NOTES

1 I would like to thank Professor Hsiao Tso-liang of the University of Taiwan for calling my attention to some of these Comintern directives.

2 Translations of several contemporary Communist accounts of this episode are given in an article by Martin Wilbur, "The Ashes of Defeat," in The China Quarterly, No. 18 (April-June 1964).


4 T'ien Chia-ying, Min-kuo i lai Ta Shih Nien Piao (Calendar of Main Events Since The Republic) (Yenan: J Hsin Hua Publishing Co., 1945), p. 131.

5 Ibid., p. 139.

6 Mao Tse-tung, Selected Military Writings, p. 91.

7 Mao Tse-tung, "The Struggle in the Chingkang Mountains."

8 Tang Leang-li, Suppressing Communist Banditry in China (Shanghai: China United Press, 1934), pp. 114-115. The appendix includes a number of tables giving National Government estimates of Red Army strength at different dates.


10 T'ien Chia-ying, Min-kuo i lai Ta Shih Nien Piao, pp. 141, 175.

11 Ibid., p. 157.


13 Ibid., pp. 102, 109-111.

14 Ibid., pp. 127, 143-144.

15 Dates from T'ien Chia-ying, Min-kuo i lai Ta Shih Nien Piao.

16 Information from Professor Hsiao Tso-liang.

18. For details, see Frederick F. Liu, A Military History of Modern China (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1956).


21. Dates and figures throughout from Mao Tse-tung, Selected Military Writings, and T'ien Chia-ying, Min-kuo i lai Ta Shih Nien Piao.

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

Author's Note: Unfortunately, this is the period in the history of the Chinese Communist Party for which least information is available, or at least not readily available and in English. There are a number of good studies covering various aspects of developments before 1928, the early years of the Communist Party, Sun Yat-sen's relations with the Communists, the development of the Communist-Kuomintang alliance, and so on. From then on, however, the Chinese Communist Party was operating either underground in the cities or else in country areas largely cut off from the outside world. And the work which has been published in English has concentrated on political developments, the internal disputes within the Communist Party, or relations between the Chinese Communist Party and the Comintern, rather than on the military developments more directly relevant for a study of insurgency and counterinsurgency. A great deal of potential source material is available in Taiwan, from the Communist side as well as from the Kuomintang side, but little or no work has been done on this to produce a study of military developments.

When Gen. Ch'en Ch'eng was in charge of the anti-Commmunist campaign, he instructed his troops to collect all the written material they found, so that the Ch'en Ch'eng archives have more source material for this period than would be available in Peking, because the Communists could not carry many records on the Long March. The Ministry of Justice Library in Taiwan also has considerable files of Communist publications. Working from these sources, Professor Hsiao Tso-liant of the University of Taiwan has completed a very important study of Chinese Communist agrarian policy and has published a selection of documents on the power struggles within the Party. He hopes to proceed to a study of military developments. If this study is made, it will greatly increase our knowledge about the early period of Chinese Communist insurgency.

This study has made considerable use of T'ien Chia-ying's Min-kuo i lai Ta Shin Nien Piao (Calendar of Main Events Since the Republic), ([Yenan]: Hsin Hua Publishing Co., 1946), because it gives a definitely dated record of major operations but, as the book tries to record all major events in China between 1911 and 1936, it gives very little detail. Also, as a Communist publication, it is inclined to leave out Communist defeats, and since it was published in the Communist areas in 1946, there are not likely to be many copies in the United States.

However, although the source material is inadequate, it is possible to get a general picture of operations for the main Communist base area in Kiangsi, Hunan, and Fukien. And one can trace some important factors which influenced the effectiveness both of insurgency and of counterinsurgency.

Clubb, O. Edmund. 20th Century China. New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1964. This has quite a lot of background information but only a few pages on the counterinsurgency operations of the 1927-1934 period.

Hsu, U.T. The Invisible Conflict. Hong Kong: China Viewpoints, P.O. Box K-5271, 1958. An interesting but little-known book by the man who was in charge of operations against the underground Communist organization in the Kuomintang areas.
Mao Tse-tung. Selected Military Writings on Mao Tse-tung. Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1961. Mao Tse-tung is perhaps the most important source. This volume contains five items dealing with the period up to 1936: (1) "Why Is It That Red Political Power Can Exist in China?" (October 1928), (2) "The Struggle in the Chingkang Mountains" (November 1928), (3) "On Correcting Mistaken Ideas in the Party" (December 1929), (4) "A Single Spark Can Start a Prairie Fire" (January 1930), and (5) "Problems of Strategy in China's Revolutionary War" (December 1930). These are extremely important for an understanding of Chinese Communist strategy but they give only a fragmentary account of actual operations. "The Struggle in the Chingkang Mountains," which was written as a report to the Central Committee, comes closest to being a coherent history, but it covers only the first year of operations in one area and it is clear that Mao is primarily concerned to defend his record against critics. In "Problems of Strategy in China's Revolutionary War," which is as long as all the other items together, a number of operations are described or mentioned, but only as illustrations of strategic principles.

O'Ballance, Edgar. The Red Army of China. New York: Praeger, 1963. This study appears at first sight to be fairly complete and detailed but, on examination, proves to be unreliable on certain matters of fact. For example, the account of the Hailofeng Soviet (p. 42) describes P'eng P'ai as a bandit from Szechuan. In fact, he came from a wealthy family in Hai-feng hsien, joined the Communist Party after graduating from Waseda University, Tokyo, was appointed as Chief of the Bureau of Education in Hailfent in 1921 and resigned the following year to work on peasant organization. Again, a list of Communist regions in 1938 includes an "East Hopei Soviet Area." This is wrong on no less than three counts: (1) A rising in the summer of 1938 was rapidly and completely suppressed by the Japanese and guerrilla activities did not revive on any appreciable scale until after 1941, so East Hopei was a Communist area for only a few weeks in 1938; (2) in the Communist organization, East Hopei was part of the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei Region which O'Ballance also lists.
Chapter Three

ON THE PROTRACTED WAR

by Mao Tse-tung

The following material has been selected from Mao Tse-tung's On The Protracted War, published by the Foreign Languages Press, Peking, China, in 1960.
ON THE PROTRACTED WAR

by Mao Tse-tung

*In the spring of 1938, Mao Tse-tung delivered a series of lectures at the "Yenan Association for the Study of the Anti-Japanese War." The Japanese War had been going on for almost a year. The Communists and the Nationalists had joined in a tenuous "United Front," and the Communists' Eighth Route Army (45,000 strong), commanded by Chu Teh, was in the field.

In September 1937 the Eighth Route Army scored an impressive victory over a Japanese division by ambushing a long column in a defile known as the Pinghsing Pass. Lin Piao's 115th Division conducted the action. It was the first and only time that the Communists committed a division-size unit into conventional battle against the Japanese. Despite this one minor attack, Japan continued what seemed to be an inexorable drive into North and Central China.

Chairman Mao was being pressured by his own organization as well as the Nationalists to continue the military fight against the invading Japanese Army. Mao instead turned the energies of his party to expanding the political control over the peasants and the establishment of guerrilla bases.

In retrospect, it was a brilliant decision, and it stemmed from Mao's concept of the war as a protracted struggle. In the following excerpts from his lectures, Mao explains his concept of a protracted war and outlines the strategy required for victory.

*Editor's comments.
ON THE PROTRACTED WAR

"... [Our] strategy should be that of employing our main forces in mobile warfare, over an extended, shifting and indefinite front: a strategy depending for success on a high degree of mobility, and featured by swift attack and withdrawal, swift concentration and dispersal. It will be large-scale mobile warfare rather than the simple position war of extensive trench-work, deep-massed lines and heavy fortifications.

"This does not mean the abandonment of vital strategic points, which can be defended in position warfare as long as profitable. But the pivotal strategy must be mobile warfare. Fortified warfare must be utilized, but it will be of auxiliary and secondary strategic importance.

"Geographically the theatre of the war is so vast that it is possible for us to pursue mobile warfare with the utmost efficiency and with a telling effect on a ponderous slow-moving war-machine like Japan's cautiously feeling its way in face of fierce actions. Deep-line concentration and the exhausting defense of a vital position or two on a narrow front would be to throw away all the tactical advantages of our geography and economic organization, and to repeat the mistake of the Abyssinians. Our strategy and tactics must aim to avoid great decisive battles in the early stages of the war, and gradually to break the morale, the fighting spirit and the military efficiency of the living forces of the enemy.

"Besides the regular Chinese troops, we should create great numbers of guerrilla detachments among the peasantry. What has been accomplished by the anti-Japanese volunteer units of this type in Manchuria is only a very minor demonstration of the latent power of resistance that can be mobilized from the peasantry of all China. Properly led and organized, such units can keep the Japanese busy twenty-four hours a day and worry them to death.

"It must be remembered that the war will be fought in China. This means that the Japanese will be entirely surrounded by a hostile Chinese people. The Japanese will be forced to move in all their provisions and guard them, maintaining troops along all lines of
communications, and heavily garrisoning their bases in Manchuria and Japan as well.

"The Process of the war will present to China the possibility of capturing many Japanese prisoners, arms, ammunition, war-machines, and so forth. A point will be reached where it will become more and more possible to engage Japan's armies on a basis of position warfare, for, as the war progresses, the technical equipment of the anti-Japanese forces will greatly improve, and will be reinforced by important foreign help. Japan's economy will crack under the strain of a long, expensive occupation of China and the morale of her forces will break under the trial of a war of innumerable but indecisive battles. The great reservoirs of human material in the revolutionary Chinese people will still be pouring men ready to fight for their freedom into our front lines.

"All these and other factors will condition the war and will enable us to make the final and decisive attacks on Japan's fortifications and strategic bases and to drive Japan's army of occupation from China.

The Basis of the Problem

"Why is the Anti-Japanese War a protracted war? Why will the final victory be China's? What is the basis for our assertions?

"The Sino-Japanese War is like no other war; it is a life-and-death struggle between semi-colonial and semi-feudal China and imperialist Japan and it is fought in the 1930's. This is the basis of the whole problem. The two belligerents possess contrasting features; let us take them in turn.

"Let us consider Japan. First, she is a powerful imperialist country which ranks first in the East in military, economic and political-organizational power and counts as one of the five or six notable imperialist countries in the world. This is the basis of Japan's war of aggression; the inevitability of the war and the impossibility of a quick victory for China are due directly to Japan's imperialist state system and her strong
military, economic and political-organizational power.

"Secondly, however, the imperialist character of Japan's social economy determines the imperialist, retrogressive and barbarous character of her war. In the thirties of the twentieth century Japanese imperialism has been forced by its internal and external contradictions to engage in an adventurist war on a scale hitherto unparalleled, and is driven to the brink of final collapse. In terms of social evolution, Japan is no longer a prosperous country; the war will not make her prosperous as her ruling classes fondly hope but, on the contrary, spells the doom of Japanese imperialism. This is the retrogressive nature of Japan's war. Such retrogressiveness, combined with the military-feudal character of her imperialism, leads to the peculiar barbarity of her war. This barbarity will arouse most violent antagonism between the classes in Japan, between the Chinese and the Japanese nations, and between Japan and most countries of the world. The retrogressive and barbarous character of Japan's war constitutes the principal reason why Japan's defeat is certain.

"Thirdly, although Japan is conducting her war on the basis of her military, economic and political-organizational strength, she does so with very inadequate natural resources. She has military, economic and political-organizational strength, but her strength is quantitatively inadequate for her purpose. A comparatively small country deficient in manpower and in military, financial and material resources, Japan cannot stand a protracted war. Seeking to overcome her lack of resources by means of war, her rulers will get the very reverse of what they desire; in the long run the war, which has been launched to solve her difficulties, will only increase them by exhausting even her original resources.

"Fourthly and lastly, despite the support Japan has obtained from the fascist countries, she is bound to encounter an international opposition greater than the support. This opposition will gradually grow, and eventually not only cancel out the support but also bring pressure to bear upon Japan herself. This exemplifies the law that the unjust can find little support, and is a consequence of the very nature of Japan's war.
"Japan's advantage lies in her great fighting capacity and her disadvantage in the retrogressive and barbarous nature of her war, in her deficiency in men and material, and in her lack of international support. These are the main features of Japan's situation.

We now turn to China. First, she is a semi-colonial and semi-feudal country. From the Opium War, the Revolution of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom, the Reformist Movement of 1898, and the Revolution of 1911 down to the Northern Expedition, all revolutionary and reformist movements aiming at her liberation from a semi-colonial, semi-feudal status have met with serious setbacks, and China has remained a semi-colonial and semi-feudal country. We are still a weak country and, in striking contrast to the enemy, are inferior in military, economic and political-organizational strength. That is the reason why the war cannot be avoided and China cannot win a quick victory.

Secondly, however, China's liberation movement which has developed throughout the last hundred years, is now quite different from what it was at any time in its history. Although the domestic and foreign forces opposed to the liberation movement have caused serious setbacks, they have steeled the Chinese people. Although weaker than Japan militarily, economically, politically and culturally, China today contains certain factors more progressive than those in any period of her history. The Communist Party and the army under its leadership represent such factors. It is on the basis of these progressive factors that China's war of liberation becomes protracted and ultimate victory possible. While Japanese imperialism is on the decline, China, in striking contrast, is a country rising like the morning sun. China's war is a progressive war and hence a just war. A war that is capable of uniting the nation, arousing the sympathy of the people in the enemy country and winning the support of most countries of the world.

Thirdly, being a very big country, vast in territory, rich in resources, with an enormous population and huge military forces, China is capable of sustaining a prolonged war -- another striking contrast to Japan.

Fourthly and lastly, fighting a progressive and just war, China can win abundant international support, whereas Japan, carrying on an unjust war, can find little support.
"China's disadvantage lies in her small fighting capacity and her advantage in the progressive and just nature of her war, in a vast territory and in the abundance of international support which she enjoys. These are the main features of China's situation.

"Thus it can be seen that, in spite of Japan's military, economic and political-organizational strength, her war is retrogressive and barbarous, her manpower and material resources are inadequate, and internationally she is in a disadvantageous position. China, on the contrary, though weaker militarily and economically and in political organization, is in a period of progress and fights for a cause that is progressive and just, with a vast territory which enables her to keep up a protracted war, and assured of the support of most other countries in the world. These are the basic contradictory characteristics of the Sino-Japanese War. They are the factors that have determined and are determining politically the policies and militarily the strategies and tactics of both sides, the factors that make the war a protracted one and final victory certain for China. The war is a struggle for supremacy between these factors. They will develop in the course of the war, each according to its own nature; and from such development everything will follow. Such characteristics are hard facts and not fictitious or illusive; they constitute all the basic factors of the war and are not incomplete facets; they pervade all problems big and small and on all stages of operations on both sides, and are not things without consequence. Anyone who ignores them in considering the Sino-Japanese War will certainly come to wrong conclusions; even though in some of his views he may seem right to some people for a time, the course of the war will eventually prove him wrong.

The Three Stages of the Protracted War

"Since the Sino-Japanese War is a protracted one and final victory will be China's, we can reasonably assume that such a protracted war will pass through the following three stages. The first stage is the enemy's strategic offensive and our strategic
defensive. The second stage is the enemy's strategic defensive and our preparation for the counter-offensive. The third stage is our strategic counter-offensive and the enemy's strategic retreat. It is impossible to predict the three stages in specific detail, but we can, in the light of present conditions, point out certain main trends. As objective events will follow a chequered course, full of ups and downs, nobody can cast a horoscope for the Sino-Japanese War; for the strategic direction of the war, however, it is necessary to make a rough chart of the war's trends. Hence, although future developments may belie our chart and cause it to be modified, such a chart is nevertheless required in the strategic plan for carrying on a protracted war firmly and purposefully.

"The first stage has not yet ended. The enemy's intention is to occupy Canton, Wuhan and Lanchow and link up these three points. To accomplish this aim the enemy will have to throw in an army of at least fifty divisions, about one and a half million men, and spend from one and a half to two years and over ten thousand million yen. In penetrating so deeply into the interior, he will encounter immense difficulties, with disastrous consequences which he cannot even imagine. In order to occupy the full length of the Canton-Hankow railway and the Sian-Lanchow highway, he will have to fight very risky battles without, however, being sure of achieving his aims. But our plan should be one or a protracted war based on the possibility that the enemy may occupy the three points and even certain other regions as well as linking them up, so that we may be able to cope with him even if he succeeds in this venture.

"In this stage we should chiefly resort to mobile warfare supplemented by guerrilla and position warfare. In the first phase of this stage the Kuomintang military authorities subjectively and wrongly assigned the chief role to position warfare which, when one considers the stage as a whole, should play only a supplementary role. In this stage, China has formed a broad united front and achieved unprecedented unity. Though, in an attempt to bring about a quick decision and to conquer the whole of China at little cost, the enemy has resorted and will resort to shameless trickery to induce her to capitulate,
so far he has failed and is not likely to succeed in the future. In this stage, in spite of considerable losses, China has made great progress, which will become the main basis for the continuance of her resistance into the second stage. In this stage the Soviet Union has already given substantial aid to China.

"On the side of our enemy, the morale of his troops has begun to deteriorate, and the spearhead of his attacking army has in the middle phases of this stage lost some of the sharpness it possessed in the first phase and will be further blunted in the concluding phase. His finance and economy have begun to show signs of exhaustion; the Japanese people and troops have begun to suffer from war-weariness, while the bloc that directs the war has begun to feel anxiety which will grow into pessimism about the prospect of the war.

"The second stage may be termed one of strategic stalemate. At the end of the first stage, owing to his shortage of manpower and our firm resistance, the enemy will be forced to fix a limit to his strategic offensive. He will thus enter the stage of retaining the territories he has occupied. He will attempt to hold on to these regions and perpetuate his occupation by the fraud of setting up puppet governments while ruthlessly plundering the Chinese people, but again he has to reckon with a stubborn guerrilla war. The enemy's rear being unguarded, our guerrillas will have seized the opportunity to develop themselves considerably in the first stage and establish many base areas so that his retention of the occupied areas is fundamentally jeopardized; consequently, in the second stage there will still be large-scale fighting. We shall resort mainly to guerrilla warfare, supplemented by mobile warfare. Although China will still have a large regular army, she will yet find it difficult to launch immediately the strategic counter-offensive because, on the one hand, the enemy will adopt a strategically defensive position in the big cities and on the main lines of communication under his occupation and, on the other hand, China's technological equipment will still be inadequate. Except for the troops engaged in front line defense, a large number of our forces will be switched to the enemy's rear in comparatively dispersed formations and, relying on the areas not occupied by the
enemy and in co-ordination with the armed units of the people, will launch an extensive, fierce guerrilla war against the enemy-occupied areas and, whenever possible, keep the enemy on the move so as to destroy him in mobile warfare as is now being done in Shansi Province. The fighting will be ruthless and the country will face serious devastation.

But the guerrilla war will achieve victory and, if well conducted, will not allow the enemy to hold on to more than one-third of the areas now occupied and enable us to recover the other two-thirds; this will be a great defeat for the enemy and a great victory for China.

By then the entire enemy-occupied territories will be divided into three categories: the enemy base areas, the base areas for guerrilla warfare and the guerrilla zones contested by both sides.

"The duration of this stage will be determined by the changes in the relative strength of the two sides and in the international situation; generally speaking, we should be prepared to hold out for quite a long period so as to come safely through this difficult stage. China will have to undergo a very painful period and will be faced with two big problems: economic difficulties and the subversive activities of the collaborators. The enemy will do his utmost to undermine China's united front, while the various puppet regimes in the enemy-occupied areas will merge into a so-called united government. Owing to the loss of big cities and the hardships of war, vacillating elements within our own ranks will clamour for compromise, and pessimism will spread far and wide. Our tasks will then be: to mobilize the people of the whole country to unite as one man and carry on the war unflinchingly, to broaden and consolidate the united front, to sweep away every trace of pessimism and compromise, to promote the will to sustain the bitter struggle, and to carry out new wartime policies, so that we can come safely through this difficult stage of the journey. In this stage, we must call upon the whole country resolutely to maintain a unified government, to oppose splits, to improve our military technology according to plan, to reform our armed forces, to mobilize the entire people and to prepare for the counter-offensive. The international situation will become even
more unfavourable to Japan; although 'realism' of the Chamberlain type which acquiesces in 'accomplished facts' may emerge, the main international forces will give further help to China. Japan's threat to South-east Asia and Siberia will become more serious and a new war may even be touched off. On the enemy's side, scores of his divisions can hardly be extricated from China, a mire in which they have been bogged down. Widespread guerrilla warfare and the people's anti-Japanese movement will wear down the big Japanese forces by inflicting heavy casualties, and at the same time, demoralizing them by fostering their homesickness and war-weariness or even their anti-war feelings. Although admittedly Japan will achieve something in her plunder of China, yet, short of funds and harassed by guerrillas, she cannot make quick or sweeping gains.

"This second stage is the transitional as well as the most trying period of the whole war, but it is also the pivot of change. Whether China will become an independent country or sink to the level of a colony is not determined by the retention or loss of the great cities in the first stage but by the extent to which the whole nation exerts itself in the second. If we can maintain the resistance, the united front and the protracted war, China will in this stage shed her weakness and become strong. This will be the second act in the three act drama of China's War of Resistance. Through the efforts of the entire cast the curtain will fall on a brilliantly played and dramatic last act.

"The third stage is that of the counter-offensive launched by us to recover our lost territories. Success will depend mainly upon the strength China has built up in the preceding stage and continues to increase in the present stage. As China cannot win by relying on her own strength alone, but must utilize international aid and the changes within the enemy country, propaganda abroad and diplomacy will become more important. In this stage, our war will be no longer one of strategic defensive, but one of strategic counter-offensive in the form of strategic offensive and we shall no longer operate on strategically interior lines. The war cannot be said to have been concluded until our army has fought its way to the banks of the Yalu River. The third stage is the last stage of the protracted war, and keeping up the war to the end means going through the whole
of this stage. Our main form of fighting in this stage will still be mobile warfare, but position warfare will grow in importance. Just as position defense in the first stage could not be regarded as important because of the conditions then existing, so now, with the changed conditions and fresh requirements, attacks on positions become quite important. Whereas in the second stage guerrilla warfare was the main form, in this stage it will again become supplementary to, and strategically co-ordinated with, mobile and position warfare.

"Thus, it is obvious that the war is protracted and, as a corollary, ruthless. The enemy will not be able to swallow up the whole of China, but he will be able to occupy many areas for a relatively long period. China will not be able to oust the Japanese speedily, but will retain most of her territory. Ultimately the enemy will be defeated and we shall be victorious, but a difficult part of the journey lies ahead.

"Such a long and ruthless war will strengthen and toughen the Chinese people. The political parties participating in the war will also be toughened and tested. We must resolutely maintain the united front; only by maintaining the united front can we maintain the resistance; and only by maintaining the united front and the resistance can we win final victory. If we succeed in this, we shall overcome all difficulties. The logic of war is that we must first traverse the stony path of war before we reach the smooth road leading to victory.

"Throughout the three stages the relative strength of the two sides will change along the following lines. In the first stage the enemy is superior and we inferior. It must be noted that from the eve of resistance to the end of this stage the inferiority on our part will change in two different directions. One is a change for the worse. In the first stage, China's original inferiority will be aggravated by war losses, by a diminution in territory, population, economic resources and military strength, and in the number of cultural institutions. These losses, especially of economic resources, may be quite considerable towards the end of the first stage. This will be exploited by some people as a basis for their theories of national subjugation and compromise. But the other change, a change
better, must also be noted. I refer to the accumulation of war experience, military and political progress, the mobilization of the people, cultural development in a new direction, the emergence of guerrilla warfare and the increase of international aid. In the first stage, what is old is on the decline both in quality and in quantity, mainly in quantity. Meanwhile, what is new is on the rise both in quality and in quantity, mainly in quantity. The second kind of change provides the basis for us to keep on fighting and win final victory.

"In the first stage two kinds of changes also occur on the enemy's side. The first is a change for the worse, which manifests itself in hundreds of thousands of casualties, consumption of arms and ammunition, decline of the morale of the troops, discontent of the people at home, shrinkage of trade, an expenditure of over ten thousand million yen and condemnation before the court of world opinion. This aspect provides another basis for us to keep on fighting and win the final victory. But the second kind of change on the enemy's side, a change for the better, must also be reckoned with. He has extended his territory and increased his population and resources. This point again forms the basis for the view that our War of Resistance is protracted and cannot be won quickly, but it also serves as the basis of theories of national subjugation and compromise. But we must not forget that this change for the better on the enemy's side is only transitory and partial. An imperialist power on the brink of collapse, our enemy can only occupy Chinese territory for a time. The vigorous development of Chinese guerrilla warfare will actually restrict his occupation zone to narrow strips of land. Moreover, the enemy's occupation of Chinese territory has given rise to and sharpened the contradiction between his own country and other foreign countries. Again, what happened in the three north-eastern provinces shows that this occupation is for a considerable time a matter of capital outlay on the enemy's part and not of profits. All these things provide us with arguments to refute the theories of national subjugation and compromise and to confirm the theories of protracted war and final victory.
In the second stage, the above-mentioned changes on both sides will continue to develop and, generally speaking, Japan will continue to decline while China will continue to rise, though we cannot yet foretell the specific details. For instance, China's guerrilla war will be a serious drain on Japan's military and financial power, the people of Japan will become more discontented, the morale of her troops will decline further and internationally she will become more isolated. As to China, her condition will be quite different from what it is now: she will make further political, military and cultural progress; her people will become more extensively mobilized; her guerrilla warfare will be further developed; her economy will develop to some extent along new lines of small industries and extensive agriculture in the interior; international aid to her will gradually increase. The second stage may last quite a long time. During that time the contrast in strength between the enemy and ourselves will undergo a great change and be reversed in our favour; China will gradually rise and Japan will gradually decline. Then China will shed her inferiority and Japan will lose her superiority; the two countries will first be evenly matched and then their relative positions will be reversed. After that China will in general have completed her preparations for the strategic counter-offensive and will enter the stage of driving out the invaders. It should be repeated here that the change from inferiority to superiority and the completion of preparations for the counter-offensive imply an increase in China's strength, in Japan's difficulties and in international aid given to China; the sum total of all these forces will bring about China's superiority and the completion of her preparations for the counter-offensive.

Because of the unevenness in China's political and economic development, the strategic counter-offensive of the third stage will not proceed in the initial phase at a uniform pace throughout the country; but will rise in one locality and fall in another. As the enemy will not slacken his efforts to break up China's united front by various methods designed to cause division and bad feeling, internal unity in China becomes all the more important, and it is for us to see to it that the strategic counter-offensive is not balked.
halfway by internal dissensions. In this period the international situation will become very favourable to China. It is for China to avail herself of this opportunity to attain her complete liberation and establish an independent democratic state, thereby rendering help to the world anti-fascist movement.

"China's shift from inferiority to parity and then to superiority and Japan's shift from superiority to parity and then to inferiority; China's shift from defensive to stalemate and then to counter-offensive and Japan's shift from offensive to defensive and then to retreat -- this is the course of the Sino-Japanese War and its inevitable trend.

Mobile, Guerrilla and Position Warfare

"In a strategically protracted inter-line-defense, exterior line quick-decision attacks in campaigns and battles, which are the substance of our war operations, assume the form of mobile warfare. Mobile warfare is the form of exterior-line quick-decision attack in campaigns and battles undertaken by regular armies along an extensive front in a vast theatre of war. At the same time, it includes mobile defense, which must occasionally be conducted to facilitate such attacks, and also attacks on positions and position defenses in a supplementary role. Its characteristics are: regular armies, superior forces in campaigns and battles, the offensive, and fluidity.

"China has vast territory and huge armed forces which, however, are inadequately equipped and trained; the enemy's forces are inadequate in number, but better equipped and trained. To fight the enemy under these conditions we should beyond all doubt resort principally to the offensive form of mobile warfare and supplement it with other forms so that the warfare as a whole is mobile. We must oppose both 'flightism' or retreat without advance and 'desperadoism' or advance without retreat.

"One of the characteristics of mobile warfare is its fluidity, which not only permits, but requires, a field army to advance and withdraw in great strides. But this has nothing
in common with Han Fu-ch'u's flightism. The main objectives of war are the annihilation of the enemy and self-preservation. Self-preservation aims at the annihilation of the enemy, which is in turn the most effective means of self-preservation. Therefore, mobile warfare can never be used as an excuse by people like Han Fu-ch'u and can never mean only backward without forward movement, a movement which negates the fundamentally offensive character of mobile warfare, and, if followed to the end, would 'move' China, for all her vast territory, out of existence.

"The other view, desperadoism, which advocates advance without retreat, is also wrong. We advocate mobile warfare with exterior-line quick-decision attacks in campaigns and battles; it includes position warfare in a supplementary role, as well as mobile defense and withdrawal, without which mobile warfare cannot be carried out to the full. Desperadoism is a form of military short-sightedness, arising often from the fear of losing territory. A desperado ignores one of the characteristics of mobile warfare, its fluidity, which not only permits, but requires a field army to advance and withdraw in great strides. On the positive side, to draw the enemy into a fight unfavourable to him but favourable to us, we should often try to keep him on the move and look for conditions favourable to ourselves such as suitable terrain, the enemy's vulnerability, a local population which can stop leakage of information and the enemy's fatigue and unpreparedness. This means that we should allow the enemy to advance and not grudge the temporary loss of part of our territory. For temporary and partial loss of territory is the price of the permanent preservation of our country and the recovery of lost areas. On the negative side, whenever we are forced into an unfavourable position and threatened with annihilation, we should have the courage to withdraw so as to preserve our forces and strike again when new opportunities arise. In sheer ignorance the desperadoes would keep on fighting for a single city or a piece of ground even when they are obviously in an unfavourable position, with the result that they not only lose the area or the city but also fail to preserve their forces. We have always advocated the policy of luring the enemy deep into the interior precisely because this is the most effective military policy
for a weak force in strategic defense against a strong one.

"Mobile warfare is the most important form of fighting in the Anti-Japanese War and guerrilla warfare comes next. When we say that in the war as a whole mobile warfare is the principal and guerrilla warfare the supplementary form, we mean that the issue of the war must be mainly decided by regular warfare, especially in its mobile form, and not by guerrilla warfare. It does not follow, however, that the strategic role of guerrilla warfare in the Anti-Japanese War is unimportant. Its strategic role in the war ranks second only to mobile warfare, because without it victory is impossible. This statement implies that strategically guerrilla warfare must develop into mobile warfare. Guerrilla warfare will do so in the course of the prolonged, ruthless war, and will not remain in its original form. Thus the strategic role of guerrilla warfare is twofold: supporting and evolving into regular warfare. In view of the unprecedented extensiveness and protractedness of guerrilla warfare in China's Anti-Japanese War, there is all the more reason why its strategic role should not be underestimated.

'Guerrilla warfare in China, therefore, has not only its tactical but also its peculiar strategic problems. I have discussed this in my 'Strategic Problems in the Anti-Japanese Guerrilla War.' I have already mentioned the forms of fighting in the three strategic stages of the Anti-Japanese War: In the first stage mobile warfare is the principal and guerrilla and position warfare are supplementary forms. In the second stage guerrilla warfare will be raised to the principal position supplemented by mobile and position warfare. In the third stage mobile warfare will again become the principal form supplemented by position and guerrilla warfare. But mobile warfare in the third stage will not be undertaken entirely by the original regular forces; a part of it, possibly quite an important part, will be undertaken by the original guerrilla forces, who will by then have developed from guerrilla to mobile war. Taking all the three stages into consideration, guerrilla warfare is definitely indispensable in China's Anti-Japanese War. It will be the most glorious chapter in the history of war.
It is therefore absolutely necessary to assign at least several hundred thousands out of the millions of China's regular troops to spread all over the enemy-occupied areas and mobilize the armed units of the people and carry on guerrilla warfare in co-ordination with them. These regular forces should willingly accept this assignment as an honourable mission and must not think that their status is lowered simply because they fight fewer big battles and so cannot for the time being appear as national heroes. In guerrilla war one cannot achieve such quick results and great fame as in regular war, but just as a distant journey tests the strength of a horse and a long task proves the character of a man, so will guerrilla warfare demonstrate its enormous power in the long course of a ruthless war and is indeed a glorious task. Moreover, a regular force, when dispersed, can conduct guerrilla warfare, and, when reassembled, can resume mobile warfare, just as the Eighth Route Army has been doing. The directive of the Eighth Route Army is: Basically guerrilla warfare, but lose no favourable chance for mobile warfare. In spite of opposing views this directive is absolutely correct.

Defensive or offensive position warfare is generally impracticable, a weakness due to China's present technological conditions. Moreover, the enemy is also taking advantage of the vastness of our territory to bypass our fortified positions. Hence position warfare cannot become an important, let alone the principal, form of fighting. But in the first and second stages of the war, it is possible and necessary to employ localized position warfare which lies within the scope of mobile warfare and plays a supplementary role in campaign operations. Semi-positional mobile defense is especially an indispensable part of mobile warfare because it resists the enemy at one point after another, wears him down and gains time. China must increase her modern armament so as to be able to launch attacks on positions in the stage of the strategic counter-offensive. In this stage position warfare will undoubtedly play a greater role, for we cannot dislodge the enemy firmly entrenched in our lost territories unless we launch fierce position attacks in co-ordination with mobile warfare. Nevertheless, we should see to it that mobile warfare remains the principal form of fighting. For in a position war like the one fought in
western Europe in the latter part of the First World War, the art of directing war and the mobility of armies would be largely nullified. In any case, since the war is being fought over the vast territories of China and since China will remain technologically weak for quite a long time, it is inevitable that fighting will break through the restrictions of trench warfare. Even during the third stage China, although she will have made some progress technologically, can hardly expect to overtake her enemy in that respect, and will therefore be compelled to pursue highly mobile warfare to achieve final victory. Thus throughout the Anti-Japanese War, China will not adopt position warfare as the principal form of fighting; the principal and important forms of fighting are mobile and guerrilla warfare. In these two forms of warfare the art of war direction and the mobility of armies can be displayed to the full -- some consolation for our misfortune!

The Question of Decisive Engagements

"The rash advocates of a quick victory, lacking the stamina for an arduous long drawn-out war and bent upon a speedy conclusion, clamour for strategic decisive engagements the moment the situation takes a slightly favourable turn; to act on their advice would be the worst mistake imaginable for it would do incalculable damage to the War of Resistance, deal a death-blow to the protracted war and lead us straight into the enemy's deadly trap. Of course, to avoid decisive engagements means abandonment of territory, but we must have the courage to abandon territory when, and only when, conditions demand it. We should not begrudge such a loss, for it is a correct policy to barter territory for time. In history, Russia made a courageous retreat to avoid a decisive engagement and then defeated Napoleon, the terror of the age. China should not hesitate to do the same today.

"But should we worry about being denounced for non-resistance? Certainly not. Non-resistance means not fighting at all and compromising with the enemy, which not only must be condemned but is utterly impermissible. We are resolutely fighting the War of Resistance but at the same time it is also absolutely necessary for us to avoid
the enemy's deadly trap and prevent our main forces from being annihilated by one blow, if we are to sustain the War of Resistance and, in short, avoid national subjugation. Anyone who has any doubts on this point is taking a narrow and short-sighted view of the war, and will end up in the camp of the national subjugationists. We have already criticized desperation, the policy of advance without retreat, precisely because such a policy, if prevalent, could make it impossible to continue the War of Resistance and lead ultimately to national subjugation.

"We advocate decisive engagements in all favourable circumstances, whether in battles or in major or minor campaigns, and will tolerate no passivity. Only by such decisive engagements can we achieve our objective of annihilating and wearing down the enemy, and every Chinese soldier in the Anti-Japanese War should play his part resolutely. This involves the sacrifice of many lives in the common cause; only cowards and defeatists seek to avoid all sacrifice and we must oppose them relentlessly.

"Is it not self-contradictory to fight heroically and then abandon territory? Will not the blood of heroic fighters be shed in vain? This is an incorrect way to pose the question. One eats first and then relieves one's self; does one eat in vain? One sleeps first and then gets up; does one sleep in vain? Should questions be posed in such a way? I think not. To keep on eating, to keep on sleeping and to keep on fighting heroically all the way to the Yalu River are all illusions born of subjectivism and formalism and cannot happen in real life. Everybody knows that though we can hardly avoid abandoning some territory, in the bloody combats to gain time and prepare for the counter-offensive, we have gained time, realized our objective of annihilating and wearing down the enemy, obtained fighting experience, aroused people hitherto inactive and raised our international prestige. Has our blood been shed in vain? Certainly not. We abandon territory in order to preserve our military forces and in fact to preserve our territory, because if, instead of abandoning a part of our territory under unfavourable conditions, we stupidly fought a decisive but hopeless battle, the result would be the loss of our military power, which would inevitably be followed by the loss of all our territory, and the recovery of
the territory already lost would be completely out of the question. A capitalist must have capital for his business, and he is no longer a capitalist if he loses all his capital. Even a gambler needs money to gamble with, and if he stakes all he has on a single throw of the dice and loses it, he will not be able to gamble again. Only formalists cannot grasp the truth that the course of war, like everything else, is full of twists and turns and does not follow a straight line.

**The Army and the People As the Foundation of Victory**

"The mass of the people is the richest source of the immense power to wage war. Japan dares to bully China mainly because our people are not organized. When the hundreds of millions of our people are organized, they will rise and with a shout strike terror into the heart of the invader who will perish like a frightened bull rushing madly into the flames. Our army must have an uninterrupted flow of reinforcements; recruiting of men through press-gangs and buying substitutes, both of which are now recklessly practiced by the local authorities, must be immediately forbidden and replaced by an extensive and lively political mobilization, which will easily obtain several millions for the armed forces. With the masses mobilized, our war finance, now at a very low ebb, will present no problem at all. Is it not absurd that a country so large and populous as China should find itself financially exhausted? The army must be thoroughly united with the people and be regarded by the people as their own: then that army will be invincible throughout the world, and will easily vanquish a single imperialist power like Japan.

"Many people think that it is wrong methods that produce strained relations between officers and men and between the army and the people, but I have often said that it is rather a question of basic attitude or principle—a question of respect for the soldiers and for the people. From this attitude ensue correct policies, methods and approaches. Departing from it, policies, methods and approaches will be incorrect, and relations between officers and men and between the army and the people unsatisfactory. The three major principles for the army's political work are: first, unity between officers and men;
second, unity between the army and the people; and third, the disintegration of the enemy forces. To implement these principles effectively, we must start from the basis attitude of respecting the soldiers and the people, and respecting the personal dignity of war prisoners who have laid down their arms. It is certainly wrong to take a technical view of the question and not to regard it as a question of a basic principle, and this must be corrected.

"China's political situation enters a new stage. .... The main task of the present stage is to mobilize all forces to win victory in the armed resistance.

"The key to victory in the armed resistance lies in developing the resistance already begun into total resistance by the whole nation. Only through such total resistance can final victory be won.

"As the armed resistance is at present vitiated by serious defects, it is possible that its future course may be beset by obstacles, failures, retreats, internal splits and betrayals, temporary and partial compromises. We must realize therefore that the war is going to be bitter and protracted. But we believe that through the efforts of our Party and of the whole people the resistance already started will sweep aside all obstacles and continue its progress and development.

"These are our conclusions. The national subjugationists regard the Japanese as supermen and ourselves as nonentities, while the advocates of a quick victory regard ourselves as supermen and the Japanese as nonentities; both are wrong. Our view is opposed to both: the Anti-Japanese War is a protracted war, and the final victory will belong to China. That is our conclusion.

"My lectures end here. The great Anti-Japanese War is in progress, and many people are looking for a summary of our experiences to help us to win complete victory. I have dealt only with the general experiences of the past ten months, and what I have said may perhaps serve as a summary. The problem of the protracted war needs wide attention and discussion; I have given only a sketch, and I hope you will study and discuss it as well as amend and amplify it."

2 Led by K'ang Yu-wei, Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, T'an Sau-t'ung and others, this reformist movement stood for the interests of a section of the liberal bourgeoisie and the enlightened landlords. Although backed by Emperor Kuang Hsu, it had no mass basis and ended in tragic failure.

3 In China's liberated areas under the leadership of the Communist Party, subsequent events developed just as Comrade Mao Tse-tung had here predicted. In the Kuomintang-controlled areas, however, because of the ruling bloc's policy of passive resistance to Japan and active opposition to the Communist Party and the people, retrogression rather than progress became the order of the day. For a detailed analysis, see On Coalition Government, Foreign Languages Press, Peking, 1960.

4 Han Fu-ch'u, a Kuomintang warlord, was for many years the ruler of Shantung. When the Japanese invaders, after occupying Peking and Tientsin in 1937, advanced southward along the Tientsin-Pukow railway, Han took flight all the way from Shantung to Honan without fighting a single battle.

5 These were the Kuomintang methods of conscription. The former meant seizing people and pressing them into service, the unfortunate victims being bound with ropes and treated like convicts. The latter meant that anyone with money could bribe the Kuomintang officials and buy a substitute for himself.
Chapter Four

THE SINO-JAPANESE WAR (1937-1945)

by Major J. W. Woodmansee, Jr.
Saved from destruction by the external threat of Japanese aggression, Mao Tse-tung and the remnants of the Long March joined the Nationalists in a "United Front." As the Japanese attack stalled, the Reds turned to the task of politically organizing the people while Chiang, much to the despair of American advisors, conserved his growing army for the post-war struggle with communism. Japanese defeat by the Allies set the stage for the great civil war.

Expansion of the Northwest Border Region

The northern part of Shensi province offered an ideal sanctuary for Mao and the remnants of the Long March. Of primary importance was its distance from the Nationalist power centers around the Yangtze Valley. It was also close to the borders of the Soviet Union—and possible external support. Finally, Shensi province was protectively enclosed mountainous retreat near the populated North China plain. The terrain is rugged; mountains five to seven thousand feet high are common. Hills were generally deforested, but adequate agricultural land existed in the valleys. North Shensi was not a highly developed area; only a few of the major cities could boast public utilities. In this area the communists were surrounded by three independent
"war-lord" armies, with numerous but ineffective forces. The Reds had only the
Nationalists to fear, but with Chiang Kai-shek facing the complex problems of internal
disorder, economic disaster, and external Japanese aggression, the ragged and weary
communist cadres were granted a breathing spell.

Mao took advantage of the Nationalist inattention and began a comprehensive
program of securing, expanding, and developing his base area. To the south, he
developed diplomatic relations with the most dangerous of the warlords, Chang Hseuh-
liang, the "Young Marshal." Chang's army consisted of 150,000 troops, most of them
Manchurian. These troops were much more concerned with the current Japanese
occupation of their homeland than they were with the harmless refugees of the
communist movement. With his southern flank diplomatically secured, Mao ordered
his military commander, Peng Teh-huai, to expand the base area. Peng pushed out to
the west and north without meeting much resistance. In early 1936, under the pretext
of attacking the Japanese, Peng moved east across the Yellow River into Shansi
province, and there met with great success. He defeated Yen Hsi-shan (the "Model
Governor") at will. And, showing the political indoctrination that was to become the
hallmark of Mao's forces, Peng began to organize the rural masses, assassinate rich
landlords, and redistribute the land. His ranks swelled with peasant volunteers and
even defecting units of Yen's army. As a result of Peng's efforts, Mao's military
forces took on a more respectable image. Their base area was now expanded and
secured, and—a factor that was to prove of inestimable value in the forthcoming
struggle—all of Shansi province north of Taiyuan became a breeding ground for
communism.

Mao then turned to the internal problems of developing and administering his
expanding base. Land was redistributed more equitably to the peasants; small
industries began producing paper, soap, shoes, and textiles; sewing machines were
brought in, and the Red Army soldiers appeared in uniform. An arsenal was begun;
radio communications were established. There was coal in the area, giving Mao a vital source of fuel. Salt, a near-precious commodity, was also available; thus, the Reds had an item which could readily be exported in exchange for manufactured goods, particularly military supplies. The key element in the development of the base area however lay in Mao's emphasis in training and indoctrination. A political-military school in Pao-An had, by 1936, gained an enrollment of some 2,000. The school offered a variety of courses to officers, noncommissioned officers, communications specialists, etc. A vast program to eliminate illiteracy in the army was also begun because it is very difficult to assimilate the "glorious thought of Comrad Mao Tse-tung" if one cannot read or write. Meanwhile, Chu Teh and the remainder of the Red forces on the Long March arrived in the base area, swelling the Red army to about 95,000.

Chiang Kai-shek, recognizing that the communist movement was again on the upsurge, planned a "Sixth Encirclement and Suppression Campaign." He ordered Chang, the "Young Marshal," and Yen, the "Model Governor" to exterminate the communists. The "Young Marshal" refused, protesting to Chiang that the Japanese, not the communists, were the principle threat. The Generalissimo rushed to Sian to talk to Chang and was there taken prisoner by the warlord. Some mystery surrounds the subsequent events in Sian, but it seems clear that the party line from Russia decreed that Chiang and the Nationalists were necessary to stop the Japanese (and thus secure Russia's eastern flank). So, Chiang's life was spared. In return for his release and his agreement to form a united front, the Communists reportedly promised to abolish their soviet form of government, stop propagandising the people, follow the goals of Sun Yat-sen, and to allow the Red army to be incorporated into the Nationalist forces. Thus, the Eighth Route Army, 45,000 men under Chu Teh, was created.

Mao was quick to dispel any misapprehension that his party members might harbor concerning the agreement. In a booklet entitled "Present Strategy and Tactics of the Chinese Communist Party--very confidential," Mao explained:
Our present compromise is designed to weaken the Kuomintang and to overthrow the National Government under the Kuomintang dictatorship by utilizing the name of a democratic republic.

For the sake of strategy and during the initial stage of the United Front, the Red Army can change its insignia and accept a united command. However, in reality, the Red Army should maintain its independent entity so that it can act as a model army and become the center and reliable force of the Communist movement in China.

For the present, the organization of the Communist Party should still be kept secret while the members of the party should openly participate in all patriotic organizations, forming a nucleus in them.

It is interesting to note that the Communist Party in America received instructions shortly thereafter to refer to Mao and his followers not as communists, but as "agrarian reformers."

This same tactic of renouncing communist affiliations for a more nationalistic motive would be used in less than ten years by Ho Chi Minh in Indochina. By renouncing communism, Ho was able to gain the support of all groups seeking independence from France, including those who were opposed to communism. The tactic of forming a "United Front" seems to be a standard weapon in the communist arsenal of revolutionary warfare.

The "Incident in China"

Although Japan's encroachment on China's soil during the early 1930's caused alarm and resentment in the Nationalist camp, Chiang realized that his regime was not strong enough to defeat Japan in an open conflict. However, on the night of 7 July 1937, Japanese troops on a training exercise near the town of Lukouchiao touched off a fire-fight with Chinese soldiers guarding the Marco Polo Bridge. As a result of the incident, the Japanese demanded the right to search a neighboring village for one of their missing men. Chiang refused this demand. As negotiations carried on between the two nations, the Japanese moved five divisions near the border. In
Situation at the End of 1937

- Chinese Territory Seized Prior to July 1937
- Initial Attacks Against China
- Limit of Japanese Advance
- Communist Base Area

MILES
mid-August these forces launched a converging attack on the eastern portion of the Peiping-Suiyan railway, and a bitter eight-year struggle had begun.

**Strengths of the Combatants**

The Japanese in 1937 had a regular army of 300,000 elite troops, plus an indigenous Manchukuoan Army of 100,000 to 150,000, officered by Japanese. To support this force, Japan had the third largest navy in the world—some 200 warships—plus an air force of 2,000 first-rate airplanes manned by a pool of surprisingly effective pilots. Although Japan lacked the natural resources to feed her war machine, her industries had great capacity and were capable of rapid wartime mobilization. Japan could easily supply the required munitions, provided the raw materials were made available.

Chinese Nationalist forces in 1937 totaled around 2 million men. The quality of these soldiers ranged from miserably-armed, ill-trained men of questionable loyalty, to 100,000 well-armed, German-trained and advised elite troops. Both German generals, von Seekt and his successor, von Falkenhausen, had an impressive record of winning Chiang's confidence and influencing the reorganization of the Chinese Army. Von Falkenhausen, with a distinguished military career to include service in Turkey in World War I, had studied the Chinese language at the School for Oriental Studies in Berlin and had the advantage of being able to converse directly with Chiang. China had some German 75mm and 88mm guns, but in general lacked artillery, tanks, and air support. The Chinese navy was, of course, no match for the Japanese. It consisted of a few old destroyers, gunboats, and twelve light cruisers. While China was well endowed with natural resources, she had no war industrial capability beyond the few mills and factories that the Germans had constructed as part of their advisory effort. China could not even satisfy her own ammunition requirements.

The Communist Eighth Route Army, commanded by Chu Teh, was 45,000 strong.
and organized with three hand-picked divisions: the 115th, commanded by Lin Piao; the 120th, commanded by Ho Lung; and the 129th, commanded by Liu Po-cheng (often called Liu, the "One-eyed General"). The Nationalists had sent sums of money and some ammunition to the Reds but had not sent any arms. About all the Reds could be expected to do was fight harassing, guerrilla actions. China's ultimate victory or defeat, it was felt, lay in the hands of the regular Nationalist forces.

Operations in 1937

Japanese operations in 1937 aimed for a rapid victory over the disjointed Chinese forces. An early dash across the Kalgan-Paotow railway cut the main Chinese supply routes to Russia and protected the right flank of the attack. The main attack then plunged south towards Taiyuan. The plan was to drive the Chinese forces back to the North China Sea, cut off all lines of communications and administer a swift coup de grace. To assist the main attack, a secondary attack was launched into the Shanghai area on 13 August. This would fix Chinese forces in the defense of Shanghai, obtain an excellent port from which to supply further operations, gain control of the Yangtze and so cut off the Chinese lines of communications from the south and, finally, deal an economic blow to China by capturing the financial center and cutting off revenue from customs duties.

Meanwhile, the Eighth Route Army crossed the Yellow River from Shensi into Shansi province in September 1937. Its orders were probably to produce a significant victory in order to cement the "United Front" and then to organize and sovietize the peasants. Certain conditions led to the successful execution of these missions. The Japanese commander of the 5th Division, General Itagaki, was known as an arrogant, over-confident leader, and he was marching blindly into a rugged area called the Pinghsing Pass. The great lesson of providing front and flank security for marching columns that Hannibal taught the Romans at Lake Trasimene in 217 BC and the People's Liberation Army later taught a regiment of the United States 2d Infantry Division south of Kunu-ri.
SINO-JAPANESE WAR
Situation at the End of 1938
- Japanese Occupied Territory
- Limit of Japanese Advance
- Red Soviets
- Communist Base Area

U.S.S.R.

SOUTH CHINA SEA

SEA OF JAPAN

THAILAND

SOUTH CHINA SEA

HAINAN

FORMOSA

KOREA (CHOSUN)
in November 1950 was about to be re-learned. Nieh Jung-chen, the deputy commander of Lin Piao's 115th Division, conducted the ambush. As described by Chu Teh: "...two regiments struck the enemy's flank and two battalions enveloped his rear. The Japanese were caught in a trap." A large portion of the Japanese division was defeated, the remainder dispersed. The 115th captured five tanks, five armored cars, 50 field guns, and another 100 assorted vehicles. However, all this material had to be destroyed except some of the artillery. The victory provided a tremendous boost to communist morale and gave the Reds a "show-piece" battle on which they could claim the correctness of Chairman Mao's concept of mobile warfare.

The Nationalists welcomed the news of the battle since it showed that the Japanese Imperial Army could be beaten. However, Chiang no doubt winced at the battle-effectiveness of the Red forces. The victory at Pinghsing Pass, though impressive, was not decisive to the outcome of the war. Nevertheless, it was an important chapter in the history of the PLA, and it was a portent of things to come. It was also, as one authority noted, "the first, last, and only occasion during the Anti-Japanese War when the Communists committed a unit as large as a division to formal battle—despite the fact that there were many opportunities to have done so." Despite this setback to the Fifth Division, the remainder of the Japanese forces poured around the communist 115th Division and siezed Taiyuan on 8 November 1937. This left the Red division completely isolated in Japanese-held territory. There, in the Wutai mountains of the Shansi-Hopeh-Chahar border region, Mao's forces began the second part of their mission, the conversion of the masses and the organization of a communist base area. Meanwhile, the 129th Division was in southeast Shansi facing the Japanese on three sides. The other division of the Eighth Route Army, the 120th, remained out of contact in northwest Shansi. All of the areas picked by the divisions were mountainous, were not occupied by large Japanese garrisons, and thus were quite suitable for the development of guerrilla base areas.
To the east in Hopeh province, Chiang Kai-shek refused decisive battle and withdrew his forces to the south. Chiang's strategy for the war was surprisingly similar to Mao's concept of a protracted struggle. Recognizing the Japanese need for a battle of annihilation, Chiang proposed instead a war of attrition. It was to be a trading of space for time, a strategy of "accumulating minor successes into major victory." By late October the Japanese had crossed the Yellow River and captured Tsinian. Then winter fell, and operations ground to a halt. In November, Chiang moved the capital inland to Hankow.

While the advance in the north had been making rapid progress, the invasion of Shanghai had met determined resistance. Japan had been forced to reinforce this effort with troops from the north. After several costly frontal assaults, the Japanese enveloped the Chinese on the peninsula by the imaginative employment of amphibious landings on the north shore of Hangchow Bay and the south shore of the Yangtze River. Shanghai fell in early November. On 13 December, Nanking was evacuated and Japanese troops began the infamous "Rape of Nanking." The number of military prisoners and civilians estimated to have been slaughtered during the sack of this city have exceeded 200,000.

By the end of 1937, the Japanese had overrun the northern area down to the Shantung peninsula and in the south were well-established on the Yangtze River. Chiang had felt the brunt of the Japanese attack and, despite heavy losses around Shanghai, had managed to preserve the fighting strength of his army. The communists, in the meantime, had begun the political organization of the thinly-held Japanese territory in Shansi-Hopeh provinces. Their base area in northwest Shensi had not been reached.

1938 - Japanese Consolidation and Stalemate

In 1938, the Japanese forces in the Shanghai-Nanking area drove North to Suchow (or Hsuchow) to link up with the forces in the Shantung peninsula. Chiang Kai-shek
again withdrew his armies before they were destroyed. While the Battle for Suchow was raging, Chiang counterattacked at Tai-erh-chuang trapping 60,000 Japanese troops and inflicting 30,000 casualties. It was the first time in modern history that a Japanese army had suffered such a military disaster. After the fall of Suchow in early June, the Japanese turned southwest and drove to Wuhan, occupying this area by the middle of November. Chiang defended stubbornly and, in a last resort, destroyed the dikes of the swollen Yellow River. Water inundated the countryside spoiling the offensive and miring down large quantities of trucks, tanks, and artillery, all of which the Japanese had to abandon. Hankow fell in October and Chiang was forced to move the capital further inland to Chunking, also on the Yangtze River.

While the attack on Hankow was in progress, an amphibious landing struck Canton and secured it in nine days. The limit of Japanese advance at the end of 1938 is shown on the accompanying map. The Japanese were eventually to expand their control in the south to Hainan Island (early 1939), Swatow (June 1939), Nanning (February 1940), and French Indochina (June 1940).

While the Japanese had been advancing successfully up the Yangtze, the Communists persuaded Chiang to consolidate the Red guerrilla forces in this area into the New Fourth Army. (Many of these men had been left behind on the Long March.) The new army was to assemble in southern Kiangsu province between Shanghai and Nanking. By August 1938 some 11,000 Reds, passing through both the Nationalist and Japanese lines, had assembled. When the Reds were in position, they found themselves facing Japanese troops to their north and east. Chiang then moved strong Nationalist forces in on their west and south flanks to prevent any expansion—except toward the enemy. In north China, the Japanese only controlled the major cities and communications routes. With 1,000,000 total troops in China, Indochina, and Burma, almost one-half of them (45,000) were required as support troops to maintain the lines of communication. In retrospect, the strategies of both Mao and Chiang seemed to have properly estimated
that the Japanese advance would extend itself until the problem of defending and organizing its conquered territory out-weighed the capability to continue advancing.

By the end of 1938, the Japanese advance had stalled and a plan for consolidation of the over-run territory was proposed by their headquarters:

The next important step for the Japanese army is to create conditions favorable to the sound development of the new central regime in China, in process of being set up. It is not considered necessary to conduct a large-scale, prolonged war against the Chiang Kai-shek regime but rather to establish a new regime which will cooperate with Japan, at the same time maintaining sufficient Japanese strength in China to secure peace and order. 

In a country which had traditionally been under the oppressive rule of landlords, an enlightened occupying power, working through a liberal indigenous puppet government, should have been able to create stable conditions. In fact, Japan did establish a puppet regime. In December 1937 the first provisional government was established at Peking. It was moved to Nanking in 1938 and bolstered in March 1939 by the defection of the Nationalist Prime Minister, Wang Ching-wei, who was immediately installed as the head of the Chinese government. Over the next three years Wang was to build an indigenous force of over 800,000—many of whom defected from Chiang Kai-shek's forces. However, the Japanese Army generally outdid the previous warlord regimes in cruelty and plundering. As a result, the Communist cadres found that all areas occupied by the Japanese Army were ready targets for their ideology and organization. One authority has significantly observed that in north China, in areas where the Japanese had not penetrated, there was little enthusiasm for communism from the peasants.

Despite Chiang's many demoralizing battles and continual retrograde, his army was growing, exceeding 3 million by late 1939. When compared to the Japanese 1 million, it seems that more might have been expected of the Nationalists. But Chiang, instead of directing his power at the Japanese, was more concerned with the
progress of Red political activities, Chiang still refused to give them arms, discounted any of their claims of large-scale military operations, and ordered them to adhere to their earlier agreement to refrain from political organization. In December 1939, the Generalissimo even directed one of his major forces in the north to attack the Red Northwest Border Region. General Hu Tsung-nan responded with a driving assault, to include air strikes, against the southwest corner of the base. The Japanese, obviously pleased about the situation joined Hu and struck the southwest corner. Mao struggled against both his "friends" and "enemies" and after shifting troops down from the north, managed to stabilize his positions. General Hu then dug-in and was satisfied to contain the Reds in their reduced base area. The "United Front", shaken by this assault, still held together, but it would not do so much longer.

Communist Development of Soviets in North China

The area of revolutionary struggle in the northern zone was generally relegated to the territory bounded on the east by the sea, in the west and southwest by the Yellow River and including almost all of Hopeh and Shantung, and the northern portions of Hunan. When the Chinese Nationalists had been driven out of this area, most of the public administrators pulled back with them. Combining the oppressive occupation by the Japanese with the administrative vacuum, provided fertile ground for communist indoctrination. Much of the communist progress was similar to the success in the Shansi-Chahar-Hopeh region where the 115th division had established its base. In this region, administrative committees and even local officials were elected among the peasants. Land reforms based on the National Government's plan of 1930 were also put into effect. The reform limited the amount of rent which a landlord could demand to 37.5% of the value of the crop. This reduction of profits for landlords, along with increased taxation, "encouraged landlords to sell out to their tenants and to put their money into trade or local industry, both of which the regional government
wanted to encourage." As another author expressed it: "Although most landlords escaped with their lives, they paid for them."

Tax reform was also instituted. In well-organized soviets there were regular income and property taxes. Michael Lindsay states that the rates for 1941 would have assessed a peasant about five percent of his income, while a well-to-do landlord could expect to pay around 45 per cent. This was quite a change over the old system which was both "inequitable and inefficient." Local security police kept the community purged of "suspected collaborators, overt Nationalist sympathizers, local bullies, evil landlords, and rich peasants" whose social attitudes were unacceptable. The women and children of a village were particularly encouraged to volunteer for one of the numerous auxiliary groups. In this way all members of a village developed a feeling of loyalty for a party-sponsored organization and a sense of participation in community affairs.

The peasants could also expect equally well-organized military programs. At village meetings the people would be asked to form local self-defense units and eventually regional militia units. Thus, cadres were developed which would ultimately swell the ranks of the Red Army. Weapons were easily obtained for these local forces. Wars had been waged in and around these villages literally since the advent of gunpowder. And, although many types of weapons had been used, the Chinese armies had apparently used the same cartridges since the 1890's; therefore, ammunition was limited but obtainable.

The political indoctrination of the communist military forces was perhaps the key factor in its success. Emphasis had been placed on relationships between the soldier and the peasant. One eyewitness account told of seeing insurgent forces who "were prepared to do without a meal rather than override a cantankerous old peasant woman who refused the loan of a cooking vessel." According to Mao, each member of the Eighth Route Army was required to memorize a code called "Three Rules and Eight
Remarks.

Rules - All actions are subject to command; do not steal from the people; be neither selfish nor unjust.

Remarks - Replace the door when you leave the house; roll up the bedding in which you have slept; be courteous; be honest in your transactions; return what you borrow; replace what you break; do not bathe in the presence of women; do not without authority search the pocketbooks of those you arrest.

The administration and supply of the guerrilla forces was also well handled. Troops on the move were issued "grain-tickets" which they could use to pay the peasants for any food required. The peasant could, in turn, use these tickets to pay his taxes to the communist government. Supply procedures reached impressive standards. In one instance in the main base area of the 115th Division, the Japanese in 1943 had launched a long-term sweep of the base area that dragged on into the winter. The supply agencies were able to distribute winter uniforms to the men although Japanese columns were moving about all over the area. 32

Neither was the psychological weapon neglected. In each soviet the propaganda section arranged for schools to eliminate illiteracy, "staged theatrical and other entertainments," and saw to the posting of large anti-Jap slogans on wall newspapers. 33 Local newspapers tried to maintain publication even during Japanese "mopping-up" operations. 34 Japanese prisoners were usually treated with kindness and after a short period of indoctrination, might be released to rejoin their units. 35 This, of course, discredited the official Japanese policy that prisoners of the Chinese would be tortured. It also must have had some influence on the Japanese soldier's will to resist the next time he found himself in a tight position. Some of the more cooperative prisoners were used in combat against their own forces, while others were organized into a Japanese Communist-front, called the People's Emancipation League and were used for propaganda work against the Japanese Army. 36

As the Communist military organization developed, there were some efforts
directed at harassing Japanese troops and employing the guerrilla warfare which Mao had predicted would characterize phase two of his "protracted war." These actions did, to a degree, fix Japanese troops and maintain the image of Red participation in the "United Front," but it did not accomplish the attrition which Mao had predicted in his earlier thesis. Mao later admitted that their overall efforts were generally divided into "seventy percent self-development, twenty percent compromise, and ten percent fight the Japanese." 37

Michael Lindsay analyzed the communist success in North China as being due primarily to superior administration.

The Communists came to dominate the resistance movement in North China largely because they were able to provide the essential elements of effective organization, while, in most cases, forces under National Government leadership failed to do so. 38

Or, as similarly analyzed by the cryptic humor of one local saying in a peasant area in southeast Shanxi province: "Japanese--too many killed; Kuomintang--too many taxes; Communists--too many meetings." 39

The Hundred Regiments Campaign

By late 1939 the Communists were progressing quite well. The areas infiltrated by the troops of the Eighth Route Army were developing from a condition of temporary influence through guerrilla presence to a condition of solid political support for and sustenance of the revolutionary forces. (Mao described this process as the transitioning of a "guerrilla area" into a "base area.") In the meantime, Red forces made small attacks to antagonize and harass the Japanese. But there was no major attack or increasing intensity of military activities to coincide with Mao's proposed phase two of this protracted war. If, as Mao stated, the purpose of guerrilla warfare was to support and evolve into mobile warfare, it was obvious that the Red operations in North China were dragging their feet.
As Mao's organization grew, he also became more dependent on outside support. Despite the fact that the U.S. was showing increasing support for Chiang, very few supplies were filtering down the Nationalist channels to the Reds. Neither could the Reds expect to get aid directly from the Americans because the newsmen and diplomatic representatives of foreign countries were only accredited to and received news releases from the Nationalist headquarters in Chunking. Needless to say, Chiang was not extolling the virtues of the Eighth Route Army. In fact, Chiang constantly complained about both the Red political activity, and their military inactivity.

Besides the Nationalist neglect, a new Japanese officer, Lieutenant General Tada Hayao, had taken over command of the North China Area Army and was determined to eliminate the Red guerrilla bands and pacify the countryside. His plan was similar to Chiang's "Fifth Encirclement and Suppression" plan of 1934, in which the German advisors proposed a massive network of barriers, ditches, and blockhouses surrounding and dissecting the infested area. Although it was a slow, costly plan, Tada built hundreds of miles of new roads with protecting ditches and blockhouses. These roads began to divide and seal the area into manageable compartments. The compartments could then be dealt with one at a time. Not only would Tada's "cage policy" threaten the guerrilla movement, but it would bring the Japanese administration down to a closer working level with the people, and thus destroy or endanger the crucial factor of party influence in the area.

Thus, in order to prove his theories of protracted warfare, to defend his growing bases against the new Japanese plan, to repudiate the Nationalists claims of inactivity, and to try to gain some international recognition for his movement, Mao was forced to attempt the "Hundred Regiments Campaign."

The campaign, a well-coordinated series of surprise attacks, executed by most of the elements of the growing Eighth Route Army, began on the night of 20 August 1940. The initial objectives were rail lines, road networks, and industrial areas (principally
mines). After these attacks, the Reds turned to the reduction of isolated blockhouses and small garrisons. For several weeks the Red guerrillas seemed to be everywhere, taking prisoners, seizing arms and ammunition, and avoiding engagement by any of the Japanese brigades that were beginning to respond to the crisis. Then with their momentum spent, the guerrillas resought anonymity and refuge from the reprisals which they knew would be forthcoming.

The Communists claimed to have killed more than 20,000 Japanese and 5,000 puppet troops. In addition, they cut several hundred miles of railroads, and destroyed almost 3,000 forts. The Japanese admitted that "these totally unexpected attacks caused serious damage, and it was necessary to expend much time and money in restoration work." Communist losses are not documented, but they must have been quite serious. After the Japanese retaliation and "mopping-up" operations, Japanese records indicate that the "heavy blow suffered by the Communist forces and their bases . . . forced them to resort to guerrilla warfare, and thereafter they offered very little resistance in this area." The Japanese reprisals probably exceeded in ferocity and brutality the worst Red expectations. In July 1941, General Okamura Yasuji instituted the "three-all" policy—kill all! burn all! destroy all! His wrath was directed toward the guerrilla bases in the hills and the nearby town and villages that had apparently supported the Reds. Villages were burned to the ground, inhabitants shot, and livestock slaughtered. This policy remained in effect throughout 1942, and unquestionably was hurting the communists. Strength figures of the Eighth Route Army showed that from the end of 1940 to the end of 1941, Red forces decreased from 400,000 to 350,000. Also, the population base which the Reds controlled was almost halved, from 80 million to 50 million. This policy was continued until American pressure in the Pacific caused Jap troop strength in China to be drastically reduced. In summary, Mao had surprised the Japanese with the strength and fury of the Hundred Regiments Campaign. Despite

102
their eventual losses the Reds hailed the campaign as a great victory and unquestionably capitalized on the resulting favorable press releases and Nationalist approval. But the cost of the victory had been a dear prise. The "Three All" retaliation (strikingly similar in concept to Marshal Bugeud's campaign in North Africa from 1841-47) had been successful in the short run. In the long run, the troop shortage rendered it ineffective and the peasants, if they had been non-committed before, were now flocking into the communist camp.

Fracture of the "United Front"

The Communist New Fourth Army, which had been created in September 1937, never reached the size and influence of its sister unit, the Eighth Route Army. For one reason, the terrain did not permit the Fourth to develop secure base areas. Most of the lower Yangtze valley was open plain, criss-crossed with waterways and irrigation canals. But, if a permanent camp could not be built and defended, the Reds could still avoid major engagements with the Japanese and continue an active program of political indoctrination of the countryside. In the rainy season, the technological superiority of the Jap army was especially nullified, and the Reds could move about much more freely and openly. Certainly the major threat to the Fourth Army was the Nationalist troops to their south and west. Clashes had occurred as early as 1938, and they grew in size and frequency as the months passed. By late 1940 Chiang was upset with the political machinations of the Fourth, and since this was taking place in an area felt to be a Nationalist stronghold, Chiang Kai-shek ordered the Fourth to move north across the river. On 7 January 1941, most of the Red army had crossed over, its headquarters and perhaps 8,000 - 10,000 troops remained behind. Chiang, claiming that the army was refusing his orders, attacked the forces on the south bank, capturing the commander, Yeh Ting, and inflicting 9,000 casualties on the surprised Reds. The Fourth reorganized after this incident and
consolidated its position in North Kaingsu. The facade of a "United Front" between the Nationalists and the Communists had finally been shattered. With the Japanese forces in a static position, the Reds and the Nationalists stared each other down in what might best be called an armed truce.

Communist Developments Through 1945

The "Three All" policy had been effective in reducing the size and influence of the Red movement. But other international designs crippled the Jap occupational efforts. In 1941 Japan had taken over Indochina and Burma, and she made the fatal mistake of bombing Pearl Harbor (7 Dec 1941). By 1943 the tide in the war had changed and the Japanese were forced to draw seven experienced divisions from occupational duty in China to more necessary battlefronts in the central and southwest Pacific. The few replacements received in China were inferior in quality and lacked any experience in counterinsurgency warfare. General Okamura, Japanese Commander in North China, stated to an American officer:

If you people had not come into the Pacific when you did, there would be no Communists in Peking. My operations in 1942 and 1943 reduced their strength by more than 100,000. But the troops that replaced my good divisions were worthless. For one thing, the average age of the men was ten to fifteen years older. These older men could not campaign as the youngsters could, and they had no heart in it all.

This decrease in priority gave the Reds another chance to develop and expand their organization and to prepare for the real test after the war. There were several main facets of this Communist expansion that should be stressed: the continual improvements in the Northwest Base Area, the development and refinement of the "militia", and the division of the regular forces into regional and main forces.

In 1942, Mao brought Liu Shao-chi in from the New Fourth Army to organize and train the political cadres. It became Liu's responsibility to see that all the developing base areas had trained party officials who were loyal to Mao and who "thought" and
could be expected to "perform" along the party line. Each of the base areas was also
directed to strive toward self-sufficiency. In the Northwest base area, the number of
"industrial" workers rose to 12,000 and limited quantities of radios, grenades, rifles,
and mines were produced. 50

As previously stated, Mao relied primarily on his "regular" army to go forth and
organize the people. The army was to educate, mobilize, assist, and protect the
masses. To do this task Mao divided his regular army into two distinct groups --
the main forces and the regional forces. The regional forces were to be permanently
associated with a geographic area. The troops were encouraged to marry into the
settlements and develop the area into a self-sufficient "base area." 31 The "main"
forces were to act as the military reserve. They were not to be tied down to one area
but remain "mobile" and be able to rush to the defense of a base area or to be used in
mobile warfare to attack the Japanese.

To assist the regular army, the Reds developed the concept of a Ming Ping or
Militia. The idea originally grew out of the need for village "Home Guard" or "Self-
defense Corps." By 1944 the militia had reached the staggering size of two million
and contributed significantly to the capabilities of the regional and main forces. Most
importantly, the militia furnished the sound intelligence on which military plans could
be based. Then they would act as guides to the Chinese forces and provide the
guerrilla forces with vital knowledge of the terrain. The other main contribution was
the militia's development of mine warfare. Realizing that the Chinese guerrillas
fought with almost no external assistance, it is easy to appreciate that as the size of
the Eighth Route Army and its militia forces expanded, there were increasing demands
placed on the conservation and local fabrication of ammunition. "Frequently the first
shots a (militia) recruit ever fired were at a real, live enemy." 52 Since land mines
and hand grenades were types of weapons which could be locally produced, they
naturally became the prime weapons of village self-defense. One author described
the various tactics which the militia employed to increase the effectiveness of its mines.

"When the Japanese compelled civilians to walk ahead of them, the Chinese developed mines with the firing device some 15 to 20 yards behind the mine, so that the mine would explode among the Japanese. When the Japanese sent out detector squads who marked the places where mines were buried, the militia observed their marks and duplicated them to show almost impenetrable mine fields."53

To increase the effectiveness of local units and base areas to defend themselves, insurgents, in some areas, developed an elaborate underground tunnel system. At first air raid shelters were built to protect the villagers from Japanese bombers. Then these shelters were later expanded to connect houses within a village or to provide an escape route out of the village. In central Hopei, where the sub-soil was particularly easily to tunnel and required few supports, tunnel networks were even constructed connecting villages.54

One additional measure that aided the Reds was the ability of local militia and regional units to reach an "understanding" with Chinese puppet troops employed by the Japanese. In some cases guerrilla units were ordered not to attack puppet garrisons without specific permission. In another case, puppet troops later sent word to guerrillas that they apologized for firing on them and hoped that no one had been hit, but that Japanese had been in the garrison, and they were forced to shoot at them.55

The development of the Red base areas continued in this manner until 1945. In April 1945 Mao ordered the expansion of the militia units to regular army units. The size of the Red forces then immediately jumped from 507,000 to 1,029,000. In June as the Japanese began to pull back the Communists could boast of controlling a "population of 95 million, (that) held over 300,000 square miles of territory, and had over 500 miles of coast line."56