At the beginning there were at Dien Bien Phu only ten enemy battalions but they were gradually reinforced to cope with our offensive. When we launched the attack, the enemy forces totalled 17 battalions and 10 companies, comprising chiefly Europeans and Africans and units of highly-trained paratroops. Moreover the camp had three battalions of artillery, one battalion of sappers, one armored company, a transport unit of 200 lorries and a permanent squadron of 12 aircraft. Altogether 16,200 men.

The forces were distributed in three sub-sectors which had to support one another and comprised 49 strong-points. Each had defensive autonomy, several were grouped in "complex defence centres" equipped with mobile forces and artillery, and surrounded by trenches and barbed wire, hundreds of metres thick. Each sub-sector comprised several strongly fortified defence centres.

But the most important was the Central sub-sector situated in the middle of the Muong Thanh village, the chief town of Dien Bien Phu. Two-thirds of the forces of the garrison were concentrated there. It had several connected defence centres protecting the command post, the artillery and commissariat bases, and at the same time the airfield. To the East, well-situated hills formed the most important defence system of the sub-sector. Dien Bien Phu was considered by the enemy to be an unassailable and impregnable fortress.

In fact, the central sub-sector did have rather strong forces, and the heights in the East could not be attacked easily. Besides, the artillery and armoured forces could break every attempt at intervention through the plain, a system of barbed wire and trenches would permit the enemy to decimate and repel any assault, and the mobile forces formed by the battalions of paratroops, whose action was combined with that of the defence centres, could counter-attack and break any offensive. The Northern sub-sector comprised the defence centres of Him Lam, Doc Lap and Ban Keo. The very strong positions of Him Lam and Doc Lap were required to check all attacks of our troops coming from Tuan Giao and Lai Chau.
As for the Southern sub-sector, also known as Hong Cum sub-sector, its purpose was to break any offensive coming from the South and to protect the communication way with Upper Laos.

Their artillery was divided between two bases: one at Muong Thanh, the other at Hong Cum; they linked with Hanoi and Haiphong in an airlift which ensured 70 to 80 transports of supplies daily.

The reconnaissance planes and fighters of the permanent squadron constantly flew over the entire region. The planes from the Gia Lam and Cat Bi airbases had the task of strafing and bombing our army. Navarre asserted that with such powerful forces and so strong a defence system, Dien Bien Phu was "an impregnable fortress..." The American general O'Daniel who paid a visit to the base shared this opinion. From this subjective point of view the enemy came to the conclusion that our troops had little chance in an attack on Dien Bien Phu. They even considered that an attack on our part would be a good opportunity for them to inflict a defeat on us.

On our side, after the liberation of Lai Chau, the attack upon Dien Bien Phu was on the agenda.

**How to Attack Dien Bien Phu?**

We had pledged to wipe out the whole enemy force at Dien Bien Phu but we still had to solve this problem: How should we do it? Strike swiftly and win swiftly, or strike surely and advance surely! This was the problem of the direction of operations in the campaign.

In the early stage, when we began the encirclement of Dien Bien Phu, and the enemy, having been newly parachuted into the area, had not yet had time to complete his fortifications and increase his forces, the question of striking swiftly and winning swiftly had been posed. By concentrating superior forces, we could push simultaneously from many directions deep into enemy positions, cut the fortified entrenched camp into many separate parts, then swiftly annihilate the entire enemy manpower. There were many obvious
advantages if we could strike swiftly to win swiftly: by launching a big offensive with fresh troops, we could shorten the duration of the campaign and avoid the wear and fatigue of a long operation. As the campaign would not last long, the supplying of the battlefront could be ensured without difficulty. However, on further examining the question, we saw that these tactics had a very great, basic disadvantage: our troops lacked experience in attacking fortified entrenched camps. If we wanted to win swiftly, success could not be ensured. For that reason, in the process of making preparations, we continued to follow the enemy’s situation and checked and re-checked our potentialities again. And we came to the conclusion that we could not secure success if we struck swiftly. In consequence, we resolutely chose the other tactic: to strike surely and advance surely. In taking this correct decision, we strictly followed this fundamental principle of the conduct of a revolutionary war: strike to win, strike only when success is certain; if it is not, then don’t strike.

We patiently educated our men, pointed out that there were real difficulties, but that our task was to overcome them to create good conditions for the great victory we sought.

It was from these guiding principles that we developed our plan of progressive attack, in which the Dien Bien Phu campaign was regarded not as a large-scale attack on fortresses carried out over a short period, but as a large-scale campaign carried out over a fairly long period, through a series of successive attacks on fortified positions until the enemy was destroyed. In the campaign as a whole we already had numerical superiority over the enemy. But in each attack or each wave of attacks, we had the possibility of achieving absolute supremacy and ensuring the success of each operation and consequently total victory in the campaign. Such a plan was in full keeping with the tactical and technical level of our troops, creating conditions for them to accumulate experience in fighting and to ensure the annihilation of the enemy at Dien Bien Phu.
Preparations for the Attack

Three months had passed from the occupation of Dien Bien Phu by enemy paratroops to the launching of our campaign. During that time, the enemy did their utmost to consolidate their defence system, gather reinforcements, dig new trenches, and strengthen their entrenchments.

On our side, the army and people actively prepared the offensive, carrying out the orders of the Party's Central Committee and the Government; the army and people mustered all their strength to guarantee the success of the Winter-Spring campaign, to which Dien Bien Phu was the key. Our troops succeeded in liberating the surrounding regions, isolating Dien Bien Phu, obliging the enemy to scatter forces and thus reduce their possibilities of sending reinforcements to the battlefield. We made motor roads, cleared the tracks to haul up artillery pieces, built casemates for the artillery, prepared the ground for the offensive and encirclement; in short, transformed the relief of the battlefield terrain with a view to solving the tactical problems. We overcame very great difficulties. We called upon our local compatriots to supply food, to set up supply lines hundreds of kilometres long from Thanh Hoa or Phu Tho to the North-West, crossing very dangerous areas and very high hills. We used every means to carry food and ammunition to the front. Our troops and voluntary workers ceaselessly went to the front and actively participated in the preparations under the bombs and bullets of enemy aircraft.

In the first week of March, the preparations were completed: the artillery had solid casemates, the operational bases were established, food and ammunition were available in sufficient quantity. After having been educated in the aim and significance of the campaign, all officers and soldiers were filled with a very high determination to annihilate the enemy, as they were persuaded that only the destruction of the Dien Bien Phu entrenched camp would bring the "Navarre plan" to complete failure.

On March 13, 1954, our troops received the order to launch an offensive against Dien Bien Phu.
The campaign proceeded in three phases: in the first phase we destroyed the Northern sub-sector; in the second, the longest and bitterest one, we took the heights in the East of the Central sub-sector and tightened our encirclement; in the third, we launched the general offensive and annihilated the enemy.

**First Phase: Destruction of Northern Sub-Sector**

This phase began on March 13th and ended on March 17th. On the night of March 13th, we annihilated the very strong defence centre of Him Lam which overlooked the road from Tuan Giao to Dien Bien Phu. The battle was very sharp, the enemy artillery concentrated its fire, and poured scores of thousands of shells on our assaulting waves. Our troops carried the position in the night. This first victory had very deep repercussions on the development of the whole campaign.

In the night of the 14th, we concentrated our forces to attack the defence centre of Doc Lap, the second strong defence sector of the Northern sub-sector which overlooked the road from Lai Chau to Dien Bien Phu. The battle went on till dawn. The enemy used every means to repel our forces, fired scores of thousands of shells and sent their mobile forces protected by tanks from Muong Thanh to support their position. Our troops fought heroically, took the strong-point and repelled the enemy reinforcements.

The third and last defence centre of the Northern sub-sector, the Ban Keo post, became isolated and was threatened by us. This was a less strong position, manned by a garrison chiefly made up of puppet soldiers. On March 17th, the whole garrison left its positions and surrendered. After the loss of the Northern sub-sector, the Central sub-sector, now exposed on its eastern, northern flanks, was threatened.

In the fighting in the first phase, the correctness of our tactical decisions, the good organisation of our defence and anti-aircraft activity reduced the efficiency of the enemy artillery and air force. Besides, our artillery fire, which was very accurate, inflicted heavy losses on the enemy. The main airfield was threatened. Our anti-aircraft batteries went into action for the first time and brought down enemy planes. But above all, it was
by their heroic spirit, their high spirit of sacrifice and their will to win, that our troops distinguished themselves during these battles.

The great and resounding victory which ended the first phase of operations stirred our army and people and gave each and every one faith in final victory.

As for the enemy, despite their heavy losses, they still had confidence in the power of resistance of the Central sub-sector, in the strength of their artillery and air force. They even expected that we would suffer heavy losses and would be obliged to give up the offensive; and especially, that if the campaign was protected our supply lines would be cut and that the great logistic difficulties thus created would force us to withdraw.

Second Phase: Occupation of the Hills in the East and Encirclement of the Central Sub-sector

The second phase was the most important of the campaign. We had to deal with the Central sub-sector, in the middle of the Muong Thanh plain, and new difficulties arose in the conduct of the operations. Our troops had to work actively to complete the operations; they had to dig a vast network of trenches, from the neighbouring hills to the plain, to encircle the Central sub-sector and cut it off from the Southern sector. This advance of our lines which encircled the enemy positions was made at the cost of fierce fighting. By every means the enemy tried to upset our preparations by the fire of their air force and artillery. However, our troops drew closer to their positions with irresistible power in the course of uninterrupted fighting.

During the night of March 30th, the second phase began. We launched a large scale attack of long duration to annihilate the heights in the East and a certain number of strong points in the West in order to tighten our encirclement, and to hamper and cut off the supplies to the garrison. On this night of March 30th, we concentrated important forces to attack simultaneously the five fortified heights in the East. On this same night, we succeeded in capturing hills E-1, D-1 and C-1, but could not take hill A-1, the most important of all. The defence line constituted by these heights was the key to the defensive
system of the Central sub-sector: its loss would lead to the fall of Dien Bien Phu.

Consequently, the fight here was at its fiercest. Particularly on hill A-I, the last height which protected the command post, the battle lasted until April 4th. Every inch of ground was hotly disputed. Finally, we occupied half of the position while the enemy, entrenched in casemates and trenches, continued to resist in the other half. While this fighting was going on, the garrison received paratroop reinforcements.

On April 9th, the enemy launched a counter-attack to re-occupy hill C-I. The battle went on for four days and nights, and the position was occupied half by the enemy and half by us.

While the situation in the East was static, in the North and in the West our encirclement grew tighter and tighter. The lines of both sides drew nearer and nearer, in some points they were only 10 to 15 metres away from each other. From the occupied positions to the battlefields northward and westward, the fire of our artillery and mortars pounded the enemy without let-up. Day and night the fighting went on. We exhausted the enemy by harassing them, firing constantly at their lines, and at the same time tried to take their strong points one by one with a tactic of combined nibbling advance and full scale attack.

In mid-April, after the destruction of several enemy positions in the North and West, our lines reached the airfield, then cut it from West to East. Our encirclement grew still tighter, the fighting was still more fierce. The enemy launched several violent counter-attacks supported by tanks and aircraft aimed at taking ground from us and obliging us to loosen our encirclement. On April 24th, the most violent counter-attack was launched with the aim of driving us off the airfield: after inflicting heavy losses on the enemy, we remained the master, and the airfield stayed in our control.

The territory occupied by the enemy shrank in size day by day, and they were driven into a two kilometres square. It was threatened by our heavy fire. The enemy's supply problem became more and more critical. The airfield had been out of action for a long time, all supplies were being dropped by parachute. But as the enemy zone was so narrow, and their pilots feared out anti-aircraft fire and dared not fly low, only a part of
the parachutes carrying food and ammunition fell into the enemy position, and the bulk of them fell on our ground; thus we poured shells parachuted by the enemy on the entrenched camp.

Throughout the second phase, the situation was extremely tense. The American interventionists sent more bombers and transport planes to support the Dien Bien Phu base. The enemy bombers were very active; they ceaselessly bombed our positions, dropped napalm bombs to burn down the vegetation on the heights surrounding Dien Bien Phu, and bombed points that they took for our artillery bases. Day and night they shelled our supply lines, dropped blockbusters on the roads, showered the roads with delayed action and "butterfly" bombs, in an endeavour to cut our supply lines. These desperate efforts did not achieve the desired results. They could not check the flow of hundreds of thousands of voluntary workers, pack-horses and transport cars carrying food and ammunition to the front. They could not stop us from carrying out our plan of encirclement, the condition of their destruction.

The French and American generals clearly saw the danger of the destruction of the Dien Bien Phu entrenched camp.

At this moment, the High Command of the French Expeditionary Corps thought of gathering together the remaining forces for an attack on our rear and in the direction of the Viet Bac, to cut our supply lines and oblige us to withdraw for lack of food and ammunition. But it could not carry out this plan. Moreover, it feared that a still more severe defeat could be the result of so foolhardy an action. At another time it intended to regroup the Dien Bien Phu garrison in several columns which would try to break through our encirclement and open at all costs a way towards Upper Laos. Finally, it had to give up this plan and continue to defend its positions.

Third Phase: Annihilation of the Enemy

On May 1st, began the third phase. From May 1st to May 6th, following several successive attacks, we occupied hill C-1, hill A-1 which was the key of the last defensive
system of the Central sub-sector, and several other strongpoints from the foot of the hills in the East to the Nam Gion river, and, finally some positions in the West.

The enemy was driven into a square kilometre, entirely exposed to our fire. There was no fortified height to protect them. The problem of supply became very grave. Their situation was critical: the last hour of the entrenched camp had come.

In the afternoon of May 7th, from the East and West, we launched a massive combined attack upon the headquarters at Muong Thanh. At several posts, the enemy hoisted the white flag and surrendered. At 5.30 p.m. we seized the headquarters: General de Castries and his staff were captured.

The remaining forces at Dien Bien Phu surrendered. The prisoners of war were well treated by our troops.

The "Determined to fight and to win" banner of our army fluttered high in the valley of Dien Bien Phu. On this very night, we attacked the South sub-sector. The whole garrison of more than 2,000 men was captured.

The historic Dien Bien Phu campaign ended in our complete victory. Our troops had fought with an unprecedented heroism for 55 days and 55 nights.

During this time, our troops were very active in all theatres of operation in coordination with the main front.

In the enemy rear in the Red River delta, they destroyed, one after another, a large number of positions and seriously threatened road No. 5.

In the Fifth zone, they attacked road No. 19, annihilated the mobile regiment No. 100, liberated An Khe, penetrated deep into the region of Cheo Reo, and threatened Pleiku and Banmethuot.

Our troops were also very active in the region of Hue and in Nam Bo.

In Middle Laos, the Vietnamese and Laotian units increased their activity on road No. 9 and advanced southward.

Our troops won victories on all fronts.
Such are the broad outlines of the military situation in Winter 1953 and Spring 1954.

On all fronts, we put out of action 112,000 enemy troops and brought down or destroyed on the ground 177 planes.

At Dien Bien Phu, we put out of action 16,200 enemy troops, including the whole staff of the entrenched camp, one general, 16 colonels, 1,749 officers and warrant-officers, brought down or destroyed 62 planes of all types, seized all the enemy's armaments, ammunition and equipment, and more than 30,000 parachutes.

These great victories of the Viet Nam People's Army and people as a whole at Dien Bien Phu and on the other fronts had smashed to pieces the "Navarre plan," and impeded the attempts of the Franco-American imperialists to prolong and extend the war. These great victories liberated the North of Viet Nam, contributed to the success of the Geneva Conference and the restoration of peace in Indo-China on the basis of respect of sovereignty, independence, national unity and territorial integrity of Viet Nam and of the two friendly countries, Cambodia and Laos.

These are glorious pages of our history, of our People's Army and our people. They illustrate the striking success of our Party in leading the movement for national liberation against the French imperialists and the American interventionists.
Chapter Four

ALGERIA (1954-1962)

by Major J.W. Woodmansee, Jr.
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The French army responded to a widely-based nationalist movement by the resourceful application of military strength and psychological techniques. Despite successful counterguerrilla measures, the causes of the revolution could not be removed. Unwilling to pay the high costs of continued suppression of an alienated people, DeGaulle, in the face of a dissident army, granted independence to Algeria.

BACKGROUND

Although the country of Algeria spans some 900,000 miles on roughly four times the size of France, the populated sector, and thus the area involved in the insurgency was limited to the northern area along the Mediterranean, extending for 100-200 miles inland. Scarred by several major east-west mountain ranges and numerous secondary chains, the geography of northern Algeria also includes a fertile shoreline crescent and inland valleys, spectacular wadis, and great dry salt lakes. To the south the harsh Sahara desert forms an undisputed barrier to the physical capabilities as well as the political ambitions of man.
The cities were fairly modern, and were linked by a respectable communications network of highways, railroads, telephone, and telegraph. Because of the mountains, these communications only penetrated south at several locations. The insurgent bands thus enjoyed most of the advantages which geography could provide: rugged mountains to permit well-hidden guerrilla camps and to act as a great equalizer against modern, sophisticated armed forces; a proximity of rural villages and arable land to provide intelligence, recruits, and food; proximity to vital communications networks linking the nerve centers of government influence -- the cities; and (after 1956) contiguous borders on both the east and west with countries whose governments not only provided sanctuary for the rebels but also established training camps and repair depots as well.

The History of the Conflict

French involvement in Algeria dates from the 1830's. General Thomas Robert Bugeaud after an extended campaign captured the excellent Arab leader Abd-el-Kader in 1847. Bugeaud's methods of "pacification" were admittedly harsh. Wrote Bugeaud, "We have burned a great deal and destroyed a great deal." Sporadic fighting continued until 1871 when the Algerians, encouraged by the results of the Franco-Prussian War, again tried unsuccessfully to overthrow their French conquerors.

Behind this conquest followed colonization by people, whom Bugeaud referred to as "the agricultural scum of the European countries." The colons, as these settlers were called, were crude but hard-working stock and soon extracted a prosperous yield from the unwilling soil. They developed a love for the land that was at least the equal of their Muslim compatriots.

In the Twentieth Century, Marshal Lyautey introduced his famous "oil-spot" (tache d'huile) concept of national development. Lyautey's military and social concepts did much to give the country a national character. His handling of the RIF War in Morocco in 1925-1926 established Lyautey as a combination "soldier, nation-builder"
that was without equal. His profound thinking and valuable experience have been sadly neglected at a time when the U.S. Army is groping for a doctrine of employing military force in stability operations.

On 8 May 1945, local Muslims of Setif in the Kabylia area asked for and received permission to have a non-political parade celebrating the victory of World War II. During the parade Algerian nationalist flags appeared; a clash with the police exaggerated by wild rumors of police brutality precipitated mob violence. The French declared martial law and crushed the revolt with heavy-handed tactics that included "bombing and burning of villages and wholesale arrests." Thousands of Muslim political leaders were arrested, including the respected Ferhat Abbas who was not even present at the demonstrations. The handling of the Setif revolt, similarly to the British reprisals against the "Easter Monday" Irish rebellion, provided the spark, the rallying point, that was to grow into the revolution of 1954.

Conditions in 1954

By 1954 the Muslim population had reached nine million; Europeans accounted for an additional million. The colons however had developed most of the arable land, and Europeans dominated the urban middle and upper classes of an increasingly bi-polar social structure. Some of the Muslim population took advantage of the educational opportunities and joined the progressive portion of society. Ninety percent of the Muslims, however, remained illiterate; one million were underemployed; another half-million were unemployed. Four hundred thousand males were forced to work in metropolitan France and support an additional two million dependents by remittance. Many of the Muslims gravitated toward the cities and lived in ghettos called bidonvilles because they were made of bidons or tin cans. Wrote one observer, "Their grief, which must be seen to be believed, drives them inexorably to despair."
As previous experience has demonstrated, poverty is not the sole ingredient of revolution. There must also be a recognition of some political goal and an obstruction to the peaceful, evolutionary achievement of this goal. The Muslims, since 1845, had been considered French subjects. Algeria was said to be a part of France, not an overseas colony. Thus, the phrase "Algerie Francaise" was a French rallying cry to keep Algeria as a part of France. Despite their status as French subjects, the Muslims could become French citizens "only by abandonment of 'personal status' under Koranic law, which was tantamount to renouncement of their religion. As French subjects, but not citizens, they were governed by the 'native code' and could not vote." In addition to the growing economic disparity between the races, there was political obstruction to the democratic rectification of these ills.

The constitution of the Fourth Republic established provisions to eliminate the native code. It also provided for a Muslim electoral college to select half the members of the Algerian Assembly and half the Algerian delegates to the French parliament. But these provisions threatened the prestige and the power base of the colons since the colons could exert the most political pressure on France and the most influence on the French Army. The provisions of 1944 were never implemented. By 1954 an Algerian government in exile had appeared in Cairo, Egypt.

The ingredients of poverty, discrimination, French myopia, political frustration, capable political-military leadership, and external assistance and encouragement had driven the moderate Muslim leaders to violence.

INSURGENCY

On 1 November 1954, at one o'clock in the morning, thirty small armed bands of Algerian Muslims made simultaneous strikes against Europeans in various parts of Algeria. Their targets were small army outposts, settler's farms, and government buildings. "At the same hour, radio Cairo reported these attacks and announced the formation of the National Liberation Front (FLN)."
Initially the guerrilla forces were only about 300 strong; a far cry indeed from the Army of National Liberation (ALN) that Cairo was extolling. The bands, at first, were isolated from each other and were loosely coordinated from Cairo. But as the movement spread from the Aures to the Kabylia ranges, further west to the Tlemcen mountains, the size of the insurgent forces grew, and their organizational structure improved. At their peak the revolutionary army is believed to have numbered 40,000 and was formed into conventionally structured battalions. The irregular forces estimated at 55,000 to 100,000, assisted the regulars in limited operations, provided a replacement pool for the units, and furnished guides and intelligence to the ALN. The rebel sanctuary in neighboring Tunisia harbored some 15,000 men. Tunisia also established training camps, gunnery ranges, and technical schools for armorers, radio operators, and demolitionists.

Organization of the FLN

Algeria was divided by the FLN into six wilayas which became operational theaters as well as civil divisions. Each wilaya was in turn subdivided into four or five zones (mintaka), each zone into five regions (nahia), each region into four or five sectors (khazma), and finally each sector into a varying number of communes (douar). Wilayas were not former territorial divisions of the French administration, but were new divisions especially set up by the nationalists.

The region was the basic territorial unit of the FLN organization. The sectors making up the region usually consisted of a town, which contained the bulk of the population and became the capital of the region, and three or four rural subdivisions comprising the remaining area between the town and the outlying mountains. The extent and nature of the terrain determined the number of sectors in a region.

A war council consisting of the commanding officers of the various wilayas coordinated the entire war effort. Under the wilaya commanders came the zone commanders, the region commanders, and the sector commanders. A political executive, a
military executive, and a liaison-intelligence executive at each level formed an advisory council for the commanding officers. The political executives were attached to all levels to assure political control over military activities. They also served military operations by disseminating propaganda and setting up local administrations for rebel-held territory. At the wilaya level, an executive was in charge of logistics. A committee of five members, the most important of whom was the mas'ul or responsible executive, was in charge of distributing food supplies and provisions at the commune level. In the lower echelons the organization was highly cellular in nature, so that the members of a cell in one commune would not know the members in the next.

Within the territorial scheme of the FLN organization, the city of Algiers and its immediate surroundings, well protected and garrisoned with French troops, became
an autonomous zone. Although Algiers never became a target of open attack by the ALN, the FLN maintained an extensive underground unit in the city. Because of military and security considerations, the FLN allowed the Algiers underground a large measure of autonomy.

The early success of the FLN and its military arm was probably as great a surprise to the insurgents as it was to the French. Generally, the success was due to the following factors: (1) the existence of real grievances within the Muslim population; (2) ideal terrain for guerrilla operations within sight of a population base to serve as cover and to provide support; (3) the application of sound politico-military tactics and techniques by rebel forces; (4) the virtual non-existence of French bureaucratic structure in the rural areas; and (5) an inadequate and ineffective military response to the initial insurgent challenge.

Revolutionary Techniques

The basic strategy for the revolutionary struggle had not, strangely enough, been borrowed from Mao Tse-tung or Ho Chi Minh, although the rebels could recite learnedly the proverbial relationship between guerrilla "fish" and the population "sea." Instead, the revolutionary struggle had a striking similarity to French Marshal Lyautey's famous "oil-spot" concept--only in reverse.¹⁰ The rebels, moving into remote villages outside the French control, would win over these villages to their cause. Then with a broadening base of support and intelligence the rebels would spread their activity and influence to neighboring areas until they reached larger settlements protected by French outposts. Force was then surgically applied to discredit the French presence and drive French authority away or to antagonize the French into the harsh reprisal that would unify the insurgents and the villagers in a common cause of hatred. The tactics most frequently employed against these French outposts were the classic ones: hit-and-run attacks, ambushes, selected assassination of French authorities and Muslim "traitors", and, in the larger communities, strikes, and economic boycotts.
Terrorism in the Urban Areas

In the urban areas the "oil-spot" process could hardly apply. The French military forces there were too strong to be driven out, and the affluent colonists and the pro-French Arab businessmen were opposed to Arab nationalism. The rebel tactics and objectives in these urban battlefields were similar to those used by Colonel Grivas on Cyprus--terrorism to discredit the government and raise the national struggle to one of international concern and involvement. The terrorism in populated areas was generally divided into two categories: (1) the assassination of individuals and indiscriminate shooting of Europeans and (2) indiscriminate bombings.11 Assassinations were usually carried out by a team of two executioners. Individual assassinations were usually preceded by a thorough study of the individual's habits and detailed planning of the execution. Indiscriminate shootings of Europeans usually took place near the Casbah or the Muslim section of the city, so that the individual terrorist could return quickly to this urban sanctuary and the jungle-like security of the crowd.

The bomb network was initially composed of an extensive organization of chemists (who could obtain potassium chlorate), welders (who could make the castings), and others who assembled the bombs and prepared detonators. After "plastique" became available the construction process was considerably simplified.12 A large proportion of women and children were used to place the bombs because they were less likely to be suspected and were rarely searched.13

The combination of political organization and guerrilla tactics in the rural areas and terrorism in the urban areas was initially successful in gaining the willing support of most Muslims or in compelling them to cooperate with the goals of the revolution. Failure to support these goals meant that one was a "traitor," and "traitors" had a life expectancy predictably less than "patriots."

By the end of 1956 the movement had spread with incredible speed until the FLN ruled with greater authority in some areas than the government. Also, the
development of shadow parallel governments was so complete that a "subterranean Algerian nation with widespread if inexpert administrative services had precipitously come to birth."\[34\]

**ALN Attempts Large-Scale Operations**

During 1957, the FLN-ALN decided to continue the consolidation of the political base ("oil-spot" process) and to follow the military pattern set by the Chinese Communists and the Viet Minh—evolution into large-scale operations. Several factors probably accounted for this decision.\[15\] First of all the rebels had been quite successful, and their movement was gaining strength. Second, there was a growing feeling that since the Algerian problem had taken on international proportions (having been placed on the United Nations agenda)—the rebels needed to dramatize this struggle with a display of strength and success. Finally, the rebel situation may have been somewhat similar to the dilemma of the Greek communists in 1948-49. The French government forces by 1957 were fully aware of the insurgent threat and were responding to the challenge. More veterans of Indochina were arriving to swell the French ranks from its initial strength of 55,000 to an ultimate force of over 400,000. New tactics, the quadrillage* and a zealous application of psychological warfare, threatened to wrest the initiative from the fellaga (Arab guerrillas). Finally, the rebels’ flow of supplies and replacements from the Eastern Base in Tunisia was being choked off by the construction of a complex barrier system called the "Morice Line". Militarily, time seemed to be running out for the Algerians, and it was possibly their last opportunity to achieve a significant military success and a quick political settlement. After several major battles in late 1948 and early 1949, the rebels realized that their battalion sized units with machine guns and supporting mortars were no match for French forces with artillery, airpower, and armor support. Henceforth the French were militarily in an "unbeatable" position, and

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* A grid system of occupying all key towns and villages and connecting the strong points with adequate forces to control the intervals.
the ALN was forced to reorganize its units into small, elusive groups which could avoid French military patrols. Thus, guerrilla activity for the remainder of the war, until its end on 19 March 1962, was characterized by selective attacks and ambushes of these smaller bands. Their strategy could no longer be one of victory through military force. The alternative was to protract the war—to increase the external pressure on France through the United Nations and increase the internal disunity of France through the costs of maintaining three-fifths of the entire French Army in Algeria.

Summary

Revolutionary warfare in Algeria was primarily a two-pronged attack on the French administration; both military and nonmilitary techniques were employed simultaneously. The military aspect of the war was expressed in the armed struggle against the French administration and military forces. The nonmilitary aspect was expressed in political and social action directly involving the general population. Waging a successful revolutionary war in Algeria, then, included the winning over of a large sector of the population. Where the revolutionary organization failed to win over the local inhabitants through the effective use of propaganda techniques, terror tactics were employed. Either way, the local inhabitants were forced to take a stand on the question of violent revolution. Without an effective system of defense against the threat of terrorism, many had no alternative to joining the rebel forces, if only out of fear for themselves, their families, and their property. The French Army and their resulting campaign, although successful in preventing an ALN victory, were never successful in regaining the loyalty of the people.

COUNTERINSURGENCY

The best means for achieving pacification in our new colony is provided by combined application of force and politics... We should turn to destruction only as a last resort and only as a preliminary to better reconstruction... Every time that the necessities of war force...
one of our...officers to take action against a village or an in­habited center, his first concern, once submission of the in­habitants has been achieved, should be reconstruction of the village, creation of the market and establishment of a school. 16

The officer propounding this concept was indeed a veteran of Indochina; Mar­shal Gallieni had served in Tonkin in the 1880's, and this quotation was taken from one of his later directives, written as Governor General of Madagascar in 1898.

France in 1954 was hesitant to apply the military force required to stabilize Algeria and unwilling to implement the political measures required to resolve the basic causes. The violence in the Aures had erupted only four months after the end of the struggle in Indochina. The impassioned search for a doctrine to counter la guerre revolutionnaire and to save the honor of the French Army, was just beginning in the detention camps of the Viet Minh, but in Algeria the army responded in an inept, conven­tional manner. Large-scale operations noisily thrown into the Aures to encircle and search a djebel (hill) were exhausting and fruitless. The fellagha had plenty of time to run away or simply to hide their weapons and return to grazing their goats. The French military outpost system was too weak to really secure, and thus influence the people of the area; patrols and ambushes were dispatched without adequate intelligence and under the observation of a population which supported the stronger rule, the guerrillas. 17

In March 1955, five months after the revolt in the Aures Mountains and one month after Jacques Soustelle had taken over as Governor General, the French assembly approved a bill authorizing a "state of emergency." Under the provisions of this act, M. Soustelle could establish curfews, conduct night searches, establish protection and security zones, control the press, literature, and radio, and could expel any person seeking to impede the action of authorities. 18 But these new measures could not replace the administrative void that M. Soustelle found in the eastern mountains. French admin­istration was, in many places, virtually non-existent; huge areas were administered by a single official. The rebellion, Soustelle said, "was tending to become an endemic evil,...No one spoke,...Fear closed mouths and hardened faces.... The population, as
a whole, without throwing in their lot with the rebels... remained frightened and noncomittal."

Soustelle also saw other conditions that alarmed him. In addition to the administrative vacuum (except for the rebels' establishment) and wide-spread terror, there was appalling poverty. The Governor General realized that the solution to the problem would require the ingredients of "peace and security" plus the social programs of "justice and equality." His new budget included a record proposal of $148 million for a "crusade against hunger," four-fifths of the funds to be provided by France. He also realized that in order for the programs to be administered, a means of re-establishing contact with the Arabs was vital. Thus, in September 1955, Soustelle formed the Service of Algerian Affairs, (SAA) a modern version of Marshal Bugeaud's Arab Bureaus of 1844. Since the civil agencies of France were unable to expand rapidly enough to staff the SAA, and since the situation was as pressing militarily as it was politically, the mission eventually was assigned to the army.

Changes in the Military Response

The war by 1956 had spread rapidly throughout Northern Algeria and had grown from sporadic terrorist acts, to the development of guerrilla bases, and finally in some areas, the formation of parallel shadow governments. The difficult situation was aggravated further by two international events. First, Tunisia and Morocco gained their independence from France, and became ideal sanctuaries, training bases and supply centers for the FLN. In 1957, the external FLN directorate was relocated from Cairo to Tunis. Second, the abortive French-British invasion of the Suez was launched in November 1956. Although victory was in their grasp, pressure from the great powers forced a withdrawal. The French army, sensing that a victory in Egypt would have destroyed the leadership and external direction of the Algerian insurgency, felt that they had been denied a military victory because of political timidity.
"Quadrillage" - The Principal French Tactic

By the end of 1957, the French forces in Algeria swelled to 400,000—almost 80 percent of these were conscripts. The principal military tactic employed by General Raoul Salan during 1956-57 was one called the quadrillage, or grid. The system consisted of "garrisoning in strength all major cities, and, in diminishing force, all towns, villages, and farms of Algeria." About 300,000 troops in all were assigned this mission. These men were backed up by reserves in each of three territorial zones (Oran, Algiers, and Constantine) and further supported by troops in general reserve. These reserve units were usually composed of paratroop battalions, marines, mechanized infantry, and the Foreign Legion. These troops did not suffer the unglamorous day to day frustrations of the "grid" units, and when committed into battle, they could expect to fight and then return, well-publicized and well-decorated, to Algiers for restaging. They were considered as elite troops and many stories and, no doubt, myths have evolved around "les paras" and the Legion. There was understandably some jealousy and animosity between the reserve forces and the grid units. Grid forces also complained that after the "paras" operated in an area, their harsh application of force damaged the subsequent process of pacification, and it was the grid unit which had to go in and face the population and assist in the rebuilding.

The quadrillage system embodied military and non-military techniques in both the urban and rural areas. In the cities a block system was established whereby an indigenous chain of command was given the responsibility of controlling, through appointed subordinates, all people on a block. The military units worked with the local police in taking a census, establishing identities, issuing census certificates and also in setting up spot checks to stop the flow of supplies from the city. In the rural areas, indigenous self-defense forces (harka) were formed to assist in the protection of their villages and to relieve the regular units for deeper penetration into the hills. One veteran of Algeria describes a typical quadrillage operation in this manner.
...a typical unit first carried out police operations to flush out subversive elements in the towns and villages of its sector, all the while gathering information about revolutionary leaders, arms caches, etc. It then penetrated deeply into the sector, carefully searching the terrain, setting up ambushes and assaulting guerrilla bands, always guarding its formation to avoid ambushes. In case of unexpected major engagements with guerrilla bands whose forces may have been underestimated, or if elements of the sector units overextended themselves, the intervention units at the zone level could be called upon and transported rapidly to the troubled area. Some guerrilla bands managed to escape French operations and retreat to shelter areas. Then the zone intervention units pursued the retreating guerrillas while the sector units continued operations in their own sectors until the political element of the guerrilla band, which usually remained behind, was completely eliminated. 

A French Chief of Staff later described quadrillage as an "attempt to put French troops--to the last man, to the last private--in, direct contact with the Moslems, turning each into a kind of ambassador to the Moslem population."

The Morice Line

Because of the increasing importance of the Tunisian sanctuary, a decision was made in the spring of 1957 to isolate Algeria from external interference by building an electrified barrier along the eastern boundary from Boné south approximately 200 miles to Bir el Ater; another obstacle later sealed off the Moroccan border. The eastern barrier, named the Morice Line, consisted of an electrified fence with sufficient charge to electrocute anyone who touched it. A master control board would also indicate, within several meters, any portion of the fence that was cut. The barrier was protected with barbed wire fences, anti-personnel mine fields, blockhouses, gun emplacements, floodlights to illuminate the fence and blind approaching raiders, and radar sets to detect movement beyond the floodlights. Armored patrols roamed the barrier 24 hours a day, and troop reinforcements were stationed at intervals along the length of the obstacle. To prevent circumnavigation of the barrier the French navy patrolled the coastal waters to the north, while light aircraft flew reconnaissance missions deep into the desert in the south. The obstacle was successful in isolating the FLN from outside assistance, but it
was expensive to man. One authority reports that 80,000 men were required to secure the Morice Line.\textsuperscript{27} With the combination of the barrier and the quadrillage, the guerrilla units in the rural areas were denied the external and internal support to wage a guerrilla war of any significant size. Restricted by the amount of arms it could obtain, and staggered by the paras and the Legionaires anytime they grouped together for large-scale operations, the guerrillas by 1958 found it necessary to break up into smaller bands. Only in reduced numbers could they safely avoid the French military operations and maintain an organization that would permit their subsistence.

The Battle of Algiers

In what has become a modern classic of urban warfare, General Jacques Massu and his 10th Paratroop Division were ordered into Algiers in January 1957 and given blanket police authority to reduce the 1500-strong terrorist organization led by Yacef Saadi. For Massu, frustrated after Indochina and the Suez invasion of 1956, it was to be a test of the new French doctrine for countering \textit{la guerre revolutionnaire}. Algiers had been racked with bombings of cafes, trolley cars, and theaters. The atmosphere prevailing in the city was reaching a critical condition and could easily have exploded into a blood-bath between the Muslim and European sections of the city. In January alone there were 200 victims of bombings.\textsuperscript{28} The FLN in a demonstration of power, announced that there would be a general strike on 27 January 1957--all storeowners who did not comply could expect punishment. Massu retaliated and threatened the store owners with unrestrained plundering if the stores were not kept open. The strike did not materialize. Massu then conducted a census of all 700,000 people in Algiers. The Casbah district,\textsuperscript{*} housing 75,000 Muslims and Saadi's terrorist organization, was in for a special treatment. One regiment cordoned off the Casbah and set up check points within the crowded sea of humanity. Quick raking operations (rattisages) searched homes and

\textsuperscript{*} An area of approximately 75 acres.
whole blocks. Arrests were made on the slightest suspicion; resistance was met with death. Prisoners were taken to various paratroop headquarters for "questioning". The questioning procedures were direct and if need be, brutal. But the paratroopers got the information and were able to destroy the terrorist band. Their methods of interrogation drew criticism upon the French army from all quarters. There is no doubt that the strong-arm tactics left their own invisible mark on many of the soldiers who were ordered to carry them out. One Captain has testified:

I don't know what hell the man went through who gave the order. But I know the rape it was for the young men straight from St. Cyr. All myths and illusions crashed together. They were told that the end justifies the means, and that France's victory depended on it. 30

Colonel Trinquier, one of General Massu's regimental commanders, feels that the use of torture was justified. In his book Modern Warfare, Trinquier explains:

The terrorist must be made to realize that, when he is captured, he cannot be treated as an ordinary criminal, nor like a prisoner taken on the battlefield. What the forces of order who are arresting him are seeking is not to punish a crime, for which he is otherwise not personally responsible, but, as in any war, the destruction of the enemy army or its surrender. Therefore he is not asked details about himself or about attacks that he may or may not have committed...but rather for precise information about his organization. In particular, each man has a superior whom he knows; he will first have to give the name of this person, along with his address, so that it will be possible to proceed with the arrest without delay.

No lawyer is present for such an interrogation. If the prisoner gives the information requested, the examination is quickly terminated; if not, specialists must force his secret from him. Then, as a soldier, he must face the suffering, and perhaps the death, he has heretofore managed to avoid. 30

By September 1957 Yacef Saadi had been captured and Massu had won the battle of Algiers. The FLN network that had terrorized the city for the past two years was destroyed and would not reform. Three thousand Muslims reportedly died in the Casbah; another 5,000 were placed in prison camps or reeducation centers. 31 The Battle of Algiers served to convince the French army of the validity of its new doctrinal approach.
to revolutionary warfare. It also generated a feeling of confidence that ultimate victory would be gained if given the time and latitude to do the job.

Pacification Programs

The group of officers upon whom fell the demanding task of reuniting the French and Muslim population into a spirit of cooperation had perhaps the most difficult job in the war. In retrospect, one might argue that it was an impossible task. However, for many the job was a most rewarding experience. As one lieutenant leaving Algeria remarked, "The future may hold great joys in store, but certainly there is no greater happiness than having won back the souls of the 25,000 persons placed in our charge for the past year..." Each SAS team usually consisted of an officer, an NCO, one clerk, one interpreter, and one radio operator. Occasionally, military or civilian assistants for agriculture, public health or education were added. By late spring of 1958, some 800 teams were in operation. The average day of an SAS officer would find him checking plans for the building of a local school, arbitrating local disputes, and directing the activities of the local self-defense forces (harka). The SAS team was meant to be employed in places where the quadrillage tactics had reduced the guerrilla threat to a level which could be contained by the self-defense forces and nearby forces of intervention. In areas where it was difficult to provide this security, natives were frequently moved into a more secure area; over a million Muslims were relocated during the war. SAS teams supervised the building and administration of the new villages.

A great deal of attention was spent with the children of the village. In many cases the boys in vocational schools lived with their teachers. The curriculum was heavily laden with political and moral themes stressing citizenship, ethics, and good manners. Despite this attention, many Muslim youths were not alienated from the FLN. As one author suggested:

"The heroic names written on the blackboard were Jeanne d'Arc, Napoleon, and Foch—not Abel-el-Kader and Abd-el-Krim. Children were taught to identify with alien masters and precepts.
that held no favorable associations for them outside the classroom. It was not surprising that they would translate the militant French nationalism they were taught into militant Arab nationalism. 33

Another author suggests that the benefits of civic action merely "whetted the appetite for more. And many Muslims interpreted the beneficial aspects of civic action as primarily a response to the rebellion and thus to the credit of the FLN." 34

The urban counterpart to the SAS was the Sections Administratives Urbaines (SAU). These teams were formed during the battle of Algiers and were designed to perform a similar mission of controlling the population, providing a link between the civil servants and the army, and also acting as a contact with the natives.

In the midst of a war whose reciprocal reprisals dishonored both combatants the SAS-SAU cadres were universally applauded. Despite the outcome of the war, these men did much for the reputation of the Army and had a lasting impact on an independent Algeria.

**Psychological Operations**

Members of the SAS teams sought the integration of the French and Muslims societies through programs of education and civic improvement. The proponents of the new doctrine to counter la guerre revolutionnaire felt that stronger programs of psychological indoctrination must be employed to sway the crowd and turn them against their former allegiance. By November 1957, the importance of psychological operations had developed to the degree that a fifth staff section (5es Bureaux) was introduced into all combat units and territorial commands. 35 These staff sections had two basic tasks. "Psychological action" encompassed all measures taken to protect French morale and unity of purpose. It was to include information sessions, pamphlets, periodicals, movies, etc., to convince the French soldier of the virtue of his cause and to make each soldier a veritable diplomat of the French nation.

The second task was called "psychological warfare"; its target audience was the enemy. This task was sub-divided into three objectives: (1) to help destroy the
enemy's political network, (2) to help destroy the enemy's armed forces, and (3) to re-
educate captured enemy personnel. The first two objectives were aimed at influencing
enemy groups; the last objective involved the influencing of enemy individuals. The
techniques employed to influence groups were different from those used against individ-
uals. The theorist who had most influenced the new approach to the control of large
groups was Serge Tchakhotin, who in his book, The Rape of the Masses, argued that the
violent propaganda of the Hitlers and Mussolinis must be countered by equally effective
ideological rearmament. Morale reflexes built on principles of Truth, Freedom, etc.,
were necessary to provide the shield of invulnerability to alien doctrines. French
loudspeaker and pamphlet companies were designed as the main tool for mass persuasion.
Symbols, slogans, demonstrations, repetition of a theme—all became standard techniques
used by these companies. The French were to learn, however, that calling people to-
gether to hear these messages was not as profitable as using these techniques in places
where the crowd tended to form naturally, such as marketplaces, festivals, ceremonies,
and public works projects where large numbers of workers were present.

Captured terrorists or suspects were screened into three separate groups.
The "innocents" were, of course, released. The "irreducibles" would be placed in iso-
lation or if circumstances warranted, brought before a tribunal. The "reducibles" were
brought to one of ten reeducation centers. The program for conversion consisted of a
period of brain washing (lavage de crâne) where the subject must acknowledge his errors
and a period of brainfilling (bourrage de crâne) in which he would assimilate his new
allegiances. In the latter period, there were lectures and discussions. Also:

Visits from relatives were permitted, vocational training
was encouraged, and considerable time was spent in political
classes. Reading matter was censored..., and great pomp and
circumstance were attached to patriotic ceremony and the unpre-
dictable assault of loudspeaker transmissions, which followed
the internees about like a companion.

There has been no consistent evaluation of the success of the reeducation
camps. Opinions vary radically from "humane" and "effective" to "brutal" and "wasted

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effort." As George Kelly suggests, "The sojourn in a camp...probably represented... another disorienting experience in a life already studded with war, hunger, personal tragedy and dislocation.\(^4\)

**Large Scale Operations**

In January 1959, General Maurice Challe of the French Air Force was appointed as the Commander-in-Chief of French Forces in Algeria. Challe found the military tactics of quadrillage successfully protecting the populated areas but unable to sweep the guerrillas from their mountain hideouts. He therefore created a highly mobile force of some 20,000 (taken from the general reserve). These units were equipped with new arms and extensive signal communications; they were also provided with special logistical units to enable them to remain on long-term operations. This reorientation of military strategy resulted in the application of effective, large-scale encirclement (bouclage) operations. General Challe habitually used squadrons of CH-21 (the tandem rotor "banana" helicopter) or CH-34's to support the large-scale operations. Transport helicopters moved units into blocking positions; armed helicopters provided suppressive fire to the landing zone just before and during touch-down of the transport ships. Aerial resupply operations permitted the units to remain in the field for long periods of time. Medical evacuation by helicopter was a great morale factor to the French soldier; over 7,500 evacuations were performed. It is interesting to note that out of a fleet of over 250 helicopters operating in Algeria in 1959, none were lost that year to enemy fire.\(^4\) Although French helicopter resources were divided between the Air Force and the Army, there was no apparent conflict over the roles and missions of each. While the United States army was giving lip-service to airmobility, the French were commendably adapting this concept to their Algerian struggle.

The first large-scale operation directed against Wilayas IV and V was swift, achieved the key element of surprise, and took a heavy toll on the enemy. After the encircling forces were moved rapidly into place, observation posts and ambushes were
established within the enclosed area. Air observation was continuous. On some occasions, the maneuver forces would drive enemy bands into the encircling forces. On other occasions, depending on intelligence, the encircling forces would wait patiently until the surrounded prey attempted to break through and escape. In the Wilaya IV and V operation 2,000 guerrillas were reported killed, 500 were captured, along with over 1,000 weapons. As one officer noted, "The most notable result of this operation was the debunking of the myth that the mountain bases were invulnerable rebel bastions." This operation was followed by other similar sweeps into the Aures and Kabylia ranges.

Termination of the Struggle

Although the French devised effective military operations, and overpowered the guerrillas, Algeria gained its independence. One is reminded of the old story of the doctor who proclaimed the operation a success...but the patient died. The army was not happy to lose the war on a political settlement--knowing that any form of defeat would again (as it did in Indochina) reflect on the professionalism of the army. It was this sense of professional frustration that caused the French army to take an increasingly active part in the politics of Algeria and eventually to place the army above the state and force one French government to fall and another to teeter.

On 13 May 1958, after a series of events too amazing to be real, General Massu formed a Committee of Public Safety and assumed control of Algiers (later, all of Algeria) in order to preclude "an effusion of blood" and to prevent "a diplomatic Dien Bien Phu." The Fourth Republic, never a stable institution, crumbled. The Gaillard Cabinet had fallen on 16 April; M. Pflimlin, the new premier, came into office on 13 May and lasted only two weeks. Charles DeGaulle, meanwhile, had let it be known that, "in the face of the trials that again are mounting toward it,...I am ready to assume the powers of the Republic." On 1 June, President Coty appointed DeGaulle as premier, and when the new premier flew to Algiers on 4 June, there was a spontaneous and unbridled ovation for him.
DeGaulle's program for Algeria did not, however, follow the generals' scenario. As premier and later as President, De Gaulle swayed from a position of "Algerie Francais" to a middle position of promising a referendum after four years of peace to determine "integration, association, or secession." Finally, in 1960, after a so-called routine tour of army mess halls, DeGaulle spoke of an "Algerian Algeria" and hoped that she would maintain economic, and defense ties with France.

On 22 April 1961 the generals revolted again. Challe, Salan, Jouhand, and Zeller took over Algiers in a bloodless coup claiming that Algeria was in danger of becoming a Soviet base. The coup was short-lived; the Air Force remained loyal and flew all transport aircraft back to France. The conscript units in Algeria would not support the coup, and the French navy maintained a delicate neutrality. Challe was arrested within three days. Salan organized the Organization of the Secret Army (OAS), but was also eventually captured.

De Gaulle recognized the need to negotiate with the FLN. They have, he said, "created a spirit; hence a people; hence a policy; hence a state. In March 1962, both parties agreed to a cease-fire. France recognized the right of Algerian self-determination. On 1 July 1962, the national referendum reflected that an overwhelming majority of the people wanted independence from France.

CONCLUSIONS

Perhaps the main conclusion that can be drawn from the Algerian struggle is the realization that the military response can only provide the environment of stability under which the battle for control of civilian allegiance is fought. In the long run, the battle can only be won or lost by the establishment of civilian support. In conditions where there are serious grievances, these causes for revolt must be eliminated. It is entirely possible for the military forces to establish a mantle of superiority over the opposing guerrilla forces while the "forces of order" lose the political battle to the revolutionary movement.
The question of the morality and effectiveness of counterterror by the government forces continues to be a difficult problem for regular forces faced with the frustrating requirement of fighting within a crowd. That the techniques used by the 10th Airborne Division were effective, that these techniques prevented continued bombings of cafes and trolleys, there can be little doubt. It is also a matter of record that certain villages ceased to support the rebels and began to warn the French forces of anti-vehicular mines, only after a brutal French reprisal against that village. However, one must wonder what effect these actions had in destroying the possibility of long-range political settlements. Can a battle for the allegiance of the people survive such tactics? Furthermore, what process takes place in the army of a democratic nation when the army attempts to protect a country from an ideological enemy by using techniques that are contrary to its own nation's mores and customs? Can this army defend democratic "ends" by the use of inhumane "means"?

A final point suggested by the Algerian experience is of particular importance to the American soldier of the 1960's and the 1970's. How much can or should an army be asked to do in aiding a struggling nation to defeat a revolutionary movement? Should the army assume the essentially civil roles of agriculturalist, educator, judge, urban planner, and nation-builder? In our nation, which seems habitually to fear a threat of military dominance over the civil authorities, should those same authorities require its military establishment to assume non-military functions? How well can an army be expected to do these functions? Is our military system of promotions and decorations designed to reward an Infantry lieutenant colonel who has done a truly magnificent job in advising, pacifying, and rebuilding a section of a foreign nation? Or will the system reward the lieutenant colonel who commanded an American battalion engaged in military operations? The prospects for career advancement decidedly favor the latter officer. On the other hand, if the military establishment should not perform these tasks, what other national resources are available to do the job? One French officer, embittered after the outcome of Algeria argued that although the armed forces could and should
fight against the effects of subversion, they were neither organized nor equipped to combat the causes. The same officer concluded: "To recognize that war had become total is implicitly to recognize that the Army can no longer handle more than a part of war."

A military tragedy occurred in Algeria, a tragedy of an army fighting to regain its honor in a battle of physical and psychological persuasion against an imagined international conspiracy—an army that eventually was to elevate itself above the state, and so, alienate itself from its people. There was also a political tragedy involved—the tragedy of an underdeveloped country with its natural wealth centered in the hands of a few, with its illiterate masses and disease-ridden slums. Muslim Algeria, subjected to a process of encroaching European "civilization," yielded only the mutations of population explosion, economic destitution, social frustration, and revolution. But beyond the military and political tragedies of Algeria, as George Kelly suggests, there was the poignant "...tragedy of two distinct peoples, united by their love for a single soil, sundered by a fatal suspicion of each other. Into this dilemma was interposed a bitter and ill-used Army, with consequences that [shook] the foundations of France itself."

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NOTES

2Ibid., p. 31.
3Ibid., pp. 27-8.
6*Guerrilla Warfare and Airpower*, p. 6.
7Ibid., p. 9.
9The organization of the FLN is based on, primarily extracted from, an unpublished study by Sano M. Stepanovich, "Algeria, 1954-1962" written for the Special Operations Research Organization of The American University, under contract to the Department of the Army.
13Ibid.
15Discussion of this decision based primarily on Jureidini, *Case Studies*, p. 95.
18Clark, *Algeria In Turmoil*, pp. 142-3.
19 Quoted by Clark in *Algeria in Turmoil*, pp. 310-1.

20 Ibid.

21 Ibid., p. 133.

22 Ibid., p. 134.

23 Kraft, *The Struggle in Algeria*, p. 94.


27 Quoted in *Guerrilla Warfare and Airpower*, p. 28.


36 Ibid., pp. 96-7.


41 Ibid.

42 Ibid., p. 191.
For a more detailed but perhaps slanted discussion, refer to **Guerrilla Warfare and Airpower**, pp. 55-9, 67-71, 102-10.


Ibid.


Ibid., p. 390.


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DIEN BIEN PHU
THREE PHASES OF COMMUNIST ATTACKS

PHASE I
13-17 March

PHASE II
30 March - 1 May

PHASE III
1-7 May

FRENCH DEFENSES & PHASES

NORTHERN SUB-SECTOR

CENTRAL SUB-SECTOR

SOUTHERN SUB-SECTOR

B. Hong Lech

B. No Ten

B. No Khue

Muong Thom

Doc Lap Hill

"GABRIELLE" (406 m)

"HUGUETTE" (559 m)

"ELAINE" (535 m)

"ISABELLE"

"DONALD"

"CLAUDINE"

"DOMINIQUE"

"ELAINE" (535 m)

"ISABELLE"

"CLAUDINE"

"DOMINIQUE"

"ELAINE" (535 m)
INDOCHINA-TONKIN 1951

FREE ZONES, GUERRILLA BASES AND AREAS OF VIET-MINH INFLUENCE

SCALE OF MILES

100
50
0

A battle on Day River
29 May-18 June 1951

"Hell of Hoa Binh"
November 1951-February 1952

Việt-Minh Operations
Thai Highlands
Apr Recon In Force (-)
Sept-Oct Atk (+) 312

Battle of Vinh Yen
13-17 January 1951

Battle of Mao Khe
23-28 March 1951
