Grouping of Questionnaire Sections

(U) The logical organization of the 36 sections of the questionnaire for analysis of responses used in this report requires grouping which differs from the time sequence on which organization of the questionnaire is based. Grouping is slightly different for NVA and VC samples unless specifically indicated; otherwise, remarks which follow refer to both NVA and VC questionnaires. The way in which sections can be regrouped most conveniently for analysis of the data is described here under eight major headings; grouping is not rigid.

Pre-Military - Service History (Sections 1, 2, 3, 4)

(U) Major influences working in his infancy, childhood, and adolescence are of special concern because experiences during these years fix the base content of his body of knowledge and shape the way in which he will perceive the world and whatever happens to him in the future.

Indoctrination/Propaganda (Sections 6, 19, 20)

(U) Sections 6, 19, and 20 are concerned with the effort devoted to thought control and conditioning represented by the program of propaganda and political indoctrination to which he is exposed while in military service.

(U) Major elements of interest are content and the emphases found in the formal political indoctrination program; the way in which the individual is manipulated through the Front's ability to give or withhold basic necessities for his family; and the machinery for control and surveillance represented by group discussion, several forms of group criticism and self-criticism, and 3-man cells.

Trip to RVN (Sections 8, 9, 10, 11)

(U) Sections 8, 9, 10, and 11 treat the NVA soldier's journey to RVN in detail. For someone who previously has led a relatively impoverished and restricted life, each soldier's long, grueling trip to RVN to join the fighting must be an extremely significant, new, and formative experience.
Despite its rigors, because it is such a new and different experience, it cannot be assumed to have only a negative impact. It may increase his sense of self-importance or may open new vistas. It may act to create or strengthen feelings of camaraderie and heightened morale generated from increased reciprocal esteem among comrades in his unit because of having shared and successfully endured a long period of successively greater dangers and hardships.

(U) Sections 8 and 10 treat the VC soldier's attitude toward joining the Front and his contacts with and aid to NVA units traveling to their destination in South Vietnam.

Controls/Exposure in RVN (Sections 13, 14, 15, 18)

(U) Sections 13, 14, 15, and 18 are designed to obtain details about the opportunities for various kinds of contacts and experience in RVN which confirm or negate indoctrination-derived notions.

Exposure to Allied Psyop (Sections 25, 26, 27, 28, 29)

(U) Familiarity with GVN psyop messages and general communications efforts is analyzed in Sections 25 through 29 to gain perspective on exposure to various media and the extent and nature of impact upon the enemy soldier.

Stress in RVN (Sections 12A, 12, 32, 17)

(U) In Sections 12A, 12, 32, and 17, stress-producing elements of the soldier's experience in the South are looked at, such as disparities between propaganda and actual experience, food and diet, sickness and medical care, and combat exposure.

Contemplation of Defection (Sections 22, 22A, 23, 24, 31)

(U) Sections 22, 22A, 23, 24, and 31 treat the kind and extent of the individual's thoughts which might result from stress such as consideration of various methods of defection, and the role of GVN psyop in his thoughts and decisions is examined.
Motivators/Obstacles to Defection (Sections 5, 7, 21, 30, 33)

(U) Factors which may act as positive motivators and therefore counterbalance negative experiences such as compensation, promotions, current benefits, future rewards, and expectations of victory are covered in Sections 5, 7, 21, 30, 33. Finally, because the indoctrination-inculcated expectation of "very bad treatment" is judged to be -- based on previous research -- a major deterrent to all types of defections, and because there are some reasons to believe that the "grapevine" reaches easily into PW camps, reactions to treatment at various stages of the steps by which he reaches the PW camp are analyzed.

Results

(U) Results were presented as a profile in narrative form with supporting raw data shown adjacent to narrative statements. The profile is a device to describe an "average" or "typical" NVA or VC soldier since the average is the "best guess" about what is characteristic of him. As any given percentage moves closer to 0% or 100%, less "guess" is involved and more certainty is assumed. The numbers in parentheses appearing in the narrative indicate the question and answer upon which statements in the narrative are based. Where statements are based on more than one set of responses only the most pertinent question number is cited. Material in the text, not directly drawn from the percentage distributions shown, is usually from quantitative or narrative elaboration of initial answers.

(U) In the process of creating verbal summarizations of percentage distributions -- an action necessitated by the narrative treatment designed to interrelate the answers to a sequence of questions -- several devices were used. Generally, if the distribution of answers is essentially balanced (for instance, 46% No, 52% Yes) the verbal equivalent is usually "...he might or might not..." Where the distribution is less in balance (for instance, 34% No, 61% Yes) the verbal equivalent is usually "...it is likely..." Where the imbalance is greater (for instance, 17% No, 79% Yes) the usual verbal equivalent is "...probably..." Larger percentages may be equated to "...very probably..." and percentages above 90%, depending on the nature of the distribution among other answer choices of the remaining 10%, may be unqualified statements (for instance, 6% No answer, 94% No); the verbal equivalent might be "...he never..." or "...he believes..."
(U) Narrative statements also may be phrased in terms of probability such as "...there is 1 chance in 4..." if the low-percentage issue is thought to have some special significance.

(U) In the main body of results that follows, percentages are used to show the way in which responses are distributed among pre-selected answers.

(U) Some questions require answers in terms of numbers rather than words. For such questions, three other statistics may be added to the percentage distribution; the median, range, and inter-quartile range of the numerical responses.

"Median" - when the numerical responses are ranked low to high, the median is the numerical response below and above which there are an equal number of responses, i.e., the middle response. The median is used, rather than an average, to eliminate distortions that may be introduced by unusually high or low responses.

"Range" - when the numerical responses are ranked low to high, the range represents the limits of a series, i.e., the lowest and highest numerical response obtained.

"Inter-Quartile Range" - for "Inter-Quartile Range": when the obtained quantified responses are ranked low to high and divided into four equal quarters or groups, the spread of numbers covered by the two middle quarters is the Inter-Quartile Range, i.e., the middle half of any set of responses. The Inter-Quartile Range is given where the range alone may be misleading because of unusually high or low answers.

(U) These three statistics may be computed in several ways; the manner of computation can be inferred logically from the nature of the question. For instance, if 80% of the sample report that their father is alive, the median age is obviously computed on those whose fathers are living.

(U) Profiles for each of the seven samples follow; in generalizing from samples to the general VC or NVA populations, it must be kept in mind that there is good evidence for the existence of considerable differences between VC and NVA personnel who come to be ralliers or prisoners, between VC ralliers and VC PW's and between NVA ralliers and NVA PW's.
(U) The NVA soldier captured in MR1 shows the following typical characteristics:

1. The typical low-ranking NVA soldier, captured in MR1 in 1970, was a volunteer whose parents wanted him to go South to join the fighting. He has had a very restricted and controlled early life. No parents, but other family members may be war casualties.

2. Cradle-to-grave news control and thought-conditioning creates individuals who unquestioningly accept NVN leaders' version of events. This belief in NVN's version of "reality" -- grossly distorted from a Westerner's point of view -- is the basis for NVA "morale". Surveillance and control mechanisms -- group discussions, criticism sessions, 3-man cells -- are enjoyed or liked rather than resented.

3. The three-month trip to RVN, for those in MR1, was not nearly as difficult and stressful as it may seem when seen in a Westerner's perspective.

4. There is very little contact with people or villagers in GVN-controlled areas.

5. Psyop resources devoted to newspapers, posters, and novelty items show little return if aimed at NVA soldiers; this is true also for television, radio, and ground loudspeakers.

(U) It is probable that airborne loudspeaker broadcasts were heard occasionally by the MR1 NVA PW but they were heard clearly on less than half of those occasions; this suggests that the full potential of the impact is reduced to an unknown extent by operating and/or mechanical problems. It is very significant that almost all have seen leaflets but less than one-third have read them and little credence is given to them.

6. There is some receptivity -- although a small one representing about 15-20% of the total -- for defection appeals but the fact that the individuals who represent the market are all prisoners who say they were captured in combat indicates something additional is needed to evoke action rather than just arouse curiosity or interest.

7. Experiences in RVN tend to confirm rather than negate expectations created by Party propaganda: food was seldom a problem, sickness was frequent but seldom fatal, and exposure to hostilities seems small. Stress does not seem great enough to evoke such a drastic action as defection except in those already predisposed.
8. There appear to be very few positive motivators for NVA. Their conviction of superior strength and complete confidence in ultimate victory is the key to their morale; both notions are a product of the NVA's total news control and pervasive mind-conditioning indoctrination programs.

Profile of the NVA Soldier in MR2

(U) The NVA soldier captured in MR2 shows the following typical characteristics:

1. The typical NVA soldier captured in MR2 in 1970 is a draftee who is a little older on the average than his counterparts in other areas and has led a very restricted and controlled early life. Neither he nor his family wanted him to enter military service, and his 1-in-5 chance of a relative being a war casualty is the highest throughout the country for NVA soldiers.

2. The amount of NVN effort devoted to cradle-to-grave news control and thought-conditioning may have a mild backlash in the existing circumstances. There are about 2 chances in 5 that he has a negative attitude toward the various control and surveillance mechanisms. He is much more ready than those in other regions to say that there was some resentment in his unit about such practices.

3. He was a somewhat unwilling combatant since he did not want to go to RVN and was in no hurry to get there after he started to South Vietnam. On the 3-month trip, illness was frequent in his unit; about 5% could not continue and it is a 1-in-4 chance that about 4 men died from sickness.

4. Opportunities to see those aspects of GVN areas which might confirm or disprove his indoctrination-based expectations were few and brief. He had very little contact with people or villages in both Front-controlled and GVN-controlled areas. There was a modest amount of exposure to South Vietnamese NLF personnel and most of his time was spent in forests.

5. Many psyop resources apparently can be used more profitably in other ways or require rethinking. It is extremely informative about the degree of control accomplished by the Party or the degree of credibility given to its policies since, although almost all had seen leaflets,
6. A small percentage of the NVA have allowed their thoughts to encompass the possibility of defection in some form; nevertheless, almost all are now prisoners who claim they were captured in combat or as a result of severe wounds. Some factor to be added on the side of defection is needed to tip the balance; integration of psyop with tactical planning and operations should be routine rather than sporadic.

7. Experiences in SVN form a neutral balance with indoctrination-derived notions. Food does not seem to be a problem. Sickness was a problem of some proportions with malaria being prevalent; for example, it is probable that he lost about thirty days through sickness too severe to allow him to carry out any of his normal duties. It may be significant that if hospitalization was needed, there were perhaps 3 chances in 5 of getting it. Exposure to hostilities seems comparatively slight.

8. There are no discernible tangible and positive motivating factors in the life of the lower-ranking NVA soldier in RVN. Benefits or rewards appear minimal even in his perspective; for example, his monthly pay in RVN was 60 GVN piastres -- about enough to buy one package of cigarettes. Apparently, no current or future benefits or rewards were held out to him. He does expect a pension and a job if disabled and aid to his family if he is killed but these are negative nullifiers of concerns rather than positive motivators; i.e., he must be hurt severely or lose his life for these benefits to be applicable.

(U) On balance there has been general minor disappointment about his experiences in South Vietnam and his indoctrination-derived notions are a little frayed around the edges; for example, he recognizes that, on balance, NLF support among the general public is less than he had been led to expect. This is a very significant factor in view of the fact that public support is a key factor in the logical structure of the NVA indoctrination program.

(U) The usual complete confidence in eventual victory is not found. On balance, he still thinks NLF is the eventual victor, but conviction is lacking.
Profile of the NVA Soldier in MR3

(U) The NVA soldier captured in MR3 shows the following typical characteristics:

1. The typical low-ranking NVA soldier captured in MR3 early in 1970 was a draftee; both he and his family had mixed emotions about his entrance into military service and his going south to join the fighting. He led a very restricted and controlled early life. There is a 1-in-25 chance that his father may be considered a war casualty, but no other close relatives are war casualties.

2. Indoctrination during training in NVN and in the field in RVN appears to have been less thorough and less frequent than for comparable samples in other regions.

3. The trip to the South appears to have been more rigorous for this group than for similar groups in other areas of the country. The five-month trip to RVN, in a 500-man unit where few men had weapons, was marked by considerable sickness; about 10% of the men were unable to continue and some died from sickness.

4. There has been little contact with civilians in RVN in both NLF and GVN-controlled areas. There has been frequent contact with VC soldiers partly but not solely because there were both VC and NVA soldiers in his unit; contact with VCI is very infrequent. Since most of his time has been spent in forests he has had little direct exposure to situations, other than military operations, that might confirm or conflict with his indoctrination-derived notions about RVN.

5. The typical NVA soldier in MR3 has been reached by more psyop media than NVA in any other MR. Leaflets are seen by about 95%, and read by about 70%; about one-third give some degree of credence to the content of some of the messages. MR3 NVA PW's are the only ones to have read GVN newspapers before becoming prisoners; 20% read newspapers but believed little of what was read; about 5% read posters of slogans on novelty items.

(U) No ground loudspeaker messages reached them and they saw no television programs. About 40% heard radio broadcasts but preferred music to the news which they did not believe. Almost all heard airborne loudspeaker messages occasionally but often could not hear clearly or understand them. Less than half of what was heard was judged to be believable.
6. NVA PW's in MR3 were much more likely to have considered some form of defection than were NVA in any other MR. Twenty-four percent had considered surrendering, 18% had thought of rallying, and 30% had considered other alternative methods -- usually desertion. Excluding overlaps in the percentages, almost 40% of the sample had considered at least one of these actions. The fact that 88% expected death or torture when captured is surely associated with their failure to reach a positive decision when they were considering defection.

7. Sickness was pervasive; the average NVA soldier was incapacitated for an average of 20 days during his time in RVN. A large proportion -- although still a minority -- were dissatisfied with medical care and medicines received. Food was seldom a serious problem. Frequent contact with VC soldiers who may have a realistic view of general conditions in RVN, coupled with less intense and pervasive indoctrination, may be related to his perception of negative differences between what he was told in NVN and what he experienced himself in RVN.

8. No tangible rewards are found for the typical NVA soldier in MR3. He has not been promised any current rewards. There is a 1-in-3 chance he has been told of future rewards and benefits; these hinge on victory and are largely intangible such as "better priorities" and "esteem". If tangible, they are still essentially symbolic such as medals and citations. The indoctrination he has received about how soldiers are treated by GVN is certainly a strong deterrent to defection. He no longer is completely convinced that NLF will win under any circumstances but those who do not choose NLF as the eventual victor are uncertain about who will win rather than judging that RVN will win.

Profile of the NVA Soldier in MR4

(U) The NVA soldier captured in MR4 shows the following typical characteristics:

1. The typical NVA soldier taken prisoner in MR4 in 1970 at 21 years of age is the youngest among samples from the four Military Regions. He grew up in a restricted and tightly-controlled rural environment. There is about 1 chance in 20 that his father or a sister is considered a war casualty.
2. Cradle-to-grave news control and thought conditioning creates individuals who unquestioningly accept NVN leaders' version of events. This belief in NVN's version of "reality" -- grossly distorted from a Westerner's point of view -- is the basis for NVA "morale". Surveillance and control mechanisms such as group discussions, criticism sessions, and 3-man cells are enjoyed or liked rather than resented.

3. Although a draftee rather than a volunteer, his comparatively intensive indoctrination while in NVN apparently created an enthusiastic soldier for he was eager to start South to join the fighting. During the five-month trip, there was always sufficient food for his 600-man unit, half of which carried weapons. Sickness was frequent; slightly over 2% dropped out because of illness and several men may have died.

4. Exposure to the villages and civilians of RVN was small although there were occasional opportunities to talk to VC soldiers. He tends to be uncertain or ambivalent about how well the VC and NVA get along together.

5. Psyop efforts seem either to involve inappropriate media, or be subject to purely mechanical problems, or be thwarted by NVA discipline. GVN newspapers, posters, and novelty items are not read by any NVA. No ground loudspeaker broadcasts and no television programs were heard or seen. The very infrequently heard radio news or messages were disbelieved in entirety.

(U) Leaflets were seen by more than 70% but read by less than 15%; more than half of this 15% believed none of what was read. Airborne loudspeaker broadcasts were heard by about 40%, usually were not heard clearly, were seldom understandable, and were judged not credible by almost all who heard them.

6. The NVN PW in MR4 is the most intransigent of all. He claims to have given no thought to surrender; none to rallying, and never has considered any alternative methods of leaving the NVA ranks. He will not even speculate about what might be the most advantageous mode of defection for "another NVA soldier".

7. During his time in RVN he might have been ill seriously enough to lose about 20 days in which he did not carry out his normal duties; however, despite the frequency of illness in his unit, it was seldom fatal.

(U) His experience in RVN provided only strong confirmation of his indoctrination-derived expectations; for instance, it is an even chance that he finds NLF military operations even more successful than he has expected. His exposure to hostile actions about equals those in MR3 and is considerably more than those in MR1 and MR2.
8. No tangible rewards for military service are detectable. His conviction of eventual victory is the strongest and the least uncertain found in all four Military Regions.

Profile of the VC Soldier in MR1

(U) The VC soldier captured in MR1 shows the following typical characteristics:

1. The typical VC soldier taken prisoner in MR1 in 1970 very probably had at least one war casualty in his immediate family. It is a 42% chance that his father is a war casualty; 24% his mother; 18% a sister; and 32% chance that a brother is a war casualty.

2. The median time of 20 hours devoted to political indoctrination after joining the Front was preceded by lengthy discussions before he actually became a volunteer. Subsequent indoctrination in the field was conducted almost entirely by other VC personnel. Group discussion and various forms of criticism sessions were frequent and were enjoyed as was participation in a 3-man cell.

3. The typical VC soldier captured in MR1 was an eager volunteer whose desire to join the Front was supported by his parents. He was proud to join and was in a hurry to get to the fighting.

4. After having joined the Front, there was little contact with civilians in GVN-controlled areas but there was a considerable amount of contact with NVA soldiers; relations between the NVA and VC were judged to range from normal to very good.

5. Exposure to psyop varies greatly by media. All VC PW's had seen GVN leaflets frequently but only one-third had read any; only some of what was read was believed some of the time. Eight percent had read GVN newspapers, 6% had read posters, and none had seen novelty items bearing slogans or messages.

(U) All in the VC PW sample had heard the sound of airborne loudspeakers occasionally but ability to hear the words clearly varied considerably in frequency. The same was true for understandability of the message theme or content; none were able to understand the theme all or most of the time. A fifth of the total sample believed some portion of the messages some of the time.
6. The typical VC prisoner taken in MR1 described himself as a dedicated soldier; he claimed to have given virtually no consideration to any form of defection.

7. Frequent illness and exposure to air strikes, artillery, heavy bombing, and combat dangers should have combined to create considerable stress but personal experience appears to have reinforced rather than undermined adherence to indoctrination-derived belief in NLF superiority and eventual victory.

8. Motivation was emotionally or idealistically based for no obvious material rewards for participation in the Front were described. VC soldiers did not share the NVA belief that a pension and a job will be available for the disabled and that financial aid will be given to the families of men who are killed. Complete conviction of ultimate victory played a major role in sustaining motivation.

Profile of the VC Soldier in MR4

(U) The VC soldier captured in MR4 shows the following typical characteristics:

1. The typical VC soldier, captured in MR4 in 1970, was aged 22, had 3 years of schooling, and was from a farmer family in a small rural village; he is a Buddhist and an ancestor worshipper. There is about a 1-in-3 chance that a close relative is a war casualty.

2. The formative early years were not controlled by membership in a succession of junior Party-controlled organizations; the result is an individual with more freedom than the typical NVA soldier to make his own interpretation of what he sees and hears.

(U) After joining the Front, he received about 40 hours of political indoctrination. Group discussions and various forms of criticism were frequent while in the field; a majority of those who participated liked these sessions and liked being in a 3-man cell as well.

3. There were many indications of enthusiasm and high expectations more than three years ago at the time of joining the Front; dangers and hardships were discounted and help was confidently expected from civilians in both NLF and GVN controlled areas.
4. The fact that the VC soldier spends time in NLF-controlled villages and may have some contact with civilians in GVN areas who are perhaps VCI while the NVA soldier is unlikely to have such contacts, makes the VC soldier a credible source of information for any NVA soldiers who may be in his unit; the VC soldier is probably the source of much of the data that forms the NVA soldier's impression of RVN.

5. Success of attempts to reach the type of VC soldier who becomes a prisoner through various means of communications varies considerably. Leaflets were seen frequently by about three-quarters of the PW sample and were read by about one-fifth of the total. Ten percent gave some degree of credence to the leaflet messages.

(U) The sound of airborne loudspeaker messages reached two-thirds of the PW's occasionally. In the total sample only about one-quarter heard the words clearly on some occasions but among those who did hear the sound of the loudspeakers, about half heard clearly on some occasions but not on others. Less than one-fifth of the PW's gave any degree of credence to the messages' content.

(U) Posters, novelty items, and magazines did not reach the VC, nor did ground loudspeaker messages or television programs. All had seen radio sets; 12% had listened to the radio, and 8% had heard rally or surrender appeals on the radio.

6. Consideration has been given to rallying or surrendering, and to some alternatives as well. In speculating about what would be the "best way for a VC soldier to leave the ranks" almost half could select a method -- mostly rallying -- and most indicate that they might themselves have rallied if the right opportunity had occurred at the right time.

7. Frequent exposure to hostile action, occasional instances of inadequate medical care for sicknesses, and the possibility that he may -- although infrequently -- find himself without food for so long that his energy is impaired appear to underlie the VC soldier's tendency to make judgments favorable to RVN when comparing personal experiences with NLF indoctrination and propaganda.

8. Few sources of positive motivation appear to exist for the VC PW in MR4; there may be some extra emphasis on control through families since there is a comparatively high belief that families of defectors may be adversely affected. What may have once been confidence in eventual victory now appears more like uncertainty about who will win.
(U) The rallier is an atypical NVA soldier. In the course of the war up to early 1970, more than 7,000 NVA prisoners had been taken. This is roughly 10% of the NVA troops that have been in the field. Some 700 NVA soldiers had rallied; this is roughly 1% of the NVA troops that have been in the field. The NVA rallier is a disaffected individual, not a convert who has made a positive change of allegiance.

1. The typical NVA rallier (who overall is an atypical NVA soldier) received within RVN in early 1970 was a draftee; neither he nor his family had wanted him to enter military service. He is twice as likely to be married compared to NVA PW's and is 5 or 6 years older than the average NVA PW. It is less than a 10% chance that there is a war casualty in his family.

(U) The typical NVA rallier had received about fifty hours of political indoctrination in a period of about six months while in NVN after entering military service.

2. He has a distinctly more negative attitude toward the communist surveillance and control mechanisms. In addition, more ralliers than prisoners claim not to have been affected by or exposed to various forms of controls which is itself suggestive of a general adaptive avoidance.

3. The duration of his trip to RVN averaged about four months. Food was not a problem but illness was frequent and apparently served as an excuse for some men to return to NVN. Deaths from illness were infrequent but most of the men in his group were somewhat devitalized when they arrived at their destination; few men arrived in normal good health.

4. The NVA rallier has had at least as much exposure to RVN civilians in NLF-controlled areas as any NVA PW and considerably more than most. He does not appear to have any more contact with VC or VCI personnel than the typical NVA PW. A large majority of his time was spent in forested areas.

5. Almost all NVA ralliers had seen and read GVN leaflets frequently and found them easy to understand. A majority of the messages were rally appeals. Most contained some form of instructions that the rallier judged made the act of rallying seem somewhat more safe.
(U) A large majority had been exposed to airborne loudspeaker broadcasts; although he had the usual difficulty in hearing them, more than half of the sample found some of the messages to be believable. Almost half had listened to GVN radio broadcasts but only 10% remembered any radio psyop appeals.

6. Compared to NVA PW's, the NVA rallier is much more likely to have considered various forms of defection prior to his rallying. He favored rallying as the best means to leave the NVA ranks mainly because he believed the promise of "good treatment". Apparently, the promise of "good treatment" and "warm welcome" are important adjuncts to rally appeals; more specific details about the treatment may be even more persuasive.

7. The NVA rallier had a difficult time in RVN. Typically there was much illness and many deaths from illness in his unit. If he needed medical care he is likely to have felt that he received inadequate treatment. He is also likely to have experienced a severe shortage of food on one or more occasions. There was considerable exposure to air strikes, artillery, and heavy bombing; some losses in his unit were probably associated with each of these actions in addition to losses suffered in combat. Perhaps because of all these factors he is disillusioned about the NLF position on many of the issues treated in indoctrination programs. In particular, he feels that the NLF military operations are much less successful than he had been led to believe.

8. Many negative and no positive motivating factors can be identified for the NVA rallier. He did not want to enter military service originally and now has no interest in a military career. He is not aware of any current or future rewards that he can expect to receive and, on balance, feels that his being in military service has had an adverse effect on his family's financial situation. He began military service dissatisfied with his salary and allowances and remained dissatisfied; the fact that his monthly pay while in RVN was between 50 and 80 GVN piastres a month represents a concrete reason for feeling that he is not properly compensated. If he ever had the conviction -- shared by most NVA soldiers -- that NLF would win the war, he has now lost that conviction.
### Task 3: Psychological Factors of the NVA/VC Soldier

#### Phase 1: Survey of 800 NVA/VC POW's and HoI Chanh

**Man-Month Allocation Chart**

**Chart 3**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TITLE</th>
<th>STUDY</th>
<th>JAN</th>
<th>FEB</th>
<th>MAR</th>
<th>APR</th>
<th>MAY</th>
<th>JUN</th>
<th>JUL</th>
<th>AUG</th>
<th>SEP</th>
<th>OCT</th>
<th>NOV</th>
<th>DEC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NVA-POW</td>
<td>1A</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1B</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1C</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1D</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STUDY 1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VC-POW</td>
<td>2A</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2B</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2C</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2D</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STUDY 2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NVA-HC</td>
<td>3A</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3B</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STUDY 3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VC-HC</td>
<td>4A</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4B</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STUDY 4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Study 5</td>
<td>Study Group</td>
<td>SEP</td>
<td>OCT</td>
<td>NOV</td>
<td>DEC</td>
<td>JAN</td>
<td>FEB</td>
<td>MAR</td>
<td>APR</td>
<td>MAY</td>
<td>JUN</td>
<td>JUL</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5A</td>
<td>NVA POW</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5B</td>
<td>NVA HC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5C</td>
<td>VC POW</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5D</td>
<td>VC HC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STUDY 5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Study 6</th>
<th>Study Group</th>
<th>SEP</th>
<th>OCT</th>
<th>NOV</th>
<th>DEC</th>
<th>JAN</th>
<th>FEB</th>
<th>MAR</th>
<th>APR</th>
<th>MAY</th>
<th>JUN</th>
<th>JUL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6A</td>
<td>NVA POW</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6B</td>
<td>NVA HC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6C</td>
<td>VC POW</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6D</td>
<td>VC HC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| STUDY 6 |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Study 7</th>
<th>Study Group</th>
<th>SEP</th>
<th>OCT</th>
<th>NOV</th>
<th>DEC</th>
<th>JAN</th>
<th>FEB</th>
<th>MAR</th>
<th>APR</th>
<th>MAY</th>
<th>JUN</th>
<th>JUL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7A</td>
<td>NVA POW/HC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7B</td>
<td>VC POW/HC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| STUDY 7 |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Study 8</th>
<th>Study Group</th>
<th>SEP</th>
<th>OCT</th>
<th>NOV</th>
<th>DEC</th>
<th>JAN</th>
<th>FEB</th>
<th>MAR</th>
<th>APR</th>
<th>MAY</th>
<th>JUN</th>
<th>JUL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8A</td>
<td>POW NVA/VC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8B</td>
<td>HC NVA/VC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| STUDY 8 |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Study 9</th>
<th>Study Group</th>
<th>SEP</th>
<th>OCT</th>
<th>NOV</th>
<th>DEC</th>
<th>JAN</th>
<th>FEB</th>
<th>MAR</th>
<th>APR</th>
<th>MAY</th>
<th>JUN</th>
<th>JUL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9A</td>
<td>NVA/VC Soldier</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| STUDY 9 |

**TASK 3: PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS OF THE NVA/VC SOLDIER**

**PHASE 2: ASSESSMENT OF THE ENEMY SOLDIER**

**MAN-MONTH ALLOCATION CHART**

**CHART 4**
PAG TASK 4

FACTORS AFFECTING SUPPORT FOR GVN
FACTORS AFFECTING SUPPORT FOR GVN

Summary and Introduction

(U) JUSPAO requested research into factors affecting support for GVN.

(U) The survey was intended to supply information needed to improve the effectiveness of JUSPAO products directly related to political aspects of the war, which are targeted to South Vietnamese audiences.

(U) A five-phase study was designed to (1) construct the data base needed for design and development of means to assess relevant factors; (2) prepare instruments and conduct research to identify attitudes relevant to GVN support; (3) prepare instruments and conduct survey of communications media impact patterns; (4) determine perspective on appropriate role of information and methods for communications; (5) consolidate and analyze results for report.

(U) This research task was held in abeyance while more urgent research needs were filled. It was not undertaken later.

(U) The plan to research a problem that is even larger in 1971 than it was in 1970 is reported here.
Problem

(U) JUSPAO requested that HSR conduct a study of communication needs of a people developing their government while defending against military invasion. The PAG Task Statement:

Task 4, Priority 2: In order to improve the effectiveness of JUSPAO products, directly related to political aspects of the war, which are targeted to South Vietnamese audiences, analyze the factors which affect the GVN's gaining support of the countryside, emphasizing the following issues:

a. Research, primarily through field study, the attitudes of rural people relevant to support for the GVN.

b. Determine which media are best able to reach the people.

c. Place in perspective the role of information in gaining support for the GVN.

d. Determine whether GVN is using the right means of communication, if information has a significant role in gaining support for the GVN.

Background

(U) The people in RVN are variably exposed to different sources of communications depending on geographic location, economic status, literacy, and other such factors. A not inconsiderable factor which affects the potential effectiveness of communications is existence of built-in culturally-based attitudes which affect the credibility of news and information received in different ways. The overall problem is compounded by the impact of enemy-introduced distortions of news and propaganda.
(U) To be effective, an information-dissemination program package must first reach most or all of the individuals who compose the many diverse groups within GVN. Next, the messages conveyed in many different treatments through many different media should achieve the same effect for all -- that is, promotion of individual and group acceptance and identification with GVN aims.

(U) The problems faced by the communicators are truly staggering.

(U) JUSPAO has undertaken many programs and activities since its inception in Vietnam during a period of time when the demand for its services and products was always in excess of resources; the success of these efforts is evidenced by the fact that many of the resultant publications or activities are still in operation. During the time when operational necessities automatically had first priority, secondary activities naturally gave way. Therefore, it is entirely understandable that systematized efforts could not be made in the past to evaluate the utility of each program or activity.

(U) Now, as purely military activities plateau or decline and as GVN is called on to assume more responsibility in all areas, the civilian-oriented pacification and development activities assume progressively greater importance. Pacification and development will not be brought about solely by force. It must be facilitated by a carefully considered blend of actions and examples forcefully brought to the attention of the general population through effectively persuasive information-dissemination programs to motivate support for GVN; in this task, JUSPAO has a major responsibility. The issues treated in news and information media, the manner in which the issues are treated, and especially the impact of messages to the general population must come under careful and close scrutiny. Note that the concern should not be limited only to those who are presently civilians. Those who are now in military and paramilitary services will also be "civilians" in the not-too-distant future; these individuals are a significant group among the general population (with a heavy loading of individuals of rural origin).

(U) Fortunately, it is now possible to devote some time and effort to activities designed to increase the success of future information support programs with derivative beneficial effects upon attitudes toward the GVN P&D Plan and toward GVN as a whole. This effort will be devoted to a systematic means of evaluating the prevailing general attitudes toward support for GVN, the various needs for information, and the best means of getting the right information to the right people at the right time in the right way to engender support.
This study should be undertaken in close collaboration, or desirably in full participation, with GVN agencies such as the Ministry of Information (MOI), General Political Warfare Department (GPWD), the Social and Behavioral Sciences Section of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam Combat Development Test Center (ARVN CDTC), and others. Their assistance is not vitally necessary but the training and experience gained by the Vietnamese participants would represent a sizeable bonus without any increase in costs.

Results of a successfully executed study will have direct application to MAG and USIS activities far beyond the scope of Vietnam.

**HSR Research Approach**

An attempt to identify factors which operate to determine the attitudes of the general population toward the Government of Vietnam may represent a task of the same magnitude as JUSPAO's own primary task of trying to communicate meaningfully and similarly to all Vietnamese. As a minimum, major considerations that must be covered include identification of what "GVN" means to all major groups; identification and measurement of the attitudes of significant groups toward the image, aims, and actions of GVN; search for the sources, kinds, and strengths of factors which impact attitudes positively or negatively; identification of patterns of use of information-dissemination media; identification of kinds, volume, and content of news-dissemination activities; and subsequent identification of the most credible and effective themes, treatment, media, human resources, and timing for information dissemination purposes.

In the several earlier versions of the presently proposed task statements, Task 4 was built around GVN Pacification and Development Plan, its objectives, and JUSPAO and GVN information support programs. Several weeks of discussion and search have not discovered alternative means for defining GVN aims and objectives in a way that can be specified and tested in the field. Since no useful alternative is realistically available at this time, the P&D Plan necessarily will be an important source of "GVN aims".

This research plan, which represents a conservatively conceptualized minimum but adequate response to the task statement, is comprised of five sub-tasks. The combined results of these sub-tasks will respond to the general and specific issues contained in the PAG task statement.
Sub-task 4.1 - Preparation of Data Base

(U) Survey materials relevant to identification of GVN aims; implementing announcements, plans, and programs; and the information support activities of JUSPAO, MOI, and other news-dissemination agents to construct the data base are needed for design and development of data-collection instruments and procedures appropriate for identification and analysis of the factors which affect GVN's gaining support in the countryside. Three different types of data about three different types of activities will be acquired by the following activities:

1. Construct agreed-upon definitions of what constitutes "support for GVN".

2. Identify GVN actions, and information released to the public about these actions, that could have impacted the general population and could have affected attitudes.

3. Identify the related information programs and information support activities of JUSPAO, the GVN Ministry of Information (MOI), and other news-dissemination agents.

Sub-task 4.2 - Identify Attitudes Relevant to Support for GVN

(U) Design and develop questionnaires and other data-collection instruments and procedures needed to determine the attitudes of rural people that are relevant to gaining support for GVN and identify the major factors that influence the nature and intensity of attitudes toward the GVN; execute field surveys using questionnaires and other data-collection instruments and procedures.

Sub-task 4.3 - Survey Communications Media Impact Patterns

(U) Design and develop questionnaires and other data-collection instruments and procedures needed to assess which media are best able to reach the people. Conduct field surveys using questionnaires and other appropriate data-collection instruments and procedures.
Sub-task 4.4 - Determine Perspective on Appropriate Role of Information and Methods for Communications

(U) Analyze the data obtained in Sub-tasks 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3 and collect other information as necessary to develop perspective on the role of information in gaining support for the GVN and determine whether appropriate means of communication are being used.

Sub-task 4.5 - Prepare Consolidated Report

(U) Consolidate the data and analyze the results of Sub-tasks 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, 4.4; prepare an overall summary report.

(U) Detailed research plans and flow-charts are attached for all sub-tasks.

Research Plan

(U) Sub-task 4.1: Prepare Data Base

1. Arrange through JUSPAO liaison, access to US and GVN officials, agencies, facilities, and documents as needed.

2. Review all documents available through JUSPAO which bear upon the GVN aims and objectives with special emphasis on review of the Pacification and Development Plan (P&D Plan); identify assumptions, objectives, priorities, and relevance to various geographical areas of the country.

3. Review the steps taken to date on the part of GVN to implement their objectives and the P&D Plan, and the process by which implementation is achieved; the difference in planned implementation and the actual implementation; the sources supporting various types of implementation and those opposing.

4. Determine the distinctive geographical areas of the country in terms of pertinence for various objectives and in terms of distinctive population groups distinguished on the basis of interests, language, ideology, etc.
5. On the basis of Steps 2, 3 and 4 relate objectives and implementing actions of the P&D Plan to geographical areas.

6. Assess popular support needed and desirable for each objective by area.

7. Interview US and GVN officials and survey agencies, facilities, and documents needed to construct a data base and create perspective on the major information support programs that are operational in support of the GVN P&D Plan.

8. Survey all GVN and JUSPAO information programs, activities, resources, and capabilities.

9. Judge the past and present role of information support in relation to achievement of GVN P&D aims; retain in project files as pre-study assessment for update at end of study.

10. Arrange through JUSPAO to receive for review all pertinent documents relevant to GVN aims and to each P&D objective on a current basis.

11. Arrange through JUSPAO to receive for review all reports of pertinent GVN meetings/decisions relating to GVN aims and to P&D objectives on a current basis.

12. Determine the various sets of information needed to survey rural peoples' attitudes toward GVN aims and the P&D objectives.

13. Specify (restate) aims and objectives of the GVN, emphasizing the GVN P&D Plan:

   a. At a level of concept, detail, and language that has personal applicability and meaning for individuals in a rural population.

   b. In a manner which enable questions to be formulated which treat the pertinent dimensions of rural populations' attitudes and which may evoke an answer whether or not an individual is aware that the objectives exist.
1. Design and develop sampling plans and procedures.

2. Design and develop needed questionnaires and other research and data-collection instruments and procedures for attitude surveys.

3. Through JUSPAO, make initial contact and arrangements with the MACV Data Management Agency to insure conformance to any local special technical requirements for key-punching and machine-processing of obtained data.

4. Working with bilingual specialists, both US and Vietnamese, analyze each part of the developing questionnaires in an attempt to assure conceptual equivalence and intra-instrument consistency.

5. Select an interview team and instruct the team in administration of data-collection instruments and survey procedures.

6. Administer questionnaires to small test populations to pre-test instruments and procedures.

7. Tabulate pre-selected responses of test populations and summarize by question.

8. Translate free-responses of test populations, and regroup responses by questions (as distinguished from grouping by individuals); analyze to establish categories; categorize responses and summarize.

9. Analyze results from test populations in terms of instrument design.

10. Modify questionnaires and procedures as appropriate on basis of analysis of results of test administration.

11. Have bilingual experts, both US and Vietnamese, check each part of each revised questionnaire for conceptual equivalence and intra-instrument consistency.
12. Have final master copies of the questionnaires and other materials typed in English and in Vietnamese.

13. Prepare appropriate versions of data-collection instruments for each geographical area which requires distinctive treatment.

14. Reinstruct interview teams on administration of questionnaires and survey procedures.

15. Have questionnaires and other materials printed.

16. Select desired populations from rural areas for which instruments are appropriate.

17. Obtain through JUSPAO and MACJ3-11, any necessary permits or clearances (US, GVN, local area, etc.) for access to survey populations, transportation, housing, and subsistence support for interview teams.

18. Schedule survey teams with supervisory personnel to rural areas selected.

19. Arrange through JUSPAO or MACJ3-11 for machine data processing of results.

20. Conduct surveys and studies.

21. Tabulate and summarize pre-selected response results.

22. Translate narrative answers to free-response questions.

23. Regroup free-response answers by question; analyze to establish categories; categorize responses and summarize.


25. Interpret results.
26. Issue summary reports, where findings warrant, relative to:

a. Profiles of rural Vietnamese attitudes toward support of GVN and P&D Plan objectives.

b. Factors that cause existence of or changes in attitudes related to support of GVN.

c. Identification of attitudes which may be affected by possession or lack of information.

d. Identification where possible, of any significant ways in which P&D programs are suited to psychological exploitation through publicizing themes or content that may have positive application to GVN aims.

(U) Sub-task 4.3: Survey Communications Media Impact Pattern

1. Design and develop sampling plans and procedures to survey means of communication and appropriate use of various media.

2. Design and develop needed questionnaires and other research and data-collection instruments and procedures.

3. Through JUSPAO, make initial contact and arrangements with the MACV Data Management Agency to insure conformance to any local special technical requirements for key-punching and machine-processing of obtained data.

4. Working with bilingual specialists, both US and Vietnamese, analyze each part of the developing questionnaires to assure conceptual equivalence and intra-instrument consistency.
5. Select an interview team and instruct the team in administration of data-collection instruments and survey procedures.

6. Administer questionnaires to small test populations to pre-test instruments and procedures.

7. Tabulate pre-selected responses of test populations and summarize by question.

8. Translate free-responses of test populations, and regroup response by question (as distinguished from grouping by individuals); categories; categorize answers and summarize.

9. Analyze results from test populations in terms of instrument design.

10. Modify questionnaires and procedures as appropriate on basis of analysis of results of test administration.

11. Have bilingual experts, both US and Vietnamese, check each part of each revised questionnaire for conceptual equivalence and intra-instrument consistency.

12. Have final master copies of the questionnaires and other materials typed in English and in Vietnamese.

13. Prepare appropriate versions of data-collection instruments for each geographical area which requires distinctive treatment.

14. Reinstruct interview teams on administration of questionnaires and survey procedures.

15. Have questionnaires and other materials printed.

16. Select desired populations from rural areas for which instruments are appropriate.
17. Obtain through JUSPAO and MACJ3-11 any necessary permits or clearances (US, GVN, local area, etc.) for access to survey populations, transportation, housing, and subsistence support for interview teams.

18. Schedule survey teams with supervisory personnel to rural areas selected.

19. Arrange through JUSPAO or MACJ3-11 for machine data processing of results.

20. Conduct surveys and studies.

21. Tabulate and summarize pre-selected response results.

22. Translate narrative answers to free-response questions.

23. Regroup free-response answers by question; analyze to establish categories; categorize answers and summarize.


25. Interpret results.

26. Issue summary reports, where findings warrant, relative to:

   a. Identification of attitudes directly affected by possession or lack of information.

   b. Development of proper perspective on the role that is realistically possible and appropriate for information support programs and activities.

   c. Use of the right means of communication and communications media in terms of probable audience, appropriate content, and comparative effectiveness.

   d. Identification, where possible, of any significant ways in which P&D programs are suited to psychological exploitation through publicizing themes or content that may have positive application to GVN aims.
(U) Sub-task 4.4: Determine Perspective on Appropriate Role of Information and Methods for Communication

1. Consolidate and organize the data obtained in Sub-tasks 4.1, 4.2, 4.3.

2. Analyze the consolidated data to identify existence of needs for additional data.

3. Analyze the consolidated data for various communications methods and media from the standpoint of audience size and acceptance in relation to publication frequency and volume, content, credibility of content, and tone or style in the case of hard-copy media.

4. Prepare a brief summary report treating such issues as:
   a. Identification of attitudes affected by possession or lack of information.
   b. Identification, where possible, of any significant ways in which support for P&D objectives can be aided through information support activities.

(U) Sub-task 4.5: Prepare Consolidated Report

1. Organize the data from Sub-tasks 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, and 4.4.

2. Analyze the consolidated data and prepare a summary report of Task 4.0.

Staffing. The effort required for Task 4.0 assumes availability of contracted Vietnamese personnel trained in survey research procedures, interviewing, and translation. It will require two HSR Research Scientists for a total of thirty man-months spread over sixteen calendar months with intermittent participation of HSR Senior Research Scientists.

Table 7 shows the overall schedule for Task 4.0.
### TASK 4.0

**FACTORS AFFECTING SUPPORT FOR GVN**

**MAN-MONTH ALLOCATION CHART**

**CHART 6**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1970</th>
<th>1971</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>Jun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>4.1</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prepare Data Base</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>4.2</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attitude Surveys</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>4.3</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Survey Media Impact</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>4.4</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role of Information</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>4.5</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consolidate Report</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
SUBTASK 4.1: WORKFLOW CHART

CHART 7

1. Arrange JUSPAO Liaison/Access
2. Review Pertinent Documents
3. Review Implementation Plans/Actions
4. Determine Pertinent Geographical Distinctions
5. Relate P&D Objectives Implementing Actions
6. Assess Support/Area/Objective
7. Interview Officials/Survey Agencies Responsible for Information Support Programs
8. Survey GVN/JUSPAO Information Programs/Resources
9. Assess Role of Information Support
11. Review Current Pertinent Activities Reports
12. Determine Information Needs for Survey
13. Specify GVN Aims/Objectives in Research Specific Terms

Go to Box 7
SUBTASK 4.3: WORKFLOW CHART

CHART 9

- Design and Develop Research Instruments (2)
- Minitual Analysis of Instruments (4)
- Pre-Test Instruments (6)
- Translate/Summarize Pre-Selected Responses (8)
- Analyze in Terms of Instrument Design (5)
- Modify Questionnaire as Necessary (10)
- Bilingual Analysis of Modified Instruments (11)
- Prepare Final Masters (12)
- Tabulate and Summarize Pre-Selected Response Data (21)
- Analyze Results (24)
- Interpret Results (25)
- Issue Summary Reports (36)

- Coordinate with DMA for Machine-Processing Requirements (3)

- Prepare Appropriate Versions for each Geographic Area Required (13)
- Have Materials Printed (15)

- Reintest Interview Teams (14)

- Select Sampling Areas (18)

- Schedule Team/Supervisors to Areas (19)

- Conduct Surveys and Studies (20)

- Translate Narrative Response Data (22)
- Summarize Narrative Responses Data (23)
Subtask 4.4: Workflow Chart

Chart 10

Subtask 4.1

Subtask 4.2

Subtask 4.3

Consolidate and Organize Data from Subtasks 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3

Identify Additional Data Needs

Prepare Summary Report

Assess Audience Response to Communication
SUBTASK 4.5: WORKFLOW CHART

CHART 11

- Subtask 4.1
- Subtask 4.2
- Subtask 4.3
- Subtask 4.4

Consolidate and Organize Data from Subtasks 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, and 4.4

Analyze Consolidated Data

Prepare Summary Report
PAG TASK 5

(U) JUSPAO PUBLICATIONS EVALUATION (U)
Summary and Discussion

(JUSPAO requested a survey of audiences and attitudes toward four JUSPAO Vietnamese language publications distributed free of charge in South Vietnam. These four: *Huong Que*, a monthly magazine; *Viet-Nam Ngay Nay*, a weekly newspaper; *Long Me*, a magazine published bi-monthly; and *The-Gioi Tu-Do*, a monthly magazine.

This survey was intended to supply urgently needed data for executive decisions about the future policy, course, and continuance of these publications.

A three-phase study was undertaken to (1) collect and consolidate existing information; (2) develop instruments for and collect needed additional information; (3) organize, analyze and report findings. JUSPAO arranged with various outside resources to collect the data within ongoing survey efforts.

Findings are summarized for each of the four studies below.

Summary of Huong Que Study

1. The definition of "audiences" in underdeveloped countries is complicated by varying literacy rates; therefore, two different definitions of audiences have been considered here (see section titled "Discussion" for descriptions of the bases for computation).

   *Huong Que is read by 43\% of "all rural villagers".*

   *Huong Que is read by 86\% of "all rural villagers able to read in some degree".*

2. Best available estimates placed the 1966 population of RVN at about 16,000,000. After appropriate projections and adjustments it was calculated that a conservative estimate of "all available and accessible rural villagers" was 10,000,000 people. A generous estimate of "all rural villagers who are potential readers" was set at 12,800,000.
Based on 10,000,000 rural villagers, the absolute number of readers is 4,300,000.

Based on 12,800,000 rural villagers, the absolute number of readers is 5,500,000.

3. (U) The typical reader is a male farmer, married, aged 42-43, with two years of schooling.

4. (U) The content of Huong Que is understandable in whole or part for almost all of its readers. Articles concerning agriculture or animal husbandry receive the most widespread interest.

5. (5) The content of Huong Que articles is rated extremely high for "usefulness" which, in this context, can be interpreted to mean "applicable in some practical way."

Summary of Viet-Nam Ngay Nay (VNNN) Study

1. (U) The definition of "audiences" in underdeveloped countries is complicated by varying literacy rates; therefore, two different definitions of audiences have been considered here (see section titled "Discussion" for description of the bases for computation).

VNNN is read by 11% of "all rural villagers."

VNNN is read by 22% of "all rural villagers able to read in some degree."

2. (U) Best available estimates placed the 1966 population of RVN at about 16,000,000. After appropriate projections and adjustments it was calculated that a conservative estimate of "all available and accessible rural villagers" was 10,000,000 people. A generous estimate of "all rural villagers who are potential readers" was set at 12,800,000.

Based on 10,000,000 rural villagers, the absolute number of readers would be 1,200,000.

Based on 12,800,000 rural villagers, the absolute number of readers would be 1,400,000.
3. (U) A typical reader of VNNN is age 36-37, male, and married. In relation to occupation, a typical reader is not identifiable; 34% are farmers or unskilled laborers; 21% are semi-skilled craftsmen; and another 32% are merchants, technicians"professionals", or military; 13% are distributed thinly among other classifications. For the total group, the average level of education is approximately four years of schooling; it should be noted that this "average" figure does not adequately describe any of the three groups although it is correct for the composite group of VNNN readers.

4. (U) The content of VNNN is understandable in whole or part for a convincing majority of its readers. Articles on agrarian topics clearly receive the most popular interest.

5. (U) The content of VNNN articles is rated extremely high for "usefulness" which, in this context, can be interpreted to mean "informative" to VNNN readers.

**Summary of Long Me Study**

1. (U) The definition of "audiences" in underdeveloped countries is complicated by varying literacy rates; therefore, two different definitions of audiences have been considered here (see section titled "Discussion" for descriptions of the bases for computation) as well as separate renderings of rural and urban survey results.

   Long Me is read by 19% of "all adults" in rural areas.

   Long Me is read by 04% of "all adults" in urban areas.

   Long Me is read by 38% of "all adults able to read in some degree" in rural areas.

   Long Me is read by 08% of "all adults able to read in some degree" in urban areas.

2. (U) Best available estimates place the 1966 population of RVN at about 16,000,000. With this population figure as a base, adjusting for appropriate considerations such as war-related factors and age, a "general adult" population in 1970 has been derived. The figure which may be considered realistically descriptive of a potential nation-wide urban and rural audience approximates 12,000,000. Therefore, 12,000,000 "general adults" is a reasonable working figure to describe the population that may be reached by Long Me.
Based on 12,000,000 adults (10,000,000 rural and 2,000,000 urban), the absolute number of readers is approximately 2,000,000 people.

3. (U) A typical reader of Long Me is over 30, male, married, a farmer or laborer with four to five years of schooling.

4. (U) The content of Long Me is understandable in whole or part for a majority of its readers. Articles on various aspects of the Chieu Hoi program set against a rural or agrarian background receive the most widespread interest.

5. (U) The content of Long Me articles is rated overall as high for "usefulness" which, in this context, can be interpreted to mean "informative and/or interesting."

Summary of The-Gioi Tu-Do Study

1. (U) The intended audience for The-Gioi Tu-Do is defined as "...all elements of literate upper levels of the Vietnamese population; government officials; university faculty and students; military officers and cadre; professionals, business people, and shopkeepers; labor leaders, religious leaders, et al."

The actual reading audience, defined in terms of the distribution of copies of the magazine and the characteristics of its total readership, is more correctly described as the "better-educated general adult population"; this more broadly conceived audience is inclusive of the intended audience.

The-Gioi Tu-Do is read by 29% of the national "general adult" population.

The-Gioi Tu-Do is read by 53% of the national "general adult population able to read with some degree of comprehension".

2. (U) Best available estimates place the 1966 population of RVN at about 16,000,000. With this population figure as a base, adjusted for all appropriate considerations, a nationwide "general adult" population in 1970 has been derived. The figure which may be considered realistically descriptive of a potential urban and rural audience approximates 12,000,000. Therefore, 12,000,000 "general adults" is a reasonable working figure to describe the population that may be reached by The-Gioi Tu-Do.
Based on 12,000,000 adults (10,000,000 rural and 2,000,000 urban), the absolute number of readers is 3,480,000 people.

3. (U) The typical reader is a male businessman or skilled worker, married, age 36, with about five years of schooling. Approximately 14% of the urban readers report "some college" attendance.

4. (U) The content of The-Gioi Tu-Do is understandable for the most part to its readers. Articles on agrarian subjects and commercial development receive the most widespread interest.

5. (U) The content of The-Gioi Tu-Do articles is rated relatively high for "usefulness" considering the diversity of the audience; "usefulness", in this context, can be interpreted to mean furnishing information of interest to the The-Gioi Tu-Do reader.

Comment

(U) The reader is urged to regard the figures and statistics offered here with appropriate caution and prudence.

(U) The data is internally consistent, the logical analysis is conservative and simplistic (i.e., no inappropriately sophisticated statistical operations have been performed -- the mathematics are appropriate for the quality of the data), and interpretation is straightforward and has been kept to a minimum. The reader therefore can be confident that the statistics quoted provide a more factual basis for judgment than purely subjective estimates.

(U) Nevertheless, cross-cultural research statistics must be treated with caution even under peacetime conditions. In wartime, when many otherwise non-existent factors are operating, even more caution is advisable.
Problem

(U) JUSPAO requested that HSR conduct a survey of audiences and audience attitudes toward four JUSPAO publications. The PAG Task Statement:

Task 5, Priority 3: In order to improve effectiveness of JUSPAO products directly related to political aspects of the war targeted to South Vietnamese audiences, conduct the following research studies:

Survey the audience and attitudes toward four JUSPAO publications: Huong Que, Viet-Nam Ngay Nay, Long Me, and The-Gioi Tu-Do.

Background

(U) Some of the Joint United States Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO) communications media had been in operation for as long as six years. Available history indicated that, while there may have been intermittent efforts to survey audiences and attitudes towards the various communications instruments, the current project represented the first systematic attempt to provide such information on these publications.

(U) The survey was intended to supply urgently needed data for executive decisions about the future policy, course, and continuance of these publications.

HSR Research Approach

(U) The research plan for JUSPAO's third priority research need was designed to supplement and process data already collected on the basis of informal assistance and verbally agreed-upon task plans to generate quick-response summary reports.
The entire research study was designed in three phases. Phase 1 covered collection and consolidation of existing information. Phase 2 covered development of instruments for and collection of needed additional information. Phase 3 covered organization, analysis, and report of findings. Early phases were covered in consultation afforded JUSPAO in 1969. PAG task scheduling began with Phase 2, beginning in February 1970. Based upon prior effort conducted in response to verbal request, this involved assessment of findings and analysis of results in terms of management information needs. See Chart 13 for original task-flow diagram.

Research Plan

1. (U) Interview key people involved in production and distribution of Huong Que, Long Me, Ngay Nay, and The-Gioi Tu-Do to determine how each product is developed, the schedule followed, the people involved in production, objectives for each product, preparation of material for each, the source of concepts, copy, pictures, contributors, and procedures from production to delivery to the target audience.

2. (U) Examine representative samples of each product as provided by the key people interviewed.

3. (U) Search for and review results of available previous studies conducted on the products of interest. Where possible, state who conducted the study, whether it was systematic or casual, whether responses followed some pattern or were judgments, statements of opinion, observed facts, informed analyses. Record opinions, questions, judgments from any report which bears on the research question or product effectiveness.

4. (U) From the information gathered in Steps 1, 2, 3, organize information on each product into a systematic description with uniformity of format, for easy reference. Include some historical background, state the purpose the product was originated to fill, what objectives were stated originally, the current product objectives stated, the policies followed, intended audience, and volume of each publication.

5. (U) Identify the geographic areas served.

6. (U) Obtain through Field Development Division (FDD) of JUSPAO a detailed plan of distribution for each geographic area and reports of actual distribution within each geographic area.
7. (U) Based on information about product objectives and intended audiences, design questionnaires to survey readership.

8. (U) Translate the questionnaires and back-translate.

9. (U) Have bilingual specialists examine the questionnaires for conceptual equivalence and internal consistency.

10. (U) Have questionnaires printed.

11. (U) Select sampling areas and arrange for conduct of survey and any necessary clearances with US, GVN, and local agencies involved.

12. (U) Arrange for machine processing of survey results.

13. (U) Execute the questionnaire surveys.

14. (U) Tabulate results of closed-end questions.

15. (U) Translate answers to free-response questions.

16. (U) Summarize results of closed-end questions.

17. (U) Analyze translation of answers to free-response questions to establish categories for grouping; summarize.

18. (U) Analyze results.

19. (U) Prepare brief summary report of results.

(U) Chart 12 shows the schedule for this task.

(U) **Staffing.** Six man-months of effort of HSR Research Scientists was required. Intermittent participation of HSR Senior Research Scientists was also a requirement.