Chapter Three

FRANCE (1940-1944)

by Charles B. MacDonald

This is one of fifty-seven chapters in a three volume series, Challenge and Response in Internal Conflict. The series was compiled under contract to the Department of the Army by the Center for Research in Social Systems (CRESS) of the American University.
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Conquered, divided, and partly occupied in 1940, the French, with Allied aid, created a resistance force that German and Vichy French counterinsurgents held at bay, but did not succeed in destroying, until the landing of Allied troops in June 1944 and the subsequent liberation of the country.

BACKGROUND

In June 1940, the great nation of France, bastion of democracy and individual liberty, with an army reputedly the world's strongest, lay prostrate, beaten by German arms in a whirlwind campaign that had also vanquished Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg, as well as the elite ground troops of Britain. After a campaign of only a month, the Germans entered Paris, the city in which Frenchmen had eaten rats before succumbing to the Prussian conquerors of 1870-71 and in which French taxi drivers had rushed Gen. Joseph Gallieni's troops to the Marne to thwart the Teutonic invaders of 1914.

The Nazi armies had begun their march on May 10, 1940, with a steel-tipped main effort through the sparsely defended Ardennes region of Luxembourg and Belgium. On the 14th, the Dutch surrendered. In 11 days the Germans covered 240 miles to reach the English Channel at Abbeville and cut the Allied armies off from the heart of France. Anticipating disaster, the British on the 27th began to evacuate their expeditionary force from Dunkirk. On the 28th, the Belgians capitulated. On June 10, Fascist Italy moved against the common frontier in the Maritime Alps to attack the hard-pressed French from the rear. Declaring Paris an open city, the French government retreated first to Tours, then to Bordeaux, while the Germans on the 14th paraded past the Arc de Triomphe. On the 17th, the aging World War I hero, Henri Philippe Pétain, Marshal of France, heading a new government, asked for an armistice. In the early minutes of June 22nd, the issue was settled, signatures affixed.1

The deed had been accomplished in only 42 days, but the recriminations that followed lasted far longer. The word at first was that political extremists were responsible, those of the far right and the far left who had so split France that the nation was reduced to impotence; this,
plus a soft, effete, demoralized society. These were indubitably part of the explanation, but with the perspective of time it would become apparent that France's capitulation was more properly the result of a tradition-ridden military regime being defeated in the field by an adversary who had learned well the lessons of the stalemate of 1914-18 and developed a new mode of warfare.2

The Armistice Partitions Mainland France

Although termed an armistice, it was more correctly surrender. The proud French fleet and the Empire were the only points d'appui left. The fleet was neutralized in Toulon. Though the colonies remained basically intact, their exports to the mother country were to be rigged to feed the conqueror. To assuage French pride, there was a token 94,000-man "Armistice Army," but more than 1,835,000 French soldiers were in German prison camps. Of metropolitan France itself, the northern half was occupied by German troops; the rest was ruled by a sterile mixture of French opportunists, collaborationists, and dreamers, who settled in Vichy and gave that watering place an association with infamy.

The demarcation line between the northern occupied zone and Vichy France in the south meandered across the waist of the country, except for a western coastal strip appended to the occupied zone. Though the geographical split was approximately equal, three-fifths of the 46 million French lived in the northern occupied zone, 5 million of them in Paris. The occupied zone also contained almost all the coal, iron, and heavy industry, and the bulk of the mechanical, textile, electrical, and chemical manufacturing. Here were the great breadlands of the north and of the Paris basin and also the nation's main sources of dairy products and meat. Here too were the centers of commerce and finance, the main routes of communication, the navigable waterways, and the ports of the Channel and the Atlantic.

In contrast to the north, the area controlled by the Vichy government was less developed, but it contained the ports of Marseille and Toulon and a few other important cities, like Nice, Lyon, and Limoges, plus the agricultural lands of Provence and some of the better vineyards. The south also had the sun of the Mediterranean coast, the medicinal waters of the inland spas, and the spectacular scenery of the mountains—in the east and southeast, the Jura and the Alps; in the center, the sprawling Massif Central bordered by the heights of the Auvergne and the Cévennes; and in the southwest, the Pyrénées. These sparsely populated mountain regions—some so wild that the wolf still prowls—would prove critical in shaping the nature of the insurgency that was to come.3

These were the two main zones, but the Nazis dismembered France further. In the northeast, they reaffirmed the old German claim to Alsace and most of Lorraine and annexed these two regions to the Third Reich. In the north, they incorporated two départements, Pas de Calais and Nord, in the occupied territory of Belgium, and installed a military governor.
(Militärbefehlshaber) from Brussels. In the extreme southeast, they gave Italy a small tip of land embracing little more than the town of Menton, all that the Italian army had conquered in the fighting. Later, in 1941, the Germans would create a forbidden military zone\(^6\) from which most of the population was expelled and where movement of those who remained was rigidly controlled; about 12 miles deep, it ran the length of the western coast and in the fall of 1942 would be extended along the Mediterranean coast.\(^4\)

**De Gaulle Summons French To Continue Fight From Exile**

There was yet another France, a France-in-exile. This France was scarcely evident at first, except for what seemed at the time a futile appeal from a tall, inscrutable général de division, Charles André Joseph Marie de Gaulle. On the evening of June 18, even before the armistice was signed, de Gaulle called upon all Frenchmen who aspired to continue the fight to get in touch with him in England. He closed with a rousing call to Frenchmen everywhere to keep alive the spark of resistance. Posters later appeared with even more stirring words from de Gaulle: "La France a perdu une bataille! mais la France n'a pas perdu la guerre."\(^5\)

Though few Frenchmen heard de Gaulle's first appeal, broadcast over the BBC, it was repeated numerous times. What became the Free French movement dated its birth from the broadcast, and de Gaulle immediately began working to establish a French National Committee in England. But it would be a long time before the general would be able to speak from strength.

**Confused Sentiments in France Aid Conqueror**

The trouble lay in the complex emotional conflicts that beset almost all Frenchmen in the wake of the debacle. The armistice was a bitter but ineluctable fact, and the legal authority of the Vichy government could hardly be challenged. Headed as it was by a military hero of France, the government had a strong emotional appeal as well. People asked whether a benevolent dictatorship, which Pétain promptly moved to create, might not be preferable to the dissident, impotent parliamentarianism of the old Third Republic. Besides, what alternative was there? Had strong assistance been available from some outside power, the initial determination to help France that swept her colonies might have been exploited; but no belligerent could furnish that aid except Britain, already so beleaguered that it dared not risk bringing Vichy into the war. This concern, plus a natural hesitation lest they back the wrong horse, made the British cautious in the degree of support they afforded de Gaulle.\(^6\)

A violent Anglophobia fed the confusion. In France, rumor had it that British commanders had begun their evacuation at Dunkirk without consulting the French, and that Britain had

\(^4\) The Germans had quickly closed off the north central départements, refusing re-entry to refugees, regrouping agricultural lands, and bringing in German colonists. In late 1941 they abruptly reopened the territory.
declined to make available the remnants of her fighter aircraft for a last ditch effort to save France. When Britain extended her continental blockade to the English Channel and Atlantic ports, some said it was to starve France. On July 3, 1940, British naval units tried to annihilate that portion of the French fleet that had found shelter in North African waters at Mers-el-Kebir, gaining by this act no French plaudits. Besides, the British were said to be succoring traitors when they received de Gaulle and his followers; by refusing to accept the armistice, had not de Gaulle rejected the authority of the French state and, by fleeing the country, abandoned France in her agony?7

Both Vichy and German propagandists made much of this anti-British sentiment, while the Germans boasted that Britain soon would be brought to heel. Since the French army had been no match for the Germans, there were few who, while wishing otherwise, did not expect that Britain too would fall. With defeat a reality, most Frenchmen stoically accepted Vichy's attempts to reach an understanding with the Germans. The fighting had not continued long enough for ingrained bitterness to develop, and the German troops were at first impressively correct in their behavior.

The Role of the French Vichy Government in the Unoccupied Zone

But what, specifically, did Vichy want? Vichy was a riddle. There were many in the government who adopted an attitude of mea culpa, a kind of regeneration through suffering, as Pétain himself put it in a broadcast on June 25. Strength would come through rejection of secular things and a return to the ideals of God, country, and family. This was an approach tailor-made for those of the far right, the people who in prewar years as the Action Française had pressed their Anglophobia, their anti-Semitism, and their anti-democratic doctrines on the Third Republic. These people were also anti-German, but somehow they believed they might be allowed to sit out the rest of the war on an island of neutrality, abandoned by their conquerors to pursue undisturbed their examen de conscience. Then there were others, personified by Pétain's heir apparent, Pierre Laval, who had become Foreign Minister-out-and-out collaborationists who embraced the German call to join their side promptly in order to gain a favored position in the New Order of Europe. And finally there were those who worked with Vichy because, whatever its sins, Vichy was France, or all that was left of it; and those who participated in the hope that by maintaining at least the myth of self-government, they might exert some pressure on the conqueror to improve the lot of France.8

Out of touch with much of the French populace and the creature of a conqueror who inconveniently refused to abdicate that role, Vichy France never became a meaningful political entity. It was a government of bureaucrats for bureaucrats, one continuing drama of intrigues and struggles among self-seeking conspirators surrounding an enigmatic old man, all of it taking place on a stage sharply constricted by a world war and the dictates of the Germans.
To the Germans, Vichy was nothing more than a tool. They found it convenient to have a supine French government in existence, both to bear some of the administrative burden and to forestall the formation of a government-in-exile that might swing the colonies and the French fleet to Britain. All the Germans were willing to grant Vichy were the minimal concessions necessary to ensure these objectives.

**German Policies and Economic Levies**

To Adolf Hitler, France, including Vichy, existed for one purpose only—to serve the Reich. While propagandists trumpeted the call for cooperation, Hitler and his ministers imposed demands and repressions that meant only subjugation. There was little delay in putting these into effect. Almost immediately all military stocks were seized. Occupation costs were assessed at 400 million francs a day, more than doubling the prewar French budget. The figure was subsequently raised to 500 million, then 700 million. Machinery and vehicles were confiscated for shipment to Germany; supplies for the German forces were requisitioned in the countryside and charged to the French authorities. The exchange rate was pegged at 20 francs to 1 reichsmark, a rate which encouraged occupation troops to buy goods on a large scale to send back to Germany. Systematic levies were imposed on raw materials and products: as much as 80 percent on French production of petroleum and motor fuel, 74 percent on iron ore, 75 percent on copper. These levies affected occupied and unoccupied zones alike. Civilian movement between the two zones was sharply curtailed, and all mail was at first forbidden, although postal cards were later permitted. Shipments of foodstuffs and other commodities from the colonies were confiscated. In July 1940 came the German annexation of Alsace-Lorraine; by the end of the year 120,000 Alsatians and 60,000 Lorrainers were to be deported to the unoccupied zone.9

**German Administration of the Occupied Zone**

To impose their will on the occupied zone, the Germans had both operational and occupation forces. The operational troops, who retained responsibility only in the coastal regions, were under the Commander in Chief in the West (Oberbefehlshaber WEST), a post held off and on between 1940 and 1944 by Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt. The head of the occupation forces was the Military Governor, France (Militärbeauftragter in Frankreich), General Otto von Stülpnagel. Because of illness, Stülpnagel was replaced in February 1942 by his cousin, Karl Heinrich von Stülpnagel.4 The military governor was directly responsible to the Oberkommando

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4After reacting with apparent approval to the attempt on Hitler's life on July 20, 1944, Heinrich von Stülpnagel attempted suicide but failed and was later executed. His successor was Gen. Karl Kitzinger.
der Wehrmacht (OKW), the Armed Forces High Command in Berlin, except in the event of invasion or similar emergency, when he would come under the Commander in Chief in the West.10

The military governor was charged with supply of all German forces, including tactical units, and control of the civilian administration, the economy, communications, and industry. He seldom exercised this control directly, but instead, from headquarters in the Hotel Majestic in Paris, supervised and passed orders through French officials. The staff included a chief of staff for military affairs and another for administrative and economic matters. For administration, the occupied zone was divided, in keeping with French practice, into regions, départements, and arrondissements. The central headquarters in Paris and each of the regional and district headquarters, and sometimes those of the arrondissements, had a consignment of German police. There was a proliferation of police, but the main ones were the Abwehr, intelligence service of the German army, and the Sicherheitsdienst (SD), security police of the Nazi party. Though there were in France only a few Geheime Staatspolizei, secret state police, the French knew all German police by the dreaded nickname of this force, the Gestapo.

**INSURGENCY**

For all the despair that accompanied the armistice, it was not long before the strong tradition of independence and individualism, which had permeated the French people at least since the Revolution of 1789, reasserted itself. At first it took subtle forms: referring to the conquerors as "ces messieurs," passing on bitter little jokes, chalking derisive comments on walls by night, never understanding either the German language or German attempts to speak French, or, perhaps, if one were a waiter, simply putting one's thumb in a German officer's soup.11 One frail lady of 78 daily stationed herself in the Paris subway to trip German soldiers with her cane.12 There were some, even from the first, who risked much, making false papers or concealing and passing on British flyers and escaped French prisoners of war. Others cheated the Germans in various ways: factory workers let sloppy or inadequate work pass through their hands, trainmen delayed or even managed to lose shipments destined for the Germans, dock workers concealed rotten vegetables among good ones so the rot would spread.13

For many months resistance remained for the most part an uncoordinated, individual thing. In the occupied zone, the omnipresent Germans inhibited even the thought of organizing resistance, and in the unoccupied zone, the cult of Pétain and the myth of a French state had much the same effect. In any event, the institutions and machinery that might have served concerted resistance had been swept away in the debacle. The Communist party, outlawed and driven underground by the Third Republic before the war, retained its underground apparatus; but the Communists for the first year of the occupation were party to the uneasy truce of the German-Soviet nonaggression pact and did not move.14
Early Attempts To Organize Rebellion in Vichy France

Nevertheless, as early as July 1940 there were attempts to form resistance organizations. In the unoccupied zone an army officer, Capt. Henri Frenay, began that month to organize a resistance group among his fellow officers. In 1941 he merged his organization with another that had been born among members of the prewar Christian Democratic party. Together they were known as Combat, and by the end of 1942 there were about 500 members, mostly in the southeast and around Lyon. Frenay formed small réseaux, or networks, some for propaganda, some for intelligence, and some for sabotage and direct action against the Germans. 15

The resistance organizations in the unoccupied zone, which did not labor under the stern repression of the north, tended to develop on a regional rather than local basis and never experienced the fragmentation that accompanied early organization in the north. Three major groups emerged fairly early. One was Frenay's Combat. Another was Franc-Tireur, 16 founded under another name in late 1940 in Lyon, capital of the resistance in the south. Including numbers of students, this group formed small action squads called corps francs, trained to stage demonstrations, to carry out sabotage, and later to engage in terrorism. The third organization was Libération, founded by an ex-naval officer and journalist, Emmanuel d' Astier de la Vigerie, whose aim was to bring together in one group all wings of the prewar labor unions, including the Communist. 16 In addition to these three main groups, several minor organizations maintained their independence in the south (e.g., France d' Abord, Le Coq Enchaîné, Libérer et Fédérer), but they usually worked in association with the larger groups. 17

De Gaulle Makes Contact With Vichy Resistance

Emmanuel d' Astier's Libération was the first resistance group to endorse General de Gaulle as the leader of Free France. This came early in January 1942 after a delegation of leaders visited de Gaulle in London.

Meanwhile, on January 1, de Gaulle sent into France by parachute a former prefect of Chartres, Jean Moulin, to coordinate the resistance movement. Moulin's was no easy task, for each organization jealously guarded its aims and methods, and for them to merge under the aegis of Moulin was basically an endorsement of de Gaulle. But Moulin held the key to persuasion: money and arms. Libération having already taken the step, Franc-Tireur followed. After a trip to London in September 1942, Frenay brought Combat into the fold. The following month the three groups agreed to form a committee of coordination for the southern zone. A few weeks later, when Gen. Charles Delestraint (alias Vidal) arrived from London, they merged their action units under Delestraint as l'Armée Sécrète (Secret Army). 18

* Not to be confused with Francs-Tireurs et Partisans, action arm of the Communist resistance movement.
Ruthlessly suppressed and confronted with Germans at every turn, the resistance groups in the northern occupied zone developed on a more local basis and were slower to merge. The first, in July 1940, was formed by a group of intellectuals associated with the Musée de l'Homme, an anthropological museum in Paris. In December, this group began to publish a clandestine newspaper, Résistance, that eventually gave its name to the overall insurgent movement. But in February 1941 the Germans trapped and executed seven of its leaders, and again in July 1941 and finally in November 1942 snuffed out the new leadership.

So strict was the police regime that as late as 1943 some small units in Paris were unaware of the existence of similar groups in the next arrondissement. On the other hand, the very presence of the Germans, plus the absence of the Pétain-Vichy phenomenon, oriented the early resistance in the north less toward political aims and more toward direct military action.

Not long after the organization founded by the ill-fated intellectuals in the Musée de l'Homme, students in Paris created a cell of resistance called Défense de la France. Theirs was one of the first resistance journals. The movement remained independent throughout the insurgency. It never gained real strength or importance because its leaders refused to coordinate with de Gaulle until nearly the end of 1943; they therefore lacked funds and supplies.

Near the end of 1940 and early in 1941 resistance units began springing up all over the occupied northern zone, but one after another they succumbed to German repression or, because of the repression, failed to expand: L'Armée des Volontaires, Bataillons de Mort, Le Coq Enchaîné, Pantagruel, Valmy, and others. Some merged with stronger groups, more often than not at the urging of both the British and de Gaulle in London, for it was impossible for those outside France to deal with such a proliferation. By the end of 1942 the resistance in the north had gradually coalesced into four main groups: Ceux de la Résistance, Ceux de la Libération, Libération-Nord, and L'Organisation Civile et Militaire.

Each of these had its own bloodstained history—Ceux (Those) de la Résistance was at one point so harried by arrests and executions that its surviving leader ironically referred to himself as "Celui (He) de la Résistance." Each had at first its own particular complexion and regions of greatest strength—Libération-Nord, for example, drew on the old labor unions and was strongest in the north around Lille and in the northeast; while L'Organisation Civile et Militaire, less militant than the others, was made up mostly of former members of government and technical, professional, and career army people and was strongest around Paris. Though each also had its own idea of what was to become of France after the liberation, all were unified in the common objective of getting the Germans out of France. As recruiting progressed, the early identifying features gradually blurred and disappeared under the impact of diverse new membership.
Communist Role in the Insurgency

The German invasion of the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941, suddenly catapulted into the resistance a powerful, experienced element: the French Communist Party. Calling themselves the Front National, the Communists tried their usual tactic of uniting in one organization all facets of antifascism, but always under Communist leadership and domination.

Frankly political as well as paramilitary, the Front National sought not only liberation but also national insurrection to bring to power a Communist government. It was the only resistance organization to operate in both occupied and unoccupied zones, though it was much stronger in the north, particularly in Paris. Its action arm, Francs-Tireurs et Partisans, provided a ready cadre of capable resistance fighters.22

De Gaulle Moves To Consolidate Control Over the Resistance

While the organs of insurgency materialized and coalesced in metropolitan France, the man who had set himself up as the rallying point for all Frenchmen continuing the fight, Charles de Gaulle, was engaged in a three-sided battle to retain and solidify his self-appointed position. On the one side, de Gaulle had to win over the French colonies and the French armed forces outside France, particularly the more than 300,000 troops in North Africa, who professed loyalty to Vichy. He had to establish his authority over the resistance groups inside France. And he had to win acceptance by the major Allies—Britain and, after December 1941, the United States—for their material assistance was essential to carrying on the fight against the Germans. Through it all, de Gaulle insisted on complete autonomy for the French and on his own absolute authority in French matters, a policy that complicated the struggle but was essential, de Gaulle believed, if France was to emerge with its sovereignty intact.23

The British could hardly be blamed for moving slowly with de Gaulle. Relatively low in military rank, de Gaulle had served only a fortnight in a political role and that as Under Secretary of War in the French government whose fall led to the armistice. Though the British had agreed to allow de Gaulle to set up a "center of resistance" in England, they had not given permission for a French national committee or a government of French exiles when de Gaulle followed his broadcast of June 18, 1940, with another in which he claimed to have set up a provisional French national committee recognized by the British government. The British failed to protest publicly, but when de Gaulle's early calls to his brothers in arms produced little response, they made it clear that they could not recognize a national committee that did not, in fact, exist. They nevertheless publicly agreed to recognize de Gaulle as "the leader of all Free Frenchmen, wherever they may be, who rally to him in support of the Allied cause."24

The French were slow to rally. Most of the combatants who had fled to Britain elected to return to France after the armistice; by mid-summer of 1940 de Gaulle had only about 6,000 men. The British attack on the French fleet at Mers-el-Kebir did nothing to spur recruitment. 55
Yet when no other leader arose to challenge de Gaulle, the British gave increasing support to what came to be known as La France Libre, or the Free French movement. Together they set out to swing the French overseas territories to their side, but, despite military expeditions to Dakar and Syria, they had little success except among the minor possessions. The presence of Free French troops alongside the British nevertheless cemented relations. On September 24, 1941, de Gaulle, with British approval, set up the French National Committee in London. Nevertheless, by the start of 1942, the Free French fighting forces still numbered only about 15,000 men.

The prestige of the Free French took an upward turn in the summer of 1942 when a French force in the North African desert cut its way out of an encirclement at Bir Hacheim. This had a notable effect on opinion in metropolitan France and brought a number of adherents to de Gaulle's cause. Shortly thereafter, to avoid confusion with Vichy, which many knew as "Free France," and with various movements that had sprung up in the Americas, de Gaulle changed the name of his movement to La France Combattante, or the Fighting French.

**Funds, Supplies, and Equipment for de Gaulle**

Meanwhile, in addition to Great Britain, other foreign governments began to recognize de Gaulle's authority, beginning with the Soviet Union in the fall of 1941. These included most of the European governments-in-exile and many of the world's smaller nations. But the United States, which had continued relations with Vichy in order to maintain a listening post inside France, still declined formal recognition, even after entering the war in December and abandoning Vichy. The reasons were complex, but not the least appeared to be a personal antipathy on the part of President Franklin D. Roosevelt toward the autocratic, seemingly intransigent French leader. Nonetheless, shortly before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor had brought the United States into the war, Roosevelt had extended the provisions of the Lend-Lease Act to de Gaulle's movement, thus augmenting his available supplies and equipment.

Initially, de Gaulle's National Committee was almost totally dependent on the British treasury for funds. The first accord during the summer of 1940 had specified that funds be dispensed as approved by the various ministries of the British government, but at de Gaulle's insistence this was broadened early in 1941 to provide for a separate annual French budget. Otherwise, French funds came from the overseas territories and from wealthy refugees and sympathizers.

For all the gains de Gaulle had achieved by the end of 1941, he still lacked support from the two main centers of French strength: North Africa and metropolitan France. The key to the latter was, of course, the emerging resistance groups. The task of winning them over would have been difficult enough simply because of their diversity, but it was complicated by the fact that beginning soon after Dunkirk, the British had been trying to mobilize the resistance to conform with their own ideas.
**British Organization in France Suffers Disaster**

Early in the summer of 1940, the British had established in London within the Special Operations Executive (SOE) a French section under Col. Maurice Buckmaster. His task was to recruit and train agents, both French and British, to re-enter France, establish radio communications with London, help organize the resistance, direct sabotage, and distribute weapons, ammunition, and equipment dropped by parachute. The first agent entered France by parachute the night of May 12, 1941. Other agents were parachuted in, some were later sent by boat, and still others were transported by Lysander aircraft, a light, slow, unarmed plane that could land and take off from improvised fields.

Colonel Buckmaster’s agents and radio operators contributed signally to organizing the resistance, particularly in getting the intelligence collected by the French back to England. Theirs was a hazardous operation. Since the Germans possessed excellent sound-detection equipment, attrition among radio operators was particularly high. But the most disastrous blow came as a result of British attempts to create one overall organization rather than a number of independent groups. In November 1941 a denunciation served to wipe out almost the entire network, leaving only three agents and no radio operators.

**De Gaulle’s Organization Steps Into Breach**

Just as the British organization in France was being wiped out, de Gaulle’s London headquarters took on a more integrated form, with the creation of a capable intelligence and operations section, the Bureau Central de Renseignements et d’Action (BCRA) under Col. André de Wavrin. By this time, also, British confidence in the Free French was increasing, while de Gaulle had shed some of the British financial shackles.

The French now began, through the BCRA, to assume much of the responsibility for providing money, organizers, and radio operators for the resistance, while the British retained the final word on arms and equipment, since they furnished both the materiel and the means of transport. The way was thus clear for General de Gaulle to establish control over the diverse French resistance groups, a task begun with Moulin’s mission and partially accomplished before the end of 1942, with the merger of the action groups of the organizations in the unoccupied zone into l’Armée Sécrète.

**De Gaulle Sustains a Test of Strength in North Africa**

The crucial struggle for the leadership of the French resistance was destined to take place not inside France, but in North Africa. In the first step of that struggle, de Gaulle’s aspirations received a sharp blow. In November 1942, on the eve of Allied invasion of North Africa, the Americans, seeking an anti-Vichyite around whom the French in North Africa might rally, turned their back on de Gaulle. They were well advised in principle, for North Africa was
strongly pro-Vichy and de Gaulle commanded little following; but neither did the man the Americans chose, Gen. Henri Giraud, who had few qualifications as leader of the French forces, although his romantic escape from a German prison camp had excited public notice.

A series of misunderstandings with Giraud—who somehow believed that what was projected was an invasion of France and that he was to be commander in chief—resulted in a delay in reaching an agreement, so that Giraud arrived in North Africa only on November 9, a day after the landings. His name failed to exercise any particular influence, and the Vichy French continued to fight. The key to a cease-fire appeared to lie with Adm. Jean François Darlan, Commander in Chief of the Vichy French forces, who happened to be visiting in Algiers when the invasion came. After a series of ambiguous cables exchanged with Vichy, Darlan agreed to a general cease-fire on November 10; but Gen. Auguste Paul Nogues, commander in Casablanca, doubted the implications contained in the cables and urged, if not continued resistance, then at least neutrality. The issue finally was settled in the field when Gen. Alphonse Pierre Juin, French army commander in North Africa, ordered his troops on November 12 to turn their guns on the Germans, who had, in the meantime, executed counterlandings in Tunisia.

As the Allied campaign proceeded, Admiral Darlan fell victim to an assassin’s bullet. The Allies then tried to effect a rapprochement between General Giraud and General de Gaulle by means of a French Committee of National Liberation (CFLN) with joint presidency. Though de Gaulle had the largest representation on the committee, Giraud retained control of the 300,000 French troops. In the end, General Giraud’s lack of political acumen proved his undoing. Having allowed a former Vichy Minister of the Interior, Pierre Pucheu, noted for his repression of Communists in the unoccupied zone, to come to North Africa to enlist in the French forces, Giraud had to contend with violent Communist-inspired demonstrations. These eventually resulted in Pucheu’s trial and death sentence in March 1944. Following a test of strength with de Gaulle on a minor matter in April, Giraud retired. From this point—April 1944—de Gaulle had no rivals as acknowledged leader of French resistance outside France. Because events in the interior had also moved in de Gaulle’s favor, he had no rivals anywhere.

**Jean Moulin Achieves Centralization of All French Resistance Under de Gaulle**

Having achieved the first steps of coordination in the south late in 1942, Jean Moulin attained true unity among the three southern groups with the formation early in 1943 of a central headquarters at Lyon, Mouvements Unis de Résistance (MUR).* L’Armée Sécrète now received its orders from de Gaulle’s London headquarters through MUR; in addition, MUR directed a new force, l’Organisation de Résistance de l’Armée. This was composed of former officers.

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*If subsequently took the grander title, Mouvement de Libération Nationale, but there was no broadening of authority.
and soldiers of the Armistice Army who rallied to the resistance after the Germans, in response to the Allied landings in North Africa, had occupied the southern zone and dissolved the Armistice Army.

German occupation of the southern zone further aided the establishment of a centralized resistance by removing any sharp distinction between the resistance in the north and that in the south. Coincident with political organization in the south in March 1943, Moulin—assisted by a special delegation from French headquarters in London—achieved military unity in the north through a committee of direction for the action units of the occupied zone. This brought these units into l'Armée Sécrète. To the committee of direction, each of the four major non-Communist resistance groups in the north sent a delegate. Declining to join, Francs-Tireurs et Partisans, action arm of the Communist Front National, sent an observer.

Political centralization followed quickly. On May 27, 1943, Moulin conducted the first meeting in Paris of the Conseil National de la Résistance (CNR), which not only united north and south but also brought in the Communists and representatives of labor and of the prewar political parties. Its directorate had six members: Moulin himself as de Gaulle's national representative and a delegate each from the Front National, Mouvements Unis de Résistance (the southern federation), the Confédération Générale du Travail (representing all former labor unions), a so-called Alliance Démocratique (a coalition of former political parties, into which the strongly Socialist resistance group, Libération-Nord, was integrated), and a coalition of the three other northern resistance groups (Ceux de la Résistance, Ceux de la Libération, and l'Organization Civile et Militaire). 27

**Jean Moulin's Death Is Followed by Rising Communist Influence**

This achieved, Jean Moulin—the man who in 1940 had cut his own throat upon arrest by the Germans lest he talk under torture, had then recovered and escaped to England, and had then returned behind the lines—had established himself in France as leader of organized resistance under de Gaulle. He had not much longer to refine the organization. On June 10, 1943, his colleague, the commander of l'Armée Sécrète, General Delestraint, was arrested and shot. A fortnight later, as Moulin met with the southern staff of l'Armée Sécrète and local resistance leaders in a town near Lyon, the Gestapo smashed in the doors. When Moulin and the others failed to talk under torture, they were shipped off to German concentration camps. Moulin was dead on arrival. 28

Crisis followed. Without the strong central direction of Moulin and Delestraint, many regional resistance leaders began to revert to their earlier independence. This proved reme‌diable, for the money, arms, and equipment available only through de Gaulle's BCRA were powerful levers. Not so readily eradicable was the influence achieved in the interim by the Communists.
In view of the blow dealt the resistance by Moulin's arrest, de Gaulle directed that the posts of national delegate and chairman of the CNR be separated. For chairman, the Communists threw their weight behind Georges Bidault, who was from Frenay's organization, Combat. Though the Communists had but one delegate on the six-member directorate of the CNR, they had ready sympathizers in the delegates from the Confédération Générale du Travail and from Mouvements Unis de Résistance. Bidault won. Neither a Communist nor a Communist sympathizer, Bidault nevertheless was a man fairly easily swayed; his election, while not putting the CNR under direct Communist control, meant that the Communists would seldom be openly opposed. 

De Gaulle Institutes Political and Military Reorganization To Forestall Communists

Following the arrest in February 1944 of E. Bollaert, Moulin's successor as national delegate, de Gaulle moved to circumvent the Communist influence in the national council. Appointing a new national delegate, Alexandre Parodi, de Gaulle also named five others as members of a Délégation Générale de Charles de Gaulle and provided an order of succession in event of arrests. The Délégation Générale, de Gaulle decreed, was the direct representative of the provisional government of France and thus was predominant in all matters affecting France and the resistance. The CNR's role was only advisory.

Much the same denouement occurred on the military side of the resistance organization. Though de Gaulle appointed a successor to General Delestrait (General de Jussieu-Pontcarral; then, following his arrest, Gen. Alfred Mallaret-Joinville), the CNR in March 1944 set up a military committee, the Comité d'Action Militaire (COMAC), which presumed to have final say in military matters. Like the CNR itself, COMAC was not Communist dominated but was Communist oriented; of its three delegates—one each from north, south, and Francs-Tireurs et Partisans—one was a Communist and another a sympathizer. De Gaulle countered by strengthening his military delegation, sending to France two zonal military delegates and twelve regional delegates. Then, in April 1944, he superimposed on l'Armée Secrète a new headquarters, Forces Françaises de l'Intérieur (FFI), to which all military action groups were subordinate. The commander in chief, located in London, was Gen. Joseph Pierre Koenig.

Thus General de Gaulle countered the Communists at the highest levels, but there still remained the danger that they might move at the time of liberation to seize control of local governments. This de Gaulle safeguarded against by compiling through the Délégation Générale a list of commissioners, prefects, and sub-prefects for every region and département. These men were to take office upon liberation in the name of the provisional government, while the regional military delegates assured orderly transfer of the resistance soldiers into the regular French army. The admiralty, meanwhile, prepared cadres to take over liberated ports; the
Ministry of Justice organized three delegations to reconstitute the courts; and a Mission Militaire de Liaison Administrative prepared to play the part of administrative jack-of-all-trades, dealing with such diverse tasks as repairing radio stations, supervising newspapers, protecting national monuments, and maintaining coal mines and public utilities. 32

**Guerrilla Recruitment Rises in Response to German Reprisals and Deportation of Labor**

While all this jockeying for position took place, the resistance itself was growing from individual, unorganized acts into a large-scale, concerted insurgency. Addition of the Communists to the rolls in June 1941 had marked the first turning point. The second came on August 21, 1941, in a Paris subway station. A young Communist, burning for revenge for a comrade executed two days before, fired two telling revolver shots into a German naval officer candidate. 33 As the Germans quickly countered by executing hostages, the resistance underwent an agonizing moment of reappraisal. But with every roll of German rifle fire, the ranks of the resistance grew. From this point on, the story of the resistance was written in blood.

The next turning point developed from an accord signed on July 1, 1942, by Vichy's Foreign Minister Pierre Laval and the Reich Plenipotentiary-General for Labor Fritz Sauckel in an attempt to satisfy Hitler's insatiable demand for foreign workers. By terms of this agreement, called the relève, the French were to send 150,000 skilled workers to Germany in exchange for the repatriation of 50,000 French prisoners of war. Though the program was launched with great fanfare, few workers came forward, particularly after the first reports had filtered back of living and working conditions inside Germany. By October, four months after the first appeal, only 17,000 volunteers had left France. As it became increasingly obvious that the Germans would soon turn to forced labor and deportation, young men began drifting to remote farms, while others went off in groups into the forest and mountains. By the end of 1942 a strange word began to be heard in whispered conversations—maquis. 34

It was a Corsican word, meaning a piece of wild land; it had come to be applied to brigands who hid in the Corsican bush. The French now adopted it as overall title for their new form of resistance. The individuals within the maquis were called maquisards.

In February 1943, the expected compulsory labor decree, Service du Travail Obligatoire, was announced. At first it affected only men between the ages of 20 and 23, but later it was broadened to include almost all the able-bodied population. The reaction everywhere was swift and vigorous. Young men fled to the backlands, there to organize or be organized by previously constituted resistance forces into bands varying in size from a few men to several hundred. L'Armée Sécrète helped hide, feed, finance, equip, and train them. 35
Allied Aid to the French Maquis

Authorities in London, particularly the British, were reluctant at first to arm the maquis for fear both of premature uprisings and of aiding revolutionary elements. The British also questioned how effective these isolated, relatively untrained little bands might be. But in the end they could not deny the poignant appeals for help. The first parachuting of arms to the maquis occurred in March 1943 in the Haute-Savoie. The amount of arms and equipment remained relatively small (there were 302 successful drops during 1943), but the restrictions were imposed less from will than from the number of aircraft that could be spared from other missions. Yet in deference to their own continuing fears, the British provided no machineguns, mortars, or other heavy weapons, but mainly light arms such as submachineguns. From lack of heavy weapons and sometimes from lack of any arms at all, many small maquis were easily wiped out by the Germans. Only after the D-day landings on June 6, 1944, after the maquis in Brittany demonstrated their prowess, and after more aircraft became available, were large parachute deliveries made and heavier weapons provided.36

The mechanics of the delivery operation were relatively simple. Local leaders would transmit their needs and requests through coded messages sent by their radio operators, then anxiously keep vigil each night by their radio receivers for the BBC broadcast that would alert them to the hour and place of delivery. Almost since de Gaulle's broadcast of June 18, 1940, the BBC had served as a vital communications link, both as a means of coordinating activities and as a contact for supplies.

In terms of dollar value, Allied aid to France during all of World War II, including services and supplies in the post-D-day period, totaled $3,452 million. Britain supplied a $150-million treasury advance and $435 million in services and supplies; Canada, $25 million; and the United States, $2,842 million (lend-lease).37

The U. S. Office of Strategic Services (OSS) entered the program of aiding the resistance early in 1943, but not until January 1944, when OSS merged its resources in London with the British SOE in Special Forces Headquarters, did the Americans begin to participate in arms delivery. Though this produced a sharp upturn, American commanders, like their British colleagues, gave priority to the long-range bombing campaign against Germany and thus could release few aircraft for supplying the maquis.

Sending Men Into France To Work With the Maquis

In a related program to provide French-speaking organizers and radio operators for the maquis, the Allies came closer to meeting the demand. To supplement Frenchmen trained by de Gaulle's BCRA, the Americans began and the British continued to train both Frenchmen and French-speaking citizens of their own countries. Despite their late start, the Americans parachuted a total of 375 American and French officers into France, while the British over the years
sent 393 agents under their own auspices and 868 on behalf of the BCRA. But by the end of 1943, the supply of these teams was running out, while the demands of the ever-multiplying maquis continued to increase.

As an expedient, the Allies formed special three-man "Jedburgh" teams, named for the place in Scotland where they were trained, composed of Frenchmen and American and British officers and noncommissioned officers. Few of the Americans and British were able to speak French. Unlike earlier organizers, these men wore uniforms, at once an attempt—in deference to their inability to speak French—to give them full combatant status under the rules of war, to recognize the control the maquis had established over certain localities, and to show the French that invasion was not far in the future. The Americans also provided 374 uniformed officers and men in 11 teams called Special Operations Groups, composed of up to 34 officers and men armed and trained to fight with the maquis. 38

**Internal Financing of the Maquis**

The task of financing the maquis fell largely to the French themselves. The maquisards had to be paid at least a subsistence wage, and the resistance leaders pledged themselves to provide for their dependents and survivors. To augment the money brought in from London, funds were transferred by special arrangement with the treasury in Algiers and other money was obtained on promissory notes both from public banks in France and from savings accounts in the Poste, Telephone, et Telegraph (PTT).

In many instances, when the maquisards lacked funds, they requisitioned food from farmers and issued promissory notes, almost all of which were honored by the French government after the liberation. As might be expected, there were occasions when outlaw elements took advantage of the resistance to prey on their countrymen, but most requisitions were legitimate. 39

**Growth of the Maquis Brings Axis Attack**

By mid-1943, the maquis in the south, where the forests and mountains afforded ready refuge, were a source of concern to the Germans; in the southeast, they worried the Italians, who had moved into eight southeastern départements upon German occupation of the southern zone. There were 3,000 maquisards in the Jura, 350 in the Ain, 1,200 in Haute-Savoie, 1,000 in Savoie. By the fall of the same year there were 22,000 organized maquisards in the south and 8,000 individuals, while in the north, where the terrain was less suitable for hiding, the movement had spread to 21 départements.

So troublesome were the acts of sabotage, the thefts of arms and equipment, and the ambushes of convoys and lone vehicles that by July 1943 the occupying forces had begun concerted attacks against the maquis. The Italians in the Haute-Savoie moved first, almost wiping out the maquis there temporarily, but in the process teaching lessons of security that had a long-range

impact on the movement. From this time almost every maquis had its intelligence agents in the PTT, among the French police, and among the population, to warn against the coming of the enemy. Nevertheless, as those in London had feared, some of the maquis became too brazen and their groupings too large to be ignored, so that in February and March 1944 the Germans launched major attacks against the maquis on the plateau of Glières in the Massif Central and in the Ain. 40

**Maquis Operations Prior to D-Day**

For all the problems of equipment and supply, the advent of the maquis changed the face of the French insurgency from underground resistance to guerrilla warfare. The underground activities continued—providing hiding places and escape routes for airmen, Jews, and others wanted by the Germans; furnishing military intelligence for Allied planners; circumventing requisitions of food and slowing down factory production; sustaining morale and recruiting new resistance workers through the clandestine press—but more and more the resistance groups concentrated on sabotage, ambushes, and hit-and-run attacks on German depots and convoys. In 1942 there were 1,429 acts of sabotage important enough to be recorded by the Germans; by the winter of 1943-44, the monthly average had increased sixfold.

In an effort to avoid French civilian casualties that were a by-product of Allied air attacks on the railroads, the resistance set out to prove that more damage could be accomplished by sabotage. In the first three months of 1944, the insurgents sabotaged almost three times more locomotives than were damaged by air attacks. Between June 1943 and May 1944, the resistance damaged 1,822 and destroyed 200 locomotives, damaged 1,500 and destroyed 2,000 passenger cars, and damaged 8,000 freight cars.

For Vichy officials and for informers and double agents—all considered to be French traitors—the resistance reserved a special fury. Vichy officials were sometimes murdered in their offices. In full daylight near the Arc de Triomphe a resistance fighter cut down Julius Ritter, the notorious Fritz Sauckel's first assistant. Sometimes the insurgents openly attacked German prisons to rescue captured comrades. At Amiens, in the north, the resistance and the Royal Air Force collaborated in an ingenious raid to rescue prominent French leaders from prison. In the south, the maquis exercised virtual control of some départements; it was the threat of this control to routes of communication that prompted the German attacks in the Massif Central in February-March 1944. 41

**The French Plan To Rise on D-Day**

Yet the overall aim of the resistance was to get ready for the Allied invasion and to assist in the liberation of France. As D-day neared, the FFI staff in London drew up detailed plans for four major sabotage programs designed to delay the movement of German reserves against
the Allied landings: Plan VERT, against the railroads; Plan TORTUE, against the roads, Plan BLEU, against electrical power; and Plan VIOLET, against underground cables. These plans were to be set in motion beginning on the eve of D-day by coded messages over the BBC, e.g., "Reeds must grow, leaves rustle;" or "The tomatoes must be picked." Each message was applicable to a specific plan and a specific region. Thus, to avoid exposing resistance forces far from the site of the invasion to German reprisals, some areas were to be alerted to action only after Allied armies had spread out from the beachhead and liberation neared. 42

Meanwhile, General de Gaulle, whose main headquarters had been transferred to Algiers, was having last-minute problems with his allies. The Americans, in particular, were still doubtful about the military utility of the resistance movement and equally dubious about the capacity of the Fighting French to provide a provisional government for France. As they prepared to administer the territories they liberated, they even printed their own currency. General de Gaulle, still with no formal mandate from the French people to govern, remained unrecognized as provisional head of state. On June 3, 1944, de Gaulle changed the name of his French Committee of National Liberation to the Provisional Government of the French Republic, but neither Great Britain nor the United States formally accepted the change. Not until the eve of D-day were any arrangements made by the Supreme Allied Commander, Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, to recognize General Koenig as chief of the FFI, and only then did Eisenhower make de Gaulle and Koenig privy to the invasion plans. Full recognition of the French leaders had to await the invasion itself and the revelation to the Allied leaders that in France the name de Gaulle had become synonymous with liberation. 43

As the long-awaited moment of Allied invasion approached, an army of insurgents stood at its posts in France, but nobody knew how effective it might be, nor even how many men made up its ranks. Some say there were 100,000 active resistance fighters at the start of 1944 and that the figure increased rapidly month by month as arms became available. Some say there were 200,000 at the hour of the invasion. Nobody kept a roster. 44 And who can say that those bearing arms were the only active members of the resistance army? With some notable exceptions, all Frenchmen by June of 1944 were attuned to liberation and to helping in some small way to achieve it.

COUNTERINSURGENCY

As early as the fall of 1943, Field Marshal von Rundstedt, the Commander in Chief in the West, had reported that he knew resistance groups were preparing to act in concert with the invasion, but he was powerless to eliminate the threat they posed to his lines of communications. 45 This report was valid testament to the fact that German efforts to destroy the French insurgency by repression had failed. Given the way the Nazis had come to power in Germany and the
use they wanted to make of France, perhaps repression was inevitable, even though there were those among the occupying forces who saw the folly of it. In any event, it was abundantly clear by June 1944 that the Germans had failed to pacify the country.

Originally, the Germans had sought to gain French cooperation through persuasion rather than force. In the early days, there were minor efforts to appease Vichy and even an attempt to found a political party made up of collaborationists, the Rassemblement National Populaire. And from the German Embassy in Paris, a propaganda section ground out one appeal after another, urging the "marriage" of France and Germany in the New Order of Europe. The German ambassador, Otto Abetz, who had married a French woman, was held up as an example. Abetz himself tried to court the French in such ways as moving the body of Napoleon's son from Vienna for reinterment with tremendous pageantry in the Hôtel des Invalides. But few except opportunists and extremists of the far right were impressed. The nature of the German New Order was all too soon revealed by the early restrictions on movement, press, and radio, and by the curfews and the economic levies. The Germans had in their victorious armies a strong argument for cooperation, but after 1942, when these armies ceased to conquer, France was no longer impressed.

**German Organization in France**

Ruled from Paris by General von Stülpnagel, the Military Governor, occupied France was divided into three subordinate commands—Southwest France, with headquarters at Angers; Northeast France, with headquarters at Dijon; and Northwest France, with headquarters at St. Germain-en-Laye. Later, after the southern zone was occupied, a fourth command was established—Southern France, with headquarters at Lyon. Each of these sectors had several regional (Oberfeldkommandaturen) and district (Feldkommandaturen) headquarters, though in the south, to keep alive the myth of Vichy, these were called liaison staffs (Hauptverbindungsstämbe and Verbindungsstämbe) and were manned by civil service rather than military personnel. Relations with Vichy were maintained through both diplomatic channels (German Minister Krug von Nidda) and military channels (Lt. Gen. Alexander Neubronn von Eisenburg), the latter serving primarily as a listening post for Stülpnagel and for the high command of the armed forces.

The basic responsibility for security was held by Stülpnagel. Since tactical forces were authorized to deal with police matters only in the narrow coastal strips in the west and south, he depended on the police troops of the Höherer SS und Polizeiführer (SS Police Chief) in Paris, under SS Gruppenführer Karl Albrecht Oberg.

Oberg's organization was hydra-headed. Although the main dependence was upon some 2,000 agents of the SD (Sicherheitsdienst, the Nazi party's security service), a Befehshaber der Orpo (Ordnungspolizei, the uniformed regular police) and a Befehshaber der Sipo (Sicherheitspolizei, Nazi party security police) were also under Oberg's command. Under the Sipo
came detachments of Kriminalpolizei (criminal police) and the Gestapo (secret state police). Each of these organizations had its own detachments both in Paris and at the four sectional headquarters.

There were also detachments of Verstaerker Grenzaufsichtsdienst (VGAD, or border police) operating along the Swiss, Italian, and Spanish frontiers, and of the Abwehr, the intelligence service of the German Army General Staff. Though both of these were at first fairly independent of General Oberg, they became subordinate in 1943 to the Reichssicherheitsbuehauptamt (RSHA, or overall German police system) via the Sipo. A cloak-and-dagger group, the Abwehr had posts in Paris, Marseille, Lyon, and seven other large French cities, and it was second only to the SD in importance among German police.

In each of the four sectional headquarters, Oberg had some German army or Waffen-SS troops, usually two or three Landesschützen (security) battalions, one or two "local defense" regiments, and small military police detachments. (As an example, the 200th Landesschützen Regiment, the 19th SS Police Regiment, and several Ost battalions made up of anti-Bolshevik Russians were at Lyon.) Some of these troops were stationed at the regional headquarters, and small detachments of two dozen men went to each district headquarters. For important police operations, these troops could be pooled within the region or, with Oberg's approval, on a broader basis. Through General Stülpnagel, Oberg could call upon tactical commanders to furnish additional troops if needed. Including the army, Waffen-SS, and Ost troops, there may have been as many as 160,000 German police troops in France.

Organizational Confusion and Rivalry Hurt German Security

This layering or over-organization of police forces was compounded by the presence in France of a plethora of other headquarters: Luftwaffe, navy, rear echelon army, and various German government organizations such as Sauckel's labor office, a propaganda office responsible directly to Reich Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop, and the Organization Todt—a paramilitary group responsible for building fortifications along the coasts. There were almost a million Germans in France, including 52,000 soldiers in Paris alone, and an additional 50,000 German civilians.

Though the French might bewail the fact that they had to support this mass, they reaped the benefit of the conflicting and overlapping authority. One headquarters bid against another for the best accommodations, the choice supplies. The Ambassador, Otto Abetz, and the Commander in Chief in the West, von Rundstedt, were convinced that the forced labor decree would do exactly what it did, break the back of French patience; but their protests went unheeded in the face of Sauckel's determination. Frenchman fearful of the Gestapo might not have realized it, but Hitler's dictatorship had produced within the German administration a welter of confusion and a struggle for power and position far outstripping France's unfortunate Third Republic. Paris, in the words of one ranking German officer, was "a confusion of Babel."
Hostages and Mass Reprisals

Almost from the start the Germans took hostages, not hostages in the classic sense of leaders and people of influence, but people against whom they wished to wreak particular vengeance, usually Communists and Jews. And for the first killing of a German, 30 Frenchmen paid with their lives. A few weeks later, on September 16, 1941, Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel, chief of the OKW, decreed that all acts of resistance must be assumed to be of Communist origin and that for each German soldier killed, 50 to 100 Communists must die. The decree was not clear as to how it should be determined that a person was a Communist. Three months later Hitler issued what became known as the Nacht und Nebel decree, whereby all acts of resistance were to be punished either by death or by deportation to Germany, with no information provided to the victim's relatives as to his fate. Both these decrees were cloaked in various guises of court legality, but even this was abolished after the Allied invasion. Executions, Hitler finally ordered, were to be carried out on the spot. 49

Mass reprisals became commonplace. In November 1943, 400 men of Grenoble were deported for having sung "la Marseillaise"; a month later, 100 more for no apparent reason. At Nantua, in December 1943, after insurgents drove a male and female collaborator naked through the streets, the Germans deported 150 men. In March 1944, in retribution for the killing of a member of the SD in Limoges, 26 Frenchmen were executed; the next day, in response to a similar act in a nearby village, 23. At the town of Ascq, in the Nord, 86 were executed on April 1, 1944, as punishment for a railroad accident that the Germans contended was sabotage. During the night of May 11, following an act of sabotage near the town of Figeac, almost the entire male population of 800 was arrested and subsequently deported. But the most notorious reprisals were reserved for the period following the Allied invasion.

General Security Measures and the Creation of the Milice

During the first three years of the occupation, the Germans hunted down the insurgents primarily through harsh police methods: frequent and unannounced checks on papers, frequent and unannounced searches of homes, close checks on ration cards, stringent restrictions on travel, infiltration of resistance groups, torture of prisoners and threats against their families to make them talk, use of double agents and paid informers, and imprisonment of all who were suspect for any reason. They maintained close liaison with the French police, but were increasingly frustrated except in the southern zone.

In the south, Vichy created several special police brigades specifically to keep track of Communists and Jews. Out of the Légion des Combattants, Vichy's attempt to provide a semblance of a political party backing the government, the regime's Secretary for Maintenance of Order, Joseph Darnand, recruited extremists and recidivists to create, in January 1943, a police force called the milice. Darnand's miliciens taught even the Germans a thing or two about
brutality. Numbering between 25,000 and 30,000, the milice later spread to the occupied zone
and were particularly active in Paris.60

German Intelligence Penetrates French Organization, But Resistance Grows

German counterinsurgency was undoubtedly aided by the general French disdain for secu-

rity. To some degree, this insurgent weakness was responsible for many German successes
against resistance leaders, particularly in the early days. The raids in mid-1943 in which Gen-
eral Delestreant and Jean Moulin were captured had obviously been planned for a long time, but
the Germans waited until the French themselves had revealed further details of their organiza-
tion before striking. At Bordeaux, where the regional resistance chief, a Colonel Grandclément,
defected in the early days, the Germans kept him at his post until nearly the eve of the invasion
when the resistance had grown and they had complete details on it, including the location of
large caches of arms.

Yet the Germans found that for every resistance leader taken, for every radio operator
captured, for every insurgent who defected, others took his place. This was almost ensured by
the harsh economic levies, the execution of hostages, the forced labor decree, and the political
deportations—these, plus a systematic persecution of Jews that began promptly and resulted in
perhaps 140,000 deportations out of a Jewish population of 320,000.51 The German strategy
against the resistance was based on the theory that terrorism would prompt the French popula-
tion to prevent acts of sabotage. But the population as a whole did not possess this power, even
had it so chosen, and the reprisals and the wide publicity given the terror served merely to
feed the resistance with recruits.

German Defense of Their Installations and Lines of Communication

Unable to prevent ambushes, raids, and sabotage by annihilating the insurgents, the Ger-
mans employed various tactics for protection. Guards at depots and other installations were
doubled and changed at irregular intervals. Guard posts were established along major rail
lines, and some lines were patrolled. To protect military convoys, armored vehicles were
placed at head and tail. Sometimes motorcycles equipped with machineguns preceded the column
to check for roadblocks and ambushes, and in troublesome regions machinegunners sprayed the
roadsides as the column progressed. Civilians were often carried in prominent spots on the
vehicles, a tactic later used during the fighting in Paris to safeguard tanks. To protect against
"tire bursters" or other devices laid on the roads to damage tires, the Germans sometimes
fixed brooms to the front bumpers of their vehicles. To circumvent mines on the railroads,
they pushed flatcars, sometimes with civilians aboard, in front of locomotives. All trains
had heavily armed guards. Unable to trust French railway workers, the Germans brought in 25,000 of their own trainmen to help keep the railroads running.52

Large-Scale Attacks Against the Maquis

Obviously conducting a losing campaign, the Germans early in 1944 changed their strategy to include coordinated attacks by large units, including artillery and sometimes armor and aircraft, to wipe out nests of resistance. The first of these large-scale efforts resulted in the fight on the Plateau of Glières in February-March 1944 where more than 12,000 German police and troops practically exterminated a band of some 500 maquisards. At almost the same time the equivalent of three German divisions were sweeping the Ain. The first genuine pitched battle began on June 2, in the Massif Central where, over the course of 19 days and throughout the period of the D-day landings, 20,000 Germans and 11,000 French were engaged.

To pinpoint hostile groupings, the Germans carefully plotted the pattern of sabotage and parachute deliveries, then moved swiftly to seal off the affected region with roadblocks. Sometimes an area was small enough to be swept systematically. In one case the Germans surrounded a large forest and set fire to it section by section, eventually driving the insurgents into the open. The fighting in these engagements was fierce. The Ost battalions, the SS units that had served on the Russian front, and the milice were particularly brutal, and the French knew that capture was tantamount to death.

German Counterintelligence and “Playback” Operations

By these efforts the Germans seized sizable stocks of insurgent arms and supplies. In some instances, after capturing radio operators, they continued to man the radio posts, often carrying out the deception long enough to arrange several deliveries of arms on fields staked out by German police. In one week, from February 22 through March 1, 1944, they seized during delivery 61 radios and 1,205 containers of arms, and captured 11 British officers.

The Germans asserted that they captured “the FFI code” early in 1944.53 How much use they could make of it is problematical, for the messages to each local group were in a code intelligible only to that particular group. In the first days of June, German agents who had penetrated resistance groups did pick up some of the prearranged signals from the BBC alerting the resistance to stand by for later messages directing execution of D-day sabotage plans, but these reports were given no real credence at higher German headquarters.54

For all the German efforts and successes, the resistance continued to multiply, so that by mid-1944 the Germans in France faced not only impending Allied invasion but a concerted insurgency in their midst. It had ceased to be a question of a “terrorist movement,” noted the commander of Army Group G, who was responsible for the Mediterranean coast; it was more nearly one of the presence of an “organized army” behind the German lines.55
OUTCOME AND CONCLUSIONS

On the night of June 4, 1944, anyone accustomed to listening to the coded messages from the BBC could have discerned that something out of the ordinary was taking place. There were many more messages than usual, and instead of being directed at dispersed listeners, they seemed unusually integrated and consistent. To one in the know, they applied not to various localities but to the whole of France.

Contrary to plans drawn up by the French themselves, Allied headquarters had decided to implement the four major sabotage plans—railroads, roads, electricity, and cables—all over France, for to alert only one region was to pinpoint for the Germans the site of the invasion and to forgo maximum effect against the enemy's facilities. Apprised at the last minute of the change in plans, neither General de Gaulle nor General Koenig protested. All through the next day and the night of the 5th, members of the resistance stirred, performing dutifully the tasks assigned them, and all too often so openly that the Germans quickly discerned who was responsible. In the Vosges, for example, 34 maquisards at Corcieux set off to attack hundreds of Germans in a nearby garrison. The maquisards were wiped out, the village was subjected to a reign of terror, and some of the leading citizens were shot.56

There were similar tragedies over the entire country. To many in the resistance, the messages and a broadcast by de Gaulle himself on D-day, June 6, called for open insurrection. When they responded, the Germans cut them down. On June 10, the FFI commander, General Koenig, issued clarifying orders, but for many this was too late. In the Vercors, for example, where insurgents in the south had, in effect, proclaimed an independent republic in the name of France, the counterorders arrived in the midst of a pitched battle. Who but the Germans could break it off?

Maquis Contributions to Success of Normandy Invasion

Few statistics exist to measure the effectiveness of the four major D-day sabotage plans. To the bulk of the German army, the operations may have appeared as mere pinpricks, but they were sufficient to impel the Germans to deploy considerable forces to protect their lines of communications. In the month of June, the resistance made 486 rail cuts. On D-day, 52 locomotives were blown up in one operation at Ambrérieu. The next day 26 trunk lines were unusable, including lines in the invasion area between Avranches and St. Lô, between St. Lô and Cherbourg, and between St. Lô and Caen. This was achieved despite the fact that in Normandy, as in most other coastal regions, the Germans had fairly well quarantined the coastal strip to a depth of 30 to 40 miles. French sabotage, when added to Allied bombing, measurably curtailed the supplies, particularly artillery ammunition, available to the Germans for the Normandy fighting. By June 20 no rail line was functioning in the valley of the Rhône.57
Though the resistance could do little to thwart the movement of German local reserves, movement of strategic reserves was markedly delayed. The French contend that they delayed up to 12 divisions for from 8 to 15 days. The most dramatic incident, conceivably a direct contribution to Allied success in the early days of the invasion, was delay of the 2d SS "Das Reich" Panzer Division caused by rail sabotage and by direct action against major columns. Ordered to move from Toulouse to counterattack in Normandy, first elements of the armored division did not traverse the 400 miles until 12 days after receiving the movement order. Harried by the resistance and strafed by the RAF, which was kept informed by the resistance, some 4,000 of the division were killed and 400 captured en route. In frustrated fury against the insurgents, men of this division summarily shot all male occupants of the village of Oradour-sur-Glane (Haute-Vienne) and herded the women and children into the village church, there to burn them alive. There were a thousand victims.\footnote{72}

**De Gaulle Consolidates Political Victory**

Meanwhile, Gen. Charles de Gaulle had been making his first moves to achieve full recognition of his status as head of the provisional government of France. Coming ashore in Normandy on June 14, he received enthusiastic welcomes in Bayeux and several smaller towns. With an ease that was to be repeated time after time in other sectors, he successfully implanted his hand-picked commissioner, prefects, and subprefects in the Bayeux region.

Three days later, on June 17, General Eisenhower officially acknowledged General Koenig as commander of French Forces of the Interior and subsequently accorded him the same status as any Allied commander serving under the Supreme Allied Command. Though Allied governments would retain reservations about de Gaulle until the time of the liberation of Paris, after Bayeux there was little question but that de Gaulle had triumphed.\footnote{79}

**French Achievements in Brittany and Increased Supplies From the Allies**

It remained for the insurgent forces in Brittany to provide the first incontrovertible evidence of the values of the resistance to the Allied armies. When the landings took place, there were 19,500 men in the resistance in the five départements of Brittany, of whom no more than half were armed. Two months later, when operations to clear the peninsula began, there were 31,500 in the resistance, of whom about 20,000 were armed. Among the groups was a battalion of French paratroopers trained under the British Special Air Service (SAS). After dropping into Brittany on the eve of D-day and executing sabotage missions to delay German troop movements to Normandy, the paratroopers came under command of the local FFI chief, Col. Albert M. Éon.\footnote{70}
Despite a costly pitched battle against the Germans on June 18 at Saint-Marcel, which resulted from premature assembly of resistance units, the FFI in Brittany were ready to give battle when the American Third Army turned into the peninsula early in August. Detachments as strong as 6,000 men seized possession of strategic high ground in the interior. One force took and held an airfield at Vannes; others guarded bridges and defiles. Everywhere men of the FFI kept the Americans informed on the whereabouts of the Germans and assumed the tasks of mopping up bypassed pockets and guarding prisoners. So impressive was the resistance in Brittany that General Eisenhower later specifically cited its activities.\(^61\)

A growing appreciation of the value of the resistance, plus increasing availability of aircraft, prompted the Allies to step up their supply deliveries after D-day. In June they carried out 1,263 successful sorties, doubling the number flown in April. On June 25, 108 U.S. Flying Fortresses launched the first mass air drop in daylight, followed by another on Bastille Day (July 14) with 320 successful sorties, including 85 in the Vercors. Another drop, on August 1, was of comparable strength, followed on September 9 by a last mass drop in the Doubs by 72 planes. From June through September 1944 over 75,000 containers, 25,000 packages, and 1,100 men (not counting the parachute battalion in Brittany) were parachuted into France.\(^62\)

**German Lines in Southern France Are Threatened by Maquis**

Meanwhile the Germans in the south were becoming increasingly concerned about their routes of communication and withdrawal. They were particularly perturbed by threats posed by the maquis in the Massif Central and in the Vercors to routes up the Rhône valley and by the maquis in the Vercors to the Route Napoléon through Grenoble. They also were concerned with threats by maquis in the Pyrénées and the Massif Central to the communications link—Bordeaux-Toulouse-Carcassonne—joining the two German armies in the south and southwest. To deal more effectively with these threats, the commander of Army Group G obtained approval to extend the "combat zone" to all the coastal départements and to most of the next tier inland, a total of 26.\(^63\)

Throughout June and July, German forces totaling the equivalent of two or three divisions patrolled and fought to keep open the Bordeaux-Toulouse-Carcassonne route. These included a reserve infantry division, contingents of a reserve corps, and two Kampigruppen of the 11th Panzer Division. In early July a force of approximately division strength attacked resistance strongholds in the Cévennes, declaring that they had killed 335 maquisards. In mid-July tactical forces rescued police and milice whom the maquis had surrounded in the Ain and Jura and reopened supply lines north of Lyon. The Germans claimed 500 insurgents killed and 12,000 to 15,000 dispersed. In the meantime, two other forces of unspecified strength but large enough to be commanded by general officers were employed in the Massif Central near Limoges and Clermont-Ferrand.

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The Battle in the Vercors

In third week of July 1944, following preliminary skirmishes in June, the Germans launched one of their largest set-piece attacks, this against the maquis in the Vercors. Here the maquis had assembled a small army of 5,500, plus 30 British and U.S. soldiers. Following an Allied air drop on July 14, German tactical aircraft launched a series of destructive raids. On July 21 came a concentric ground attack supported by artillery and some tanks and the landing of a glider task force of 400 men in the center of the French positions. For two days and nights the maquisards, with the help of the American Special Operations Group, kept the glider troops surrounded, but Luftwaffe strikes on the third day cleared the way for relief. By nightfall of July 23, the maquis had been forced to relinquish most of their key positions. That evening the French commander, Col. Joseph Zeller, ordered the maquisards to fight their way out in groups of 30 to 40 men. Many, including the Americans, made it, but some continued to fight within the Vercors until August 9.

The Germans admitted losses in the Vercors of 65 killed, 18 missing, and 133 wounded, out of a total force of possibly 20,000, including the 157th Mountain Division and contingents of the 9th Panzer Division. The maquis lost 1,031 killed and 288 captured. The Germans partially destroyed five villages and burned four others to the ground, including La Mure, where they killed all inhabitants of the twelve homes. Well over a hundred civilians were murdered in the Vercors, and the Germans climaxed their infamy by massacring the wounded in the emergency hospital left behind by the maquis.64

Maquis Achievements in Southern France

But what terror had not accomplished in the early days of the resistance, increased terror could not now achieve. All through the south of France the maquis continued to organize, train, and arm against the coming of the second Allied invasion. Allied officials estimated that by the time of their landings in the south on August 15 (Operation ANVIL), more than 70,000 insurgents in the south were armed. Everywhere they rose, fighting with and in advance of the Allied troops. Side by side they fought with regular French troops to liberate Marseille and Toulon, in the process saving some dock and port facilities from destruction.65

As the Germans began to withdraw from the south on August 19, the resistance forces harassed the moving columns and captured many small garrisons and isolated units. For weeks no railroad from the south had been open, and the Germans time after time had to fight to ensure passage on the roads. Some columns avoided the main roads altogether in their quest for an escape route.

To the resistance fell the task and the honor of liberating one large corner of France entirely unaided. This was the vast quadrilateral bounded by the Mediterranean, the Spanish frontier, the Atlantic, the Loire, and the Rhône. It encompassed five regions—Montpellier,
Toulouse, Limoges, Clermont-Ferrand, and Bordeaux. The FFI freed it all except for the for­
tified banks of the Gironde estuary, where the Germans held out until the end of the war to deny
the Allies use of the port of Bordeaux. One German column of 18,000 men under Generalmajor
Botho H. Elster, harassed at every turn by the resistance, finally cheated its French pursuers
by making contact with an American reconnaissance unit south of the Loire and surrendering
to a U.S. division. The resistance leaders were understandably piqued, for by all rights credit
for the mass surrender belonged to the FFI. 66

The major struggle in the southwest was not that between French and Germans but the con­
test between Communists and non-Communists in the resistance for control of local govern­
ments. The resistance forces in four of the five regions had strong contingents of Communists,
and in three of these Communists or crypto-Communists had achieved positions of authority
among the insurgents. But by dexterity, alacrity, maneuver, and subterfuge, the non-Commu­
nists succeeded everywhere except in a few small towns and villages in gaining control and
maintaining it until Gaullist-appointed officials could take over.

French Accomplishments in the North and the Dilemma Over Paris

In the meantime, in the north of France, the resistance had been performing a signal serv­
ice in protecting the southern flank of the American columns that were rapidly pursuing the
Germans toward the east. Almost every American unit received help in one way or another
from these seemingly unorganized, undisciplined men who appeared out of nowhere with FFI
bands on their left arms. But the crowning achievement of the resistance, and the ultimate test
of authority between Gaullists and Communists, was reserved for the city that to Frenchmen
everywhere represents France itself—Paris.

Under Allied plans, Paris was to be bypassed, both to avoid destructive fighting in the city
and to postpone the necessity of diverting military supplies to feed the population. 67 The FFI
commander, General Koenig, warned the inhabitants against uprisings; but in the early days of
August, as thousands of Germans began to evacuate the city, Parisians grew restless. A strike
by railroad workers that began on the 15th and spread to the police and other government em­
ployees promoted the atmosphere of crisis. By the 18th, members of the FFI were moving
about some sections of the city quite openly. Resistance posters appeared, calling for a gen­
eral strike, for mobilization, and for insurrection. When German reaction to these manifesta­
tions appeared to be feeble, small local FFI groups began on August 19, without central direc­
tion, to seize police stations, town halls, newspaper buildings, and the seat of the municipal
government, the Hôtel de Ville.

The French challenge, while serious, was hardly formidable, for few of the Parisian FFI
were armed, and thousands of German combat troops with tanks and artillery still held the city.
The German commander, Generalleutnant Dietrich von Choltitz, was ordered into Paris on August 7 to maintain the peace, defend the city to the last man, and assure its ultimate destruction. Choltitz was personally reluctant to turn the city into a battlefield; but with less principled superiors watching his moves, he could be provoked only so far.

With the help of the Swedish Consul-General, Mr. Raoul Nordling, resistance leaders arranged with Choltitz an armistice that went into effect the night of August 19, at first for only a few hours, then later extended for an indefinite period. But many Communists, hoping to take control of the insurrection and then the government, refused to honor the cease-fire.

De Gaulle Moves To Enter Paris

Apprised of these developments, Generals de Gaulle and Koenig asked General Eisenhower on August 21 to move immediately against Paris; but not until the next day, after de Gaulle had threatened to invoke his powers as head of state to order the 2d French Armored Division into the city, did Eisenhower consent. Responding to this threat, to appeals from French envoys who described the situation in Paris as chaotic, and to indications that the U.S. government had no objection to de Gaulle's entry into Paris, he agreed late on August 22 to send the French division.

In Paris, meanwhile, the resistance and hordes of unarmed civilians had already responded to the cry, "Aux barricades!" They took over entire sections of the city, but in many places—at the École Militaire, in the Rue de Rivoli near Choltitz' headquarters, and elsewhere—the Germans showed no signs either of leaving or of giving up. At some points they counterattacked with tanks against the barricades and buildings held by the resistance.

The news from inside the city provided additional impetus to the French armored columns, but to little avail. Opposition from German units in the southern suburbs was too strong, and overjubilant welcomes from civilians meant added delays. The day of August 23 passed, then much of the 24th, and French armor was still held up in the outskirts.

The French Take Paris—Militarily and Politically

As the American command committed the 4th U.S. Infantry Division to help, the French commander, Gen. Jacques Philippe Leclerc, decided to send a small reconnaissance party through back streets to try to reach the Hôtel de Ville. The little column arrived shortly before midnight. The next day, as German defenses melted away, both French and American troops advanced swiftly through the city to the accompaniment of civilian delirium. Only at isolated points was there real resistance, and tanks made quick work of these. Choltitz himself surrendered in the Hotel Majestic. By nightfall of August 25, the battle of Paris—no minor engagement, for the FFI lost somewhere between 800 and 1,000 killed, another 1,500 wounded, and civilian losses in both categories were perhaps double these—was over.68
In the internecine struggle for control of the government that immediately ensued, the Gaullists once again proved more astute and better disciplined than their Communist opponents. De Gaulle himself arrived unannounced during the afternoon of August 25 amid a riotous reception from the populace. Despite protests from the American tactical commander that the city was still unsafe, de Gaulle the next day reviewed a parade by part of Leclerc's armored division up the Champs Elysées. Scattered sniping and the discovery of 2,600 Germans with artillery pieces in the Bois de Boulogne failed to detract from the glory of the occasion.

With the liberation of Paris, all France was at least symbolically free. There would be fighting in Alsace and Lorraine for many long months; in January a German counteroffensive would threaten the revered city of Strasbourg; and resistance forces would help to contain German pockets in some of the Atlantic ports until the day of victory, May 8, 1945. But the climax had now been passed.

The Costs and Effects of the French Role During the Occupation

France could be justifiably proud of the role of the resistance in the liberation of the country. Its cost had been paid in citizens' lives. From the beginning of the occupation, the Germans arrested over 600,000 Frenchmen, of whom 250,000 were deported to Germany. Only 35,000 of these returned. In addition, the Germans executed 30,000 Frenchmen in France, and another 24,000 were killed in resistance fighting.

There had been excesses—some used the cloak of the resistance to settle personal feuds, some to punish without fair or legal judgment, some to achieve personal gain, others to claim a patriotic record that they did not in fact possess—but the accounts on the credit side far exceeded the debits. When de Gaulle moved promptly after the liberation of Paris to disarm the resistance, there were on the whole few incidents, and at least 137,000 joined the regular army for the continuing campaign against Germany.

Despite internal conflicts, emotional misconceptions, German repression, and underestimation and even mistrust on the part of Allied leaders, the French, with Allied aid, had played a noble role in regaining their freedom. In the process, an originally obscure général de division, Charles de Gaulle, had created the basis for a future French government that would eventually assure for France a new place in the councils of the world.
NOTES

1 A concise summary of the campaign may be found in Charles B. MacDonald, "Fall of the Low Countries and France," in Vincent J. Esposito, ed., A Concise History of World War II (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1944), pp. 53-67.


7 Ibid., pp. 355-59.

8 Ibid., pp. 341-44, 349-57.


See ibid., pp. 20-22.


22 See Marie Granet, "Défense de la France," in Revue d'Histoire de la Deuxième Guerre Mondiale, No. 30 (April 1958); see also Michel, Histoire, p. 23.


26 See ibid., pp. 30-31; Cobban, "Vichy France," in Toynbee and Toynbee, eds., Hitler's Europe, p. 419-20; Michel, Histoire, pp. 41-44; de Benouville, The Unknown Warriors, p. 204; Thornton, The Liberation, p. 76.

27 Thornton, The Liberation, p. 76.


29 Aron, France Reborn, p. 78.

30 Ibid.

31 Ibid., pp. 53-88.

32 Ibid., pp. 10-47; Cobban, "Vichy France," in Toynbee and Toynbee, eds., Hitler's Europe, pp. 409-10; de Benouville, The Unknown Warriors, pp. 120-21, 186-87.


34 Michel, Histoire, p. 97, and the memoir literature, passim.

38 Badaut, "La Résistance en France," in European Resistance... Second Conference, pp. 384-85; and Vigneras, Rearing the French, pp. 304, 401-402.
39 Michel, Histoire, p. 96, and the memoir literature, passim.
40 Michel, Histoire, pp. 98-100.
42 See Aron, France Reborn, pp. 94-98.
44 Badaut, "La Résistance en France," in European Resistance... Second Conference, p. 389; and Harrison, Cross-Channel Attack, p. 198.
46 See Thornton, The Liberation, p. 28.
48 Quotation from Field Marshal Erwin von Witzleben (for a time Commander in Chief in the West), as given in von Luttichau, "German Operations in Southern France and Alsace," p. 13.
49 These decrees are discussed in Clifton J. Child, "The Political Structure of Hitler's Europe," in Toynbee and Toynbee, eds., Hitler's Europe, pp. 150-52.
54 See Harrison, Cross-Channel Attack, pp. 206, 275.
56 Aron, France Reborn, pp. 92-100.


60 Aron, France Reborn, pp. 8-12, 116-47.

61 Ibid.; Pogue, The Supreme Command, p. 238; Blumenson, Breakout and Pursuit, passim.


65 Details of the campaign in the south may be found in Aron, France Reborn, pp. 322 ff.

66 In addition to Aron, France Reborn, see Blumenson, Breakout and Pursuit, pp. 654-55, and de Vormeour, An Army of Amateurs, pp. 13-15, 278-89.

67 For the story of the liberation, see Thornton, The Liberation, pp. 118 ff.; Aron, France Reborn, pp. 235-319; Blumenson, Breakout and Pursuit, pp. 590-628; Lapierre and Collins, Is Paris Burning?, passim; and Pogue, The Supreme Command, pp. 239-43. The first three of these works have drawn heavily on the other major source on the liberation, Adrian Dansette, L'Histoire de la Libération de Paris (Paris, 1946).


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Chapter Four

YUGOSLAVIA (1941-1944)

by Earl Ziemke