4. I rallied at this time because:

(1) I was too disillusioned with the communists, a totalitarian Party regime. They squeeze you to the last drop and throw you away later. They take out on your family if they can't get at you.

(2) I had read many GVN leaflets and also I was able to contact my brother who was living in a GVN area and who told me of the treatment the GVN reserved for ralliers.

Of the above reasons, the most important reason was my family's assurances of GVN good treatment toward ralliers.

5. I sent my wife out first so she could contact local officials before I came out.

ID#37

1. I first learned about the Chieu Hoi program in March 1970, about 10 months ago.

2. The first time I thought of rallying was in August 1970, four months ago.

3. I didn't rally earlier because:

   (1) The communists threatened us with thought reform if caught rallying,

   (2) The communists threatened us that ralliers were dumped in the sea by the GVN,

   (3) The communists threatened us with death if caught rallying.

4. I rallied at this time because:

   (1) The communists didn't make good their promises and I was too tired of the war,

   (2) I had been deceived by the communists but now I realized the truth about the GVN,

   (3) The GVN stepped up the Chieu Hoi program during Tet.

The most important reason was shorten the war, restore peace, shorten the days of suffering. I was deceived by the communists but now I realize the truth about the Chieu Hoi program; it is a humane program reserved for those who have taken the wrong direction.
1. The first time I learned about the Chieu Hoi program was in 1968.

2. I wanted to come out in 1968 after I learned about the program; sometime in October 1968.

3. I didn't rally earlier because:
   
   (1) Communist false propaganda that ralliers were put in jail,
   (2) Was not able to contact my brothers and relatives living in GVN controlled areas,
   (3) Was under constant surveillance.

   The most important reason was inability to contact family in GVN areas.

4. I rallied at this time because:
   
   (1) Was able to contact my family and understood the Chieu Hoi program,
   (2) Believed in the Government leniency.

   The most important reason was I wanted to be reunited to my family. I returned to the Government as a lost citizen.

5. I came out to rally at night time and presented myself to the administrative organizations at Son Khuong.

ID#15

1. I first learned about the Chieu Hoi program in 1969 but was unable to leave because VC control was too strict.

2. I thought of rallying in 1969 but couldn't come out because of VC control.

3. I didn't rally earlier because:
   
   (1) Couldn't come out sooner because of VC control,
   (2) Didn't know how to earn my living,
   (3) I had been well-indoctrinated by VC propaganda and their threats.

   The most important reasons were communist's propaganda and threats.
4. I decided to rally at this time because I realized what the Chieu Hoi program was all about.

5. I rallied by escaping the communists at night time and presented myself at the village council at Son Loi.

ID#30

1. The first time I learned about the Chieu Hoi program was in 1968, about three years ago.

2. The first time I thought of and wanted to rally was about three years ago.

3. I didn't rally earlier because:

   (1) I was influenced by VC false propaganda that ralliers were jailed,
   (2) VC threatened us that ralliers might step on mines on the road and would be caught by guerrillas.

   The most important reason was fear of being caught by the VC.

4. I came out to rally because:

   (1) Was afraid of the bombing and of getting killed,
   (2) I wanted to stay alive.

5. I came out to rally at night, walking in the jungle and presented myself to GVN officials.
## TABLE 22

### RALLY INDUCEMENT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Self</th>
<th>CH</th>
<th>ID</th>
<th>Date of Rally</th>
<th>Self-Report in 5-item Questionnaire</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>As reported from Chieu Hoi Center Information Sheet</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1/19</td>
<td>1/21</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1/19 1/21</td>
<td>Able to contact family and understood Chieu Hoi Program.</td>
<td>Reunion with family; GVN lenience.</td>
<td>Letter received</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/19</td>
<td>1/21</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>1/19 1/21</td>
<td>To stay alive.</td>
<td>Fear of bombing and of being killed.</td>
<td>Letter received.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/20</td>
<td>1/22</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>1/20 1/22</td>
<td>Understood Chieu Hoi Program from leaflet and loudspeaker.</td>
<td>Realized VC causing death and suffering to many.</td>
<td>Letter received.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/20</td>
<td>1/22</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>1/20 1/22</td>
<td>Older brother sent letter.</td>
<td>Took advantage of general movement during Tet.</td>
<td>Radio broadcast.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/20</td>
<td>1/20</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>1/20 1/20</td>
<td>Learned of GVN treatment and of ralliers from leaflets and from brother.</td>
<td>Disillusionment with Communists.</td>
<td>Radio broadcast</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Responses of 6 Hoi Chanh
Who Rallied During Operation Searchlight

CH - Chieu Hoi
ID - Questionnaire Identification
## TABLE 23

### Ralliers Received During Operation Searchlight
Compared With Pre- and Post-Campaign Period
From Province Chieu Hoi Center Information Sheet Records

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Pre-Campaign Period 12/20 - 1/18</th>
<th>Campaign Period 1/19 - 1/29</th>
<th>Post-Campaign Period 1/30 - 2/15</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Quang Tri</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>4 (0)*</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thua Thien</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1 (0)*</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quang Nam</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>10 (2)*</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quang Tin</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>28 (22)*</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quang Ngai</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>34 (7)*</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>396</td>
<td>77 (31)*</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Rallied within "Lights-On" Period
Results

Agreement to undertake evaluation of the Operation Searchlight campaign provided for HSR (1) to furnish a brief report to the XXIV Corps G5 Project Officer and (2) to use the project and the study as a case history for the long-range research program on measurement of psyop effectiveness in which HSR was under contract to OSD. Results are presented here in terms of this dual purpose.

The assessment plan furnished XXIV Corps after HSR agreed to undertake the evaluation provided for a brief summary report on the basis of information received by 15 February. This report was to describe the extent to which the performance objectives were met as revealed by the data obtained, and make recommendations for future efforts. Results are discussed below in terms of the three performance objectives (in relation to ralliers, psyop inducement to rally, and campaign coordination), and recommendations are made.

Information obtained from regional Chieu Hoi records and national Chieu Hoi reports together with the data from the Combined Intelligence Center Vietnam (CICV) and from Command Operations Center (COC) reports provide some figures on ralliers received and give situational data on enemy strength and tactical activity in MR1 during the special psyop campaign and during the preceding and following periods. This data together with the full information provided by the Project Officer prior to the campaign and the 37 rallyer responses to the 5 special questions do furnish a basis for cursory assessment as well as valuable information for future rally appeals. However, no attempt at effectiveness measurement can be made until complete data is received. For example, information sheets from province Chieu Hoi records were received on 77 VC who rallied during the 10-day campaign implementation period, 31 of these during the 3-day "Lights On Period". Until interrogation reports and/or special interviews are received, however, there is no way of determining what part Operation Searchlight or any psyop activity played in the rally decision for these individuals. This is especially true for those individuals reported as rallying between 31 January and 13 February. This is a period during which some who were persuaded to rally might
have left their units but spent Tet with their families before rallying. Intelligence reports obtained over this period from prisoners might also be used to determine the number of any who intended to rally but were captured first or who considered rally, but did not act on it, and were later captured.

Other data which would be needed to assess the fact that none rallied to the searchlight rally-point is incomplete. Again, intelligence reports are needed as well as unit operation reports and report of psyop activity, to add to situational data on enemy strength and movement and tactical activity which was received.

While information was furnished prior to the campaign on special psyop material and distribution plans, no information has been received on overall psyop effort in MR1 during the period of interest. We do know from information on hand that tactical activity as reported was light in terms of large scale action, small unit action, and enemy initiated action; that in view of reported enemy strength, casualties were inconsequential for the NVA/VC forces; that their numbers, having remained fairly steady for some time, were increasing during the period of interest.

It can be assumed that surveillance increased greatly during the intensified psyop campaign. This factor too can be assessed only from intelligence information and rallier/prisoner self-reports obtained later. This factor might also serve as a measure of effectiveness of a psyop effort. Enemy resources directed to prevent defection of their own troops, are diminished for tactical activity.

The information received from 37 ralliers who responded to 5 specific questions giving their reasons for rally can be especially useful in planning future psyop activity directed to this target audience. For these 37, analysis of the time between first thinking of rallying and actual rally (1-2 years), the reasons for not rallying earlier (close surveillance and control, no opportunity, lack of belief in or information about the Chieu Hoi Program), and the reason for rallying in January 1971 (confidence in GVN promises, opportunity), should prove of great assistance in future planning.
As described under "Procedure", the small 5-item questionnaire was designed for administration by an interviewer or as the initial part of an interrogation. In this case it seems to have been used as a single instrument and self-administered in a group.

Thirty-seven Hoi Chanh who rallied in Quang Ngai Province during January responded to a 5-item questionnaire handed to all ralliers in the Quang Ngai Province Chieu Hoi Center who had rallied during the month of January. Even as a self-administered instrument and in the face of certain other apparent difficulties, examination of the responses is enlightening.

For one thing, it is seen that where a group does not rally under combat, the process of deciding to rally is not usually immediate. Examination of the 37 responses shows that 70% had first thought they might rally from one to two years before doing so. A pattern emerges of a pre-rally decision process starting with dissatisfaction with the Front, and, while being restrained from rally by surveillance and control, a major element of restraint seems to be lack of sufficient trust in the Chieu Hoi Program. This is evidenced by comments as to reason for not rallying earlier: "Did not yet understand the Chieu Hoi Program;" "Suspicious of Chieu Hoi Program;" "Communists hide truth about GVN lenience toward ralliers." It is evidenced further by comments as to reason for rallying at the time: "Realized GVN lenience in the Chieu Hoi Program;" "Able to inquire and learn about Chieu Hoi Program;" "Able to contact family and therefore able to understand GVN policy;" "Read leaflets and heard broadcasts, realized ralliers were well-treated."

This points to the fact that while a single message may have great influence in the rally decision, it does not usually prompt immediate action. Psyop messages can increase disaffection with Front forces, can build conviction that the Chieu Hoi program can be trusted, can provide reliable instructions on how to rally; after that the main factor seems to be the occurrence of or making an opportunity.

Intelligence reports containing responses to questions contained in the SICR which would provide an array of such information for the entire military region are especially needed for determination of attention to and influence of psyop appeals. Again, the brief questionnaire, together with partial information on this point from the Chieu Hoi Information Sheet with all the headings described in the "Procedure" section, provided some information on this point.
The desirability of probing for reason for and inducement to rally is illustrated in the two independent sources of information. In the free response answers by 37 ralliers to the question: "Give three reasons why you rallied at this time; which reason is most important?", psyop rally appeals or family inducement is cited by 25 of the 37; they mention the media shown in the following figures while Chieu Hoi Information Sheet records for the same 37 individuals show pre-recorded items for rally inducement for 27 of the group as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Free response mention of rally appeals (27)</th>
<th>Chieu Hoi Center Information Sheet mention of rally appeals (27)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Broadcast</td>
<td>Radio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0%</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leaflet</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24%</td>
<td>Air Broadcast</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loudspeaker</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8%</td>
<td>Letter received</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Letter</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8%</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44%</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GVN rally appeal</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16%</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These data are supplemental; not necessarily contradictory.

Conclusions

From the analysis of information received, we can report the following results in terms of the three campaign performance objectives which pertained to (1) ralliers, (2) appeals, (3) campaign.

The first performance objective to be evaluated was: Induce the enemy to rally to the proximity of the searchlight in accordance with Operation Searchlight rally instructions.

No individuals are reported to have rallied to the searchlight.

One spot report indicated two VC taken by RF and thought to be detained at a PW camp, had claimed to be going to the searchlight to rally. No other information was received to indicate NVA and VC soldiers approached any of the 22 sites to rally during the three-day "Lights on" period.
The second objective to be evaluated was: Persuade the enemy to rally by means of printed and verbal messages; by face-to-face communication; by appeal to family members to encourage/assist their kin to rally.

According to National Chieu Hoi records, 77 ralliers were reported to have come into the Chieu Hoi Program in MR1 during the campaign period, 31 of them during the three-day searchlight phase. No other information is available for this group.

Another data input provided information from 37 ralliers in one province of MR1 during January who responded to a questionnaire, giving information on reason for and inducement to rally. Data on this group is augmented by the information contained in the Chieu Hoi Information Sheet. Approximately 65% of this group mention psyop messages, and 54% of the number mention family assistance or urging to rally. (As more than one answer was given, the total is more than 100%). No information has been received as to those who might have been persuaded to come in during the campaign but could not attempt it or as to those who attempted to rally but were prevented from doing so.

A third performance objective to be evaluated was: Coordinate a joint campaign over a 15-day period to provide inducement to and facilitation of enemy rally.

The preliminary planning and preparation of materials was thorough. Post-campaign information does not provide means for assessment of this objective. Location of sites used was received, but no reports from those sites are available. Pre-campaign examples of psyop material was furnished but no post-campaign reports of actual campaign effort was received. No information at all was made available as to MR1-wide psyop effort.
Recommendations

The following recommendations are made to assist in future psyop evaluation and to provide information helpful in planning future psyop activity:

Obtain on a regular basis the detailed records on ralliers prepared by MR1 Province Chieu Hoi Centers, and maintain this Information Sheet data for continuing analysis for planning purposes and for assessment.

Obtain, on a regular basis, the IPW reports in response to psyop SICR requests on each rallier and prisoner in MR1 for continuing analysis for planning purposes and for assessment.

Coordinate information received from SICR responses with Chieu Hoi Center Information Sheet items for more comprehensive analysis.

Include in message or order for each psyop project or campaign, specific tasking requirements necessary to insure receipt of data needed for assessment.
A CASE STUDY OF PSYOP EFFECTS OF ACTIONS:

PSYOP EFFECTS OF THE CAMBODIAN INCURSION
A Case Study Of Psyop Effects Of Actions:  
Psyop Effects Of The Cambodian Incursion

The "psyop" aspect of "actions" represents some very intricate semantic problems and problems in definition. It seems unnecessarily laborious to insist on the many small distinctions that must be carefully developed and summated in order to demonstrate the extent to which the concept of the psyop aspect of actions invites misinterpretation. Nevertheless, it may be necessary because so much lip service is given to what may be somewhat erroneous concepts of "psyop by action".

The notion that all actions, whether or not psyop is involved, have a psyop aspect or effect is considered to be a sophisticated viewpoint but the notion is actually spurious and misleading. Any action that impacts humans can be said to have a "psychological impact" but it cannot also be argued that there was a "psychological operations" impact unless the action was part of a psyop. A distinction must be made between a "psychological effect or impact" and a "psyop effect or impact" or the concept of "psyop" becomes as broad as all human behavior. Four conditions that describe any action which affects other humans can be distinguished:

1. An action may be taken with no consideration of psyop aspects and no intention of achieving a psyop effect.

   This action may have a psychological effect; it cannot have a psyop effect.

2. An action may be taken with the recognition that there may be some psyop effect but this consideration is ignored.

   This action may have a psychological effect; it cannot have a psyop effect.

3. An action may be taken for which the probability of some psyop impact was contemplated; adjustment of the original concept of the action might or might not have been made because of the predicted psyop impact.

   This action may have a psychological effect. It may or may not be considered to have a psyop effect.
4. An action may be taken because of an expected psyop aspect or effect; the action might not be taken if it were not for the expected psyop effects.

This action may have a psychological effect; if it does, it also has a psyop effect.

If an action is conceived and executed with no consideration of psyop aspects then the action cannot be said to have had any psyop objective or intent. In the absence of a psyop objective established by the decision maker, it would be impossible to evaluate the psyop effects of the action. Of course, objectives could arbitrarily be established by the researcher for measurement purposes but these would enable measurement of a psychological impact -- not a psyop impact.

In short, the concept of psyop aspects of actions should be restricted to instances where the expected impact of the psyop aspect of actions was considered in the planning and execution of the actions, or in cases where the predicted psyop effect was the major reason for undertaking an action. In either case, psyop objectives should have been established in the planning stage.

When the surprise Allied incursion into Cambodia occurred, a most unusual opportunity presented itself. NVA PW's and VC PW's had been interviewed at several locations within RVN one or two months prior to the incursion. HSR was asked to devote all resources to a study of the Cambodian incursion's effects upon the attitudes and morale of the NVA soldiers in Cambodia. It was immediately obvious that a reinterview of the PW's previously interviewed would permit a before-and-after comparison of the effect of receipt of news of the Cambodian invasion upon the PW's attitudes and opinions. The "already-PW's" opinions and attitudes compared to the "new PW's" newly taken during the Cambodian Operation would provide a base-line to give an indication of the extent of the impact of the incursion upon the morale of soldiers captured in Cambodia. Additionally, the reactions of a large number of prisoners captured in Cambodia could be compared with responses to identical questions asked of NVA PW's taken before the Cambodian incursion. Thus, several kinds of comparisons would be made possible.

In reports released early in 1970, it has been concluded that NVA morale was high and firm. Analysis had indicated that morale was based on what, from the American point of view, was an almost delusory conviction -- created by their pervasive indoctrination and thought control programs -- that the NLF was assured of victory.
HSR predicted that an extravagant surprise Allied action would be required to move their perception of the external world in the direction of reality with a consequent severe negative impact on their morale; the illustration offered at that time was a surprise resumption of the bombing of North Vietnam.

The Allied Cambodian invasion was precisely the kind of surprise action that had been said to be necessary to damage NVA morale.

In making comparisons between those who were already prisoners before the Allied incursion occurred and those who were captured in Cambodia, it was reasoned that the NVA and VC PW's in GVN prisons before the incursion were isolated from the danger and thereby much less affected. As such, they represented one approach to use of control groups. The NVA who were operating within Cambodia and who were captured were expected to display definite signs of shock, surprise, and damaged morale because of their complete conviction that Cambodia was a sanctuary.

Table 24 somewhat paradoxically shows that it was the prediction of both the NVA prisoners and the VC prisoners in GVN that both the NVA and VC morale in the field would be increased rather than decreased by the Allied incursion. This is due, in very large part, to the content of the indoctrination to which they had been subjected before imprisonment. The reasoning is something like that of the boy who says in surprise when hit by a bigger boy who had allowed himself to be teased for some time without retaliating, "Oh! You want to play that way, now I am really going to get tough with you." The untested boy has no notion whether he can make good his claims or not but his self-image allows no doubt to occur. In contrast, the NVA prisoners captured in Cambodia predicted a considerable decrease in morale for both NVA and VC.

Table 25 shows that the GVN prison camp samples were about equally divided on the question of whether the ARVN strength was increased or decreased in their estimation as a result of the incursion, but the Cambodian-captured PW's showed a large increase in estimate of ARVN strength.

Table 26 shows that the VC and NVA PW's in GVN prison camps suffered a mild reduction in the degree of their conviction of ultimate victory. The Cambodian-captured NVA PW's showed a striking increase in the number who now thought the GVN would win or who were now uncertain about the outcome.
TABLE 24

COMPARISON OF ATTITUDES OF NVA PW'S CAPTURED IN CAMBODIA IN JUNE 1970 WITH ATTITUDES OF NVA AND VC PW'S INTERVIEWED IN GVN PW CAMPS IN MARCH 1970 AND REINTERVIEWED IN AUGUST 1970

"As a result of the Allied entry into Cambodia, what is the effect on NLF soldiers' morale?"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>NVA PW's Captured in Cambodia (100)</th>
<th>VC PW's in GVN PW Camps (50)</th>
<th>NVA PW's in GVN PW Camps (50)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NVA Morale Increased</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>72%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Change</td>
<td>08%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NVA Morale Decreased</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Sure/No Opinion</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>02%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VC Morale Increased</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>72%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Change</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VC Morale Decreased</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>08%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Sure/No Opinion</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>06%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TABLE 25

COMPARISON OF ATTITUDES OF NVA PW'S CAPTURED IN CAMBODIA IN JUNE 1970 WITH ATTITUDES OF NVA AND VC PW'S INTERVIEWED IN GVN PW CAMPS IN MARCH 1970 AND REINTERVIEWED IN AUGUST 1970

"Have you raised or lowered your estimate of ARVN strength since their entry into Cambodia?"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>NVA PW's Captured in Cambodia (100)</th>
<th>VC PW's in GVN PW Camps (50)</th>
<th>NVA PW's in GVN PW Camps (50)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ARVN Strength Increased</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>About the Same</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARVN Strength Decreased</td>
<td>05%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Sure/No Opinion</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TABLE 26

COMPARISON OF ATTITUDES OF NVA PW'S CAPTURED IN CAMBODIA IN JUNE 1970 WITH ATTITUDES OF NVA AND VC PW'S INTERVIEWED IN GVN PW CAMPS IN MARCH 1970 AND REINTERVIEWED IN AUGUST 1970

"In March 1970, before the Cambodian incursion, who did you think would win the war?"

"Now (after the Cambodian incursion), who do you think will win the war?"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>NVA PW's Captured in Cambodia (100)</th>
<th>VC PW's in GVN PW Camps (50)</th>
<th>NVA PW's in GVN PW Camps (50)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>March</td>
<td>June</td>
<td>March</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NLF</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>82%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stalemate</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RVN</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Sure/No Opinion</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Since the results of much of the research that has been done indicates that belief in their operational superiority and the conviction of ultimate victory has been a mainstay for VC and NVA morale and motivation, the effects of the Cambodian incursion are considered to have had an extremely damaging psyop effect.

The summary reports for NVA and VC PW reinterviews are presented here in full. Results of the survey of PW's taken in Cambodia during the Allied invasion can be found in Volume II, under Task 7.
NORTH VIETNAMESE ARMY PRISONERS OF WAR
INTERVIEWED BEFORE AND AFTER THE CAMBODIAN INCURSION

One hundred prisoners of war (PW's), 50 North Vietnamese Army (NVA), and 50 Viet Cong (VC), interviewed prior to the May 1970 Cambodian incursion, were reinterviewed in July and August. This section reports findings on the 50 NVA PW's reinterviewed.

Objectives

An attempt to evaluate the impact of the Allied entry into Cambodia upon the enemy soldier involved three related studies. NVA soldiers taken prisoner in Cambodia were interviewed shortly after capture to evaluate the immediate direct impact upon those personally endangered; NVA and VC soldiers captured within the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) were interviewed shortly after capture to evaluate the impact upon those indirectly affected; and NVA and VC prisoners who had already been interviewed prior to initiation of the Cambodian operations were reinterviewed after the US withdrawal from Cambodia to evaluate the effect upon enemy soldiers remote from and not endangered by the Allied incursion. This report treats the 50 NVA PW's reinterviewed at PW Camps in Military Region 1 (MR1) and Military Region 4 (MR4).

Background

In HSR reports released early in 1970, it was concluded that NVA morale was high and firm, showed only the most minor signs of a trend toward deterioration, and that an extravagant surprise Allied action would be required to seriously impact their morale. The Cambodian incursion represented just such an extravagant surprise.
Questions were asked such as what is the impact of such a significant event upon the opinions and attitudes of NVA and VC soldiers within prison camps? Would the news reach them? How? What would the reaction be? Would attitudes expressed prior to the Cambodian operation be changed as a result? The study described here was designed to treat such questions with regard to NVA prisoners.

**Procedure**

A sample of 50 NVA PW's was drawn randomly from 100 NVA PW's interviewed previously. Twenty-five NVA PW's were reinterviewed in the Northern part of RVN and 25 NVA PW's were reinterviewed in MR4 in the Southern part of RVN. The initial interviews had been conducted between February and April 1970, and reinterviews were conducted in July and August 1970.

A questionnaire designed to assess knowledge and impact of the Cambodian incursion included questions selected from the questionnaire used for previous interviews. Interest was focused upon comparison of the individuals personal experience in SVN compared with what he had been told during indoctrination, evaluation of RVN military strength, quality and success of their own military leaders and operations, and expectations of victory.

The same all-Vietnamese team of interviewers who had conducted the first interviews was trained in administration of the specially designed questionnaire. After necessary official administrative and logistical arrangements were completed, interviews were conducted under the supervision of an HSR research scientist.

Workplace arrangements in the PW camps afforded adequate interview conditions. In MR1, facilities made available were inside the camp dispensary and where two interviews were conducted simultaneously, the men were not in view or hearing of each other. In MR4, each interview was conducted in a separate room.

The absence of significant consistent differences in the pattern of responses made it advantageous to combine the two sub-samples.
Results

The results are treated in terms of possession of knowledge of the Cambodian entry, immediate reaction to news of the Cambodian entry, personal knowledge of South Vietnam versus indoctrination, and evaluation of military strength and possibility of victory.

Knowledge of the Cambodian Incursion

Only a very small percentage of the NVA soldiers in PW camps in MR1 and MR4 had heard about the Allied entry into Cambodia (point 1). The 6% who had heard about it prior to their interview learned of it either in mid-May or late June (point 2); their source of information about the entry into Cambodia was varied (point 3). The remaining 94% of the PW's heard about it for the first time in their reinterview. A number of other prisoners also claimed to have heard about the Allied entry but subsequent exploration of the details placed the dates between February and April, well before the entry actually occurred. Rumors or speculation about the possibility of an Allied invasion might be inferred to be the source of such claims but further probing provided no supporting evidence; the existence of such rumors had been noted in earlier studies.

A majority of the NVA PW's were aware that NVA troops (point 4) and VC troops were in Cambodia (point 5) and their possession of that knowledge is validated by their repetition of the same assortment of reasons for NLF presence in Cambodia that is obtained consistently from other similar samples of PW's; i.e., Cambodia is a safe haven, a rest and regroupment area, and a launching pad for attacks on RVN (point 6).

About one quarter of the sample had visited or stayed some time in Cambodia (point 7).

1. Have you heard about GVN/US troops entering Cambodia? Yes: 06% No: 94%

2. When did you first hear about it? Median: 9 wks ago Range: 6 wks-3 mos ago

3. From what source did you hear of GVN/US entry into Cambodia? Did not hear 94% Guard/other official 02% Newspaper, magazine 02% Radio/loudspeaker --- Another PW 02%
Almost all of the sample had learned about the Cambodian incursion for the first time at the beginning of their reinterview. Perhaps partly for this reason, the NVA PW's varied greatly among themselves in their personal reactions. Early in the interview many of the PW's in the sample initially prefaced their responses by such phrases as "if what you say is true". As the interview progressed, the tendency to qualify answers evaporated quickly; this does not mean that there was a change in the nature of the responses or the viewpoint from which they were made, however.

No claims of foreknowledge of the entry were made (point 8). Apparently the possibility of an Allied entry into Cambodia seemed so unlikely that it had never been a subject of speculation among friends and acquaintances (point 9). Opinions about ARVN strength declined slightly as a result of their entering Cambodia (point 10); the nearest to a logical explanation for the decrease that could be obtained was "the GVN must be desperate and are creating a distraction by widening the war". A majority felt that the morale and fighting spirit of both the NVA soldiers (point 11) and the VC soldiers will be increased (point 12); they explain that "difficulties increase the fighting spirit, and force will be met with equal force by supporters of the 'Just Cause'". It is thought to be very probable that the NLF leaders will react by intensifying offensive operations (point 13).

In March 1970, the NVA PW was convinced that NLF would win the war (point 14). The news of the Allied entry into Cambodia apparently had only a minor effect on his thinking because in August only a small change was evident in his judgment of the eventual victory (point 15). It is likely that he believes by more than a 2-to-1 margin that the duration of the war
will be shortened now, mainly because he reasons that the Allies already had more than they could handle in South Vietnam, have now spread themselves too thin, acquired new enemies, and made themselves weaker by creating a situation in which they must fight on two fronts (point 16).

8. Did you know Allied troops were going into Cambodia before it happened?  
   Yes: 02%  
   No: 94%

9. Before the Allied entry into Cambodia, did other people think the GVN and Allies might enter Cambodia?  
   Yes: 08%  
   Not sure: 34%  
   No: 58%

10. Have you raised or lowered your estimate of ARVN strength since their entry into Cambodia?  
    Increased: 18%  
    Same: 34%  
    Decreased: 36%

11. What will be the effect on the morale of NVA soldiers now?  
    Increased: 72%  
    Same: 16%  
    Decreased: 10%

12. What will be the effect on the morale of VC soldiers now?  
    Increased: 72%  
    Same: 14%  
    Decreased: 08%

13. How will the top leaders in Hanoi react to the Cambodian entry?  
    Intensify operations: 80%  
    Do not know: 16%  
    Decrease operations: 02%

14. In March, who did you think would win the war?  
    NLF: 96%  
    Stalemate: 04%  
    GVN: ---

15. In August, who do you think will win the war?  
    NLF: 86%  
    Stalemate: 06%  
    GVN: 04%

16. What effect will this have on duration of the war?  
    Lengthen war: 26%  
    No effect: 02%  
    Shorten war: 62%
In March, the NVA PW's judged that the determination on the part of the RVN general public to continue to resist the NLF was even less than he had been told; his opinion remained essentially the same in August after hearing of the Allied Cambodian incursion (point 17). In March, it was judged that the effectiveness of the ARVN soldier is less than it had been said to be; that opinion remained essentially the same in August (point 18). His very positive attitude toward the quality of his leaders, in March, i.e., about 40% of the sample rate them as even better than had been expected, remained unchanged in August (point 19).

In early 1970, 40% of the NVA PW's judged the NLF military operations to be even more successful than expected and in August, after learning of the Allied Cambodian operations, this figure increased by 60% (point 20). Apparently, the NLF military leaders are given credit for devising clever military operations which lured the GVN/US troops out of the "quagmire of SVN into the quicksands of Cambodia", thereby causing the RVN/US forces to be spread even more thinly in more new and unfamiliar areas (point 20).

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<th>Pre</th>
<th>Post</th>
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<tr>
<td>17. How does the determination of the general public to keep on fighting against the NLF compare with what you were told?</td>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>18%</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>More resist NLF</td>
<td>04%</td>
<td>08%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Same</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Less resist NLF</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>22%</td>
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<tr>
<td>18. How does the fighting ability and effectiveness of the GVN soldiers (such as ARVN, RF's, PF's) compare with what you had been told about them?</td>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>08%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ARVN better</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Same</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ARVN worse</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>34%</td>
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<tr>
<td>19. Overall, how did the quality of your military leaders (their skill, courage, determination) compare with what you had expected them to be?</td>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>02%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NLF leaders better</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Same</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NLF leaders worse</td>
<td>04%</td>
<td>08%</td>
</tr>
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</table>
20. Overall, how did the general effectiveness and success of your military operations compare to what you expected it would be?

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<tr>
<th>Evaluation of Military Strength/Victory</th>
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In March, seven times as many NVA PW's judged RVN/US military power to be less than that of NLF/NVN compared to the number that judged it to be greater than NLF/NVN. In August, the corresponding ratio was nine to one (point 21); i.e., the number of PW's that judged GVN/US to be weaker increased by 33% between March and August.

When GVN's military strength without the aid of allies was compared to that of NLF/NVN in March, almost three-quarters of the PW's judged GVN to be much weaker. In August, after the RVN/US entry into Cambodia, that number was increased by more than 25%, suggesting that RVN would be overwhelmed without its allies (point 22).

In March, more than 80% of the NVA PW's judged that NLF would win the war even if the US continued to support RVN with money and manpower. In August, that figure was raised to slightly more than 90% (point 23).

More than 90% of the NVA PW's believe in August, as they did in March, that NLF will win if the US continues to support RVN with money and supplies but withdraws its manpower (point 24).

Both in March and August about 95% of the PW's expected that SVN will join with NVN as an equal partner after it is "liberated" (point 25).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>21. How does the military strength of the GVN/US and their allies compare to the military strength of NLF/NVN and their allies?</th>
<th>Pre</th>
<th>Post</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GVN/US stronger</td>
<td>08%</td>
<td>08%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Same</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GVN/US weaker</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>72%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
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<tr>
<th>22. How does the military strength of GVN alone (without allied manpower) compare with the NLF/NVN military strength?</th>
<th>Pre</th>
<th>Post</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GVN stronger</td>
<td>04%</td>
<td>02%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Same</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>06%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GVN weaker</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td>92%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
23. Can the NLF win the war if the Americans continue to support the GVN with manpower and money?

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<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>No answer</th>
<th>NLF loses</th>
<th>Stalemate</th>
<th>NLF wins</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>06%</td>
<td>08%</td>
<td>04%</td>
<td>82%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

24. Can the NLF win the war if the Americans continue to support the GVN with money and supplies and equipment but withdraw their manpower?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>No answer</th>
<th>NLF loses</th>
<th>Stalemate</th>
<th>NLF wins</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>06%</td>
<td>04%</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

25. Will SVN be joined with NVN as an equal partner if SVN is liberated?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>No answer</th>
<th>Won't merge</th>
<th>Will merge</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>02%</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>98%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

|                | ---       | 04%         | 96%        |
Discussion

In this section, the results are considered in relation to the question of whether news of the Cambodian incursion reached the PW's, the source of the information, reactions to the news, and subsequent shifts of attitudes.

Did News of the Cambodian Incursion Reach NVA PW's?

Only 6% of the NVA PW's sampled had heard of the Allied entry into Cambodia although the news had reached 90% of VC PW's sampled in the same camps at the same time. Such news obviously does not reach them through normal channels.

However, it did reach 100% of them because of the reinterview. In essence, the interviewer, as the first source of the news, was right on the scene when each PW first learned of the Allied Cambodian operations during their reinterview.

How Did He Hear About It?

The 6% who had previous knowledge of the Cambodian incursion had heard of it from three different types of sources. The remaining PW's - an overwhelming majority of the sample - first heard about the Cambodian entry from the civilian Vietnamese interviewer after the interview began.

The length of time before the news reached this sample as a whole is one of the more striking findings. While the incursion had taken place three months before the reinterview, only 6% had known of it for as much as two months at the time of the reinterview and 94% had not yet heard of it more than three months later.

What Was His Reaction?

Although almost all of the sample learned about the Allied Cambodian entry for the first time early in their interview, there were no overt signs of impact. No excessive emotions were aroused, speech remained normal, there were few departures from the normally expectable propaganda and indoctrination-inculcated pattern and content of responses, and the interviews were completed in normal fashion.
About one-quarter of the PW's commented to the interviewer that his mention of the Cambodian entry was the first that they had heard; this is true also for an additional two-thirds of the sample, although they did not discuss it so straightforwardly. About 10% of the sample carefully explained why they could not believe that it had happened just because they were told so. More than 10% of the NVA PW's complained specifically of being shut off from all news contact and therefore they could not help feeling detached and uninvolved.

The odd combination of suspiciousness, objectivity, literal-mindedness, analytical tendencies, and sheer naivete that often seems to characterize NVA PW's makes it very unlikely that the interviewer was regarded as a credible source of information. However, although the source was "foreign" and questionable, the news was apparently sufficiently intriguing to command the NVA PW's interest. Most of the sample, including those who remarked that the interviewer was the source of the information and even those who verbalized their doubts, answered the remaining questions as though they accepted the truth of the information or prefaced their answers with such phrases as, "If I were to believe what you say" or "If what you say is true".

There was a strong expectation of a counterattack directed from Hanoi and both intensified NLF military offensives and strong political denunciation were expected from Hanoi leaders by the respondents.

Did Previously-Expressed Attitudes Shift?

Two main areas of change are found in the results. The number that judged NLF's military operations as being "even more successful than expected" rose by 60% and the judgments that GVN, with or without allies, is weaker than NLF/NVN increased considerably in August.

The second major area of change was a greatly increased willingness to express an opinion in the reinterview in August. The number of "no opinion expressed" dropped sharply in all instances.

The continued belief that RVN/US forces are weaker than NLF/NVN and the increased conviction that NLF military operations are successful even in the face of the havoc wrought by the Allied operations in Cambodia can be explained by a combination of factors. One is simple disbelief or reserved judgment; unless his own leaders say something, the NVA soldier seldom accepts anything that he has not seen himself or that is not
familiar to him. Also it has been explained to him that it is their leaders' strategy to spread out the RVN/US forces so they can be killed more easily; the entry into Cambodia is therefore a serious error of judgment on RVN's part, as the NVA PW sees it.

For the group as a whole, belief in NLF victory shifted downwards slightly, although the overwhelming majority retained their assurance of an NLF victory.

Slightly more than two-thirds judge that the war will end more quickly as a consequence of the Cambodian entry.
Conclusions

Five major conclusions are as follows:

1. News of the Allied Cambodian incursion had not reached a great majority of the NVA PW's sampled in Military Region 1 (MR1) and Military Region 4 (MR4) more than three months later.

2. After hearing of the Cambodian entry for the first time during their post-Cambodian interview, the NVA PW's behavior during the interview demonstrated that news of the event -- although the truth of the report was questioned -- did have an impact. In the reinterviews, there was a striking increase in willingness to make judgments compared to their much more cautious response patterns in the pre-Cambodian interviews. Most of the responses were in the reverse direction from what -- by objective logic -- would be expected. For instance the unusual, unexpected, and aggressive entry of ARVN troops into Cambodia was interpreted as evidence of increased ARVN weakness. This interpretation, however, is logical in terms of what would be expectable based on the content of propaganda and indoctrination they have received in North Vietnam. Therefore, the psychological impact was sufficient to affect behavior to a limited extent, i.e., stimulate involvement and evoke responses, but was not sufficient to disrupt verbalization of their indoctrination-inculcated information, assumptions, and lines of reasoning.

3. Personal reactions to the Cambodian incursion were extremely varied, indicating the probable absence of prior mention of the possibility of such an event in propaganda or indoctrination.

4. A majority of the NVA PW's knew NLF troops were in Cambodia and had the usual conviction that Cambodia was their safe haven.

5. The NVA PW's were convinced that their leaders would intensify military offensive operations in reaction to the incursion. The apparent failure of the NLF to do so to date may be exploitable to GVN's advantage.
VIET CONG PRISONERS OF WAR INTERVIEWED
BEFORE AND AFTER THE CAMBODIAN INCURSION

One hundred prisoners of war (PW's), 50 North Vietnamese Army (NVA) and 50 Viet Cong (VC), interviewed prior to the May 1970 Cambodian incursion, were reinterviewed in July and August 1970. This section reports findings on the 50 VC PW's reinterviewed.

Objectives

An attempt to evaluate the impact of the Allied entry into Cambodia upon the enemy soldier was approached in three ways. NVA soldiers taken prisoner in Cambodia were interviewed shortly after capture; NVA and VC soldiers captured within RVN were interviewed shortly after capture; and NVA and VC PW's who had already been interviewed prior to initiation of the Cambodian operations were reinterviewed after the US withdrawal from Cambodia.

This report treats the 50 VC PW's reinterviewed at PW camps in MR1 and MR4.

Background

In HSR reports released early in 1970 it was concluded that VC morale, already evidencing extensive deterioration, would be further damaged by a surprise extravagant Allied action. The Cambodian incursion represented just such an extravagant surprise.

Questions were asked such as what is the impact of such a significant event upon the opinions and attitudes of NVA/VC soldiers within prison camps? Would the news reach them? How? What would the reaction be? Would attitudes expressed prior to the Cambodian operation be changed as a result? The study described here was designed to answer these questions with regard to VC prisoners.
Procedure

A sample of 50 VC PW's was drawn randomly from 100 VC PW's interviewed previously. Twenty-five VC PW's were reinterviewed in Military Region 1 (MR1) in the northern part of RVN and 25 VC PW's were reinterviewed in Military Region 4 (MR4) in the southern part of RVN. The initial interviews had been conducted between February and April 1970, and reinterviews were conducted in July and August 1970.

A questionnaire designed to assess knowledge and impact of the Cambodian incursion included questions selected from the questionnaire used for previous interviews. Interest was focused upon comparison of the individual's personal experience in SVN compared with what he had been told during indoctrination, evaluation of RVN military strength, quality and success of their own military leaders and operations, and expectations of victory.

The same all-Vietnamese team of interviewers who had conducted the first interviews was trained in administration of the specially designed questionnaire. After necessary official administrative and logistical arrangements were completed, interviews were conducted in MR1 and MR4 PW Camps under the supervision of an HSR research scientist.

Workplace arrangements in the PW camps afforded adequate interview conditions. In MR1, facilities made available were inside the camp dispensary and where two interviews were conducted simultaneously, the men were not in view or hearing of each other. In MR4, each interview was conducted in a separate room.

The absence of significant consistent differences in the pattern of responses made it advantageous to combine the two sub-samples.
The results are treated in terms of possession of knowledge of the Cambodian entry, reaction to the Cambodian entry, personal knowledge of South Vietnam versus indoctrination, and evaluation of military strength and possibility of victory.

Knowledge of the Cambodian Incursion

VC PW's in MR1 and MR4 had heard about the Allied entry into Cambodia (point 1), most probably during the first week in July (point 2), from other prisoners or from newspapers or magazines distributed in the PW camp (point 3).

It was known that NVA (point 4) and VC troops were in Cambodia (point 5). This knowledge is validated by their repetition of the same assortment of indoctrination-derived reasons for NLF presence in Cambodia that is consistently obtained from other similar samples of PW's; Cambodia is a safe haven, a rest and regroupment area, and a launching pad for attacks on RVN (point 6). None of the sample had ever been in Cambodia (point 7). There was no prior knowledge of the entry into Cambodia (point 8) and no speculation about the possibility of such an event (point 9). Apparently the VC soldiers felt completely secure in their belief that Cambodia would not be entered.

1. Have you heard about GVN/US troops entering Cambodia? Yes: 90% No: 10%

2. When did you first hear about it?
   Median: 3.5 weeks ago
   Range: 2 weeks - 2 months ago

3. From what source did you hear of GVN/US entry into Cambodia?
   Guard/other official: 28%
   Newspaper/magazine: 24%
   Radio/loudspeaker: 22%
   Another PW: 16%

4. Did you know NVA troops were in Cambodia? Yes: 46%
   No: 50%
5. Did you know VC troops were in Cambodia? Yes: 46%  
   No: 50%

6. Do you know why NLF troops are in Cambodia? Yes: 46%  
   No: 54%

7. Have you ever been in Cambodia? Yes: 02%  
   No: 98%

8. Did you know Allied troops were going into Cambodia before it happened? Yes: ---  
   No: 98%

9. Before the Allied entry into Cambodia, did other people you know think the GVN and allies might enter Cambodia? Yes: 08%  
   No: 68%

Reaction to the Cambodian Incursion

The VC PW's varied greatly in their personal reactions. Opinions about ARVN strength were raised slightly as a result of their entering Cambodia (point 10) but a majority feel that the morale and fighting spirit of both the NVA soldiers (point 11) and the VC soldiers will be increased because he has a feeling of outrage at the aggressive invasion of a small innocent country and the NLF soldiers will feel the same way (point 12). Despite considerable uncertainty, if the PW holds an opinion about the probable reaction of the leaders in Hanoi, he very probably expects them to intensify offensive operations (point 13). In March 1970, the VC PW very probably held a strong conviction that NLF would win the war (point 14). The news of the Allied surge into Cambodia apparently had little adverse significance in his thinking because in August only a very minor change was evident in his judgment of the eventual victory (point 15). It is likely that he believes by a 5-to-2 margin that the duration of the war will be shortened now mainly because he reasons that the Allies already had more than they could handle in South Vietnam, have now spread themselves too thin, and also have acquired new enemies (point 16).

10. Have you raised or lowered your estimate of ARVN strength since entry into Cambodia? Increased 33%  
    Same 30%  
    Decreased 18%
11. What will be the effect on the morale of NVA soldiers now?  
   Increased 52%  
   Same 16%  
   Decreased 20%

12. What will be the effect on the morale of VC soldiers now?  
   Increased 56%  
   Same 10%  
   Decreased 22%

13. How will the top leaders in Hanoi react to the Cambodian entry?  
   Intensify operations 52%  
   Don't know 28%  
   Decrease operations 16%

14. In March, who did you think would win the war?  
   NLF 82%  
   Stalemate 06%  
   GVN 08%

15. In August, who do you think will win the war?  
   NLF 78%  
   Stalemate 02%  
   GVN 16%

16. What effect will this have on duration of the war?  
   Lengthen 26%  
   No effect 02%  
   Shorten 66%

Experience in SVN vs Indoctrination

VC PW's are unlikely to find many differences between their experiences in RVN and what they are told about it by their leaders; the proportion of those who judged that there are "few differences" to those who saw "many differences" was essentially unchanged between April and August (point 17).

Before the Allied entry into Cambodia, the proportion of those who judged that the RVN general public's determination to resist NLF was the same or even lower than they had been told to those who found it higher was about 4 to 1. In August, the proportion was reduced to 2 to 1; i.e., those who judged that more of the RVN general public resisted the NLF increased by more than 100% (point 18).

In April, one-quarter of the VC PW's rated the fighting ability and effectiveness of RVN soldiers as being somewhat better than they had expected. In August, this figure increased to about one-third of the sample; i.e., the number of those who judged the ARVN soldier better than he had expected increased by about 50% (point 19).
In March, one-third of the VC PW's judged the quality of their military leaders to be even better than they had expected, while in August one-quarter of the sample made this judgment; i.e., the number of those who found their leaders even more able than expected was reduced by almost 50% (point 20).

The modest reduction in the appraisal of the NLF military leaders is reflected in the PW's judgment of the success of NLF military operations. In pre-Cambodian interviews, one-fifth felt that NLF military operations were generally less effective and less successful than had been expected. In August, two-fifths of the sample found them less successful; i.e., the number of those who might be disappointed in NLF military operations increased by about 80% (point 21).

### Table 1

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>17. Your cadre should have told you many things about GVN and GVN people. If you have had an opportunity to form your own personal opinions, in general, how does what you yourself have seen and heard about GVN compare with what you were told about it?</td>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>42% 12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Few differences</td>
<td>50% 66%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Many differences</td>
<td>16% 20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. How does the determination of the GVN general public to keep on fighting against the NLF compare with what you were told?</td>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>30% 02%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>More resist NLF</td>
<td>14% 30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Same</td>
<td>26% 24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Less resist NLF</td>
<td>30% 34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19. How does the fighting ability and effectiveness of the GVN soldiers (such as ARVN, RF's) compare with what you had been told about them?</td>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>14% 02%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ARVN better</td>
<td>24% 36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Same</td>
<td>30% 40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ARVN worse</td>
<td>32% 22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20. Overall, how did the quality of your military leaders (their skill, courage, determination) compare with what you had expected them to be?</td>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>22% 04%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NLF leaders better</td>
<td>36% 26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Same</td>
<td>30% 54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NLF leaders worse</td>
<td>12% 14%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
21. Overall, how did the general effectiveness and success of your military operations compare with what you expected it would be?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Evaluation of Military Strength/Victory</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No answer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More successful</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Same</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less successful</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

22. How does the military strength of the GVN/US and their allies compare to the military strength of NLF/NVN and their allies?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pre</th>
<th>Post</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GVN/US stronger</td>
<td>34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Same</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GVN/US weaker</td>
<td>42%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In early 1970, VC PW's were uncertain about whether the RVN/US allies were stronger or weaker than the VC/NVN allies, although slightly inclined in VC/NVN's favor. In August, after the entry of RVN/US troops into Cambodia, the balance shifted in favor of VC/NVN being stronger; i.e., the proportion of those who judged VC/NVN to be stronger compared to those who thought RVN/US stronger increased from about 4:3 to more than 5:3 (point 22).

In March 1970, when the VC PW's compared the military strength of RVN alone without allies to the military strength of VC/NVN, the number who judged RVN to be weaker than VC/NVN was two and one-half times as large as those who thought GVN to be stronger. In August, the ratio increased to four and one-half to one (point 23).

The VC PW's in March, by a margin of more than four to one, judged that NLF would win the war even if the US continues to support RVN with money and manpower; that proportion remained essentially unchanged in August (point 24).

In early 1970, it was judged, by a four to one ratio, that NLF would win if the US continued to support RVN with money and supplies but withdrew US manpower. In August, after the Cambodian incursion, that proportion increased to about six to one (point 25).

The belief that SVN will join with NVN as an equal partner after liberation remained unchanged (point 26).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>No answer</th>
<th>GVN stronger</th>
<th>GVN weaker</th>
<th>Same</th>
<th>NVN military strength</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>23. How does the military strength of GVN alone (without allied manpower) compare with the NLF/</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>06%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NVN military strength?</td>
<td></td>
<td>16%</td>
<td></td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>72%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24. Can the NLF win the war if the Americans continue to support the GVN with manpower and money?</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>06%</td>
<td>06%</td>
<td>72%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>06%</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>06%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>70%</td>
<td></td>
<td>76%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25. Can the NLF win the war if the Americans continue to support the GVN with money and supplies and equipment but withdraw their manpower?</td>
<td>08%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>76%</td>
<td>06%</td>
<td>86%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26. Will SVN be joined with NVN as an equal partner if SVN is liberated?</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>04%</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>08%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Discussion

The study was designed with such questions in mind as what is the possible impact of the Cambodian incursion upon VC soldiers within prison camps in RVN? Would the news reach them? How? What would the reaction be? Would attitudes expressed prior to the Cambodian operation shift as a result? Findings are discussed here in terms of these questions.

Did News of the Cambodian Incursion Reach VC Prisoners?

Most of the total sample (90%) had heard of the GVN/US Cambodian incursion prior to the interview and the majority (72%) indicated they believed it had occurred.

How Did He Hear About It?

The length of time before the news reached this sample as a whole is one of the striking findings. While the incursion had begun in May, three months before the re-interview, only 30% had heard about it by mid-June, more than six weeks after initiation of the Allied Cambodian operations. Some 10% of the sample learned of it for the first time from the interviewer. It is most probable that he learned about the Cambodian operation through some semi-official source connected with the PW camp.

What Was His Reaction?

Despite the fact that they had learned of it slowly, VC prisoners expressed strong reactions to the news of the Cambodian incursion. Even those who said they had no opinion expressed very cogent feelings as to why they could not form an opinion.

Of those expressing personal responses, many reflected analytically on what will be the probable effect of the incursion on the progress and outcome of the conflict with particular concern for NLF soldiers and for themselves personally. Others viewed the effects of the incursion in terms of political ideology and strategy. The variability of the responses indicated a lack of previous indoctrination concerning such an event.

Two-thirds of the entire sample expected that the NLF troops would counterattack while one-fifth felt they would withdraw.
Both military offensive and strong political denunciation were expected from Hanoi leaders by the respondents.

Most said the event had changed their thinking about the war. The majority of those spoke of the disadvantage for their forces, indicating general concern about the war, while still expressing confidence that NLF would win. A small minority considered that GVN had gained some advantage.

Did Previously Expressed Attitudes Shift?

There was a 50% increase in the number of PW's that judged the ARVN soldier to have more fighting ability than expected.

The number of those who judged that a higher-than-expected percentage of the RVN people are determined to resist the NLF more than doubled.

The judgment that NLF military leaders were of a quality even better than expected dropped by fifty percent.

Those who found the NLF military operations to be less successful than expected increased by about eighty percent.

After hearing about the Cambodian invasion there was an increase in the proportion of those who judged the VC/NVN to be stronger militarily than RVN/US and the proportion of those who judged RVN alone to be weaker than VC/NVN almost doubled.

One striking factor was a greater willingness to express an opinion in the second interview. The number of "no opinion" responses dropped sharply for every item.

For the group as a whole, the conviction of eventual NLF victory remained essentially unchanged despite the Allied Cambodian offensive. The assumptions and line of reasoning that allow them to maintain this view also contribute to their belief that, as a result of the Cambodian entry, the war will end more quickly.
Conclusions

Eight major conclusions are as follows:

1. News of the RVN/US entry into Cambodia had a definite impact upon the attitudes and opinions of VC soldiers who were prisoners of war in RVN at the time the Allied Cambodian operations began.

2. VC prisoners had the usual conviction that Cambodia was the NLF safe haven. The news of the Cambodian incursion does appear to have contributed to changes in previously-expressed attitudes and opinions. There was additional evidence of psychological impact in that there was a much greater readiness to express an opinion, rather than state that a basis for opinion did not exist, than had been the case in earlier interviews.

3. Favorable judgments about the quality of the NLF leaders dropped sharply and negative judgments for the success of NLF military operations increased sharply.

4. Belief that NLF strength is greater than RVN's increased because the VC PW's reason that RVN is now spread too thinly, NLF troops' fighting spirit is aroused because RVN invaded a neutral country and murdered innocent civilians, and NLF has more-than-adequate additional resources to draw upon.

5. Belief in eventual victory remained high; most felt that, as a result of the Cambodian operation, the war would end more quickly in NLF's favor.

6. Personal reactions to the Cambodian incursion were extremely varied, indicating the probable absence of previous exposure to any propaganda inculcated explanations. This in turn could suggest the absence of any expectation of a need for such preparation.

7. It was expected that Hanoi would respond to the Cambodian entry with greatly intensified military offensive operations and by political denunciation. The failure of the NLF to date to make any significant counterattack may be exploitable to GVN's advantage.

8. News apparently reaches VC prisoners in PW Camps in Military Regions 1 and 4 slowly, if at all, even in the case of an event having the significance of the Allied Cambodian incursion.
PROCEDURE FOR PSYOP PROJECT EVALUATION
Detailed reports of the two psyop campaigns serve to demonstrate how certain psyop activities could be evaluated, why they are not measured, and what must be done if measurement of this vital component of present-day military strength is desired.*

The attempt to determine criteria for psyop measurement is essentially the attempt to state the relationship between psyop communications and the outcome these communications were designed to produce. Expressed another way, psyop criteria must relate to the psyop objective.

It has been the thesis of the HSR approach to this problem that not all psyop activities can be measured as to effect; that some can be measured routinely if the needed procedures are instituted as part of the ongoing operational activity to insure receipt of criterion data and information as to situational factors within which the criterion data must be assessed; that even with this latter stipulation, the effect of some psychological operations can be measured only with great difficulty and by trained researchers experienced in real-time field assessment of complex issues. It has been a further thesis of this investigation that there is no need to measure each project. When a number of psyop activities of a specific type have been shown to be effective under certain situations, it should not be necessary to go through the tediously careful process of an evaluation study each time that type of psyop project is conducted.

Two plans are involved in evaluation of psyop and it is necessary to distinguish between them. There is the plan for the psyop project itself and there is the research study plan for the evaluation of that project. It is important to keep in mind this distinction between the project plan and the evaluation plan. The two plans are necessarily involved together in any evaluation of a psyop project at this period of development of the state of the art. This is true because the evaluation plan for any psyop project must be specific so that project and evaluation criteria must be derived from the psyop project objective.

*Those who have read the case studies carefully may have been dismayed by the amount of data and detailed analysis involved. It should be recognized that this wealth of detail is required during these early exploratory studies because one of the main objectives is to determine which sources of data are useful and can be used. Eventually, standardization of methods and procedures for specification of data requirements, data acquisition and data-processing will ease the requirements considerably.
Evaluation Plan

The evaluation process outlined on the following page lists the step-by-step procedure for an evaluation study in three phases.

The six steps in the Definition Phase begin with explication of the objective and move to the finished detailed evaluation plan. This phase defines data to be collected, its source and means of collection and handling. Two types of data are required: criterion data and control data, called "situational data". The term "situational data" is used here, as control implies a greater degree of precision than is warranted.

Criterion data defined for a project is derived from the project psyop objectives.

Situational (control) data defined for a project is derived from the criterion data.

Criterion data measures the outcome of the project ("n" number of ralliers received).

Situational data permits assessment of this measure to determine how the outcome relates to psyop activity and the other factors working with or against the psyop activity ("x" number of enemy troop build-up; number of ralliers in adjoining area)

For example, the rally rate is "up" in campaign areas; situational data shows it also "up" country-wide, and therefore the rise may have little relation to the single-area campaign. Other situational data is needed to assess this fully.

Or the rally rate is down in the campaign-area. If situational data shows it is also down over the surrounding area, it may not indicate lack of success of the project. Or criterion data may show the rate is down only in the campaign area. Perhaps there was a build-up of enemy forces or greater control exercised to prevent rally as a result of the campaign.

To determine this, it is necessary to have the best information possible for the pertinent time-frame for these situational factors.
Phase I - Definition

Step 1. Determine Psyop Project Objective
Step 2. Determine Criterion Data Needed
Step 3. Assess Availability of Needed Criterion Data
Step 4. Establish Sources and Means for Obtaining Criterion Data and Situational Data
Step 5. Establish Data Handling and Analytical Procedures
Step 6. Specify Criterion Research Plan:
- Criterion Data
- Means of Obtaining Data
- Method of Handling Data

Phase II - Execution

Step 7. Task Appropriate Units to Obtain Data
Step 8. Collect Data Systematically

Phase III - Analysis

Step 9. Tabulate, Translate, Summarize Data As Required
Step 10. Prepare Summarization of Findings for Comparison and Analysis
Step 11. Evaluate and Interpret Results