# TABLE 7

**VULNERABILITIES: DESCRIPTIVE PARAMETERS OF STUDIES IN BIBLIOGRAPHY (U)**

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I - INTERVIEWS  B - BIOGRAPHICAL DATA
Concern for Family Welfare

--- Family economic hardships
--- Decline in family income

Dislike of Means Used Toward Self to Implement Party Goals

--- Dislike of feeling of being distrusted and under constant surveillance
--- Contrast between what NVA cadre say and what NVA soldiers experience

Dislike of Means Used Toward Others to Implement Party Goals

--- VC ruthlessness in recruiting
--- War atrocities

Loss of Confidence in Eventual Success

--- War weariness
--- Loss of faith in VC victory

Disillusionment with Faulty Implementation of Goals of Party

--- Dissatisfaction with superiors
--- Dissatisfaction with military policy

Intraparty Tensions

--- Disagreement about military strategy/tactics between Northerners and Southerners
--- Conflict between puritanical, dogmatic, political-solution-oriented ideology of older VC and technocratic, reform-oriented ideology of younger VC

Disillusionment with Goals of Party

--- Doctrinal disillusionment
--- Frustrated idealism
The items in each group were sufficiently homogeneous to allow a descriptive label to be used which summarizes the nature of each group of "vulnerabilities" despite the variations in levels of generalization. For instance, one category contains relatively simple, specific, individually relevant, and individually variable items such as "dislike of being sent on missions" and such sweeping generalizations as "increased (Allied) military pressure."

Use of this method, type, and level of categorization, representing the highest level of sophistication of which there are examples in the literature, highlights some of the problems that currently exist in defining and exploiting vulnerabilities. The items listed include objective external conditions, evaluative statements about military practices, emotional reactions, physical conditions, logical analyses, etc. Results of the grouping raise the semi-humorous question, "will the real 'vulnerability' please stand up?" More precisely stated, the question is: "What is the most informative and systematic manner for definition and specification of vulnerabilities in a fashion that facilitates recognition, communication to others, and productive exploitation?"

Organization of Data. The assortment of "vulnerabilities" identified also represents a rather amorphous set of observations made on many different levels of penetration or generalization by individuals with diversified points of view who have used many different frames of reference. A wide range is found in the degree of consequence or significance of specific findings; they range from abstract policy-level statements which attempt to combine generalizations about causes, effects, and resultant "vulnerabilities" all the way to minute fragments of the total problem such as "ragged clothing" or "lack of sleeping mats" or just "hardships."

To date, the uninformed or partially informed user of vulnerabilities studies appears to have had no basis for distinguishing between "vulnerabilities" which are major causal factors common to all or those which are effects of minor consequence with only restricted application in terms of audience, locality, or situation.

In summary, perspectives and objectives in studies pertinent to vulnerabilities have varied greatly. There has been no systematic consolidation and organization of the results produced which, for the reader or user, would place the so-called vulnerabilities in proper perspective in terms of the relative degree of consequence of each vulnerability and the specificity or generality with which it is applicable (i.e., specific groups of people or all people, specific geographic locality or all areas, specific conditions or all conditions, specific times or not time-bound, etc.).
(U) Because of the disjointed nature of the many vulnerabilities to be analyzed, a cause/effect or input/output analysis was made. Table 3 shows the results of this analysis in terms of external actions, conditions, situations, or other such general considerations; the consequences of the "external factors"; the implications that these consequences of external factors hold for individuals and groups; and the physical, behavioral, intellectual, emotional, and attitudinal impact or residual effect upon individuals and groups.

(C) The matrix of vulnerabilities shown in Table 8 contains eight columns grouped in two separate sections.

(C) The first separate section contains three columns devoted to matters of general significance which are outside the control of the individual:

"External Considerations/Factors"

(conditions, actions, situations, events, or any other major factor affecting everyone that is beyond the control of the general population; in this case, NVA/VC military and civilian rank and file)

"Consequences" of External Factors

(direct or indirect results of more consequential and more broadly applicable factors. In some cases events/actions with heavy impact but restricted applicability)

"Implications" of Consequences of External Factors

(conscious or unconscious inferences resulting from the individual's perception of the consequences of external factors)

(C) The second separate section contains five columns which represent the various ways in which External Factors eventually affect the individual:

Physical Impact

(changes in physical condition or capacities)

Behavioral

(actions occurring as a direct or indirect result of the individual's perception of external events and consequences)
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<td>3. Insecurity of population and life in villages (15)</td>
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</table>

**Other Relevant Considerations**

- Capacity Building and Awareness Raising:
  - 1. Importance of education and training in resilience building (15)

- Community Engagement:
  - 2. Importance of community participation in planning and implementation (15)

- Security and Safety:
  - 3. Importance of security and safety in ensuring the protection of rights and freedoms (15)
Logical/Intellectual Impact

(thoughts which occur or lines of reasoning consciously developed as a result of the individual's perception of consequences of external events)

Attitudes/Beliefs/Opinions Impact

(positions adopted by the individual, consciously or unconsciously, toward external factors as a result of his perception of their consequences)

Emotional/Psychological Impact

(emotional states or conditions resulting on an unconscious level from the impact on the individual of his perception of consequences of external events)

(C) The two major sections of the matrix represent the simplest possible model of each individual's relation to and interaction with the external world. The three-column section on the left is the external world; the five-column section is the internal world of the individual. The section on the left represents "what is happening" in three sequential steps: what happened, consequences of what happened, and the way in which the individual sees the results of what happened. The five-column section fractionates the input pathways through which data about the external world travels into the internal world of each individual.

(U) The model is described as the "simplest possible" because no attempt is made, at this point in the research task, to describe what occurs during the intermediate processing of data on external factors between the time when it impacts the individual and when it is finally stored within the "apperceptive mass", i.e., the memory and understanding the individual has of that particular set of data within the framework of all previously stored data.

(U) Some comments or cautions are necessary to avoid misinterpretation of the model; since delineation of the line of research and reasoning that supports the validity of these comments would require several treatises to be written, they will have to be made by fiat; following are many commonly held assumptions:
1. It would be easy to assume that everyone who looks at the same object, "sees" and registers internally the same evidence or impression. This is not so.

2. If a plea or argument is based on infallible mathematical logic in terms comprehensible to the individual, he will necessarily accept it. This is not so.

3. If others are exposed to the same evidence that is convincing by the communicator's standards, they will reach the same conclusions as the communicator. This is not so.

4. It is a common assumption, made consciously or unconsciously, that an individual can report accurately his reasons for his actions, attitudes, and feelings. This is not so.

5. People who are the products of very different cultures are completely different. This is so or not so depending on the level of analysis applied to the issue in question.

   This is so in one sense because the essential concept of "culture" and difference in cultures is based on individuals in various cultures having learned:

   -- different ways of reacting to the "same" external factor
   -- different ways of outward expression of the same internal reaction to external stimuli

   This is not so for many reasons:

   -- all humans have the same assortment of senses which are the means by which they obtain information (with obvious exceptions, such as individual cases of deafness, etc.)
   -- all humans are thought to have a small assortment of the same basic drives
   -- all humans are guided in their total behavior and thinking from the unconscious -- a level below awareness -- far more than by conscious perception/analysis/decision
   -- all humans have some assortment of the same limited repertoire of primary "defense mechanisms" or "adjustment mechanisms"
6. Vietnamese are the best judge of, and understand better than anyone else, all other Vietnamese. This might or might not be so depending on the interaction of such factors as pertinence and extent of appropriate knowledge, training, and experience; intelligence; personality organization; emotionality/logic bias; and many other factors.

(U) As has been stated, the assortment of "vulnerabilities" identified from the first three studies represented observations made on many different levels of generalization from very diversified points of view within many different frames of reference. The degree of consequence or significance of specific findings varied greatly. This was neither surprising nor disappointing in what is clearly a newly-emerging field of research as evidenced by the absence of precise and generally accepted working definitions. It was expectable to find that there had been no systematic consolidation and organization of the results of research efforts. However, there is a need for organization and consolidation of the results in order to provide proper perspective for readers and users on the relative consequence of each vulnerability and the specificity or generality of its applicability.

(U) Because the manner of describing vulnerabilities represented such diversity, including mention of objective external conditions, evaluative statements about military practices, emotional reactions, physical conditions, logical analyses, etc., a test question was formulated to crystallize the objectives of further work. The question was: "What is the most informative and systematic manner for definition and specification of vulnerabilities in a fashion that facilitates recognition, communication to others, and productive exploitation?"

(U) After exhausting the possibilities of more simple forms of analysis, a more sophisticated approach than any noted in the literature -- a modified input/output analysis -- was employed to analyze and organize the data in meaningful fashion. Imposition of this organizing procedure on the data made several facts evident:

(U) 1. As now described in the literature or general discussion, many "vulnerabilities" deal with various partial aspects of the same condition/event/action/or state of being.

(U) 2. Many "vulnerabilities" represent descriptions of the same condition/event/action/or state of being but appear to be different because of being pitched at different levels of analysis or generalization.
(U) 3. All or almost all descriptions of vulnerabilities deal with intermediate factors, i.e., conditions/events/actions/or states of being/or nature of impact on the individual. It is invariably left to the reader or user to draw the needed inferences to arrive at the actual vulnerability.

(U) 4. In the absence of any mention of the need to draw inferences, and because the described phenomenon is already labeled a "vulnerability", there is no basis for assuming either that the need for further inference is known or that the necessary inferences are indeed made by the psyoperator.

(C) Integration of the products of the analysis as shown in Table 8 with data obtained in the field surveys against a background of knowledge gained from the literature, previous pertinent research, and related experience, indicated that items which had been treated as vulnerabilities in the literature would be, depending on their nature, more correctly termed "Primary Mediators" (of vulnerability), "Secondary Mediators" (of vulnerability), and "Contributory" or "Facilitating" factors which enhance or decrease the intensity of effect of "primary" or "secondary mediators".

(C) The "primary vulnerabilities" are derived mainly from the emotional states which, in a stressful situation, are the primary determinants of behavior. "Secondary vulnerabilities" are associated with and are inferred mainly from attitudes, opinions, and beliefs which have less ability to affect behavior. "Contributory" or "facilitating" factors are all other aspects of the human psyche that function to create or enhance, in positive or negative direction, the emotional receptivity or resistance to any input of any type of data.

(C) Each of the "primary vulnerabilities" is the resultant of a complex of interacting factors; the secondary and contributory factors may change to a small or large extent over time and may change frequently or infrequently, but the "primary vulnerability", representing a summation of the subordinate factors, operates in a different time frame. It comes about more slowly, changes more slowly, and disappears more slowly. However, in the case of truly significant events, psychological/emotional changes of any kind can occur overnight or even immediately.

(C) In reporting results, for ease and clarity of communication and convenience in discussion, the manner of description of vulnerabilities found in the literature and in general current use for discussion purposes is continued in use here in conjunction with definition of the inferred or true vulnerabilities.
Two primary vulnerabilities and their related primary mediating factors have been identified, one applicable to all VC and one applicable to all NVA. For each of the two primary vulnerabilities, two secondary vulnerabilities and their related secondary mediating factors are identified.

(C) The primary VC vulnerability is:

a. Greatly increased receptivity to messages which describe a safe means to leave a highly unsatisfactory situation, which decrease his apprehension about the way in which he will be received and treated, and which decrease his uncertainty about the near-term future.

(C) The related primary mediating factor is:

"Generalized deterioration of the will to fight" resulting from a feeling that in the current situation he has little to gain and much to lose. The feeling is caused by his perception of the present situation as becoming progressively more dangerous, frustrating, and unrewarding.

(C) Secondary VC vulnerabilities are:

a. Increased readiness to give credence to messages which indirectly reflect recognition of his current plight and feelings and which suggest believably safe ways to remove himself and others from the scope of Party controls and which remove uncertainty about the near future to the greatest extent possible by description of procedures and what is to be expected.

(C) The related secondary mediating factor is:

"Negative reaction against Party control methods" which are becoming progressively more frequent and intense in application and which affect him, his relatives, and his fellow VC.

b. Increased receptivity to messages which establish credibility by indirectly indicating recognition of those aspects of the VC situation that engender a sense of loss and frustration and which provide a rationale for acting to change his situation.
C) The related secondary mediating factor is:

"Feeling of victimization" resulting from interaction of many factors, two of which are the increasing drain created by progressively greater levies upon all VC to fulfill quotas that once may have been realistic when larger numbers of VC existed but which now are oppressive in view of the reduced number of NLF supporters, and the disappearance of hope of victory and any tangible form of reward for service and sacrifice for the "liberation" cause.

C) The primary NVA vulnerability is:

a. Potential for receptivity to messages which indirectly confirm and complement the sources of a generalized disaffection; receptivity is discussed in terms of potential because the available evidence supports only the notion of a developing trend toward erosion of morale and allegiance to the cause rather than any active dissatisfaction.

C) The related primary mediating factor is:

"Recognition of unfulfilled promises, unachieved objectives, and paucity of positive rewards" in a situation that may result in a long-drawn-out half war. The current information available does not suggest active resistance or rejection of the cause.

C) The secondary NVA vulnerabilities are:

a. Decreased resistance to acceptance of messages which indirectly reflect existence of disparities between NVN indoctrination and RVN reality. There is no evidence as yet that this receptivity in itself is adequate to cause any widespread positive reaction to messages suggesting such final actions as rally, surrender, self-assisted capture, etc.
The related secondary mediating factor is:

"NVA disillusionment" in RVN which may occur on the infrequent occasions when the NVA comes into contact with RVN civilians or receives other visual evidence of disparities between indoctrination-derived notions and what is actually seen.

b. Increased receptivity to messages which develop lines of reasoning that justify taking an action that will benefit both the NVA soldier and his family.

The related secondary mediating factor is:

"Family-centered concerns" which stem from an extremely complicated interrelationship of dependency and obligation. The preservation of his relationship to his family is perhaps the most important single concern in the life of the North (or South) Vietnamese soldier.

It should be noted that this traditionally inculcated attitude may be trending toward reduced importance for the current adolescent generation.

Each of the vulnerabilities is treated in detail in the sections that follow.

VC Vulnerabilities

There are many differences between the situation of the VC and the NVA soldier; two major differences are the fact that the VC are in familiar territory and have many personal contacts within the local population while the NVA are in an area unfamiliar to them, far from their families and civilian friends, and are unlikely to know anyone in the local civilian population. These aspects of the situation, sometimes referred to as vulnerabilities, are not in themselves vulnerabilities but do affect the nature of VC/NVA vulnerabilities.

Primary: Deterioration of the Will to Fight. Despite reduction in the intensity of military operations, because of the apparent increase in GVN strength and effectiveness, the prototypical VC soldier perceives
his total situation as becoming progressively more dangerous, frustrating, and unrewarding. The genesis of this feeling is reflected in the literature in such general terms as "ARVN pressure", "pressure from Allied Forces" with a resultant "fear of Allied arms", and in such specific terms as "fear of being killed", "fear of death", etc.

(C) The major perceived danger has shifted from fear of death in battle to anxiety over the increased likelihood of capture and imprisonment. Logically, imprisonment would seem less dangerous. However, the same reasons that caused the reduction in military operations also result in there being fewer motivating factors to push the VC soldier in a positive direction. With the shift of the war in GVN's favor, there is no longer a valid basis for enthusiasm for a glorious victory; for visions of personal success, recognition, promotion; for dreams of "liberating brothers", etc. In other words, the positive motivating factors have vanished.

(C) In the operation of the human mind, changes in perception and adjustment to perceived "reality-situations" can be described as being mediated by a psychological process termed "adaptation level". This mechanism which affects human thought processes can best be described as a sliding scale of values that is continually unconsciously adjusted or recalibrated to provide psychological comfort within an individual; it is not bound by logic and therefore its workings cannot be understood in logical or mathematical terms. Used with considerable freedom of interpretation, the general nature of this process is helpful in understanding the nature of individual vulnerabilities.

(C) For the VC soldier, functioning of the "adaptation-level" process can cause him to perceive his present situation as one in which he has little to gain and much to lose (capsulized in the literature as "feeling that the VC cause is hopeless"). More specifically, the varied benefits that would have accrued to him through victory do not now exist as motivators; the risk of his own death, or injury, or loss of years of living-time are deglamorized and cannot be justified by any grandiose expectations.

(C) The primary vulnerability that is created by the generalized deterioration of the will to fight, representing the sum of many large and small factors, is a greatly increased receptivity to messages which describe a safe means to leave a highly unsatisfactory situation, which decrease his apprehension about the way in which he will be received and treated, and which decrease his uncertainty about his near-term future.
(C) Secondary: Reaction Against Party Control Methods. As the overall situation becomes more difficult for the VC leadership, efforts to improve their position result in more oppressive actions, increased restrictions, and stronger and more punitive methods of control and motivation, all becoming progressively more frequent and intense in application. This is seen in the literature and in the current document-flow in such statements as "resentment at being criticized or punished", "dislike of feeling of being mistrusted and under constant surveillance", "dislike of VC methods of controlling villagers","opposition to cadre", "arrest or execution of a family member or friend", etc.

(C) The adaptation-level process causes the VC to view this aspect of the overall VC structure with an ever more jaundiced eye as the once-existing compensatory factor -- faith in victory and associated material and psychological rewards -- deteriorates.

(C) The secondary vulnerability created by the increase in scope and intensity of Party control methods and the individual VC's negative reaction toward the perceived effects of these actions, is an increased readiness to give credence to messages which reflect recognition of this (to him) unfortunate situation and which suggest believably safe ways to remove himself and others from the scope of the Party controls. Such a message should also remove uncertainty about the future to the greatest extent possible by specific description of what can be expected. For instance, the basic logic of the Chieu Hoi concept easily encompasses the notion that a VC eventually can be returned to his former village, have returned to him his former holdings and even offices, and perhaps unrealistically, some form of indemnity for his losses.

(C) Secondary: VC Feeling of Victimization. A sense of personal loss, which ranges in intensity up to a feeling of having been victimized, exists among the VC. This is encapsulated in "vulnerabilities" identified in the literature such as "feeling of being exploited by VC for the benefit of the Party with no real care for the individual and no personal benefit", "dislike and distrust of the VC civilian cadre for continued exactions by forcible methods", "conclusion that personal sacrifices for the Front have been insufficiently rewarded", "feeling of having gained nothing for services to the VC", etc.

(C) With waning fortunes, the process of obtaining material support from the civilian population becomes more difficult and increased effort and stronger methods must be used. As the forcible levies for supplies,
money, and manpower grow in scope and as the methods for the exactions increase in harshness in order to fulfill quotas, the families and friends of the VC soldiers can seem to be receiving worse treatment than is customarily given to the GVN civilian population by VC soldiers. This is noted in the literature as "sacrifice of the interests and well-being of the people to the interests of the apparatus, i.e., callous indifference in demanding fulfillment of quotas and requirements".

(C) As the VC acts more oppressively toward its own supporters, particularly while unable to offer any real hope of reward, it is progressively destroying its acceptance and allegiance among both the VC civilian and military populations; this is noted in the literature as "growing alienation of the people".

(C) The adaptation-level process makes it easy for the VC soldier in this situation to develop or accept a rationale that justifies his acting to change his situation for a less frustrating or more rewarding one.

(C) A secondary vulnerability created by this condition is increased receptivity to messages which establish credibility by indication recognition of those aspects of the VC situation that engender a sense of loss and frustration and which provide a rationale for acting to change the situation.

NVA Vulnerabilities

(C) The NVA soldier, even though he is also Vietnamese and engaged in liberating his "brothers", usually is easily distinguished from his southern brothers by his language and manner of speech. While in the South, he is also usually identifiable as a Northerner through his lack of what, for a Southerner, is the most basic and ordinary knowledge of names and locations. As a consequence, unlike the VC who are at home, he cannot merge with and disappear into the local population. These factors are not vulnerabilities but do affect the nature of actual vulnerabilities.

(C) Primary: Trend Toward "Generalized Disaffection". General disaffection with the "just cause" or "liberation" effort, where it exists, is caused by unfilled promises, unachieved objectives, and lack of any discernible reward for service and sacrifice. The effect of these factors is exacerbated by fear of a long drawn-out unsuccessful half-war in which lack of success over a long period of time has degraded the concept of "dying gloriously for a noble cause" to a "risk of life for no good reason" (this is a different order of concern than fear of death itself).
If a generalized erosion leading to widespread deterioration of morale and the "will to fight" is to occur, it will have to be prompted by evidence that leads to generalized loss of conviction in what is the keystone of the NVA motivational structure and a major factor in NVA propaganda and indoctrination, i.e., belief in eventual victory. Suggestions of a beginning trend toward erosion of this conviction can be seen in the research literature in such terms as "war weariness", "fear of Allied arms", "fears and anxieties about a protracted war", "fighting and killing fellow Vietnamese", "defeats", "rising desertion rates in weeks just prior to infiltration", "doctrinal disillusionment", etc.

More specifically, the positive motivating factors that create internally-generated initiative and which cause individuals to persevere logically or illogically in the face of obstacles can undergo considerable erosion or can have evaporated without any significant change in behavior occurring because a major sustaining factor will remain in the form of habit -- an inertia caused by conditioning and environment -- and absence of a powerful external factor/event which would disrupt their accustomed routine.

The external factor in the case of the NVA would have to be, for example, of the magnitude of a surprise implementation of Vice-President Ky's recent remark about possible resumption of bombing of NVN coupled with announcements of ARVN's intention to carry the war into NVN. Assuming hypothetically that an action of such magnitude were possible, the surprise, consternation, and disruption it would cause are lost if it is publicized prior to occurrence.

A state of generalized disaffection, although it would constitute a major vulnerability, is not easily exploitable because of the complex interaction of the multitude of minor factors that summate to create the whole pattern described by the term "generalized disaffection".

It is not possible to tell whether concern about the possibility of a protracted wartime state is reduced or increased by the well-publicized and already partly-implemented plans for U.S. withdrawal.

The adaptation-level process allows the mental and emotional state of an NVA soldier to arrive at a disaffected state with less difficulty than might be expected since field research data shows rather surprisingly, that neither he nor his family wanted him to come South to fight (see Table 9). This attitude, surprising in view of the apparent thoroughness and effectiveness of indoctrination on so many other issues.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(U) Question</th>
<th>(U) Response</th>
<th>(U) Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In what way did you enter military service?</td>
<td>2. Volunteered</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Drafted</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Other)</td>
<td>04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How did you feel about entering military service?</td>
<td>2. Wanted to</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Neutral</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. Did not want to</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Other)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How did your parents feel about your going to South Vietnam to fight? (Did they want you to go?)</td>
<td>2. Not sure</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Wanted me to go</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. Were neutral</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5. Did not want me to go</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>When you left NVN to go to SVN where the actual fighting is going on, did you want to go?</td>
<td>2. Not sure</td>
<td>02%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. No</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. Yes, a little</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5. Yes, very much</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
(U) TABLE 9 (con't)

MILITARY SERVICE/TRIP TO RVN: ATTITUDES (U)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Not Sure</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Yes, Little</th>
<th>Yes, Much</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(U) When you left NVN to go to SVN</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>where the actual fighting is going on</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--- were you afraid to go?</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--- were you in a hurry to get there?</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--- expect support from people in GVN areas?</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--- expect to get needed food from NLF sympathizers?</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--- think trip would be dangerous?</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--- think trip would be hard?</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>06</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--- worry about safe return to NVN?</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
and attitudes, is not an adequate cause for him to initiate action to "leave
the field." Part of the reason for this appears in field research data that
tends not to support the notion that the NVA are uniformly combat-weary
and subjected to intense hardship. Many state that they had not been ex­
periencing any hardships and of fifty POW's, only five had been in actual
combat more than once; also, only five had been in combat lasting for one
hour or more (see Table 10).

(C) Despite the frequent references to "hardships" in the literature
and the frequent occurrence of that term in interviews with prisoners and
ralliers, it is extremely important to place the interpretive meaning and
implications of this term in proper perspective.

(C) Most of the NVA soldiers come to NVA military service and to
RVN from what is, for any American, an unbelievably impoverished en­
vironment; some research data from NVA POW's is:

(C) As a civilian, did you earn more or less than your military pay?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pay Comparison</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Much more</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>About same</td>
<td>06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Much less</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Other)</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(C) While in service in NVN, how many NVN piastres were you paid
each month?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pay Range</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5 - 6 NVN$</td>
<td>90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 - 10 NVN$</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(C) While in RVN, before becoming a prisoner, how many GVN piastres
did you receive each month?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pay Range</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0 - 80 GVN$</td>
<td>82%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100 - 200 GVN$</td>
<td>06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>600 - 1600 GVN$</td>
<td>06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Other)</td>
<td>06</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(U) It is not possible to accurately compare the value of the
NVA dollar (piastre) but the best available estimate indicates the ratio to
the GVN dollar to be about 1:20. If that ratio is used, the monthly pay of
**COMBAT EXPERIENCE: NVA POW'S (U)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Have you ever been in combat?</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>74%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How often in combat?</td>
<td>Never</td>
<td>74%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>One time</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Three times</td>
<td>06%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Four times</td>
<td>02%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Seven times</td>
<td>02%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What was the longest period of time you were in any single battle?</td>
<td>Never</td>
<td>74%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10 - 30 minutes</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4 - 5 hours</td>
<td>06%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>20 - 24 hours</td>
<td>04%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
the NVN soldier is about 30 cents in U.S. money based on the free rate of exchange. Perspective on the NVA soldier's standard of living can be gained if one considers that receipt of one can of condensed milk per month is a significant benefit or privilege awarded to a cadre.

(U) It must be kept in mind that what the foreign observer may view as a series of incredible hardships on the trail and in the jungle or swamp may very well be the high point in the life of someone (NVN) who would otherwise have been bound for the remainder of his life within one or two square miles, interacting always with the same two or three hundred people, and concerned only with the same limited range of topics peculiar to his particular hamlet or village. Instead of such a life, his income is very likely to be considerably increased despite what seems to be extraordinarily low compensation for military service even for an impoverished, under-developed country. He has more and possibly better clothing than ever before; he is fed possibly as well as he ever has been; and as a soldier he has an unaccustomed high status in NVN civilian eyes. He is also traveling and -- for someone with his limited purview -- seeing the world, seeing many interesting and exciting new things, places, events; may be impressed or even exalted by his first access to authority symbolized by possession of a weapon which renders him able to overpower others. Finally, many of the "hardships" referred to in interview records, upon further elaboration turn out to be danger from bombing and other military operations; the exposure to these hazards is not frequent.

(U) In summary, the very great differences in the life style and mental content of the NVA population and the NVA soldier from that of the average American causes it to be almost impossible to maintain "conceptual equivalency" across language lines when describing experiences and conditions in evaluative terms.

(C) Secondary: NVA Disillusionment in RVN. Among the NVA, a feeling exists that is similar in nature to the VC feeling of having been victimized, but is much less intense. The origin of the feeling to the extent that it may exist lies mainly in the disparity between the objective evidence forced upon them by their experience in the South and the expectations and beliefs created by propaganda and indoctrination in the North. This feeling is mentioned in the literature in such items as "disillusionment at finding propaganda claims at variance with reality", "doctrinal disillusionment", "friction between old-line VC and new NVA in the Delta", "increasing strife between the NVA and VC", "being misled about the extent of Communist control in the South and about degree of popular support", "villagers hostile and uncooperative to requests to supply NVA with food", etc.
(C) After a lengthy and exhausting trip to RVN, the NVA soldier appears to have little contact with the civilian population and spends little time in hamlets or cities; therefore, impressions formed in the North remain unaffected unless there is contact with the local population on food-gathering trips. The resistance that apparently is frequently encountered acts to raise questions about the validity of claims regarding the support of the RVN population. This is seen in the literature as "villagers uncooperative and hostile to requests to supply NVA food."

(C) Table II contains a sample of the questions and responses from 50 NVA POW's which illustrates some of the disparities or changes in perception of significant features treated in indoctrination and propaganda while still in NVA and later personally experienced in RVN.

(C) The cumulative effect of gradually increasing amounts of personal experiential evidence that points up the disparities between indoctrination-derived concepts and actuality provides stimuli that can, by the adaptation-level process, cause the NVA soldier to feel that he has been misled or manipulated. This feeling does not yet appear to exist with sufficient intensity or pervasiveness to constitute a major vulnerability in the sense of producing ralliers or surrenderers if exploited. In adaptation-level terms, this is because an offsetting factor -- belief in eventual victory -- still holds firm in the NVA mind.

(C) The vulnerability resulting from recognition of disparities between propaganda or indoctrination and personal experience in RVN does not appear to have significant value at the present time as an avenue through which action can be stimulated. It can best be exploited by incorporating assumptions of recognition of disparities in messages relating to family-centered concerns; the negative feelings aroused by recognition of the disparities would counterbalance to some extent the indoctrination and training-inculcated factors which are negative to the possibility of rally, surrender, or desertion.

(C) Secondary: NVA Family-Centered Concerns. The literature contains many references to concern about or attachment to the family, some stated quite succinctly such as "homesickness" while others are more informative such as "anxiety of NVA personnel at being far from home and family with no hope of an early return". Many references deal with the individual's own reactions such as "long absence from home and family", "family separation", "separation from family", etc.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(U) Question</th>
<th>(U) Response</th>
<th>(U) Indoctrination in NVN</th>
<th>(U) Indoctrination in SVN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>How was the military strength of GVN and its allies compared to the military strength of NVN and its allies?</td>
<td>2. GVN much stronger</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. GVN stronger</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. About equal</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5. NVN stronger</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6. NVN much stronger</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Other)</td>
<td>(28)</td>
<td>(16)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| How was the military strength of GVN alone compared to NVN alone?            | 2. GVN much stronger       | 0                         | 14                       |
|                                                                               | 3. GVN stronger            | 4                         | 12                       |
|                                                                               | 4. About equal             | 4                         | 06                       |
|                                                                               | 5. NVN stronger            | 38                        | 38                       |
|                                                                               | 6. NVN much stronger       | 20                        | 12                       |
|                                                                               | (Other)                    | (34)                      | (18)                     |

<p>| According to what was said, who would win the war?                            | 2. GVN certainly           | 0                         |                          |
|                                                                               | 3. GVN probably            | 0                         | 12                       |
|                                                                               | 4. In doubt                | 4                         | --                       |
|                                                                               | 5. NVN probably            | 2                         |                          |
|                                                                               | 6. NVN certainly           | 70                        |                          |
|                                                                               | (Other)                    | (24)                      | (32)                     |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>(U) Money/ Supplies</th>
<th>(U) Money/ Supplies:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(U) Response</td>
<td>Manpower</td>
<td>No Manpower</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Can NVN win the war if

1. No, definitely
2. Probably not
3. Stalemate
4. Yes, probably
5. Yes, certainly
6. (Other)

### US continues to support GVN with:

7. No, definitely
8. Probably not
9. Stalemate
10. Yes, probably
11. Yes, certainly
12. (Other)
(U) It is extremely important to recognize, and keep in the forefront of one's thinking, that the concept of "relationship to the family" for Vietnamese is just as difficult to understand as is any other aspect of Vietnamese life and culture; this is apparently often overlooked because almost everyone is part of a family and this fact is so much taken for granted that it is easily understandable if it is assumed that all family relationships and feelings are much the same.

(U) The basic unit of the Vietnamese culture is the extended family (grandparents, parents, children plus ancestors) and the prototypical Vietnamese personality is egocentric to the ultimate degree. This means that because of the nature of his total physical, social, and financial environment, the typical Vietnamese comes to regard himself as the center of his own universe in which his primary concern is an amalgam of himself and his family. In contrast, the American basic family unit is composed of parents and children and is acquiring a heavy loading of childless couples. Also, while it might be oversimplification to describe a prototypical American personality (other than in terms of "ideal" or tradition), the American can be characterized as other-oriented or outwardly-oriented rather than as egocentric. Psychologically, because of the nature of his total environment, the American, with no diminution of his relationship to his family, can at times be more concerned with the welfare and needs of others than with his own.

(U) The significance of the differences between Vietnamese and Americans in family relationships lies in the fact that the individual Vietnamese must look to his family for all things since there are few other sources of aid. Also, the early training of Vietnamese -- particularly rural Vietnamese -- inculcates a tremendous sense of obligation to the family. There are no rest homes for the aged in Vietnam.

(U) In contrast, Americans have a wide variety of sources to draw upon before turning to the family and depending on their background, might look to their family for aid only as a last resort.

(U) In summary, the "family" factor for Vietnamese is not based purely in emotions or attitudes. It is a deeply-ingrained cultural characteristic but it also has a heavy loading of financial or personal welfare elements. This cultural phenomenon is, in effect, an institutionalized social, financial, and personal security system.
The degree of vulnerability created in the NVA soldier by a complex of family-centered concerns is also counterbalanced to some extent by his egocentricity. Stated in somewhat oversimplified fashion:

--- he would not accept a given risk if both he and his family could lose

--- he would not accept the same risk if he or his family could lose

--- he might not accept the same risk if he could gain but his family would lose

--- he might not accept the same risk if he could lose but his family would gain

--- he might accept the same risk if he could gain but his family would not be affected either way

--- he might accept the same risk if he would not be affected either way but his family would gain

--- he would accept the same risk if both he and his family would gain

The adaptation-level process, if the right psyop approach could cause the weight of the effect of family ties and egocentricity to be combined rather than acting to some extent as counterbalances, would be very likely to enable an NVA soldier to devise logical grounds for any action such as rallying or surrendering or deserting that he was persuaded would benefit both himself and his family at an acceptable risk level.

The NVA soldier, to the extent that he is vulnerable, is most likely to have some interest in (although not necessarily be stimulated to action by) messages which develop lines of reasoning that justify his taking an action which he can interpret as being of benefit to both himself and his family.
(U) Major conclusions are:

(U) 1. For all psyop policy-level managers and for operators in the field, a more precise and consistent approach to data collection, data analysis, and definition of vulnerabilities is a basic requirement for valid understanding, conceptualization, and productive exploitation of vulnerabilities. A formal definition of "vulnerability" and the manner in which it is described for users must be established as an initial step in systematization of theory, thinking, and practice regarding vulnerabilities.

(U) 2. Conclusion 2 is responsive to the need for precise definition of vulnerabilities described in Conclusion 1. The manner and level of generalization with which vulnerabilities should be described for all purposes has been tentatively identified and can be described as follows:

--- Vulnerability may be primary (which implies generality of applicability) or secondary (which refers to a sub-factor included within and facilitating the primary vulnerability). Other conditions/events/actions or states of being are contributory or facilitating.

--- Diagnosis of a vulnerability must be preceded by identification of the mediating factors (actions/situations/events, etc.).

--- The relationship of the mediating factor and resultant primary or secondary vulnerability to other major characteristics and current situations of the enemy individual or group must be considered before decision on diagnosis of the existence of a vulnerability.

--- The primary or secondary vulnerability must be expressed in terms of the impact of the mediating factor upon the resistance or receptivity of enemy individuals or groups to a specified psyop approach.

--- The objective expected to be achieved by exploitation of the vulnerability should be expressed in terms of impact on resistance to or acceptance of a psyop approach and/or the specific behavior the exploitation is designed to evoke.
3. A procedure has been devised for classifying and positioning data about an external event/situation/action/or state of being by use of the External Factor/Consequence/Implication/Impact on Individual sequence shown in the Vulnerabilities Classification Matrix in Table 8. Use of this means of classification in combination with formatting of the description of the inferred vulnerability according to the manner of definition described in Conclusion 2, provides a consistent and systematic means of describing and defining vulnerabilities and of communicating this information to others in a form sufficiently specific for use. There is no implication that the process is easy; but the method and the proper focus of attention for psyop communications is identified and usable. The accuracy of an initial assumption of existence of a condition/situation/event/or state of being that leads to diagnosis of a vulnerability is, of course, a function of the quality and quantity of available pertinent valid data interacting with the extent of pertinent knowledge and degree of skill possessed by the diagnostician.

4. It is recognized that the current practice of quick-reaction exploitation in the field would be seriously hampered by attempting to follow these steps listed in sequence and it is not intended to prevent quick-reaction exploitation where appropriate. However, it does appear to be possible to restrict quick-reaction operations to functioning within the limits of primary vulnerabilities already identified with the option of adding certain carefully-specified features to already-selected and approved themes or procedures and to restrict the execution of such operations to specified sets of conditions under which they can be productive.

5. Two primary vulnerabilities and their related primary mediating factors have been identified, one applicable to all VC and one applicable to all NVA. For each of the two primary vulnerabilities, two secondary vulnerabilities and their related secondary mediating factors are identified.

The primary VC vulnerability is:

a. Greatly increased receptivity to messages which describe a safe means to leave a highly unsatisfactory situation, which decrease his apprehension about the way in which he will be received and treated, and which decrease his uncertainty about the near-term future.
The related primary mediating factor is:

"Generalized deterioration of the will to fight" resulting from a feeling that in the current situation he has little to gain and much to lose. The feeling is caused by his perception of the present situation as becoming progressively more dangerous, frustrating, and unrewarding.

Secondary VC vulnerabilities are:

a. Increased readiness to give credence to messages which indirectly reflect recognition of his current plight and feelings and which suggest believably safe ways to remove himself and others from the scope of Party controls and which remove uncertainty about the near future to the greatest extent possible by description of procedures and what is to be expected.

The related secondary mediating factor is:

"Negative reaction against Party control methods" which are becoming progressively more frequent and intense in application and which affect him, his relatives, and his fellow VC.

b. Increased receptivity to messages which establish credibility by indirectly indicating recognition of those aspects of the VC situation that engender a sense of loss and frustration and which provide a rationale for acting to change his situation.

The related secondary mediating factor is:

"Feeling of victimization" resulting from interaction of many factors, chief of which are the increasing drain created by progressively greater levies upon all VC to fulfill quotas that once may have been realistic for larger numbers but which now are oppressive in view of the reduced number of NLF supporters, and the disappearance of hope of victory and any tangible form of reward for service and sacrifice for the "liberation" cause.
The primary NVA vulnerability is:

a. Potential for receptivity to messages which indirectly confirm and complement the sources of a generalized disaffection; receptivity is discussed in terms of potential because the available evidence supports only the notion of a developing trend toward erosion of morale and allegiance to the cause rather than any active dissatisfaction.

The related primary mediating factor is:

Recognition of unfulfilled promises, unachieved objectives, and paucity of positive rewards in a situation that may result in a long-drawn-out half-war. The modest amount of current information available does not suggest active resistance or rejection of the "liberation" cause.

Secondary NVA vulnerabilities are:

a. Decreased resistance to acceptance of messages which indirectly reflect existence of disparities between NVN indoctrination and RVN reality. There is no evidence as yet that this receptivity in itself is adequate to cause any widespread positive reaction to messages suggesting such drastic and final actions as rally, surrender, self-assisted capture, etc.

The related secondary mediating factor is:

NVA disillusionment in RVN which may occur on the infrequent occasions when the NVA comes into contact with RVN civilians or receives other visual evidence of disparities between indoctrination-derived notions and what is actually seen.

b. Increased receptivity to messages which develop lines of reasoning that justify taking an action that will benefit both the NVA soldier and his family.
The related secondary mediating factor is:

Family-centered concerns which stem from an extremely complicated interrelationship of obligation and dependency. The preservation of his relationship to his family is perhaps the single most important concern in the life of the North (or South) Vietnamese soldier.

It should be noted that this traditionally inculcated attitude may be trending downward in importance for the adolescent generation.

(U) 6. Data obtained from the field research supports the existence of the kinds and degrees of vulnerabilities listed in Conclusion 5.

(C) 7. The concept of targeting and tailoring can be applied profitably to vulnerabilities as they are defined here since by definition, appeals would represent "the most appropriate messages aimed at the biggest potential" if the intelligence data used as a base is valid.

Field research data provides the direction that must be taken to overcome the multiple obstacles represented by indoctrination-inculcated attitudes and justified or unjustified fears. The added factor is pressure.

Approximately a third of the NVA report that it would not cause harm to them or to their family if they were captured in combat or in various forms of hopeless situations. Such a situation, then, is a great help in enabling the psyop message to do its part.

If pressure is provided by military operations to create a situation in which it is acceptable and honorable to become a prisoner, thereby nullifying fears inculcated by Party indoctrination and controls, and an earlier stream of psyop messages have conveyed credible information about safe procedures and methods for coming into GVN hands, then the timely introjection during combat or any other similar pressure-situation of appeals which normally relate to secondary vulnerabilities may be successful.

(C) 8. At the present time, field research data indicates that evocation of desired behavioral responses such as surrender, rally, desertion, and self-induced capture are most likely to be promoted by an integrated
combination of military operational pressure and psyop messages -- if
they occur at all. Doctrine says essentially that consideration of psyop
should occur at all levels and in all operations; whether this occurs in
the way that is intended in actual practice is undetermined. A study to
assess the extent to which psyop is incorporated in tactical planning is
needed to provide perspective on the realistic possibility of increasing
such integrated planning and on the extent to which it can be increased.

In comment on this point, rally, surrender, and other such
appeals directed to NVA in the South are attempting to induce or trigger
an action of a kind that may have more important, sweeping, and radical
consequences for the individual soldier than any other possible action;
the danger involved is an added negative factor. In true perspective,
this is a great deal to hope for from one or several brief messages on
leaflets or radios. When one factors in the additional consideration that
the NVA is in strange territory, and operates with full awareness that
his family -- perhaps his most important concern -- is to some extent
a hostage, it is clear that even the most artfully devised and compel-
lingly persuasive message or flood of messages must overcome some
very solid obstacles.
REFERENCE LIST OF STUDIES RELATING TO ENEMY VULNERABILITIES


17. U.S. Military Assistance Command, Viet-Nam, Civil Operations For Revolutionary Development Support. "VC Counter-GVN Chieu Hoi Program." (U) Saigon, South Viet-Nam. Chieu Hoi Directorate, 10 June 1969. (Chieu Hoi Operational Memorandum No. 15/69)


PAG TASK 3

PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS OF THE ENEMY SOLDIER
Summary and Introduction

(U) JUSPAO requested research into the psychological characteristics of the enemy soldier.

(U) This survey was intended to increase the effectiveness of psychological operations directed to NVA and VC enemy audiences and continued use of procedures established under Task 2, Vulnerabilities.

(U) Based upon an intensive effort then under way, a research program in two phases was planned in response to the formal task statement presented in April. In Phase 1 equal samples of NVA prisoners and Hoi Chanh would be surveyed in each of the four military regions and data from each sample tabulated, summarized and reported. In Phase 2 the samples were to be combined into the four categories and profiles prepared for each, i.e., a profile of the NVA prisoner, of the NVA rallier, of the VC prisoner, and of the VC rallier. These would then be compared: the NVA prisoner and the NVA rallier, the VC prisoner and the VC rallier, the NVA prisoner with the VC prisoner, the NVA rallier and the VC rallier, permitting a final assessment of the enemy soldier for the report.

(U) The task was halted abruptly in May to divert all HSR effort to another top-priority psyop community research need. As a result of the diversion of time to other tasks, the scope of Task 3 was reduced to include only treatment of data already collected in Phase 1 which totaled 400 interviews within three of the groups, or seven studies.

(U) Findings from each study were reported together with a profile of the individual samples in an attempt to provide as much information as possible.
Problem

(U) JUSPAO requested that HSR conduct a study of the psychological characteristics of the NVA and the VC soldier. The PAG Task Statement:

Task 3, Priority 1 - Psychological Factors of the NVA/VC soldier.

In order to increase the effectiveness of psychological operations directed to NVA and VC enemy audiences, conduct a program of research to continue use of HSR survey instruments developed in PAG Tasks 1 and 2. Perform extensive field work to tap Ho Chanh (HC) and Prisoners of War (PW's); investigate the possibility of gaining access to PW's as soon after coming into Allied hands as possible. From this research, prepare basic profiles on four groups of available enemy population -- NVA PW's, NVA HC, VC PW's, and VC HC -- and highlight important differences among these groups. Analyze comparisons of these profiles and the total obtained data base, emphasizing the following issues:

1. NVA/VC resistance to getting out of the war by any voluntary means.
   a. Weakening of resistance to voluntary self-removal by the theme that seeking an alternative to certain death can be considered involuntary.
   b. Other approaches that might weaken resistance to self-removal from the war.

2. Presence of any common factors at the time of surrender which may give clues to psychological exploitation.
3. Factors which motivate NVA and VC soldiers' will to fight.

4. Themes and actions which may depress morale to an extent that may impair the will to fight.

Prepare summary reports to convey significant information when it is revealed in the continuing series of surveys.

Plan the research with the view of its continuation in the future.

Background

(U) This task continued use of the procedures established under Program II, Task 2 - Vulnerabilities. Already-developed data collection instruments and procedures, modified as necessary, were used to focus on means to remove NVA and VC from the war voluntarily.

HSR Research Approach

(U) The research plan for JUSPAO's top priority research need as expressed on 12 April was conservatively designed to obtain adequate information required to respond to the task statement, based upon an intensive effort then under way. The effort was to consist of a series of studies in two phases: Phase 1 was to involve conduct of surveys to obtain 200 samples each of prisoners of war and Hoi Chanh from the North Vietnamese Army and from the Viet Cong, for a total of 800 interviews; Phase 2 was to involve assessment of the findings on each group and analysis of combined groups with comparisons and contrasts among the various categories. (See Chart 5 for original task flow diagram.) As modified by the suspension of Task 3 on 9 May due to the urgent need for assessment of the effect of the Allied invasion of Cambodian sanctuaries, and subsequently the curtailment of Task 3 research effort to the level of already-completed data, the task consisted of a modified Phase 1 only. This included only the seven studies (400 interviews) for which survey data had been obtained prior to mid-May. Survey of VC ralliers was eliminated. Phase 2 which provided for detailed analysis and comparisons of groups and combinations of groups, was also eliminated completely.
Phase 1, the field research phase, included three studies:

**Study 1.** Investigations of NVA prisoners countrywide:

- A. 50 from MR1
- B. 50 from MR2
- C. 50 from MR3
- D. 50 from MR4

**Study 2.** Two investigations of VC prisoners, from the extreme northern areas and extreme southern areas of RVN:

- A. 50 from MR1
- B. 50 from MR4

**Study 3.** One investigation of NVA ralliers in the National Center in Saigon:

- A. 100 from National Chieu Hoi Center (received countrywide)

**Research Plan**

Questionnaires and procedures had been designed for each of the four categories to be assessed: NVA PW's, NVA Hoi Chanh, VC PW's, VC Hoi Chanh. Because of priority shifts, the VC Hoi Chanh instrument was not used as only three categories were assessed. With the major time-consuming tasks of instrument-development/test/preparation accomplished, the detailed research plan described steps used for each group surveyed from that point:

1. **Select specific groups of no less than 50 within the three populations to be assessed:** NVA PW's, NVA Hoi Chanh, and VC PW's. Plan for 50 protocols from the NVA PW population from each of the four Corps areas, and 50 percent of that total from the NVA Hoi Chanh population. Also, obtain two sets of 50 protocols from VC PW's.

2. **Train interviewer teams in use of questionnaires designed for specific categories of enemy forces.**
3. With the assistance of JUSPAO and MACJ3-11, prepare and submit access authorization through US/GVN channels to insure admission to PW camps and to Chieu Hoi Centers.

4. Have versions of questionnaires required for specific samples produced in sufficient quantity.

5. Receive authorizations for access to samples.

6. After authorizations have reached the facilities to be sampled, visit the camp officials to arrange times, entry, schedules, and interviewer accommodations.

7. Through JUSPAO and MACJ3-11 and ARPA, arrange travel schedules and accommodations for survey team in the field.

8. Conduct questionnaire surveys of the selected samples.

9. Tabulate pre-selected response data.

10. Translate narrative responses; regroup and categorize.

11. Summarize pre-selected response data.


13. Organize/analyze results of surveys.


15. Issue summary reports for immediate use in the field.

(U) These fifteen sub-tasks were required for each of the seven groups investigated.

(U) Staffing. This effort assumed availability of contracted Vietnamese personnel as required, trained in survey research, interviewing and translation. From resumption of effort after completion of the Cambodian effect task, this task required three HSR Research Scientists.
Procedure

(U) Random samples, each sample containing 50 low-ranking prisoners, were drawn from PW camps in each military region. Both NVA and VC prisoners were drawn from Da Nang in MR1 and Phu Quoc in MR4; NVA were also drawn from Pleiku in MR2 and Bien Hoa in MR3. PW names were drawn from camp records either the night before or on the morning of each day of interview. Although Phu Quoc is a collection center for PW's from all the military regions, the large number of prisoners concentrated there made it easy to select a random sample of PW's captured in MR4, both VC and NVA, for the two samples from that region.

(U) Interviewing was done by a trained staff of Vietnamese interviewers under the supervision of a Vietnamese Research Supervisor and an HSR Research Scientist.

(U) Individual interviews with each PW, averaging three hours and fifteen minutes in length, were conducted in facilities furnished in the camps' enclosures.

(U) A lengthy questionnaire that had been developed specifically for each of the groups (i.e., NVA PW's, NVA Hoi Chanh, VC PW's) and several supplementary data-collection instruments were used.

Development of Data-Collection Instruments/Procedures

(U) Results of participation in surveys using questionnaires obtained from other sources or questionnaires designed in large part by other participants showed clearly that new and radically different questionnaires and procedures would have to be developed for at least four specific groups; i.e., NVA PW's, NVA Hoi Chanh, VC PW's, and VC Hoi Chanh.

(U) In mid-September 1969, HSR research personnel participated in a quick-response questionnaire survey of 60 NVA Hoi Chanh using an already available questionnaire. Early in October, HSR personnel played a major part in executing a survey that proposed to sample 40-50 NVA PW's to obtain useful data while pre-testing a questionnaire developed jointly by representatives of several groups within the psyop community including HSR. Work was terminated after the questionnaire had been administered to 24 NVA PW's when it became clear that the questionnaires in use were not appropriate or productive for the task.
Four new questionnaires were designed to cover all significant aspects of NVA and VC PW's and ralliers.

The questionnaire is made up of independent sections, each of which can be used alone or in any combination of sections depending on the focus of interest. The questions combine the use of pre-selected answer choices where appropriate for speed, accuracy, and consistency, with provision for narrative response or elaboration of all questions where desirable and appropriate. In this fashion, the questionnaire makes use of the advantages inherent in both the open-end and closed type of questions.

The questions are pre-coded to enable the data to be key-punched directly from the questionnaire even without knowledge of the Vietnamese language. The questions are so numbered that all four forms are fully compatible (with the exception of a small number of specific questions which do not hamper processing) and the data can thus be processed on cards or tape with the same program and report format even though they treat four different types of subjects. Those questions which permit elaboration of a pre-coded response will show, in machine-produced reports, whether a narrative answer exists for any specific question for a particular subject but will not show the content of the narrative answer itself. The narrative portion of the answer must be extracted later in narrative form from the original questionnaire by a Vietnamese translator; the "present" or "absent" indicator in the machine-produced report will eliminate the necessity to search all questionnaires to find out whether or not a narrative response was given.

In the course of development and translation of the questionnaires into Vietnamese, it was established that there is a considerable disparity between the Vietnamese and English languages in the range of distinctions or nuances that are possible for many keywords. This issue is extremely important because the nature of the research objectives makes it imperative that these fine distinctions be made; it is clearly possible that some apparent ambiguities or contradictions in the literature may have resulted from this problem.

As a partial solution to this problem, i.e., the problem of maintaining "conceptual equivalence" in working between different languages, an essentially behavioral card-sort technique was developed, field-tested, and used to supplement questionnaire data. It is important to recognize that, under the time and operational pressures which exist in a war, no full solution to this problem (which is both a technical and an operating problem) may be realistically possible.
Rather than using a single word such as "surrender" which has or may have unfortunate connotations, and because the Vietnamese language cannot easily handle the distinction between "surrender", "allowing capture", and "being captured" (indeed, they require some operational elaboration to make a distinction in English), several situations have been described in consistent fashion on cards. The individual reads (or has read to him) the description, sorts the cards in four successive choices by placing the card on a labeled section of a large chart in response to the following four questions given in sequence.

1. Do your leaders consider this action in this situation acceptable or unacceptable? Acceptable Not Acceptable

2. Do your leaders believe this action in this situation to be honorable or dishonorable? Honorable Not Honorable

3. Would your families be affected or not affected if you took this action in this situation? Family not Affected Family Affected

4. Would you do this in this situation? Would Would Not

The questionnaires have gone through a process of successive modifications following field use; the current versions represent the product of a series of analyses of the instrument.

The questionnaire contains about 450 questions; about three-quarters of the questions may require quantitative or qualitative elaboration or both depending on the nature of the initial answer. Therefore, administration usually involves about 750 questions plus discussion.

The questionnaire was designed, to the extent possible, to follow the time sequence of major phases of the individual soldier's life history because that is the most efficient mode of organization for data collection. Also treated, after entrance into military service, are the individual's judgments about the other men in his unit and the situation in which he is operating.