Table 38

Exposure and Attention to Loudspeaker

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Prisoners</th>
<th>Ralliers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In RVN, before coming into GVN hands, did you ever hear any GVN air loudspeaker messages?</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How often?</td>
<td>Frequently</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Occasionally</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Once or twice</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Could you usually hear it clearly?</td>
<td>Always</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mostly</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Half the time</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Seldom</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Never</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Could you usually understand the message or theme?</td>
<td>Always</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mostly</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Half the time</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Seldom</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Never</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Could the message usually be believed?</td>
<td>Always</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mostly</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Half the time</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Seldom</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Never</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did you ever hear any GVN ground loudspeaker messages?</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Sixteen of the seventeen prisoners heard GVN air loudspeaker messages; seven could usually hear them clearly, but three could seldom hear clearly and six, never. Only two could always understand the message or theme; three could understand it most or half the time; eleven, seldom or never. Three reported finding the messages usually believable; three found them believable half the time. None reported remembering any main points or themes.

None of the seventeen PW's reported ever hearing GVN ground loudspeaker messages.

Attention to specific messages (on defection) is discussed under "Attitude Toward Defection" in a following section.

Impact of Tactical Pressure

The psyop printed and spoken messages directed to the NVA soldier were only part of the psychological pressures exerted during the campaign. Tactical operations and combat experience was a major part of the total effect.

B-52 attacks dropped a considerable tonnage of bombs on the four provinces during the six-week period. There was a total of 563 contacts (small unit, large scale, and enemy initiated) reported during the campaign period within these four provinces, resulting in 4,805 enemy casualties (refer to Table 27). The individual response of the prisoners and ralliers was investigated (see Table 39).

All five of the ralliers had experienced air strikes, four had been under artillery fire, four had experienced B-52 bombing attacks, two had had their unit surrounded, and had been in combat. Men in their units had been killed or wounded in such actions. Two of the five had themselves been wounded but these wounds had occurred before rallying and did not influence the decision to rally (see Table 40).

Fourteen of the prisoners had experienced air strikes, ten had been under artillery fire, seven had experienced B-52 bombing attacks. Three had been in units surrounded by attacking forces and four had been in combat. All had had men in their units killed and wounded in these actions. Five of the seventeen had been wounded, only one of these at the time he became a prisoner. One reported an old wound; one, both old and newly received wounds which did not relate to being taken prisoner (see Tables 39, 40).
### Table 39

**Tactical Pressure Felt by Respondent**

**Unit Attack**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Prisoners (17)</th>
<th>Ralliers (5)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Experienced air strikes?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under artillery fire?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experienced heavy bombing?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unit ever surrounded?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ever in combat?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 40

**Tactical Injury Received by Respondent**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Prisoners (17)</th>
<th>Ralliers (5)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Were you ever wounded?</strong></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>By what weapon were you wounded?</strong></td>
<td>Artillery fire</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cannon</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Napalm</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rocket</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Shot gun</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Able to move about after being wounded?</strong></td>
<td>Not sure</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Were you wounded at the time you came into GVN hands?</strong></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Did your wound have anything to do with your being taken by GVN?</strong></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Attitude Expressed Toward Defection

Some discussion of types of defection had occurred with superiors in NVN and from other men in the units or from civilians in RVN. The terms used during the interview defined: capture (being taken prisoner against will); surrender (gives up voluntarily but does not join the other side); rally (joins the other side). Five of the POW's had been told of treatment to expect if captured (bad); only one reported being told of treatment to expect if he surrendered (good). Four reported being told of treatment to expect if he rallied, three of these saying it was bad, one of the four saying it was very good. Prior consideration of their own defection was explored.

Before rallying, two of the five Hoi Chanh had considered surrender, because of the hardships, stresses of war and lack of food. One of the ralliers had heard of people putting themselves in a position to induce their own capture. These were: if hardships were unendurable; due to anger with supervisors for treating them badly; to avoid being killed; if tired of fighting; if the soldier changed his mind about remaining in NVA ranks and no longer wanted to fight. Two felt intentional capture was the same as surrender; three felt it was different. Four felt sure their leaders believed they could not surrender with honor when in a hopeless situation; one was not sure. All were sure their leaders thought they should fight until death in a hopeless situation (Table 41).

Before becoming a prisoner, five of the POW's had considered surrendering; twelve had not. Only one of the prisoners said he had heard of men intentionally entering a situation that would insure capture. Nine said that it was possible that soldiers would intentionally get themselves into a situation when they could be captured, but four were not sure, and four said it was not possible. Eight felt that intentional capture was the same or almost the same as surrender while eight felt it was different and one was not sure. Fifteen of the POW's said their leaders did not believe a soldier could surrender with honor even when in a hopeless situation; only one prisoner said his leaders probably did feel he could surrender with honor under this condition; one was not sure. Fourteen of the prisoners stated their leaders believed they should fight on until killed when in a hopeless situation; twelve of these termed this definitely so and two probably so. Only three felt this was not the case (Table 41).
Table 41

Prior Consideration of Defection

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Prisoner (17)</th>
<th>Rallier (5)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prior consideration of surrender.</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Had heard of people putting themselves into situations where capture unavoidable.</td>
<td>Not sure</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Felt soldiers could intentionally put themselves into situation where capture unavoidable.</td>
<td>Not sure</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Felt leaders would condone surrender in a hopeless position.</td>
<td>Not sure</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Felt leaders would expect fight to death in a hopeless situation.</td>
<td>Not sure</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prior consideration of rally</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prior consideration to leaving NVA ranks, method other than rally.</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Not exactly</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Conditions of Rally/Capture

How They Rallied

(U) Each of the five men had thought of rallying before he actually came out to rally. Four gave as reasons for thinking of rallying:

(1) He would receive financial help from the people of the South; it would lessen bloodshed.

(2) So many killed; so much hardship endured; felt his side would not win; was sick and exhausted.

(3) Future looked dark; felt his side would not win; disappointed and frustrated because of hardships; saw the truth about SVN.

(4) To avoid getting killed; to get away from hunger and hardships.

(U) Five gave these reasons for not rallying earlier:

(1) The situation did not permit.

(2) Didn't have the opportunity.

(3) Would have had a bad name for displaying low morale and being unable to endure hardships.

(4) Didn't have the opportunity to carry it out.

(5) Because I was afraid if I came out I might be shot down by the GVN or Allied soldiers while on my way to rally.

(U) Five expressed what had happened to make them change their minds as follows:

(1) Found the war did not solve anything; too much blood has been shed in this war.
(2) I was sick and exhausted. If I remained with the unit I would be killed for sure so when I was sent to the hospital I went to the highway to wait for someone to come and asked them to take me to the Chieu Hoi Center.

(3) I got lost, was hungry and cold and went to a civilian home to ask for food and water. The old man of the house told me to rally and kept me there. He then told his son to go get the GVN soldiers who came to fetch me and take me to Phu Giao District, Binh Duong.

(4) I went on a mission for one entire month with a VC cadre. We contacted the cadre’s mother and she fed us well. Finally both of us desired to contact the cadre’s uncle who was then working at the police station in Binh Duong to rally. The police sent a car to pick us up.

(5) Because I did not want to remain with the VC side because we were being bombed and had to endure hardships and hunger constantly.

How Did They Become Prisoners?

(U) Three of the PW’s had considered rallying before becoming prisoners. Their reasons for thinking of it are quoted:

Because I want to stay alive, to better myself. I don’t like to fight. I would be better off materially.

The situation was too tense. I was too worried and too disenchanted.

I didn’t want to fight so I could stay alive until the day when I could return to my family.

It is very difficult to come out to rally. I was afraid I might be shot down by the cadre and didn’t know the way to the Chieu Hoi Center. I was afraid I might get caught by the cadre or other soldiers in combat and might be killed.
Because the cadres gave us the wrong directions; because I didn't understand the Chieu Hoi Program and didn't dare to come out although I had opportunities.

(U) Four of the prisoners had considered leaving the NVA ranks by methods other than rally or surrender. Five of the seventeen PW's had previously considered surrender. Reasons given for contemplating surrender were:

--- avoid fighting, bombing, shooting
--- was surrounded; under attack
--- tired of war, hardships, seeing people killed
--- knew will be killed or captured; no hope of returning north
--- when thought of the two wars, felt GVN too strong to be defeated

(U) Reasons were given for not doing so by a larger number of the prisoners. Some of these:

--- will reflect adversely on my family and my political future
--- my family is still in the north; if I am captured, I will be the only one who has to suffer
--- came to liberate south; cannot surrender because must unify country
--- once volunteered to liberate south, would rather be killed or captured
--- because why come all the way from north to south to surrender? Our family could be mistreated. They would get 60% of what other families get.
--- would be ashamed of myself. It would give my family a bad name
as an NVA fighter, you can't leave your ranks and your just cause

now that I have come south, am willing to endure all hardships and can endure them all...also, afraid of getting beaten up

because I haven't had to endure much hardship

yes, because I didn't know what I would get from GVN at all

(U) Only one of the seventeen said he had any other possible choice to avoid becoming a prisoner; he felt he might have escaped. Three of the seventeen did not know what to expect at the time. Fourteen expressed variously the belief they would be beaten, shot, tortured for information, and sent to prison.

How Were the Ralliers Treated?

(U) All five of the ralliers reported being well treated both at the time of being taken and between that time and reaching the classification center.

(U) Two felt they were being treated well and three, with normal fairness at the Province Chieu Hoi Center. Three thought the treatment much better than expected and one, better than expected; one respondent had not been told what to expect.

(U) Two of the five felt they could not evaluate how they felt about being there; three said they felt very fortunate to be in their present circumstances.

How Were the Prisoners Treated?

(U) Nine of the seventeen prisoners reported being treated badly (two of these said "very badly") at the time of becoming a prisoner; seven felt they were treated with normal fairness and one reported being treated well.
(U) As to treatment between the time of becoming a prisoner and reaching the classification center, ten reported being treated badly (two, "very badly"; eight, "badly"). Four reported being treated with normal fairness and three reported being treated well.

(U) Two considered they were being treated badly at the PW camp; nine felt they were being treated with normal fairness and six felt they were treated well.

(U) One had not been told how he would be treated, but for seven of the group, treatment was about the same as expected; for nine, it was better than expected and for two of these, "much better". Eight felt very fortunate and four felt fortunate to be there now; one felt neutral. Four felt unfortunate, one of these, "very unfortunate".
ATTACHMENT 1

POLICY GUIDANCE
POLICY NUMBER 87

15 October 1969

SPECIAL EFFORT TO INDUCE NVA
TO RALLY OR SURRENDER

DISTRIBUTION:
LIMITED

APPROVED BY:
DIRECTOR, JUSPAO

OFFICE OF POLICY, PLANS AND RESEARCH
JUSPAO
SAIGON, VIET-NAM
SPECIAL EFFORT TO INDUCE NVA TO RALLY OR SURRENDER

I. PURPOSE

To make a controlled test of the capability of intensified psyop efforts to induce more NVA troops to rally or surrender. This test will take priority over all existing psyop efforts.

II. SITUATION

Information gathered in the last six weeks from intelligence reports and interviews of NVA hoi chanh and POW's indicates that:

a. Communist soldiers in South Viet-Nam are short of food and medicine, are not receiving adequate support from the local population, and are war-weary;

b. NVA soldiers do not have sufficient information on how to rally;

c. NVA soldiers fear they will be badly treated, perhaps tortured or killed, if they rally or surrender.

Additionally, we note that in the last six weeks 76 NVA have become hoi chanh. This represents 25 per cent of the total NVA ralliers in all of calendar 1969 to date. The period of the last six weeks generally has not been a time of intense military contact.

The situation appears, therefore, to be propitious for intensified psyop efforts, supported by command instructions to GVN and US forces and an information program directed to the Vietnamese inhabitants in or near NVA-occupied areas.

Accordingly, a plan has been developed to conduct as speedily as possible a controlled test in a representative III CTZ area of large NVA concentration and through traffic. Lessons learned will be adapted for exploitation in other areas of South Viet-Nam.
II.

III. GUIDELINES

1. The keys to success are good local intelligence and credible psyop messages.

2. Some media output can be developed in Saigon on the basis of information available at MACV and JUSPAO and in GVN Ministries. The texts of other products should be prepared locally. In some instances the framework of the message can be prepared in Saigon, with details on enemy units and means of rallying or surrendering added locally.

3. Whenever possible, use voices, photos and messages of recent ralliers or prisoners whose companions are still with the enemy in the field. Testimonials from NVA soldiers are preferable in messages addressed to NVA forces.

4. Be clear and precise in giving instruction on how to rally or surrender.

5. Do not engage in polemics with the enemy. The assumptions in this special program are that for practical reasons he is ready to opt out of the war. If our assumptions are correct, he wants aid and comfort now, not propaganda. For the same reason, do not argue the relative advantage of rallying or surrendering. Tell him how-to-do either one, and leave the choice to him.

6. To the maximum extent feasible US forces should coordinate actions with GVN forces.

7. Do not exaggerate the kind of treatment the enemy will receive. Promise him good treatment but do not overstate the case or he will not believe it.

8. In order to allay suspicions of mistreatment at American hands do not overplay the role of US forces, in fighting or providing care for prisoners and ralliers. State that ralliers and prisoners may give themselves up to Vietnamese or to American forces who will pass them on to Vietnamese authorities.
9. We can expect Communist forces to make special efforts to tighten security over their troops if they believe we are making special inducement efforts in selected areas. We should take precautions to avoid disclosing the fact that we are focusing on the particular area chosen for the III CTZ test. During the four to six weeks of special effort there psyop efforts to induce rallying or surrendering probably will be conducted at normal levels elsewhere in South Viet-Nam. The III CTZ will represent an intensification of effort in that area and will also employ some new messages and techniques, as described below.

IV. ACTION PROGRAM

Instructional Information

1. Using all appropriate psyop media (leaflets, aerial tapes, radio broadcasts, APT teams, publications), beginning October 15 we will tell NVA soldiers in the selected area in simple language and in detail how to rally or surrender. All existing psyop material of this nature has been reviewed. Standard items suited to this special program will be used. Other material is being developed.

2. The instructional material for enemy troops should include suggestions on how to evade surveillance and other controls imposed by cadre and officers to prevent access to friendly psyop messages, rallying or surrendering.

3. Simultaneously, in the test area appropriate media (posters, ground tapes, radio broadcasts, publications, culture-drama team performances) will be used to instruct the local population on how to receive communist soldiers who wish to rally or surrender. This instructional program will include details on which places and which officials rallying or surrendering troops should be directed to in the local area.

4. Through command instructions and through information media (GVN and US radio, television, publications) GVN and US forces throughout Viet-Nam will be directed to assist communist troops who show disposition to rally or surrender.
Motivational Information

1. The same means will be used to tell communist troops, especially NVA, that they will be well treated if they rally or surrender. Specific promises of proper food and medical care will be made. Postwar repatriation will be promised to NVA prisoners of war only. The philosophy of the chieu hoi program will not be argued. In other words, messages for this intensive campaign will not be in ideological terms but will be pragmatic in nature.

2. Details of rewards for bringing in weapons will be reiterated to communist troops.

3. Details of inducement rewards will be repeated to South Vietnamese living in the area.

4. It would be highly desirable to institute and to publicize special commendations or other awards to GVN and US forces responsible for bringing in ralliers or prisoners.
ATTACHMENT 2

CAMPAIGN ORDER
SUBJECT: TINH THUONG Campaign (Affection)

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. (C) PURPOSE: To conduct a special six week Chieu Hoi Campaign in SR-1 and selected areas of Tay Ninh, Binh Long and Phuoc Long Provinces to test the effectiveness of intensified PSYOP efforts in inducing NVA troops to rally or surrender.

2. (C) GENERAL:

   a. Communist soldiers in South Vietnam have recently experienced shortages of food and medical supplies and have not received adequate support from the local population. There are indications that some NVA soldiers are beginning to be disillusioned with the war and are ready to rally, but do not have sufficient information on how to rally and fear they will be treated badly, tortured or killed.

   b. Following a series of military reverses, major NVA/VC units within III CTZ (1 NVA Div, 5th VC Div, 7th NVA Div, 9th VC Div) are presently located in dispersed positions along the Vietnamese/Cambodian border in the areas of Tay Ninh, Binh Long and Phuoc Long Provinces for resupply and refitting operations. Additional enemy units with significant NVA concentrations operating separately in SR-1 (Binh Duong) include 101 NVA Inf Regt, 268 VC MF Regt, 2 Quyet Thong Bns, 8th and 9th Arty Bn's and K35 Bn.

   c. SR-1 (Binh Duong Province) is the primary target area, while the Vietnamese/Cambodian border areas of Tay Ninh, Binh Long and Phuoc Long Provinces are designated as secondary target areas. All available PSYWAR/PSYOP assets for broadcasting and dissemination of leaflets will be employed in both target areas to inform NVA soldiers and the local population of Chieu Hoi policies, rallying procedures, reward policies for weapons and caches, and good treatment for ralliers and PW's. In the primary target area additional appeals will be disseminated to elicit the assistance of the local population in establishing contact with and encouraging NVA soldiers to rally to GVN agencies or ARVN/US forces.

3. OBJECTIVES: The campaign will be conducted to accomplish three interrelated tasks:
AVFBE

SUBJECT: TINH THUONG Campaign (Affection)

9 NOV 1969

a. Task I: Psychological operations conducted against enemy forces leaflet drops and broadcasts along the Cambodian border by III CTZ CPOC controlled PSYWAR aircraft. Leaflet drops, broadcasts, and distribution of handbills and posters in the SR-1 (Binh Duong Province) area.

b. Task II: Indoctrination of local population to include proper rallying instructions to be given by the populace to enemy soldiers. Appeals to the population to cooperate with GVN, RVNAF, and FWMAF units and agencies to assist in contacting the enemy. Encouragement of civilians to aid potential ralliers in leaving their units.

c. Task III: Quick reaction exploitation of successes and continuous improvement of campaign.

4. RESPONSIBILITIES:

a. 5th ARVN Division/32d DTA:

(1) The Commanding General 5th ARVN Infantry Division/32d Division Tactical Area or his authorized representative will supervise the campaign.

(2) Utilize organic infantry elements operating in SR-1 to distribute leaflets, handbills, posters, and conduct broadcasts during operations and civic action activities.

(3) Instruct PSYWAR elements at the unit level to combine with Provincial and Village VIS cadre of Binh Duong Province to educate the people.

(4) Establish a combined headquarters for the direction of the campaign Representation will be drawn from US units in the 32d DTA, 25th ARVN Division/31st DTA, provincial (Binh Duong) government, and a detachment from the 30th POLWAR Battalion.

b. 25th ARVN Division/31st DTA:

Establish liaison with the Combined Campaign Headquarters of the 5th ARVN Division/32d DTA.

c. Binh Duong Sector:

(1) Direct dissemination of leaflets, posters, handbills, and conduct of broadcasts by Territorial Forces (RF/PF).

(2) Conduct educational programs to inform the population of objectives and procedures of the Chieu Hoi program. Elicit voluntary assistance and cooperation from the population in the conduct of the campaign. Employ provincial, district and village VIS cadre, APTs, RD Cadre, and Pacification Teams for conduct of educational programs.
SUBJECT: TINH THUONG Campaign (Affection)

(3) Establish liaison with the Combined Campaign Headquarters.

(4) Provide for receipt of ralliers from other provinces and Combined
Campaign Headquarters and insure PSYOP exploitation.

d. Tay Ninh, Binh Long and Phuoc Long Sectors:
Receive ralliers from the Allied forces and arrange for immediate transfer to
Binh Duong Sector Chieu Hoi Center. All NVA and VC ralliers/PW's received
as a result of this campaign will be transferred.

e. 1st Air Cavalry Division, 1st Infantry Division and 25th Infantry
Division:
(1) Insure objectives of this campaign and detailed instructions on
receiving and handling of ralliers are disseminated to all US personnel.

(2) Disseminate special leaflets, handbills and posters in conjunction
with tactical operations.

(3) Assist the Combined Campaign Headquarters in quick reaction exploi­
tation of Hoi Chanh's by providing organic leaflet drop and broadcasting assets.

(4) Establish liaison with the Combined Campaign Headquarters for the
duration of the campaign.

f. CPOC/III CTZ And 6th PSYOP Bn:

(1) Receive propaganda materials from support agencies and transfer them
to Combined Campaign Headquarters of participating organizations as directed.
Schedule and prepare aerial drops of provided materials as directed.

(2) Provide strategic leaflets as required.

(3) Produce quick reaction exploitation of Hoi Chanh's as directed by III
CTZ/II FFORCEV PSYOP.

(4) Provide both preplanned and quick reaction aerial mission support on
request.

g. 30th POLWAR Battalion:
Provide necessary personnel to establish and staff the Joint Operating Center
of the Combined Campaign Headquarters.

h. Coordinating instructions.

(1) This campaign will be initiated on 15 November 1969.
AFVBE

SUBJECT: TINH THUONG Campaign (Affection)

(2) Loudspeaker appeals will be in clear and simple wording avoiding ideological language and self-praise.

(3) The "Early Word" systems will be used to the maximum extent possible for ralliers to appeal directly to members of their former units. Standard "Early Word" frequency will be 43.80 FM.

(4) Ralliers obtained as a result of this campaign will be turned over to province Chieu Hoi Centers as soon as possible for subsequent transfer to the Binh Duong Chieu Hoi Center.

(5) All ralliers and PW's must be treated well.


j. Logistics of propaganda printed matter and aerial support: See Incl 2.

k. The Combined Campaign Headquarters will be operational not later than 13 November 1969.

5. (U) REPORTS REQUIRED: Daily telephonic reports will be submitted to Combined Campaign Headquarters by ARVN/US divisional units and Sector Headquarters. Reports will include results and/or problems encountered. Commander, Commanding General, III CTZ and Commanding General, II FFORCV.

DO CAO TRI
Lieutenant General, ARVN
Commanding General
III CORPS AND III CTZ

JULIAN J. EWELL
Lieutenant General, USA
Commanding General
II FFORCV

DISTRIBUTION:
RVNAF JGS ATTN: GPWD
MACJ3-11 ATTN: OPS
CG, III CTZ ATTN: DCS, POLWAR
CG, II FFORCV, ACMOS, G5
CG, 5th ARVN Div
CG, 25th ARVN Div
CG, 1st Inf Div
CG, 25th Inf Div
CG, 1st CAV Div
DEPCORDS, III CTZ
Prov Chief, Binh Long
(Distribution Continued on Page 5)
I. PURPOSE

To make a controlled test of the capability of intensified psyop efforts to induce more NVA troops to rally or surrender. This test will take priority over all existing psyop efforts.

II. SITUATION

Information gathered in the last six weeks from intelligence reports and interviews of NVA Hoi Chanh and POWs indicates that:

a. Communist soldiers in South Viet-Nam are short of food and medicine, are not receiving adequate support from the local population, and are war-weary;

b. NVA soldiers do not have sufficient information on how to rally;

c. NVA soldiers fear they will be badly treated, perhaps tortured or killed, if they rally or surrender.

Additionally, we note that in the last six weeks 76 NVA have become Hoi Chanh. This represents 25 per cent of the total NVA ralliers in all of calendar 1969 to date. The period of the last six weeks generally has not been a time of intense military contact.

The situation appears, therefore, to be propitious for intensified PSYOP efforts, supported by command instructions to GVN and US forces and an information program directed to the Vietnamese inhabitants in or near NVA-occupied areas.

Accordingly, a plan has been developed to conduct as speedily as possible a controlled test in a representative III CTZ area of large concentration and through traffic. Lessons learned will be adapted for exploitation in other areas of South Viet-Nam.

A TRUE COPY:

STEPHEN M. GRIFFITH
Colonel, General Staff
ACofs, G5
III. GUIDELINES

1. The keys to success are good local intelligence and credible PSYOP messages.

2. Some media output can be developed in Saigon on the basis of information available at MACV and JUSPAO and in GVN ministries. The texts of other products should be prepared locally. In some instances the framework of the message can be prepared in Saigon, with details on enemy units and means of rallying or surrendering added locally.

3. Whenever possible, use voices, photos and messages of recent ralliers or prisoners whose companions are still with the enemy in the field. Testimonials from NVA soldiers are preferable in messages addressed to NVA forces.

4. Be clear and precise in giving instructions on how to rally or surrender.

5. Do not engage in polemics with the enemy. The assumptions in this special program are that for practical reasons he is ready to opt out of the war. If our assumptions are correct, he wants aid and comfort now, not propaganda. For the same reason, do not argue the relative advantages of rallying or surrendering. Tell him how-to-do either one, and leave the choice to him.

6. To the maximum extent feasible US forces should coordinate actions with GVN forces.

7. Do not exaggerate the kind of treatment the enemy will receive. Promise him good treatment but do not overstate the case or he will not believe it.

8. In order to allay suspicions of mistreatment at American hands do not overplay the role of US forces, in fighting or providing care for prisoners and ralliers. State that ralliers and prisoners may give themselves up to Vietnamese or to American forces who will pass them on to Vietnamese authorities.

9. We can expect Communist forces to make special efforts to tighten security over their troops if they believe we are making special inducement efforts in selected areas. We should take precautions to avoid disclosing the fact that we are focusing on the particular area chosen for the III CTZ test. During the four to six weeks of special effort there PSYOP efforts to induce rallying or surrendering probably will be conducted at normal levels elsewhere in South Viet-Nam. The III CTZ will represent an intensification of effort in that area and will also employ some new messages and techniques, as described below.
IV. ACTION PROGRAM

Instructional Information

1. Using all appropriate PSYOP media (leaflets, aerial tapes, radio broadcasts, APT teams, publications), beginning October 15 we will tell NVA soldiers in the selected area in simple language and in detail how to rally or surrender. All existing PSYOP material of this nature has been reviewed. Standard items suited to this special program will be used. Other material is being developed.

2. The instructional material for enemy troops should include suggestions on how to evade surveillance and other controls imposed by cadre and officers to prevent access to friendly PSYOP messages, rallying or surrendering.

3. Simultaneously, in the test area appropriate media (posters, ground tapes, radio broadcasts, publications, culture-drama team performances) will be used to instruct the local population how to receive communist soldiers who wish to rally or surrender. This instructional program will include details on which places and which officials rallying or surrendering troops should be directed to in the local area.

4. Through command instructions and through information media (GVN and US radio, television, publications) GVN and US forces throughout Viet-Nam will be directed to assist communist troops who show disposition to rally or surrender.

Motivational Information

1. The same means will be used to tell communist troops, especially NVA, that they will be treated if they rally or surrender. Specific promises of proper food and medical care will be made. Post war repatriation will be promised to NVA prisoners of war only. The philosophy of the Chieu Hoi program will not be argued. In other words, messages for this intensive campaign will not be in ideological terms but will be pragmatic in nature.

2. Details of rewards for bringing in weapons will be reiterated to communist troops.

3. Details of inducement rewards will be repeated to South Vietnamese living in the area.

4. It would be highly desirable to institute and to publicize special commendations or other awards to GVN and US forces responsible for bringing in ralliers or prisoners.
Reference: Message, CONF, MACJ3-11, CITE 59113, DTG 2102262 Oct 69

Subject: PSYOP Exploitation: Special Effort to Induce NVA to Rally or Surrender (U)

1. Distribution Materials.

   a. Objectives

      (1) Reinforce the purpose of the Chieu Hoi program within the RVNAF/FWMAF units in SR-1 and Tay Ninh, Binh Long and Phuoc Long Provinces.

      (2) Indoctrinate the local populace of Binh Duong Province in methods of assisting ralliers and induce them to cooperate with GVN/RVNAF/FWMAF agencies to obtain ralliers.

      (3) Induce the VC/NVA of SR-1 and the four enemy divisions to rally or surrender to GVN/RVNAF/FWMAF agencies.

   b. Leaflets. The following leaflets will be available for the campaign at 12 million each for the six week period.

      (1) Leaflet #3460: The Chieu Hoi benefits and rewards for weapons.

      (2) Leaflet #3461: The Chieu Hoi policy.

      (3) Leaflet #3464: How to Rally; Assurance of good treatment.

      (4) Leaflet #3473: Various means for learning unit and rallying.

      (5) Leaflet #3499: Declarations of former ralliers and surrenderees.

      (6) Leaflet #3501: Special Chieu Hoi appeal.

      (7) Leaflet #8930: Safe Conduct Pass.

   c. Posters and Handouts. The following posters and handouts will be available for the campaign in the numbers indicated:

      (1) Poster #3476, 17"x22", two color: VC/NVA choose to live (50,000).

      (2) Handout #3502, 8"x10", two color: How to treat persons desiring to rally (50,000).

      (3) Booklet, 16 pgs, three color: Chieu Hoi Guidebook (50,000).

   d. Tapes. Four aerial messages and two 30 minute ground messages have
been developed and will be available for use during the campaign. Present planning calls for maximum use of the "Early Word" system to supplement prepositioned tapes.

e. Radio and Television. Broadcast spots and interviews will be conducted to further inform the people of the Chieu Hoi Program and its benefits.

f. Newspaper. Two special additions of the TUDO newspaper will be available during the campaign.

g. Tactical support. In addition to the above preplanned strategic materials, an allowance of 8,000,000 tactical exploitation leaflets will be provided for support of the campaign through Saigon agencies. For smaller amounts of quick reaction leaflets, the 6th PSYOP Bn and 30th POLWAR Bn will support as directed by III CTZ POLWAR and II FFORCEV PSYOP through the CPOC.

2. Distribution Methods

a. Leaflets Number 3460, 3461, 3464, and 8930 will be dropped by air in preplanned target areas in a mix of 2 million each per week for the six weeks (Total for the period is 45,000,000 leaflets).

b. Leaflets Number 3473, 3499 and 3501 will be dropped twice by Frantic Goat assets during the campaign in a mix of 4,000,000 each (12,000,000 per drop for 24,000,000 total).

c. The TUDO newspapers will be dropped twice by Frantic Goat assets during the campaign in batches of 250,000 each (500,000 for the campaign total), in the same flight as 2b.

d. Hand dissemination of leaflets listed in 2a will be performed by operational infantry elements in the field to the extent possible.

e. Aerial broadcasts will be employed over intelligence and contact targets throughout the campaign. Air assets will be provided to the extent possible from CPOC controlled aircraft. CPCON units will endeavor to utilize organic aircraft for exploitation (quick reaction) of Hoi Chanh whenever possible.

f. Posters, handouts and Chieu Hoi Guidebooks will be disseminated by Provincial agencies to insure maximum distribution to the civil populace. These materials will be prepositioned in Binh Duong Province through the VIS/APA/PSYOP.

g. Broadcast of Radio and Television testimonials, spots, and indoctrination will be conducted by the Chieu Hoi Ministry, Ministry of Information and the CORDS/JUSPAO advisory staffs.
### PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS AGAINST ENEMY FORCES REPORT

RCS: AVPBE-M-2

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<tr>
<th>TARGET UNITS</th>
<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>STRENGTH</th>
<th>(IF APPLICABLE) NUMBER/SIZE OPERATIONS AGAINST UNIT</th>
<th>NUMBER OF CONTACTS</th>
<th>UNIT MAKING CONTACT</th>
<th>CATALOG NUMBER LEAF/POST USED</th>
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<th>GND/AIR</th>
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1. Form is CONFIDENTIAL when completed.
2. Report will be prepared on 8"x10½" size paper.

FFORCEV Form 345-1-8
ENCLOSURE 2

TAY NHINH

BINH DUONG

HAU NGHIA
APPENDIX II

CASE STUDY FOR OPERATION SEARCHLIGHT
CAMPAIGN (REPORTED IN VOLUME I)

CLASSIFIED TABLES
TABLE 19
SPECIFIC INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION REQUIREMENT
ITEMS FOR OPERATION SEARCHLIGHT

When did you first hear of Chieu Hoi program?
When did you first think of rallying?
Why did you rally at this time? (Interviewer to obtain at least 3 reasons, then ask which is most important.)

*Have you heard of the TET appeal "Light of Freedom"?
*Did you see any leaflets, handbills, posters or hear any loudspeaker broadcasts concerning the TET appeal "Light of Freedom"?
Did you hear an aerial loudspeaker broadcast?
If so, were you able to hear and understand the message clearly (Always, Mostly, Half the time, Seldom, Never). NOTE: In conjunction with this question interviewer is to determine the source's general intelligence, whether he is hard of hearing, the type of terrain he was in at time of broadcast, any background noises or battlefield conditions that might affect the audibility of the broadcast, and proximity of source to broadcast target area.

*Did you believe the TET appeal message?
*Did the TET appeal "Light of Freedom" influence your decision to rally?
*If so, what specifically in the message influenced you to rally?
*Did the message give instructions to rally?
*Do you believe the instructions reduced the danger involved in rallying?
*Did any of your friends who heard about the TET appeal "Light of Freedom" persuade you to rally?
*Was there anything in the TET appeal "Light of Freedom" that was unclear?
*Did you or anyone in your unit have any suspicions about the TET appeal "Light of Freedom"?

Were you influenced by the TET appeal "Light of Freedom" but prevented from rallying until a later date?
Is there some appeal which would have increased your motivation to rally that was not used by US/RVNAF/GVN PSYOP/POLWAR personnel?

(Questions marked with asterisk to be asked until 28 Feb 71)
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<th>PROVINCE</th>
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<td></td>
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<td>TOTALS</td>
<td>36,540</td>
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(C) TABLE 42

ESTIMATE OF ENEMY STRENGTH AT TIME OF OPERATION SEARCHLIGHT IN MR1 AND IN PERIODS PRECEDING AND FOLLOWING
<table>
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<th>Province Name</th>
<th>Week of 16-23 January</th>
<th>Week of 23-30 January</th>
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<td>L/S Cont. Small Unit</td>
<td>Enemy Casualties Total</td>
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<td>Days Acts Total</td>
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<td>Quang Ngai</td>
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<td>TOTAL</td>
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(C) TABLE 43

TACTICAL OPERATIONS DATA

MR1

(Early Estimates Based on Initial Reports)
APPENDIX III

SPECIFIC INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION REQUIREMENT

CONCERNING PSYOP EFFECTIVENESS
SPECIFIC INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION REQUIREMENT
CONCERNING PSYOP EFFECTIVENESS

a. (C) REQUIREMENTS: The following requirements concerning PSYOP effectiveness are for levy on Hoi Chans and PW's: This SICR superseded SICR U-UPE-U1600.

(1) Message Content:
   (a) How many different times during the past year have you seen Allied leaflets? Heard broadcasts (air, surface)?
   (b) What was the message theme?
   (c) What action did the message suggest you take?
   (d) What pictures or drawings accompanied the message?

(2) Circumstances of Exposure:
   (a) What was the source/media which delivered the message (printed, broadcast, face-to-face, family/friend)?
   (b) Which particular person did the message come from?
   (c) What made it difficult for you to receive/understand the message?

(3) General Situation:
   (a) Where were you when you received the message?
   (b) What were your, or your unit's, activities at the time of message reception?
   (c) What problems were you and your unit experiencing?
   (d) What were your main sources of news and information?
   (e) What travel restrictions were imposed when you traveled from your base area?
Reactions to Message Content:

(a) What was your reaction to the message?

(b) What action did you consider taking as a result of the message?

(c) What action was taken as a result of the message?

(d) What did other members of your unit do as a result of the message?

(e) What prevented you from taking the action suggested by the message?

(f) Prior to your rallying/capture what were your major personal concerns? (Find the relative importance of: Personal survival, physical discomforts, concern for family welfare, Communist cause/goals, and VC/NVA conflicts).