ANALYZING
GUERRILLA
WARFARE

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PREFAE

Assessing the Soviet War in Afghanistan is an interesting problem. But it is often a difficult problem because of the lack of data and access to information on either side. What is known is usually fragmentary and random. Trying to analyze the war and provide a quantitative assessment of the status, trends, or prospects of the course of the war is a challenge for the intelligence analyst.

The idea occurred that we might learn something from the US experience in analyzing the Vietnam War. While no two wars are exactly alike there might be some analysis lessons learned which could provide ideas for analysts trying to assess the current war. In the words of James Dunnigan, "History may not repeat itself, but it often paraphrases itself."

The purpose of the conference was as follows:

- To recall what analysis was done in the Vietnam War through participation of a group of speakers who analyzed the war from varied viewpoints: Washington (DoD, Army STAG, NAVOP, the intelligence community), MACV, the Navy's carriers, and, debriefing POWs and defectors in Vietnam.

- To summarize lessons learned about analysis of the Vietnam Conflict and the effect of organizational interests on analysis and data collection.

- To suggest how to approach the analysis of wars for which there is limited data and identify pitfalls for the unwary analyst.

Obtaining reliable, pertinent data when your country is a participant will be seen from these talks to be a substantial task. The question is, what can be carried over to a war where you are not a direct participant and have much more limited access?

The conference had two specific types of problems in mind for applications.

A. How should the Afghan War be analyzed? What measures could be used to assess the status of the war, given the limitation of data available? What hazards are there in using some of the obvious measures?
B. If we should obtain data on the Afghan war how is it likely to be biased or reflect a subjective view of the source? What do we need to know about the source to keep from drawing erroneous conclusions from the data?

The latter questions are harder than the first pair, but we believe presentations may help alert analysts to the pressures and organizational interests in commands which tend to bias data, affect choice of measures of effectiveness, or mislead our understanding of the real implication of data.

The days when a chief of state personally leads his countrymen into battle, and runs the war on the basis of direct observation, are long past. National leaders, legislatures, foreign policy offices, defense departments, and the public generally form their views from reports, many of which involve some type of implicit or explicit analysis. The forms and presentation of analysis affect perceptions, and through them the decisions taken with regard to running and supporting a war. Whether it is a report in person by a field commander, a newscast, or written reports about intelligence or operations, the way in which the analysis is done and from what viewpoint affects what is said and how it is received.

The speakers at this conference represented very different points of view of the Vietnam War, from two key disciplines: intelligence analysts and operations analysts. Each participant was involved in some form of data collection or analysis. They agree on some points and disagree on others, as might be expected. But they all mention how data analysis was necessary to reach certain important conclusions which simply were not obvious otherwise. And they all mention the need for data and analysis to change or correct preconceived ideas of various decisionmakers. Nearly all the speakers comment on how much data was collected. All clearly think we could and should have done more analysis of the data. Some, I think, believe better analysis might have changed the course of the war.

I think there are quite a number of lessons to be found here, as well as interesting stories and anecdotes. I hope we can learn from them and not have to relearn the lessons the hard way.

Allan S. Rehm
December 1985
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SUMMARY

The invited presentations covered a number of aspects of analyzing the Vietnam war by analysts located in Vietnam and in Washington. Each analyst noted the lack of established procedures for data collection or analysis when he began. Each story of data collection, creation of a data base, or analysis had unique aspects.

Some of the conclusions drawn by the speakers about the Vietnam War seemed to be in conflict. When analyzing a war in which we are not a participant even greater possibility for disparity in drawing conclusions seems inevitable.

Nevertheless, the speakers agreed uniformly on the desirability of trying to build a data base despite limited data. They also believed the tools available to the analyst today (microcomputers and software advances) permit much easier and more extensive analysis than during the Vietnam War.

They made a number of suggestions, few of which are new, but which may be worth listing for an analyst starting a data collection and data base effort for the first time.

- Determine the purpose of your analysis; it determines what you need in the data base.
- The analyst's viewpoint and mindset always have an effect on the analysis.
- Understanding the objectives and motives of the participants and those interested in analyzing the war should be a key goal. Achieving such an understanding may be difficult to reach in practice.
- A data base should be started on a limited scale with test cases rather than with a fullscale data base.
- Take advantage of today's software and graphics. A lot can be done relatively easily for exploratory analysis.
- In a guerrilla war traditional measures of military
effectiveness and models used for major force conflicts may not apply. Look for patterns — by season, time, location, unit, etc.

- Establishing overly rigid criteria for accepting evidence may mean you condemn yourself to never having a timely, accurate picture in matters such as the enemy order-of-battle.

- First hand observation of the war zone and the data collection effort will almost invariably disclose things the analyst didn't know and probably did not realize he should be concerned about.

- Understanding the culture of the country is particularly important in a guerrilla war. In characterizing the state of a guerrilla war combat and military indicators may be of secondary importance to political factors and morale.

- Modeling guerrilla warfare may be half way between traditional political models and traditional warfare models, and different from both.

- It takes a lot of data and evidence to overturn preconceived notions which policy has been based upon.

- The biggest problem is not knowing what you don't know.

* * *
OPENING REMARKS

Good morning. I am here to tell you what we are up to. Our office follows the war in Afghanistan. We put this seminar together today largely in hopes of helping my office and others concerned with the war in Afghanistan to come to grips with a problem that has bothered us in the last year. That is, how can we better order data that we have on the Afghan War? What are the kinds of things we should be looking for? What kinds of data would help us and also what kinds of models should we employ to better organize and understand that data?

In thrashing around and trying to answer that question we have had assistance from Allan Rehm, who is an operations research specialist. In the course of our discussions, Allan suggested that we contact some people who had dealt with these kinds of issues in the Vietnam War.

He contacted a number of analysts of the Vietnam conflict and they agreed that a conference like this would permit people to relate their experiences, point out some of the problems and pitfalls, and some of the advantages in the analysis in what some, like Mr. Tom Thayer, have called a "War Without Fronts." Tom has written a book by that title.

That is the origin of this conference. We organized it rather hastily. We wanted help on these issues as quickly as possible.

The discussion will be unclassified. We hope to put out a proceedings. We will conduct the program informally.

Allan is going to serve as moderator and will introduce the participants.
MODERATOR'S COMMENTS

Allan Rehm
Consultant

We are going to break the schedule into two parts. First, we are going to ask each of the five speakers to talk about their experiences during the war, what their organization was doing in the way of analysis, and perhaps comment on what they would have done if they had it to do over again.

Second, in the afternoon session we would like to have a panel discussion with the five speakers, answering questions from the audience, and trying to determine what lessons might apply to the Afghan War, which has its own peculiarities and differences from Vietnam.

No matter what everyone here thought the difficulties were in the Vietnam war concerning analysis, I am sure there are more obstacles for an American trying to do a competent analysis of the Afghan War. We do not have much access to good data from either side.

While one can easily imagine aspects of the situation which are different, I suspect that there may be a number of similar problems for data collectors and analysts, and hence this conference. There are at least some common general problems such as: What do you try to measure to represent the status of the war? Or, how does one use data of questionable reliability?

What we have tried to do is select five people who did intelligence analysis and operations analysis of the Vietnam War from different perspectives: geographically, organizationally, at different time periods, and using qualitative and quantitative methodologies. There are probably many other people who could give additional points of view of the analysis of the war.

One suggestion was that inviting more speakers would simply repeat the same viewpoints, but another suggested that five speakers would have at least seven viewpoints, and that there are dozens of others who could provide additional insights. I think I side with the latter. The five represented here are certainly diverse.
John Battilega served in MACV and was involved in the Hamlet Evaluation System. He modeled guerrilla warfare for the Army Strategy and Tactics Analysis Group (the predecessor of CAA) when he returned to Washington.

George Allen spent seventeen years doing intelligence analysis of Vietnam for the Army, DIA, CIA and others. He told me he invented Vietnam in 1950 when he first became involved there as a member of the Army ACSI looking at the French version of the war. He also said that if he had known it would end only five years after he left he would have stuck around for the finish.

Leon Goure worked for the RAND Corporation questioning POWs and defectors and reporting on the Vietcong and North Vietnamese point of view of the War. He also analyzed the bombing campaign of North Vietnam. He worked with the Australian government on analysis of guerrilla warfare during these years too.

George Haering commuted to the war for the Navy in 1965-66 as CINCPACFLT DEG REP with TAD to USS MIDWAY, USSS ORISKANY, USS RANGER, CMCARDIV ONE, and COMSEVENTHFLFT for a total of 3 1/2 months. In 1967-68 he worked for the JCS in the NIGHT SONG Group and on a B-52 study in Washington. He was a member of the Center for Naval Analysis which kept the Navy's official data for the war. George also spent 1961 as CTF 77 DEG REP. George will present an overview of the Vietnam perspective.

Tom Thayer, our first speaker, spent from June 1962 to December 1965 in the Advanced Research Projects Agency, Research and Development Field Unit, Vietnam, as Chief of Operations Analysis. From March 1966 to June 1972 he was Director for Intelligence and Force Effectiveness, Southeast Asia Programs Division, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Systems Analysis.

Tom was so concerned with how the war was analyzed that he has written a book on the subject which will be published soon. I have seen an early draft and found it most interesting. Without further ado I would like to introduce our first speaker, Mr. Thomas Thayer, speaking on, "A War Without Fronts."
Good morning. I was in a little different posture, I think, than some of the other people here in the sense that, we had absolutely no influence on the data coming out of Vietnam. Influence like, "Report this now, please, and report it this way, and we request that you do that with the data."

I was in Vietnam from mid-1962 until mid-1965, as a civilian. I was the only professional civilian in MACV. During one part, for General Dick Stillwell, we Overhauled, or did a survey, of the MACV reporting system. What were they reporting from the provinces? From the field? We went all over everywhere. We made some suggestions.

Dick Stillwell is kind of a brilliant sort of fellow and he said, "OK, you think your suggestions are pretty good. You guys implement that system for six weeks." That is how I ended up writing the weekly MACV cable to Washington. I then discovered that a whole bunch of statistical tables were attached to the MACV messages each week before they were sent.

I didn’t think anything about it then, because I wasn’t in the business of analyzing the war or anything else myself. We were responsible for helping Americans and Vietnamese with combat development and testing. We tested the AR-15 which became the M-16 and Project Orange was from our unit. We sponsored some operations research work.

One of the analysts with us was a fellow named Jimmy Johnson, an operations researcher, who some of you may know. He had been to Korea, and in World War II, and he wasn’t going to miss this one. He came out to Vietnam to help us try to figure out the war.

At the time General Westmoreland couldn’t understand the briefings he was getting. He couldn’t see what they had to do with anything. But he also couldn’t figure out what they should be telling him.

As either Jimmy or I was leaving (I can’t remember which) he said that he had been accumulating an enormous amount of data by hand because we had no computers out there.
I had been wondering what he was trying to do.

He finally said, "Tom, there are no fronts in this war. There are no battle lines. If we are ever going to understand it, we have got to look for the patterns." I have always remembered that.

I came back and worked at ARPA for five or six weeks and didn't like that much so I wanted to move. At that time, Alain Enthoven, at McNamara's direction, was setting up a South East Asia program shop because McNamara knew he had approved all kinds of deployments, but he didn't know where the units were, how many units had gone, when they were scheduled to go, or anything. The shop was set up, in effect, to produce the deployment tables, once a month or so.

I was just back from Vietnam and I was from the Office of the Secretary of Defense -- I had always worked there, even when I was in Vietnam -- and so I came back and put out the word that I was looking for a change. Phil Odeen came around and said, "Hey, we are setting up as shop and we would like you to join us." I was the eleventh person he had hired. The other ten were working on deployment tables. They wanted me to figure out what the effects of the deployments were going to be.

They named me Director of Intelligence and Force Effectiveness, whatever that means. I thought, whew, I didn't have the vaguest notion of what to do. But then I remembered Jimmy's injunction, look for patterns, and I remembered all those tables in the MACV messages.

I realized MACV had been sending the messages in for a couple of years so I would just have to find them. They must be here in the building in the Joint Staff somewhere and there will be a couple of years worth of data. I'll be able to get secretaries to make statistical tables and we'll begin to see what the patterns are over time. We'll make them by Corps areas, as we called them in those days, and then see where is this stuff happening, when is it happening, and are there patterns over time? It turned out there were very precise patterns but finding the data was a problem.

Nobody had the messages. Nobody kept them. I put out the word. I abruptly got three or four other people and I was hiring executive trainees or management interns, because I had been one, and I took all I could get.
I told everybody in my particular area, our Intelligence and Force Effectiveness Group, "See if you can find those cables anywhere, when you talk to anybody, ask around for them."

One day they came back and said they had found a naval officer on the Joint Staff who had kept a year's worth, or maybe two years worth. They were in his safe. He asked if I would like to have them and I said, "Ohhhh yes, I would like to have them!"

We were then able to make some tables by month and corps area and I circulated them to everybody — the White House Staff, CIA, State Department, MACV, etc. Walt Rostow asked questions later, about what data were people using. He asked everybody because there had been some previous differences because everybody was using different numbers. So, he was just delighted that suddenly all the numbers that came back were the same, because everybody had a set of my tables and it was their easiest way to answer questions, and it was official MACV data, message number so-and-so.

That was the beginning, and my project was, what effect are the deployments having, or going to have? In effect, what is happening out there in the war? So we were started with that. We wrote the staff papers and requests. It grew and grew, the tables were cranked out.

Then suddenly, I guess the first year, we got a priority from McNamara on the Joint Staff's computer facilities to the tune of something like five million dollars. I didn't know anything about a computer.

A friend I had dinner with last night was the first IBM project director and he was going to build me a big system, but I said, "Wait a minute. First, I don't even know what is in the system. Second, we don't know what the data mean. So you are not going to build a big system. I don't want your systems analysts. I want your journeyman programmers who can work files, this list of files from the Joint Staff. I want to retrieve data to answer specific questions so we learn what is there and what it may be good for. I will have one person responsible for each given area, and they will give you all their requests in writing so we both have a complete record.

We had some questions that I had brought back. We started working the data. This was the MACV data. It was
Air Force data on air strikes.

We had the IBM people build files, first, so you get the stuff out and, second, I wanted a date and location on every record we pulled. Now, if it was a UMT coordinate -- great, if it was a province -- great, if it's a corps area -- that was not too good, but give it to me. I wanted the data, the date-time group if you had it. I wanted the week. I wanted the day. And we simply just kept grinding these things over time. We were looking for patterns.

What kind of patterns could you get? Well, patterns by location, patterns by time. So we started looking over time and location. To jump ahead, the patterns we found were very definite. I am going to talk time now, and I am going to talk in terms of months.

We had the one year tour in Vietnam which cost a lot of extra lives. One of the patterns was that if you go through all the records of combat deaths it turns out that if you look at who died, and when did he die, in what month of his tour did he die or she die, you find that the first month has the highest number. This is shown in my book. I wrote the book when I was still working in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. It was classified, in fact, there is a classified version which is ten years old. Then if you just accumulate combat deaths by month over years of the war and just say, OK, how many died in the first month of their tour, how many died in the second month of their tour, and how many died in the third and the fourth month, all the way through, you find that the highest number you get is the first month, the next highest is the second month, the third highest is the third month, etc. right down through the twelfth month. The twelfth month was the lowest number.

One of the most important things we found, that might be relevant to Afghanistan, was the weather, and what I called the "cycle of combat." The command did not recognize the cycle of combat in the early years, because everybody was on a one year tour.

What is the cycle of combat? There is the rainy season, and the dry season. It turns out that the Communists would have a Spring offensive -- this is no news to anybody, I hope -- which would start sometime between February and April, and they would really come booming out. Everybody would get excited and then it would just grind on. May was the worst month for American combat deaths or Vietnamese combat deaths. More people got killed that month on average most of the
time, five of seven years or six of seven years. Then the thing would crackle on till June and then the third week in June, around the twenty-first -- you talk about patterns -- it wouldn’t shut off, but it would drop by forty percent.

My measurement of intensity is combat deaths because we found "wounded" varied too much. Everybody counted wounded differently, but combat deaths were combat deaths. If you could get the final figure that was pretty good. The American figure, U.S. combat deaths, was the most reliable single number to come out of Vietnam. There’s no question about that because there is name, rank, and serial number for every single one of them.

One of the things you had to watch out for though was taking the deaths out of the operational messages because you could be misled. As an example, I recall this story. One Secretary of Defense — I think it was Clark Clifford — noted the numbers for Vietnamese combat deaths were lower than American combat deaths. He was starting to raise Cain about that. We decided we’d better check into that and see what is going on.

It turned out that we were getting operational figures for the Vietnamese combat deaths right from the field, from cables, from data compiled by MACV, in the weekly message, and so forth. It turns out when we checked into it, when you got the final figures -- the people who had died in the hospital and the numbers of who had really died, from the Vietnamese S-1 I guess -- the Vietnamese in the final records had final numbers which were much higher than the Americans.

We found out that we had to watch out for an operational lag. We developed a factor eventually where we take the operational number, crank the factor into it, and give a current estimate of what the final figure was going to be, just so people would know what was going on.

The early estimated figure would be approximately what the final figure would be. In your Afghan situation, I do not know what kind of data you are getting out there, but it might be a factor.

This was important to us later in the war because during the so called "Ceasefire," everybody was saying combat deaths have declined significantly and our shop was gone by then. I was out of the business of Vietnam. Everybody in the Defense
Department was telling Congress, "The intensity has dropped 40%." And then one day I saw a Defense Attache's report, not from MACV, but from the Embassy. I thought, these are not the official figure here. They are too high. Then I remembered the operational figure problem and the factor we had to apply.

There was a Deputy Assistant Secretary going out so I hunted him down. I wasn’t working on Vietnam, but I didn’t want to let this one go by. So I said, he must ask MACV whether the Attache's report is right, because DIA was saying, "Well, no, you can’t really believe that stuff!"

It turned out that we, the Defense Department, had been telling the Congress "The ceasefire is working pretty well, and the casualties are down 40%." In fact, the Vietnamese were having the highest combat deaths that year that they’d had since the Tet offensive in 1968.

In this kind of war, and in Afghanistan — because it’s a war without fronts too — the Russians are in the soup now. They aren’t going to be able to kill those guys off. Those guys are going to be able to get some of these modern anti-aircraft weapons and other stuff. If they have a hand carried anti-aircraft weapon that works your Russian choppers go down. That is what happened in Vietnam.

I thought the numbers were very important to finding the patterns. I wanted to write my book because I was convinced from the response we got throughout the effort — six and a half years — to the numbers, that if I didn’t write this book that the numbers wouldn’t have been preserved, and that the analysis wouldn’t have been preserved. I now know what a preacher means when he says he has a call to do something. I had a call to write my book, and everytime I reread it I say I didn’t know I could work that hard.

So we looked for patterns. In the Afghan war you probably have seasonal patterns if you have any at all. Geographical patterns will probably show up too. In Vietnam the war slowed down in June. July was quiet. In August and September the Communists came out again. They the rain starts. Infiltration shuts down and it becomes fairly quiet.

And so in August/September they come out and give you a shot, a final shot of the year. October is the quietest month of the year. Combat deaths drop -- and I’m always talking combat deaths -- drop like a shot. October is lowest
month on average over the seven years we were working. And
then comes November and it is still pretty quiet, but
infiltration is now starting again. And MACV gets a little
excited. When you are on a one year tour you don't know
infiltration starts up again in November every year.

But it is still pretty quiet and it is time for the year
end reports. And so you write, "There's light at the end of
the tunnel." Westmoreland at the end of 1967, it was the
most favorable message I ever saw from the command. I don't
know why I remembered it, but I was quite struck by it. And
so, things were going pretty well, but look out, the Tet
Offensive is coming up! If they're in good shape and if
their infiltration in Vietnam was working very well, they are
going to slug you. They are going to come out with a punch.

Later we started to do a little better at it. Jim
Eddins couldn't be here today, but one year he watched NVA
divisions come down. We were getting all of the reports from
MACV, CIA, everybody. He was watching them. He came in and
said, "It's going to be the first week in April this year."
This was at the beginning of March. He was right. The first
week in April was the big start of the Spring offensive.

So these are the patterns over time. I expect there
will be patterns if your data is detailed enough for you to
detect them. I have no idea what the climate is there, or
the rain, although they have mountains I guess. You have
some guys who fight pretty well, and they are pretty
stubborn.

The other main patterns we were looking for were
geographic patterns. Where? Where was the war going on? It
wasn't really going on all over the country. It was, but the
levels of the difference between, for example, Military
Region 1, and the rest of them was significant. If you look
at the map of the territory held by the Vietminh in 1954 at
the Geneva Convention, you'll find that it goes down into
South Vietnam, in effect, including I Corps. The North
Vietnamese held it. The Geneva convention settled like it
did because both Russia and China are the ones that made sure
it got settled that way.

The Chinese were tired of supporting the war and wanted
to get it over with. The Russians had just had Stalin die
and there was a little detente coming on. So it was actually
the Russians and the Chinese that got that Geneva Convention
working, particularly the Chinese Foreign Minister Chou.
Presentation by THOMAS THAYER

En-Lai.

There was a big debate over the line to divide Vietnam on. The North Vietnamese wanted to divide it about the 13th parallel and the French wanted to divide it about the 23rd parallel, and as they started talking together, finally, Molotov just said the seventeenth. They had talked themselves down to either the 16th or the 18th, so he said the 17th and they agreed.

The Chinese, Chou En-Lai, told Ho Chi Minh, "Hey, you've got to give some of this territory back. You'll get it eventually, but we've got to get this thing settled."

So Ho Chi Minh gave it up. Okay, examine I Corps. If you then take a look at the location, province by province, what were the combat death rates there? In my book I show it by percentage of combat deaths and which provinces have the highest percentages.

"Allied combat deaths in South Vietnam were particularly heavy in a few provinces indicating that combat was much more intense there than in other areas. Five provinces (11 percent of the total) accounted for 33% of the allied combat deaths and four of the five provinces are in the northern part of the country. The pattern is quite stable. All five provinces ranked among the top ten each year and accounted for roughly a third of the deaths every year. Stated simply, the war in these five provinces was almost four times as intense as it was in the other thirty-nine provinces."

"The top ten provinces accounted for half of the combat deaths. The other thirty-four accounted for the remainder. All five provinces of Military Region 1 were among the top ten as were Kontum and Binh Dinh in Military Region 2."

"This is precisely the area considered to be under communist control in 1954 and where the French fought hardest in south Vietnam."

This was where the Americans were very foolish from the beginning in that they never looked into what had happened in the French war. They utterly forgot Dien Bien Phu, where those little brown men were hauling the artillery cannons up the side of the hill by hand, and the French artillery commander committed suicide because he was so disgraced. He pulled the pin on a grenade and held it, and Dien Bien Phu
Presentation by THOMAS THAYER

was gone. The airstrip was taken out, the artillery was taken out and the French were done.

I was talking with General Beech in Korea on the way home. I didn’t have a clearance so I couldn’t do all these other things, so they said would you talk to General Beech for now? I said sure. And so I said, I thought it was very sad that we hadn’t learned from the French, just from what I had read in Bernard Fall. I had gotten all these books on Vietnam because I had carte blanche from ARPA to buy all the books I wanted to, so I had read all the French history of the war. And his response was, “Well, what can we learn from the French? They haven’t won a war since Napoleon!”

We could have learned a lot! One day a contract analyst, who had been with the French underground during World War II, came in to see me. He asked me if he could go see the French military attache at the Embassy. I said that’s okay, but don’t make any noise about it.

He came back and said he couldn’t believe it. He said, “Tom, this Colonel is very well qualified in English, and he has a really good record in the French War.” He might have been at Dien Bien Phu, he had been in Algeria, and he had been hand-picked by the French so that their attache would be able to give advice to the Americans in Vietnam. You know, be available for information.

My contractor was the first American to call on the attache who had been there 18 months. I’m sure no one else had been there.

The French had never won a war since Napoleon all right. Did they fight a good war? Another important measurement had to do with combat deaths in my opinion. I decided in the book to take a look at the numbers concerning how well did the French fight in Indochina? Did they fight hard or were they goofing off? Enjoying the good life in Saigon whenever they could get there?

I decided that the way to look at this was to compare combat death rates, to look at the annual rate of combat deaths in a war as a percentage of the forces committed. So I said how many forces did we have committed in Korea? What was the combat death rate? It was 5% annually. One out of twenty got killed annually. What was the rate for the French during their war? Lo and behold, it was 5% -- and the French served a 26 month tour, not a one year tour.
So they fought pretty hard, and more to the point, the French officers were losing a class of their West Point every year out there! But some survived. And those guys knew what it was like. We were fighting exactly the same enemy, in exactly the same places, and the same enemy commander twenty years later. It was the same everything, only twenty years later.

Roger Trinke, known for his role in Algeria, had fought in the Highlands of Vietnam. I was told he had in his room or office in Paris, or wherever he was living, complete maps of all the VC trails in the Highlands. The VC were using exactly the same trails against us as they used against the French.

[EDITOR'S NOTE: Electrical power to the building was lost at this point. The remainder of this section is from notes. More details will be found in Mr. Thayer's book, War Without Fronts: The American Experience in Vietnam, which partly first appeared as a classified report in 1975.]

Mr. Thayer believes the Communists controlled their own losses, that is, set a limit per time period and reduced operational levels if necessary to stay within bounds. Small units would take up to 60% losses in a battle and then rest and retrain for six months. There was a high correlation between combat deaths and Communist attacks, about 85% correlation. There was an 87% correlation between American deaths and Communist attacks.

Mr. Thayer made some comments on the Hamlet Evaluation System, HES. The peasants were more conservative than HES. They felt 5% less secure than HES reported. The territorial forces were the unsung heroes.

Mr. Thayer recommends a rotation of regular forces rather than a large draft if possible in such a war to cut down losses.

One observation was that helicopters announce their coming. Walking in to combat zones by ground troops may lead to more effective surprise than helicopter attacks.

Mr. Thayer concluded by reiterating:

- Look for patterns.
Presentation by THOMAS THAYER

- Use rough figures to measure intensity of combat.
- Look for significant changes.

For a more detailed discussion see Mr. Thayer's book.

*   *   *
INTRODUCTION

This talk briefly discusses certain aspects of the counterinsurgency modeling activities underway within the U.S. Army in the late 1960's and early 1970's. My perspective on this subject does not represent official U.S. Army position, nor even necessarily the most informed commentary. My perspective is that of an Army Officer, with some background in modeling and military operations research, who was involved first-hand: in 1968 I served as one of a team of U.S. military officers in MACV Headquarters in Vietnam who were involved in the use of quantitative analytic methods to study the progress of the war; subsequently I served on the staff of the U.S. Army Strategy and Tactics Analysis Group in Washington,D.C, and was somewhat involved in the development of analytic models related to countinsurgency to support U.S. Army forceplanning. The comments I want to make in this talk are principally those of a modeler.

MODELING IN MACV

There were several data collection and analysis systems in use in MACV headquarters. Each of the major military staff sections used at least one, and most of these were computer-based in some form. Several U.S. military analysts attempted to use the data collected through their respective reporting systems, and the computer, to develop insights about various dimensions of the war. For example, a fellow officer and friend of mine assigned to MACV J-2 used formal analytic modeling techniques to develop better estimates of the infiltration rate from North Vietnam into the south.
My particular experience was with the office known as MACV-CORDS (Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support). That office monitored the state of the pacification program. The pacification program was designed, ultimately, to return control of South Vietnam to the South Vietnamese. As a result, the principal actors involved in the program included the South Vietnamese civilian government, the Army of the Republic of South Vietnam (ARVN), and MACV military forces and military advisory personnel.

Starting in January, 1967, CORDS developed two major data collection systems designed to provide a variety of information which could be then analyzed to determine progress in the pacification program. These systems were known as the Hamlet Evaluation System (HES) and the Territorial Forces Evaluation System (TFES). The HES focused principally on the country itself, and the impact of military operations on the country. The TFES focused on the status and development of the Vietnamese Regional Forces (RF) and Popular Forces (PF). CORDS also fielded, or could draw on, a number of other computerized reporting systems (e.g. the Terrorist Incident Reporting System). In this talk, I am going to concentrate principally on the Hamlet Evaluation System, although I will discuss an example of a study in which data from multiple data collection systems was merged to provide composite analysis.

The CORDS data collection systems were organized to correspond principally to the civil organization of the Government of South Vietnam (GVN). The country at that time was organized into 44 Provinces (somewhat equivalent to a state in the United States), and each Province was further divided into Districts. There were a total of 236 Districts in South Vietnam. Each district further contained a number of villages, which were collections of hamlets. The sizes, and populations of the districts varied dramatically (somewhat as function of geography). As a result, the number of hamlets in a district also varied, ranging from approximately a low of 5 to a high of 125.

The purpose of the HES was to track, on a monthly basis, the "status" of each and every one of those hamlets. The total number of hamlets was in the range 11,000-12,000 (and changed somewhat over time). The "status" was captured on a worksheet which was prepared every month for each hamlet. The worksheet was prepared jointly by the U.S. military district advisor and his South Vietnamese counterpart, and submitted to MACV headquarters. The data was then keypunched onto cards and eventually stored in a computer file which was then available for analysis by CORDS. Over time, a large data management and analysis computer system was developed for the purpose
of producing monthly standard analysis reports, and to support other special studies. (A similar system existed for the TFES, which concentrated, unit by unit, on the Vietnamese Regional and Popular Forces. Regional forces were company size units operated at the South Vietnamese District Level, and Popular Forces were platoon-size units which operated at the village level).

The HES worksheet recorded the status of 6 major factors which were used to judge the status of the hamlet. Three of these factors pertained to the "security status" of a given hamlet, and 3 pertained to the "development status" of the hamlet. The three factors that pertained to "Security" were entitled "Military Activity of the Vietcong", "Vietcong Political Activities and Subversion", and "Security". The three that pertained to "Development" were entitled "Non-Administrative", "Health, Education, Welfare, and Economic Development".

For each of these 6 factors, there were three designated "indicators", giving a total of 18 indicators. For example, one of the Security factors was "VC (Viet Cong) Military Activities", and the three indicators associated with that factor were "Village guerrilla Units", "External Forces (Province Main Force Unit in District)", and "Military Incidents Affecting Hamlet".

Each indicator had associated with it five different qualitative conditions, labeled from "E" (worst) to "A" (best). For example, the first indicator cited above ("Village guerrilla Unit") had the following 5 possible conditions:

E ........... The village guerrillas are combat effective, although some have been identified or eliminated; VC village defenses are largely intact.

D ........... The village guerrillas are reduced somewhat in men and defenses. They can attack in platoon strength from within the village or 1-2 hours travel to the hamlet.

C ........... Military control of the village is is broken, most guerrillas are identified. 50% losses have been inflicted, havens have been destroyed, activity is below the platoon level. They can harass but not prevent GVN activities in the hamlet.
B. Village guerrilla control is reduced to 1-2 hamlets on the village periphery or 2-3 hours travel to the hamlet. They could make a desperation raid. Activities of the guerrillas from adjacent villages is limited by no havens or by friendly defenses.

A. Village guerrilla remnants are driven out. No threat or harassment or intimidation exists from the guerrillas in adjacent villages.

Each month, the ARVN/US district advisors would evaluate each hamlet in their district in accordance with these pre-specified conditions for each of the 18 indicators using the standard Hamlet Evaluation Worksheet. Once this data was entered in the computer at MACV headquarters, a simple numerical scoring system was used to determine the composite "status" of the hamlet. This scoring system assigned a numerical weight of 1.0 to an E-category indicator, a numerical weight of 2.0 to a D-category indicator, and so forth up to a weight of 5.0 for an A-category indicator. The 18 numbers thus associated with a single HES worksheet were then averaged, and the hamlet status determined by the average as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hamlet Status</th>
<th>Average of the 18 weights</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>5.00 - 4.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>4.49 - 3.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>3.49 - 2.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>2.49 - 1.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>1.49 - 1.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A copy of the complete HES worksheet is included as an appendix to this paper (Since the actual HES worksheet is oversized, copies have been provided of each of the major sections of both the front and back of the worksheet). Additionally, a brief discussion of HES will be found in the monograph by J.J. Ewell and I.A. Hunt, Jr, Sharpening the Combat Edge, Department of the Army, 1974, pages 159-160. This is a book on the use of analysis to reinforce military judgement, drawing
heavily on the Vietnam experience.

With the indicator data reduced to an overall numerical score, it was then possible to do a variety of higher order analysis. For example, the status of a given district could be judged either by recording the profile of A through E hamlets in the district, or, by applying the same algorithm as above to all hamlets in a given district taken collectively. This latter approach would produce a numerical score (and hence a letter category) for the district as a whole. Aggregate results were tabulated at hamlet, district, province, Vietnamese Military Region (or the 4 "Corps" as they were called), and South Vietnam. Since the worksheets were filled out monthly, with time the computer data base at MACV headquarters contained a growing amount of data with which to do trend analysis. (The actual data consistently pointed out a number of anomalies in the countryside as well; for example, there were a few districts inhabited mainly by special religious sects—such as the Hao Hao in IV Corps and the Cao Dai in III Corps. RES scores in these districts were generally insensitive to the pace of the war around them; both sides apparently left them alone.)

I want to talk specifically about a special study partially using the RES data which I believe provides some special insight about counterinsurgency modeling. In 1968, after the TET offensive, the Government of South Vietnam intended to increase the number of regional force (RF) companies by a specified number. The question was to determine how they should be best distributed throughout the 236 Districts of South Vietnam.

Making this determination was a complex question. Ideally, the Regional Force companies were to be employed within a district to improve the overall security of that district and hence provide a better environment for developmental activities. However relating the actions of the Regional Forces to the security of a given district was not always easy. This was due to the large number of qualitatively different kinds of military forces which were operating in South Vietnam. The forces on the side of the United States which may or may not be operating in a given district included, in order of decreasing combat capabilities, Regular U.S. or Allied combat units, Regular ARVN combat units, RF companies, PF platoons, and local police (the "white mice"). Forces on the side of the North Vietnamese, also in order of decreasing combat capabilities, included North Vietnamese Regular combat units, VC local force combat units, village and hamlet guerrillas, and the VC infrastructure. Many different combinations of these forces appeared in the various military districts of South Vietnam, and it was not a straightforward manner to see where the...
addition of more RF companies would provide the greatest leverage.

To study this problem, an attempt was made to isolate the relationship between the RF force levels and the overall security of a given district. The method used drew on the data systems maintained by CORDS... principally the HES and TFES, but also some of the other systems. The numerical scores resulting from the HES were used as the dependent variable in a mathematical stepwise regression analysis for which the numerical scores contained in the other data systems (e.g. the TFES) were used as the independent variables. Various algebraic combinations, and functional forms, of the independent variables were also used to conduct the stepwise regression. The regression estimate was based on those districts for which the largest friendly force units operating in the district were RF companies, and the largest enemy forces were VC local force battalions.

Although the specific numerical coefficients of the resulting regression equations were decidedly a function of the data, I would like to suggest that the general functional form of the result demonstrates some underlying characteristics important to the modeling of counterinsurgency warfare. The form of the dominant analytic relationships from this study was the following: (In each case, the data is aggregated at the district level)

1. "HES Security Score" = \( f\left(\frac{RF+PF\text{ Strength}}{\text{Population}}\right) \)

2. "VC Population" = \( f(\text{VC Infra. Strength,} \<br>RF\text{ strength/Village, PF}\text{ strength/Hamlet}) \)

3. "Secure Population" = \( f\left(\frac{RF+PF+\text{National Police strength}}{(\text{VC local force + guerrilla + VC Infra. strength})}, \right. \<br>\left. RF\text{ strength, PF Strength} \right) \)

4. "Terrorist Incidents per month" = \( f\left(\frac{(RF+PF\text{ strength})/\text{population,} (RF+PF\text{ strength})/(\text{VC local force + guerrilla + VC Infra. strength})} \right) \)

( "VC Infra." denotes the Vietcong infrastructure operating in South Vietnam which was not directly associated with operating military force units. "Secure Population" denotes the population of
those hamlets which were considered "Secure" by the HES reporting system).

I personally believe that the form of these functions illustrates some of the basic similarities and differences between the historical modeling of combat operations and what is required to model counterinsurgency warfare. For example, an explicit factor in both relations 3 and 4 is the force ratio of the military forces involved. (The "force ratio" is a traditional device used in modeling engagements between regular combat units). On the other hand, neither relations 1 and 2 contain the force ratio. They do, however, both contain a ratio relating the friendly military force to the population that they are supposed to create security for. It makes a great deal of sense to me that this kind of a factor should appear. It captures the idea that in guerrilla warfare, a significant military force is should be measured in terms of its distributed influence over a non-military domain, rather than its singular encounter with another military force.

MODELING IN WASHINGTON

In the late 1960's, the U.S. Army was trying to improve its analytic capability to determine force requirements for future conflicts. The dominant guidance at that time was known as the "2 1/2 war strategy": the Army was to be prepared to fight in two major theaters (e.g. Europe and Korea) and one minor theater (e.g. Vietnam) simultaneously. Those theaters could occur anywhere on the globe, and in different combinations.

To determine Army force requirements to meet this strategy, an automated force planning system called FOREWON was under development. This system traced, analytically, the mobilization, distribution, and combat of Army forces in the possible theaters of war associated with a 2 1/2 war strategy, and then related the results to the structure and cost of an actual force posture. A number of analytic computer models comprised the FOREWON system, and one family of these focused on the determination of combat outcomes for the forces engaged in a given theater.

For those theaters which involved combat between regular modern combat units, computer models and methodologies were plenty. The requirement was to adapt existing methods or models to the specific FOREWON requirements. For theaters not involving major combat engagements, however, this approach did not work. Consequently
Researchers in Washington focused on the problem of modeling guerrilla warfare. A number of researchers throughout the country during the 1960's tried to develop various analytic representations of combat associated with the Vietnam war; to my knowledge, no single "standard" model emerged.

Research on this subject fell into one of two categories. Some modelers attempted to use a Lanchester-like model, in which the status of forces on the two sides was represented as a system of simultaneous differential equations which are a function of such parameters as rates of fire, probabilities of kill, and so forth. This is one of the standard approaches to modeling conventional warfare; however there are sufficient differences between the conditions of standard combat and guerrilla warfare that special mathematical modeling was required to attempt to represent some of the unique considerations of counterinsurgency. There were a number of researchers investigating this approach. The one that stands out in my mind, and one of the earliest, to my knowledge, is the model developed by Seymour Deitchman from the Institute for Defense Analysis. It became known, simply, as "Deitchman's Guerrilla Model." A technical paper describing the mathematical details of that model was published under the title "A Lanchester Model of Guerrilla Warfare", Operations Research, Volume 10, pp. 818-827, 1962. (This model was later extended by Marvin B. Schaffer from the Rand Corporation, and a paper published under the title "Lanchester Models of Guerrilla Engagements", Operations Research, Volume 16, pp. 457-488, 1968).

The second approach that was taken concentrated on the analysis of combat data to try and determine some basic relationships that related characteristics of military forces to outcomes. This approach has also been used in the modeling of conventional forces...for example some of the force ratio models such as ATLAS implicitly invoke mathematical relationships inferred from historical data. Again, the trick was to develop useful relationships from data describing counterinsurgency operations.

This approach was used by a researcher at the Research Analysis Corporation, James Johnson, based on data collected from Vietnam. That research resulted in a model called the Stability Operations Model (STOPS), which became the FOREWON model for guerrilla warfare. The methodology invoked by Johnson resulted in the derivation of set of basic mathematical equations for each of the four military regions (the "Corps") of South Vietnam. (These equations were similar in spirit to those discussed above in connection with the HES). The use of the model for a region other than South Vietnam required the user to estimate which of the four Military Regions of South Vietnam was most
similar to the region under investigation, and then the computer model invoked the corresponding equations to determine the outcomes.

The Stability Operations Model was documented in a Research Analysis Corporation Technical Report of the early 1970's. That report is entitled Stability Operations (STOPS): A Simulation and appears in a separate volume as Appendix H of RAC Publication RAC-TP-397. At the time, RAC was a Federal Contract Research Center of the U.S. Army, and this report should be available through the Defense Documentation Center.

CONCLUSION

My impression is that during the period 1967-1971 or so, serious attempts were made to use quantitative analysis to represent the dominant factors in counterinsurgency operations, and serious research was undertaken to develop new and better ways to model that form of combat. To my knowledge, however, the state of the art did not progress to the point that a "standard model" emerged, in the way that standard models have occurred for other aspects of military operations. The Vietnam war also resulted in an enormous amount of data which was collected many different ways, and over a long period of time; I do not know what happened to that data after the war ended.

It appears to me that serious attempts to expand the state of the art in this area have not been underway for several years, although I may not be fully informed about that. (My personal interests have been elsewhere for quite some time as well.) Given the state of the world these days, further serious research would seem warranted, and on a sustained basis. Hopefully the actual experiences, and perhaps the data, from Vietnam will provide a useful starting point.
# HAMLET EVALUATION WORKSHEET

**Directions for Completing HAMLET Evaluation Worksheet:** All hamlets are to be evaluated

1. **Step 1:** Check the hamlet by name and location at the top of the worksheet. Type of hamlet refers to

2. **Step 2:** Use a check mark to indicate whether or not the hamlet is in a National Priority Area (NPA). Enter the
   - total monthly population figure and indicate by a check mark whether the figure is reliable or unreliable.

3. **Step 3:** For each of the 10 indicators, select the response that best represents the hamlet condition during
   - the month. The brief responses given on the worksheet are intended as examples in progress from A to E.

4. **Step 4:** Enter the indicator at the far right the number that represents the condition you have in the
   - validity of the information with which your ratings for each letter were based:
   - (1) No confidence, (2) Low confidence, (3) Medium confidence, (4) High confidence, (5) Cannot determine.

5. **Step 5:** Changes in the wording of indicators are reflected in upper case.

## HAMLET PROBLEMS DURING MONTH

Select the one best answer for each section of each indicator.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator of Hamlet or Family Demographic Changes Affecting Hamlet Condition</th>
<th>Response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>US Military</td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Military</td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RVSN</td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RD Team</td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Comments

- Any unusual events during military operations, accidents involving civilians and hamlets.

- Any unusual activities not covered by existing guidelines.

**CONFIDENTIAL WHEN FILLED IN**

- This Worksheet contains sensitive information. 2 Jan 1987

- This Worksheet contains sensitive information. 2 Jan 1987

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**FACTORS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factors</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>B</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. <strong>VW REVISED APPLAT</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. <strong>Staffing &amp; Staffing</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. <strong>Training Center &amp; Unit</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. <strong>VW REVISED APPLAT</strong></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:**
- T_V: VW vehicle involved in event.
- D_V: VW vehicle damaged in event.
- T_W: VW vehicle involved in event.
- D_W: VW vehicle damaged in event.

---

**HAMLET EVAL**

**DISTRICT**

**VILLAGE**

**HAMLET RALE**

**Notes:**
- T_V: VW vehicle involved in event.
- D_V: VW vehicle damaged in event.
- T_W: VW vehicle involved in event.
- D_W: VW vehicle damaged in event.

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Family Violence or Homelessness</strong></td>
<td>Issues related to family violence and homelessness in the community, including assistance and resources.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Emergency Services</strong></td>
<td>Emergency response and services such as police, fire, and medical assistance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Education and Training</strong></td>
<td>Educational opportunities, training programs, and local schools.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Economic Development</strong></td>
<td>Economic growth, job creation, and business opportunities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Environmental Management</strong></td>
<td>Environmental protection, recycling, and waste management programs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Health and Wellness</strong></td>
<td>Health services, hospitals, and community health programs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Public Safety</strong></td>
<td>Law enforcement, public protection, and crime prevention.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Recreation and Culture</strong></td>
<td>Parks, sports, cultural events, and community activities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Transportation and Infrastructure</strong></td>
<td>Roadways, public transit, and construction projects.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Utilities and Services</strong></td>
<td>Utilities, electricity, and water services.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Water Quality and Conservation</strong></td>
<td>Water quality, conservation, and environmental programs.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**FOUO**

Finalized when filled out.
4. Support of mission self-defense forces other than FY by district and/or province officials.

- [ ] Received immediate support as requested.
- [ ] Some support received but inadequate.
- [ ] Support promised but not received.
- [ ] Support received but not promised.
- [ ] No self-defense forces had mission support as required.
- [ ] Used an off-duty force.
- [ ] Unknown.

5. Supplies from outside sources or seized for self-defense purpose.

- a. From GVR sources.
  - [ ]不良
- [ ] Good.
- [ ] Delayed but adequate.
- [ ] Inadequate and delayed.
- [ ] Promised for future delivery.
- [ ] More required.
- [ ] Unknown.

- b. From non-GVR sources.
  - [ ] On time and adequate.
  - [ ] Delayed but adequate.
  - [ ] Inadequate and delayed.
  - [ ] Promised for future delivery.
  - [ ] More required.
  - [ ] Unknown.

6. Access to drinking water.

- a. Local sources of drinking water are adequate.
- b. Plans under way to improve local drinking water supply.

7. Refugees problems.

- a. What percent of the local population are temporary residents who are refugees:
  - [ ] Few or very few
  - [ ] 10-25%
  - [ ] 25-50%
  - [ ] 50-70%
  - [ ] 70-90%
  - [ ] More than 90%
  - [ ] Unknown.

- b. In GVR mission estimated to receive them as refugees:
  - [ ] Few required.
  - [ ] More required.
  - [ ] Unknown.
  - [ ] Not applicable (refugees only).

8. The situation in town or in camp:

- a. By the Vice-Cmp.
- b. By the GVR.

9. OS officers' access to mission:

- a. By officers from district headquarters.
  - [ ] Weapons not necessary.
  - [ ] Special security arrangements necessary.
  - [ ] Not feasible due to accompanying an operation.
  - [ ] Access unfeasible.
  - [ ] Unknown.

- b. From security or headquarters in mission.
  - [ ] Weapons not necessary.
  - [ ] Special security arrangements necessary.
  - [ ] Not feasible due to accompanying an operation.
  - [ ] Access unfeasible.
  - [ ] Unknown.

10. Conditions of local roads from town to village centers:

- a. In good repair, adequate for current traffic.
- b. Being repaired or improved (roadway, repaved, new bridge, etc.).
- c. Difficult or dangerous to travel because of poor repair.
- d. Impassable (flooded, bridge out, stream dried up, etc.).
- e. Unknown.

FOUO
CONFIDENTIAL WHEN FILLED IN
I. GENERAL: The hamlet category is a letter designation derived by averaging the responses to 15 questions, each of which is graded A (best) thru E (worst). The following explanations represent the general characteristics of each hamlet category, although some of the 15 responses may be rated higher or lower than the overall hamlet category. For example, a hamlet rated in security with 3 A's, 1 B's and 2 C's and in development with 2 C's, 1 D's and 3 E's would be given an overall rating of "C". Similarly, "A", "B", "D" and "E" hamlets may have individual response ratings of A, B, C, D and E.

II. EXPLANATION:

A. In an "A" hamlet, VC remnants have been driven out, external VC forces are ineffective and no incidents occur; the infrastructure appears to be eliminated and no subversive activity occurs; adequate friendly defense forces exist, urban areas have adequate police day and night, there is only a slight need for external forces, and the hamlet is covered by effective internal security; an effective elected hamlet government exists, all GVN officials are resident, resident grievance representatives in hamlet or village, and public awareness of GVN personnel and programs exist; general public participation in adequate medical programs, at least 90 per cent of children receive primary education and secondary schools are accessible; welfare needs are satisfied and special benefits are being paid; some self-help projects are completed, local pride is evident, public works projects are underway or completed, economic programs are well advanced or not even needed, popular demands are expressed and public participation and interest are widespread.

B. In a "B" hamlet, the VC can make only desperation raids, VC bases within 6 hrs. travel to hamlet have been destroyed and no incidents in hamlet have occurred during the month within the village or nearby; all party apparatus is identified, most leaders have been eliminated and no subversion and no incidents occur; friendly defense force is organized and partially effective, adequate plans and communications have been prepared for its use; in urban areas there are adequate police during the day, and an effective informant system is operative; complete GVN managerial group is resident, hamlet chief is elected and people are participating freely in civic associations; a trained medic and midwife are accessible and at least 90 per cent of children receive primary education; all programmed self-help projects are underway, advanced economic programs have been started and popular support and participation have increased.

C. In a "C" hamlet, military control of the VC has been broken, external VC units have been reduced up to 50 per cent and only sniping and mining occurs on routes to hamlet; most party apparatus is identified, its effectiveness is curtailed and no overt VC incidents have occurred recently; local communications system is operative, urban areas have inadequate police during day, friendly forces meet security requirements and hamlet chiefs are receiving useful information from informants;
GNV managerial groups are usually present at night, census grievance program has been completed and civic associations are being developed; full-time medical support is rendered by external teams, formal full-time education is available and some welfare needs are being met; economic programs are underway, people are interested and have given their consent to self-help projects and some participation has been achieved.

D. In a "D" hamlet, VC military activities have been reduced and external VC forces have been reduced up to 25 per cent, but there is VC activity in the hamlet at night; some VC cadre have been eliminated, VC leaders have been neutralized, but terrorism and taxation occurs during the month; day and night defenses by friendly external and popular forces exist and voluntary informants are increasing; local participation in hamlet management has begun and a census-grievance program has started and local officials occasionally respond to popular aspirations; MEDCAP visits are scheduled periodically, some formal education is available and initial welfare activity has begun; and economic development has been initiated and planning for self-help projects has started.

E. In an "E" hamlet, VC military activities are effective and attacks and ambushes occur; VC political and subversive activities exist, infrastructure is operating and VC terrorism and taxation occurs; friendly security capabilities are inadequate and night defenses are lacking; GVN administrative activities are temporary, appointed officials ineffective and usually only present in the daytime; health, education and welfare programs are non-existent; and no economic development is in progress.

F. An "Other" hamlet is one which is abandoned (contains no population but the hamlet name is maintained on the GVN roster), planned or not evaluated.

III. A "VC" hamlet is one under Viet Cong control and therefore, is not evaluated in terms of the 18 questions.
QUESTIONS FOR DR. JOHN BATTILEGA AND RESPONSES

BATTILEGA: I'll take some questions.

QUESTION: I have two questions. My first question is, what type of validity test did you do on the HES data concerning biases that might have been built in, and on having this data form filled out by the Vietnamese. For my second question, while these functional relationships you showed were very interesting, you say this was based on correlation analysis, but correlation analysis does not assume causation at all. And I want to know how you address that, because where I am coming from correlation a functional relationship is not proved through statistics [ED. NOTE: QUESTION PARTIALLY INAUDIBLE]

BATTILEGA: What I meant by correlation analysis was that -- I was using the term loosely -- there were linear stepwise regressions that actually were used to search through very large amounts of the data, and all the different functions of the data: squares, ratios, and so forth, and from that certain combinations of parameters which produced very high values of \( r^2 \) were determined. I was told that before I arrived, when they were in the first year doing this kind of analysis there were a lot of procedural problems and that created great distress in the system, and they eventually worked their way out.

The other thing I need to talk about was the HES form itself. I read you the front part of the list of questions, but there were also a back where there was a place the district senior advisor could list comments in connection with the type of problems that were current and of the kind you were talking about, some situation which had come up or an activity which in his judgment were not covered by the questions at all. So if you had questions about data or anomalies in the data you had that available.

When I was there, there was a team of about a dozen US officers from all three services which were doing the analysis. They had the job of standard processing of this data when it came in. Once that was done there was a standard distribution list.

There were also key districts which were the best windows to what was actually happening. Analysis was done to try and figure out which ones of those really needed to be
monitored as lead indicators. An analyst would go out to the Corps headquarters in a province to check on problems and actually talk to people. The US analysts that were doing this were generally pretty well trained. A number of them, when I was there, were on a utilization tour and has just received a master's degree in OR from the US Naval Postgraduate School. They were all US analysts at MACV headquarters itself, but we also began to work with ARVN analysts as well toward the latter part of 1968.

QUESTION: Did you ever ask the advisors who filled out one of these HES surveys about confidence levels and compare the difference? You know, I think it is a four, not a three?

BATTILEGA: The advisor did not do that explicitly. All the advisor did was fill out the sheet, and it was pretty much yes or no questions. It would say, did you see this or did you not see this? And the figure of merits were added in Saigon, based on the weighting scheme.

ALLEN: In fact, we did on several occasions run tests on the validity of the data. They did it after about the first seven or eight months, they did a detailed validity test. And they scored them pretty good. They had a lot of subjectivity in their individual assessments. But the nature of the system was such that these things tended to balance themselves out.

There were a number of anomalies. Some gung-ho new district advisor would come arrive, and he would say, "See Whiz. Things look pretty good here. How am I ever going to make a record for myself based on where we are now with our average score?" And so in his first monthly evaluation he would tend, at least some of them, to downgrade things rather substantially. Then they would be in a position over time to have the picture get better during their twelve months tour, or some times it was only a six months tour. Although it was a one year tour in country, generally, most US officers held two jobs during that one year tour: six months in one job, and six months in another.

But anyhow, these things tended to work themselves out. They concluded, and I think rightly so, that the system did generally portray the status of the situation over time in the area. I think one of the mistakes people made with the Hamlet Evaluation System was to try to take everything as religiously accurate. And I guess when it comes to be my turn, that is one of the things I would like to make some more comments about the quality of data in general. When one
Presentation by JOHN BATTILEGA

took into account the kind of data it represented, there were all kinds of utility in what you could get out of it.

BATTILEGA: The numbers game helped a lot. They were numbers like 11,000 per month, based on the number of hamlets, aggregated in ways that were appropriate. One other thing I would like to mention; there was a very interesting analysis process going in J-2. They were trying to use the data to be able to estimate the infiltration rate both coming into the country and coming from the North. I would think about if someone could find anybody that was associated with analysis of that type it could provide some insights which would help on your problems of looking at movement in and out of Afghanistan. I don’t happen to know of any place to start.

BRINKERHOFF: I would just like to make a comment with respect to force ratios for conventional attack. I would like to point out some flaws in the conventional wisdom. Historical analysis of combat shows no direct relationship between force ratios and either attrition or advance rate.

* * *
THE VIEW FROM THE US INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

George Allen
Consultant

I am going to confine myself here to my experience, and I will talk about lessons to apply, as best we can, in the afternoon session, as Allan originally mentioned we would do it.

It is awfully hard, in the framework of thirty minutes, to condense the experience of seventeen years on the problem. I'll focus on just a few key elements.

One point I would like to start with is, and it almost goes without saying but I am going to say it anyhow, Vietnam was a unique problem in analysis, just as Afghanistan is a unique problem. A lot of what we learned and experienced with respect to Vietnam is not going to be all that relevant to Afghanistan for a wide variety of reasons, among them being the extent to which we, working on Vietnam, by the late 1960s, were almost inundated with data and with information. Whereas those working the Afghan problem are still trying to figure out what kinds of data they should look for, and they don't have anything like the sources available to them to collect and report the data that they would like to have to do their job.

The nature of the data changed over the time that I worked on the Vietnam problem from in the fifties, during the French War. There are some analogies with respect to the French experience in Indochina that come closer to what the Soviets are up against in Afghanistan, than to what we experienced and what the Soviets are up against. In the French period we did not have the vast quantities of data like the Hamlet Evaluation System available to us. We had to do what we could to try to help the policy makers understand what was happening in the French War. We didn't do all that badly, largely because we relied on the French. There were a lot of aspersions cast upon me in those days by people who would say, "You don't believe what the French are telling you do you? You don't trust the French?" The fact is that French intelligence was one thing, what the French operations people and policy makers and planners and strategists were telling us was something else. The French intelligence people were looking for evidence about the nature of the enemy and the way the war was going and information with respect to the capabilities and intentions of the enemy. They were rather honest, I think, and straightforward. We
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had ways of checking to some extent on what the French were
telling us.

I was pleased, when I made my first visit to Indochina
in 1954 just after the fall of Dien Bien Phu, I was talking
to the French J-2 and I asked him which sources he found to
be the most useful to him as the head of the French military
intelligence effort in Indochina. He said, le moyen
technique, the technical means. I said but you had
prisoners, you had captured documents, you had agents.
Weren't these helpful to you?

"No," he said, "a prisoner can be made to tell you what
you want to hear. An agent will tell you what he thinks you
want to hear, and documents, you can't tell the false ones
from the valid ones." He said, "No, it is only the technical
means" and he was referring here to the signal intelligence.

It is not generally understood the extent to which the
French did rely on signal intelligence. But they had
capabilities available, for example, for direction finding,
and fixing the locations of Vietminh transmitters, that we
never evolved ourselves in Vietnam. They had U.S. Navy World
War II vintage Privateer bombers, the Liberator bombers, but
the Navy version that had the single fin. The had direction
finding or intercept positions installed in that aircraft.
It could stay on station twelve to fourteen hours at a time.
They were able, for example, at Dien Bien Phu, to circle
around the Dien Bien Phu area and repeatedly locate the
transmitters down to battalion level. Their SIGINT analysis
was such that by fingerprinting and all other kinds of
advanced technological systems they were able to identify
which battalion that is with great facility. Their problem
was made more difficult as the war progressed because the
Communists got more sophisticated in the kinds of
communications security systems they employed. That did not
prevent the French from, at the very least, through DFing to
be able to fix, locate, and identify where the enemy's main
forces were deployed. He thought that was the best
intelligence source available to him.

Our data problems during the French war were relatively
simple because of the nature of the US objective with respect
to Vietnam. One thing to be said about that was, the US
objective differed from that of the French, and most of our
US policy makers never understood that. The US objective in
Indochina during the French War was for the French to win the
war. The French objective, from 1948 on, was to maintain, as
they said, a sufficient position of strength so that when
conditions are right we can negotiate an honorable
settlement. I heard a French Assistant Secretary of State tell a US Conference in the Pentagon in Washington chaired by the US Assistant Secretary of State for the Far East, just that. "Our objective is not to win the war, but to maintain a position of sufficient strength so that we can negotiate, just as you are now doing in Korea," because this was in 1953. But that went right over the heads of all the policy makers and planners in that conference because they did not want to hear that. They wanted to believe the French wanted to win the war and we wanted to impose on the French the kinds of military assistance programs that would meet our objective, but had little bearing on theirs.

The data that we were looking for mostly was order-of-battle data -- numbers of enemy forces. We were concerned with patterns, trends, and the growth of those forces and of their capabilities. By the time of the mid-1950s, as we were leading up to the campaign of Dien Bien Phu, the main force war had become that part of the war effort which clearly was going to have the ultimate dramatic impact on the outcome, although it was always the insurgency base, which the Communists had generated in their war against the French, which had made possible the main force war, or the war of maneuver which was going to have the dramatic final impact.

But we were concerned with the growing development of the Communist main force conventional military forces which began to grow after the Chinese Communists arrived on the border and after they drove the French garrisons from the border area and began their assistance programs to the Communists on a sufficient scale, so that, whereas, previously a Vietminh "regiment" might have consisted of a headquarters element and a dozen or so companies in 1949, by 1951 a Vietminh division was a division of three regiments of three line battalions each plus a support battalion, and with organic artillery.

They were really conventionalized and were conventionally equipped and were able, gradually, over the next few years, to develop the capability to meet the French in conventional operations and, in fact, through a combination of circumstances, to defeat the French in a semi-conventional siege at Dien Bien Phu. The tactics they employed at Dien Bien Phu were more reminiscent of seventeenth century siege warfare in Europe than they were of anything we saw in World War II. Maybe the siege of Richmond and Petersburg in the US Civil War was somewhat comparable too.
In any event, we were concerned with the developing capabilities, and trying, not so much to measure them, as to assess (because we didn't talk measurement in those days) the relative capabilities of the opposing forces through non-quantitative methods.

The other thing we were interested in was the intensity of action, and measuring the relative intensity of action over time by the opposing forces. But mostly we were looking at operations and trying to determine whether this operation had been successful or not. The French would mount these in large what they would call, clearing operations, sweeping operations. They would try to sweep the enemy guerrillas out of a sector and hopefully keep them out. Our aim was to try to determine to what extent they had been successful over time, because you never knew when the operation was over how successful they had been. You only knew by watching to see whether there would be a reemergence of enemy activity in that area after they had gotten back out from underground.

We were concerned with area control, with determining what areas were controlled by opposing forces. But we never devised, in the French War, any effective measure for this. We generally knew what areas the French forces were concentrated in, and you automatically turned over to the enemy any territory in which there were no French forces present. But even in the areas in which French forces were concentrated you had large penetrations, infiltrations of enemy forces in the so-called passified zone in the North in 1953 and 1954, behind the de Lattre [or Doc Lap?] line of fortifications during the Dien Bien Phu campaign we had three Vietminh main force regiments and about two dozen battalions operating behind this de Lattre defense line around the Red River Delta in the north. But in addition to the companies and platoons of guerrillas and hamlet self-defense forces that the Communists maintained.

We were able, with primitive methods, to do, I think, a useful degree of analysis of trends in the war. There was no question in our minds that a) in 1951-1952 there was stalemate, and b) in 1953-1954 that the Communists had gained the initiative with their massive maneuver and were able to dictate when, where, and under what conditions major combats would occur, and it was only a matter of time before the Dien Bien Phu situation arose.

The outcome, to those of us following the situation was obvious, with one exception. One was disappointed by the extent to which the French at Dien Bien Phu failed. The extent to which they became paralyzed intellectually about
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the nature of the situation. The French intelligence generally was good. There was nothing that appeared at Dien Bien Phu in the way of enemy forces and capabilities that the French J-2 did not telegraph in advance to the commander. They didn't know that the Chinese were training an anti-aircraft regiment of 37-mm guns in China, while the unit was in China, but as soon as the unit crossed into Indochina, and began its movement to Dien Bien Phu, which took about four and a half to five weeks, the French knew about the presence of those guns the minute they crossed the French border because of the nature of the enemy's reporting system. There wasn't a thing that was there that they didn't know about.

Even Bernard Fall, I think, makes a misstatement in his book (he contradicts himself in two successive paragraphs). At one point he says it was not an intelligence failure and in the next paragraph he says it was. What it was was a command failure. Command tended, habitually, to discount what the J-2 was telling him about the enemy capabilities. The French command, at the senior level, with its historical colonial outlook could not believe that these guys, who didn't even wear shoes on their feet, could do things. Tom mentioned the French artillery commander at Dien Bien Phu who committed suicide when he realized that he had erred in saying that he, as the artillery commander, could destroy the enemy artillery if it opened up because we, the French, invented modern artillery tactics and techniques and so forth. When he found that he could not do it, for reasons that I do not have time to go into, he committed suicide.

The perspective later in the war, when in 1959 and 1960, we had a recurrence in the South of insurgency, the big questions, to me at least at the time, were the extent to which the enemy is expanding his insurgent force in the South.

I was on a TDY in Vietnam in May of 1960. There was no US intelligence effort in Vietnam at the time other than the attaches in the station. That is, there was no US command. There was an intelligence advisor in the advisory group, but when I arrived, he said, "Look, I am not an intelligence officer, I have never had an intelligence assignment before, I hope never to have one again, and I hope this one doesn't go in my record."

He was assigned to be the intelligence advisor as punishment because the regiment to which he had been an advisor previously, the command post of that regiment had been overrun in January, and as punishment they took him away
from that job and gave him the J-2 job.

They, at that time, were following enemy activity and they had developed -- patterned after the French -- what continued for years thereafter to be the basic structure of the reporting on enemy activity. Differentiating between harassment and terrorism, propaganda incidents, company size attacks, battalion size attacks, larger attacks, attacks by fire, and all those things. They were assiduously collecting this from their Vietnamese counterparts in those days. That continued as the fundamental basis for measuring the level and intensity of enemy activity. That was always useful to us, not in and of itself, because of the numbers, but because if you understood the situation, understood the impact of the seasons and so forth, you could interpret this data, analyze it in ways that would make sense to you as you were following the war.

We were also concerned with the expanding enemy forces. Not so much the rate of expansion, but the extent to which they were growing. When an insurgency is starting you have zero to begin with and you have to start forming your propaganda teams, then your armed propaganda teams, then the people to defend the areas that you are going to use as bases, and then the self-defense militia, the guerrillas, and the local forces, and you gradually get a larger and larger force as your organization becomes more and more complete.

We were always behind the eight ball on this thing. In 1960 we were behind the eight ball because there was nobody systematically following this when I went out in May of 1960 other than the Vietnamese themselves. The Vietnamese Army's intelligence effectiveness in those days was zilch. They had problems in their version of the order-of-battle.

The same battalion would be listed about eight times by eight different names or numbers. They might know the commander's name or the commander's codename or his alias. They might know the number of the battalion that had been in that province during the French War and there would be reports that the 308th battalion is that provincial battalion. The VC may have assigned to it a new number, the 218th, totally divorced as separate and distinct from the designation they had used before. The VC would assign to it a code number, the U-S Battalion, and other things of that sort. The South Vietnamese were not sophisticated enough to sort all that out.

As a result of this, in 1962 I was sent out on a 90-day
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TDY to help the MACV J-2 staff, which had been established in January 1962, to establish the first order-of-battle of enemy forces. We imposed, much to my chagrin later, a very strict criteria on what was needed to accept a new unit into the order-of-battle. We demanded several sources, hard sources be available.

The system as it evolved thereafter had a built-in time lag. MACV's order-of-battle never, or almost never, bore any relation to enemy's actual strength at a given time. It was always historical. Sometimes units were in country six months, eight months, even a year before they would appear in the official order-of-battle. What they were counting was only a portion — granted the largest portion — but only a portion of the forces in country. So the system had that kind of a built-in time lag.

There was another part of the problem with respect to the irregular forces: the militia, which I don't think we ever fully sorted out, CBS to the contrary, not withstanding.

In the early sixties, the US was using measures of intensity and so forth, but there was a great deal of uncertainty about what was really going on in the countryside. People tended to move in several directions in that area to get a handle. Despite the buildup of the enemy forces, despite the level of enemy military activity, what is the situation in the countryside? Who is controlling the countryside?

A number of programs evolved separately to try to determine that. Among the better non-quantitative tries was an effort to get the original reporting system whereby the embassy and the CIA station in MACV divided up responsibility for each province and people were assigned to specialize on each province. They were to go down there and spend time, and talk to the advisors, and talk to the Vietnamese, and come up with a finger-on-the-pulse, a man-in-the-street or a cop-on-the-beat kind of understanding of what was going on. Non-quantitative, very subjective, but very useful. State, particularly, developed a number of very good Vietnamese linguists who did a fine job. John Negroponte, who was recently Ambassador to Honduras, was among them, the young lads who were so good at that in those days.

The second thing that we were looking for was some way of quantifying data. We heard a lot of talk this morning about the Hamlet Evaluation System. I want to pat myself on the back to the extent that I was in on the conceptual
creation of the Hamlet Evaluation System.

Early October of 1966 Secretary McNamara asked Mr. Helms if the Agency couldn't take a cut at coming up with some way of measuring the progress of the war in the countryside. He said, particularly, "I would like your people to take a look at the Marine Corps system up in I Corps and see if there is anything there that they might find useful."

I was saddled, as the action officer, to come with an answer to Secretary McNamara's letter. I got two guys together one Wednesday afternoon and in my office with a blackboard we came up with the matrix that you described.

The Marine Corps System measured it at the village level. It didn't go down to the hamlet. And the Marine Corps System was measuring mostly inputs. We thought that the US input to pacification was not a measure of progress of the war. The kilometers of barbed wire distributed, the numbers of schools built, the number of dispensaries, that in itself was not a measure of pacification, so we insisted that it be balanced. We insisted that there be three of the major indicators that would be looking at the enemy situation, and that the other three measure out inputs. We had one week to do all of this.

We got the memo out on schedule. McNamara told Helms, "Great! Do it." We told Helms that there was no way CIA ought to put itself in the position of monitoring a US aid program in Vietnam. We suggested that MACV do it, but we were still the executive agent on it. I had to vet it with the White House, Bob Komer and company, and DoD and so forth. It made it easy that it had McNamara's blessing.

Then I was sent out to test it in the countryside. We worked with MACV, and chose three districts, and we tested it. It seemed to give readings that correlated with people's subjective judgment about those districts. I had to brief the country team and tell them all about it and get their approval, and they approved implementing it in January of 1967.

That, I think, is the most substantial contribution I made to analysis in the Vietnam war. I won't say the most useful contribution, but most substantial, because I think more man-years of time were eaten up in the Hamlet Evaluation System by the US government and the Vietnamese government, over time, more casualties, in some respects, because some of
these guys that were going out to check on what is the status of this hamlet, ran into ambushes on their way, than almost any other single information collection system that we had during the war.

The Hamlet Evaluation System gave us something that we could show graphically on a map. You could plot on a map all eleven thousand hamlets if you wanted to, and you could grade them by degrees of government control. You could see graphically what the pattern showed, who controls what parts of the country, in terms of hamlets, at any given time.

It was also converted to population control, because if you knew the census, the number of people in the hamlet, you could come up with numbers of people under government control and varying degrees of government control, and as the US goal became as much pacification of the countryside and population control as attrition, so this became a useful measure of the extent to which we were succeeding.

I think the real progress made in securing the population in 1970, after I left the analytical problem, demonstrated the utility of the Hamlet Evaluation System in measuring it.

I mentioned one thing that occurred was that we started with 13,000 hamlets. I think the demise of 2,000 hamlets was a result of, as much of anything, the sort of thing the Soviets are engaged in now in Afghanistan. In essence, much of our military operations, and in particular our bombing, tended to force the population to make a choice. Stay in the countryside and get killed, or get the hell out and get somewhere where you are not going to get bombed. And where you are not going to get bombed is in areas where Vietnamese troops are. That is why I think 2,000 hamlets disappeared in Vietnam and were no longer viable political administrative entities. It was just because they were wiped off the maps.

I think there is an extent to which the Soviets are attempting to achieve, probably more deliberately in the case of Afghanistan, what we did in Vietnam in that respect.

One major point I would like to make, with respect to all of this Hamlet Evaluation System is what do you do after you have got that? It is great to see the measles and to be able to draw lines around dots, and link them up and say these are the secure areas, and these are the partially secure areas, and these are the areas that we have no
Presentation by GEORGE ALLEN

control.

In the staff which I worked on in CIA, which was in the Office of the DCI, his Special Assistant for Vietnamese affairs, we were anxious to use the Hamlet Evaluation System as a starting point, as a base for studying the war in general.

It had clearly a geographically oriented reporting system and you could plot the locales of all of these hamlets on the map. Almost every other data stream we had in Vietnam similarly had a geographically based element. Bomb strikes were reported by grid coordinates. Friendly and enemy order-of-battle, from the largest division sized units down to the Popular Force platoons in the countryside on our side and guerrilla platoons on the other side, self-defense militia units on the other side, were reported by geographic coordinate. You could plot those.

In 1967 and early 1968, to some extent in consultation with Tom, but on our own in CIA, we attempted to devise a system which would enable us to correlate all of these kinds of data against the Hamlet Evaluation System in such a way that we could determine cause and effect relationships between what was going on and this. What affects the scores over time? We were working with a contractor, Nortronics, attempting to devise a system that would enable us to do it.

One of the problems was all of these different data streams were based on different computer programs. They didn’t all use the same spreadsheet. There was not a great deal of consistency between them. What we needed was a system that would enable us to correlate these different data streams within a buffer.

Nortronics had something they had developed for the Navy that was used by the Navy in an ocean surveillance information collation system. It fit our bill completely. You could overlay these various kinds of data on top of each other in mixes that interested you. You could make a test to see whether this particular data stream has any relation over time. You could take a given province and you could work that province against each of these data streams over a six month period.

Does the order-of-battle change, has the dynamics of movement of friendly or enemy forces had any impact and if so what? What relationships have bomb strikes had to it?
Refugee flow, deserters and defectors -- when rallyers came in, they would rally at a geographic point so you knew where that was happening.

In our test of this system, which was essentially manual, because we didn’t have the software, we discovered that, in this one province, you could see all kinds of useful correlations that made sense. We thought we had stumbled across what would be, not just an intelligence analytical tool, but a management tool for the pacification operators in the provinces.

If I had been the US senior advisor in the province responsible for the pacification program, I would have wanted something that would have shown me where things are going well, and why, where it is I ought to stop investing resources, because this has happened and this has happened, in terms of maybe the deployment of enemy forces, and I ought to focus down here where he has denuded himself, perhaps. I can make some hay while the sun shines, pacificationwise, in this particular sector.

It looked good, it sounded good. My problem was I couldn’t get anybody in the Agency I was then working for to come up with $400,000 for the software package. For want of a nail the shoe was lost. Here we were spending scores of millions of dollars a day to fight the war and nobody was willing to spend $400,000 for software to analyze how you were doing in waging that war.

It was one of the most frustrating experience I had. The problem was the Comptroller said, you can have the money if you can get somebody else somewhere else in the Agency to say that that particular software package will be useful after the war.

You go to the Office of Economic Research, which has its models –– econometric models for its kind of analysis -- and, "No," they don’t want our package. You go to the Office of Strategic Research and ask them if they want it, and, "No," they’re not interested in insurgency -- they’re looking at the Soviet problem.

We weren’t able to get the money and there wasn’t the follow through. I hope there are still people at Nortronics that could take a look at that.
Presentation by GEORGE ALLEN

I'll go back to where I started. Vietnam was a unique problem. It is definitely different from Afghanistan. Your big problem in Afghanistan is that you don't have those amounts of data but I suspect that you have some kinds of information which would allow you to do the kind of correlation, or the attempt at correlation, of various factors to see what's happening and enable you to try to understand why it is happening. Because quantification, in my not so humble opinion, the quantification of the data is one thing, which will provide you with a steam, but the most important thing is what you do with that data after you get it. Tom, with whom I worked very closely back in the old days, Tom and his people had been castigated from here to hell and back again, systems analysis, Enthoven, ...

THAYER: By George Carver dozens of times.

ALLEN: Yes, dozens of times, but not just by Carver. There is a bad taste left in a lot of people's mouths by the systems analysts that McNamara brought in, the Whiz Kids he brought in to the Pentagon. Yet those people broke some ground that would have enabled the rest of us, had the government been willing to commit the resources necessary, and I am not talking just about my own little problem, to do better. I think generally, after you finished your project over there, we failed to devise systems to make macro use of all this micro data we collected and that we structured ourselves to get a handle on. I think that is the biggest shortcoming we had.

I hope you do not have to go through it on Afghanistan. I hope you are able to focus on the basic things such as trying to understand what the Soviet objective is. And then, what about that situation would be the most meaningful expression of the extent to which the Soviets are reaching that objective? What is the US objective and what is the most meaningful expression of what the Afghans are doing that would indicate to us how well we are doing with regard to the situation in Afghanistan? The extent to which you lose sight of these questions is the extent that you are repeating earlier errors.