INSURGENCY AND COUNTERINSURGENCY:
AN ANTHOLOGY

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PREFACE

This anthology has been compiled to meet the need of the Industrial College for a representative collection of the most significant literature, suitable for student use, on those aspects of insurgency and counterinsurgency pertinent to its mission. The study of these subjects at the College, in consonance with the primarily economic focus of its mission, emphasizes the nonmilitary aspects of the struggle for control of the insurgent's habitat, including, of course, the large area of participation by military forces and agencies in such noncombat activities as civic action. Guerrilla warfare, for example, though often identified in the public mind with insurgent and counterinsurgent operations, is examined mainly in its logistical and administrative, rather than its tactical, aspects. The material in this volume has been chosen with this special orientation in view.

Counterinsurgency studies and programs have not as yet produced an extensive published literature in the areas pertinent to the College's curriculum. In these areas, fortunately, the editors have been able to obtain from various government agencies exercising counterinsurgency responsibilities a number of authoritative and detailed descriptions of their operations and problems. These accounts, collected for the most part in Part V, supplement the selections from the abundant literature on cold war economics and politics, economic development and growth, "trade and aid" programs, and the politics and sociology of modernization in traditional societies. These selections, making up the bulk of the volume, describe the broad milieu of conditions, policies, and programs in which counterinsurgency programs operate.

Responsibility for preparation of the volume was assigned to a faculty committee consisting of Dr. Richard M. Leighton (chairman), Colonel James Lake, USAF, Colonel Frank M. Muller, USA, Dr. Ralph Sanders, and Dr. Harry B. Yoshpe. Drs. Leighton and Sanders have served as general editors. The committee gratefully acknowledges the valuable assistance of Drs. Stanley L. Falk and Donald W. Mitchell of the Textbook Development Group who, under Dr. Yoshpe's direction, edited and rewrote portions of the agency material submitted. Mr. Pablo Alemar, also of the Textbook Development Group, coordinated the work of assembling, typing, and publication. The arduous task of typing the manuscript was carried out by a team consisting of Mrs. Marie A. DeToto, Mrs. Ethel Spates, Mrs. Darlene C. Etcher, and Mrs. F. Emma Burke.

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INTRODUCTION

The term "insurgency" has enjoyed respectable status in the language of international law for centuries. "Counterinsurgency," on the other hand, was unknown to that or any other discipline until early 1962, when almost overnight it became a focal point of public discussion and a common label for a bewildering variety of U.S. government activities. Since the one term is new, and the old one has been forced into a new context, it is important for any examination of this area of activity that the rather arbitrary official meanings of both terms be understood at the outset. They have been defined for interdepartmental use as follows:

INSURGENCY--A condition resulting from a revolt or insurrection against a constituted government which falls short of civil war. In the current context, subversive insurgency is primarily Communist inspired, supported, or exploited.

COUNTERINSURGENCY--Those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat subversive insurgency.

Three features of these official definitions call for comment. First, "insurgency" is defined here as a condition of conflict distinguished from others by its level of violence, rather than, in the traditional sense, by the legal status accorded it (as compared, for example, with "belligerency"). What level of violence is meant can only be guessed at, to be sure, since "civil war," which is stated to represent the next highest level, has not been defined officially and, according to standard dictionaries, refers generally to all armed conflict between sections or parties within a nation. In practice, as Dr. Sanders indicates on page 15, counterinsurgency officials appear to draw the line between insurgency and higher levels of violence at about the point where guerrilla operations give way to formal positional or mobile warfare.

In an important sense, however--and this is the second point to be noted--armed violence does not appear to be the most distinctive hallmark of insurgency and counterinsurgency in their present-day manifestations. Modern insurrections may, indeed, broaden into full-scale civil
war, as occurred in Greece after World War II, in northern Indochina in the early fifties, and in Laos and Algeria more recently. Even if hostilities do not escalate to this level, the guerrilla warfare that usually accompanies an insurrection may have devastating effects--vide Malaya, Burma, Cyprus, Kenya, the Philippines, Angola, and, today, South Viet Nam—in terms of bloodshed, economic loss, and civil disorder. Yet, as the official definition of "counterinsurgency" suggests and the varied literature assembled in this volume demonstrates, military and paramilitary action is not the most decisive sector of this battlefield. Insurgents, in Mao Tse-tung's vivid image, are fish swimming in a sea of people. If the habitat is friendly, they win; if it is poisonous, they perish. Insurgents need the active support of only a few strategically placed individuals and groups, primarily for intelligence and communications. In the bulk of the population, passive support suffices, and to gain this a numerically weak insurgent movement can bring many weapons into play: terror, ideological persuasion, exploitation of grievances, or simply default of effective government. Counterinsurgent action can be successful only to the extent that it deprives actual or latent insurgency of the kind of political, social, economic, and psychological environment in which it can find nourishment.

In a strict sense, it might be said that this is no more than what any strong and just government should be expected to do: maintain law and order; dispense equal justice; protect the weak against the strong and the lawless; provide services appropriate to government; foster a healthy economy; and encourage a social environment that rewards wisdom, talent and energy. But conditions in a large part of today's world make good government in this classic sense virtually unattainable. Most of the situations with which U.S. counterinsurgency programs are concerned are those in traditional, underdeveloped societies in which the threat or the reality of insurrection is superimposed on, and is largely an outgrowth of, the already appalling array of more fundamental if less dramatic problems described in Parts II and IV of this volume. In these societies the basic maladies of poverty, unbalanced and dependent economies, and, in some cases, explosive population growth are aggravated by the volatile mass emotions of anticolonialism and xenophobic nationalism, by class and group tensions resulting from the clash between traditionalism and modernism, and by the internal struggle for power between rival political groups. Counterinsurgency programs are one piece in the broad mosaic of assistance—economic, financial, technical, and military—by which the United States seeks to help friendly nations to surmount these problems.
Finally, as the definition of "insurgency" suggests, U.S. counterinsurgency programs are most directly aimed at Communist-led or supported insurrections or those which appear vulnerable to Communist exploitation. United States policy toward such movements has varied widely in the past and will no doubt do so in the future, depending on the nature and degree of Communist involvement, the local situation, and other relevant factors. Soviet and Chinese Communist interests sometimes clash in particular situations, dividing and confusing the local insurgent leadership, and providing opportunities for skillful and flexible exploitation by American policy. Given the aims of international communism, however, insurrections which it supports can be assumed to be inimical to the security of the United States and the Free World in the long run. As the definition states, they can also be assumed to be "subversive," a term that presumably implies, in this context, not merely the aim of overthrowing the regime or the administration attacked—a common aim of all insurrections—but a more fundamentally revolutionary purpose involving the eventual establishment of a Communist system of government and society. Traditional societies struggling to accommodate the forces of modernization while coping with all the other economic, social, and political ills described above are peculiarly vulnerable to Communist-directed insurrections. Such movements enjoy the immeasurable advantage of concentrating on the destruction of an existing order, without facing up to the vastly more difficult task, placed upon their opponents, of transforming it by peaceful processes into a more viable and modern one. Where victory has forced communism to establish a new order on the ruins of the old—in China, in North Korea, in North Viet Nam—the results have not been notably successful.

It would be shortsighted to regard the present patterns and trends of insurgency as fixed, or even as necessarily likely to be of long duration. As we have seen, U.S. counterinsurgency programs are primarily concerned at present with a single, by now readily recognizable, phenomenon: the threat of insurrection instigated or vulnerable to manipulation by local Communists with outside support, exploiting the forces of discontent and change in traditional, underdeveloped societies. Postwar history provides many other, quite different models of violent change, occurring in a variety of settings—primitive, modern, traditional, colonial, post-colonial—and affecting U.S. security in a variety of ways. The list is long, and hardly any two conform to a single pattern.

History is not likely to repeat itself in these or other areas. But the diversity of the patterns suggests that we may expect equal diversity in the future. Present counterinsurgency policies and programs are
sharply divided between Southeast Asia, where the model of Communist-dominated insurgency is clearly defined and the threat active, and other regions of the world, notably certain parts of Latin America and the Middle East, where the threat is still latent. Counterinsurgency programs in these areas necessarily are preventive in character. What form the disease may actually take, or what kind of therapy it may require, are still matters of guesswork.

What is certain is that the patterns of insurgency will vary in important respects from those made familiar by our experience in Southeast Asia. A different environment is likely to produce a markedly different kind of insurrection, or even violence at higher or lower levels. Nor can we assume constancy in Communist aims and involvement. These will be governed by such variables as local politics, accessibility to Communist-controlled and Western sources of power, the climate of East-West conflict, and, above all, the state of Moscow-Peking relations. Communists no doubt will continue to pursue their interests as they see them, and hostility to the capitalist West is unlikely soon to abate.

The day is long past, however, when all Communists saw their own interest in the same light, and there was only one party line. Polycentrist Communism has already found itself more than once working at cross purposes. "Wars of liberation" sometimes divide instead of uniting their sponsors, and weak proteges are learning how to play off one master against another. The time may yet come when Communist counterinsurgents will stalk Communist insurgents in far-off jungles, while an uncommitted West watches nervously from the sidelines. In a revolutionary age the only certain constant is change itself, and the directions of possible change are infinite.

RICHARD M. LEIGHTON
Chairman, ICAF Counterinsurgency Committee
PART I

INSURGENCY: ITS NATURE AND BACKGROUND

The following three selections are brief introductory surveys of the general area of insurgency, addressed to contrasting audiences. The talk by Walt W. Rostow, now Chairman of the State Department's Policy Planning Council, was given in June 1961 to the graduating class of the Army Special Warfare School at Fort Bragg (number 1). It was a significant policy statement, heralding the government's counterinsurgency program launched soon thereafter. The lecture by Ralph Sanders of the Industrial College faculty (number 2), was given at the College in September 1962 as an introduction to the study of insurgency and counterinsurgency in the Resident Course in the 1962-63 academic year. Franklin A. Lindsay, Vice President of ITEK Corporation, and former member of the Gaither Committee, the Rockefeller Special Studies Panel on Economic Policy, and the Second Hoover Commission, served in 1945 as Chief of the U.S. Military Mission to Jugoslavia. His article on unconventional warfare (number 3), written for the sophisticated lay readers of Foreign Affairs, appeared in January 1962.
GUERRILLA WARFARE IN THE UNDERDEVELOPED AREAS*

When this Administration came to responsibility it faced four major crises: Cuba, the Congo, Laos, and Viet-Nam. Each represented a successful Communist breaching—over the previous two years—of the Cold War truce lines which had emerged from the Second World War and its aftermath. In different ways each had arisen from the efforts of the international Communist movement to exploit the inherent instabilities of the underdeveloped areas of the non-Communist world; and each had a guerrilla warfare component.

Cuba, of course, differed from the other cases. The Cuban revolution against Batista was a broad-based national insurrection. But that revolution was tragically captured from within by the Communist apparatus; and now Latin America faces the danger of Cuba's being used as the base for training, supply, and direction of guerrilla warfare in the Hemisphere.

More than that, Mr. Khrushchev, in his report to the Moscow conference of Communist parties (published January 6, 1961), had explained at great length that the Communists fully support what he called wars of national liberation and would march in the front rank with the peoples waging such struggles. The military arm of Mr. Khrushchev's January 1961 doctrine is, clearly, guerrilla warfare.

Faced with these four crises, pressing in on the President from day to day, and faced with the candidly stated position of Mr. Khrushchev, we have, indeed, begun to take the problem of guerrilla warfare seriously.

To understand this problem, however, one must begin with the great revolutionary process that is going forward in the southern half of the world; for the guerrilla warfare problem in these regions is a product of that revolutionary process and the Communist effort and intent to exploit it.

What is happening throughout Latin America, Africa, the Middle East and Asia is this: old societies are changing their ways in order

* Address by the Honorable W. W. Rostow, Chairman, Policy Planning Council, Department of State, at the United States Army Special Warfare School, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, on Wednesday, June 28, 1961.
to create and maintain a national personality on the world scene, and to bring to their peoples the benefits modern technology can offer. This process is truly revolutionary. It touches every aspect of the traditional life: economic, social and political. The introduction of modern technology brings about not merely new methods of production but a new style of family life, new links between the villages and the cities, the beginnings of national politics, and a new relationship to the world outside.

Like all revolutions, the revolution of modernization is disturbing. Individual men are torn between the commitment to the old and familiar way of life and the attractions of a modern way of life. The power of old social groups--notably the landlord who usually dominates the traditional society--is reduced. Power moves towards those who can command the tools of modern technology, including modern weapons. Men and women in the villages and the cities, feeling that the old ways of life are shaken and that new possibilities are open to them, express old resentments and new hopes.

This is the grand arena of revolutionary change which the Communists are exploiting with great energy. They believe that their techniques of organization--based on small disciplined cadres of conspirators--are ideally suited to grasp and to hold power in these turbulent settings. They believe that the weak transitional governments that one is likely to find during this modernization process, are highly vulnerable to subversion and to guerrilla warfare. And whatever Communist doctrines of historical inevitability may be, Communists know that their time to seize power in the underdeveloped areas is limited. They know that, as momentum takes hold in an underdeveloped area--and the fundamental social problems inherited from the traditional society are solved--their chances to seize power decline. It is on the weakest nations--facing their most difficult transitional moments--that the Communists concentrate their attention. They are the scavengers of the modernization process. They believe that the techniques of political centralization under dictatorial control--and the projected image of Soviet and Chinese Communist economic progress--will persuade hesitant men, faced by great transitional problems, that the Communist model should be adopted for modernization, even at the cost of surrendering human liberty. They believe that they can exploit effectively the resentments built up in many of these areas against colonial rule and that they can associate themselves effectively with the desire of the emerging nations for independence, for status on the world scene, and for material progress.
This is a formidable program; for the history of this century teaches us that communism is not the long run wave of the future towards which societies are naturally drawn. On the contrary. But it is one particular form of modern society to which a nation may fall prey during the transitional process. Communism is best understood as a disease of the transition to modernization.

What is our reply to this historical conception and strategy? What is the American purpose and the American strategy? We, too, recognize that a revolutionary process is under way. We are dedicated to the proposition that this revolutionary process of modernization shall be permitted to go forward in independence, with increasing degrees of human freedom. We seek two results: first, that truly independent nations shall emerge on the world scene; and, second, that each nation will be permitted to fashion, out of its own culture and its own ambitions, the kind of modern society it wants. The same religious and philosophical beliefs which decree that we respect the uniqueness of each individual, make it natural that we respect the uniqueness of each national society. Moreover, we Americans are confident that, if the independence of this process can be maintained over the coming years and decades, these societies will choose their own version of what we would recognize as a democratic, open society.

These are our commitments of policy and of faith. The U. S. has no interest in political satellites. Where we have military pacts we have them because governments feel directly endangered by outside military action, and we are prepared to help protect their independence against such military action. But, to use Mao Tse-tung's famous phrase, we do not seek nations which "lean to one side." We seek nations which shall stand up straight. And we do so for a reason: because we are deeply confident that nations which stand up straight will protect their independence and move in their own ways and in their own time towards human freedom and political democracy.

Thus, our central task in the underdeveloped areas, as we see it, is to protect the independence of the revolutionary process now going forward. This is our mission and it is our ultimate strength. For this is not--and cannot be--the mission of communism. And in time, through the fog of propaganda and the honest confusions of men caught up in the business of making new nations, this fundamental difference will become increasingly clear in the southern half of the world. The American interest will be served if our children live in an environment of strong, assertive, independent nations, capable, because they are strong, of
assuming collective responsibility for the peace. The diffusion of power is the basis for freedom within our own society; and we have no reason to fear it on the world scene. But this outcome would be a defeat for communism—not for Russia as a national state, but for communism. Despite all the Communist talk of aiding movements of national independence, they are driven in the end, by the nature of their system, to violate the independence of nations. Despite all the Communist talk of American imperialism, we are committed, by the nature of our system, to support the cause of national independence. And the truth will out.

The victory we seek will see no ticker tape parades down Broadway—no climactic battles, nor great American celebrations of victory. It is a victory which will take many years and decades of hard work and dedication—by many peoples—to bring about. This will not be a victory of the United States over the Soviet Union. It will not be a victory of capitalism over socialism. It will be a victory of men and nations which aim to stand up straight, over the forces which wish to entrap and to exploit their revolutionary aspirations of modernization. What this victory involves—in the end—is the assertion by nations of their right to independence and by men and women of their right to freedom as they understand it. And we deeply believe this victory will come—on both sides of the Iron Curtain.

If Americans do not seek victory in the usual sense, what do we seek? What is the national interest of the United States? Why do we Americans expend our treasure and assume the risks of modern war in this global struggle? For Americans the reward of victory will be, simply, this: It will permit American society to continue to develop along the old humane lines which go back to our birth as a nation—and which reach deeper into history than that—back to the Mediterranean roots of Western life. We are struggling to maintain an environment on the world scene which will permit our open society to survive and to flourish.

To make this vision come true places a great burden on the U. S. at this phase of history. The preservation of independence has many dimensions. The U. S. has the primary responsibility for deterring the use of nuclear weapons in the pursuit of Communist ambitions. The U. S. has a major responsibility to deter the kind of overt aggression with conventional forces, which was launched in June 1950 in Korea. The U. S. has the primary responsibility for assisting the economies of
those hard pressed states on the periphery of the Communist bloc, which are under acute military or quasi-military pressure which they cannot bear from their own resources; for example, South Korea, Viet-Nam, Taiwan, Pakistan, Iran. The U.S. has a special responsibility of leadership in bringing not merely its own resources, but the resources of all the Free World to bear in aiding the long-run development of those nations which are serious about modernizing their economy and their social life. And, as President Kennedy has made clear, he regards no program of his Administration as more important than his program for long-term economic development, dramatized, for example, by the Alliance for Progress in Latin America. Independence cannot be maintained by military measures alone. Modern societies must be built, and we are prepared to help build them.

Finally, the United States has a role to play--symbolized by your presence here and by mine--in learning to deter guerrilla warfare, if possible, and to deal with it, if necessary.

I do not need to tell you that the primary responsibility for dealing with guerrilla warfare in the underdeveloped areas cannot be American. There are many ways in which we can help--and we are searching our minds and our imaginations to learn better how to help; but a guerrilla war must be fought primarily by those on the spot. This is so for a quite particular reason. A guerrilla war is an intimate affair, fought not merely with weapons but fought in the minds of the men who live in the villages and the hills; fought by the spirit and policy of those who run the local government. An outsider cannot, by himself, win a guerrilla war; he can help create conditions in which it can be won; and he can directly assist those prepared to fight for their independence. We are determined to help destroy this international disease; that is, guerrilla war designed, initiated, supplied, and led from outside an independent nation.

Although as leader of the Free World, the U.S. has special responsibilities which it accepts in this common venture of deterrence, it is important that the whole international community begin to accept its responsibility for dealing with this form of aggression. It is important that the world become clear in mind, for example, that the operation run from Hanoi against Viet-Nam is as clear a form of aggression as the violation of the 38th parallel by the North Korean armies in June 1950. In my conversations with representatives of foreign governments, I am sometimes lectured that this or that government within the Free World
is not popular; they tell me that guerrilla warfare cannot be won unless the peoples are dissatisfied. These are, at best, half truths. The truth is that guerrilla warfare, mounted from external bases—with rights of sanctuary—is a terrible burden to carry for any government in a society making its way towards modernization. As you know, it takes somewhere between ten and twenty soldiers to control one guerrilla in an organized operation. Moreover, the guerrilla force has this advantage: its task is merely to destroy; while the government must build and protect what it is building. A guerrilla war mounted from outside a transitional nation, is a crude act of international vandalism. There will be no peace in the world if the international community accepts the outcome of a guerrilla war, mounted from outside a nation, as tantamount to a free election.

The sending of men and arms across international boundaries and the direction of guerrilla war from outside a sovereign nation is aggression; and this is a fact which the whole international community must confront and whose consequent responsibilities it must accept. Without such international action those against whom aggression is mounted will be driven inevitably to seek out and engage the ultimate source of the aggression they confront.

I suspect that, in the end, the real meaning of the conference on Laos at Geneva will hinge on this question: it will depend on whether or not the international community is prepared to mount an International Control Commission which has the will and the capacity to control the borders it was designed to control.

In facing the problem of guerrilla war, I have one observation to make as an historian. It is now fashionable—and I daresay for you it was compulsory—to read the learned works of Mao Tse-tung and Che Guevara on guerrilla warfare. This is, indeed, proper. One should read with care and without passion into the minds of one’s enemies. But it is historically inaccurate and psychologocally dangerous to think that these men created the strategy and tactics of guerrilla war to which we are now responding. Guerrilla warfare is not a form of military and psychological magic created by the Communists. There is no rule or parable in the Communist texts which was not known at an earlier time in history. The operation of Marion’s men in relation to the Battle of Cowpens in the American Revolution was, for example, governed by rules which Mao merely echoes; Che Guevara knows nothing of this business that T. E. Lawrence did not know or was not
practiced, for example, in the Peninsular Campaign during the Napoleonic wars, a century earlier. The orchestration of professional troops, militia, and guerrilla fighters is an old game whose rules can be studied and learned.

My point is that we are up against a form of warfare which is powerful and effective only when we do not put our minds clearly to work on how to deal with it. I, for one, believe that, with purposeful efforts, most nations which might now be susceptible to guerrilla warfare could handle their border areas in ways which would make them very unattractive to the initiation of this ugly game. We can learn to prevent the emergence of the famous sea in which Mao Tse-tung taught his men to swim. This requires, of course, not merely a proper military program of deterrence, but programs of village development, communications, and indoctrination. The best way to fight a guerrilla war is to prevent it from happening. And this can be done.

Similarly, I am confident that we can deal with the kind of operation now under way in Viet-Nam. It is an extremely dangerous operation; and it could overwhelm Viet-Nam if the Vietnamese--aided by the Free World--do not deal with it. But it is an unsubtle operation, by the book, based more on murder than on political or psychological appeal. When Communists speak of wars of national liberation and of their support for "progressive forces," I think of the systematic program of assassination now going forward in which the principal victims are the health, agriculture, and education officers in the Viet-Nam villages. The Viet Cong are not trying to persuade the peasants of Viet-Nam that communism is good: they are trying to persuade them that their lives are insecure unless they cooperate with them. With resolution and confidence on all sides and with the assumption of international responsibility for the frontier problem, I believe we are going to bring this threat to the independence of Viet-Nam under control.

My view is, then, that we confront in guerrilla warfare in the underdeveloped areas a systematic attempt by the Communists to impose a serious disease on those societies attempting the transition to modernization. This attempt is a present danger in Southeast Asia. It could quickly become a major danger in Africa and Latin America. I salute in particular those among you whose duty it is--along with others--to prevent that disease, if possible, and to eliminate it where it is imposed. As I understand the course you are now completing, it is designed to impress on you this truth: you are not merely soldiers in the old sense. Your job is not merely to accept the risks of war and to master its skills.
Your job is to work with understanding, with your fellow citizens, in the whole creative process of modernization. From our perspective in Washington you take your place side by side with those others who are committed to help fashion independent, modern societies out of the revolutionary process now going forward. I salute you as I would a group of doctors, teachers, economic planners, agricultural experts, civil servants, or those others who are now leading the way in the whole southern half of the globe in fashioning new nations and societies that will stand up straight and assume in time their rightful place of dignity and responsibility in the world community; for this is our common mission.

Each of us must carry into his day-to-day work an equal understanding of the military and the creative dimensions of the job.

I can tell you that those with whom I have the privilege to work are dedicated to that mission with every resource of mind and spirit at our command.
INTRODUCTION TO COUNTERINSURGENCY*

By Ralph Sanders

During the year you will hear much about something we call counterinsurgency or internal defense. Some of you may know more about this subject than others. The purpose of this talk is to provide a common understanding of the problem. I do not intend to tell you how to flush out a guerrilla band, but to explore why that guerrilla band exists and the possible courses of action to counter it.

One must understand insurgency before one can intelligently go about countering it. And one must understand revolution and the role of power in society to grasp a firm meaning of insurgency.

Perhaps we best can begin with the official definition of insurgency:

A condition resulting from a revolt or insurrection against a constituted government which falls short of civil war.

In the current context, subversive insurgency is primarily Communist-inspired, supported or exploited.

In point of fact, actions taken against constituted governments fall within a spectrum from individual expressions of disapproval to conventional, positional armed conflict--our own Civil War being a good example of the latter type of conflict. (See figure I)

Insurgency then represents a band in a spectrum of actions against constituted government, its distinguishing feature being the degree of physical violence. Below a certain level of violence we confront subversion; above a certain level we confront civil war. While we have difficulty identifying with precision the parameters of insurgency, the official definition is adequate for operational purposes.

Insurgency can take several forms, alone or in combination: coups d'etat, putsches, urban uprisings, guerrilla warfare, or any combination of these.

* A lecture delivered at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces on 24 Sep. 1962 (L63-30).
Figure 1

SPECTRUM OF ACTIONS AGAINST CONSTITUTED GOVERNMENTS

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Because of our experience with Vietnam, Cuba, Greece, Malaya, and the Philippines, we are prone to equate insurgency with guerrilla warfare.

But, in fact, all insurgent movements are not necessarily guerrilla wars nor are all guerrilla wars insurgent movements. The initial Bolshevik takeover in October 1917, although clearly an insurgent action, involved no guerrilla war. The guerrilla actions which raged in Russia during World War II supported conventional armies fighting an international war and did not constitute an insurgent movement.

Notice that the official definition specified that we are chiefly concerned with Communist-inspired insurrection, supported or exploited. This is an important qualification.

From the point of view of the United States, not all insurgent movements are bad. Nor are all revolts Communist-directed or exploited. We should remember that a group of now-revered gentlemen in North America raised the banner of insurgency in 1775 against George III of England. The groups of insurgents who deposed certain Latin American dictators--Rojas Pinilla in Colombia, and Jimenez in Venezuela--brought no Communist regime to power. Recently, the United States welcomed, and to some degree, abetted, the insurgent movement that deposed the tyrannical Trujillo regime of the Dominican Republic.

This country faces an exceedingly difficult and sometimes delicate task in determining if an insurgent movement in fact involves Communist inspiration, support, or exploitation, and to what degree. In the case of Cuba, Communist involvement did not become apparent at an early stage; in other cases, such as Greece and the Philippines, we made this determination in time. The future, no doubt, will confront us with a host of identification problems.

Power and Revolution

We must ask ourselves: "Why should men turn to insurgency?" We must look beyond the condition of cold war for an answer, inasmuch as insurgency predates communism. In fact, insurgency is one of the oldest forms of conflict. As I indicated earlier, any examination profitably could begin with an analysis of power and revolution. In a short lecture, I can only touch on the highlights of the complex interrelationships between power and revolution.
According to one philosopher, power is to society what energy is to physics—the prime mover determining relations between people. Such a sweeping hypothesis entertains debate. Some analysts of society maintain that other values, such as respect, enlightenment, love, wealth, well-being, skill, standards of right and wrong, congenial personal relationships, and others, also condition the interplay of human beings. However, few deny that power acts as a crucial shaper of human relations.

Power is the ability to make and enforce decisions. Men seem psychologically prone to modify the conduct of other individuals or groups, especially when they benefit thereby. Power need not rest solely upon physical force, but also upon persuasion, faith, loyalty, habit, and apathy.

Historically, groups of men have exercised power not only because of their will to command other persons, but also because others traditionally obeyed their command. The relatively small group which ruled the huge Roman Empire relied upon the habit of obedience to authority as much as upon force of arms. No matter what the basis or source of power, men, in varying degrees, attempt to translate decisions into fact, most often by affecting the conduct of others.

For analytical purposes, allow me to oversimplify some of the major distinguishing features of the relationship between power and revolution.

Within any society there exists a distribution of power. In a dictatorship, power is concentrated in the hands of one or a few; in a democracy, it is more evenly apportioned. Of course, there are varying degrees of dictatorial and democratic rule.

Furthermore, men on different levels of society wield different types and degrees of power. In Vietnam, traditionally the territorial ruler may have levied a certain tax on a village, but the village chief decided how to collect the tax.

In any society a competition for power always exists. This competition may occur within a small elite or involve more of the population. In any case, some men always seek to change the distribution of power in their favor. The Communists are attempting to do precisely this throughout the world. If these men do so fast enough and use force, they make a revolution.

Revolution, then, means a drastic, relatively sudden substitution of one group of rulers for another.
Revolution most often results from an active, though not necessarily miniscule minority prompting dissatisfied majorities. The American, French, and Russian Revolutions demonstrated this pattern. Revolutions usually do not occur spontaneously in the form of massive uprisings.

To the contrary, able and well-organized vanguards spearhead even popular revolts. One could say that in 1775 only a minority of the colonists actually favored a war of independence against England, but that minority stimulated an aggrieved populace to revolt. For their part, the Communists understand all too well the role of minorities in revolutions.

The last observation about revolution is particularly significant. While we shall treat later on the role of social environment in causing insurgency, I wish to point out here the importance that unequal opportunity and consequent frustration have in stimulating revolt. In Beaumarchais' famous play, the Marriage of Figaro, the hero, who by study unsuccessfully tried to rise in a privileged society, contemptuously remarks of his master:

Because you are a great lord, you think you are a genius! ... nobility, fortune, rank, appointments; all this makes a man so proud! But what have you done to deserve so many good things? You took the trouble to get born!

Here we see the pentup emotions of the potential revolutionary, the person who chafes at the accident of birth which prevents him from enjoying increased power. To paraphrase Lenin, frustrated people provide the engines of revolution.

Insurgency in Communist Strategy

With this background in mind, I want to discuss the role of insurgency in Communist strategy.

Marxist-Leninist doctrine nurtures the concept of conflict: class against class; the exploited against the imperialist; socialist against capitalist countries—these are the hallmarks of the theory. Given such a philosophy, it seems natural that the Communists would devise and organize methods for fighting, among other forms of conflict, such as unconventional and internal wars.
There is no standard Communist strategy for conducting such wars; generally Communists devise strategies and tactics to fit local circumstances. Thus, the Chinese Communists and Soviets disagreed about the tactics of revolution while the North Vietnamese, according to some observers, violated some of the Mao Tse-Tung's most prized prescriptions.

Paradoxically, the Soviet Union, the original base of the worldwide Communist movement, has not been the leading contributor to the doctrine of insurgency in emerging lands. While Lenin wrote on insurgency, we look more to the writings of Mao Tse-Tung, Vo Nguyen Giap, and Ernesto (Che) Guevara, all non-Russians, to study Communist thought on the subject.

The Russians, mirroring their own experience, have tended more toward subversion and urban uprisings of the proletariat. This tactic proved disastrous in Canton in 1927 and in Indonesia in 1948. Mao, knowing Asia more intimately, rightly centered his attention on the countryside. Asia is a land of villages; hence Mao made the village his target.

Mao developed a concept of a three-stage internal war. He believed that initial efforts should be directed toward organizing, consolidating, and preserving the movement— including securing equipment and training guerrillas— followed by progressive expansion and culminating in the final destruction of the enemy.

In the first stage, the insurgents chiefly aim to stay alive while trying to win sympathizers and subvert the enemy. In the second stage, they turn progressively to terrorism, guerrilla warfare, and mobile warfare. In the last stage, they seek victory chiefly in orthodox, conventional battle, using guerrilla actions in a supporting role. Mao recognizes, however, that local conditions may modify this progression from defensive to counteroffensive operations.

Notice that guerrilla war constitutes only the middle stage. Insurgents who are strategically weaker use this form of warfare to assume the tactical offensive in selected forms, times, and places. Mao outlines the primary function of guerrillas as: first, to conduct a war on exterior lines, that is, in the rear of the enemy; second, to establish bases; and last, to extend the war areas.
Guerrillas use as their *modus operandi* concentration and dispersion. They assemble overwhelming strength, hit the enemy at a weak spot, then disperse to strike again.

The Communists realize that very often guerrilla warfare alone cannot win and they must shift to conventional warfare. They must consider the interrelationships between political and military factors in assessing the opportunities for a shift. Communists always have had trouble with planning and timing the shift from the second to the third stage. If they shift too early, they court disaster; if they wait too long, they lose time and opportunities. In China and Indochina, they successfully moved into stage three. In Cuba, they never launched a concerted conventional attack; rather, they won by default. In Laos, interestingly enough, international complications forced them to revert from stage three to stage one.

Environment for Insurgency

Why, at this point in history, do the Communists turn to insurgency as a major technique for expanding Communism? Five characteristics in contemporary society lend support to Communist ventures:

(1) A major war in the nuclear age has become too dangerous to play the role of "midwife" to the revolution that the Communists have preached for so long. Khrushchev has acknowledged the insanity of general nuclear conquest. At least for the public record, he has expressed fears that local wars may grow into thermonuclear rocket wars. Therefore he pledges Communist support to that form of conflict which offers much at little cost: wars of liberation and popular uprisings. In other words, insurgency.

(2) Western Europe's past resistance to Communist takeover and its phenomenal political and economic resurgence make the prospects for Communist success in this area quite remote. In truth, Premier Khrushchev appears to be running scared in the rising competition between the European Common Market and the Communist world.

(3) The world is passing through an epoch of disintegrating colonial empires and sprouting independent countries by the bushel-full. The Communists can ride the crest of the anticolonial wave.
(4) Millions throughout the world are experiencing a breakdown in traditional patterns of life. They seek to build modern, preferably industrial, nations out of societies distrustful of the world, ground in poverty and wrapped in rigid and oppressive social hierarchies. As with Figaro, formerly neglected, downtrodden, and unconsulted, human beings begin to demand a redistribution of power favorable to them.

Modernization, by destroying old values and generating new expectations, inevitably breeds trouble. An old saying of the Basuto tribe in Africa goes:

If a man does away with his traditional way of living and throws away his good customs, he had better first make certain that he has something of value to replace them.

Unfortunately, most emerging peoples have not yet found that "something of value." The disciples of Marx and Lenin claim that communism will provide them with true and workable values. At the same time, ambition spurred by a glimmer of hope strides in seven-league boots. Leaders of emerging lands just cannot meet hopes. The bitter fruit of unrequited aspirations, trammeled dreams and unrewarded effort is social upheaval. The Communists swoop in as the scavengers of social unrest.

(5) In restless lands a glaring gap exists between the elite and the people, between the village and the national government. In fact, there is little dialogue between the villagers and the officials in the capitals owing to lack of modern communications, to traditional relationships, and to the absence of political and administrative intermediary groups. This condition leads to a lack of identification by the peasant with the national government and often results in instability. The Communists are ever willing to fill this vacuum.

The Human Dimension of Insurgency

Throughout the year, you will study many aspects of insurgency. Right now, I want to concentrate on the human dimension of the problem.

As has so often been pointed out, the battleground of Communist insurgency is people. The people of the countryside would prefer to be left alone, but willing or not, are caught up in the conflict. Under these
circumstances, their attitude is the most important factor in insurgency. Mao recognized this fact by characterizing the people as water and the guerrillas as the fish who inhabit it. The loyalty of the people is up for grabs and will go to the most effective wooer.

Why concentrate on these lowly people? The answer is simple. The Communists usually have a fertile field of endeavor among the restless city masses and especially among the peasants in the countryside. The leaders of Communist insurrection usually come from the city, but the countryside has more successfully been used as the battlefield. On entering a target area, Communist cadres first exploit the grievances of the villagers and ethnic minorities. These people pay the taxes which support the insurgents; they provide a source of recruitment for guerrillas; and, above all, they supply all important intelligence to the guerrillas while denying it to government forces.

The Communists have devised effective methods to coerce or solicit the support of rural people. They propagandize a cause catering to the dissatisfactions of rural folk. They discipline their forces not to molest the peasant's property, wife or daughter, thereby gaining his respect. They are not always successful in this endeavor; one reason the Meo tribesmen fight the Pathet Lao is their memory of earlier Viet Minh ravages. The Communists also conduct selective terrorism against local opposition leaders and informers.

Programs of Counterinsurgency

What are we doing about this serious problem? Simply stated, we seek to administer prophylaxis where armed insurrection has not erupted and therapy where it has. Some measures are either preventative or therapeutic, depending upon conditions; others, we only use as cures in open and violent revolt.

In countries not yet plagued by armed insurrection, we work through the host government to eliminate those conditions that give rise to Communist insurgency. Specifically, we aim to:

1. Induce the elite to launch needed reforms.

2. Prompt the people to identify themselves with the national government.
3. Promote economic and social improvement at a rate fast enough to convey an image of progress.

4. Help provide opportunities for career advancement of all people, including those not of the elite.

5. Improve internal security by strengthening the armed forces, intelligence services, and the police.

6. Provide training to the armed forces specifically tailored to combating guerrilla rather than conventional forces.

7. Enlist the sympathy of the people for the armed forces by encouraging military discipline and aiding civic action programs.

8. Improve the motivation and efficiency of bureaucracies.

An extra word about civic action programs. Our vastly increased sponsorship of such programs signifies a new trend. Less-developed countries profit from using their armed forces for economic and social purposes as well as for military purposes. Friendly armed forces can help build needed roads and schools, teach reading and writing, train men in technical and administrative skills, and conduct a host of other beneficial activities. In the U.S., military forces have a long history of such service. Today, our Military Assistance Advisory Groups, with the cooperation of the Agency for International Development field personnel, are busily devising and implementing such programs in many emerging countries. For example, with our help the Ecuadorian armed forces are conducting a pilot project to help the peasants in a selected area to improve the transportation and living conditions of their villages.

Where a country suffers from actual hot guerrilla warfare, such as South Vietnam, our first order of business is to aid the host government to defeat the Communist insurgents. Formulators of doctrine seem prone to divide their concepts into three parts. We have developed a concept of counterguerrilla warfare also involving three stages which, in part, overlap. In all stages we use not one, but a combination of military, economic, social, psychological, and political actions.

In the first stage, we attempt to insulate the people from the guerrillas, a very difficult task. There are many ways to do this. In Vietnam, we are applying the idea of the strategic hamlet used so successfully in Malaya. The strategic hamlet provides a protected haven for
peasants formerly exposed to Communist attack and terror. It possesses more efficient military defenses as well as heretofore unavailable services such as medical, sanitation, and farming assistance.

By the use of such fortified villages, we aim to cut off access of the guerrillas to the people as sources of supplies, recruitment and intelligence, and also to protect those who inform on the guerrillas. These hamlets not only improve the material lot of the people, but just as important, establish closer rapport between the villagers and the national government.

In the second phase, counterguerrilla forces seek out and destroy the guerrillas by aggressive military actions.

The third stage is one of reconciliation and reconstruction, during which we seek to convert captured guerrillas into loyal, useful citizens—a lesson we learned from Magsaysay in the Philippines—and to rebuild what the revolt has destroyed. The Vietnamese Government is now considering a similar program of effective defector encouragement and rehabilitation.

The United States can marshal many resources to cope with these twilight wars: military advice and assistance to indigenous military establishment; training by American officers and enlisted men; adequate materiel; and, if need be, direct support by U.S. forces of combat missions launched by government troops. Army and Marine helicopter units provide such support in Vietnam.

The guerrillas then are confronted with an appropriately trained armed force. If properly designed and executed, these military programs also can contribute in some measure to the economic and social progress of the country in question.

Economic aid programs help to buttress the local economy now under severe duress. Support of counterinsurgency measures such as civic action, strategic hamlet and police programs, and economic assistance, not only contributes to internal defense but fosters conditions hospitable to the growth of democratic institutions and to social and economic progress.

AID also supplies technical assistance to particularly vulnerable sectors of the society. In this respect it sponsors community development projects and provides village alarm and communications systems. These actions may augment grants and loans designed for more long-range economic development.
Our information service prompts people to identify themselves with the national government and improves the image of the United States in the country.

To apply these resources with telling effect, this country must expertly manage extensive and complex programs conducted by various U.S. agencies. Anyone familiar with the way of doing business in government knows that this is no easy task. It takes a lot of doing for the State Department, the Defense Department, the AID, the USIA, and the CIA to orchestrate their efforts. The country team, under the direction of the Ambassador, has the responsibility for performing this function in the field; the Special Group/Counterinsurgency directly under the President provides top level monitorship in Washington. It is certain that you will hear more about these and associated counterinsurgency organizations throughout the year.

Conclusion

The concept of counterinsurgency does not provide a neat formula for all situations. For example, our policy for countering insurgency in Laos differs considerably from our policy in Vietnam. In Laos, we used diplomatic means to conclude an armed insurgency that we were losing, preferring to shift to a still uncertain political contest we conceivably might win. In Vietnam, a people willing to fight allows us a more aggressive approach.

Good judgment rather than doctrine should govern our responses to actual or potential insurgency in specific countries. We can exercise good judgment only by knowing the underlying social, economic, and psychological forces within these societies as well as the political maneuvering at the top.

Whatever approach we take, we must work through host governments. Some governments may be more cooperative and effective than others. For example, it has not always been easy to convince the Vietnamese Government to initiate certain reforms we consider important. Yet, President Diem points to several major accomplishments made by rejecting American advice. In any event, working with host governments will continue to tax our diplomatic ability.
This observation logically leads to the next—the problem of dictatorial regimes and insurgency. We don't want to be labeled the defenders of tyranny; at the same time, we don't want Communist elements hostile to the United States to assume power. In some cases, as in the Dominican Republic, we promoted insurgency. Yet, how do we encourage insurgency and still retain the support of friendly regimes in the international arena? We may prefer a peaceful and evolutionary movement toward democratization rather than insurgency.

In some instances, our problem may be one of preventing Communist capture of an insurgent movement—an extremely difficult task for which there are few guidelines. We know, for example, that there is a growing insurgent movement against the Portuguese in Angola. We also know that the Communists have made inroads into this movement. If we are convinced that the winds of change in Africa are inevitable and that insurgency some day will give rise to an independent Angola, we want to be certain that it won't be a Communist Angola.

Should we decide that a particular insurgent movement threatens eventual Communist takeover, we have a host of resources and techniques appropriate for many situations. Our overall aim should be to help emerging nations maintain their independence and to influence their modernization constructively. To attain this goal worldwide, we must avoid giving exclusive attention to snuffing out hot revolts, and work toward eliminating conditions—political instability, economic deficiencies, social inequities, and administrative inefficiency—which give rise to insurgency.

After listening to this talk, you might be tempted to ask: "What is so new about all this?" "After all, the Free World has had to deal with Communist-led insurgency or subversion for years." "How about Greece, Malaya, the Philippines, and so forth?"

In truth there is not much new, but what is new is crucial—and that is: (1) the current high level interest in countering this form of conflict; (2) the establishment of the Special Group/Counterinsurgency and other bodies to expedite the development and implementation of counter-insurgency programs; (3) the U.S. commitment to vigorous civic action programs; (4) the high priority given to police assistance programs; and (5) the determination of this Administration to get the message across to all members of the armed forces and appropriate civilians.

In the field of counterinsurgency, we face a momentous challenge, plagued by uncertainties, concerns, and consternations. We should strive
to make our response as productive as that of the turtle in Ogden Nash's famous poem:

The turtle lives 'twixt plated decks
Which practically conceal its sex
I think it clever of the turtle
In such a fix to be so fertile.
UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE*

By Franklin A. Lindsay

Unconventional war is the war that is being fought today in Laos and South Viet Nam; it is the war that the French fought in Indochina and are now fighting in Algeria. It is a form of warfare the Communists have learned to employ with great effectiveness, and one which they will continue to exploit to the maximum in furthering their long-range objectives.

Unconventional warfare differs profoundly from warfare in which regular armies are openly engaged in combat. The objective of such conventional combat is to win control of a state by defeating the enemy's military forces in the field. In contrast, the strategy of unconventional forces must be to win control of the state by first winning control of the civil population. For without the disciplined support of the civil population, militarily inferior guerrilla forces can have no hope of success.

As yet the West has not developed a form of defense that is adequate against this form of warfare. And even where the defense has been effective, the costs to the West of suppressing such attacks have been many times the costs to the Communists of mounting them. In Greece between 1945 and 1948, for example, Communist guerrilla forces, numbering less than 20,000 armed men, successfully cut the country in two so that the only communication between north and south was by sea and air. A Greek army of several hundred thousand men, heavily supported by the United States, was required to contain the very much smaller guerrilla force. The total cost of military and political pacification, and of economic reconstruction, was about $2 billion—or somewhere between 100 and 1,000 times what the Communists had spent. The fortuitous defection of Yugoslavia from the Soviet bloc, and the consequent loss of guerrilla bases in Macedonia, caused the Communists to call off their attack. Had this not occurred, the costs in men, money and materiel needed finally to subdue the Communist rebels would have been many times greater. And the outcome would not have been certain.

The essential reasons the Communists have been able to do so much with so little in many areas of the world are four:

1. They have learned thoroughly the techniques of gaining control of the civil population by combining effectively the positive incentives of a political doctrine, applied meticulously from the grass roots up, and the negative pressures of a terrorism applied against those who refuse to accept their leadership voluntarily.

2. They have mastered the principles and techniques of guerrilla warfare, a form of warfare quite apart from regular or frontal warfare.

3. They have directed their most determined attacks against countries whose territory is contiguous to the Communist empire so that safe haven and training areas can be provided for guerrillas and so that supplies can be provided clandestinely.

4. They have also been able to exploit effectively the pent-up hatreds against former colonial powers and pent-up frustrations with the slow pace of economic advancement.

In most cases these have proven to be unbeatable combinations.

To gain control of a key part of the civilian population is an absolute prerequisite for further action. Having gained this control, the Communist leadership is then in a position to use its guerrilla force with great advantage against equal or superior forces supporting the government in power.

A guerrilla force is like the top of an iceberg; the supporting civilian organization, without which it cannot survive, is the much larger part that can't be seen. Just as control of the air has become a prerequisite for successful frontal warfare, so control of the population is a prerequisite for successful unconventional warfare. From the outset of conflict, a major struggle for control over the civilian population will take place and it will continue throughout the entire course of the war. Each side must try to organize the civil population into a tightly disciplined force, and, through propaganda and police activities, try to break the grip exercised by its adversary.

In Viet Nam, for example, the defeat of the French was due primarily to the Communists' success in this regard. It made it possible to trap French forces in one bloody ambush after another until the French were so weakened they could no longer keep open supply lines to their fortified outposts. Once the fortified outposts were isolated and could no longer be supplied, except in dribbles by air, the Communists were in a position to complete the establishment of political and military control over the rest of the country. With their base of operations thus secured, they could safely convert their guerrilla forces to regular assault forces equipped with heavy artillery and a supply system to back it. The final phase was to launch massive frontal assaults against these weakened fortresses.

Thus the French and their local supporters were progressively driven from the country into the villages, and from the villages into the cities until, at the end, they held in the north of Indochina only the heavily
fortified perimeter immediately surrounding Hanoi. In the areas from which they had withdrawn, the Communists erected a political structure which exacted the positive loyalty of every peasant and his family by the stark example of violence to some and the threat of heavy punishment or death to others.

The key to the successes of the Communist guerrillas in Viet Nam and elsewhere is found in the fact that they had established control over the rural population as a first step. For every man in a guerrilla force carrying a rifle there must be a large number of civilians who provide the support he must have to survive and fight. They are the source of food, clothing and recruits. Even more important, the civilian organization must supply the guerrilla force with constant operational intelligence on every movement of the enemy. Only with such information can a militarily inferior guerrilla force be forewarned of an encircling trap, a planned offensive or an ambush. This intelligence net embraces not only the peasants who observe military movements but also spies in enemy headquarters who provide advance warning of intended offensives.

The cause of the French defeat in Viet Nam can be traced to their loss of the support of the civilian population. Here, as elsewhere, the Communists had been able to capitalize upon a basic anti-colonial feeling and to harness this antagonism into an effective tool for political indoctrination of the population. But in order to obtain effective control, the Communists go far beyond political indoctrination. Once they have a fanatically dedicated minority, they begin the application of systematic terror to ensure that the masses of the people will be brought under, and kept under, complete Communist control. Their objective is to build in each village— even though it may be under nominal control of the legitimate government— a shadow government completely controlled by the local Communist representative. It has often happened that in a single village two governments exist simultaneously, one the official and open government representing the anti-Communist central government, the other the secret government which, in fact, exercises complete control over the actions of every member of the village.

The use of terror to form a secret government under the nose of the enemy has long been a Communist technique. In some of the worst German concentration camps, a secret Communist government was often sufficiently powerful to bring about the execution, through clandestine manipulation of Gestapo records, of those prisoners who failed to accept its control.

The French were defeated in Viet Nam because they were fighting blind. They never knew where the enemy was. They were repeatedly caught on the march in the most indefensible positions where, without
warning, they were subjected to murderous rifle, machine gun and mortar fire from concealed positions on both sides of the track. The surviving remnants of one ambush lived only to be cut down the next day by the same Viet Minh force, which held them constantly under surveillance, and moved through the jungles on foot to prepare the next ambush on the expected line of march. When the French undertook mop-up operations in areas known to be harboring guerrilla forces, the Communist-controlled civil population collaborated in warning the guerrillas, and in helping them to hide or escape.

The pattern of, first, political organization, second, guerrilla warfare and, finally, frontal assault was followed in Jugoslavia during World War II, in China from the thirties until the Communist victory in 1950, and in Viet Nam prior to the partition of the country in 1955. Now it is being followed in South Viet Nam, where Communist organizers have been increasingly active in building clandestine organizations in the rural areas. During the last year, guerrilla activities were stepped up with the objectives of forcing government troops to withdraw from the villages into the larger towns and into fortified positions. Now it appears from reports from Saigon that the Communist leaders have decided that their control of many areas outside the cities is sufficiently firm to permit the use of regular military units trained in North Viet Nam. If their judgment is correct, the war for South Viet Nam has entered the third, or final, assault stage.

Because the Communists have been permitted to consolidate their hold over most of the country, the forces of the government, supported by the United States, find themselves in a very precarious position. They can be extricated from the situation only by an extraordinary military effort coupled with a major effort to free the rural areas from the pressures of Communist terror.

In Malaya and in the Philippines are found two examples of the successful suppression and ultimate defeat of Communist guerrilla forces. In both cases, the heart of the Western strategy was twofold: (1) a vigorous and aggressive pursuit of the Communist guerrillas into their own territory while maintaining constant pressure on them so that they were denied the initiative and the ability to launch attacks on their own terms; (2) a major political program undertaken to win back the population, to protect it against the violence and reprisals of the Communists, and to match force with force.

The second of these represents one of the West's most difficult problems, for it is obvious that when two forces are contending for the loyalty of, and control over, the civilian population, the side which uses violent reprisals most aggressively will dominate most of the people, even
though their sympathies may lie in the other direction. Communist efforts to dominate the population must be frustrated before their control has become strong enough to support guerrilla operations. If the Communists are unopposed in their initial application of force against the civilian population, and thereby gain control, the counterforce which must be applied finally to break that control will be far greater and the population will suffer far more than if action had been taken resolutely at the outset.

In 1945 in Rumania, for example, a broad popular feeling of support for the monarchy had developed spontaneously. As evidence of this loyalty, people wore badges with the royal coat of arms. Communist thugs began systematically beating up people wearing the monarchist symbol whom they were able to catch alone in back streets after dark. There was no reaction from the population other than to stop wearing these pins when they were alone at night. Thus emboldened, the Communists became more aggressive until they beat up, in broad daylight and in the open streets, those who still wore the monarchist pins. Finally the pins were driven completely from the streets; the will of the people had been broken and the first step in the Communist takeover had been accomplished.

The way in which force is applied to counter Communist terror is nevertheless all-important. The strategy of the Communists may be to use acts of terror and sabotage to goad the government into repressive counter-measures and thereby widen the split between the population and the government. Thus when the government and its security forces use force to meet the Communist terror they must do so resolutely, but with great selectivity and only against those who are directly responsible.

II

The first step in mobilizing a civilian population against Communist subversion and guerrilla attack is to establish a set of political goals expressed in terms that the average person can understand. They must be goals that strike a sympathetic response and that aim to remove the inequities in the existing society and the grievances which they have caused. Through mass communications these reform programs must be communicated effectively, and repeatedly, to the population.

But this is only the beginning of the task. Political organizers must be recruited and trained in sufficient numbers to reach by direct contact nearly every family in the land. They must be as thorough as the best of ward or district leaders in American politics. The organizer must know everyone in his village. He must know who are the Communist sympathizers and who are the secret Communist organizers. He must know who
comes and goes in the village and what their business is. He must build a core of persons loyal to himself and to the government. Through these people he must be constantly informed of the activities of the Communists and the pressures they are placing on villagers to gain their secret help. Above all, he must be able to provide effective protection to those who, against their will, are being forced into Communist collaboration by threats of violence against themselves and their families. To accomplish this, he must have the support of his own government and of the West; he must be able not only to provide physical protection but to alleviate the legitimate economic and political grievances of his village. More than anyone else, the local political organizer holds the key to success or failure. If he is successful in his task, he will hold the loyalty of his village and will be able to integrate its people and resources into the effort to defeat the Communists.

If he is not successful, the shadow of Communist control will gradually be extended and consolidated until the village is organized entirely in support of the Communist forces. Food and money will regularly be collected for that purpose. The entire village will become part of the Communist intelligence network, reporting to the guerrilla commanders every movement of the government security forces. At the same time the government will be totally cut off from information about the guerrillas--their strength, their movements and their intentions.

The organization of the civilian population will require months, if not years. But where control by the Communists has already progressed to the point where they are able to launch guerrilla war, military operations must be conducted aggressively against them, regardless of the disadvantage at which government forces will be operating. Government patrols must push vigorously into Communist-dominated territory, try to contact the guerrillas and force them into open combat. Lacking the intelligence that the civilian population might have provided, the defending forces must employ to the fullest all other means, such as air reconnaissance. The United States has effectively applied its advanced scientific skills to the solution of major problems in the missile and space fields. There is now the opportunity, as yet largely untried, to apply these same scientific capabilities to the development of modern equipment designed to help meet the special problems of guerrilla and counter-guerrilla warfare.

The basic principle of counter-guerrilla military operations is to maintain the offensive and thereby deny the guerrillas the initiative. The Communist guerrilla strategy, in turn, will be to attempt to seize and hold the initiative by mounting a variety of attacks against fixed installations so that large government forces are pinned down defending towns and villages, rail lines, power lines, ports and other vital installations. A counter-guerrilla offensive, then, will have these objectives:
To keep guerrilla units off balance at all times; to force them to flee continuously from attacking government units, and thereby to minimize their opportunities to mount attacks on vital communication lines and military installations or to lay ambushes.

By maintaining the initiative, to force guerrilla units to overrun their intelligence screens, and thereby to deny them the protective cover they need to survive against superior military forces.

To prevent guerrilla forces from grouping for strong attacks against isolated points.

To tire them out, and keep them tired out, through constant offensive action against them; to force them into more isolated hinterlands where food supplies are less and less available; to force them through constant offensive action to expend their limited ammunition.

Whatever the means used to carry out this offensive strategy, the basic and overriding necessity is that counter-guerrilla forces be organized early enough and strongly enough so that they are able to meet and contain, at the outset, the attacks of guerrilla forces. Too little and too late has been the normal reaction of governments to the development of such forces.

The core of the counter-guerrilla troops must be a highly mobile attacking force. Normally it need not be substantially larger than the guerrilla elements opposed to it. It should be able to meet and defeat guerrilla forces essentially on their own terms, that is, with small mobile units capable of moving in patrols over extended periods in enemy territory. As soon as one patrol is withdrawn for rest, another should take its place.

Mobile counter-guerrilla units should operate without fixed plans, and with the ability to modify their operations quickly, in order to take advantage of unforeseen targets and to concentrate superior forces against guerrilla units that have been located and brought to combat. In contrast, the government force that relies on "set piece" offensives, based on plans drawn up days in advance, will always be at a disadvantage. Even before the operation is launched, such plans may find their way into the hands of the guerrillas, who will have moved meanwhile to another area. Periodic offensives of limited duration have the further disadvantage of permitting the guerrillas to hold the initiative between offensives. A strategy of constant offensive can effectively deprive the guerrillas of the opportunity to conduct the war on terms favorable to themselves.
It will also be necessary to provide defensive forces to guard key installations. Care must be exercised, however, that these forces are not spread out beyond all reasonable bounds in the attempt to defend an increasingly large number of fixed installations. A French military commentator has written, "There should be no fortified posts except those necessary for promoting mobility."

III

In a broader sense the dilemma of the West is that, even if we can develop a more effective strategy for defending countries against unconventional Communist warfare it can at best only limit further losses. When one considers a strategy for liberating areas over which the Communists have gained control, the difficulties are seen to be very great. The organization of clandestine activities in a Communist state faces extraordinary obstacles. It is, for example, common practice for the Communists to undertake provocative activities designed to test the loyalty of each individual in the régime. A person may at any time be contacted by someone purporting to represent a clandestine organization. Even though the sympathies of the person approached may be strongly anti-Communist and his fondest hopes that the Communists be overthrown, he must assume that this is not a genuine resistance movement but rather one conducted under the control of, and at the direction of, the secret police. To prove his loyalty he must not only refuse to join the purported clandestine organization, but must also inform the police. If he does not, he will have failed to demonstrate his positive loyalty to the régime and will be subject to reprisals and imprisonment. Thus a clandestinely organized resistance within a consolidated Communist régime is not likely to get very far before someone has, out of fear, reported its existence to the police.

A second device used by the Communists is to form a clandestine anti-Communist organization under their own secret control, to encourage its growth by recruiting unwitting members, and to permit them to conduct actual operations against the régime until finally, having attracted a large number of the most aggressive anti-Communists, its entire membership is arrested.

The communes and collective farms provide other means of containing potential resistance operations, by centralizing food supplies, rather than allowing them to remain under the control of individual peasants. It is thus extremely difficult to obtain locally the food needed to support a guerrilla force. Similarly, the Communist practice of issuing new currency from time to time minimizes the opportunities to build up currency reserves to finance resistance operations.
Because of these techniques, a Communist dictatorship probably can be overthrown from within only in an area in which the Communists have not yet consolidated their control, or in which their control has been seriously weakened by other events. It is therefore of the utmost importance to move quickly to prevent the total consolidation of a nation into a completely controlled police state. This struggle will take place at a very personal level, and the final outcome will depend on whether the individual, faced by the Communist instruments of terrorist control, can, in the face of this force, be given a viable alternative to complete surrender.

Where the effective political control of the country has passed to the Communists, it will not be enough to conduct long-distance propaganda activities or to make plans on the assumption that the very real and very considerable dissatisfactions with the Communist régime will automatically result in a popular uprising as soon as the guerrilla forces appear. Clandestine support of at least a part of the villages and the countryside is an absolute prerequisite to the employment of guerrilla forces, for they must have local intelligence support and supplies if they are to survive in areas in which superior enemy forces are openly in control. In Jugoslavia, for example, in World War II, the Communist partisans had in many ways as favorable a situation for guerrilla warfare as might be expected anywhere. The main German forces were engaged by powerful allies on other fronts. Tito's partisan forces had as overt allies not only the Soviet Union but the United States and Britain. And from the latter two they received massive air support. In Slovenia, where there were no Cêtnik forces of Mihailovich to contend with, the political commissars of the Communist-established National Liberation Front could represent themselves to the people as the only force fighting the invader, and as having the complete support of all the major powers fighting the Germans. Yet they still found it necessary, in the words of one commissar, to "prepare the area intensively by the introduction of clandestine political organizers for a period of several months before we dared to introduce guerrilla forces."

It is not merely with benefit of hindsight that one can say it would have been a better strategy in Cuba to have built organized support in the villages and rural areas of Cuba and to have organized widespread guerrilla activities rather than to have risked all on a spontaneous uprising following a single assault landing. By far the largest part of any population will not voluntarily risk reprisals even though their sympathies may be strong. Instead, they will sit on the sidelines while others battle it out, joining in only when the outcome becomes a foregone conclusion. The political organization of each village must be undertaken under the nose of vigilant Communist political and security services. This is not easy. It requires
unusual men possessing great personal courage and high motivation as well as superior political organizing skills. They must be thoroughly trained and then supported to the fullest extent possible under the circumstances. Guerrilla operations can be initiated only as the Communist control at the village level is loosened so that clandestine support to guerrillas can be provided.

The West needs to acquire the ability to conduct unconventional warfare successfully, and it must do so quickly. The Communists have evolved a highly effective strategy combining grassroots political organization and guerrilla warfare which they are employing against the non-Communist world. They have devised a totalitarian political structure that is highly resistant to counter-attack. The creation by the West of an adequate defensive and offensive capability for political and guerrilla warfare will require time and effort. It must be pursued vigorously and without further delay.

The United States has expanded significantly its military capabilities and, in the Army's Special Forces units, is creating a highly competent corps of guerrilla and counter-guerrilla fighters. This capability must be quickly matched with the political skills to conduct unconventional warfare at the village level. This will require training in depth and an extraordinarily high level of individual aptitude and competence. Specifically, we require a system of training--both for our own personnel and for those we are aiding--comparable to that for an army officer, a physician or an engineer. A national institute or staff college comparable to those of the Army, Air Force and Navy is needed to provide a center for training of United States and possibly foreign personnel and for elaborating strategic concepts of unconventional warfare and developing practical and effective tactics to meet the operational problems we now face in many parts of the world. Similar institutes should be established jointly with our NATO partners and in the countries lying across the Communist lines of attack.

The Communists have allowed themselves lead times of as much as 10 to 20 years in training revolutionary leaders. One can only hope that the free world yet has time to build the political leadership, both abroad and at home, to meet their threat successfully.