fund at its province under the responsibility of the Mayor or Province Chief.

Mayors and Province Chiefs are deputy authorizing officers of the fund who will designate a liquidator and examine and sign on correct vouchers.

The Open Arms Chief acts as Cashier (and enjoys no allowance). Funds will be gradually advanced to Open Arms Services by the Province headquarters concerned for expense according to needs.

The following categories of expenditures are paid by the imprest fund:

- The nine types of expenditures recorded in article 3 (except expenditure for Open Arms Armed Propaganda cadres' equipment which is to be cleared by the central (Saigon). A money order will be sent to provinces indicating clearance):
Food, clothing, pocket money, transportation, weapons, and exploitation rewards, propaganda campaign, political training, vocational training, and per diem.

Two types of expenditures recorded in article 5: return-home allowance and allowance for members of returnee families who are killed:

In order to facilitate the vouchering and expenditure control, two imprest funds have been established, and money-orders will be issued separately:

- Imprest fund No._____ covering expenditures recorded in article 3.
- Imprest fund No._____ covering expenditures recorded in article 5.

3. Allowances and Vouchering Procedures of Activities

Allowances of Permanent Open Arms Activities

a. Feeding

The feeding price provided for a returnee in the 1967 National Budgeting Project is $30.00 per day.

However, the new rate can only be applied after getting the approval of the Central Executive Chairman's Office. Pending approval, returnees will be fed according to the old tariff, e.g., during the 60 days of refuge in Open Arms Centers, the feeding fees per day for:

- 1 returnee. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $24.00
- His wife or child over 15 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $24.00
- His children under 15 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $12.00

Feeding fees should be given to the returnee representative committee daily for marketing cooking.

The provincial Open Arms Center is considered as a temporary shelter for returnees when they return to GVN territory. The center takes charge of the making of ID cards, classification and political training. The maximum dwelling period for carrying out of the aforesaid activities is fixed at two months. Beyond that deadline, the returnee who wishes to stay longer at the center, due to special reasons, should have the approval of the Central (Saigon).

b. Clothing

In principle clothing fee for a returnee who just returns to the GVN is $1,000.00 for the purchase of one pajama suit, one trousers and one shirt.
In reality, the returnee can request cash for clothing according to his liking. However, it would be advisable to maintain close control so as to avoid the case where they use the money for another expense in lieu of clothing. In cases where the returnee has a family, he can apply a part of this allowance for clothing for the family. He must have a pajama suit made for himself. Clothes are provided on a permanent basis and the returnee need not return them upon leaving the center.

c. **Pocket money**

During 60 days in the Open Arms Center, the monthly pocket money to be given to:

- 1 returnee is ... $200.00
- His wife and children is ... $100.00 each

If the one-month period has not expired when a returnee is transferred to another Open Arms Center, he then has no right to get additional pocket money.

After his return home, any returnee who is requested to come over to the center for training or for other reasons is allowed $100.00 of pocket money even though his dwelling period in the Center is only for a few days.

d. **Return-home**

Return-home allowance for a returnee family is $1,000. The center must issue a return-home certificate and is responsible for the granting of allowance. It is advisable to inform the province that received the concerned returnee in order to avoid duplication, as return-home allowance is granted only once.

e. **Per diem**

The returnee who participates in activities which are useful to Open Arms Program, such as intelligence, Open Arms propaganda campaigns, whether he works independently or in coordination with friendly agencies, is to get $80.00 per diem, but the feeding fees should be taken off his per diem if the concerned works at the center (re Resolution No. 10/PTT/PDUCH/18/QD dated January 2, 1965).

Per diem is granted during the period of field duty (no maximum amount of per diem is fixed) recorded in the mission order delivered by the Provincial Open Arms Services, and approved and signed by the Province headquarters authorities.

f. **Transportation**

Returnees' home travel authorization to carry out activities or move from one place to another is authorized to enjoy transportation means or get cash for bus fare or air ticket, if need be.
Transportation fees are to be borne by the province from which the returnee has departed.

g. Campaign

Permanent propaganda campaigns include the printing of leaflets, posters, slogans, mottos, movie slides, the exploitation and organization of cultural performances.

The local Open Arms Chief has authority to spend up to $5,000.00 per month for forecited propaganda activities without having requested approval from the central (Saigon) beforehand.

In case it is necessary to organize a special propaganda campaign having a wider scope central (Saigon) approval is mandatory. The projected program should be submitted to the central as well as the estimated cost list and drafts of leaflets, slogans, etc., for examination beforehand (so that they can be approved in due time).

The Directorate for Operations will issue a guided communiqué dealing with propaganda matters.

h. Political Training

The political training for returnees is carried out at three levels: provincial, Regional and Central levels depending on the returnee elements (temporarily, the communiqué No. 10-QP/P3CH/XH/K dated February 20, 1964 is still applicable).

The political training method should be flexible and practical, and avoid idle theory. Therefore:

- It would be advisable to introduce visitations to cultural, social, economical, and military structures into the political training program so that returnees can see with their own eyes all the progress achieved by the government concerning the betterment of government machinery and people's living conditions.

- It would be advisable to audio-visualize all materials and focus attention on the organization of seminars (conversation, debate, comparison).

On an average, the political training cost is $500.00 for each returnee, including:

- Production of materials (including audio-visual materials)
- Office supplies for students
- Organizing observation visits (tours)
- Taking pictures of returnees to complete their training dossier, individual file, application form 7, return-home certificate, etc.
Rewards granted to outstanding students, closing ceremony and party

Organizing annual Returnee Nationwide Assemblies so as to give them refresher motivational training (expenditures concerning feeding, transportation, pocket money, etc... granted to congress returnee participants are to be charged to other articles).

1. **Trade Training**

   1. Organize breeding and cultivation demonstration pilot centers at or near the center in order to teach returnees improved agricultural methods along with the political learning during a maximum period of two-month dwelling at the Open Arms centers. This should be technically supported by local technical services.

   2. Organize trade training classes at the Open Arms center for returnees or those who have completed their political training course and who request to stay for vocational training.

   3. Allow returnees cited in item 2 to be trained at government trade schools, private trade schools and local firms.

   Vocational training for returnees is also carried out during the same period at three levels: province, region and central. Special adherence should be paid to the following points:

   - Only common trades which can help returnees gain employment easily and whose training period is short (one month at maximum) are taught at the provincial level. For example: carpentry, masonry, brick making, bamboo weaving, haircutting, etc.

   - Longer training courses (2 months at maximum) can be organized at regional level but should not overlap with those being organized at the provincial and central levels.

   Expenditures for vocational training recorded in items 1, 2, 3 above-mentioned, depending on circumstances, include:

   - Organizing cost: renting of land for demonstration pilot center, if need be, remuneration for trade teachers (this remuneration should be approved by the central).

   - Tuition paid to private trade schools: according to the agreement concluded with the schools.

   - Office supplies for students: $60.00

   - Feeding fees:
- If taking meals at the Open Arms center, the tariff of feeding fees is fixed at $24.00 per day as it was applied for returnee dwellers at the center.

- In case the center has no available room for students, they must board outside the center and the feeding fee is fixed according to the local living standards, but meal should be similar (and reasonable) to that served at the center.

- Pocket money: as fixed at the concerned item.

Regional service chiefs and inspectors should draw up a trade-training project for 1967 and submit it to the central (Saigon) for study and fixing fund release for each place. However, it is feasible to rely (base) on the aforesaid principles so as to open trade-training courses immediately, if required.

k. Rewards

Reward for special activities

As for returnees who achieve meritorious and special deeds, including the bringing back of enemy's documents or supply of reliable and valuable information from the enemy, service chiefs can propose to the Mayor, Province Chief (Open Arms Committee Chairman) to fix appropriate rewards up to $10,000.00 depending on the case.

Rewards which are over $10,000.00 must be submitted to central Open Arms for approval.

Public servants and cadres who achieve meritorious activities are only allowed to get administrative rewards (reward certificate, encouragement certificate, proposal for promotion, etc., but no cash reward).

A third person who is not a meritorious public servant or service-man can receive a cash reward to be charged on the National Budget through the central Open Arms organization's resolution.

Weapons Reward

Returnees bringing weapons with him will be rewarded in accordance with the tariff fixed by Decree No. 0144-HC/18/ND dated September 18, 1964 as follows:

- Pistol
  - $ 800.00
- Foreign rifle, Mas 36, British and Japanese rifle, etc.
  - $ 1,000.00
- Garant MI rifle
  - 1,200.00
- US and French carbine, German MAT 49
  - 1,200.00
- Thompson machine pistol
  - 2,000.00
- B.A.R. 24/29
  - 3,500.00
- Machine gun 30
  - 5,000.00
- Machine gun 12.7 - 13.2
  - Mortar 60
  - Mortar 81
  - Bazooka
  - Rocket, SKZ 37 (recoilless rifle)
  - SKZ 75 (recoilless rifle)

Vouchers should include the resolution of the Province Chief, chairman of Open Arms Committee, and a weapons receipt issued by ARVN and GVN agencies which received weapons from returnees reported at national bases.

As for returnees who reported to allied Forces Units (US, Korean, New Zealand) there were some cases that trespassed on returnees’ rights because allied units have kept weapons as trophies and refused to issue receipts to the concerned. In order to protect the returnees’ rights, Open Arms centers must (are requested to) give explanations to friendly units to issue proper weapons receipts so as to clear cash reward for the concerned as a means of warding off difficult-to-solve complaints.

Usually when the returnee brought weapons to any province rewards should be made by the province concerned. However, if for special reasons the returnee is dispatched to another place, say the central Open Arms center, reward procedures and payment can be made at the latter place. Dossier is composed of:

- Legal weapons-receipt issued by the agency receiving weapons
- Certificate delivered by the concerned province certifying that the concerned returnee has not received cash reward.

The central Open Arms center must inform the provincial Open Arms center concerned immediately after completing the weapons reward clearance.

Imprint Fund Vouching Procedures

The manager of the imprint fund should keep three accounting books:

- the cash book
- the receipt book
- the voucher book

The aforesaid books are supplied by printing shops to the government at the official price.

Open Arms services can request province H.Q. to supply them with these books (which are subject to payment) or request Central Open Arms to supply them directly.

a. Cash book (Appendix 1)*

The province chief or local representative, the Deputy Commissioner for Open Arms or central representative initial the first and

*Not attached.
last page of the book to certify the number of sheets (a 100-page copy book can be used provided that it is made out in accordance with the Appendix 1).

The manager (bookkeeper) is to record on the left page the date and amount of money (recorded on money orders) received.

On the right page, he has to record expenditures and money released (day, month, year) and date of submitting vouchers to the central. Each expense item has an order number.

b. Receipt book (Appendix 2) *

This E3-Form book has 100 duplicating numbering sheets.

In each payment, the bookkeeper has the money-receiver sign on the receipt E3-Form.

If many persons get pay on the same activity, a collective description list with the signature of each individual should be attached.

If the receiver submits an individual invoice or receipt, the bookkeeper will make a receipt E3-Form (the invoice requires a fiscal stamp).

E3-Forms are prepared and signed below by the bookkeeper and the province headquarters (chief?) will approve and sign as deputy authorizing officer.

c. Voucher book (Appendix 3) *

This E2-Form book has 100 quadruplicating numbering sheets for recording the following details of E3-Form receipts bearing the signature of creditors: date, receipt number, money receiver, expense item, amount of money, code, expenditure.

* Not attached.
Appendix 6

English Translation of:

National Reconciliation Policy

Delivered by Prime Minister Nguyen Cao Ky on 19 April 1967

Today on Hung Vuong day when the entire nation is reminded of its origins, the Government solemnly announces its course of action and its policy concerning the National Reconciliation Program to be put into effect throughout the country.

With the Constitution as a base, the National Reconciliation Program is a part of a campaign for the attainment of our national objective. This objective is to accomplish reforms within the framework of historical continuity to liberate the nation and to free the people. The three guiding principles of the National Reconciliation Program are National Community, National Concord and National Progress.

The principle of National Community is based on the fact that our ties of blood demand us to have tolerance rather than hatred. This principle aims at bringing together all the Vietnamese spiritual heritage bequeathed on us by our forefathers, and at the same time to strive and keep us with the rate of progress of mankind in this second half of the twentieth century. This principle requires that we reject the communist proposed divorce with our traditions. For indeed this denial of the past will bring the nation and the individual into the pit of extermination and slavery.

The principle of National Concord, which aims at restoring the life of harmony that had been worked out by our ancestors after so much hardship, will establish the foundation of our democratic regime. In an atmosphere of peace and harmony, all disagreements and differences will be expressed, not through the use of steel and not at the cost of bloodshed, but rather through democratic procedures.

The principle of National Progress will guide our people to move forward in freedom and with greater expectations. Based on this principle, the social revolution which is being carried out by the Republic will bring about progress and social justice.

All citizens without discrimination will have equal opportunity to develop their capabilities and to enjoy the fruit of the progress the achievement of which everyone will have a chance to contribute his share.

The three principles of National Community, National Concord and National Progress will strengthen our unity of purpose and action within the national community and that will create the essential conditions for the Vietnamese people to be the masters of their own destiny.

In recent days, the Government of the Republic of Vietnam has many times set forth proposals for the restoration of peace and has stated its readiness to meet North Vietnamese authorities either at the demilitarized zone or at any other place. Such initiatives on the part of the
Government have no other purpose than to safeguard the supreme interests of the Vietnam race.

In the field of Chieu Hoi Open Arms action, these three principles provide the Government and the people three ways to implement the National Reconciliation Program.

First, all those who decide to leave the ranks of the communists and reintegrate in the national community will be warmly welcomed as citizens with full rights of citizenship. All returnees will be protected by the Government which will also provide them facilities to build a new life. In other words, every citizen who abandons the communist ranks will enjoy the rights set forth in the Constitution, including the right to have the law protect his freedom, his life, his property, and his honor, the right to vote and to run for office, the right to go back and live within one's family, the right to choose his place of residence and the right to enjoy the national assistance on the pursuit of his profession.

Second, the citizens who rally to the national cause will be employed in accordance with their ability so that every Vietnamese, without distinction, will have the opportunity to contribute positively to the reconstruction and development of the country.

Third, the citizens who rally to the national cause, but who have violated the law under communist coercion or deception, whether they have been convicted or not, will enjoy all the guarantees set forth in the Constitution. The country will be tolerant to the utmost so they have the opportunity to put their ability and determination to serve and redeem themselves.

The Government hereby orders all cadres at all levels, civilian, military and administrative, and calls on the entire people to disseminate and carry out the National Reconciliation policy and program.

The realization of this policy will help shorten this destructive war initiated by the communists and will soon bring about the day which has been yearned for by the entire people for more than twenty years: the day of a lasting and genuine peace.
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy for CORDS, I, II, III, and IV CTZs  
Attn: Chieu Hoi Advisors  
SUBJECT: Chieu Hoi Operational Memorandum No. 6/69: Chieu Hoi Planning.

1. Every province should have some kind of a Chieu Hoi plan. Such a plan serves a number of useful purposes:

   a. Forces the operator to develop realistic goals imposed from higher echelon into an appropriate local proportion.
   b. Sets forth procedures and processes in proper priority by which goals are to be achieved.
   c. Informs all concerned as to what is to be accomplished and how it is to be done.
   d. Enables resource requirements to be anticipated and properly budgeted for.
   e. Serves as a check list for the necessary recurrent measurement of progress.

As special note, be advised that provinces are not to be assigned returnee goals from higher authority. Past experience has clearly established this as entirely counterproductive in a Chieu Hoi sense. If provinces themselves desire to set forth their own targets for returnees, there would be no objection.

2. A province plan was received some time ago which could well be used as a general guide for the preparation of such plans. It is appended hereto for information and such use as is deemed appropriate.

FOR THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, CORDS:

RAYMOND G. JONES  
Director  
MACCORDS/Chieu Hoi Directorate
Pacifications and Development Plan (Chieu Hoi) - Annex K

I. Province Goals

1. Induce move Hoi Chanh to rally. Improve and exceed previous rates.

2. Intensify inducement through increased use of the CH psyops fund, the Hoi Chanh, the APT and the CH Cadre.

3. Improve reception methods and facilities.

4. Improve vocational training and political reorientation; establish a regular literacy education program.

5. Expedite intelligence interrogation of the Hoi Chanh; facilitate wider dissemination of the information obtained therefrom and maximize the tactical utilization of the Hoi Chanh.

6. Improve after-release program.

II. Forces and Resources Available:

1. APT

2. Chieu Hoi Staff.

3. Chieu Hoi Advisory Team (1 CH Advisor, APT Advisor, CH Psyops Advisor).

4. Province MACCORDS Advisory Team

5. US Navy Seabees

6. US Navy PBR Sections

7. Civic Action Platoon

8. US Infantry Division

9. Psyops Battalion

10. Engineers Brigade (US)

11. Maintenance Battalion (US)

12. JUSPAO

13. Province Radio Station

14. VIS Monthly Newspaper
13. ARVN Inf. Div. Psywar Team
16. Province Sector Psywar Team
17. JUSPAO-VIS Drama Team
18. TV Station
19. CH Budgeted Funds
20. AK and CH Division Special Funds
21. GVN Provincial Committees and Services
22. PA & E and RMK
23. ARVN Units in the province
24. RD Teams
25. Chieu Hoi Center and equipment (10 service vehicles, 1 polaroid camera, 1 mimeographing machine, 4 typewriters, 2 bullhorns, 1 electric tape-recorder, 1 battery-operated-loudspeaker).

III. Plans for utilization of the resources to achieve goals:

1. Intensify inducement through increased use of CH psyops fund, the Hoi Chanh, the APT and the CH cadre:

   a. Publish a monthly Chieu Hoi newsletter, out of the CH psyops fund, to keep the people in both sides of the camps fully informed of the Chieu Hoi program.

   b. Print at least one leaflet out of the Chieu Hoi psyops fund every month. Quick reaction leaflets will be printed with the assistance of the Psyops Bn and/or the province JUSPAO multi-lith print machine.

   c. Purchase one 35-mm camera and films for this and the polaroid cameras out of the CH psyops fund.

   d. Select reliable Hoi Chanh to go back to their respective villages and induce their comrades, who are still with the VC ranks, to rally.

   e. Encourage Hoi Chanh who could not go back to their native villages due to insecurity to write leaflet, messages mimeographed at the CH Center or at the districts or make taped messages.
f. Provide adequate training to the new APT recruits for a period of one month, and a refresher training for old APT cadre for a period of at least 2 weeks. The emphasis of the training is in making the individual a psywar man as well as a part of a psywar team.

g. Improve the weapons of the APT by replacing the M-1 with automatic weapons. Coordinate with the Province ADS & L Co.

h. Provide APT with a distinct uniform and proper identification patches.

i. Equip the APT with adequate psyops capability such as a polaroid camera with films, portable battery-operated tape-recorder and loudspeaker.

j. Coordinate with the RD team in the districts to enable the APT, CH Cadre and/or Hoi Chanh to participate in RD-organized hamlet meetings.

k. Coordinate with S-2 and S-3 sections to enable the APT to provide military operations with Chieu Hoi psyops support. They should be informed within 48 hours after the operation has been started.

l. Continue to coordinate with the US Navy PBR Sections in order to cover the areas, which are inaccessible from the highways, with Chieu Hoi psyops.

m. Request District Chiefs to plan out operations using the APT in their respective areas to support their local operations and/or programs.

n. Establish a roster of families with relatives known to be working with the VC. Utilize APT, CH Cadre and Hoi Chanh in contacting these families face-to-face or by letters.

o. Encourage families with VC relatives to visit the Chieu Hoi Center. Make follow-up visits to these families until their wayward relatives rally to the government.

p. Continue the third party reward program following the national reward schedule made by the Ministry of Chieu Hoi and funded by Provincial AK funds.

q. Offer a monthly reward for the "200th Hoi Chanh of the Month" received at the Chieu Hoi Center.

2. Improve reception methods and facilities:

a. Complete the construction of district reception centers.
b. Construct the Chieu Hoi office inside the Chieu Hoi Center to put the Chieu Hoi staff closer to the Hoi Chanh.

c. Organize a reception committee composed of the Chieu Hoi Chief or his deputy, Chieu Hoi Center Manager, APT Company Commander and the Representative of the Hoi Chanh.

d. Provide the Hoi Chanh his authorized issues (blankets, mosquito net, mat, bowl and chopsticks and reception kits) within 24 hours after his arrival at the CH Center.

e. Accelerate the processing of Hoi Chanh dossiers by employing more PSB interrogators at the Chieu Hoi Center during periods of high Hoi Chanh influx, borrow additional type-writers from JUSPAO or USAID, and provide overtime pay, using AIK fund, to CH cadre when overtime work is necessary.

f. Put up a dispensary with 20-bed capacity, inside the Chieu Hoi Center using pre-fab house to be obtained through the assistance of the Civic Action Platoon. Vietnamese, American and/or Filipino doctors will be requested to visit the dispensary regularly and provide the Hoi Chanh with a monthly medical check up.

g. Construct a two-compartment bathroom.

h. Invite ARVN and GVN officials to visit the CH Center during their leisure hours to further the loyalty of the Hoi Chanh to the government.

3. Improve the vocational and political reorientation programs; establish a regular literacy education program:

a. Continue to hold training on masonry, carpentry, tailoring, barbering and hollow-block making.

b. Coordinate with the US Navy Seabees and the US and/or ARVN maintenance battalions to provide deserving and reliable Hoi Chanh an on-the-job training.

c. Send more Hoi Chanh to the CH regional training center for advanced vocational trades.

d. Provide the political reorientation training with adequate and interesting visual aids. If possible purchase a picture projector.

e. Invite ARVN and GVN officials as resource speakers to political reorientation training.
f. Hire one Hoi Chanh as literacy education instructor paid out of AIK funds.

g. Show a regular JUSPAO movie to supplement the TV program. Invite ARVN and GVN entertainment/drama teams to perform at the Chieu Hoi Center.

4. Expedite intelligence interrogation of the Hoi Chanh and facilitate wider dissemination of information obtained therefrom; maximize the tactical utilization of the Hoi Chanh:

a. Provide fast transportation to Hoi Chanh who rally in inaccessible areas. Remote outposts and villages should contact the nearest unit with airlift capability so that these Hoi Chanh are interrogated, utilized and received at the Chieu Hoi Center within 48 hours after his rally.

b. Construct a Chieu Hoi interrogation building inside the Chieu Hoi Center adequate to accommodate interrogators from the NFS/PSB, S-2, Phuong Hoang/Phoenix, FWMAF Mil. Unit, Chieu Hoi Service and others.

c. Set up a wall map indicating the location where each new Hoi Chanh came from and the number of Hoi Chanh from each area for reference use by the agencies mentioned in b.

d. Recruit Kit Carson Scouts.

e. Keep friendly units informed of the Hoi Chanh received both in the districts and at the Chieu Hoi Center for immediate operations.

5. Improve after-release program:

a. Establish a province Chieu Hoi hamlet capable of accommodating 100 Hoi Chanh families who cannot return to their native villages due to insecurity.

b. Establish district Chieu Hoi hamlets capable of accommodating 25 Hoi Chanh families who prefer to stay in the district but cannot return to their native villages because of insecurity. Since this program has not support from the Ministry of Chieu Hoi assistance from the Refugee and Social Services, the RD self-help program and the CORDS will be solicited.

c. Revitalize the province employment committee to enable the government to assist Hoi Chanh needing employment.

d. Assist released Hoi Chanh to obtain advanced vocational training by sending them to the regional and national Chieu Hoi Centers.
a. Assist reliable Hoi Chanh get employed with the Kit Carson Scouts, PRU, CIDG, RDC, RF/PF, and the ARVN.

f. Coordinate with ARVN and US units and GVN agencies that are employing Hoi Chanh, to enable the Chieu Hoi Service to keep track of their performances and problems.

g. Hire reliable and married Hoi Chanh to assist the Chieu Hoi cadre in the districts carry out the follow-up of released Hoi Chanh. AIX fund will be used to pay for their salaries and per diem.

h. Organize a yearly ex-Hoi Chanh reunion in each district.
Appendix 8

1970 PACIFICATION AND DEVELOPMENT PLAN
ANNEX V
GREATER NATIONAL UNITY

I. GENERAL

a. According to the tradition of national unity, the RVN Government promulgated the Chieu Hoi Policy to save lives of Vietnamese people, and to early end the aggressive war initiated by the Communists.

b. From early 1963 (when the Chieu Hoi policy was promulgated) up to this date (20 September 1969), the Chieu Hoi program has accepted 126,247 Hoi Chanh. Particularly, in the first nine months of 1969, there were 32,867 Hoi Chanh; this number is six times higher than the total number of Hoi Chanh in 1964, and nearly double the number in 1968.

c. The Chieu Hoi program has obtained many remarkable achievements in these recent months due to the following main factors:

1. Good results achieved by the Pacification and Development Operations, from the Special Pacification Plan through the 1969 Pacification and Development Plan, Phases 1 and 2.

2. Pressure of the ARVN and allied military activities was permanently placed on Communist forces, particularly from the two phases of the Communist general offensive during Tet Mau Than (Monkey's New Year).

3. Good actions of all civilians, military, and government officials in welcoming Hoi Chanh.

4. Morale of Communist troops and cadres has been extremely lowered, particularly after heavy defeat of their Tet Mau Than general offensive, and the belief in their leaders also has been weakened.

5. Communist forces have encountered many difficulties in the strength replenishment, food and weapons supply.

6. Effectiveness of the popularization of the national unity policy and the psywar offensive conducted by the Chieu Hoi Ministry in coordination with all the Vietnamese psywar agencies, the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces, and the Allied Forces.

7. Participation of more and more people in the propaganda campaign for the Chieu Hoi policy.

d. If the situation is better and better to our side in comparing with the weakness day after day of the enemy, and if the Chieu Hoi activities are more and more effective and stronger, it is believed that the Chieu Hoi program will have more capabilities to contribute to the 1970 Pacification and Development Program for the following reasons:
1. Results of the Chieu Hoi Program will considerably increase effectiveness of the Pacification and Development Program, thus, reducing the burden of the latter program.

2. Results of the Pacification and Development Program will exercise basic pressure on the enemy, and provide more opportunities to the execution and development of the Chieu Hoi program in two fields: motivation and propaganda for the Chieu Hoi policy; and vitalization of Hoi Chanh's activities.

II. OBJECTIVES

a. Based on the results obtained during the first nine months of 1969, the objectives of the Chieu Hoi Program in the 1970 Pacification and Development Plan are to receive 40,000 Hoi Chanh and vitalize their activities.

b. In the first phase of the plan (1 January 1970 to 30 June 1970) the target to be achieved is to receive and revitalize 25,000 Hoi Chanh, apportioned among CTZs as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CTZ</th>
<th>1 January 1970 to 30 June 1970</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>3,000 Hoi Chanh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>3,100 Hoi Chanh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>5,100 Hoi Chanh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV</td>
<td>13,800 Hoi Chanh</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

c. The number of Hoi Chanh to be returned by each province and city will be jointly decided by the CTZ Chieu Hoi office (representative office) in coordination with the respective CTZ Pacification and Development Council.

III. DUTIES

a. The Chieu Hoi Program is simultaneously aimed at two objectives: decreasing the enemy potential while increasing our potential.

b. These objectives will only be achieved if the people are willing to participate directly in the implementation of the Chieu Hoi Program and the Chieu Hoi Ministry and other friendly agencies effectively perform the main tasks in the Chieu Hoi Program to include conducting propaganda and motivation, and receiving Hoi Chanh and vitalizing their activities.

1. Propaganda and motivation must be performed effectively in order to widely popularize the national unity policy as well as to induce hostile personnel to return to the national community.

2. Reception of Hoi Chanh must be made properly so as to prepare their psychology, particularly their attitude, to enable them to easily enter into the community life. In addition, the Hoi Chanh's knowledge of the enemy situation must be immediately exploited for military, security and psywar intelligence purposes.
3. Vitalization of Hoi Chanh's activities must be conducted effectively so as to make maximum use of Hoi Chanh resources in the struggle against Communism in the building of the Nation.

IV. EXECUTION

A. Propaganda and motivation.

1. Orientation:

a. Widely publicize the national unity policy within the Chieu Hoi operational limit.

b. Motivate people, military personnel, civil servants, governmental cadres, Hoi Chanh, and particularly the persons whose relatives are joining the Communists and induce them to call their relatives to the national just cause.

c. Provide additional means and improve propaganda and motivation techniques in order to initiate the psychological offensive against the enemy, sow disunion among hostile people, and popularize the Chieu Hoi policy.

d. More effort will be made in the following areas of the Chieu Hoi campaign.

   (1) Rallying of entire units.
   (2) Rallying of high ranking Communists.
   (3) Rallying of Montagnard Viet Cong.
   (4) Rallying of infiltrators from the North.
   (5) Rallying of former Southerners returned from the North.
   (6) Rallying of unmarried individuals between 15 and 29.

e. More propaganda and motivation efforts are made in all provinces in I, II, and III CTZ as well as in Saigon and its suburbs.

2. Planned Tasks:

a. Widely popularize the national unity policy both at home and abroad through the production and dissemination of movies, documents, magazines, etc.

b. Increase propaganda and motivation efforts of all radio broadcasting units aiming at the priority areas included in the 1970 Pacification and Development Plan. Main tasks of the radio broadcasting cadres are to reach and motive the persons whose relatives are joining the Communists and induce them to call their relatives to the national cause.
c. Improve all overt propaganda and motivation activities: The Tieng Chim Goi Dan Program (calling VC personnel to return to the national community) broadcast on Radio and Television (particularly on Local radio), leaflets, air-mounted loudspeakers. After completing exploitation of the enemy situation, expedite an appeal by the Hoi Chanh to their comrades-in-arms to return to the nationalist cause.

d. After one or two weeks living at the Chieu Hoi Centers, Hoi Chanh will be encouraged to volunteer to return to their former areas of activities to popularize their experiences in the Chieu Hoi program and call other hostile persons to return to the national just cause.

e. Hoi Chanh teams (composed of Hoi Chanh officers or cadres) will have to be formed and sent to every locality, people’s associations, universities, high schools, military schools, etc., to talk about the real weaknesses and political plots of the Communists.

f. The program for awarding money in cash to civilians, Hoi Chanh, military personnel, and civil servants who take part in the motivation of Communists to return to the national just cause will have to be continued. However, it must insure that the merit done by the awarded person is of real value so as to maintain the value of this program.

g. Open the Spring Campaign for 1970.

h. Initiate a Chieu Hoi Campaign to call single Communists between 15 and 29 to return to the national just cause.

i. Organize exhibition of the achievements performed by the Chieu Hoi program.

j. Conduct press conference to introduce important Hoi Chanh to the public.

k. Support the Joint General Staff, ARVN (Department of Political Warfare) in the conduct of psywar and Chieu Hoi campaigns, such as the Nguyen Trai Campaign, against the enemy.

B. Reception of Hoi Chanh.

l. Orientation:

a. Clear up all complexes of guilt and suspicion in Hoi Chanh’s minds immediately after their reception.

b. Place emphasis on the classification of Hoi Chanh.

c. Improve facilities and the administration of the Chieu Hoi Centers.

d. Improve the exploitation of information concerning the enemy situation, cross check, use and exchange this information with those of other government agencies.
a. Improve the system for the Hoi Chanh political training.

f. Select Hoi Chanh with instructor ability to act as political lecturers with pay. Training will be coordinated with National Cadre Training Center at Vung Tau.

g. Pay attention to the defense of all the Chieu Hoi Centers against Communist sabotage.

2. Planned Tasks

a. Strictly apply the Basic Instruction on Reception No. 222/HT/CH, 15 November 1968, issued by the Prime Minister (already disseminated to the Province, Sectors and Provincial Chieu Hoi Services) and follow up related military and civilian agencies as well as allied units in applying this document which covers the following areas:

(1) Reception. Civilians, military personnel cadres, and allied troops should warmly welcome Hoi Chanh.

(2) Award for weapons. The award for weapons must be made in the shortest possible time based on the rates fixed by the Chieu Hoi Ministry.

(3) Transfer of Hoi Chanh. Strictly apply current regulations which prescribe that Hoi Chanh should be brought with all means available to the appropriate provincial Hoi Chanh Center in the shortest possible time.

(4) Screening and determination of Hoi Chanh's personal records: the determination of personnel records and screening of Hoi Chanh elements must be done carefully in order to identify the elements who disguise as Hoi Chanh to perform their underground sabotaging actions or to be exempt from the draft.

(5) Exploitation of information concerning enemy infrastructures in order to timely furnish this information to the Local Phung Hoang Committee.

(6) Hoi Chanh used as guides in military operations. Use of Hoi Chanh as guides in operations must be made on a voluntary basis, and other procedures for employing Hoi Chanh out of their centers must be respected.

b. All Hoi Chanh should attend a political training course at a Chieu Hoi center (province, regional, or central level according to their rank). A training program will be provided by the Chieu Hoi Ministry, and instructors will be cadres of this Ministry, or men of letters, experienced cadres of authorized associations, military personnel and civil servants (instructors will be paid).

c. Establish system of classifying Hoi Chanh in order to tailor their political training.

(1) Youths. Could be drafted by the Communists again and therefore must have different political training than women and old persons.
(2) The two other types mentioned in (1) have a tendency to return to their old ways after leaving the Chieu Hoi Center and therefore need political training different from youths.

(3) Classification needs to be accomplished in detail in order to have data for research and estimates.

d. According to the budget situation, all Chieu Hoi Centers will be maintained and enlarged in order to improve their facilities and insure the defense.

ea. Anti-Communist refugees, the persons whose relatives are joining the Communists, and other civilians will be encouraged to visit Chieu Hoi centers.

f. Detach personnel from the National Police General Directorate to all Chieu Hoi centers on the basis of at least two police personnel for one center in order to interrogate Hoi Chanh and prepare their personal dossiers and Identity Cards.

g. Issue Identity Cards to Hoi Chanh within two months from the date they arrive, and prior to their departure from the Chieu Hoi centers.

h. Improve the establishment of Hoi Chanh dossiers, especially the seven-colored cards. Hoi Chanh dossiers will have to be completed within one month, and the seven-colored cards within one week, beginning the date the Hoi Chanh entered the centers.

C. Vitalization of Hoi Chanh's activities.

1. Purposes:

a. Help Hoi Chanh so that they can promptly join the national community. However, the treatment of Hoi Chanh will have to be legitimate so as to avoid any possible jealousy by members in nationalist ranks.

b. Majority of Hoi Chanh are farmers, therefore, their training will be aimed much as agriculture, fishery, and animal husbandry techniques in accordance with the national economy development policy, in addition to the handicraft and industry training. This training will be given only to those Hoi Chanh who want it.

c. The employment of Hoi Chanh in the Armed Forces and government agencies will have to be executed in compliance with the following criteria:

   (1) The Hoi Chanh must be qualified in the assigned functions.

   (2) The nationalist stand of the Hoi Chanh is reliable.

   (3) In addition, after recruitment of Hoi Chanh, a guide plan will have to be made to help them to familiarize themselves with their newly-assigned functions as well as to avoid conflicts which often occur between them and their co-workers who are not Hoi Chanh.
d. Try to utilize Hoi Chanh in the Regional Forces and Popular Forces.

e. Attention will be paid to the updating of Hoi Chanh's status when they are resettled in rural hamlets and villages as well as in urban wards and villages. This updating has two purposes:

(1) Understand clearly the status of Hoi Chanh in order to help them when necessary.

(2) Keep an eye on the political stand of the Hoi Chanh.

f. Pay attention to leading Hoi Chanh to return to a normal and peaceful life, participating in activities of groups such as PSDF, Youth Groups, Women's Groups, or private organizations such as cooperatives and labor unions.

2. Planned tasks:

a. Vocational training.

(1) Provide training in cultivation and animal husbandry techniques to 40,000 Hoi Chanh while they are at Chieu hoi centers, and 4,000 resettled in Chieu Hoi villages.

(2) Give training in popular skills such as carpentry, masonry, tailoring, two and four stroke motor repair, typing, driving, etc.

b. Resettlement.

(1) Convert 30 Chieu Hoi villages to normal local communities.

(2) Completely maintain eight Chieu Hoi villages (buildings, wells, roads, etc.).

(3) Resettle an additional number of Hoi Chanh in existing villages.

(4) Issue land titles to Hoi Chanh resettled in Chieu Hoi villages located in governmental land.

(5) Organize agriculture and animal husbandry cooperatives at three Chieu Hoi villages which are suitable for agriculture development.

(6) Organize handicraft cooperatives at three Chieu Hoi villages.

(7) Push the 1969 program concerning the electrification of the 17 Chieu Hoi villages.

c. Employment.

(1) Recruit Hoi Chanh and organize them into 15 additional Chieu Hoi armed propaganda companies so as to bring the total strength of Chieu Hoi propaganda companies to 90.
(2) Recruit enough Hoi Chanh to act as village Chieu Hoi cadre (extend deadline for joining army).

(3) Recruit a maximum number of Hoi Chanh into the Popular Forces and Regional Forces and employ them in the protection of hamlets, villages, and mobile activities (subject of a separate plan of the Ministry of National Defense).

(4) Introduce Hoi Chanh to government and private factories for jobs.

(5) Establish a system to follow up results of the employment of Hoi Chanh at government and military agencies.

(6) Fix the manner and pursue achievement of organizing Chieu Hoi groups.

(7) Test Hoi Chanh's specialized qualifications previously learned from the Communists.

(8) Test military and cultural qualifications of Hoi Chanh who were commanders in the Communist forces in order to insure their interest when they perform military service.

d. Census and Liaison.

(1) Conduct the updating of status of Hoi Chanh, and make a census of Hoi Chanh resettled in rural hamlets and villages as well as in urban wards and villages through administrative channels therein (Ministries of Interior and Chieu Hoi will meet to settle details).

(2) Establish a liaison system between the Chieu Hoi infrastructure and Hoi Chanh who are leading a normal life as other citizens.

D. Support.

1. Personnel:

a. Recruit 1,130 village Chieu Hoi Cadres (recruit talented local inhabitants and Hoi Chanh with essential qualifications).

b. Recruit enough personnel and cadres as authorized (1,589 persons excluding 1,130 village cadres, and 6,660 armed propaganda cadres). Regarding 85 political instructors, they will be recruited among members introduced by anti-Communist parties and associations, and should have political qualifications and training.

c. Rationalize the assignment of personnel and cadres to Local services based on local requirements.

d. Fifteen officers and NCOs from the Ministry of Defense will be detached to the Chieu Hoi Branch to perform security and intelligence tasks.
2. Training

a. The following personnel will be sent to the RD Cadre Training Center at Vung Tau for training:

(1) 5,000 armed propaganda cadres (Hoi Chanh) for the following training:

   (a) People leadership.
   (b) Politics.
   (c) Operational techniques.
   (d) Military.

(2) 1,500 Chieu hoi personnel and cadres: They will attend the aforementioned training. However the military training will be cancelled and replaced by the administrative, personnel, and financial training.

(3) 1,130 village Chieu Hoi cadres: They will attend the aforementioned training. However, the military training will be cancelled and replaced by the Chieu Hoi technical training.

(4) 200 Chieu Hoi interrogator cadres. These cadres will be completely trained in techniques of interrogating and classifying Hoi Chanh, preparing their dossiers and laminated ID cards, and exploiting information concerning enemy situation.

(5) 300 security and intelligence cadres. These cadres will be completely trained in security and intelligence techniques.

(6) All the above-listed personnel and cadres (8,130) will attend one-month training course.

b. Training and refresher training to be conducted by the Chieu Hoi Ministry:

(1) One Province Service Chief training course for Deputy Province Service Chiefs and outstanding District Section Chiefs.

(2) One District Service Chief training course for outstanding personnel.

(3) One refresher training course for Province Service Chiefs and Regional Center Managers.

(4) One refresher training course for District Section Chiefs.

(5) The appointment of Province Service Chiefs and District Section Chiefs will be made based on their classification after graduation.

3. Finance

The foreign aid fund in the Chieu Hoi Budget appropriated for the management of Chieu hoi programs at localities will be transferred through normal procedures to the Provinces for use through RD financial procedures.
V. PREPARATION OF PLANS

Based on the main points in this Annex and according to local situation, all Province Chieu Hoi Service are requested to compile their own Annex to be attached to the 1970 Pacification and Development Plan. See Annex XVIII.

VI. COORDINATION

In order to achieve the objectives set forth for 1970 (Receive 40,000 Hoi Chanh, and vitalize their activities), the Chieu Hoi program will require coordination between the Chieu Hoi agencies, governmental and allied civilian agencies, ARVN and Allied Forces at Central and especially local levels through the command channel of all Pacification and Development Councils.

a. In order to promote propaganda and motivation (popularize government's policies), coordination of the following agencies will be required:


2. Joint General Staff, ARVN (Department of Political Warfare): Armed propaganda teams, printed propaganda materials, loudspeaker aircraft, radio, psywar units and cadres.

3. Ministry of Revolutionary Development and Ministry of Ethnic Minorities: Coordinate activities between RD Cadres or Son Thon Cadres and armed propaganda teams.

4. MACV-JUSPAO support propaganda operations, loudspeaker aircraft, leaflet drops, special activities in Chieu Hoi operations.

5. Psywar Operations Coordinating Centers: Support propaganda and aircraft operations in tactics applicable to various corps and provinces.

b. In the reception of Hoi Chanh (apply the procedures for reception, particularly the establishment of dossiers, classification, issuance of ID cards the entry of Hoi Chanh into Chieu Hoi Centers within two months, and exploitation of the enemy situation), coordination is required from the following agencies:

1. Ministry of Interior (General Directorate of National Police), J2/JGS.

b. In the political training of Hoi Chanh at the Chieu Hoi Centers, coordination is required from the following agencies:

1. Ministry of Information (Province Information Services).

2. Sector S-5s.

3. Anti-Communist national political parties.
d. In the vocational training and employment of Hoi Chanh, coordination is required from the following agencies:

1. The Ministry of Land Reform and Agriculture and Fishery Development. This Ministry will help in training 44,000 Hoi Chanh in cultivation and animal husbandry techniques, and issuing land titles to Hoi Chanh who are resettled in Chieu Hoi villages.

2. The Ministry of Health. This Ministry will assist in testing medical qualifications of Hoi Chanh who were nurses and physicians turned out by Communist regime.

3. The Ministries of Education and Defense. These Ministries will assist in testing cultural and military qualification of Hoi Chanh who were commanders in the Communist Forces.

4. The Ministry of Defense. This Ministry will help in recruiting a large number of Hoi Chanh into Regional and Popular Forces.

e. In the execution of the full range of Chieu Hoi tasks at the grass-root level (particularly the updating of status of Chieu Hoi and census of Hoi Chanh resettled in rural hamlets and villages as well as in urban villages and wards), coordination is required with the following agencies:

1. The Ministry of Interior through the Administrative Committees of rural villages, and urban villages and wards.

2. The Ministries of Revolutionary Development and Information through the hamlet and village cadres.

f. In the training and refresher training of Chieu Hoi personnel and cadres, coordination is required with the following agencies:

1. The Ministry of Revolutionary Development in the training of 8,130 personnel and cadres at RD Cadre Training Center, Yung Tau.

2. The Ministry of Interior in the administration training of local Chieu Hoi personnel and cadres in provinces.

g. In the operational management, education, and mobilization of the morale of all Hoi Chanh Armed Propaganda Teams, coordination is required from the Ministry of Interior through the Province Chiefs who have direct responsibility for the employment and management of Chieu Hoi Armed Propaganda Teams.

h. In the provision of weapons to Hoi Chanh Armed Propaganda Teams, coordination is required from the Ministry of Defense.

i. In the detachment of personnel, coordination is required from the Ministry of Defense in the detachment of officers and non-commissioned officers from that Ministry to the Chieu Hoi Branch to perform security and intelligence operations for village Chieu Hoi Cadres.
VII. REPORTS

a. A monthly report form will be disseminated by the Chieu Hoi Ministry to all Provincial Services.

b. The monthly operational report of the previous month will have to be submitted to the Chieu Hoi Ministry prior to the fifth of the following month. Copies of this report will be sent to:

   (1) Concerned province or city Pacificification and Development Council.

   (2) CTZ Chieu Hoi Office.
Appendix 9

HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM
APO San Francisco 96222

DIRECTIVE
NUMBER 381-11

19 April 1969*  
(MACJ2)

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE

EXPLOITATION OF HUMAN SOURCES AND CAPTURED DOCUMENTS

1. PURPOSE. This directive announces policy and prescribes responsibilities and procedures for the U.S. military intelligence exploitation of human sources and captured documents within the Republic of Vietnam (RVN).

2. APPLICABILITY. This directive is applicable to all U.S. personnel assigned to U.S. units, agencies, and headquarters operating in the RVN; and to all U.S. personnel assigned to advisory or liaison duties, at all levels of command, to the RVN or Free World Military Assistance Forces (FWMAF).

3. DEFINITIONS.

   a. Detainee. A person who has been apprehended by U.S., RVN, or other FWMAF but whose individual status has not yet been determined. Although such persons have not been categorized as a prisoner of war, they are entitled to the same protection afforded a prisoner of war under the provisions of the Geneva Convention of 1949 (GPW49).

   b. Very Important Source (VIS). A human source assessed by appropriate intelligence officers or personnel to be of significant intelligence value and warrants immediate exploitation because of his rank, level of access to information, area of knowledgeability, or particular unit of assignment.

   c. Documents. All written, printed, drawn, or engraved material, sound or voice recordings, photographs, exposed film, insignia, or reproductions of the foregoing.

4. RESPONSIBILITIES.

   a. The ACofS, J-2, MACV, is responsible for developing plans, policies, and procedures for the intelligence exploitation of human sources and captured documents.

   b. Commanders of subordinate commands, advisory, and liaison teams, as defined in MACV Directive 310-2, will insure compliance with the procedures contained herein.

*As revised 6/3/69 and 8/17/69
5. GENERAL. The intelligence exploitation of human sources and captured documents is accomplished through a combined U.S., RVN, and other FWMAF exploitation system. The concept of combined interrogation of sources and exploitation of captured documents is practiced at all echelons. The priority for human source and captured document exploitation in this system is: first, combat intelligence; second, intelligence required by higher headquarters; third, psychological operations; and fourth, public information. This mutually supporting system provides for the exchange of information derived from captured documents and human sources. This system is designed to satisfy appropriate intelligence requirements of the U.S., RVN, and other FWMAF (see JGS Directive 170-1).

a. The following facilities and teams comprise the combined exploitation system.

(1) A Combined Military Interrogation Center (CMIC) located in Saigon.
(2) A Combined Document Exploitation Center (CDEC) located in Saigon.
(3) Corps Interrogation Centers (CIC) located at Da Nang, I CTZ; Pleiku, II CTZ; Bien Hoa, III CTZ; and Can Tho, IV CTZ.
(4) U.S. interrogation/translation teams attached to the RVN elements.
(5) RVNAF interrogation teams attached to U.S. and other FWMAF.
(6) U.S. advisory, assistance, and liaison personnel assigned to the RVN and other Free World forces.

b. Through liaison with national and local officials, additional interrogation and document exploitation support may be provided during specific operations by Government of Vietnam (GVN) agencies.

c. Field interrogations and field document exploitation will be conducted by CMIC and CDEC field teams when subordinate units need special assistance in interrogation or document exploitation because of an unusually high number of detainees taken or documents captured, or when an especially difficult exploitation situation has arisen requiring assistance. Requests for field team assistance will be validated by ACoFS, J-2, MACV, Exploitation Division, and will be dispatched as personnel resources allow. Extraordinary circumstances may warrant the dispatch of a field team without prior request from the field commander.

6. HUMAN SOURCE INTERROGATION AND REPORTING PROCEDURES.

a. General. Detainees will be screened expeditiously by the capturing unit to determine PW or non-PW status, to identify knowledgeable sources, and to establish interrogation priorities. All detainees will be processed in accordance with the provisions of MACV Directive 381-66. Doubtful cases will be processed as outlined in MACV Directive 20-5.
b. Exploitation of Sources.

(1) Interrogations may be conducted at all levels of command. However, interrogation will normally be limited to that information which is of immediate value to the commander of the unit having custody and his subordinate units or agencies.

(2) All interrogations will be conducted in accordance with pertinent provisions of the Geneva Conventions relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (CPW), 1949, with particular regard to the prohibitions which apply equally to all detainees incorporated within the definitions contained in Articles four and five. Detainee and PW interrogations at separate regiment, brigade, and division PW collecting points will be conducted so as to permit military police observation of interrogations. Military police will be positioned so as not to interfere with the interrogation procedures or environment. Interrogations at corps and force level will be conducted in accordance with CMIC agreement dated 14 August 1968 and signed jointly by JGS/MACV. When U.S. personnel have knowledge of a RVN or FMAF violation of the Geneva Conventions, a report must be made through channels to the senior U.S. commander involved in the operation. The senior U.S. commander will then point out the violation to the RVNAF or FMAF commander. A report identifying all parties involved and describing the violation in detail is to be forwarded to COMUSMACV, Attn: MACJA, by the senior U.S. commander. Reports of Geneva Convention violations will be transmitted electrically by priority precedence.

(3) Sources will be held at the CMIC and the CIC for a reasonable time mutually agreed on by the J-2/JGS, RVNAF, and the ACofS, J-2, MACV.

(4) Interrogation of PW and Hoi Chanh in the CMIC is ordinarily based on the MACV Intelligence Collection Plan (ICP), and current MACV special collection plans. Requirements in addition to the ICP and special collection plans will be processed by way of the Specific Intelligence Collection Requirement (SICR) format (see MACV Dir 381-16 (C)).

(5) The CIC will collect intelligence information in response to requirements of the corps commander, U.S. senior advisor, and higher headquarters. Methods of tasking CIC by higher headquarters will be made by separate arrangements.

c. Evacuation of Prisoners of Intelligence Value.

(1) The normal evacuation of knowledgeable PW by U.S. and other FMAF is from capturing unit to division or separate brigade, then to the RVNAF Corps PW camp as shown in Annex A. VIS may be released to the CIC, or directly to the CMIC in Saigon for detailed interrogation. The evacuation of PW and RVNAF division tactical areas or corps level PW camps is not to exceed 14 days from the date of capture.

(2) Units evacuating sources directly to the CMIC will notify the U.S. Director, CMIC, of the expected time of arrival so necessary arrangements may be made with the RVNAF detaining authorities at the center.
(3) When it is necessary to reinterrogate a PW after he has entered
the ARVN PW camp, the PW may be retrieved from the PW camp by coordination
with the ARVN corps S-1.

d. Hoi Chans of Intelligence Value. SVN authorities require that
Hoi Chanh be delivered to the sector S-2 within 48 hours of the original
contact with friendly elements. During this period he may be interrogated,
if the Hoi Chanh agrees, for perishable information of immediate tactical
value. Hoi Chans will be processed and handled in accordance with MACV

e. Innocent Civilians of Intelligence Value. The sector S-2, or
the S-2 advisor will supervise the interrogation of innocent civilians who
possess information satisfying military intelligence requirements. Detain­
ees placed in the innocent civilian category will not be held by U.S.
units; they will be turned over to ARVN sector officials for processing
and return to their homes.

f. Reporting Procedures. All U.S. units (separate brigade and higher)
will report on PW and Hoi Chans as indicated below; the unit having cus­
tody of the PW or Hoi Chanh is responsible for reporting. Advisory per­
sonnel and U.S. military liaison personnel with other FNSF units will
insure that reports are forwarded, as they are available, on all PW and
Hoi Chans who meet the reporting criteria for each report required.

(1) Interrogation Spot Report. The first report on a PW or Hoi
Chanh from VC LF battalions, VC MF units, all NVA units, or a member of the
Viet Cong Infrastructure (VCI) at district level and above, will be trans­
mittted electrically within 12 hours from time of capture or return. Inter­
rogation Spot Reports should not be transmitted on PW or Hoi Chans from
hamlet or village level units and organizations unless the PW or Hoi Chanh
has valuable or potentially valuable information. The minimum amount of
information required in the Interrogation Spot Report is found at Annex 3.
Format is to be followed exactly as prescribed. It is to be clearly in­
dicated which of the four categories source belongs to; NVA/PW; NVA/Hoi
Chanh (Returnee); VC/PW; or VC/Hoi Chanh (Returnee).

(2) Very Important Source Report (VISR). Very important sources will
be identified through the VISR which will be transmitted electrically within
48 hours after the transmission of the Interrogation Spot Report. The for­
mat for the VISR is at Annex C.

g. Interrogation Reports.

(1) All reports submitted subsequent to the Interrogation Spot Report
will fully identify the PW or Hoi Chanh by repeating his full name (the
Vietnamese diacritical markings of the PW or Hoi Chanh's name will be in­
dicated by use of the International Telegraphic Code (ITC), alias(es), rank,
and date and place of capture or return (DTG and UTM coordinates).
(2) A copy of all interrogation reports originated by the RVN and other FMAF, and passed locally to U.S. units, U.S. advisors, and liaison personnel, will be forwarded through intelligence channels to the same addressees as listed on the Interrogation Spot Report.

(3) Interrogation reports will be classified in accordance with MACV Directive 380-5.

(4) Initial Interrogation Report. This report is to be transmitted electrically within 72 hours of the transmission of the Interrogation Spot Report. The criteria for transmitting an Initial Interrogation Report is the same as the Interrogation Spot Report. Every Interrogation Spot Report is to be followed up by an Initial Interrogation Report. A copy of this report will accompany the PW during evacuation. The Initial Interrogation Report format is found at Annex D. Format is to be followed exactly as prescribed. It is to be clearly indicated on this report which of the four categories source belongs to: NVA/PW; NVA/Hoi Chanh (Returnee); VC/PW; or VC/Hoi Chanh (Returnee).

(5) Additional Interrogation Report. Three copies of any interrogation reports in addition to those required by this directive will be forwarded to the ACoFs, J-2, MACV, Exploitation Division. The interrogation report format found in FM 30-15 is recommended for additional reports.

(6) Intelligence Information Report (IIR), DD Form 1396. The IIR will be prepared by the CMIC and the CIC in response to MACV SICR (see MACV Directive 381-26 (C)).

h. Knowledgeability Brief (K3). A KB will be prepared on every PW and Hoi Chanh who is interrogated at the CMIC and CIC. Criteria for publication of the KB will be established by the CMIC and the CIC directors. As a general rule, KBs should be published on PW and Hoi Chanhs of officer and NCO rank, PW or ralliers having significant information on the Viet Cong Infrastructure (VCI), and others who are in possession of valuable tactical or strategic information. The format for the KB is found in Annex E.

i. PW control. U.S. directors of the CMIC; the corps interrogation centers at Da Nang, Pleiku, Bien Hoa, and Can Tho; and the Division Interrogation Center at Hue will report by the 10th of each month all U.S. captured PW who have been interrogated during the preceding month. The report will include the PW name, rank, organization, date and place of capture, and disposition. Report is to be forwarded to CG, USARV, Attn: AVHPM-PW.

j. Availability of Sources for Transfer to CNIC. The corps interrogation centers at Da Nang, Pleiku, Bien Hoa, and Can Tho will forward or transmit to the ACoFs, J-2, MACV (MACJ213 and MACJ213-3), on the 15th and last day of each month, a report of all sources that are expected to be available for transfer in the forthcoming two weeks. Report will include name, status (PW or Hoi Chanh), rank, organization, date and place of capture, areas of knowledgeability, and degree of cooperativeness of source.
7. EXPLOITATION OF CAPTURED ENEMY DOCUMENTS

a. General. Captured documents will be expeditiously processed, exploited, and evacuated to division or separate brigade level, with subsequent evacuation directly to CDEC, if feasible. The original document will be forwarded so as to reach CDEC within 10 days of the date of capture. Because of the complete facilities available at CDEC, the forwarding of documents within the first two days following capture will provide maximum exploitation results in most cases. Units will process all captured documents on an urgent basis, and follow-through on the final delivery of documents to CDEC, with view to improving evacuation procedures.

b. Document Reporting. Captured documents containing significant intelligence information (such as new order of battle findings, attack plans, location of mine fields or booby traps, or new weapons or equipment) will be reported electrically to COMUSMACV for the ACoFs, J-2, MACV (see Annex F). Other appropriate RVNAF/RVN units (to include ARVN corps) should be included as addressees of this spot report. The original copy of the significant captured document will be forwarded expeditiously to CDEC.

c. Document Reproduction. Within existing capabilities, captured documents containing important intelligence information will be reproduced for distribution to interested higher, lower, and adjacent U.S. units, to the local ARVN corps, and other RVNAF/RVNAF units as appropriate. Translations which accompany captured documents should be in a format similar to that of the Translation Report at Annex G.

d. Detainees and Hoi Chanh with Documents. Documents taken along with a detainee or Hoi Chanh will be reproduced at the lowest echelon possible, the original copy forwarded to CDEC, and the duplicate copy evacuated with the individual to aid in interrogation.

e. Technical Documents. Documents concerning matériel will be tagged "Technical Documents" or appropriately identified to facilitate technical intelligence exploitation. Technical documents, when captured or acquired with matériel, will be annotated to describe the matériel from which the documents were separated and the documents will be forwarded to the Combined Materiel Exploitation Center (CMEC) in accordance with MACV Directive 381-24.

f. Signal or Cryptographic Documents. Signal or cryptographic documents containing codes or charts pertaining to enemy messages or message traffic will be delivered promptly to the Technical Research Unit (TRU) field team in each corps area. If contact cannot be made with the TRU field team, the documents will be forwarded to the ACoFs, J-2, MACV, Exploitation Division, Attn: TRU, by the most expeditious means.

g. Packaging and Tagging Documents. Captured documents will be packaged, tagged with document cards (a locally produced form similar to that shown at Annex H may be used), and delivered by the capturing or acquiring
unit to the next higher echelon (normally battalion or brigade) at which field exploitation may be accomplished. If document cards are not available, the protective wrapping placed around the documents will be annotated with the date, time, place, and circumstances of capture or acquisition (such as "taken from captive," "found on body," or "found in bunker"); the identity of the capturing or acquiring unit; and the name or numerical designation of the specific operation in which the document was captured. Captured documents will be handled as CONFIDENTIAL. However, no marking whatsoever will be made directly on any captured document.

h. Batch Slips. Transmittal of captured documents from one echelon of command to another will be under cover of a batch slip. A locally produced form similar to that shown in Annex I may be used.

i. Propaganda Documents. Propaganda materials will be forwarded to the CDEC as outlined in paragraph 6g, above, and MACV Directive 380-20. The acquiring unit will enter on the accompanying document card the information pertaining to the propaganda materials such as quantities of leaflets found, area of coverage in which leaflets were distributed, suspected target group, and methods of delivery.

j. Captured Film. Captured enemy film will be handled in the manner described for documents in paragraph 6g, above, except that all film will be forwarded without delay to the CDEC for initial processing and evaluation.

k. Captured Currency. Policies and procedures to be used in safeguarding and disposing of currency captured during field operations are prescribed by MACV Directive 37-20.

8. REPORTS

Reports required by this directive are assigned reports control symbols as indicated below:

b. Interrogation Spot Report (RCS: MACJ2-26)
c. Very Important Source Report (VISR) (RCS: MACJ2-27)
d. Initial Interrogation Report (RCS: MACJ2-28)
e. Knowledgeability Brief (excluding those published on DD Form 1396) (RCS: MACJ2-29)
f. PW Control Report (RCS: MACJ2-19(RI))
g. Very Important Document Spot Report (RCS: MACJ2-31)
h. Translation Report, Document Identification and Document Transmittal tags and slips (RCS: MACJ2-32)
i. Availability of Sources for Transfer to CMIC (RCS: MACJ2-47).

9. REFERENCES

b. FM 19-40
c. FM 27-10
d. FM 30-5
e. FM 30-15
f. MACV Directive 20-5
g. MACV Directive 37-20
h. MACV Directive 190-3
i. MACV Directive 310-2
j. MACV Directive 380-5
k. MACV Directive 380-20
l. MACV Directive 381-15 (C)
m. MACV Directive 381-17 (S)
n. MACV Directive 381-24
o. MACV Directive 381-26 (C)
p. MACV Directive 381-46
q. MACV Directive 381-50
r. MACV Directive 335-27.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

(Official Seal)

ELIAS C. TOWNSEND
Major General, USA
Chief of Staff

SIDNEY GRITZ
Colonel, USA
Adjutant General

Annexes
A. Prisoners of War Intelligence Evacuation Channel
B. Interrogation Spot Report Format
C. Very Important Source Report (VISR) Format
D. Initial Interrogation Report Format
E. Knowledgeability Brief (KB) Format
F. Very Important Document Spot Report Format
G. Translation Report
H. Document Card (RCS: MACJ2-32)
I. Batch Slip

DISTRIBUTION:
B
Plus: 300 MACAG-ACP
   120 MACJ213
   25 MACJ2
   2 MACAG-ACD
1. US/TFNAP Channel

2. ARVN Channel

3. After recovery, PW may be evacuated to PW Camp, CIC or GIC. Interrogations will be conducted in accordance with MACV Dir 190-3.

**WARNING**

MACV/JCS/CIC

CTZ CIC 2/1, 2
FORCEN/III MAP

U.S. Division/TFNAP Unit 1
ARVN Division Tactical Area 2
Special Zone 2
Separate Regt/Sgt 1, 2
SFAC 1
GMAC 1
Navy/Air Force 1st

Subordinate/Supporting Units 1, 2

PW Camp 2

Hospital 3

Navy/Air Force 1st

Annex A
INTERROGATION SPOT REPORT FORMAT

   a. Name and alias(es).
   b. Rank or position (NVA or VC).
   c. Date and place of capture or return (in DTG and UTM coordinates).
   d. Capturing unit.
   e. PW or Hoi Chanh's unit designation, location, and mission.
   f. Present location and future disposition of PW or Hoi Chanh.

2. **GUIDANCE.** COMUSMACV will be an addressee of Interrogation Spot Reports.
   a. The following AGofS, J-2, MACV, offices will be listed on message "for" lines.
      (1) MACJ213 (Exploitation Division).
      (2) MACJ213-3 (CMIC).
      (3) MACJ233 (Current Intelligence, Indication, and Estimates Division).
      (4) MACJ241 (RVNAF Intelligence Affairs Division).
   b. This report is to be transmitted electrically within 12 hours of capture or return.

Annex B