PAG TASK 7

EFFECT OF CAMBODIAN INCURSION
ON THE ENEMY SOLDIER
(U) HSR was requested in May 1970 to interrupt all ongoing research effort to devote full resources to assess the effect of military operations directed against VC/NVA sanctuaries in Cambodia.

(U) Research activities under this task included interviews, as soon after capture as possible, of NVA PW's taken in Cambodia and NVA and VC PW's taken in RVN after the Cambodian operation began.

(U) HSR recommended that VC and NVA ralliers also be surveyed as this is where the impact might be most identifiable. The PAG did not, however, request that this be done. The group did request resurvey of PW's who had been interviewed earlier to compare pre-Cambodian and post-Cambodian attitudes. Just as this sub-task was to be undertaken, HSR was told that June-July phase-down operations for the field research team which had been held in abeyance should go into effect, discontinuing the task with data collection phases of the first two sub-tasks.

(U) In August the contract field period was extended to allow processing and reporting of already-collected data. At that time, HSR undertook the reinterview task under Program I, Effectiveness Studies, and issued field reports on the results.

(U) In general it was found that the Allied incursion into Cambodia had a striking effect; during the first several weeks, the NLF in that country was completely demoralized.
Some of the advantageous effect of Cambodian operations was lost when it became apparent that announced limitations on US operations would be honored. Prisoners questioned later in the six-week period showed a greater tendency than those questioned earlier to believe communist forces would devise new strategy to compensate for the Allied attacks in Cambodia, based in part on regrouping farther back inside Cambodia.

It had almost the same demoralizing effect upon VC troops located in RVN but a much less marked effect upon NVA troops located in RVN. The heavy impact upon VC troops is thought to have occurred for a combination of reasons, foremost being that while the news of the Cambodian entry reached them, communications from higher levels to VC troops in RVN were severely disrupted temporarily with the consequent inability of Party indoctrination/propaganda machinery to transmit a set of "explanations" and "justifications" to provide the troops with a shared consistent understanding of events. While the same disruption of communications existed for the NVA soldier in RVN, lesser impact was believed to be due to longer-term indoctrination and personal experience.

News of the RVN/US entry into Cambodia had a definite impact upon the attitudes and opinions of VC soldiers who were prisoners of war in RVN at the time the Allied Cambodian operations began. News of the incursion had not reached a great majority of the NVA PW's resampled in MR1 and MR4 more than three months later. After hearing of the Cambodian entry for the first time during their post-Cambodian interview, the NVA PW's behavior during the interview demonstrated that news of the event -- although the truth of the report was questioned -- did have an impact.

The reports for each of the studies explicate these general statements further. Reports for studies on NVA captured in Cambodia and on NVA and VC captured in RVN follow. Reports for reinterviews of VC and NVA prisoners, which were initially designed as Task 7 - Study 3, are included in Volume I in the section devoted to case studies of effectiveness of psyop.
(U) Objectives of studies on the effect of the Cambodian incursion were to provide fact-based information and perspective on the impact of the Cambodian operations on NVA soldiers in Cambodia and on NVA and VC soldiers in RVN at the time the Cambodian operations began.

Problem

(U) Both JUSPAO and MACV requested that HSR evaluate the impact of the Allied invasion of sanctuaries in Cambodia on the NVA/VC soldier. The Pag Task Statement was as follows:

Task 7, Pre-emptive Priority: Pursue the question of the effect on the enemy of cleaning out the Cambodian sanctuaries by the following research activity:

1. Interview NVA POW's taken in Cambodia to determine the effect, if any, of cleaning out the Cambodian sanctuaries. Particular research questions: Is it demoralizing? Are expectations of victory, or the future course of the war, changed as a result?

2. Interview NVA POW's and VC POW's taken within South Vietnam outside the border areas since the Cambodian action started to determine effect upon them. Particular questions in (1) above apply.

3. Recheck previously interviewed NVA/VC, especially those in I CTZ and IV CTZ considered hard-core, to see if attitude changed in any way as a result of action on the sanctuaries.

(U) Furnish as much information as possible on these factors between 10 May and 31 August, providing a full report in the weeks that follow.
Background

(U) Urgent research needs expressed by the psyop community on 9 May resulting from the ongoing military situation added specific new work requirements. The priority of these requirements superseded any included in the task statements delivered to HSR on 15 April for which HSR delivered detailed task research plans on 30 April. At the PAG meeting on 9 May, called for the purpose of specifying schedules and efforts under HSR Task Research Plans 3, 4, 5, and 6, the new top-priority task statement for Task 7 was approved and HSR was requested to direct all research effort to Task 7 from 10 May onward.

(U) HSR agreed to accept Task 7 as described and a tentative plan for obtaining the new urgently-required information was drawn. Effort began immediately. On 14 May HSR had two teams of interviewers in the field at the Cambodian border, and a third team was preparing for a new location.

HSR Research Approach

(U) As agreed at the PAG meeting, the initial approach would be exploratory. The task required first the identification of new types of arrangements and relationships that would be needed, and next that the necessary steps be taken to set up these arrangements and relationships. An immediate, intensive effort was initiated for the period 10 May through 31 May to establish whether the sample population could be reached and to gain perspective in this situation - almost unique in the present war - on means of access to the PW's, rate of acquisition of data, and other factors which would affect research conduct and results. Firm plans and schedules were then prepared.

(U) Questionnaires and procedures designed for the various categories of prisoners and ralliers to be assessed were already available. This, together with the trained survey team, represented a major time-saving factor. Additional specially-tailored questionnaires were also developed.
Three studies were designed to obtain information specified in the task statement:

Study 1. Survey 100 NVA PW's taken in Cambodia; interview them as soon as possible after coming into Allied hands.

Study 2. Survey adequate samples of NVA PW's and VC PW's in at least two different Corps areas, taken within the Republic of Vietnam since the Cambodian operations began; it is recommended that ralliers be surveyed also since they are considered most likely to reflect the impact of the Cambodian operations.

Study 3. Resurvey already-interviewed NVA and VC PW's, especially in I Corps and IV Corps, to compare pre-Cambodian and post-Cambodian attitudes.

Because the Allied collection centers for prisoners were variously located, it was necessary to form three Vietnamese interviewing teams. The three teams, each working with an HSR Research Scientist as supervisor, were scheduled for field work for approximately eighty percent of the time for three months. Other HSR staff and Vietnamese support personnel were scheduled to coordinate receipt of data from the field and processing of the data in Saigon.

Brief notes were to be communicated as soon as significant items of interest were identified; summary reports were to be prepared at the conclusion of each separate study.

Research Plan

1. With assistance of MACJ3-11 and JUSPAO, explore means to obtain necessary agreements for access to newly-taken prisoners before they reach PW camp.

2. Visit field facilities and personnel to make arrangements for early access to prisoners taken in Cambodia.
3. Develop new questionnaires tailored to the Cambodian operation and appropriate for the different study samples.

4. Modify existing questionnaires for use with different samples in the study situation.

5. Train interviewer teams in use of questionnaires designed for specific categories of enemy forces.

6. With the assistance of JUSPAO and MACJ3-11, prepare and submit requests for access authorizations through US/GVN channels to insure admission to forward positions, PW camps, and to Chieu Hoi Centers.

7. Have versions of questionnaires required for specific samples produced in sufficient quantity.

8. Obtain access authorizations for access to samples.

9. Access authorizations to PW's are sensitive documents and are distributed by a carefully controlled procedure. After authorizations have reached the facilities to be sampled, visit the camp officials to arrange times, entry, schedules, and interviewer accommodations.

10. Through JUSPAO and MACJ3-11 and ARPA, arrange travel schedules and accommodations for survey team in the field.

11. Conduct questionnaire surveys of the selected samples.

12. Tabulate pre-selected response data.

13. Translate narrative responses; regroup and categorize.

14. Summarize pre-selected response data.

15. Summarize narrative responses.
16. Organize/analyze results of surveys.

17. Interpret results of surveys.

18. Issue summary reports of results for immediate use in the field.

(U) These eighteen sub-tasks must be accomplished for each individual survey conducted.

(U) **Staffing.** This effort assumed availability of contracted Vietnamese personnel as required, trained in survey research, interviewing, and translation.

(U) **Comment.** Field reports were issued for the psyop community on each of the three categories of studies requested under this task and discussed in the preceding pages. Results of two of these, the NVA Soldier Captured in Cambodia, and the NVA and VC Captured in RVN, are presented here. Third category studies, reinterview of NVA and VC PW's appear in Volume I.

(U) At the request of the PAG in May, all HSR research resources were rechannelled immediately when a new and much higher priority requirement arose to investigate the effect of Allied Cambodian operations on the enemy. All other tasks were suspended but kept viable for resumption in an extension of the contract period desired by the sponsoring agencies. Phase-down operations, which would have to occur in the June-July period if the contract were not extended were also held in abeyance. After data collection phases of Studies 1 and 2 under Task 7 had been completed and results of a brief preliminary analysis of the data had been presented to the sponsors, HSR was told that June-July phase-down operations for the field research team should go into effect, discontinuing Task 7 after completion only of the data collection phases of the first two sub-tasks. This stopped execution of Study 3, the reinterview surveys.

(U) In August, the field report of the contract was extended to allow processing and reporting of already-collected data. At that time, HSR undertook the reinterview task under Program I, Effectiveness Studies, and issued field reports on the results; these reports are included in Volume I in the section devoted to case studies of psyop effectiveness.

(U) Results of the studies on the NVA taken in Cambodia and the NVA and the VC captured in RVN follow.
This report is based upon interviews of 100 North Vietnamese Army (NVA) prisoners taken in Cambodia; where interpretive comments are made, it is against a background of additional results available from several lines of continuing research into the background and attitudes of NVA/VC soldiers.

**Objectives**

This report is intended to provide fact-based information and perspective on the impact of the Cambodian operations on the NVA soldier.

**Background**

One hundred interviews with recently-taken NVA prisoners averaged about 3 hours and 15 minutes in length. All were interviewed within 1 - 25 days of their date of capture.

**Results**

1. The NVA, before leaving NVN, did not know that NVA/VC troops were in Cambodia (98%).

2. Apparently, about 60% of the Cambodian-taken sample had never been inside RVN.

3. 50% had no advance warning of Cambodian entry.
   
   33% learned of Cambodian entry through cadre announcement.
   
   10% learned of Cambodian entry by unofficial rumor.

4. 15% were warned of entry "months" ahead.
   
   15% were warned of entry weeks ahead.
   
   18% were warned of entry days ahead.
Comment: Could these have been deliberately planted false rumors which would redound to the credit of NLF when the rumored invasion failed to materialize?

The actual invasion appears to be taken as "proof" of GVN strength rather than "proof" of the foreknowledge of NLF leaders.

(C) 5. 33% previously thought GVN might enter Cambodia; Item 4 minus Item 5 suggests rumors were generally credible.

(C) 6. 66% say their own estimate of strength and determination of ARVN was much higher as a result of Cambodian entry; 10% say estimate was decreased.

(C) 7. The morale and fighting spirit of NVA/VC as a result of operations in Cambodia:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>NVA</th>
<th>VC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Increased</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Change</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decreased</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Sure</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(C) 8. Hanoi leaders will react by:

- Intensifying Operations 31%
- No Change 3
- Decreasing Intensity 8
- Not sure 58
(C) 9. In March 1970, thought would Now, think will win win the war? 

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>NLF Certainly</th>
<th>NLF Probably</th>
<th>Stalemate</th>
<th>GVN Probably</th>
<th>GVN Certainly</th>
<th>Not Sure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>11 / 16</td>
<td>34 / 18</td>
<td></td>
<td>24 / 31</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comment: Conviction of victory cut in half.

(C) 10. 23% heard NLF broadcasts since Cambodian entry. 

77% did not hear NLF broadcasts since Cambodian entry. 

Credibility was high; of the 23 that heard: 

- 50% say all believable 
- 28% say most believable 
- 11% say half believable 
- 11% say part believable 

All 23 could remember some content of broadcasts. 

-- 10 (43%) mention report of NLF victories in Cambodia.

(C) 11. 25% had leaders who discussed the Cambodian entry: 

Example: 

-- "Front suffered losses, but world opinion now against US; Americans now standing up to fight their own government."

-- "Front using a scheme to lure US into Cambodia to create an international political issue; world opinion will be resentful against US."
"US troops sent to protect Lon Nol's golden days; this strongly denounced by world opinion."

"...ensure Lon Nol's golden days but NLF and Cambodian population have already liberated almost all the 21 Cambodian provinces already."

Some reactions to what the leaders said:

"I only somewhat believed it; will take a lot to re-establish rear bases."

"What was said might be true; but it might be that ARVN had recently received more armament and are attacking to score victories."

(C) 12. Opinion on effect on length of war?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Opinion</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Last longer</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No difference</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shortened</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not sure</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(C) 13. Shorten or lengthen war? Why? (Random sample of 10 narrative answers)

"Will end more quickly because Cambodia where we have been concentrating our troops, stored our supplies for the troops has been attacked and a lot has been destroyed; the morale of the troops has decreased greatly. It is certain that Hanoi will more willingly negotiate."

"The war is expanding to Cambodia, Laos and is quick becoming an Indochina war. The world will intervene so as to bring a peace solution to Southeast Asia in accordance to the spirit of the Geneva Agreement of 1954. The war will end more quickly."
"Will end because GVN/Allied troops will be dispersed to two fronts, in RVN and Cambodia, and thus a more favorable occasion will be provided the NVA/Front troops for increasing the fighting and bringing a quick end to the war."

"Front bases in Cambodia have been destroyed, and it will be a long time before they can be set up again. The Front won't be able to win immediately. If Red China intervenes in this war by sending voluntary troops to give the NVA and Front a hand, the fighting will last much longer as was the case in Korea before."

"If this trend continues and if the GVN which is powerfully armed keeps launching offensive attacks upon attacks, the Front will not be able to sustain and indeed how can it when each one of us has only an AK for defense."

"Before I used to think the Front might win, but since the US/GVN operations in Cambodia I feel that the war has been expanded and will last longer with no solution in sight since Front military bases in Cambodia might have been completely destroyed. It will take the Front a lot of time to re-build its forces to the level where they had been. Moreover, having no longer a base in Cambodia from which to launch its attacks, the Front will meet with many more difficulties than before and thus, it will take it a lot before being able to score victory."

"I feel that the US and the GVN are already incapable of dealing with RVN alone, and now with the war having expanded to Cambodia and Laos, they have even less chance to win. But the Front too has no hope to score yet. The war will go on longer."
-- "The Allies are very strong. If the Front fights back it will disintegrate. The war will end very quickly soon."

-- "US and ARVN troops are fierce and powerful, and all Front rear service bases in Cambodia will be destroyed. If the Front fights back it will be defeated. The war will become shorter and end quickly."

-- "I feel that giving their military strength the Allies and GVN will defeat the Front easily and speedily, in particular once they have destroyed all Front rear service bases in Cambodia. The war will become shorter and end quickly.

(C) 14. Overall

Some examples of extreme and emotional language not often used in other situations:

-- "I was scared to death ... I was terribly frightened."

-- "I was terrified, and couldn't think about anything, and was constantly concerned about getting killed."

-- "I saw our men fleeing in all directions. I had a feeling we would all be captured, not to say killed."

-- "They launch one attack after another like the wind and storms. It is indeed something to dread."

-- "Their troops were impressive, their Army belligerent."

-- "The ARVN have won in RVN and are moving on to attack the Front's safe bases."
-- "Previously I used to think the Front might win very soon. But ... has prospect of lasting longer with no end in sight."

-- "I thought we have come South to take over territory liberated by the Front but now I see nothing but bombing and shelling, death and suffering for the Army. I can't see any people in liberated areas."

-- "Before, being influenced by propaganda, I had the idea that the NLF was winning everywhere; now with this large-scale operation, I think it over and I feel I had been misled by propaganda."

General Conclusions

(C) 1. Entry into Cambodia has had a striking effect; during the first several weeks the NLF was completely demoralized.

(C) 2. Some of the advantageous effect of Cambodian operations was lost when it became apparent that announced limitations on US operations would be honored. (Prisoners questioned later in the six-week period showed a greater tendency than those questioned earlier to believe communist forces would devise new strategy to compensate for the Allied attacks in Cambodia, based in part on regrouping farther back inside Cambodia.

(C) 3. A line of approach for Allied psyop suggested by the communist tactics of news control and distortion is:

   a. Consider the many differences between what Hanoi tells you and what you see now.

   b. Hanoi can never let you and your friends return because then the truth would be known.
c. If you are not allowed to return home you must stay and fight and risk death endlessly.
d. Or, you can come to GVN, be treated fairly and stay alive. You will have as good a chance as those who stay in the field to return home when the war ends; your chance will actually be better because you are sure to stay alive.
(U) This report describes results of interviews of 25 North Vietnamese Army (NVA) prisoners (PW's) taken within the Republic of Viet Nam (RVN) during the time of the Cambodian operations in May and June 1970; these results are compared with results of interviews of 100 NVA PW's captured within Cambodia during the same time period. Where interpretative comments are made, it is against a background of additional results available from several lines of continuing research into the background and attitudes of NVA and Viet Cong (VC) soldiers.

Objectives

(U) This report is intended to provide fact-based information and perspective on the impact of the Cambodian operations on NVA soldiers who were stationed within RVN at the time the Cambodian operations were begun.

Background

(U) Two reports on major tasks involving identification of enemy vulnerabilities and obstacles to enemy defection were released by HSR in February 1970. In those reports it was concluded that NVA morale was firm; while available research data could support the notion that a trend might be developing toward erosion of morale and allegiance to the NLF cause, there was no evidence to indicate any active rejection of the "liberation" cause by the NVA soldier. The NVA soldiers' conviction of eventual NLF victory, instilled in him by indoctrination and propaganda, was identified as a major factor upholding morale that could be disrupted in the near term only by an unusual and extravagant action on the part of the Allies.
(U) The example offered for the type of extreme action required to disrupt NVA morale was a surprise implementation of Vice-President Ky's recent remark about possible resumption of bombing of NVN coupled with announcements of RVN's intention to carry the war into NVN. Assuming hypothetically that an action of such magnitude were possible, the surprise, consternation, and disruption it could cause would be lost if it were to be publicized prior to occurrence.

(U) The Allied operations in Cambodia precisely fitted the specifications for such a significant disruptive act; research conducted during these operations showed that the morale of NVA and VC soldiers stationed in Cambodia was shattered in the initial phases of the Cambodian campaign.

Procedure

(U) Twenty-five interviews with NVA PW's captured within RVN between May and June 1970, averaged about three hours and fifteen minutes in length; all PW's were interviewed within 1 - 30 days of their capture. The interviews were identical, except for necessary changes based on geographic location, to those conducted with 100 NVA PW's captured in Cambodia.

Results

(U) Results are treated in terms of enemy conviction that Cambodia is a safe haven, enemy reaction to the surprise invasion of the NLF safe haven, impact of Allied psyop programs, and effects upon enemy indoctrination and propaganda. Comparisons are made with results of interviews of 100 Cambodia-based NVA PW's.

Enemy Conviction that Cambodia is a "Safe Haven"

(U) A combination of indoctrination and propaganda (point 1) reinforced by personal experience and confirming information from comrades (point 2) caused NVA troops in RVN to be firmly convinced that Cambodia was their totally secure "safe haven" (point 3) in which they could rest, regroup, resupply, and organize for sorties into RVN (attachment "A").
Conclusions

(U) For the convenience of the executive reader, conclusions are given here, rather than in the usual sequence at the end of the report.

1. The surprise entry of ARVN/US troops into Cambodia initially had a demoralizing effect upon NLF troops located in Cambodia but had much less impact upon NVA troops located in RVN. The effect was less marked upon NVA troops located in RVN for a combination of reasons: the element of unexpected personal danger was not present; disruption of communications resulted in comparatively little news reaching them about Cambodian events; and the news was not exploited vigorously through psyop efforts within RVN.

2. The impact of the Allied Cambodian entry on the morale of NVA PW's captured in RVN caused a dramatic change of opinion on "who will win the war". Between March 1970 and June 1970 those who thought NLF would win were reduced by 18%; the number that thought RVN would win increased by 60%.

3. The complete conviction possessed by enemy troops, created by long-term indoctrination and personal experience, that Cambodia was their "safe haven" caused the Allied Cambodian incursion to have an especially negative impact on enemy morale.

4. Communications from higher levels to NVA troops in RVN were severely disrupted temporarily. Enemy morale was hurt by the inability of the Party indoctrination/propaganda machinery to transmit a set of "explanations" and "justifications" to the men in the field to provide the troops with a shared consistent understanding of the events in Cambodia in terms of Party policy.

5. There is no evidence that any extra effort was exerted within RVN for timely psyop exploitation of the dramatic news of the Allied entry into Cambodia.
6. Two items relating to NLF failure to meet expectations held by their troops, that were created by indoctrination and propaganda, are the firmly-planted belief that Cambodia represented assured safety and that NLF would be able to counter-attack and retaliate in great strength. The concept of Cambodia as a "safe haven" was demolished (at least temporarily) and many months have passed in which the only semblance of retaliation is represented by inconclusive relatively small-scale activities against the comparatively weak and untrained Cambodian Army. This failure provides productive themes for psyop exploitation.
(U) 1. The question of why NLF troops were in Cambodia had been discussed by political officers or cadre with 40% of the sample. (See attachment "A"). In almost all cases Cambodia had been described as a totally safe haven:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Before the RVN/US troops entered Cambodia, did your leaders or political officers ever discuss with you reasons why NLF troops were in Cambodia? What was said?</td>
<td>Not discussed</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Yes) Safe haven and regroupment</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Yes) Protect Cambodia</td>
<td>04%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(U) 2. Almost all of the RVN-based NVA PW's had personal knowledge of the pre-incursion conditions in Cambodia since most had passed through or spent some time in Cambodia:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Experience in Cambodia</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Had been in Cambodia</td>
<td>88%*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Had travelled back and forth between RVN and Cambodia</td>
<td>20%*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(U) 3. As a result of indoctrination and personal experience, ninety-six percent of the sample believed NLF troops were in Cambodia because it was their totally secure safe haven and regroupment area or rear base:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Do you know why NLF troops were in Cambodia?</td>
<td>Safe haven</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rear base/re-groupment area</td>
<td>56%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Enemy Reaction to Surprise Allied Entry in Cambodian "Safe Haven"

(U) Although the RVN-based NVA troops raised their opinion of ARVN strength because of the objective demonstration of power provided by the ARVN/US entry into Cambodia (point 4), it was judged that there would be only a balanced effect on NLF troops' morale (point 5). Although it was thought that the NLF troops would counterattack and fight harder (point 6), the odds in favor of NLF winning the war had been greatly reduced (point 7).

*Not mutually exclusive.*
(U) 4. Twenty-eight percent of the sample increased their estimate of ARVN strength as a result of ARVN's entry into Cambodia while 12% decreased their estimate; the explanations of those who felt ARVN strength was decreased represented a mixture of propaganda and misinformation:

Have you raised or lowered your estimate of the strength and determination of ARVN troops since they entered Cambodia?

- Higher: 28%
- Same: 24%
- Lower: 12%

(U) 5. Responses were fairly divided on the question of whether the Cambodian entry would decrease or increase the morale and fighting spirit of the NVA and VC soldiers:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>NVA Morale</th>
<th>VC Morale</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Increase</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decrease</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No change</td>
<td>08%</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Would you say that the effect of the Cambodian operations will increase or decrease the morale of NVA and VC soldiers?

(U) 6. Fifty-six percent believed that their troops would counterattack and fight harder as a result of the Cambodian incursion. Sixteen percent felt that the NLF would not be able to react strongly:

In general, how do you think your own troops will react to this new development in Cambodia?

- Counterattack/fight harder: 56%
- NLF retreat/morale shaken: 16%

(U) 7. Between March 1970 and June 1970 the percentage of those who thought that NLF would win was reduced by 18%. The percentage of those who thought GVN would win increased by 60%:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>NLF Wins</th>
<th>RVN Wins</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In March 1970:</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Who did you think would win the war?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(In June 1970:)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>NLF Wins</th>
<th>RVN Wins</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Who do you think will win the war?</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net Change:</td>
<td>-18%</td>
<td>+60%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Impact of Allied Psyops on RVN-based NVA

(U) NVA PW's captured in RVN during May and June 1970 were asked: "Since the Allied Cambodian operations began and before you became a prisoner: did you read any GVN leaflets?" This question was repeated for GVN newspapers, GVN radio broadcasts, GVN airborne loudspeaker messages, GVN ground loudspeaker messages, and GVN television programs. For each medium further questions were asked about frequency, ability to understand the theme or content, believability of the content, and recall of themes or content.

(U) Fifty-two percent of the sample read leaflets (32% once or twice; 20% more frequently); 40% found the words and language easy to understand; 40% found the meaning or theme to be clear all or most of the time; 12% found the message to be believable all or most of the time; and 32% judge none of the messages to be believable. Forty percent recalled themes or content (20% mentioned rally appeals; 12% mention surrender appeals; 4% rally or surrender appeals; and 4% mention a poem but no theme); none mentioned references to Cambodia.

(U) Forty percent of the sample heard GVN radio broadcasts occasionally; the content or theme could be understood about half the time. Thirty-six percent judged none or only some portion of the content to be believable. Thirty-two percent recalled themes or content: 20% mentioned music, and 12% mentioned news of Cambodia.

(U) Sixty-four percent of the sample heard airborne loudspeaker messages (28% once or twice; 36% more frequently). Twenty-four percent heard the broadcast clearly about half of the time and 36% seldom or never could hear it clearly. Theme or content was judged to be understandable most of the time by 16% and seldom or never understandable by 44%. Forty-eight percent recall themes or content (28% mentioned rally appeals; 12% mentioned surrender appeals; 8% mentioned rally/surrender appeals); none mentioned references to Cambodia.

(U) Twelve percent mention reading GVN newspapers once or twice and 8% heard ground loudspeaker messages.

Effect on Enemy Indoctrination/Propaganda Machinery

(U) Interviews of PW's, which touch upon issues that have been treated over some length of time in enemy troop indoctrination and propaganda, show a consistent pattern of responses which can be traced rather directly to the content of their indoctrination programs. In other words, it is recognizable that the PW's are regurgitating what they have been force-fed.
The usual consistent pattern of responses was given by RVN-based NVA PW's to questions about an issue which has been treated during indoctrination over a lengthy period of time (point 8).

In contrast to the usual consistent patterns of indoctrination-inculcated responses made by PW's to questions dealing with long-standing issues (as illustrated by point 8), very varied responses were made to two questions about recent events (points 9, 10). Where such unusual variability occurs, it is a safe assumption that indoctrination/propaganda has failed or, more likely in this instance, has not occurred. The degree of variability which characterizes these answers suggests that there had not yet been time for a "standard" answer to be provided through the NLF indoctrination and propaganda machinery.

8. "Was there ever any discussion of why the war has lasted for so many years? What reasons were given?"

"US intervention into the war, and by doing this the US is causing obstruction to our victory."

"The US is a powerful country, the most powerful in the world, and its intervention into this war is the cause for this war going on for so long."

"US intervention in VN and aid to the puppet government in SVN."

"US intervention and aid to SVN."

"We fight Americans, and wage people's war and guerrilla warfare. This is the reason for the war to go on for so long."

"US intervention."

"The US stubbornness is the cause for this war and its widening to all over Indochina."

"Vietnam is a small country, and it has to fight against a country of the size of the US. It therefore has to resort to people's war tactics to drag on the war."
"US intervention into VN."

"US intervention in SVN."

"The US has got itself involved in the war and this is the reason for the war to go on for so long."

(U) 9. "Since the time when Allied troops first entered Cambodia: Have your political officers or cadre ever told you anything about the entrance of the Allied troops and the consequences of the fighting in Cambodia?"

"They said we would have to pull back to SVN for we would not be able to put up opposition to ARVN for we were out-numbered and we ran the risk of being detected."

"Even by launching attacks across the border to Cambodia the US cannot widen the war for it has pulled out some of its troops already. We might meet difficulties at the battlefields in Long An because our supply route from there to Cambodia has been cut off."

"The US/GVN attacks on Cambodia are aimed at opening up the war and giving a hand to Lon Nol to massacre Vietnamese civilians in Cambodia."

"The US has widened the war to all over Indochina. The three countries of Indochina -- Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos -- have formed an alliance to fight against US aggression of their territories and to liberate the whole population of Indochina."

"The CIA has staged the overthrow of Sihanouk, the former Cambodian Chief of State, and has put the reactionary and puppet Lon Nol clique into power. Lon Nol and his clique are nothing but a screen behind which the US expands the aggression into Cambodia."

"The US made its intervention in Cambodia as a means to save the situation in SVN. The US is doing this by implementing its policy of using Vietnamese to fight against Vietnamese, Asians to fight against Asians."
(U) 10. "Do you think now (in relation to the Allied Cambodian operations) that the war will end more quickly or will last longer?"

"The GVN has succeeded in cutting off the NVA's route, so the NVA can no longer advance; thus the war will end more quickly."

"With the war widening beyond SVN's borders, the fighting will become heavier and the quicker we will come to a coalition government."

"The widening of the war across the border to the whole of Indochina indicates that the GVN must have used its last resort in launching attacks in Cambodia. The GVN wants to make a political gain by this action. It is incapable to fight in SVN and has to launch attacks against VC and NVA key organizations."

"If the attacks in Cambodia didn't take place the Front rear organization couldn't have been destroyed and lost. The Front then would be able to win sooner. But now a number of its organizations and bases have been destroyed, and it will take the Front some time to set them up again. As a result the war will go on longer, but in the end the Front will still win."

"This is the people's war, a war with a great cause. It necessarily has to be a protracted war before the final victory comes."

"With the war widening, the liberation forces will reconsolidate their strength and resort to guerrilla warfare, and so the war will go on for many more years."

"The American public and the whole world are against this war in Vietnam and demand that the US pull its troops out of Indochina."

"Both sides are equally strong; one side makes extra efforts and the other side puts up stronger opposition, and this goes on without either wanting to give in to the other, so the war will go on longer."
"Before Vietnam was alone in its fight against US aggression. Now Vietnam has allies, Cambodia and Laos. Thus, there is a prospect for the war to end very soon."

Comparison of Responses of NVA PW's taken in RVN and Cambodia

(U) 1. NVA PW's taken in Cambodia and those taken in RVN were similar in respect to age in years, age at start of military service, amount of time spent on political indoctrination during basic training, approximate date at which they started the journey to SVN (and consequently the amount of time away from home and family), and the size of their unit.

(U) The two groups differed in extent of exposure to combat and hostile actions; a larger percentage of the NVA PW's taken in RVN had combat experience and had been in combat on more occasions for longer periods of time.

(U) 2. The possibility of RVN/US entry into Cambodia was a popular rumor among NLF troops stationed in Cambodia as evidenced by the fact that a sizeable percentage of troops in Cambodia were thought to have expected it. This was not true for the NVA troops located in RVN.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Answer</th>
<th>Source of NVA Sample</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Before the Allied troops entered Cambodia: Did the people you knew and worked with think that the RVN or US troops would ever come into Cambodia?</td>
<td>No, none did 68%</td>
<td>RVN 46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yes, all did 08%</td>
<td>CAM 22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yes, some did 08%</td>
<td>CAM 19%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(U) 3. A considerable percentage of the NVA PW's from RVN and Cambodia believed the top leaders in Hanoi would strike back after the Cambodian entry. Unless the NLF propagandists have been able to portray their modest efforts against the Cambodian troops in Cambodia as massive retaliation, some disillusionment should have occurred as time passed since the end of Allied Cambodian operations without any substantial NLF retaliation against RVN/US troops.
Do you think that the Cambodian operations may cause the Hanoi leaders to intensify or decrease offensive operations?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rating</th>
<th>Source of NVA Sample</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intensify</td>
<td>RVN: 52% CAM: 31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Same</td>
<td>RVN: -- CAM: 03%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decrease</td>
<td>RVN: -- CAM: 08%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(U) 4. The three sets of responses to questions shown below may represent both a positive and negative validation of the old saying that "familiarity breeds contempt." Based on first shallow analysis it would be easy to assume that the RVN-based NVA were much more restrained in their interpretation of the implications and effect of the ARVN entry into Cambodia than were the Cambodian-based NVA who were directly affected, because the RVN-based NVA had survived considerably longer and more intense combat engagements with the ARVN/US forces and were not directly and personally shocked by sudden demolition of the belief that Cambodia represented complete safety.

But if the conclusions based on shallow analysis are accepted, what happens to the firmly-entrenched concept that morale is eroded by exposure to increasingly larger amounts of lengthy experience of hardships? It may be much more correct to reason, after more deeply searching analysis, that RVN-based NVA are showing the appropriate and expectable degree of reaction and it is the factors of surprise, unanticipated destruction of an important cherished belief that Cambodia represented safety, and sustained intensity of aggressive attack that caused the exaggerated impact on morale of Cambodian-based NVA troops.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Rating</th>
<th>Source of NVA Sample</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Have you raised or lowered your estimate of the strength and determination of ARVN troops since they entered Cambodia?</td>
<td>Higher</td>
<td>RVN: 28% CAM: 63%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Same</td>
<td>RVN: 24% CAM: 10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lower</td>
<td>RVN: 12% CAM: 05%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is the general morale and fighting spirit of NVA soldiers increased now as a result of the Cambodian operations?</td>
<td>Increased</td>
<td>RVN: 44% CAM: 13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Same</td>
<td>RVN: 08% CAM: 08%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Decreased</td>
<td>RVN: 40% CAM: 58%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is the general morale and fighting spirit of VC soldiers increased or decreased now as a result of the Cambodian operations?</td>
<td>Increased</td>
<td>RVN: 28% CAM: 11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Same</td>
<td>RVN: 16% CAM: 10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Decreased</td>
<td>RVN: 40% CAM: 47%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
5. NVA PW's captured in RVN and Cambodia during the Allied Cambodian operations reported very substantial shifts in favor of GVN "winning the war".

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source of Sample</th>
<th>March 1970 thought NLF would win</th>
<th>In June 1970 thought NLF would win</th>
<th>Belief in NLF victory reduced by:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NVA PW's taken in Cambodia</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NVA PW's taken in South Vietnam</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source of Sample</th>
<th>March 1970 thought RVN would win</th>
<th>In June 1970 thought RVN would win</th>
<th>Belief in RVN victory increased by:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NVA PW's taken in Cambodia</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>89%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NVA PW's taken in South Vietnam</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The statements below are examples of answers to a question which asked, "Before the Cambodian invasion, did your political officers and cadre ever discuss with you the reasons why NLF troops are in Cambodia?" The content of the answers makes it obvious that the "reasons" were received some time before the Cambodian operations began. It is significant to note that all responses emphasize safety or security in Cambodia.

Verbal promises of "safety in Cambodia" reinforced by personal experience or news from others which attested to the absence of Allied activity in Cambodia convinced enemy troops that Cambodia was, indeed, their "safe haven."

"The GVN has lots of aircraft, large numbers of troops. In Cambodia we can rest assured of not being bothered by aircraft."

"We are only temporarily stationed along the border areas in Cambodia where we have set up our sanctuaries."

"The cadres explained that because of the heavy fighting in SVN it was necessary for us to set up our bases in a secure place in Cambodia as a means to relieve the pressure of the battlefield along the Cambodian-Vietnamese frontier."

"NVA troops must camp in Cambodia for we already have our VC counterparts in the delta in SVN. If too many of our troops are stationed in SVN they run the risk of being air-striked."

"We have been given temporary use of the border areas in Cambodia to concentrate our troops because it is completely safe there."

"The NVA has to be stationed in Cambodia to stand ready against the aggression of Cambodia by U.S. troops. Moreover, the Cambodian frontier being completely secure, the NVA is using it to set up its rear bases in order to safeguard its troops."
VIET CONG PRISONERS

CAPTURED IN THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM

DURING THE ALLIED CAMBODIAN OPERATIONS: MAY-JUNE 1970

(U) This report describes results of interviews of 25 Viet Cong (VC) prisoners (PW's) taken in the Republic of Viet Nam (RVN) during the time of the Cambodian operations in May and June 1970; these results are compared with results of interviews held with 25 NVA PW's taken in RVN and the results of interviews of 100 NVA PW's captured within Cambodia during the same time period. Where interpretative comments are made, it is against a background of additional results available from several lines of continuing research into the background and attitudes of NVA and VC soldiers.

Objectives

(U) This report is intended to provide fact-based information and perspective on the impact of the Cambodian operations upon VC soldiers who were stationed within RVN at the time the Cambodian operations were begun.

Background

(U) In reports released early in 1970, it was concluded that VC morale had deteriorated seriously as indicated by factors described as generalized deterioration of the will to fight; negative reaction against Party control methods; and recognition of unfulfilled promises, unachieved objectives, and absence of any positive rewards. On the other hand, it was concluded that NVA morale was firm and would require an extravagant surprise Allied action of the magnitude of a surprise bombing and ARVN invasion of North Viet Nam (NVN) to seriously damage the NVA morale.
(U) Predictably, because of the comparatively lower VC morale, VC reaction to the "surprise extravagant Allied action" required to damage NVA morale should be more extreme than the reactions of NVA troops based in RVN but possibly would be less severe than the reactions of any NLF directly impacted in Cambodia. The surprise Allied entry in Cambodia precisely fitted the specifications for an extravagant disruptive action.

Procedure

(U) Interviews with twenty-five VC PW's captured within RVN between May and June 1970, averaged about three hours and fifteen minutes in length; all PW's were interviewed within 1 - 30 days of their capture. The interviews were identical, except for necessary changes based on geographic location, to those conducted with NVA PW's captured in Cambodia and in RVN.

Results

(U) Results are treated in terms of enemy conviction that Cambodia represents a safe haven; enemy reaction to the surprise Allied invasion of the NLF safe haven; impact of Allied psyop programs; and effects upon enemy indoctrination and propaganda. Additionally, comparisons are made between responses of the RVN-based VC, RVN-based NVA, and Cambodia-based NVA PW's.

Enemy Conviction that Cambodia is a "Safe Haven"

(U) A combination of indoctrination and propaganda (point 1) reinforced by personal experience and confirming information from comrades (point 2) caused VC troops in RVN to be firmly convinced that Cambodia was their totally secure "safe haven" (point 3) in which they could rest, regroup, resupply, and organize for sorties into RVN (Attachment "A").
Conclusions

(U) For the convenience of the executive reader, conclusions are given here, rather than in the usual sequence at the end of the report.

1. The surprise entry of ARVN/US troops into Cambodia, which initially had a demoralizing effect upon NLF troops located in Cambodia, had almost the same effect upon VC troops located in RVN. The heavy impact upon the VC troops is thought to have occurred for a combination of reasons: even though the element of unexpected personal danger was not present and the news was not exploited vigorously through psyop efforts within RVN, comparatively little "official" news was reaching them through normal NLF communications channels. The consequent uncertainty about their situation, coupled with the low state of morale already existing, caused a temporary reaction that was probably at least as great as that experienced by the NLF troops in Cambodia.

2. The impact of the Allied Cambodian entry on the morale of VC PW's captured in RVN caused a striking shift of opinion on "who will win the war". Between March 1970 and June 1970, those who thought NLF would win were reduced by 47%; the number that thought RVN would win increased by 114%. In March 1970, about 2 out of every 3 RVN-based VC believed NLF "would win the war"; in June 1970, 2 out of every 3 believed RVN would win.

3. The complete conviction possessed by enemy troops, created by long-term indoctrination and personal experience, that Cambodia was their "safe haven" caused the Allied Cambodian incursion to have an especially negative impact on morale.
4. Communications from higher levels to VC troops in RVN were severely disrupted temporarily. Another factor which hurt enemy morale was the inability of the Party indoctrination/propaganda machinery to transmit a set of "explanations" and "justifications" to the men in the field to provide the troops with a shared consistent understanding of the events in Cambodia in terms of Party policy.

5. There is no evidence that any extra effort was exerted within RVN for timely psyop exploitation of the dramatic news of the Allied entry into Cambodia.

6. Two items relating to NLF failure to meet expectations held by their troops, that were created by indoctrination and propaganda, are the firmly-planted belief that Cambodia represented assured safety and that NLF would be able to counter-attack and retaliate in great strength. The concept of Cambodia as a "safe haven" was demolished (at least temporarily) and many months have passed in which the only semblance of retaliation is represented by inconclusive relatively small-scale activities against the comparatively weak and untrained Cambodian Army. This failure provides productive themes for psyop exploitation.
1. The question of why NLF troops were in Cambodia had been discussed by political officers or cadre with 24% of the sample (see Attachment "A"). In almost all cases Cambodia had been described as a totally safe haven:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Before the RVN/US troops entered Cambodia, did your leaders or political officers ever discuss with you reasons why NLF troops were in Cambodia? What was said?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not discussed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Yes) Safe haven and regroupment</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. A majority of the RVN-based VC PW's had personal knowledge of pre-incursion conditions in Cambodia or had spent some time in Cambodia:

| Had been in Cambodia | 48%* |
| Had travelled back and forth between RVN and Cambodia | 24% |

*Not mutually exclusive.

3. As a result of indoctrination and personal experience, eighty-eight percent of the sample believed NLF troops were in Cambodia because it was their totally secure safe haven and regroupment area or rear base:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Do you know why NLF troops were in Cambodia?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safe haven</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rear base/regroupment area</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

**Enemy Reaction to Surprise Allied Entry in Cambodian "Safe Haven"**

Three-quarters of the RVN-based VC sample raised their opinion of ARVN strength because of the objective demonstration of power afforded by the ARVN/US entry into Cambodia (point 4). It was judged that there would be a balanced effect upon the morale of NVA troops but a very large decrease in VC morale had occurred (point 5). Although it was thought that the NLF troops would counterattack and fight even harder (point 6), the number of those in the sample that thought the NLF would win the war decreased by 47% and the number that believed RVN would win increased by 114% (point 7).
(U) 4. Seventy-two percent of the sample increased their estimate of ARVN strength as a result of ARVN's entry into Cambodia while none decreased their estimate:

Have you raised or lowered your estimate of the strength and determination of ARVN troops since they entered Cambodia?

- Higher 72%
- Same 20%
- Lower

(U) 5. Responses were evenly divided on the question of whether the Cambodian entry would decrease or increase the morale and fighting spirit of the NVA soldiers but a majority felt that the morale of VC troops would be decreased:

Would you say that the effect of the Cambodian operations will increase or decrease the morale of VC and NVA soldiers?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>VC Morale</th>
<th>NVA Morale</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Increase</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No change</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decrease</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(U) 6. Forty-eight percent believed that NLF morale was shaken or NLF would retreat while only 36% felt that their troops would counterattack and fight harder as a result of the Cambodian incursion:

In general, how do you think your own troops will react to this new development in Cambodia?

- Counterattack/ fight harder 36%
- NLF retreat/ morale shaken 48%

(U) 7. Between March 1970 and June 1970 the number of those who thought that NLF would win was reduced by 47%. The number of those who thought GVN would win increased by 114%:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>NLF Wins</th>
<th>RVN Wins</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In March 1970: Who did you think would win the war?</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(In June 1970:) Who do you think will win the war?</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Net Change: -47% +114%
Impact of Allied Psyops on RVN-based VC

(U) VC PW's captured in RVN during May and June 1970 were asked: "Since the Allied Cambodian operations began and before you became a prisoner, did you read any GVN leaflets?" This question was repeated for GVN newspapers, GVN radio broadcasts, GVN airborne loudspeaker messages, GVN ground loudspeaker messages, and GVN television programs. For each medium, further questions were asked about frequency, ability to understand or hear the words, ability to understand the theme or content, believability of the content, and recall of the theme or content.

(U) Fifty-six percent of the sample read leaflets (28% once or twice; 28% more frequently): 40% found the words and language easy to understand; 28% judged the meaning of most of the leaflets to be clear; less than half of the messages could be believed. Fifty-six percent recalled themes: 36% mentioned rally appeals; 12% mentioned news of Cambodia.

(U) Twenty percent of the sample heard GVN radio broadcasts once or twice; the theme or content was understandable most of the time but the messages were only partly believable. Twenty percent recalled themes or content: 20% mentioned music; 4% mentioned news of Cambodia.

(U) Fifty-six percent heard airborne loudspeaker messages once or twice; they were heard clearly less than half of the time and believed only partly if at all. Thirty-two percent recall themes or content (20% mention rally appeals; 12% mention rally or surrender appeals); none mention references to Cambodia.

(U) Eight percent had read GVN newspapers and eight percent had heard GVN ground loudspeaker messages.

Effect on Enemy Indoctrination/Propaganda Machinery

(U) Interviews of PW's, which touch upon issues that have been treated over some length of time in enemy troop indoctrination and propaganda, show a consistent pattern of responses which can be traced rather directly to the content of their indoctrination programs. In other words, it is recognizable that the PW's are regurgitating what they have been force-fed.

(U) The usual consistent pattern of responses was given by RVN-based VC PW's to questions about an issue which has been treated during indoctrination over a lengthy period of time (point 8).
In contrast to the usual consistent patterns of indoctrination-inculcated responses made by PW's to questions dealing with long standing issues (as illustrated by point 8), very varied responses were made to two questions about recent events (points 9, 10).

Where such unusual variability in answers occurs, it is a safe assumption that indoctrination/propaganda has failed or, more likely in this instance, has not occurred. The degree of variability which characterizes these answers suggests, in comparison to the consistent pattern of answers usually obtained for similar questions, that there had not yet been time for a "standard" answer to be provided through the NLF indoctrination and propaganda machinery.

8. "During indoctrination, was there ever any discussion of why the war has lasted for so many years? What reasons were given?"

Answers to Question 8 shown below illustrate the consistency of responses regarding issues which have received long-term consistent emphasis during indoctrination.

"US intervention in SVN."

"Because the US interferes in SVN."

"Because of US intervention in Vietnam and aid to the GVN puppet government."

"Although the Front is stronger, it still has many weaknesses, many shortcomings; therefore, it hasn't been able to defeat the enemy."

"Because the US interferes in SVN."

"Because the US interferes in Vietnam and because the US supports the GVN."

"Americans have sent in many modern armament, ammunition, and aircraft, as well as many men to fight such a small country as ours. This is why the war against Americans must necessarily be a long and dragging one before the final victory comes."

"The US has poured troops and heavy weapons into Vietnam in order to fight us; we are but a small country and have to fight a protracted war in order to win."

"Because of US intervention in Vietnam."

"Because the US interferes in SVN."

"Americans have brought aircraft and heavy weapons into here and this is the reason why we have not been able to win quickly."
9. "Since the time when Allied troops first entered Cambodia, have your political officers or cadre ever told you anything about the entrance of the Allied troops and the consequences of the fighting in Cambodia?"

Answers to Question 9 shown below illustrate the variability found in responses that are largely self-generated.

"The US/GVN have opened the war to Cambodia in order to use Cambodia to encircle VC troops in SVN but the US/GVN will fail for up to date a Front for the Liberation of Cambodia has been formed and a people's forces for the unification of the people of Indochina set up; both these organizations will fight Americans and liberate the people."

"The cadres said that the US had plotted for Sihanouk's downfall and for the widening of the war. Americans are also behind Lon Nol in the massacres of Vietnamese citizens living in Cambodia."

"The GVN has launched attacks in Cambodia and we now no longer have a place to stay. We all have to do everything we can to avoid being wounded."

"The cadres informed us about Sihanouk's overthrow and the rise of the puppet Lon Nol to power by the US. They said Americans were using Lon Nol as a screen to conceal their act of aggression in Cambodia for the US is being defeated everywhere in SVN and in order to be able to pull out of SVN it has to widen the war across the border to Cambodia, using Asians to fight against Asians in their place."

"Lon Nol has invited Thieu in to give him a hand to rule, oppress and exploit the Cambodian population, but the scheme of opening the war to all over Indochina has been denounced by world public opinion."

"By launching attacks in Cambodia the Allies did inflict a few material losses to the Front, but as far as Front Army's morale is concerned, it is still high, for now having the support of the Cambodian people who are now very resentful of Americans, they will wait for an opportunity to launch a counter-offensive and in the end will win."
(U) 10. "Do you think now (in relation to the Allied Cambodian operations) that the war will end more quickly or will last longer?"

(U) Answers to Question 10 also illustrate the absence of indoctrination-inculcated consistency in responses which are largely self-generated.

"I can see clearly that the liberation forces have been defeated everywhere and it might be possible that the Front has no longer any men to carry on the war. Thus our side will soon have to retreat back to NVN, and SVN will become independent and free under the GVN leadership."

"Front rear bases in Cambodia have been destroyed; thus the Front has lost its springboard from which it launches attacks against the GVN. The Front will be defeated soon. The war will become shorter and end soon."

"The more the war widens the thinner Allied troops are spread out and therefore more vulnerable. The US has created more hatred of Americans among the Cambodian and Laotian population. The Front, on the contrary, has found more allies; the whole world and even the American public are against this war and strongly protest the US government's action, demanding the withdrawal of US troops. The Front will be able to win more quickly."

"I can now see that the US/GVN strength is really great; moreover, formerly Front-controlled or contested areas in SVN are now all under GVN control. The war will surely end very soon for the scale now leans in favor of the GVN for victory."

"Neither side wants to yield. NVN also appeals for more aid, and so the war will go on for many more years."

"In my opinion, the GVN is winning more every day, while liberation troops are being defeated at every battle; presently there aren't any VC regulars in Can Duoc District any more, but only a handful of soldiers in hiding. It is certain that the VC will soon be defeated completely."
"The more the war spreads out to Cambodia and Laos, the quicker the US/GVN will be defeated, for even in SVN they are incapable of winning; with more enemies, Cambodia and Laos, the US has less chance and many more difficulties. The world will intervene and the US will have to pull back its troops. Peace will be restored sooner."

"But for the attacks against Front rear bases in Cambodia, the Front will have been able to win soon, but now the war will go on longer and will be more rigorous. However, it is certain that in the end the Front will win."

"Having lost its rear bases the Front no longer has a supply base, a launching pad from which to attack SVN, and as a result it will soon be defeated, and the war will become shorter and end soon."

"The VC are bound to be defeated, and so the war will end very soon."

"The fighting is intensified so a peace solution can be arrived at for the liberation forces are now in very bad shape."

"The US still refuses to pull out its troops, the war is sure to go on for much longer."

"Both sides are intensifying the fighting in order to negotiate, and soon there will be a coalition government to bring about a settlement."

Comparison of Responses of VC PW's Captured in RVN and NVA PW's Captured in RVN and Cambodia

(U) 11. VC PW's captured in RVN and NVA PW's captured in RVN and in Cambodia are essentially similar in respect to age in years, social class of family, availability of adequate food, and expectations of harsh treatment from the enemy. Religion is also grossly similar although no Catholics are found in the RVN NVA sample. A similar degree of acceptance is given to Party means of control and discipline such as group discussions, criticism sessions, and membership in 3-man cells.

(U) The two NVA groups are essentially similar but differ from the VC in respect to:
-- education: VC average 2 years of education; NVA average 5.

-- means of entry into military service: 40% of VC are volunteers and 48% are drafted; 90% of NVA are drafted.

-- becoming probationary Party members: VC claim 20% probationers; NVA about 8%. (The 20% figure for the RVN-based VC is unusually high but is not incorrect.)

-- benefits for disabled veteran: 85% of NVA expect a lump sum payment or a pension and job or training; 40% of VC do.

-- exposure to hostile action: VC have most, NVA in RVN next; NVA in Cambodia have least.

-- indoctrination at entry to service: 90% of NVA received an average of 80 hours; 50% of VC received an average of 5 hours (This factor not necessarily comparable).

-- consider rally or other means of defection: VC twice as often as NVA.

-- might defect if right opportunity: VC 50%; NVA-RVN 12%/NVA Cambodia 29%.

(U) 12. The possibility of RVN/US entry into Cambodia was a rumor that varied in the extent to which it reached different enemy groups:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Answer</th>
<th>Source of Sample</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Before Allied troops entered Cambodia:</td>
<td>No, none did</td>
<td>RVN VC 36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did the people you knew and worked with think that RVN or US troops would ever come into Cambodia?</td>
<td>Yes, all did</td>
<td>RVN RVN 20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yes, some did</td>
<td>CAM NVA 20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>NVA 68%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>NVA 46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>NVA 22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>NVA 19%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(U) 13. A sizeable percentage of each of the three groups believed the top leaders in Hanoi would strike back after the Cambodian entry. Unless the NLF propagandists have been able to portray their modest efforts against the Cambodia troops in Cambodia as massive retaliation, some disillusionment should have occurred as time passed since the end of Allied Cambodian operations without any substantial NLF retaliation against RVN/US troops.
Do you think that the Cambodian operations may cause the Hanoi leaders to intensify or decrease offensive operations?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Rating</th>
<th>Source of Sample</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Do you think that the Cambodian operations may cause the Hanoi leaders to intensify or decrease offensive operations?</td>
<td>Intensify</td>
<td>RVN 52%  NVA 24% CAM 31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Same</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Decrease</td>
<td>---  03%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(U) 14. The three sets of responses here may represent both a positive and negative validation of the old saying that "familiarity breeds contempt." Based on first shallow analysis it would be easy to assume that the RVN-based NVA were much more restrained in their interpretation of the implications and effect of the ARVN entry into Cambodia than were the Cambodian-based NVA who were directly affected, because the RVN-based NVA had survived considerably longer and more intense combat engagements with the ARVN/US forces and were not directly and personally shocked by sudden demolition of the belief that Cambodia represented complete safety.

(U) But if the conclusions based on shallow analysis are accepted, what happens to the firmly-entrenched concept that morale is eroded by exposure to increasingly larger amounts of lengthy experience of hardships? It may be much more correct to reason, after more deeply searching analysis, that the RVN-based NVA are showing the appropriate and acceptable degree of reaction and it is the factors of surprise, unanticipated destruction of an important cherished belief that Cambodia represented safety, and sustained intensity of aggressive attack that caused the exaggerated impact on morale of Cambodian-based NVA troops.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Rating</th>
<th>Source of Sample</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Have you raised or lowered your estimation of the strength and determination of ARVN troops since they entered Cambodia?</td>
<td>Higher</td>
<td>RVN 72%  NVA 28% CAM 63%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Same</td>
<td>20%  24%  10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lower</td>
<td>08%  12%  05%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Rating</th>
<th>Source of Sample</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Is the general morale and fighting spirit of NVA soldiers increased or decreased now as a result of the Cambodian operations?</td>
<td>Increased</td>
<td>RVN 24%  NVA 44% CAM 13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Same</td>
<td>12%  08%  08%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Decreased</td>
<td>28%  40%  58%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Rating</th>
<th>Source of Sample</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Is the general morale and fighting spirit of VC soldiers increased or decreased now as a result of the Cambodian operations?</td>
<td>Increased</td>
<td>RVN 20%  NVA 28% CAM 11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Same</td>
<td>12%  16%  10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Decreased</td>
<td>56%  40%  47%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The balance of opinion about "who will win the war" held by VC PW's captured in RVN during the Allied Cambodian operations shifted to favor RVN by almost 2 to 1. Cambodia-based NVA troops were affected to almost the same extent.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source of Sample</th>
<th>March 1970 thought NLF would win</th>
<th>In June 1970 thought NLF would win</th>
<th>Net Change: # Believe in NLF victory reduced by:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>VC PW's taken in RVN</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>-47%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NVA PW's taken in Cambodia</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>-57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NVA PW's taken in RVN</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>-18%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source of Sample</th>
<th>March 1970 thought RVN would win</th>
<th>In June 1970 thought RVN would win</th>
<th>Net Change: # Believe in RVN victory increased by:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>VC PW's taken in RVN</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>+114%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NVA PW's taken in Cambodia</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>+89%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NVA PW's taken in RVN</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>+60%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
(U) The statements below are examples of answers to a question which asked: "...what was said by political officers and cadre about the reasons for NLF troops being in Cambodia?" The content of the answers make it obvious that the "reasons" were received some time before the Cambodian operations began. It is significant to note that all responses emphasize safety or security in Cambodia.

(U) Verbal promises of "safety in Cambodia" reinforced by personal experience or news from others which attested to the absence of Allied activity in Cambodia convinced enemy troops that Cambodia was indeed their "safe haven".

"Before the Cambodian operation: did the cadre or political officers ever discuss with you about the reasons for NLF troops being in Cambodia? What was said?"

"Our army is temporarily taking refuge in Cambodia because it is a neutral country and free from US bombing and destruction; thanks to Cambodia our rear bases can be completely secure."

"While the fighting is fierce and heavy in SVN we have to go across to the Cambodian frontier in order to safeguard our forces; Cambodia being a neutral country we are using it to set up our rear bases to stockpile our weapons, ammunition and food supplies."

"In our country we are exposed to all sorts of US modern weaponry such as chemicals, napalm bombs, the B-52 bomber which is very destructive. This is the reason why our troops have to take refuge in Cambodia where they have been given temporary use of the border areas and where they can be in complete security."

"We are using Cambodia as a sanctuary to stockpile our weapons and ammunition depots."
"Front forces have more security in Cambodia for we think that the US will not take the risk of going across the border and attacking in Cambodia. In Cambodia our troops regroup, replenish their armament, ammunition, and food supplies, and get reinforcements for their ranks before going across the border again to fight in SVN. This, in my opinion, has been possible because of a secret agreement with the Sihanouk government."

"We are in Cambodia to be protected from the GVN sweep operations and the terrifying bombing by B-52's. We are in Cambodia to rest and recuperate, to regroup and re-equip ourselves, to get reinforcements before going back to SVN to fight."
APPENDIX I

CASE STUDY FOR TINH THUONG (AFFECTION) CAMPAIGN (REPORTED IN VOLUME I)
TINH THUONG CAMPAIGN RESULTS

(U) Methods of data collection used in the Tinh Thuong Evaluation Study were field observations, official statistical records, and survey.

(U) One member of the research team devoted full time during the campaign to collection of data from field areas and was responsible for maintaining accurate records during the six-week activity as to conduct of the campaign, coordination between agencies, actual activity as it varied from planned activity, interagency and inter-governmental cooperation, and the collection of pertinent data.

(U) Sources of needed statistical records data were located, form and content for computer output specified, and delivery arranged.

(U) A five-member all-Vietnamese interview team under direction of a Vietnamese supervisor was employed and trained to administer two specially developed comprehensive compartmentalized questionnaires, one for NVA ralliers and one for NVA prisoners during the campaign. One member of the HSR research team devoted full time during the latter part of the campaign to running the field interview program.

(U) Data which was furnished included:

(U) From the field:

Weekly Report from Combined Campaign Headquarters via G5 Advisor's Office
Weekly Summary of significant activities from II Field Force
Monthly Tabular Report of Psychological Operations Activities from MACJ3-11
Weekly and monthly Chieu Hoi Returnee Reports from National Chieu Hoi Center
Prisoner of war records compiled from files of Senior Advisor, G2, III Corps
Leaflet drop and loudspeaker broadcast records compiled by map coordinate from Campaign Headquarters
(C) From official statistical records sources:

Enemy location, movement and strength, from CICV

Statistical data printout of tactical operations through November from MACV, Data Management Agency

B-52 strike data from MACV, J2

(U) From survey:

Protocols on 22 ralliers and prisoners taken in four campaign provinces (all who could be reached; five of the seven ralliers and 17 of the 53 prisoners)

(U) Data Handling. Field observation and field record data was compiled in cumulative summary form for the various types of psyop effort. This data set was maintained under the headings used by the original sources. The Weekly Hoi Chanh Reports, and Psyop Directorate reports, were in their standard form. Leaflet and broadcast dissemination was additionally furnished by map coordinate.

(C) Statistical records data were obtained in computer printout form. A special output was arranged to show information on tactical operations within the special portions of each of the four provinces. These portions, parallelograms lying at an angle to latitude and longitude, could be defined only by the squared coordinates. Also, the data that were needed were stored by only one coordinate (i.e., upper left) which could result in a compounded error: activity could be within the parallelogram area of interest but one coordinate be just outside so the activity would not be shown, or the activity could be entirely outside the area of intent with the one coordinate on the line and be shown as a data item.

---

(C) Activity A would not be shown although almost entirely within the special area; activity B would be shown although almost entirely outside.
(U) The same information had been requested for each province in RVN for comparison purposes and for use in future studies. Information needed for the immediate report was taken from these records for each of four campaign provinces and so provided data for the province as a whole rather than as a special portion.

(C) Data on enemy location and movement were furnished in both computer printout and computer graphics form. The graphic, on acetate overlay, showed positioned movement the enemy made during the period under investigation.

(C) Bombing strike data did not enter computer records on a basis that could furnish timely printout. This information was furnished from original input records by map coordinate from the MACJ2 office at MACV.

(U) The interview data was taken from the protocols of the 22 NVA ralliers and prisoners made available to the study. Pre-recorded responses were hand-tabulated; all free responses were translated and records for each individual and the total response set for each question categorized and placed in array for analysis.

(U) Data were arranged for presentation in tabular and matrix form. Data furnished by map coordinate was plotted, a separate acetate for each item, on a 1:25,000 scale map of the special area. This showed:

--- Each leaflet drop
--- Each aerial loudspeaker broadcast focus
--- Bomb strikes
--- Enemy location and movement

(U) The necessity to coordinate many organizations and groups and to initiate certain procedures for the first time made difficulties in obtaining information and in coordinating campaign goals within campaign boundaries. Information which was obtainable is in three sections which follow. The Campaign Field Report gives results of field observation. Statistical Records Data presents findings from statistical data records obtained at MACV. Survey Data presents information obtained from the ralliers and prisoners interviewed.